NATCHER vs.

CA

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal
demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact.
Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of
insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

MONTANER VS. SHARIA

JURISDICTION OVER SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF DECEASED MUSLIMS

All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property shall be under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Shari’a District Courts (Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known
as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines cited in MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT,
G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.1. The Supreme Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts, Ijra-at-al-
Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the
running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay" xxxxx Moreover, the Shari’a District Court
is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a prioridetermination that the deceased is a
Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim,
the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT
COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.2. Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court
as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, G.R. No.
95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719) such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well
as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the
estate of the decedent(Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO.
174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

1.3. THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION,

SETTLEMENT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, IS CONSIDERED A
SPECIAL PROCEEDING

The proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court
(Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact." The Supreme Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim (Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722). In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent (Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001). Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in
fact. x x x x x Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action (Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999) applies to a special
proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which
has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. x x x As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate, pay its liabilities (Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312
Phil. 578, 593 (1995) and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same (Vda. de Manalo v. Court
of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).

1.4. EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF HEARING

The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights
of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing
is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected(Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R.
No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with
procedural due process (Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals,369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999) for
the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix
any period within which to file a reply or opposition (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May
29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292). In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" (De Borja, et al. v.
Tan, et al., 93 Phil. 167, 171 (1953). x x x In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s
order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in
question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion
as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion
for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said
motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of
hearing, procedural process, was duly observed. x x x To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity
to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the
notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice. x x x x x In the event that a special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
proceeding (Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198). The court,
in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent (Uriarte v.
Court of First Instance Negros Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970). In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent (MONTAÑER VS. SHARI’A DISTRICT
COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).
SHECKER VS. SHECKER

Civil Procedure – Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Not Required in a Contingent Money Claim

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic will
which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all
creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent
money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some
properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by Alan
Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan
Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will. Under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to initiate
new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is
filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a
cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and
dependent upon the principal remedy.

Hilado vs. CA G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009

Facts: Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his
death, two (2) civil case were pending against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Administratrix Benedicto, then
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her
deceased husband, Â which included as among the liabilities, the liability corresponding to the two cases asÂ
P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 andP35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC
required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate. On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private
respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate; and (3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC,
alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that
had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate. On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an
order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. A petition for certiorari was filed with
the Court of Appeals by the petitioners. But on 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
decated that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.

Issue: WON the petitioners has the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Benedicto.

Held: The disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt
compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested
persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x. Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled
to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b)
of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for
an order for distribution of the estate residue. A deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof Section 1 of Rule 83 requires
the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render
an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration.
We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person
whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did
delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate. On
complaints against the general competence of the administrator The proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON AND MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, PETITIONERS, VS. MA. LOURDES
BELEN, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013. -
THE LAWYER'S POST.

Venue in special proceedings; "residence" is actual residence.

“x x x.

What is the rule on venue in special proceedings, especially as in this case, a settlement of estate of a decedent?
Was the marriage between Amelia and Eliseo bigamous?

“Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).

The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In
other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence
or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Maria Socorro Avelino vs Court of Appeals

In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In 1991, his daughter, Maria Socorro Avelino filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of his deceased father. All the other
heirs however opposed the petition and they moved that the petition be converted into an action for
judicial partition of the said estate. The trial court granted the opposition’s motion and so Socorro’s
petition was converted accordingly. Socorro’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Socorro then
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in granting the other heirs motion. The
Court of Appeals found no reversible error. Socorro elevated the petition to the Supreme Court. She
insists that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the estate is not yet determined hence an
administration proceeding is still needed. She also insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for
a conversion of a petition for administration to an action for partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration may be
converted into an action for judicial partition.
HELD: Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Where the more
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not
be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. In this case, all the heirs, with the exception of
Socorro, agreed to judicial partition as they see it to be the more convenient method. There is no merit
to the contention of Socorro that a partition cannot be had because the extent of the estate is not yet
determined. The extent of the estate can actually be determined during the partition proceedings.
Therefore, the trial court made no error in converting Socorro’s petition to an action for judicial
partition.

SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008

FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely:Francisco,
Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. OnAugust 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,Cebu.Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have
herself appointed administrator, and afterfiling an opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco, assisted by their
corresponding counsels,agreed to have Gloria appointed as administratrix of the estate & letters of administration
of theestate of the late Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after postinga nominal
bond of P1,000.00. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act asCommissioner to effect the
agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition. Inhis Commissioner’s report dated July 29, 1976,
Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenaesupplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance
on February 28 and 29,1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference
ormeeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud andEnrique Cuyos
failed to attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to partitionthe properties of the estate but
instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 & dividethe proceeds equally. Columba bought the
properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos)as the new administrator of the estate based on Gloria’s absence
& change of residence. TheCourt ordered the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale afterthe payment
of the sumofP36,000 which shall remain in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment ofnecessary
taxes.Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor ofColumba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Original Certificates of Titles wereissued in favor of the latter. In Feb
1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with the CA apetition for annulment of the
order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFI’s order was null andvoid and of no effect, the same being based on a
Commissioner's Report, which was patentlyfalse and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due
process in claiming theirshare of their father's estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be
deprived oftheir property.The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issuedin
the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annulthe CFI’s order.

HELD: The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsicfraud, as there is no
sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, buton the ground that the assailed order is
void for lack of due process.Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of
judgment.— The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However,
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.

The veracity of Atty. Taneo’s report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that theheirs indeed convened
for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estateproperties, since they were not even
required to sign anything to show their attendance of thealleged meeting. The Commissioner's Report, which
embodied the alleged agreement of theheirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their
consent and conformitythereto. It was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard
toafford them the opportunity to protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved the Reportdespite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI'sorder based on a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.The CFI's order being null and void may be
assailed anytime, the respondents' right to dueprocess is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed
order. An action to declare thenullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no
legaland binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.Hence, the
execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said voidjudgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers arevoid ab initio. The petition was denied

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth
to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of
their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a parcel of land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed an “Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person” adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of
Deeds then issued the title in her name.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaint against Portugal-
Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of
action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not been established
before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC‘s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued
in her name

HELD:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the parcel of
land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal‘s
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

Azuela v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122880 (2006)

FACTS:
1. Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was
opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent. According to
her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that
the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment.

An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore actually declares to
the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and
deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof.
A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and
sworn to by the executor.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as
the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental
witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for
another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON (Succession)

Binding Effect of Judgments

490 SCRA 140
June 8, 2006

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code

Facts: Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines
for 30 years. On July, 29, 1979, Audrey died, and she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard through a will. In 1981,
Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. On July, 20, 1984, Richard died; leaving a will wherein he bequeathed
his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle, his daughter with Audrey. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of Maryland, USA, and Atty. William
Quasha of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Offices was appointed as ancillary administrator. On
October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.9625 before the Makati RTC, a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Aubrey and apportioned to them ¾ and ¼ of all the estate, respectively. This motion and project
of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, “a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy.” Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her
entire estate to Richard, then it should be wholly adjudicated to him and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left
his entire estate to the respondent, except for the A/G Interior Inc. shares, then the entire property should now
pertain to respondent. The Court of Appeals annulled the trial court’s Orders in Speacial Proceeding No. 9625 abd
later denied the appeal of the petitioner, thus the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State
of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will.

Held: Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as
to who are her heris, is governed by her national law, i.e. the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Art. 16 of
the Civil Code. Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that “capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.”

ENG VS. LEE

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein
petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that
probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already requested his mother to
settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner
refused to do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic
will and that she knew of its whereabouts. The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of
respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied.
Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially
denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion,
set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees.
It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession
the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court denied this motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in
the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the
appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

Held: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and
clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel
the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As
the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or
which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will
mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or
person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the
part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.

Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of
an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to
the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used
for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words,
mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally
controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the
court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the
production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will,
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his
petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005 (SpecPro 2016)
Posted on JUNE 29, 2016
FACTS:

Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings

HELD:

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings.

Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of
the estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties
thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.

Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in
the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice.

Fleumer vs. Hix

(1930)
FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Hix, appealed the denial of the probate of Hix’s will,
alleging that since the will was executed in West Virginia by a resident therein, West Virginia law should govern.

HELD: The courts of the Philippines are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of law were not met. There was no
showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of
West Va. as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure; nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of
the officer having charge of the original.

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976)
(SpecPro 2016)
Posted on JUNE 29, 2016
FACTS: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging
“that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the
estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving
spouse of the deceased, contending that 1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by
his death certificate and therefore have an improper venue. 2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over the
petition. CFI denied the motion. CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratix. Thus, Fule elevated the
matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUES:

a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?

b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?

c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

Held:

No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the substance of the
facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and cannot be
waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It
is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be waived or
stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court.
Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a
special administratix.

Pacioles v. Chuatoco-ching
Facts:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth
P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her
husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the RTC a
verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the
duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.”

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the
estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her
inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners.” She then nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.

The intestate court then issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the
estate and then declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner
then submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate
taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,”
considering that there is yet no determination “whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.” Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an “heir
and co-owner.” She prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.” It also ordered that a hearing on
oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties
listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased,
or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’”

Petitioner questrioned this order but the MR was denied. The Petition for Certiorari with the CA. This is a Petition for
Certiorari to the CA.

Issue: Did the lower court acted with GADALEJ in ordering that a hearing be set to determine the ownership of the
properties in an intestate procedding?
Held: YES May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

Ratio::

The general rule is that the intestae court cannot hear and pass upon questions of ownership. However the intestae
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership provisionally and when merely incidentalif the purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory of he estate of the deceased. But this case
does not fall under the above mentioned deviation from the general rule, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering that a hearing be set for determining the ownership of the properties in question.

The facts of this case show that the inventorty is not disputed. In fact, in repondent’s Manifestation and Opposition,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s
inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead
of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties. Also, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative, did not submit his own inventory

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or
should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her
claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not
the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita's estate given that she had Torrens title over such properties. (Miguela cannot even determine in particular
the properties she is claiming.

Tan vs Gedorio

Facts:
Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Sugaand Helen Tan Racoma, who
were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for theappointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim
as special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that
none of the respondentscan be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have
thesame competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of theestate, and that the
nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent
were illegitmate children).However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of
theestate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for review oncertiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selectionof a special administrator.

Ruling:
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refersto the appointment of a
regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as theappointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable.If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of
preference , they should pursue theappointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which
necessitated theappointment of a special administrator.

Comment:
The court was correct in granting the appointment of Romualdo as specialadministrator since it was shown that
Vilma was in remiss after failing to follow the series of directives and extension given to her to account for the
estate.

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ et al., (Executor), petitioner, vs. CA January 29, 1996 G.R. No. 118671 (SpecPro
2016)
Posted on JUNE 24, 2016
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters,
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz

Issue: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts and
obligations, has the authority:

(1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren?

(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs?

(3) Petitioner claims that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate?

Held: 1. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate.

The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court
to sustain the probate court’s order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement
of his estate.

Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
respondents. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1)
after all the debts and obligatiobns have been paid; or (2) only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations.
SC: As executor, he cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof.
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of
the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration.”

KALAW vs IAC

Facts Carlos Lim Kalaw died INTESTATE in 1970. One of his children, Victoria Lim Kalaw, thus filed a petition
for issuance of letters of administration with the CFI Manila, naming Carlos†™surviving heirs as: Ana Lim
Kalaw, Victoria Lim Kalaw, Pura Lim Kalaw and Rosa Lim Kalaw. Ana was the one named by the court as
special adminstratrix in 1974. In 1984, respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with Victoria and Pura, filed a
motion to remove Ana as administratrix of their father†™s negligence and to appoint instead Rosa, on the
ground of Ana†™s negligence in her duties as administratrix, specifically that of failing to render an accounting
of her administration (as required under Sec.8 of Rule 85[footnoteRef:1]) since her appointment, despite several
orders supposedly served to her by the court. Ana opposed this motion, saying that she didn†™t know who to
render the accounting to as the judge assigned to the intestate proceeding was promoted to the CA (resulting in
a vacant sala for a while) while his replacement judge died of a cardiac arrest soon after appointment. [1: Sec. 8
RULE 85. When executor or administrator to render account. - Every executor or administrator shall render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or
paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the
court may require until the estate is wholly settled.] The Trial Court removed Ana as administratrix, pursuant to
Rule 2, Sec. 82[footnoteRef:2], and the IAC affirmed this, hence this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul the lower court†™s decision. [2: Sec. 2. Court may remove or
accept resignation of executor or administrator; Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. - If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an
order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or
otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may
permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there
is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.]
Issue: w/n Ana†™s removal as administratrix of her father†™s estate is valid

Held: YES. †œThe rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from
his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule (Sec. 8 of Rule 85). The only
exception is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the
estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
Furthermore, petitioner†™s excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding was pending was vacant most
of the time deserves scant consideration since petitioner never attempted to file with said court an accounting
report of her administration despite the fact that at one time or another, Judge Sundiam and Judge Tiongco were
presiding over said sala during their incumbency. Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an
accounting report did not purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years,
which justifies petitioner†™s removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her place
as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. †œ The removal of an administrator is within the
discretion of the courts.

BANG VS SY
Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA 194, January 15, 2014, G.R. No. 156407
Civil Law; Succession
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order
dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the
inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure

An appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of
law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order
or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material
issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz.:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken.—An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a
deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in
whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate
in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e)
Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of
a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no
appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment
rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Civil Law; Succession;

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct
the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of
letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
Civil Law; Succession;
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
“to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator,
and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with
wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta, 71 Phil. 66 (1940), the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of
which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of
discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it
be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure;

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial
court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third
parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional
and may be still revised.

Remedial Law; Evidence;

The fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument
did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale
only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se
guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The
presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As the Court has
observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its
favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and
make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of
a contract.

Civil Law; Land Titles;

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a
valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding
the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because: The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to
lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in
the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except
claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land
registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

Civil Law; Succession;

Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that
it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to
the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.

Civil Law; Succession;

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties
was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC
acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent
grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Union Bank vs Santibanez

Facts: Efraim Santibanez and his son Edmund entered into 2 loan agreements with First CountrysideCredit
Corporation (FCCC). February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Edmund, as one of theheirs, was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executeda Joint Agreement dated
July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and takepossession of the three (3) tractors; that
is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence.Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC.On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by
and betweenFCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, assigned all its
assetsand liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. USMB then made demand letters to Edmund andFlorence
for their debts with FCCC.Edmund was nowhere to be found (he went to the US) so all demands went to Florence.
USMB statedthat since she and Edmund executed a joint agreement for the partition of the estate, she is liable
forthe debts. Florence said alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a partythereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approvedby the probate court,
it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the jointagreement. The TC denies the claim of
USMB for lack of merit.

Issue: Can USMB file a claim against Florence and the estate since the estate was already partitionedbetween
Edmund and her?

Held: NO! Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all theproperties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in theinventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with theadministration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate.In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will hasbeen
probated:USMB should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since novalid partition
may be had until after the will has been probated.The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.
USMB, purportedly a creditor of the lateEfraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance withSection 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executoror administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determinewhether it is a proper one which should be allowed.

PNB vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 121597

June 29, 2001

FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and registered in their names. Upon
the husband’s death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan as special administrator of the
deceased’s intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation from PNB to be secured
by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land, which Allan did for P450,000.00 with interest.

For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. During the auction,
PNB was the highest bidder. However, the loan having a payable balance, to claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an
action with the RTC, Balayan, Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.
The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNB’s complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision by dismissing PNB’s appeal for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of
the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same.

HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No

Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990), holding that in extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover
the deficiency from the mortgagor.

However, it must be pointed out that petitioner’s cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The case
at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the
administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the
probate court. As the CA correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The
applicable rule is Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court ( which PNB contends is not.)

In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with [see
notes]. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand, which
in summary [and case law as well] grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive
remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the
mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without
right to file a claim for any deficiency.

Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditor’s option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged
property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate,
after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further
liability remains on the part of respondents and the deceased’s estate.

Rioferio v. CA
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and
Kalookan City.He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada,

legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City.

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the

Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the
contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed
to register them in his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of
a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions,
1. If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of
and he is made a party defendant
Note: Ma’am pointed out that property fraudulently registered in favor of another (like
when paramour registered a land owned by decedent in her favor) still forms part of the
estate of the decedent.