1. Francisco v. House or Rep.

,
G.R. No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the
constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of
impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question — has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

2. Lambino v. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and
by adding Art 18.the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling
law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is
inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complie

s with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms an
d conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show
the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders
The initiative void.2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision,
it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical
change,therefore a constitutes a revision.3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not
Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

3. Gonzales v. Comelec
21 SCRA 774 (1968)

FACTS:

Congress enacted RA 4913, an act providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed
in Resolution of Both Houses Nos. 1 to 3 be submitted for the approval by the people in a
plebiscite to be jointly held with the general elections.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review a resolution of Congress for
unconstitutionality.

HELD:

When proposing an amendment to the Constitution, senators and members of the House of
Representatives are acting as component elements of a constituent assembly who derive their
authority from the Constitution. The issue of whether or not an act of a constituent assembly
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable and subject to judicial review.
4. Santiago v. Comelec
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative
to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated
powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its
deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is
adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid.

HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No.
6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution are declared void.

5. Tolentino v. Comelec
41 SCRA 702 (1971)

FACTS:

The Constitutional Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend the
Constitution in lowering the voting age. COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional
Convention that a plebiscite will be held to ratify the proposed constitutional amendment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Organic Resolution No. 1 and all its organic acts should be rendered NULL and
VOID.

HELD:

YES. The amendment proposed to be submitted to the plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention proposed. The Court holds that plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitted
the same for ratification of the people is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution.
6. In Re: Laureta and Maravilla
148 SCRA 382 (1987)

Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the
her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was
an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in
her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.”
She threatened that she would call for a press conference.Illustre’s letter basically attacks the
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was
previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued,the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was
also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.Still, Illustre wrote
letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind
of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.” True to her threats, Illustre later
filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering
an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their
influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.Atty LAURETA was the counsel
of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court,
nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and
corruption.The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.Now, the SC is charging them with
contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to
dishonor the court.

Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated

Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises
is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate
lawyer,mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We
re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre’s letters, nor with the complaint
filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks suc7. h as “undue
influence”, powerful influence” in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta
distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name.
He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustre’s lawyer, he had control of the proceedi
ngs.SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because
of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches
of government.

7. Demetria vs. Alba

148 SCRA 208 (1987)

Facts: The petitioner sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing
funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides
that: “The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.” As concerned
citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest common to all people
of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the
fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation
of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for
approving appropriations. Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973
Constitution. The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
the petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged
that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under
consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”

Issue:
Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.
Ruling:
No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive
Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without
any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not
only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. "For the love of money is
the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an
even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in
the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution.
8. Angara v. Electoral Commision
G.R. No. L-45081
63 Phil. 139 (1936)

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20,
Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest
filed by Ynsua.

9. Miranda v. Aguirre
G.R. No. 133064
Sept. 16, 1999

Facts: On 5 May 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago,

Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of

Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528

was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent

component city to a component city. Petitioner, Jose Miranda, mayor of Santiago assailed the

constitutionality of RA 8528 due to lack of ratification through plebiscite pursuant to Section 10

Article 10 of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend the petition raises a political question

over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction on juticiable and political question.
Decision: Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of

prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.

The plea that the court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground

that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal

especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial

power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been

a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch

or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable

issue has been made by this Court in many cases.

10. La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos

G.R. No. 127882
Dec. 01, 2004

Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and
declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the
entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs
are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject
FTAA for being similar to service contracts which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our
natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

Pursuant to Section 2 Article XII of the Constitution it effectively banned such service contracts.
Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
[DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben
Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of our natural resources?

Decision: In contrast to express mandate of the President and Congress in the EDU of natural
resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should
the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may
exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Under the doctrine of separation of powers and
due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself
from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum
discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups
to eradicate poverty and answer employment opportunities in the country.

The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief
Executive in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On
the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining
Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements – as well as the subject FTAA.

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11. PACU v. Secretary of Education

G.R. No. L-5279 97 Phil. 806 (1955)
October 31, 1955

Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) request that Act

No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared

unconstitutional due to (1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers

and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; (2) They deprive parents of

their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and (3) Their

provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to

prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

However, the Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has

cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually

operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law

and had no need for relief.

Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy to be settled by the Court

Decision: Petition for prohibition is denied. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a

statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily

involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the

parties concerned. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when

the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against

actual interference, a hypothetical threat is insufficient. Judicial power is limited to the

decision of actual cases and controversies. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of

Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute

a justiciable controversy.

12. Mariano v. Comelec

G.R. No. 119694
March 7, 1995
13. Montesclaros v. Comelec
G.R. No. 152295,
July 9, 2022

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang

Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.”

On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK

elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to

the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of

pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK election

on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050

and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age

to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of

Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19

March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order
seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on

11 March 2002.

Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable

controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present

actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A

proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no

legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA

No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any

provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.

14. Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec, DAR

G.R. No. 93100
June 19, 1997

Facts: Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and

prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law), as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in

Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the

Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by including

the raising of fish and aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating

them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection

clause of the Constitution and therefore void.

Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.

Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20 February 1995

expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In

view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions

has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.

15. Lacson v. Perez

G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001

FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP
to suppress the rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
"rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court. The case at bar is
for prohibition,injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail
the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the
lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly, the instant petitions
have been rendered moot and academic. As to petitioners'claim that the proclamation of a
"state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with
the "rebellion."

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not
based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under
imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary
remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is
not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and
mandamus
is improper at this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued
against them be declared null and voidab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even
expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same
must be made in proper proceeding sinitiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations
ex abundante ad cautelam
in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.
Petition is DISMISSED. However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking
earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting for and in
their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the required judicial
warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of
Malacañang

16. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 159085
Feb. 3, 2004

FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders
have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of
the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place
and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003,
both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the
Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court
may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, the President was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless
arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not
as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless
arrest is present.
17. Pimentel v. Ermita
G.R No. 164978
Oct. 13, 2005

Facts: Gloria Arroyo issued appointments as acting secretary to Arthur Yap (Agriculture),

Alberto Romulo (Foreign Affairs), Raul Gonzales (Justice), Florencio Abad (Education), Avelino

Cruz Jr (National Defence), Rene Villa (Agrarian Reform), Joseph Durano (Tourism) and

Michael Defensor (Environment and Natural Resources) on 23 August 2004 except Yap on 15

August 2004. The respondents took their oaths and assumed duties. The Congress

commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and Senators Aquilino Pimintel, Edgardo Angara,

Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Panfilo LAcson, Alfredo Lim, Jamby

Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III filed petition for certiorari and prohibition against respondents.

The Senators contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV of EO 292 the undersecretary

shall be designated as acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners assert that while

Congress is in session there can be no appointments without first obtaining consent from

Commission on Appointments. When Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria

Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the same respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the President may appoint in an acting secretaries without the consent of

th Commission on Elections while Congress is in session.

Decision: Petition for certiorari and prohibition were dismissed. Due to the appointment of

Gloria Arroyo to the respondents as ad interim immediately after the recess of the Congress, the

petition has become moot. However as an exemption to the rule of mootness, courts will decide

a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review

18. Marbury v. Madison

19. Joya v. PCGG
G.R No. 96541
Aug. 24, 1993

Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon

Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of

82 Old Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique

silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved on 14 August 1990 and the

consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit

submitted audit findings to the President – the assets subject of auction were historical relics

and had cultural significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and

artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to restrain

respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article

XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing

means a personal and substantial interest ion the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings

legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the

Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects were

confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without complying

with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these

were already acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners.

Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said objects that have become

publicly owned.

20. Agan v. Piatco

G.R No 155001

May 5, 2003

Facts: Petitioners filed instant petitions for prohibition seeking to prohibit the Manila

International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and

Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements

executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine

International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1) the Concession Agreement signed on July

12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26, 1999, (3)

the First Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated August 27,

1999, (4) the Second Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated

September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession

Agreement dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).

Issue: Whether or not petitioning employees has legal standing to raise validity of the PIATCO

contracts?

Decision: Petition granted and contracts declared null and void. Petitioner’s have direct and

substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. They

stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right which is protected by the Constitution.

Subsisting agreements between MIA and petitioners stand to be terminated by the PIATCO

contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to petitioners is

legitimate interests sufficient to give them legal standing to file the petition.

21. CHR Employees Assoc. V. CHR

G.R. No. 155336
Nov. 25, 2004

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No.
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to
provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request
for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-
National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of
the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe

recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR
on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing
of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management?

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions,
without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.

1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in

the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is
the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary
Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire
gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA.
The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend
the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to
administer the government of the state.

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law,
but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that
compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without
the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer
the compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix
the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the
rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless,
subject to the review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the
compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can
dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter.
Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors
complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation system
“conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM
must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3,
Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the
President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation,
execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting
systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration of compensation and position
classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification,
and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme
lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously
sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the
species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that
only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with
the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the
constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are
granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent
on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority,
and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning agency.

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is
not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In
essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance
with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In
Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the
CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal
Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the
heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the
special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states
its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in
the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the
DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the
same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their
respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep.
Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.”

22. Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo

G.R. No. 157509
Jan. 18, 2005

Facts: The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its Affiliated Unions filed apetition
for Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185
unconstitutional.The petitioners contended that EO 185 violated their rights and interests as
labor union sand as taxpayers. By the said EO, the administrative supervision over the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including the
executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment.Claiming that the issues does not pose an actual case or
controversy, respondents contend that the petitioners have not specifically cited how EO No.
185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as
taxpayers.Furthermore, they argued that the petitioners lacked legal standing to challenge the
validity of said EO, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are
exempt from paying taxes.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.

Ration Decidendi: Legal standing or locus standi

is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." Since
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury due to EO No. 185, it cannot be said that the aforementioned EO will prejudice their rights
and interests. OnlyNLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary of Labor’s disciplinary
authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue.In their capacity as taxpayers,
petitioners also do not have legal standing on this issue since there is no mention of an
established disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution.The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The challenging of EO 185’s
constitutionality have to wait for the proper party in a proper case before the court may intervene
and entertain.
23. Tanada v. Tuvera
L-63915, 136 SCRA 27|
April 24, 1985|

Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Tañada,Sarmiento,
and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc(MABINI) seeking a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,and or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. There is a
need for Publication of Laws to strengthen its binding force and effect: giving access to
legislative records, giving awareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette,
however, does not contain publications of administrative and executive orders that affect only a
particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all presidential
issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability.” Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15 days unless it is otherwise (for
some do specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette. However, the decree has been misread by many; for it has no juridical force, but a
mere legislative enactment of RA 386.

Issue: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as it
would be essential to the effectivity of the said legislative or executive act that regulates the acts
and conduct of people as citizens.

Held: Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the Official
Gazette, serving as a response to the maxim “ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance.” The
effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right. There
will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which applied the 15-day rule of publication in the
Official Gazette.
24. Chavez v. PEA and Amari
G.R No. 133250
July 9, 2002

Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways
signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
toreclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.On April 25,
1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the
Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding.The
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the
conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are
lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom
Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal.On December 5, 1997, President Ramos
created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees.On April
27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands
to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore,petitioner
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of
the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Petitioner assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billion of pesos in properties of
the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit.

Ratio Decidendi: The petitioner has standing to bring the tax payers suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. This duties are particularly in
answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional
provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain
among Filipino citizens.Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of
transcendental importance to the public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of
paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well
being of the people.The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this
compels the court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution
intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to
transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, bar and the public

25. KMU Labor Center v. Garcia

G.R No. 115381
Dec. 23, 1994

FACTS: In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios
Fernando to allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or
below the LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of regulation
in the transport sector which the government intends to implement and to make progress
towards greater reliance on free market forces.

Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus
Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to
LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order
& to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public
hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.

Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c
was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily
granted by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above
existing authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.

HELD: The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine
of Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable
because a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to
give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs
ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can increase their
rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.
26. IBP v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284
Aug. 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,

President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and

Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and

utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless

violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are

merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation

shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking to declare the

deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General

contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.

Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to

assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?

Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of

law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support

of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing. However, when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside

technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.

27. Executive Secretary v. CA

GR No. 131719, 429 SCRA 781
May 25, 2004

Facts: Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on

15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-

Phil) filed petition for declaratory relief. The alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is

unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal

footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between

recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties,

Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being

based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause,

besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the

Constitution. In their answer to the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil has no legal standing,

it being a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in

the action. It is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-

oriented.

Issue: Whether or not ARCO-Phil has legal standing to assail RA 8042?

Decision: The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its

members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An

association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its

members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its

constituents. However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of

unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.

28. Kilosbayan v. Guingona

G.R. No. 113375, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)
May 5, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioners strongly opose the setting up of the online betting system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical consideration. They submitted that the contract of lease violated Section 1 of
RA 1169, as amended by BP Blg. 42.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioners have locus standi.

HELD:

YES. The Court finds the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
issue it raised is of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved
in many cases. The ramification of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people.
29. ITF v. Comelec
G.R. No. 159139, 420 SCRA 438
Jan. 13, 2004

Facts: RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide

computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated

election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same month and

out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although DOST’s evaluation report

states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five

individuals and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr.

Abalos rejected the protest, hence the present petition

Issue: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case?

Decision: The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, it is of

paramount public interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed to sue when

there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being “deflected to

any improper use,” or when petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds through the

enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”

30. Tolentino v. Comelec
G.R. No. 148334, 420 SCRA 438
Jan. 21 2004

Facts: After becoming president on January 2001, Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofista

Guingona as vice-president. After confirmation as VP, Resolution 84 was passed by the Senate

calling the COMELEC to fill the vacancy with a special election tobe held simultaneously with

the 2001 May regular election. It also provided that the candidate garnering the 13th highest

vote will serve for the unexpired term of Guingona. Petitioners, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo

Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming the winner. They contend that it is without

jurisdiction because it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in (special election)

due to this the people voted without distinction in one election for 13 seats irrespective of term.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s have standing to maintain suit?

Decision: In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners assert harm classified as

“generalized grievance.” They failed to establish direct injury they suffered from the said

governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its

discretion to give due course to voter’s suit involving the right of suffrage.
31. Ople v. Torres
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
293 SCRA 141 (1998)

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National Computerized

Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996.

Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He

contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a

usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?

Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator,

petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of

Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the

Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The

blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of

executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
32. People v. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685, 65 Phil 56
Nov. 16, 1937

Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in a criminal case where he was convicted.

Cu Unjieng appealed up to the Supreme Court but was denied. On 27 November 1936 he filed

fan application for probation under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine

Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition that he is innocent of the crime of which he was

convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future.

The CFI of Manila denied the petition on 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the seventh branch of CFI

of Manila, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. The Fiscal of the City of Manila and the

private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937 that Act 4221, assuming that it has

not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of

section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws

for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11

of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or

otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the

City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Decision: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of

the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that

the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest

in the case. If Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose

name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater

import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound

inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-

settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

33. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560
Nov. 19, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
itcrosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and
itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.The focal point of the case is
the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.Particularly, this terms are: combination,
series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity
of the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law
using the facial challenge.

Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness.
The petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the
law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that
is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute
to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.On the other hand, overbreadth
doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict
scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to
legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed
for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is
evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.The crime of
plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’decision to include it
among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court holds the
plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

34. Umali v. Guingona

G.R. No. 131124, 305 SCRA 533 (1993)
March 29, 1999

Facts: Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

However, a confidential memorandum against him was sent to President Ramos and thus

forwarded to Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for investigation. Umali

complied with the pleadings and hearings set by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not raise

clarficatory questions during the hearing. PCAGC foud prima facie evidence to support the

charges and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He appealed to the Office of

the President but was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not accorded due

process and deprived of security of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the

decision and was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of

PCAGC as a government agency.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest opportunity?
Decision: In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the constitutionality of

PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the RTC. It was

certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings.

35. Arceta v. Mangrobang

G.R. No. 152895
June 15, 2004

Facts: On 16 September 1998, Ofelia Arceta issued a check to Oscar Castro payable to cash

for the amount of Php 740k even with full knowledge that the account has no sufficient fund for

the said amount. The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank. The City Prosecutor of

Metro Manila charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). She did not moved

for the charge to be dismissed and pleaded not guilty. She then petitioned for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 citing the Lozano doctrine.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutionality of BP Blg 22 is the lis mota of the case?

Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. Every law has in its favour the presumption

of constitutionality. To justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
constitution and not one that is speculative, doubtful or argumentative. Petitioner failed to show

that BP Blg 22 by itself or by implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution.

36. Macias v. COmelec

G.R. No. L-18684, 3 SCRA 1 (1961)
September 14, 1961

Facts: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of law (R.A. 3040) that apportions representative
districts in this country on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned
districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents aver
there were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and alege
to be constitutional.

Issues: Whether or not in apportionment law that is disproportion in representation is

unconstitutional

Held: Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts
than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional
representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is “arbitrary and capricious and against
the vital principle of equality.”
37. Tan v. Comelec
G.R. No. 73155, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
July 11, 1986

Facts: Batas Pambansa Bilang 885 was enacted creating a new province in the Island of

Negros to be known as the province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on 03 December

1985. Patricio Tan filed a case for prohibition to stop COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite

and implementing the same. Due to Christmas holiday, this was not acted upon and the

plebiscite was held and ratified only to inhabitants of Negros del Norte excluding the rest of

Negros Occidental province. Petitioner move to stop the implementation of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not the creation of the new province, Negros del Norte was constitutional?
Decision: BP Bilang 885 declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the new province

Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials were declared null and void. Pursuant to

Article 11 Section 3, it si imperative to obtain approval of majority of votes in a plebiscite in the

units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial

alteration of the boundaries. The boundary of Negros Occidental would be altered by the

division of its exiting boundaries to create the new province. There is no way to reconcile in

holding a plebiscite that eliminates the participation of the two component political units.

38. Veterans Fed. Party v. Comelec

G.R 136781
Oct. 6, 2000

Facts: Under the party-list system, a voter elects, apart from the district representative, a

registered party, organization or coalition that will be entitled to a maximum of three party-list

representatives in the House of Representatives depending on its obtaining a required

percentage of the national vote. RA 7941 provides for the manner of selection for the party-list

representatives.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent party-lists are entitled to a arty-list seat despite their

failure to get at least 2% of the national vote in the election?

Decision: Petition partially granted. 14 sititing party-list representatives were affirmed. The

COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling the 38 parties entitled to a party-list seat as it

violated RA 7941 requirements of 2% threshold and proportional representation. The imposition

of threshold ensures that only parties having sufficient number of constituents deserving

representation are actually represented in Congress.

39. Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

G.R. No. 147589
June 26, 2001

Facts: Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the COMELEC.Petitioner seeks the

disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections arguing that the
party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented and not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
and organizations
Held: Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major political parties cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections merely on the ground that they are political parties. But while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-
list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they
are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.

40. Aquino v. Comelec

G.R. No. 120265, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)
September 18, 1995

Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of Makati stating

that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy was opposed he filed

another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been residing in Makati for more than a year

by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s disqualification and
garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation.

COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to qualify he

must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place

“where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home” where he eventually intends

to return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of residence for purposes

of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon.

41. Marcos v. Comelec

G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)
September 18, 1995

Facts: Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the 1st district of Leyte stating that

she has been residing there for seven months. Incumbent, Cirilo Montejo filed for motion for

disqualification of Marcos for failing the required residency. Marcos amended her certificate of
candidacy to residing in the district since childhood. COMELEC decided in favour of Montejo.

Marcos received the highest number of votes and her proclamation was suspended, hence the

petition.

Issue: Whether or not Marcos failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: COMELEC resolution was set aside and directed to proclaim Marcos as duly elected

representative of the 1st district of Leyte. The essential distinction between residence and

domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the

resident has taken his abode ends. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if

his intent is to leave then as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.

42. Torayno v. Comelec

G.R. No. 137329
Aug. 9, 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995

election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis

Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record in
Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of

residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the

preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for

disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral

post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC

upheld its decision.

Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming

choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the

manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano

was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even

paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the

possibility of a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community from

seeing an elective office to serve that community.”

43. Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577
Nov. 18, 1998
Facts: The Senate convening on 27 July 1998, Senator Marcelo Fernan and Francisco Tatad

were nominated for president. Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2 and declared President of

Senate. Senator Ople was president pro tempore and Senator Drilon as majority leader were

likewise elected. Senator Tatad manifested that he will assume minority leader. This was

contested by Senator Flavier stating that their party being the minority group will determine the

holder of the said post. Thereafter, they voted for Senator Guingona. Hence the petition for quo

warranto by Tatad.

Issue: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the constitution in the election of Senate

officers?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The term “majority” simple means “the number greater than half

or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional

clause mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the

Senators.

44. Avelino v. Cuenco

G.R. No. L-2821, 83 Phil. 17 (1949)
March 4, 1949

FACTS: Senator Tañada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against
the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator
Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with
his followers, leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the respondent,
Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings
against Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because twelve members
did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political
question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a
political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten
senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution
that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution
been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction
of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and
Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor
twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares
that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the
members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the Court found it
injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about
tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

45. Pacete v. Comm. On Appointments

40 SCRA 58 (1971)
Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,

Cotabato. He assumed office on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made during recess

of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965 session and was unanimously confirmed

on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice advised him to vacate his post

on the ground that his appointment was by-passed. Pacete clarified the matter with Commission

on Appointments.COA took no action and the Secretary of Justice still moved to Pacete to

vacate his post and withheld his salaries.

Issue: Whether or not a motion for consideration with COA without being acted on is a new

one?

Decision: Petition granted. The constitutional requirement is clear; there must be either a

rejection by COA or nonaction on its part. Pacete’s confirmation became final and irrevocable

upon the adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no rule of the Commission as to a motion for

reconsideration could have the forece and effect of defeating the constitutional provision that an

ad interim appointment is effective until disapproved by COA or until next adjournment of the

Congress.
46. Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. No.127255
Aug. 14, 1997

Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by

imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were

challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee after submitting its report

to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and

was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was

defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was

approved on its third reading.

Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?

Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal

department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks

the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political

arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their

own department.
47. Alejandrino v. Quezon
G.R. No. 22041, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)
Sept. 11, 1924

Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation

of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He

was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He filed

mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from executing

the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be

directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court

lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

48. Osmena v. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)
October 28, 1960

FACTS: Congressman Osmeña took the for on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech,
entitled ‘A Message to Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations oF bribery
against the President. Being unable to produce evidence thereoF, Osmeña was then Found to
be guilty oF serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives. Osmeña argues that
the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, For words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned.

ISSUE: Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation oF Section 15, Article VI oF
the Constitution?(Read Par. 3 oF Section 16 oF the 1987 Constitution)

RULING: NO. Said disciplinary action is not in violation oF the Constitution. Section 15, Article
VI oF the Constitution provides that “For any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or
Members oF the House oF Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.” Although
exempt From prosecution or civil actions For their words uttered in Congress, the members oF
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itselF. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” in Congress.Petition was dismissed.
49. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 126055
April 19, 2001
50. De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 130240
Feb. 5, 2002

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not
comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to
appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration,
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated
by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29
August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia,
Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P.
Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma.
Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary
measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019.

Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted
to upon the filing of valid Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of

powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of
suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline
its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts
of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court.
On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-
imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.