SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT G.R. NO. 142937

AND GAMING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - PUNO, Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
*
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MARITA A. ANGARA and
BEATRIZ T. LA VICTORIA, Promulgated:
Respondents. November 15, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
January 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56375, which dismissed petitioners petition
for review for late filing; and the Resolution dated April 7, 2000, which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria (La Victoria) and Marita A. Angara

(Angara) were Slot Machine Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs)[2] of petitioner
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) assigned at its casino
in Davao City.

In a letter dated July 23, 1997, the PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissed
them from service, effective June 28, 1997, for loss of trust and confidence. [3] It
appears that respondent La Victoria was dismissed for alleged short selling of
tokens while respondent Angara was dismissed for alleged token passing and
condoning or actively assisting La Victoria in covering up her shortage. On August
12, 1997, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration[4] but their motion was
denied.[5]
On October 17, 1997, respondents filed their appeal memorandum with the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).[6] In a resolution dated October 21, 1997, the
CSC directed PAGCOR Chairman Alicia Ll. Reyes to submit her comment on the
said appeal together with the records of the case within ten days from receipt of the
resolution.[7] Instead of filing a comment, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, on
November 24, 1997, on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time.[8]

On May 27, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991110. It treated
petitioners motion to dismiss as its comment and, on the basis of respondents
appeal memorandum, ruled in the latters favor. It reversed the respondents
dismissal and ordered their reinstatement.[9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[10] but was denied by the CSC in
its Resolution No. 992571 dated November 19, 1999.[11]
 On December 22, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for a twenty-day extension
of time from December 23, 1999 or until January 11, 2000 within which to file its
petition for review with the CA.[12]

On January 10, 2000, petitioner filed its petition for review with the CA.[13]

On January 13, 2000, the CA granted petitioners motion for extension but
only for fifteen days from December 23, 1999 or until January 7, 2000.[14]

On January 31, 2000, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying
due course to the petition for review for having been filed three days past the
extended period granted by the court.[15]

On February 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,

contending that the petition was filed within the twenty-day extension it had asked
for and thus should have been given due course. It further invoked liberal
interpretation of the Rules for consideration of equity and substantial justice.[16]

On April 7, 2000, the CA rendered the second assailed Resolution denying

for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration.[17]

The CA held that: Section 3,[18] Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly provides that only one extension of fifteen (15) days may be
granted to a petitioner within which to file a petition for review; petitioner took the
risk when it asked for a twenty-day extension, evidently assuming that the court
will grant the extension prayed for; even if the petition was timely filed, it will still
have to be denied for the following formal defects: (a) the petition lacks an
affidavit of service as mandated under Section 13 [19] of Rule 13; (b) the signatory
to the certification against forum shopping was not shown to have been validly and
legally authorized by the petitioner to sign the same; and (c) the written
explanation required under Section 11,[20] Rule 13 shows that the respondents were
furnished, not with copies of the petition for review, but with copies of the Motion
for Extension of Time to File Verified Petition for Review.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the

following assigned errors:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED

IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS VERIFIED PETITION FOR
REVIEW.

II

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) ERRED IN

DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL WITHOUT
CAUSE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS EVEN WITHOUT
AWAITING THE COMMENT OF THE PETITIONER AND THE
COMPLETE RECORDS OF THE CASE, WHERE THE MERIT OF
THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FAIRLY AND IMPARTIALLY
ASSESSED.

III

THE ACTS OF RTAs LA VICTORIA AND ANGARA

CONSTITUTE DISHONESTY, A VIOLATION OF PAGCORS
RULES ON EMPLOYEES DISCIPLINE REGARDED AS LOSS OF
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

IV
 RTAs LA VICTORIA AND ANGARA HOLD CONFIDENTIAL
POSITIONS WHOSE REMOVAL FROM THE SERVICE CAN BE
JUSTIFIED THROUGH LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

THE APPEAL FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE

CSC WAS NOT WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD TO
FILE AN APPEAL, AND THEREFORE, THE CSC COULD NOT
VALIDLY ACT ON IT.[21]

Petitioner submits that technicalities should be set aside in the interest of

substantial justice. It avers that the dismissal of the petition filed three days past the
granted period is unwarranted because the delay is excusable. It points out that: the
case was originally handled by PAGCOR and referred to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel for proper handling on December 10, 1999; the
case was assigned to the present counsel for preparation of the petition only on
December 13, 1999, or ten days before December 23, 1999, the expiry date for
appeal; counsel had to coordinate with the former handling counsel of PAGCOR in
order to be apprised of the factual background of the case and collate the
documents and exhibits necessary for the preparation of the petition.

On the failure to attach an affidavit of service, petitioner contends that the

CA did not require it to attach the same. Besides, the CA had notice that the
petition was duly furnished all the parties, as manifested by the annotation of the
registry receipt numbers, place and date of filing opposite the names of the parties,
located at the last page of the petition, such that there was substantial compliance
with the requirements of the Rules.
 As to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner
maintains that the same was signed by the Managing Head for Corporate and Legal
Services Department, Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, the officer of the petitioner who has
personal knowledge of all the cases, perhaps, more knowledgeable than the head of
the office.

With regard to the written explanation in the petition which states that
respondents were furnished with copies of the Motion for Extension of Time to
File Verified Petition for Review, petitioner submits that it should be considered a
mere typographical error.

Moreover, petitioner submits that its case is meritorious. It insists that it was
denied due process when the CSC treated petitioners motion to dismiss as its
comment and decided the case forthwith, without allowing petitioner to submit its
comment or the whole record of the case be elevated to it. Besides, petitioner
maintains that the records show that respondents committed acts of dishonesty
which are punishable with dismissal, even on the first offense.

Furthermore, petitioner submits that since respondents are confidential

employees, pursuant to Section 16[22] of Presidential Decree No. 1869[23] (the
PAGCOR Charter), they did not have fixed term of office; their tenure of
employment was dependent on the continued confidence of their superiors; such
confidence was lost because it was proven that they committed dishonest acts in
the performance of their duties.
 Lastly, petitioner submits that since the CSC admitted that the appeal of the
respondents was filed out of time, it should not have entertained the same.
Therefore, petitioners decision dismissing respondents from service, being final
and executory, should stand.

Respondents, on the other hand, submit that the instant petition should have
been dismissed outright since the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by Atty. Bautista, the Managing Head for Corporate and
Legal Services Department, and no board resolution was attached to show that he
is petitioners duly authorized representative. They further submit that there is no
proof of service.

As to the issues presented by petitioner, respondents contend that the appeal

before the CSC was not filed beyond the reglementary period because respondents
were not furnished with petitioners resolution dismissing them from service for
loss of trust and confidence. Respondent La Victoria claims that she secured a
copy through her own efforts while respondent Angara alleges that she was never
furnished with a decision dismissing her from service. Besides, they submit that
there is no rule before the CSC which provides that whenever a motion for
reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from
notice of denial within which to file notice of appeal. In any event, they aver that
the CSC did not err in admitting the appeal because it is within its power to relax
the rules to attain substantial justice.

They further contend that the CSC did not err in issuing Resolution No.
991110 despite the absence of the records since petitioner was deemed to have
waived such right to file its comment when it chose to file a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the CSC did not err in ruling that respondents were not dismissed for
cause and after due process since loss of trust and confidence is not one among the
grounds for disciplinary action and there was no formal investigation conducted
but a summary proceeding.

On one hand, the Court finds that petitioner has offered no justifiable
reasons in filing the petition for review three days past the period granted since the
Rules allow only a 15-day extension and petitioners counsel cannot assume that his
request for a 20-day extension will be granted. The reasons proffered by petitioners
counsel that he needs sufficient time to collate and review the records of the case
which are still in the possession of PAGCOR in order to come up with a well
studied and appropriate Verified Petition for Review[24] and since assigned counsel
is saddled with the preparation of equally important pleadings coupled with almost
daily appearances in court[25] are not exceptionally meritorious or most compelling
reasons to allow petitioner additional three days or up to January 10, 2000, after
the lapse of the fifteen-day period on January 7, 2000.

On the other hand, the Court notes that the last day for filing the petition for
review, that is, January 7, 2000, fell on a Friday. Petitioner filed its petition for
review on January 10, 2000, Monday, which was the next working day. Therefore,
the delay in filing the motion for extension was actually for one day only.

It has been held that a one-day delay does not justify the appeals denial
where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed
to the petitioner.[26] Needless to stress, the real purpose behind the limitation of the
period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an unreasonable delay in the
administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.[27]
 In this case, the Court is inclined to excuse the one-day delay, in order to
fully settle the merits of the case. After all, the policy of our judicial system is to
encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal.

With respect to the non-attachment of the affidavit of service, such is not

fatal to the petition since the registry receipts attached to the petition clearly show
that respondents were served copies of the petition.[28] The demands of substantial
justice were satisfied by the actual receipt of the petition. In fact, respondents filed
their comment thereon.[29]

With respect to the verification and certification signed by Atty. Bautista,

petitioners Managing Head for Corporate and Legal Services Department, it is but
logical that he be the party affixing his signature therein, considering that the
person who is in the best position to ascertain the truthfulness and the correctness
of the allegations in the petition is its legal officer, who necessarily knows the
status of any suit involving the company.[30]

As to the written explanation stating that respondents were furnished with

copies of the Motion for Extension of Time to File Verified Petition for
Review,[31] it should be considered as a typographical or clerical error since what
was actually furnished, as shown by the heading of the pleading, is a Verified
Petition for Review.[32]

While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than
frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable
objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice.[33] Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than
frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair
trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities.[34] Thus, the CA should have refrained from hastily
dismissing the petition on procedural flaws.

In similar cases,[35] the Court ordinarily remands the case to the CA for
proper disposition on the merits. However, in the present case, considering the
issues raised and the fact that the records of the case are before us, the Court deems
it more appropriate and practical to resolve the present controversy in order to
avoid further delay.[36]

The issue on the nature of employment of an employee of the petitioner has

been laid to rest in Civil Service Commission vs. Salas, wherein the Court en
banc, speaking through the learned Justice Florenz D. Regalado, held:[37]
In reversing the decision of the CSC, the Court of Appeals
opined that the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is
deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this
point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the
CSC to the effect that Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts
PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and
Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987
Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987).
 However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last
portion of Section 16 which provides that all employees of the casino
and related services shall be classified as confidential appointees.
While such executive declaration emanated merely from the
provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the Implementing Rules of the
Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as defined
therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section
12(9), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity
of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-
encompassing.
Prior to the passage of the aforestated Civil Service Act of
1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: Firstly, when the President, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared
the position to be primarily confidential; and, secondly, in the absence
of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office
there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing
power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment
or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.
At first glance, it would seem that the instant case falls under
the first category by virtue of the express mandate under Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869. An in-depth analysis, however, of the
second category evinces otherwise.
When Republic Act No. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959,
Section 5 thereof provided that the non-competitive or unclassified
service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be
in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in
nature. In the case of Piero, et al. vs. Hechanova, et al., the Court
obliged with a short discourse there on how the phrase in nature came
to find its way into the law, thus:
The change from the original wording of the bill
(expressly declared by law x x x to be policy-
determining, etc.) to that finally approved and enacted
 (or which are policy determining, etc. in nature) came
about because of the observations of Senator Taada, that
as originally worded the proposed bill gave Congress
power to declare by fiat of law a certain position as
primarily confidential or policy-determining, which
should not be the case. The Senator urged that since the
Constitution speaks of positions which are primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical in
nature, it is not within the power of Congress to declare
what positions are primarily confidential or policy-
determining. It is the nature alone of the position that
determines whether it is policy-determining or primarily
confidential. Hence, the Senator further observed, the
matter should be left to the proper implementation of the
laws, depending upon the nature of the position to be
filled, and if the position is highly confidential then the
President and the Civil Service Commissioner must
implement the law.
To a question of Senator Tolentino, But in
positions that involved both confidential matters and
matters which are routine, x x x who is going to
determine whether it is primarily confidential? Senator
Taada replied:
SENATOR TAADA: Well, at the first instance, it
is the appointing power that determines that: the nature
of the position. In case of conflict then it is the Court that
determines whether the position is primarily confidential
or not.
Hence the dictum that, at least since the enactment of the
Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which
finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical. And the Court in the
aforecited case explicitly decreed that executive pronouncements,
such as Presidential Decree No. 1869, can be no more than initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must
be so, or else it would then lie within the discretion of the Chief
Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection
of Section 4, Article XII (now Section 2[3], Article IX-B) of the
Constitution. In other words, Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869 cannot be given a literally stringent application without
compromising the constitutionally protected right of an employee
to security of tenure.
The doctrinal ruling enunciated in Piero finds support in the
1935 Constitution and was reaffirmed in the 1973 Constitution, as
well as in the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 807, or
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. It may well be observed
that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contain the provision, in
Section 2, Article XII-B thereof, that appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable
by competitive examination. Corollarily, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 2260 states that the non-competitive or unclassified service shall
be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-
competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical in nature.
Likewise, Section 1 of the General Rules in the implementing rules of
Presidential Decree No. 807 states that appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination. Let it be here emphasized, as we have
accordingly italicized them, that these fundamental laws and
legislative or executive enactments all utilized the phrase in nature to
describe the character of the positions being classified.
The question that may now be asked is whether
the Piero doctrineto the effect that notwithstanding any statutory
classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the position, as
may be ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technicalis still controlling with the advent of
the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V
of which deals specifically with the Civil Service Commission,
considering that from these later enactments, in defining positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical, the phrase in nature was deleted.
 We rule in the affirmative. The matter was clarified and
extensively discussed during the deliberations in the plenary session
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the Civil Service
provisions, to wit:
MR. FOZ: Which department of government has the
power or authority to determine whether a position
is policy-determining or primarily confidential or
highly technical?
FR. BERNAS: The initial decision is made by the
legislative body or by the executive department,
but the final decision is done by the court. The
Supreme Court has constantly held that
whether or not a position is policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, it is
determined not by the title but by the nature of
the task that is entrusted to it. For instance, we
might have a case where a position is created
requiring that the holder of that position should be
a member of the Bar and the law classifies this
position as highly technical. However, the
Supreme Court has said before that a position
which requires mere membership in the Bar is not
a highly technical position. Since the term highly
technical means something beyond the ordinary
requirements of the profession, it is always a
question of fact.
MR. FOZ: Does not Commissioner Bernas agree that the
general rule should be that the merit system or the
competitive system should be upheld?
FR. BERNAS: I agree that that should be the general
rule; that is why we are putting this as an
exception.
MR. FOZ: The declaration that certain positions are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical has been the source of practices
which amount to the spoils system.
 FR. BERNAS: The Supreme Court has always said that,
but if the law of the administrative agency says
that a position is primarily confidential when in
fact it is not, we can always challenge that in
court. It is not enough that the law calls it
primarily confidential to make it such; it is the
nature of the duties which makes a position
primarily confidential.
MR. FOZ: The effect of a declaration that a position is
policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technicalas an exceptionis to take it away
from the usual rules and provisions of the Civil
Service Law and to place it in a class by itself so
that it can avail itself of certain privileges not
available to the ordinary run of government
employees and officers.
FR. BERNAS: As I have already said, this classification
does not do away with the requirement of merit
and fitness. All it says is that there are certain
positions which should not be determined by
competitive examination.
For instance, I have just mentioned a position in the Atomic
Energy Commission. Shall we require a physicist to undergo a
competitive examination before appointment? Or a confidential
secretary or any position in policy-determining administrative bodies,
for that matter? There are other ways of determining merit and fitness
than competitive examination. This is not a denial of the requirement
of merit and fitness.
It is thus clearly deducible, if not altogether apparent, that the
primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing
for the declaration of a position as policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical is to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining merit and
fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered
by security of tenure, although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that appointees thereto do not have
to undergo competitive examinations for purposes of determining
merit and fitness.
 In fact, the CSC itself ascribes to this view as may be gleaned
from its questioned resolution wherein it stated that the declaration of
a position as primarily confidential if at all, merely exempts the
position from the civil service eligibility requirement. Accordingly,
the Piero doctrine continues to be applicable up to the present and is
hereby maintained. Such being the case,the submission that
PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential appointees
by operation of law under the bare authority of CSC Resolution
No. 91-830 must be rejected.[38] (Emphasis supplied)

In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Rilloraza,[39] the

Court, in reiterating the foregoing pronouncements, further stated that:
Justice Regalados incisive discourse yields three (3) important
points: first, the classification of a particular position as primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical amounts to no
more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive
upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Second,
whether primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly
technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption
from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter
the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of
security of tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D.
1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.[40]

In the present case, as SMRTAs, respondents duties and responsibilities are:

JOB SUMMARY: Working under the supervision of the Slot
Machine Supervisor, the Slot Machine Roving Token Attendant
provides cash-to-token exchange services to slot machine
players.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:

 1. Handles cash-to-token exchange transactions with slot
machine players.
2. Accounts for the proper use, safekeeping, and
liquidation of the individual vale issued by Treasury.
3. Provides optimum customer service to casino players
in accordance with the established House Rules and company
policies.
4. Notifies the Slot Machine Attendant of any need for
jackpot payment or hopper refills, and informs the Slot
Machine Technician of any fault codes or machine
malfunctions.
5. Ensures the cleanliness of slot machine units, the
proper arrangement of slot machine area stools, and the return
of empty coin trays, bowls or tubes to the Token Counter or to a
designated location.
6. Assists in the preparation of periodic slot machine
reports, and in the maintenance of the sections files records and
reports.
7. Notifies the Slot Machine Head/Asst. Head/Supervisor
of any incident of doubtful nature.
8. Performs other duties as may be designated by the
Casino Operations Manager.[41]

As a SMRTA, each of them earns P3,000.00 a month.[42] From the nature of

respondents functions, their organizational ranking, and their compensation level,
it is obviously beyond debate that respondents, occupying one of the lowest ranks
in petitioner, cannot be considered confidential employees. Their job description
spells out their routinary functions. As enumerated in their functions, there is
nothing to suggest that their positions were highly, or much less primarily
confidential in nature. There is no showing of that element of trust indicative of a
primarily confidential position, as defined in De los Santos vs. Mallare,[43] thus:
 Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than
ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is
primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence
in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state.[44]

Petitioner, therefore, cannot justify respondents dismissal on loss of trust and

confidence since the latter are not confidential employees. Being regular
employees that enjoy security of tenure, respondents can only be dismissed for just
cause and with due process, notice and hearing. Petitioner cannot, in the
alternative, allege that respondents are being dismissed for dishonesty since
petitioners thesis, in its motion for reconsideration in the CSC and petition before
the CA, has always been that respondents, as confidential employees, can be
dismissed for loss of trust and confidence. Besides, dishonesty is not the reason for
which they were dismissed per the letter of dismissal of July 23, 1997, but for loss
of trust and confidence.[45]

Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim it was deprived of due process of law
when the CSC granted respondents appeal without the comment of the petitioner or
the records before it. Petitioner was directed to file its comment but chose instead
to move for the dismissal of the appeal. It must be remembered that the CSC, being
an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers, is not bound by the technical
rules of procedure and evidence in the adjudication of cases, subject only to
limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process.[46]
 In Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, [47] we held that the provision
for flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative value. In the present case,
since petitioner claims that respondents are confidential employees and can be
dismissed on loss of trust and confidence, the attachments to respondents appeal
memorandum, namely: (a) the letter dated February 6, 1997 from the petitioners
Board of Directors confirming respondent La Victorias regular appointment as
SMRTA, effective January 8, 1997, after six months probationary period, with a
salary of P3,000 a month;[48] (b) the letter dated July 11, 1996 from the petitioners
Board of Directors confirming respondent Angaras regular appointment as
SMRTA, effective June 4, 1996 with a salary of P3,000 a month;[49] (c) the letter
dated July 28, 1997 from Richard S. Syhongpan (Syhongpan), Branch Manager,
Casino Filipino, Davao, addressed to respondent Angara informing her of
preventive suspension effective same date, pending investigation;[50] (d) two letters,
both dated July 1, 1997, from Syhongpan, separately addressed to respondents,
requiring them to appear before the Branch Management Panel;[51] (e) the letter
dated July 2, 1998 of respondent La Victoria addressed to the Branch Manager,
explaining her side on the incident she was investigated on; [52] (f) the
Memorandum dated July 5, 1997 from Syhongpan directing respondent Angara to
report to the Corporate Office on July 7, 1997 for further investigation; [53] (g) the
two letters, both of July 23, 1997, separately addressed to respondents, from
Teresita S. Ela, Managing Head of the Personnel Administration Department of
PAGCOR, informing them that the Board of Directors in the meeting on July 22,
1997 resolved to dismiss them from service for loss of trust and confidence
effective June 28, 1997;[54] (h) respondents appeal for reconsideration dated August
12, 1997 filed with Alicia Ll. Reyes, Chairman and Chief Executor Officer of
PAGCOR;[55](i) respondents tracer letter dated September 12, 1997 addressed to
Reyes, requesting speedy disposition of their appeal for reconsideration;[56] (j) the
Reply to Endorsement of Appeal for Reconsideration, dated September 12, 1997
from Reyes addressed to then Senate President Ernesto Maceda, on the denial of
respondent La Victorias appeal for reconsideration of their dismissal;[57] and (k) the
letter dated September 17, 1997 from Romeo T. Trio, PAGCORs Corporate
Secretary, informing respondents of the denial of their appeal for reconsideration
by the PAGCORs Board of Directors;[58] and settled jurisprudence enunciated
in Civil Service Commission vs. Salas and Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation vs. Rilloraza, are sufficient bases for the CSCs decision in favor of
respondents.

Besides, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard when it filed a

motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 991110, wherein it attached the
records of the case, which included all the documents attached to respondents
appeal memorandum.[59] The CSC, however, after a thorough re-evaluation of the
arguments raised by petitioner, found no sufficient legal and factual basis to
modify or alter its decision in the resolution. Petitioner cannot bewail denial of due
process since it was given the opportunity to present its side on the propriety of
respondents dismissal through its motion for reconsideration and the attachments
therein.[60] Accordingly, the demands of due process have been sufficiently met.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
*
On Leave.
[1]
Penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now Justice of this Court) and concurred in
by Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Justice of this Court) and Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. (now Court Administrator).
[2]
In its pleadings, petitioner refers to the respondents as simply RTAs or Roving
Token Attendants.
[3]
CSC Records, p. 200.
[4]
Id., p. 215.
[5]
Id., p. 216.
[6]
Id., p. 190.
[7]
Id., p. 188.
[8]
Id., p. 182.
[9]
Id., p. 60.
[10]
Id., p. 67.
[11]
Id., p. 43.
[12]
CA Rollo, p. 2.
[13]
Id., p. 8.
[14]
Id., p. 7.
[15]
Id., p. 44.
[16]
Id., p. 45.
[17]
Id., p. 66.
[18]
Should be SEC. 4. Period of Appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or
from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court
or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
 granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied)
[19]
SEC. 13. Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a
written admission of the party served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement
of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt
issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender together with the certified or
sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
(Emphasis supplied)
[20]
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of the pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.
Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service
or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause
to consider the paper as not filed. (Emphasis supplied)
[21]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[22]
SECTION 16. Exemption. - All positions in the Corporation, whether technical,
administrative, professional, or managerial are exempt from the provisions
of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only
by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. All
employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as
"Confidential" appointees. (Emphasis supplied)
[23]
Entitled, Consolidating and Amending Presidential Decree Nos. 1067-A, 1067-
B, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632, relative to the Franchise and Powers of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
[24]
CA Rollo, p. 6.
[25]
Id., p. 7.
[26]
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149580, March 16, 2005; Samala vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128628, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 535.
[27]
Samala vs. Court of Appeals, supra; De Las Alas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-
38006, May 16, 1978, 83 SCRA 200; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & OBrien, No.
12375, August 30, 1918, 38 Phil. 521.
[28]
CA Rollo, p. 30. Gutierrez vs. Secretary of DOLE, G.R. No. 142248, December
16, 2004; Aonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152998, September 23,
2003, 411 SCRA 621.
[29]
Rollo, p. 201.
[30]
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Libunao, G.R. No. 144458, July 14, 2004, 434
SCRA 404; Robern Development Corporation vs. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042,
September 23, 1999, 315 SCRA 150.
[31]
CA Rollo, p. 30.
[32]
Id., p. 8.
[33]
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs. NLRC, G.R. No.149793, April 15,
2005; General Milling Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 153199, December
17, 2002, 394 SCRA 207.
[34]
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, supra Note No. 26; Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139034, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA
501.
[35]
Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. 160798, June 8, 2005; Vicar
International Construction, Inc. vs. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation,
G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005; Donato vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129638, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 216; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, G.R.
No. 131214, July 27, 2000, 336 SCRA 484.
[36]
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs. NLRC, supra Note No. 33.
[37]
G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 414.
[38]
Id., pp. 420-427.
[39]
G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 525.
[40]
Id., pp. 535-536.
[41]
CSC Records, p. 169.
[42]
Id., p. 206.
[43]
No. L-3881, August 31, 1950, 87 Phil. 289.
[44]
Id., p. 298.
[45]
CSC Records, p. 200.
[46]
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, No. 46496, February 27, 1940, 69
Phil. 635. See also Uichico vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121434, June 2, 1997, 273
SCRA 35; IBM Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999, 305
SCRA 592; Asuncion vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001, 362
SCRA 56.
[47]
No. 46496, February 27, 1940, 69 Phil. 635, 643.
[48]
CSC Records, p. 201.
[49]
Id., p. 206.
[50]
Id., p. 207.
[51]
Id., pp. 202, 208.
[52]
Id., p. 203.
[53]
Id., p. 209.
[54]
Id., pp. 200, 210.
[55]
Id., p. 211.
[56]
Id., p. 215.
[57]
Id., p. 204.
[58]
Id., p. 216.
[59]
Id., pp. 88-166.
[60]
Vda. de Chua vs. Court of Appeals (Special Eighth Division), G.R. No. 116835,
March 5, 1998, 287 SCRA 33, 50; Rodriguez vs. Project 6 Market Service
Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 528, 534;
Rubenecia vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115942, May 31, 1995,
244 SCRA 640, 652.