CIVIL PROCEDURE

1) Gonzales vs. JGH Land Nov 10, 2015

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015

MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES, Petitioners, v. GJH

LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A.
STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI
II, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a petition for review on certiorari,1 from the Orders
dated April 17, 20122 and July 9, 20123 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 276 (Branch 276) dismissing Civil Case No. 11-077 for lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

On August 4, 2011, petitioners Manuel Luis C. Gonzales4 and Francis Martin D. Gonzales
(petitioners) filed a Complaint5 for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order,
Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc. (formerly known as S.J. Land, Inc.), Chang
Hwan Jang, Sang Rak Kim, Mariechu N. Yap, and Atty. Roberto P. Mallari II6 (respondents) before
the RTC of Muntinlupa City seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they
purportedly bought from S.J. Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. Essentially, petitioners alleged
that the subscriptions for the said shares were already paid by them in full in the books of S.J.
Land, Inc.,7 but were nonetheless offered for sale on July 29, 2011 to the corporation's
stockholders,8 hence, their plea for injunction.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 11-077 and raffled to Branch 276, which is not a
Special Commercial Court. On August 9, 2011, said branch issued a temporary restraining
order,9 and later, in an Order10 dated August 24, 2011, granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

After filing their respective answers11 to the complaint, respondents filed a motion to dismiss12 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, pointing out that the case involves an
intra-corporate dispute and should, thus, be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court
of Muntinlupa City.13

The RTC Ruling

In an Order14 dated April 17, 2012, Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss filed by
respondents. It found that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute that is within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs designated as Special Commercial Courts. It pointed out
that the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (Branch 256) was specifically designated by the
Court as the Special Commercial Court, hence, Branch 276 had no jurisdiction over the case and
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction on the matter, including the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.15 Accordingly, it dismissed the case.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,16 arguing that they filed the case with
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City which assigned the same to Branch
276 by raffle.17 As the raffle was beyond their control, they should not be made to suffer the
consequences of the wrong assignment of the case, especially after paying the filing fees in the
amount of P235,825.00 that would be for naught if the dismissal is upheld.18 They further
maintained that the RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes under Republic Act No.
(RA) 8799,19 but since the Court selected specific branches to hear and decide such suits, the
case must, at most, be transferred or raffled off to the proper branch.20

In an Order21 dated July 9, 2012, Branch 276 denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that
it has no authority or power to order the transfer of the case to the proper Special Commercial
Court, citing Calleja v. Panday22 (Calleja); hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Branch 276 of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized Civil Case No. 11-077 as
a commercial case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute,23 considering that it relates to
petitioners' averred rights over the shares of stock offered for sale to other stockholders, having
paid the same in full. Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the
suit between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and
pertains to the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code
and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation,24 hence, intra-corporate,
which should be heard by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No.
03-03-03-SC25 dated June 17, 2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.

The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial
case - such as the instant intra-corporate dispute -has been properly filed in the
official station of the designated Special Commercial Court but is, however, later
wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that station.

As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular
case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise
of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the
orders issued from time to time by the Court.26 In Lozada v. Bracewell,27 it was recently held
that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law,
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 528 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A29 was
transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of
general jurisdiction. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. Powers and Functionsof the Commission. - x x x

x x x x

5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be
resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000
until finally disposed. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

The legal attribution of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction stems from
Section 19 (6), Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,30 known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; x x x x
cralawlawlibrary

As enunciated in Durisol Philippines, Inc. v. CA:31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of general jurisdiction. All
cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction
of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary

To clarify, the word "or" in Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally used by the legislature
to particularize the fact that the phrase "the Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the
phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the
cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts. This
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

interpretation is supported by San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council,33 wherein the Court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[T]he word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes
it the same significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes
interpretative or expository of the preceding word.34cralawlawlibrary

Further, as may be gleaned from the following excerpt of the Congressional

deliberations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Senator [Raul S.] Roco: x x x.

x x x x

x x x. The first major departure is as regards the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has been authorized under this proposal to reorganize itself.
As an administrative agency, we strengthened it and at the same time we take away the quasi-
judicial functions. The quasi-judicial functions are now given back to the courts of
general jurisdiction - the Regional Trial Court, except for two categories of cases.

In the case of corporate disputes, only those that are now submitted for final determination of
the SEC will remain with the SEC. So, all those cases, both memos of the plaintiff and the
defendant, that have been submitted for resolution will continue. At the same time, cases
involving rehabilitation, bankruptcy, suspension of payments and receiverships that were filed
before June 30, 2000 will continue with the SEC. in other words, we are avoiding the possibility,
upon approval of this bill, of people filing cases with the SEC, in manner of speaking, to select
their court.35

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

Therefore, one must be disabused of the notion that the transfer of jurisdiction was made only
in favor of particular RTC branches, and not the RTCs in general.

Consistent with the foregoing, history depicts that when the transfer of SEC cases to the RTCs
was first implemented, they were transmitted to the Executive Judges of the RTCs for raffle
between or among its different branches, unless a specific branch has been designated as
a Special Commercial Court, in which instance, the cases were transmitted to said
branch.36 It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court designated certain RTC branches to
try and decide said SEC cases37 without, however, providing for the transfer of the cases already
distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court
issued SC Administrative Circular No. 08-200138 directing the transfer of said cases to the
designated courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M.
No. 03-03-03-SC consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property
courts39 in one RTC branch in a particular locality, i.e., the Special Commercial Court, to
streamline the court structure and to promote expediency.40 Accordingly, the RTC branch
so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as well as those involving violations of
intellectual property rights, which were, thereupon, required to be filed in the Office of the Clerk
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Courts, to

wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this
Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002 all issued in
A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC; (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c)
Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be
CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual
Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x

4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the
Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court;41

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)cralawlawlibrary

It is important to mention that the Court's designation of Special Commercial Courts was made
in line with its constitutional authority to supervise the administration of all courts as provided
under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.cralawlawlibrary

The objective behind the designation of such specialized courts is to promote expediency and
efficiency in the exercise of the RTCs' jurisdiction over the cases enumerated under
Section 5 of PD 902-A. Such designation has nothing to do with the statutory conferment of
jurisdiction to all RTCs under RA 8799 since in the first place, the Court cannot enlarge, diminish,
or dictate when jurisdiction shall be removed, given that the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion jurisdiction is, as a general rule, a matter of legislative
prerogative.42 Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

x x x x
cralawlawlibrary

Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the
Clerk of Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special
Commercial Court, in accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time
of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa City acquired jurisdiction over the subject
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

matter or the nature of the action.43 Unfortunately, the commercial case was wrongly
raffled to a regular branch, e.g., Branch 276, instead of being assigned44to the sole
Special Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This
error may have been caused by a reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for
Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and Damages,"45 which, however, contradicts
and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that clearly make out an intra-
corporate dispute:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

16. To the surprise of MLCG and FMDG, however, in two identical letters both dated 13 May 2011,
under the letterhead of GJH Land, Inc., Yap, now acting as its President, Jang and Kim demanded
payment of supposed unpaid subscriptions of MLCG and FMDG amounting to P10,899,854.30 and
P2,625,249.41, respectively.
16.1 Copies of the letters dated 13 May 2011 are attached hereto and made integral parts hereof
as Annexes "J" and "K", repectively.
17. On 29 July 2011, MLCG and FMDG received an Offer Letter addressed to stockholders of GJH
Land, Inc. from Yap informing all stockholders that GJH Land, Inc. is now offering for sale the
unpaid shares of stock of MLCG and FMDG. The same letter states that the offers to purchase
these shares will be opened on 10 August 2011 with payments to be arranged by deposit to the
depository bank of GJH Land, Inc.
17.1 A copy of the undated Offer Letter is attached hereto and made and made an integral part
hereof as Annex "L".
18. The letter of GJH Land, Inc. through Yap, is totally without legal and factual basis because as
evidenced by the Deeds of Assignment signed and certified by Yap herself, all the S.J. Land, Inc.
shares acquired by MLCG and FMDG have been fully paid in the books of S.J. Land, Inc.

19. With the impending sale of the alleged unpaid subscriptions on 10 August 2011, there is
now a clear danger that MLCG and FMDG would be deprived of these shares without
legal and factual basis.

20. Furthermore, if they are deprived of these shares through the scheduled sale, both MLCG and
FMDG would suffer grave and irreparable damage incapable of pecuniary estimation.

21. For this reason, plaintiffs now come to the Honorable Court for injunctive relief so that after
trial on the merits, a permanent injunction should be issued against the defendants preventing
them from selling the shares of the plaintiffs, there being no basis for such sale.46cralawlawlibrary

According to jurisprudence, "it is not the caption but the allegations in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the basis of which such pleading
may be legally characterized."47 However, so as to avert any future confusion, the Court requires
henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and the body,
which parameters are defined in the dispositive portion of this Decision.

Going back to the case at bar, the Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure - that is,
an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction
which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of
action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated
Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e.,Branch 256.

Note that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case
has multiple special commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge,
after re-docketing the same as a commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling
among the said special branches.

Meanwhile, if the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special

Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region.48 Upon referral, the RTC to which the case
was referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC
has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special
branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts,
raffle off the case among those special branches.

In all the above-mentioned scenarios, any difference regarding the applicable docket fees should
be duly accounted for. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and
any excess, refunded.

At this juncture, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the RTC mistakenly relied on
the Calleja case to support its ruling. In Calleja, an intra-corporate dispute49 among officers of a
private corporation with principal address at Goa, Camarines Sur, was filed with the RTC of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 instead of the RTC of Naga City, which is the official station of
the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur. Consequently, the Court set aside
the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur's order to transfer the case to the RTC of Naga City and
dismissed the complaint considering that it was filed before a court which, having no internal
branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, had no jurisdiction over those kinds of
actions, i.e., intra-corporate disputes. Calleja involved two different RTCs, i.e., the RTC of
San Jose, Camarines Sur and the RTC of Naga City, whereas the instant case only involves
one RTC, i.e., the RTC of Muntinlupa City, albeit involving two different branches of the same
court, i.e.,Branches 256 and 276. Hence, owing to the variance in the facts attending, it was then
improper for the RTC to rely on the Calleja ruling.

Besides, the Court observes that the fine line that distinguishes subject matter jurisdiction and
exercise of jurisdiction had been clearly blurred in Calleja. Harkening back to the statute that had
conferred subject matter jurisdiction, two things are apparently clear: (a) that the SEC's subject
matter jurisdiction over intra-corporate cases under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A was transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction, i.e., the appropriate Regional Trial Courts;
and (b) the designated branches of the Regional Trial Court, as per the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court, shall exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - x x x

xxxx
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court
in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases, x x x.cralawlawlibrary

In contrast, the appropriate jurisprudential reference to this case would be Tan v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.,50which involves a criminal complaint for violation of intellectual property rights filed before
the RTC of Cebu City but was raffled to a regular branch thereof (Branch 21), and not to a Special
Commercial Court. As it turned out, the regular branch subsequently denied the private
complainant's motion to transfer the case to the designated special court of the same RTC, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA reversed the regular branch and, consequently, ordered
the transfer of the case to the designated special court at that time (Branch 9). The Court,
affirming the CA, declared that the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter. In view,
however, of the designation of another court as the Special Commercial Court in the
interim (Branch 11 of the same Cebu City RTC), the Court accordingly ordered the transfer of the
case and the transmittal of the records to said Special Commercial Court instead.51Similarly, the
transfer of the present intra-corporate dispute from Branch 276 to Branch 256 of the
same RTC of Muntinlupa City, subject to the parameters above-discussed is proper
and will further the purposes stated in A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC of attaining a speedy
and efficient administration of justice.

For further guidance, the Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the
inverse situation of ordinary civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly
raffled to its branches designated as Special Commercial Courts. In such a scenario,
the ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing
as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then order the
raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under
existing internal rules, and the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any
difference. Unlike the limited assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches
designated as Special Commercial Courts in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of an
ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is permissible due to the fact that a particular
branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 129.52To restate, the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended
as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the
court's exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an
internal Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of
procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the
personnel thereof.53 Certainly, an internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the
commanding statute. But as a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial
Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to the court's exercise of jurisdiction, which, as
first discussed, is distinct from the concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC's
general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule
streamlining court procedure.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

In fine, Branch 276's dismissal of Civil Case No. 11-077 is set aside and the transfer of said case
to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court of the same RTC of Muntinlupa City,
under the parameters above-explained, is hereby ordered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated April 17, 2012 and July 9, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Civil Case No. 11-077 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 11-077 is REFERRED to the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City for re-docketing as a commercial case. Thereafter, the
Executive Judge shall ASSIGNsaid case to Branch 256, the sole designated Special Commercial
Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is ORDERED to resolve the case with reasonable
dispatch. In this regard, the Clerk of Court of said RTC shall DETERMINE the appropriate amount
of docket fees and, in so doing, ORDER the payment of any difference or, on the other hand,
refund any excess.

Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following guidelines shall be
observed:

1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the
proper courses of action are as follows:
1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case
shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter,
assigned to the sole special branch;

1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case
shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter,
raffled off among those special branches; and

1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case
shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within
the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re- docket
the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as
a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has
multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among those
special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated
as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC
(including its designated special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising
general jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under existing rules.

3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of
any difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any
excess, refunded.

4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the
action's nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion
or by order of the court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due
rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in application.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.cralawlawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

2) Garcia vs. Drilon June 25, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the
women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts
to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities
of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests
for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though,
that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to
his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged
her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows
up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found
by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the
hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's
job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour
and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and
J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely
draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for
by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24,
2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses,
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner
(private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall
be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from
her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help
and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a
house for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than
2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court
by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under
pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque,
the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did
not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and
returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings
of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after
the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove
things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture,
equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect
contempt of Court;
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the
latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol
and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted
to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school.
On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at
the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent.
This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and
her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag
in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another,

acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise

communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or

agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three
brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of
the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools
of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the
children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and
the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00

for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00

and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by
J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those
in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini
St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets
or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served
a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix
her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie
that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these
properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the
TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial
court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said
motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing
the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the
civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the
civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT,
THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A.
9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO
THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction
in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section
5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before
the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which
he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand,
is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim,
cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity
of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality
of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing,
it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form
of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of
the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court,
he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was
improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and
summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle
a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who
seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as
to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now,
in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put
the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is
not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence
and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups
have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children
or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of
which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female
partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator
respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that
we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam
sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade,
of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all
be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation
for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure
that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the
domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women,
the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that
children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be
enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded.
Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men,
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we
should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as
the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and
women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of
both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would
be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone.
That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I
will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr.
President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact,
it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen
14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my
heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update
that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill
but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment,
as amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based
violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers,
providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions
and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining
more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW
is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against
women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch
of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I
quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule
of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under
the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that
one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than
their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike
down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke
her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that
the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than
the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims
of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of
every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the
very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions
or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form
of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of
all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep.
Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of
total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases
out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for
the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases.
xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of
2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more
than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence

against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200

2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lasciviousn 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ess

Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018 1,588
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28

RA 9262 218 924 9,974 9,021
9 7 9 5

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinag
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
e

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 4 8

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who
had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11%
of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely
to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their
spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical
or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited
to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized,
but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible
and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by
then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape
or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender
and then of the legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor,
the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge
Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed"
and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices
and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that
R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take
all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense
will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and
the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August
5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines
on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality
with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of
men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child

as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity
by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the

use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess
at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish"
are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to
be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving
her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should
be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus,
the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is
a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings,
is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five
days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he
chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30
days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain
that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest
that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party,
or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort
him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging

mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for
an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies
that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order
of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with
the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. 1âwphi1 A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted
upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in
his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence
of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall
be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of
acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence
and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence
of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women
for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it
should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

3) Heirs of Bautista vs. Lindo March 10, 2014

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, NAMELY: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA AND

ZOEY G. BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINA LINDO; AND
HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN, NAMELY: MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA
CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN AND CORSINO DAQUIGAN, REBECCA
QUIAMCO AND ANDRES QUIAMCO, ROMULO LORICA AND DELIA LORICA, GEORGE
CAJES AND LAURA CAJES, MELIDA BA�EZ AND FRANCISCO BA�EZ, MELANIE
GOFREDO, GERVACIO CAJES AND ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA AND VERGINIA
SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM, PEDRO M. SAM AND LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ AND
MINA MENDEZ, HELEN M. BURTON AND LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO AND
BIENVENIDA JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN, LEO MATIGA AND ALICIA MATIGA,
FLORENCIO ACEDO JR., AND LYLA VALERIO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the April 25, 2013 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 as well as its Order of July 3, 2013 denying
reconsideration.

The Facts

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner�s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land

located in Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
(1572) P-6144. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees,
herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months later,
OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in
favor of the vendees.1crallawlibrary

Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No.
1798,2anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act� No. (CA) 141,
otherwise known as the �Public Land Act,� which reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 119.� Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs,
within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches,
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

as defenses.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner
Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).

Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty
square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and
withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the
RTC in its Decision dated January 27, 2011, the fallo of which reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, a DECISION is hereby rendered based on the above-quoted Compromise

Agreement and the parties are enjoined to strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the
same.

SO ORDERED.3

Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 dated February 4, 2013, alleging that the
complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they
asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred
pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its
assessed value.� Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the
RTCs over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where
the assessed value is more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000
jurisdictional ceiling.

RTC Ruling5

Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of
the subject property exceeds 20 thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was
that the total and full refund of the purchase price of the property is PhP 16,500. This omission
was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that in real actions, jurisdictional
amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction
over the case.

With respect to the belated filing of the motion, the RTC, citing Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc.
v. Kemper Insurance Company,6 held that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be filed
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.� The
dispositive portion of the assailed Order reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Repurchase, Consignation, with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.7crallawlibrary

Assignment of Errors
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now seek recourse before this
Court with the following assigned errors:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN ADMITTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED
FEBRUARY 4, 2013, BELATEDLY FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CASE.

II

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE FOR
REPURCHASE IS A REAL ACTION.8crallawlibrary

The Issue

Stated differently, the issue for the Court�s resolution is: whether or not the RTC erred in
granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

Arguments

Petitioners argue that respondents belatedly filed their Motion to Dismiss and are now estopped
from seeking the dismissal of the case, it having been filed nine (9) years after the filing of the
complaint and after they have actively participated in the proceedings. Additionally, they allege
that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it
being founded on privity of contract between the parties. According to petitioners, what they seek
is the enforcement of their right to repurchase the subject property under Section 119 of CA 141.

Respondents, for their part, maintain that since the land is no longer devoted to agriculture, the
right of repurchase under said law can no longer be availed of, citing Santana v.
Mari�as.9 Furthermore, they suggest that petitioners intend to resell the property for a higher
profit, thus, the attempt to repurchase. This, according to respondents, goes against the policy
and is not in keeping with the spirit of CA 141 which is the preservation of the land gratuitously
given to patentees by the State as a reward for their labor in cultivating the property. Also, the
Deed of Absolute Sale presented in evidence by Bautista was unilaterally executed by him and
was not signed by respondents. Lastly, respondents argue that repurchase is a real action capable
of pecuniary estimation.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129,
which reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. � Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which
provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in civil cases. � Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x x

3)��� Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney�s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners� predecessor, Alfredo
R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right
of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.

The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.10� In this regard, the Court, in Russell v.
Vestil,11 wrote that �in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought.� If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.�� But where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.� These cases are cognizable
exclusively by RTCs.12crallawlibrary

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary

estimation, viz:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. Actions for specific performance;

2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;13crallawlibrary
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.14

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.

The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free
patent.� While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject
to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance
pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of
the deed of sale as prescribed by law.� It is basic that the law is deemed written into every
contract.15� Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law
which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties.16 Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to
enforce.� That is precisely what he did.� He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by
law to recover the lot subject of free patent.� Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific
performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific
performance.� Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

Respondents argue that Bautista�s action is one involving title to or possession of real property
or any interests therein and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is
lodged with the MTC.� They rely on Sec. 33 of BP 129.

Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (PhP 20,000)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 50,000) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney�s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots
he sold to respondents.� Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not
the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case.� This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of
the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to
and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119
of CA 141.� The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy
sought.� Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the
property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.

Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein
which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total
selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of
respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water.� This is because respondents have
actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their position,
and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following
the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the complaint,
actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence, and invoking
its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court.18crallawlibrary

Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss--it having been filed nine
(9) years from the filing of the complaint--respondents actively participated in the proceedings
through the following acts:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction19 dated September 29,
1994 whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for unpaid
survey accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP 3,000
per daily appearance by way of attorney�s fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP
100,000 by way of exemplary damages, and costs of suit;

2. By participating in Pre-trial;

3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence;20crallawlibrary

4. By presenting their witness;21 and

5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.22crallawlibrary

Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC�s authority by
asking for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial
court. Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should
be, considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the
action.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.� The April 25,
2013 and July 3, 2013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon, Davao Oriental is ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-021.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

4) Lu vs. Lu YM, Sr. GR 153690 Feb 15, 2011

EN BANC

DAVID LU, G.R. No. 153690

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU PERALTA,
YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU BERSAMIN,
YM, KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & DEL CASTILLO,
LUYM DEVELOPMENT ABAD,
CORPORATION, VILLARAMA, JR.,
Respondents. PEREZ,
x ------------------------------- x MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU
YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU
YM, KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & G.R. No. 157381
LUYM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

DAVID LU,
Respondent.
x ------------------------------- x
Promulgated:

February 15, 2011

 CIVIL PROCEDURE

JOHN LU YM and LUDO & LUYM

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 170889
- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS OF CEBU CITY(FORMER
TWENTIETH DIVISION), DAVID LU,
ROSA GO, SILVANO LUDO & CL
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By Decision of August 26, 2008, the Court[1] unanimously disposed of the three present petitions
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381
are DENIED for being moot and academic; while the petition in G.R. No. 170889
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Status Quo Order dated January
23, 2006 is hereby LIFTED.

The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 and to
resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED[,][2]

which Decision was, on motion for reconsideration, the Court voting 4-1,[3] reversed by Resolution
of August 4, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

John Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation is GRANTED. The
Decision of this Court dated August 26, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The Complaint in SRC Case No. 021-CEB, now on appeal with the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163, is DISMISSED.

All interlocutory matters challenged in these consolidated petitions are DENIED for
being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.[4]

David Lus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc was
denied by minute Resolution of September 23, 2009.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Following his receipt on October 19, 2009 of the minute Resolution, David Lu personally filed on
October 30, 2009 a Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the
Court En Banc. On even date, he filed through registered mail an Amended Second Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc. And on November 3, 2009,
he filed a Motion for Leave to File [a] Motion for Clarification[, and the] Second Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc. He later also filed a
Supplement to Second Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss dated January 6, 2010.

John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym Development Corporation (LLDC), meanwhile, filed with leave a
Motion[5] for the Issuance of an Entry of Judgment of February 2, 2010, which merited an
Opposition from David Lu.

In compliance with the Courts Resolution of January 11, 2010, Kelly Lu Ym, Victor Lu Ym and
Paterno Lu Ym, Jr. filed a Comment/Opposition of March 20, 2010, while John Lu Ym and LLDC
filed a Consolidated Comment of March 25, 2010, a Supplement thereto of April 20, 2010, and a
Manifestation of May 24, 2010.

The present cases were later referred to the Court en banc by Resolution of October 20, 2010.

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Share
Issue, Receivership and Dissolution filed on August 14, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and
LLDC.

By Decision of March 1, 2004, Branch 12 of the RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling the
issuance of the shares of stock subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than par
value, and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of LLDC. The appeal of the trial courts
Decision remains pending with the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163.

Several incidents arising from the complaint reached the Court through the present three
petitions.

In G.R. No. 153690 wherein David, et al. assailed the appellate courts resolutions dismissing
their complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate of non-forum shopping and
consequently annulling the placing of the subject corporation under receivership pendente lite,
the Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008, found the issue to have been mooted by the admission
by the trial court of David et al.s Amended Complaint, filed by them pursuant to the trial courts
order to conform to the requirements of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies.

Since an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends, the original complaint
of David, et al. was deemed withdrawn from the records.

The Court noted in G.R. No. 153690 that both parties admitted the mootness of the issue
and that the trial court had already rendered a decision on the merits of the case. It added
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

that the Amended Complaint stands since Lu Ym father and sons availed of an improper mode
(via an Urgent Motion filed with this Court) to assail the admission of the Amended Complaint.

In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate courts resolution
restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership order which
was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008
resolved that the issue was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial courts
decision on the merits. The motion having been filed ancillary to the main action, which main
action was already decided on the merits by the trial court, the Court held that there was nothing
more to enjoin.

G.R. No. 170889 involved the denial by the appellate court of Lu Ym father and sons application
in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 for a writ of preliminary injunction. By August 26, 2008 Decision, the
Court dismissed the petition after finding no merit on their argument which they raised for
the first time in their motion for reconsideration before the appellate court of lack of jurisdiction
for non-payment of the correct RTC docket fees.

As reflected early on, the Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009, reconsidered
its position on the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case for David Lu, et al.s failure to pay the correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory
matters and incidents subject of the present petitions must consequently be denied.

Taking Cognizance of the Present Incidents

The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) states that the Court en banc shall act on the
following matters and cases:

(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;

(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty
or reclusion perpetua;

(c) cases raising novel questions of law;

(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;

(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one year, or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;

(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in
the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of
attorneys, or the lifting of a judges suspension or a lawyers suspension from the
practice of law;

(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice,
or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;

(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division my be modified or reversed;

(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;

(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;

(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a community;

(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion
of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are
appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc;

(n) cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and

(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all
courts and their personnel.[6] (underscoring supplied)

The enumeration is an amalgamation of SC Circular No. 2-89 (February 7, 1989), as amended

by En Banc Resolution of November 18, 1993, and the amplifications introduced by Resolution
of January 18, 2000 in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC with respect to administrative cases and matters.

The present cases fall under at least three types of cases for consideration by the Court En
Banc. At least three members of the Courts Second Division (to which the present cases were
transferred,[7] they being assigned to a Member thereof) found, by Resolution of October 20,
2010, that the cases were appropriate for referral-transfer to the Court En Banc which
subsequently accepted[8] the referral in view of the sufficiently important reason to resolve all
doubts on the validity of the challenged resolutions as they appear to modify or
reverse doctrines or principles of law.

In Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals,[9] the Court treated the consolidated cases
as En Banc cases and set the therein petitioners motion for oral argument, after finding that the
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

cases were of sufficient importance to merit the Court En Bancs attention. It ruled that the Courts
action is a legitimate and valid exercise of its residual power.[10]

In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that
it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly
adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded
from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this
jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount
importance.
xxxx

It bears stressing that where, as in the present case, the Court En Banc
entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that
the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action
of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention
and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue
advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied
finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership that,
indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision
of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this
highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in
interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and
Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and
rule of law be observed.[11]

It is argued that the assailed Resolutions in the present cases have already become
final,[12] since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited except for extraordinarily
persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained;[13] and that once a judgment
attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable, however unjust the result of error
may appear.

The contention, however, misses an important point. The doctrine of immutability of

decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the
Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. It
finds mooring in the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution:

On proposed Section 3(4), Commissioner Natividad asked what the effect

would be of a decision that violates the proviso that no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court en banc. The answer given was
that such a decision would be invalid.Following up, Father Bernas
asked whether the decision, if not challenged, could become final and binding at
least on the parties. Romulo answered that, since such a decision would be in
excess of jurisdiction, the decision on the case could be reopened
anytime.[14] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

A decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of this constitutional provision

would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.[15] Any entry of judgment may thus be
said to be inefficacious[16] since the decision is void for being unconstitutional.

While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its Divisions,
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone and concededly recognized that [t]he only
constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered en
banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc.[17]

That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional error
cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of occasional error
but also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles
of law were modified or reversed by the Courts Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution.

The law allows a determination at first impression that a doctrine or principle laid down
by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed in a case which would warrant
a referral to the Court En Banc. The use of the word may instead of shall connotes probability,
not certainty, of modification or reversal of a doctrine, as may be deemed by the
Court. Ultimately, it is the entire Court which shall decide on the acceptance of the referral and,
if so, to reconcile any seemingconflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision, and to declare
the Courts doctrine.[18]

The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case
from their operation if and when justice requires it,[19] as in the present circumstance where
movant filed a motion for leave after the prompt submission of a second motion for
reconsideration but, nonetheless, still within 15 days from receipt of the last assailed resolution.

Well-entrenched doctrines or principles of law that went astray need to be steered back to their
proper course. Specifically, as David Lu correctly points out, it is necessary to reconcile and
declare the legal doctrines regarding actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation,
application of estoppel by laches in raising an objection of lack of jurisdiction, and whether bad
faith can be deduced from the erroneous annotation of lis pendens.

Upon a considered, thorough reexamination, the Court grants David Lus Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and September 23,
2009, which turn turtle settled doctrines, must be overturned. The Court thus reinstates
the August 26, 2008 Decision wherein a three-tiered approach was utilized to analyze the issue
on docket fees:

In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed for because of
the following reasons: First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the correct docket fees were paid. Second,
John and LLDC are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court because of their active participation in the proceedings below, and because
the issue of payment of insufficient docket fees had been belatedly raised before
the Court of Appeals, i.e., only in their motion for reconsideration. Lastly,
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

assuming that the docket fees paid were truly inadequate, the mistake was
committed by the Clerk of Court who assessed the same and not
imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any, the same may
instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter be
rendered.[20] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Value of the Subject Matter Cannot be Estimated

On the claim that the complaint had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of 600,000
shares of stock of LLDC, the real value of which based on underlying real estate values, as alleged
in the complaint, stands at P1,087,055,105, the Courts assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution found:

Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants [Lu Ym father & sons] claim has
merit. The 600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were
the subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the
nullification of the transfer thereof and their return to LLDC. David, et al., are
minority shareholders of the corporation who claim to have been prejudiced by the
sale of the shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the extent of the
damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of
stock, the action they filed can be characterized as one capable of
pecuniary estimation. The shares of stock have a definite value, which was
declared by plaintiffs [David Lu, et al.] themselves in their complaint. Accordingly,
the docket fees should have been computed based on this amount. This is clear
from the following version of Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at the time
the complaint was filed[.][21] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The said Resolution added that the value of the 600,000 shares of stock, which are the properties
in litigation, should be the basis for the computation of the filing fees.It bears noting, however,
that David, et al. are not claiming to own these shares. They do not claim to be the owners
thereof entitled to be the transferees of the shares of stock. The mention of the real value of the
shares of stock, over which David, et al. do not, it bears emphasis, interpose a claim of
right to recovery, is merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the inequitable price
at which the transfer was effected.

The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution also stated that to the extent of the damage or injury
[David, et al.] allegedly have suffered from this sale, the action can be characterized as one
capable of pecuniary estimation. The Resolution does not, however, explore the value of the
extent of the damage or injury. Could it be the pro rata decrease (e.g., from 20% to 15%) of the
percentage shareholding of David, et al. vis--vis to the whole?

Whatever property, real or personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders would be a
mere consequence of the main action. In the end, in the event LLDC is dissolved, David, et
al. would not be getting the value of the 600,000 shares, but only the value of their minority
number of shares, which are theirs to begin with.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

The complaint filed by David, et al. is one for declaration of nullity of share issuance. The
main relief prayed for both in the original complaint and the amended complaint is the same, that
is, to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued shares to Lu Ym
father and sons, et al. for a price of 1/18 of their real value, for being inequitable, having been
done in breach of directors fiduciarys duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders
rights, and with unjust enrichment.

As judiciously discussed in the Courts August 26, 2008 Decision, the test in determining whether
the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation is by ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. It explained:

x x x To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation

and the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do
not consist in therecovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money
or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such
principal action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.[22] (italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Actions which the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality
of conveyances. In a case involving annulment of contract, the Court found it to be one which
cannot be estimated:

Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale

of real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to
be paid by private respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the
property, subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the
complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the
Resolution of the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since private respondents
alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for
P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated
value of the land for the purpose of determining the docket fees.

On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141,
7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia,
Inc. and Bautista v. Lim. In Lapitanthis Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining

whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the

principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform
his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for
support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a
mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The
rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest
courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary
were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901).

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly

pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De
Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's
Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no
cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the
parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be
differently treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to
speak, of "specific performance".In both cases, the court
would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts
that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages
may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting
an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside
of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would
have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of
pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from
issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31,
1967 (the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and
the determination of the validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua
v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog v.
Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a mortgage); Baito v.
Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties, the
right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support), De
Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or
nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the
same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for
rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore,
difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission
should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable
of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must be included in the main
action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered
as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on
precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.[23] (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

IN FINE, the Court holds that David Lu, et al.s complaint is one incapable of pecuniary estimation,
hence, the correct docket fees were paid. The Court thus proceeds to tackle the arguments
on estoppel and lien, mindful that the succeeding discussions rest merely on a
contrary assumption, viz., that there was deficient payment.

Estoppel Has Set In

Assuming arguendo that the docket fees were insufficiently paid, the doctrine of estoppel already
applies.

The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution cited Vargas v. Caminas[24] on the non-applicability of
the Tijam doctrine where the issue of jurisdiction was, in fact, raised before the trial court
rendered its decision. Thus the Resolution explained:

Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the receivership
order, which the trial court had issued in the interim. David, et al., brought the
matter up to the CA even before the trial court could resolve the
motion. Thereafter, David, at al., filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform
to the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. It was at this point
that the Lu Ym father and sons raised the question of the amount of filing fees
paid. They also raised this point again in the CA when they appealed the trial courts
decision in the case below.

We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not estopped
from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the insufficiency
of the docket fees before the trial court rendered judgment and
continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the CA. Although the
manner of challenge was erroneous they should have addressed this issue directly
to the trial court instead of the OCA they should not be deemed to have waived
their right to assail the jurisdiction of the trial court.[25] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Lu Ym father and sons did not raise the issue before the trial court. The narration of facts in the
Courts original decision shows that Lu Ym father and sons merely inquired from the Clerk of Court
on the amount of paid docket fees on January 23, 2004. They thereafter still speculat[ed] on the
fortune of litigation.[26] Thirty-seven days later or on March 1, 2004 the trial court rendered its
decision adverse to them.

Meanwhile, Lu Ym father and sons attempted to verify the matter of docket fees from the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA). In their Application for the issuance a writ of preliminary
injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, they still failed to question the amount of docket fees
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

paid by David Lu, et al. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the denial by the
appellate court of their application for injunctive writ that they raised such issue.

Lu Ym father and sons further inquiry from the OCA cannot redeem them. A mere inquiry from
an improper office at that, could not, by any stretch, be considered as an act of having
raised the jurisdictional question prior to the rendition of the trial courts decision. In
one case, it was held:

Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the
assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket
fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the
opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial
region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the instant
case.[27] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring in the original)

The inequity resulting from the abrogation of the whole proceedings at this late stage when
the decision subsequently rendered was adverse to the father and sons is precisely the evil being
avoided by the equitable principle of estoppel.

No Intent to Defraud the Government

Assuming arguendo that the docket fees paid were insufficient, there is no proof of bad faith to
warrant a dismissal of the complaint, hence, the following doctrine applies:

x x x In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court ruled that
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering
the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly
authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The
party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not
automatically lost.[28] (underscoring supplied)

The assailed Resolution of August 4, 2009 held, however, that the above-quoted doctrine does
not apply since there was intent to defraud the government, citing one attendant circumstance
the annotation of notices of lis pendens on real properties owned by LLDC. It deduced:

From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of mainly in
real actions. Hence, when David, et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis
pendens on the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had filed
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

affected a title to or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least, they
must have been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of
the realties involved. Their silence or inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court
who computed their docket fees, therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus,
sufficient for this Court to conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of
good faith and into the area of fraud. Clearly, there was an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.[29]

All findings of fraud should begin the exposition with the presumption of good faith. The inquiry
is not whether there was good faith on the part of David, et al., but whether there was bad faith
on their part.

The erroneous annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not negate good faith. The
overzealousness of a party in protecting pendente lite his perceived interest, inchoate or
otherwise, in the corporations properties from depletion or dissipation, should not be lightly
equated to bad faith.

That notices of lis pendens were erroneously annotated on the titles does not have the effect of
changing the nature of the action. The aggrieved party is not left without a remedy, for they can
move to cancel the annotations. The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution, however, deemed such
act as an acknowledgement that the case they filed was a real action, concerning as it indirectly
does the corporate realties, the titles of which were allegedly annotated. This conclusion does not
help much in ascertaining the filing fees because the value of these real properties and the value
of the 600,000 shares of stock are different.

Further, good faith can be gathered from the series of amendments on the provisions on filing
fees, that the Court was even prompted to make a clarification.

When David Lu, et al. filed the Complaint on August 14, 2000 or five days after the effectivity of
the Securities Regulation Code or Republic Act No. 8799,[30] the then Section 7 of Rule 141 was
the applicable provision, without any restricted reference to paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 &
3 or paragraph (a) alone. Said section then provided:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an

estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all
clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of
interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated ... x x x
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

2. Special civil actions except judicial

foreclosure of mortgage which shall be
governed by paragraph (a) above ..... x x x

3. All other actions not involving property .xxx

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.

x x x x[31] (emphasis supplied)

The Court, by Resolution of September 4, 2001 in A. M. No. 00-8-10-SC,[32] clarified the matter
of legal fees to be collected in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission following their transfer to the RTC.

Clarification has been sought on the legal fees to be collected and the period of
appeal applicable in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It appears that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies do not provide the basis for the assessment of filing fees and the
period of appeal in cases transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to particular Regional Trial Courts.

The nature of the above mentioned cases should first be ascertained. Section 3(a),
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong. It further states that a civil action may either be ordinary
or special, both being governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions subject to
the special rules prescribed for special civil actions. Section 3(c) of the same Rule,
defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.
Applying these definitions, the cases covered by the Interim Rules for Intra-
Corporate Controversies should be considered as ordinary civil actions.
These cases either seek the recovery of damages/property or specific
performance of an act against a party for the violation or protection of a
right. These cases are:

(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of
directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting
to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or
members of any corporation, partnership, or association;
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or
association relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates; and between, any or all of them and
the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,

trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or
associations;
(4) Derivative suits; and
(5) Inspection of corporate books.

On the other hand, a petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided
in the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as
a special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status of a party or a
particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the
corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan,
containing the formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be
approved in the end. It does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another
party.

Section 7 of Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Revised Rules of Court lays the amount
of filing fees to be assessed for actions or proceedings filed with the Regional Trial
Court. Section 7(a) and (b) apply to ordinary civil actions while 7(d) and
(g) apply to special proceedings.

In fine, the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases
shall be section 7(a) and (b) l & 3 of Rule 141. For petitions for rehabilitation,
section 7(d) shall be applied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The new Section 21(k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC[33] (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that [f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases
involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) shall apply. Notatu
dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from the reference. Said
paragraph[34] refers to docket fees for filing [a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot
be estimated and all other actions not involving property.

By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-
corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value of which is always the
basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to imply that there
can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be
estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate books.

If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express phraseology of
Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.

In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000 during which
time Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision.Even the Amended Complaint
was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a)
and (b) l & 3 shall be the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing
that there could be an intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot
be estimated, such as an action for inspection of corporate books. The immediate
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

illustration shows that no mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the
assessment of the docket fees.

Finally, assuming there was deficiency in paying the docket fees and assuming further that there
was a mistake in computation, the deficiency may be considered a lien on the judgment that may
be rendered, there being no established intent to defraud the government.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and September 23, 2009
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Courts Decision of August 26, 2008 is REINSTATED.

The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resume the proceedings and resolve the remaining issues
with utmost dispatch in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

5) PCIB vs. Gomez GR 199601 Nov. 23, 2015

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK,

INC., Petitioner, v.JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court1 filed by
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) assailing the May 23, 2011 decision2 and the
December 7, 2011 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68288. The CA
affirmed the May 25, 1999 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC) in
toto.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a
certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January
1985.

The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985,
issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to "C.R.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Harrington," while the second draft was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R.
Harrington."

The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a certain Sophia La'O, as a representative of
Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for deposit.

Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores,
whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the
savings account of Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from
the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts
reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the deposits were duly
entered in Harrington's savings account.

On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the
sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made
the withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing
the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.

The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should
be taken against her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that
being a new teller she was not yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the job. She further
alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the
deposits.

On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was made.

After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine
grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures.
The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in
her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid.

Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and
liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even
respond to this letter. PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and
explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made prior to January 15, 1986,
were merely a withholding pending the investigation.

The PCIB also admitted that as early as January 15, 1986, it had started to deduct the amount
of P 200.00 from Josephine's salary as well as 50% of her bonuses and profit sharing.

On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by
gradually deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.

The PCIB filed its answer with counterclaims and a separate complaint with the RTC of Makati
City, which was raffled to Branch 149.
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the
PCIB to pay her actual damages in the amount of P5,006.00 plus 12% interest from filing of the
complaint; moral damages in the amount of PI 50,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount of
P-50,000.00.

The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine
as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy.
This was borne out by the fact that the PCIB had already deducted from her salary before
Josephine received the memorandum finding her liable for the P50,600.00. In addition, while
there were other individuals involved in this incident, it appeared that it was only Josephine who
was made solely responsible.

On appeal, the PCIB argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it was a labor
dispute, which the labor tribunals are more competent to resolve. It also maintained that there
was no factual or legal basis for the RTC to make it liable for damages and to pay Josephine.

In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision. It held that the
PCIB was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC because it had filed an answer
with counterclaims and even initiated a separate case before a different branch of the RTC. It
upheld the RTC's findings and conclusion in awarding damages and attorney's fees to Josephine
because there was no reason to disturb them.

The CA, subsequently, denied the PCIB's motion for reconsideration on December 7, 2011;
hence, the PCIB filed the present petition.

First, the PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and
wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily
imputed bad faith on how it had treated Josephine.

Second, the PCIB maintains that the CA gravely erred in awarding moral damages and attorney's
fees to Josephine absent any basis for it while averring that bad faith cannot be presumed and
that Josephine had failed to prove it with clear and convincing evidence.

OUR RULING

We DENY the present petition for lack of merit.

The civil courts have jurisdiction

over a case when the cause of action
does not have a reasonable causal
connection from the employer-employee
relationship.

Although the PCIB opted not to raise the issue before this Court, we find it prudent and
imperative to justify why the RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Josephine's complaint
despite the fact that her cause of action arose because her employer arbitrarily deducted from
her salary - an act expressly prohibited by our labor laws.4
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral, exemplary, and other forms of damages
arising from employer-employee relations. The legislative intent appears clear to allow Labor
Arbiters to award to an employee not only the reliefs provided by our labor laws, but also moral
and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Specifically, we have mentioned, in
fact, that a complaint for damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code would not
suffice to keep the case without the jurisdictional boundaries of our labor courts -especially
when the claim for damages is interwoven with a labor dispute.5

Nevertheless, when the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of the claims
provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular
courts. 6 Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article
19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor tribunals) have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.

To be sure, the case of Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Ernani Cruz Pa�o is

enlightening:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to
belong to the civil courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-
employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No.
1691 and BP Big. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship
are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the
"wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty
despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence
without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith"
violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of
petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it
within the purview of Civil Law.

Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz
of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but
on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in
terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer.7 [emphasis and underscoring
supplied]cralawlawlibrary

In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how
her employer quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct
from her salary. Clearly, without having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to
invoke the jurisdiction of our civil courts because her right to fair treatment was violated.

The discussion in Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc. is just as relevant as it is
illuminating on the present case, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-
employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a preexisting employee-employer
relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of
such dismissal.

xxx

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the mannerin
which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-
socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of
the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by
way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10. (Cf. Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, L-
21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107).8cralawlawlibrary

From the foregoing, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute because it has
something to do with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the Civil Code, and does not involve
an existing employer-employee relation within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code.
Josephine's complaint was, therefore, properly filed with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC.

Questions on whether there was a

preponderance of evidence to justify the
award of damages or whether there was
a causal connection between the given
set of facts and the damage suffered by
the private complainant are questions of fact.

The Court's jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law,
which the lower courts may have committed. The resolution of factual issues is the function of
the lower courts whose findings, when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is
especially true when the CA affirms the RTC's findings. While this Court, under established
exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, we do not find this case to be
under any of the exceptions.

Essentially, what the PCIB seeks is a relief from the Court on the issue of the propriety of the
award of damages. On this point alone, the petition must fail, as a Rule 45 petition bars us from
the consideration of factual issues, especially when both the RTC and the CA were consistent
with their rulings.

Nevertheless, we still affirm the assailed CA rulings even if we were to disregard these
established doctrinal rules.

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse
of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in
Articles 209 and 2110 of the Civil Code. We explained how these two provisions correlate with
each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right
is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.11 [Emphasis supplied]cralawlawlibrary

Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the
Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees
for acts of negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case,
the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her
to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor. When Josephine
asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any.
Moreover, the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and
bonuses.

The trial court and the CA also noted that while Josephine was penalized, other employees of the
bank involved in the subject transactions were not. It was Josephine who was made solely
responsible for the loss without giving any basis therefor. It was emphasized that the subject
deposit could not have been received by the bank and entered in Harrington's savings account
without the participation of the other bank employees. The PCIB could have exercised prudence
before taking oppressive actions against Josephine.

All told, we find nothing in the record which would warrant the reversal of the position held by
the RTC and the CA. Based on the above discussion, we find the award of moral damages and
attorney's fees in Josephine's favor proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and consequently, the May 23,
2011 decision and the December 7, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68288 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco,* Villarama, Jr.,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Brion,** (Acting Chairperson)
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

6) Malayan Insurance vs. Alibidbud April 20, 2016

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 209011, April 20, 2016

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. DIANA P.

ALIBUDBUD, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court filed by
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan) seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated
May 15, 2013 and Resolution3 dated September 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92940, which dismissed their complaint for replevin against Diana P. Alibudbud
(Alibudbud) for lack of jurisdiction.

Factual Background

Alibudbud was employed by Malayan on July 5, 2004 as Senior Vice President (SVP) for its Sales
Department. As SVP, she was issued a 2004 Honda Civic sedan bearing plate no. XPR 822 under
Malayan's Car Financing Plan4 conditioned on the following stipulations: (1) she must continuously
stay and serve Malayan for at least three full years from the date of the availment of the Car
Financing Plan; and (2) that in case of resignation, retirement or termination before the three-
year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her
share of the cost of the motor vehicle.5

Relatively, Alibudbud also executed a Promissory Note6 and a Deed of Chattel Mortgage7 in favor
of Malayan wherein it was expressly stated that: (1) the loan of P360,000.00 shall be payable in
60 equal monthly installments at the rate of P7,299.50 each, commencing on August 15, 2004
and every succeeding month thereafter until fully paid; (2) Alibudbud shall refund Malayan an
amount equivalent to its 50% equity share in the motor vehicle, or P360,000.00 if she leaves
Malayan within three years from the availment of the subject vehicle; (3) should Alibudbud resign,
retire or otherwise be terminated or separated from Malayan's employ, any remaining unpaid
balance on the principal obligation shall immediately fall due and demandable upon her who shall
remit the same to Malayan within five days from effectivity of such separation/termination; (4)
Malayan is authorized to apply to the payment of outstanding obligation of Alibudbud any such
amounts of money that may be due her from the company; (5) interests on all amounts
outstanding as of the date when all Alibudbud's obligations are treated immediately due and
payable, shall be compounded every 30 days until said obligations are fully paid; (6) Alibudbud
shall pay a penalty at the rate of 16% per annum on all amounts due and unpaid; (7) in case
Alibudbud fails to pay any installment, or any interest, or the whole amount remaining unpaid
which has immediately become due and payable upon her separation from the Malayan, the
mortgage on the property may be foreclosed by Malayan, or it may take other legal action to
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

enforce collection of the obligation; (8) upon default, Alibudbud shall deliver the possession of
the subject vehicle to Malayan at its principal place of business; and (9) should Alibudbud fail or
refuse to deliver the possession of the mortgaged property to Malayan, thereby compelling it to
institute an action for delivery, Alibudbud shall pay Malayan attorney's fees of 25% of the principal
due and unpaid, and all expenses and cost incurred in relation therewith including the premium
of the bond obtained for the writ of possession.8

On July 18, 2005, Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. In view thereof,
Malayan demanded that she surrender the possession of the car to the company. Alibudbud
sternly refused to do so.

On September 21, 2005, Malayan instituted a Complaint9 for replevin and/or sum of money before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and prayed for the seizure of the car from Alibudbud, or
that she be ordered to pay P552,599.93 representing the principal obligation plus late payment
charges and P138,149.98 as attorney's fees, should said car be no longer in running and
presentable condition when its return be rendered impossible.

On October 12, 2005, Alibudbud, in turn, filed a complaint10 for illegal dismissal against Malayan
before the Labor Arbiter (LA) wherein she prayed for her reinstatement.

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,11 Alibudbud asseverated that a reasonable

depreciation of 20% should be deducted from the subject vehicle's book value of P720,000.00,
or P576,000.00, which makes her liable to pay only P288,000.00 for the car's value.12 She
asserted a counterclaim of P17,809.0013 as compensatory damages and P40,000.00 as attorney's
fees.14 She prayed for the suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of the labor
dispute she filed. This was, however, questioned by Malayan in its reply15 as there was no
prejudicial question16 raised in the labor dispute.

On January 30, 2006, Alibudbud filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings17 to reiterate her prayer
to defer the proceedings, asseverating that the labor case she filed presents a prejudicial question
to the instant case. She explained that the resolution of the labor case will determine her rights
and obligations, as well as that of Malayan.

In an Order18 dated February 17, 2006, the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, denied Alibudbud's motion.
It was opined that: (1) reference shall be made only on the Promissory Note which Alibudbud
executed in favor of Malayan in determining the rights and obligations of the parties; (2) the
cause of action in the replevin case is rooted from the Promissory Note; and (3) the issue in the
labor dispute is in no way connected with the rights and obligations of the parties arising out of
the Promissory Note.

Trial on the merits ensued.

On July 13, 2006, Alibudbud moved for the dismissal19 of the action grounded on the impropriety
of the bond put up by Malayan. This was, however, denied by the RTC in its Order20 dated October
5, 2006 with the pronouncement that Malayan "can[,] by itself[,] file a surety bond in order to
guaranty the return of the subject property to the adverse party if such return be finally adjudged
x x x."21
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

Alibudbud sought for reconsideration,22 but it was denied in the RTC's Order23 dated December
19, 2006.

Alibudbud then successively filed motions to suspend the proceedings in the civil case anchored
on the same averment that suspension is necessary since she is seeking reinstatement in the
labor case which, if granted, would result to irreconcilable conflict not contemplated by law, much
less conducive to the orderly administration of justice.24 However, both motions were denied in
an Order25 dated June 6, 2007. The RTC pointed out that the issue raised in the civil action is
completely separable with the issue raised in the labor case.26

Malayan applied for an ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,27 which the RTC
granted in its Order dated June 8, 2007.28 The Honda Civic sedan was, accordingly, attached.

Meanwhile, the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Alibudbud was dismissed. The LA's
Decision29dated February 19, 2008 held that the redundancy she suffered resulted from a valid
re-organization program undertaken by Malayan in view of the downturn in the latter's sales.30 It
further ruled that Alibudbud failed to establish any violation or arbitrary action exerted upon her
by Malayan, which merely exercised its management prerogative when it terminated her
services.31

On November 28, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision32 which granted the complaint for replevin.
The RTC mentioned the following observations and conclusions, to wit: (1) Alibudbud is under
obligation to pay in full the acquisition cost of the car issued to her by Malayan; (2) the LA's
Decision dated February 19, 2008 which dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint settled the issue
being banked upon by Alibudbud when she moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the
civil action; (3) Alibudbud's ownership over the car is not yet absolute for it bears the notation
"encumbered", thereby signifying her obligation to pay its value within the period set forth in the
Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage; and (4) the replevin action was converted into a
money claim in view of Alibudbud's vehement refusal to surrender the possession of the car.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA ruled, in its Decision33 dated May 15, 2013, to set aside the decision of the
trial court. The CA explained that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance over the replevin
action because of the "employer-employee" relations between the parties which Malayan never
denied. Certainly, Alibudbud could not have availed of the benefits of the Car Financing Plan if
she was not employed by Malayan. Citing Section 1,34 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA
upheld to dismiss the replevin action considering that the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law.35

Malayan's motion for reconsideration36 was denied.37 Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is well-settled that "(t)he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the CA
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being
 CIVIL PROCEDURE

conclusive. In several decisions, however, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances
when the Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA,"38 such as in the instant case.

A careful study of the case would reveal that the RTC correctly took cognizance of the action for
replevin contrary to the pronouncement of the CA.

"Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels
may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession
to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The
term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional
remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by
the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action."39

In reversing the trial court's ruling, the CA declared that "[Alibudbud] could not have availed of
the Car Financing Plan if she was not an employee of [Malayan]. The status of being an employee
and officer of [Alibudbud] in [Malayan] was, therefore, one of the pre-condition before she could
avail of the benefits of the Car Financing Plan. Such being the case, there is no doubt that
[Alibudbud's] availing of the Car Financing Plan being offered by [Malayan] was necessarily and
intimately connected with or related to her employment in the aforesaid Company."40cralawred

It should be noted, however, that the present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor
and creditor, not their "employer-employee" relationship. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay
the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial
court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily
signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under
Malayan's Car Financing Plan.41 Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct
from the illegal dismissal case. The Court further considers it justified for Malayan to refuse to
accept her offer to settle her car obligation for not being in accordance with the Promissory Note
and Deed of Chattel Mortgage she executed.42 Even the illegal dismissal case she heavily relied
upon in moving for the suspension of the replevin action was settled in favor of Malayan which
was merely found to have validly exercised its management prerogative in order to improve its
company sales.

As consistently held, "[t]he characterization of an employee's services as superfluous or no longer

necessary and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of
the employer. The wisdom and soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to
discretionary review provided, of course, that a violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is
not shown."43

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 15, 2013 and Resolution dated
September 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92940 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27,
in Civil Case No. 05-113528 is, accordingly, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

 CIVIL PROCEDURE

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