SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners, vs. MA.
and only in their default is the obligation moved to the
CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children
LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO
S. LIM, III, respondents.
The Case
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003,
ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal
support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
The Facts
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents
Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their
children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband
Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of
Chua Giak in what the trial court described “a very compromising situation.”
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide
monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering
Edward and petitioners to “jointly” provide P40,000 monthly support to
respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of
P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability.
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability.
The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and
Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability
x x x to give sufficient support x x x.”
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others,
their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s
income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal
support should be “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” under
Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The
Family Code of the Philippines).
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis
to hold petitioners, as Edward’s parents, liable with him to support
respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of
the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and
their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support
one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article
200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides
that should the person obliged to give support does not
have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other
persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall
provide the necessary support. This is because the
closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the
tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is
imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives
next nearer relatives and so on.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004. Hence, this
petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward
to provide support to respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed
judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability to the amount of monthly support
needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III
only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to
provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners
themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question
of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions
found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority,
petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of
parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension
during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children,
petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends
with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports
this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In
the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of
the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on
Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that
parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they
differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its
concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the
obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and
general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while
parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains
to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension,
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only
upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide
sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary
issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give support in light of the father’s
sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that
grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants
of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order
of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private
respondent is without means to support his son;
neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson's legal support. x x x
(Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-
bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to
give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’
basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for
their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines,
following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe
to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating
extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able
to fill the void.
However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their
descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this
category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately,
Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court
awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to
remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.
Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to
fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati
residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.
The application of Article 204 which provides that — The person
obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family
dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support
are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the
option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future;
however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the
scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal
obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence
amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the
exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004
with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are
liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace
and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with
this ruling.
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, v. MARY ANN P. VILLA
ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA
ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE,
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For review are the Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the
Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
54560. The appellate court modified the Decision dated September 26, 1995
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 15.
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille
are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the
instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land
denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina,
Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in
their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired
when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under
TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on
Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the
spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and
an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family.
Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the
family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the
house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections,
but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears
on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the
four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in
connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the
house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came
home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate
until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police
Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension
and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus,
respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of
Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in
the RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his
own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the
house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina,
examined the titles when they bought the property.
On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein
respondent Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. The sale of lot 8 covered by
TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro Abrille appearing
in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. “E” is void as to
one half or 277.5 square meters representing the
share of plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by
TCT No. [88674] by defendant Pedro Villa Abrille in
the Deed of Sale (Exh. “A”) is valid as to one half or
277.5 square meters of the 555 square meters as one
half belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void
as to the other half or 277.5 square meters as it
belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille who did not sell her
share nor give her consent to the sale.
3. That sale of the house
mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. “A”) is valid as
far as the one half of the house representing the
share of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but
void as to the other half which is the share of plaintiff
Mary Abrille because she did not give her
consent/sign the said sale.
4. The defendants shall jointly pay the
plaintiffs.
 4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos
(P17,000.00) representing the value of the movables
and belonging[s] that were lost when unknown men
unceremoniously and without their knowledge and
consent removed their movables from their house and
brought them to an apartment.
4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P
100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Abrille as moral damages.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to
each of the four children as moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa Abrille – Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille –
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa
Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
exemplary damages by way of example and correction
for the public good.
6. The costs of suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471
in favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia
Ravina is declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674
in favor of said defendants spouses Ravina, together
with the house thereon, is declared null and void.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered to return the
value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No.
88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses
Ravina.
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to
reconvey the lot and house covered by TCT No. 88674
in favor of spouses Pedro and Mary Villa Abrille and to
deliver possession to them.
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise
their rights under Article [450] of the New Civil Code with
respect to the improvements introduced by defendant
spouses Ravina.
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses
Ravina are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs as follows:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) to plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille as moral
damages.
b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages to each of the four children, namely:
Ingrid Villa Abrille, Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa
Abrille and Ingrelyn Villa Abrille.
c) Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) as
exemplary damages by way of example and correction
for the public good.
SO ORDERED.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
filed this petition. Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY
TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA,
TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS
NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY
CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A
RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT
INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE
SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A
RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY
TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
In essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration
that the sale to them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null
and void. However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine:
(1) whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an
exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by
Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-
88674 was the exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him
through barter or exchange. They allege that the subject lot was acquired
by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties.
Allegedly, Pedro and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their
exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472,
respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-
26472 to one Francisca Teh Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita
using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was issued
thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an
exclusive property of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the
exclusive funds or money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides, “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.”
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-
26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by
him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No.
T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired
through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion would
not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired
during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the
house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through
the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is
governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband
and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the
court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the
assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
 disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten
(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the
Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and
void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property,
such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval
of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of
sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and
lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without
Mary Ann’s consent.
On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they
are buyers in good faith. Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot
was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common
fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title.
The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such
property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of title. But
for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of
the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he
inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer
for value in good faith.
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro
and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the
time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary
Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners
believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of
Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale
and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann’s
written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible
and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being
made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to
or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity
to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what
has been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any
contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and
punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, in consonance with
justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s
expense, we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to
petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT
No. T-88674 and the house thereon.
However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim
reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had
ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia
Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the
time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued
introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides
that, “(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.”
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding
damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which
respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves
our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her
children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the
petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to
another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful
home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.” When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform
with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible.
Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that
petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.
WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit.
The Decision dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, v. HON.
ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental
and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The
Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay
to any employee in case of death of the employee’s
legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao,
Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the
following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse,
and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit
covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only
with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.
Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January
2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the
Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during
labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death
benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of
Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union
resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series
of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting the
Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). In a Submission Agreement dated 9
October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. The parties mutually chose Atty.
Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the
dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers,
Replies, and Rejoinders to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that
Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be
covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar
provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan
(Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely
delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was
able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. Dugan’s
child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to
Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died
during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the
representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with
their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which
provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express
provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a
fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for
the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as
legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn
child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding
from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that
was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the
right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was
clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms
used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have
unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA –
the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for
bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the
legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the
employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to
by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate
and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain
its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the
parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted “company
practice.”
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled
to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said
benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the
benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered
employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of
the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements
must be present: (1) there is “death”; (2) such death
must be of employee’s “dependent”; and (3) such
dependent must be “legitimate”.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to
benefit for death and accident insurance as provided
under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the
parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is “death”; (b) such death must be
of employee’s “dependent”; (c) such dependent must
be “legitimate”; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.
 Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an
employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The
fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question
that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent,
unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein
petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano
the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave
pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or
a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however,
is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to
faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting
Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits
because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a
fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the
CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal
person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.
Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted
that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua
non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008,
affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate
court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s]
exposition on the legal sense in which the term “death” is
used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same
is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant
of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is
intended to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality
of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive
upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of
premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a “death” as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to
the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands
in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed
a narrow and technical significance to the term “death of
a legitimate dependent” as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no
experience of “death” to speak of. The Court, however,
does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be
equated with anything less than “loss of human life”,
especially for the expectant parents. In this light,
bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to
assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family,
extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn
child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the
certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point.
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20,
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental
Steel].
In a Resolution dated 9 May 2008, the
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues
that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal
meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can
die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave
under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be
of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee.
The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section
4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who
could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper
legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of
Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and
unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms “death” and “dependent” as used in the CBA. If
the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is
no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor
the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and
other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides
that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article
41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that
civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in
relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent
in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts
with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It
is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide
at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro
die. and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183
SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the When conflicting
CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on interests of labor and capital are
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power to be weighed on the scales of
or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an unborn child social justice, the heavier
is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 influence of the latter should be
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s counter-balanced by sympathy
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in and compassion the law must
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married accord the underprivileged
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did worker.
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and
avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. (1991)], we declared:

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation
to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, we have expounded on who is a
legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel, we identified an illegitimate child to be as
follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights
of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
Any doubt
concerning the rights of labor
should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice
policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20
November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño,
which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited

jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his
wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the
fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA,
i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and
other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should
have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are

granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the
said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot
be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement

leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper
Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission, we pronounced:

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR v REY C. ALCAZAR
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision dated 24
May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the
Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City,
Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by
petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their
wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s
abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October
2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked
as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did
not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call
respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a
half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that
respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent
arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living
with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the
Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and
respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s Return dated 3 October 2002, a summons,
together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served upon respondent on
30 September 2002.
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion
to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant
to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27
November 2002 an Order directing the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit
a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman
(De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an
investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but
respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also
noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were
taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether
petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of
the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag
(Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the
allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s
testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following
psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and careful
analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be
free from any underlying personality aberration
neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits,
which may possibly impede her normal functioning
(sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned
arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden
breakdown of marital life between petitioner and
respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed
personality disorder that the respondent is harboring,
making him psychologically incapacitated to properly
assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of
obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the
respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a
disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be
grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable
by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive
pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need
for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by
early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts,
as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g.
exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be
recognized as superior without commensurate
achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of
unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal
love
3. believes that he or she is “special” and
unique and can only be understood by, or should
associate with, other special or high status people
(institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e.,
unreasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her
expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes
advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize
or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes
that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or
attitudes.
The root cause of respondent’s personality
disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years
with predisposing psychosocial factors that
influence[d] his development. It was recounted that
respondent is the first child of his mother’s second
family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation
composed his immediate environment in his growing
up years. Respondent had undergone a severe
longing for attention from his father who had been
 unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was
left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they
were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to
validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked
the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a
pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a
cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything
other people offer is “consumed.” Hence, he is unable to
develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need.
There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving
others.
The psychological incapacity of the
respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as
it already existed long before he entered into marriage.
Since it already started early in life, it is deeply
engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral
part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such
to be permanent and incurable.
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond
repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic)
ceased to exist and have their different life priorities.
Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic).
The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity,
authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help
and support, and commitment, did not and will no
lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of
the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned
recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent.
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence.
Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of
petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no longer present
evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s
Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance
that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the
acts of the respondent in not communicating with
petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he
returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage
do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception of
their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to
deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by
the RTC in an Order dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision dated 24 May 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,
the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at
least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or
knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At
most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal
separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT
IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.
At the outset, it must be noted that the
Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC
was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically
incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code
refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on
the part of the spouses to perform the complete
act of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of
a marriage may be on the part of the husband or
of the wife and may be caused by a physical or
structural defect in the anatomy of one of the
parties or it may be due to chronic illness and
inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part
from psychophysical conditions. It may be
caused by psychogenic causes, where such
mental block or disturbance has the result of
making the spouse physically incapable of
performing the marriage act.
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his
marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-
examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no
physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for
annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was,
therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be
gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on
the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before
the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance. But even said
reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Although this rule is not a
hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of
counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of
his client’s substantive rights, petitioner failed to convince us that such
exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the
Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the
evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
 In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
“psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the
nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts
and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the “time of the celebration” of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence
presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain
a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s
testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after
their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the
Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and
that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondent’s psychological state.
Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and
hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to
personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for
examination despite Tayag’s invitation. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s
psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her
evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of
information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences
during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said
conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the “pattern of behavior”
that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder
made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations
as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just
to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that
such psychological disorder renders him “truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers
to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or
detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are
not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love
be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the
marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple
remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited
remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where
no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or
where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the
obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a
marriage.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As
we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
 Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the document entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which Dominique, during his
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to AUTOBIOGRAPHY
assume. x x x. I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO.
TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere “irreconcilable THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. I RESIDE AT
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN,
incapacity. TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR
FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY
null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
a Manifestation and Motion dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner AQUINO. x x x.
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is xxxx
living-in with another woman named “Sally.”
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED
JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
essential obligations of the marital state. PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER
IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL. (Emphasis and
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of underscoring supplied)
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission By letter dated November 11, 2005, the
to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. registration of the child’s name in this wise:
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that 7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004
respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 [“An Act
Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending
grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. as the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’”]) provides that:

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding
herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision
and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s
Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the
Father 7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the
father if a public document is executed by the father, either at the
back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a
private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname
of the father, provided the registration is supported by the
following documents:

a. AUSF
b. Consent of the child, if 18
years old and over at
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ the time of the filing
“AQUINO,” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ v RONALD of the document.
PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, c. Any two of the following
documents showing
clearly the paternity
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San between the father
Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas and the child:
Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. 1. Employment
Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, records
Rizal. 2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, membership in any organization
or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s 5. Statement of Assets and
parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Liability
“Aquino” at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.

6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s
surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in
support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to
Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed,
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his
Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of father because he was born out of wedlock and the
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that
 father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child
(either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 –
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or
the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against respondent
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to
Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia,
the denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation
of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255, which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes
an admission of paternity in a “private handwritten instrument” within the
contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of
summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the
circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed
her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his
yet unborn child. She offered Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit
“A”) as her documentary evidence-in-chief. Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph
Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie’s declarations.
By Decision of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the
complaint “for lack of cause of action” as the Autobiography was unsigned,
citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines “private handwritten document”
through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the
handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY
IN A “PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT”
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF
THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS
FATHER’S SURNAME. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument
containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him.
They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the
Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be “duly signed” by
the father is void as it “unduly expanded” the earlier-quoted provision of
Article 176 of the Family Code.
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding
that Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography contains a “clear and
unmistakable” recognition of the child’s paternity.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that respondent’s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It
further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography “merely acknowledged
Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her
womb.”
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter
had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a
public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of
these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
necessary.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,
explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the
child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code
which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a
written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in
Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series
of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand” the
import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to
hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s
birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably
handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is
corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father
Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose
hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s
paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that
“JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.”
In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.
— The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may
be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books
or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has
to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil
Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective,
the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a
child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father
was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on
various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent
record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures
are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted
statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by
him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-
law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-
lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died
on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave
birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit
to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance
with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied
by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
“paramount consideration” in resolving questions affecting him. Article 3(1)
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration. (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x.” Too, “(t)he State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.”
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the
stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow
him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his
birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname
of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of
petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and
record the same in the Register of Births.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FERVENTINO U. TANGO,
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated November
28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76387 which denied
the Republic’s appeal from the Order2 dated July 23, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceeding No. 357.
The trial court had declared the wife of respondent Ferventino U. Tango
(Ferventino), Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively dead under Article
413 of the Family Code.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married 4 in civil rites before
then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Maria’s relatives
witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to her relationship with
Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together and had been intimate
once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving
for the United States of America (USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however,
that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA. In the event that
said petition is denied, she promised to return to the Philippines to live with
him. On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped
responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria
wrote him. He claims to have forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from the
latter’s uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las Piñas, Ferventino learned that even
Maria’s relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though,
their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without
any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition 5 dated
October 1, 2001 before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive
death of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8, 2002, nobody
entered any opposition. On July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented evidence ex
parte and testified in court about the details of his search. On July 23, 2002,
Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V.
VILLARBA, wife of FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the
meaning of Article 41 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. 6
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to
file a Notice of Appeal.7 Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo SG.
Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of the case transmitted to
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTC’s Order. It held that Maria’s
absence for 14 years without information about her location despite diligent
search by Ferventino was sufficient to support a well-founded belief of her
death. The appellate court observed that neither the OSG nor the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino presented on
trial. It noted, in particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of
Ferventino’s basis to engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead.
Hence, in a Decision dated November 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied
the Republic’s appeal in this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the July 23, 2002
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Spec. Proc. No.
357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on the
following two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE
BY HIS FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN
SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, IS HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE
VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY MAY BE
CONSIDERED IN EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF
RESPONDENT’S FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENT’S
ABSENT SPOUSE IS PROBABLY DEAD.9
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the testimony
of respondent Ferventino is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent
Ferventino has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his
absent spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate court’s holding that
the absence of respondent’s wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient
basis to entertain a well-founded belief that she is dead. The OSG
discounts respondent’s testimony, on the steps he took to find Maria, as
hearsay because none of the persons who purportedly helped in his search
testified in court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a
detailed account of his efforts to track down Maria. According to Capt. Aris,
he went over the Seattle phone directory for Maria’s name and inquired
about her from the registrar’s office in Seattle, but both efforts proved to be
in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of respondent’s
testimony during trial. Instead, it invokes Constitutional provisions that
advocate the state policy of preserving marital institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondent’s counsel, Atty. Richie R. Regala,
manifested to this Court his intent to withdraw as counsel for respondent.
According to Atty. Regala, he received a letter by which respondent
expressed a desire to withdraw from the proceeding. 10 In view of this, the
Court issued a Resolution11 on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the
filing of respondent’s comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of
Appeals had also issued a Resolution12 dated October 15, 2003 submitting
the case for decision and ordering its re-raffling for respondent’s failure to
file an appellee’s brief. In other words, apart from the verified petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of Maria dated October 1, 2001, which
respondent filed before the Ligao City RTC, he has not submitted any other
pleading in connection with the petition.
Respondent’s apparent lack of desire to pursue the proceedings
notwithstanding, the Court is inclined to rule against the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner
without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the
rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124
and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course,
it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain
cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum.13 From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party
may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.141avvphi1
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it
filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for
certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and
ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no
means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of
the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and
treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it
failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not
appealable.15
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at
this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the
trial court had long become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 16 In light of the foregoing, it
would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by
petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.17 None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL, Respondents.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a
complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-
33. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the
criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners.
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay
damages. The dispositive portion reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and against
defendant ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos as moral damages, five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, another five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos as exemplary damages and the cost of suit.2
Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this
Court. It became final and executory on 5 March 1992.
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of
which provides:
Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the
defendant Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the
sum in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), Philippine
Currency, representing the moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside
from your lawful fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ into
court within sixty (60) days from date, with your proceedings endorsed
hereon.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this
execution and lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the
lands and buildings of said defendant you make the said sum of money in
the manner required by the Rules of Court, and make return of your
proceedings with this writ within sixty (60) days from date.3
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy
was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125322.
On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit
of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy
sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. The
auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder.
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the
husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of
sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the
deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants,
now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real
property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the
notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was
valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a "very low price" of P51,685.00,
whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The
case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution.
Citing De Leon v. Salvador,4 petitioners claimed that respondent should
have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and
which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and
notice of sheriff’s sale.
In an Order5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent’s
complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the implementation
of the writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought before
the court issuing the writ of execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies
open to the plaintiff, if he feels that the property being levied on belongs to
him and not to the judgment debtor. The first remedy is to file a third-party
claim. If he fails to do this, a right is reserved to him to vindicate his claim
over the property by any proper action. But certainly, this is not the proper
action reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate his claim over the property in
question to be ventilated before this court. As earlier stated, this case
should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC Bacoor as it was that court
which issued the writ of execution.6
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch
21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 21 for further proceedings.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence,
the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals.
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or
when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper
remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for certiorari may
be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.8
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of the
judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the conjugal
property subject to execution. The alleged error therefore is an error of
judgment which is a proper subject of an appeal.
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the case
should still be dismissed on substantive grounds.
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its judgment to
the exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution and all incidents
thereof, in line with De Leon v. Salvador. Petitioners insist that respondent,
who is the husband of the judgment debtor, is not the "third party"
contemplated in Section 17 (now Section 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
hence a separate action need not be filed. Furthermore, petitioners assert that
the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
and cited authorities to the effect that the husband is liable for the tort
committed by his wife.
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper
interpretation of Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and
serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the
judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the
court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of
the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same
shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for
damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the
bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his
claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee
from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party
claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines,
or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required,
and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the
levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable
therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the
National Treasurer out of such funds as may be appropriated for the
purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a
stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ
by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an independent
separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising
from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is
the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in
the court that issued the writ.101awphi1.zw+
A third-party claim must be filed a person other than the judgment debtor or
his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party
claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the
suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other
spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character
of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of
Appeals,11 which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,12
this Court held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed
a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an
obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.13
On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals 14 and Sy v. Discaya,15 the
Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the
writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an
independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or
paraphernal property.lawphil.net
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122
of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability
of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the
civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.17In Guadalupe v.
Tronco,18 this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party
complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a
judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife
is proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is
chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and
jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the
case to Branch 21 for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.