UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY G.R. No.

127768, November 19,1999

Thursday, January 29, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Commercial Law

Facts: On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United Airlines, checked in together with his
luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter humiliation,
an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum weight
allowance per bag and that he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front
of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repair his things and transfer some of them to the light
ones. Respondent acceded but his luggage was still overweight. Petitioner billed him overweight charges
but its employee reused to honor the miscellaneous charges under MCD which he offered to pay with.
Not wanting to leave without his luggage, he paid with his credit card. Upon arrival in manila, he
discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. In a letter dated October 16,
1989, he notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement. Petitioner paid for his loss based
on the maximum liability per pound. Respondent considered the amount grossly inadequate. He sent
two more letters to petition but to no avail. On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Airline. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29
of the Warsaw Convention. Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of Article 29, “the method of
calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.”

Issues:

1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws?

2) Has the respondent’s cause of action prescribed?

Held: 1) No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or
ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions do not regulate
or exclude liabilities for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary type of damage. Neither may the Convention be
invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefore3 beyond the limits et by said convention. Likewise, we have held that the
Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not
regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carriers
employees is found or established.

2) No. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or
goods) is well within the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st cause of action (an action for
damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent’s rights
as passengers) clearly is not.

The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not
to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum, forecloses the application
of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was indented only to let local
laws determine whether an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.) Since, it
is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the 2-yr time frame his 2nd cause of
action must be barred.

However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because
petitioner gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True,
respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when petitioner denied his claims
but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be
faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for
damages should be filed within 2 years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be
applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airlines itself. Thus,
respondent’s 2nd cause of action cannot be considered as time barred.