Title X Case No. 1 People V. Mateo GR 198012 April 22, 2012

Title X Case No.
1
People V. Mateo
GR 198012 April 22, 2012
This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02366,
which denied the appeal brought therewith and affirmed the May 31, 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40 in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176598 and 99-176599 to 603. The RTC convicted Angel
Mateo y Jacinto (Mateo) and Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a. "Vicky Mateo" (appellants) of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and of five counts of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private complainants, namely, Abe] E. Balane
(Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgiiio N.
Concepcion (Virgiiio), met appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas
employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese firms, promised them
employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could
facilitate private complainants' employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three weeks. However,
after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants failed to
secure any overseas employment for them. Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants' money. This
prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a
Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Thereupon, the
private complainants filed their Complaint and executed their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable
cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa 4 and accordingly filed the corresponding
Informations5 for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate car importer and not a recruiter.
Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first
time at the Prosecutor's Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision6 rendered on May 31, 2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment, this Court finds both accused ANGEL
MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MADINA a.k.a. "VICKY MATEO" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay P500,000.00 fine
each as well as to indemnify private complainants (1) Manuel Oledan the sum of P25,000.00, and (2) Emilio A.
Cariaga, (3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N. Concepcion and (5) Victorio D. Flordelizathe sum of PI 8,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176599, 99-176600,
99-176601, 99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of Estafa and each accused is hereby sentenced in each
case to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) shall be furnished with certified copy of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the
crimes for which they were charged. They contended that Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received
money from him; that there is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money
he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding office inside the van of Abel cannot
be easily accepted; and that their transactions with Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel
documents.
Page 1 of 101
The CA, however, denied appellants' appeal in its Decision 8 dated February 17, 2011, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 31, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
Per Resolution10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court required both parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. Appellants filed their Supplemental Brief, 11 while appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, opted not to file any and just adopted the appellee's brief it filed before the CA. 12
The Court's Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the person charged undertook any
recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have
undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised private complainants employment in Japan for a fee. This
factual finding was affirmed by the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge." 14 And when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 15 Second, the
Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was established that
there were five complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly
proved by the prosecution.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they received money from the private complainants deserves no
credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the
definition of "illegal recruitment" under the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even if there is
no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the former's respective testimonies and
affidavits clearly narrate the latter's involvement in the prohibited recruitment.16
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law]
may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code].
The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation." 17 All these
elements are likewise present in this case. As aptly held by the CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private complainants by making it appear as
though they had the authority and resources to send them to Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for
them in Japan for which they would be hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason or on the
strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fee,
documentation and hotel accommodations. All these representations were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the
appellants must be made liable under par 2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the complainants must necessarily fail. As noted by the
RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the transactions, serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one
keeping the money entrusted by the private complainants to appellants. She would also often pacify the private
complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of the amounts given and repeatedly assure them
they would be deployed to Japan. In short, she was an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo
in the illegal recruitment of the private complaintants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower courts' conviction of appellants for the crimes charged.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to award interest on the money judgment in Criminal
Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore,
Page 2 of 101
imposes interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case
No. 99-176598 shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the Decision qf the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137, Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from
December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the
funds of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and
appropriated the same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by
the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts
then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to
Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another
was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she
made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out
a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution. 3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified theft filed against
her, allowing her to pilfer from WPESLAI’S funds a total of ₱6,268,300.00, brokendown into the following amounts:
………(deleted ….)
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30 cases went
thru trial. The remaining 27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the basis of which these were
submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated, among others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy
administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the pre-trial conference and approved by the
Honorable Court, that the actualtrial and presentation of evidence will be done only on the first three (3) counts of the
cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination
of the hearing onsaid three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27)
counts, considering that all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same methods or modus operandi used
in committing the crime charged, and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.] 4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Page 3 of 101
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to suffer the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of ₱250,000.00;
of ₱200,000.00;
of ₱55,000.00;
of ₱55,000.00;
of ₱85,000.00;
of ₱350,000.00;
of ₱250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one (1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of ₱250,000.00;
amount of ₱60,000.00;
amount of ₱150,000.00;
amount of ₱50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of ₱4[6],300.00;
amount of ₱205,000.00;
amount of ₱200,000.00;
amount of ₱500,000.00;
amount of ₱500,000.00;
amount of ₱400,000.00;
amount of ₱300,000.00;
amount of ₱500,000.00;
amount of ₱65,000.00;
amount of ₱47,000.00;
amount of ₱500,000.00;
amount of ₱400,000.00;
amount of ₱500,000.00.
Page 4 of 101
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers ofthe
association. The RTC noted that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of the association, a
circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in
the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18 February 2011, the CA denied her appeal and
affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when accusedappellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks
issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be redeposited to another account of
WPESLAI. Second, the property belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI. Third, the
taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse
showing that the funds were credited to another account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account.
Fourth, the taking was done with intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the fundsby
means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits
were made in the normal course of business and with the approval of WPESLAI. Fifth, the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with
grave abuse of confidence considering that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence. 7
The Court’s Ruling
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30 cases are incorrect
and, therefore, must be modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and
Page 5 of 101
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals,
or other forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear
in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by reason of
dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high
degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused." 9
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling, managing,
receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association.1âwphi1 Cahilig’s
responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing
disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-
2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are ₱20,000.00, ₱46,300.00, ₱25,000.00, ₱30,000.00,
₱40,000.00, and ₱35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Page 6 of 101
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below ₱12,000.00. Hence, if the crime charged had been
simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least, prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Since it was established that the crime was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310
provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion
perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In lieu of the penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-
2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The judgment to indemnify the amounts in
each of the corresponding charges stands.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Case No. 3
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision 1 and the
May 6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol
(Magsumbol), questioning his conviction for Theft.
The Facts
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio
Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The
Information indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real identities are still unknown and whose
physical descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and who are all still at large, and mutually helping
one another, with intent togain and without the consent of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees from the
coconut plantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (₱44,400.00),
Philippine currency, belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount. 3
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr.
Menandro Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00
o’clock in the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land
located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting
down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not
attempt to stop the men from cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the
site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied
by SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject
trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They took photographs of the stumps left by
the men.
Page 7 of 101
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol,
Barangay Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its claim of
innocence for all the accused.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees
within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that
he had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting incident
happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and
Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut
trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that
morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the
coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely
supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share
from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut
treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work
being done thereat. Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees were
planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due
to his refusal to accede to latter’s request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present criminal
charge.4
Ruling of the RTC
On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude
the guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by the
accused in the face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not
believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on account of his relationship with
accused Magsino and Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo
Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby
sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of
Norberto Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to
accused Ramirez.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC before the CA insisting that the
prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged.
They posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime of
simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was presented to prove the element of intent to gain. 6
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of law by
the RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the view, however, that
the crime committed in this case would not fall under the general definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes theft of damaged property.
The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who was not
shown to have been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC that
Atanacio’s testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with Magsino and
Magsumbol, which provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of intent to
Page 8 of 101
gain, the CA stated that the mere fact that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into
coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants
Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day, as maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of
Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱13,200.00).
SO ORDERED.7
The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but their motion was denied by the CA
on May 6, 2013.
Issues:
Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court and imputes to the CA the following
ERRORS:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT

TREES THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and
II
MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE
AT HAND.8
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is true that the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is observed if there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that would have
cast doubt on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC, while the elements in
turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench,
petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of damaged property under
paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
Page 9 of 101
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.
[Emphasis Supplied]
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed
or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for
which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. 10 Was
criminal intent substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution
claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense,
on the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol
and his co-accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that delimit the boundaries between the adjacent
lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to
delineate the boundary of his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and competent
evidence was adduced to substantiate their respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and
considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled
coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent to
gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent
could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important point
in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut
down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his
land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the felled trees; that he informed
Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the damages that he might have sustained as some of his
(Menandro’s) trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his offer of
compensation and replied that a case had already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an
audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk to him anymore.13
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable
and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family
relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight. 14To
warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the
relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the
witness to incriminate the accused falsely.15
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his credibilty.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that
while Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacio’s brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the
accused and the accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his decision, why
would then Atanacio support one over the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed
ordered Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is convinced that Atanacio was telling the
truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on the land
co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down some
of Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following pronouncement in the
case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent
can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus
Page 10 of 101
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule,
ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The
exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to
criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and
imprudence.17
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought prior
permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad
daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused would still
approach the barangay captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals
would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the
commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize
the prosecution evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony,
that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced must be
closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows from moral certainty that
guilt has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1âwphi1 The prosecution miserably failed to establish proof
beyond reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with
malice and deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.
Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor
of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 4
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because not only the
rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the
accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges
must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their
experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-
Vergara et al., Respondents," as well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution 3 denying reconsideration of the assailed
judgment.
Page 11 of 101
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. 1427
ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the
receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate under Section 30 of Republic
Act 7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past due loans receivable by
sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among
these borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained a loanof
[P]10 Million each. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the
signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied,
much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine
Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account
of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current
account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of
CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private respondents in
relation to the purported loans of Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding
probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations 5 against the private
respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal
cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution
presented its evidence. After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the
private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another branch. The case
was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge. 6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private respondents’ Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence 7praying
for the dismissal of the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the private respondents’ Demurrer
to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the
accused in these cases. On July20, 2007, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319
moved for a reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was denied by the respondent RTC judge in an
Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) depositors’
money appear to have been lost – which must have contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no
motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’ demurrer to evidence was filed by the
handling public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the same lacked Campanilla’s approval
and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the RTC 11 does not bear Campanilla’s
approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was merely furnished with a copy of the motion by registered
mail.12 Thus, while the prosecution’s copy of PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration13 bore Campanilla’s subsequent
approval and conformity, that which was actually filed by PDIC with the RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the
public prosecutor’s written approval and/or conformity.
Page 12 of 101
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed anoriginal Petition for
Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the
prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which
undoubtedly showed that respondents committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following decretal portion: WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the
respondent RTC judge are AFFIRMED and deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court
became final since the prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached.
The CA declared thus –
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial
court has already attained finality. This Order was received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3,
2007 and by the Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who
has the authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can file a petition
for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or
before September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this matter in the case of Mobilia
Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended
party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible,
insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of
an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such
motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the offended party or private
complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar
as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the
conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or
offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."16
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was denied its day in court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was
afforded every opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed the crime
charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify, based on personal knowledge,
that the loan documents were falsified by the respondents; that the prosecution should not have relied on "letters and
unverified ledgers," and it "should have trailed the money from the beginning to the end;" 17 that while the
documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan documents were falsified, it has not been shown who
falsified them. It added that since only two of the alleged 13 manager’s checks were being questioned, there arose
reasonable doubt as to whether estafa was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is an "inescapable
possibility that an honest mistake was made in the preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks since these
checks were made out to the names of different payees and not in the names of the alleged applicants of the
loans."18 The appellate court added –
Page 13 of 101
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after they were deposited to the
checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go. There is only a vague reference that the money was used to
fund the personal checks earlier issued by x x x Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who were
the recipients of these personal checks and if these personal checks were negotiated and honored. With all the
resources of the public prosecutor’s office, the petitioner should have done a better job of prosecuting the cases filed
against the private respondents. It isa shame that all the efforts of the government will go for naught due to the
negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of evidence in a criminal case. 19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence, these are mere errors of
judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no longer be reviewed lest respondents be placed in double
jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the CA stood its ground.
Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT –
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN

GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT
CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND NOT OF
JURISDICTION.20
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed July 2,2007
Order of the trial court granting respondents’ demurrer – that is, by "joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the latter’s
July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that while it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20,
2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it had only until July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it received
the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the Order only on July 5, 2007; it pleads
thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion should not prejudice the interests of the State and the People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required Motion for Reconsideration, it may
have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition for Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs
the Court to excuse its mistake in the nameof public interest and substantial justice, and in order to maintain stability
in the banking industry given that the case involved embezzlement of large sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that demurrer was proper. It claims
that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it has shown that respondents were responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting respondents’ demurrer was null
and void to begin with, and thus it could not have attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission,
the private prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration contained the public prosecutor’s written conformity, and that
while it may be saidthat the public prosecutor’s motion was two days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof
and passed upon its merits; by so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public prosecutor’s action of adopting the
private prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it should therefore besaid that the
prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith the CA on January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-
day period, counted from November 5, 2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s October 19,
2007 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Page 14 of 101
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy against the assailed Orders of the
trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately
final and executory. It adds that the denial of its right to due process is apparent since the trial court’s grant of
respondents’ demurrer was purely capricious and done with evident partiality, despite the prosecution having
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Petitioner thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D.
Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their
Comment22 that the trial court’s grant of their demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent
prosecution for the same offense would thus violate their constitutional right against double jeopardy. They add
thatsince the public prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order, it
could not have validly filed an original Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that the prosecution and
the private prosecutor jointly filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court because the
public prosecutor’s copy of PDIC’smotion was merely sent through registered mail. Therefore if it were true that the
public prosecutor gave his approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving his copy of the motion
through the mail, and not at the time the private prosecutor actually filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial
court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant of their demurrer to evidence is
based on a fair and judicious determination of the facts and evidence bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the
prosecution failed to meet the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of respondents. They
argue thatthere is no evidence to show that OCBC released loan proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan proceeds were then deposited in the account of respondent Go. Since
no loans were granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to misappropriate. With respect to the two
manager’s checks issued to Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International, respondents contend that these may
not beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loan application
because these checks were not in the name of the alleged borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as
payees. Besides, these two checks were never negotiated with OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since they
did not bear the respective indorsements or signatures and account numbers of the payees; thus, they could not be
considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited with Go’s account with OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan proceeds in Go’s OCBC account
is questionable, since under banking procedure, a cash deposit slip may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it
has not been shown who prepared the said cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity and
authenticity of the other documentary evidence presented, such as the Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof, 23 Schedule of
Returned Checks and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not been shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds,
and that a demand was made upon him for the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents against the
respondents are based on the theory that in 1997, fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. – were approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these
fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and
ZetaInternational – without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s checks – together with
several others totaling ₱120,819,475.0024 – were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC
Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.
Page 15 of 101
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a commercial bank, was ordered
closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC was designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s
affairs, assets and liabilities, records, and collected the bank’s receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent demand letters to the bank’s
debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained
unsecured loans of ₱10 million each, and which apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand letters,
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans from OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its
designated representative, claimed that while it is true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the
application after it was granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to Timmy’s,
Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the signatures therein of the corporate officers were forgeries. In their defense
and to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s corporate officers executed affidavits and furnished official documents such as
their passports and the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation containing their respectivesignatures to show PDIC that
their purported signatures in the OCBC loan documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the matter, PDIC
came to the conclusion that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were indeed falsified. 25
On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc. vehemently denied thatit
applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded that the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus.
Moreover, PDIC discovered other bogus loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go, who was likewise
OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, or SVP, and Chief Operating Officer, or
COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu – approved a ₱10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s,
Inc. After deducting finance charges, advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan proceeds amounting
to ₱9,985,075.00 covered by Manager’s Check No. 0000003347 27 dated February 5, 1997.28 The face of the check
bears the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the purported
loan of Timmy’s, Inc.29 However, the payee thereof was not the purported borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta
International". Likewise, on even date, Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 30 for ₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its
face is indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477", which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was made payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but to
"Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5, 1997, it appears that the two
checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling ₱120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks,
the word "PAID" was stamped, and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing
thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was
presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which among others included the
₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch,
apparently on instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC Cash Deposit Slip 34 dated
February 5, 1997, with the corresponding machine validation thereon indicating that the deposit was made at 6:19
p.m.35 The funds were credited to Go’s savings account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go from his personal OCBC
Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After
Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were encashed
and the proceeds thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 withautomatic
transferfeature to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds were automatically transferred from the
said savings account to the current account, which atthe time contained only a total amountof ₱26,332,303.69.
Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 was credited with ₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account
registered a balance of ₱147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored personal checks were thenpresented for
clearing, and were subsequently cleared that sameday, or on February 5, 1997. 38 Apparently, they were partly funded
by the ₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and
0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998, Go issued and sent a letter39 to
the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director of the Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically requesting
that the BSP refrain from sending any communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among others. He
Page 16 of 101
manifested that he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of the accounts under investigation and
examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of
frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or
official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must
prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused." 41 Thus,
when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the
matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." 43 As to effect, "the grant of a
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or
excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and
void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain
exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered
void, as this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s
demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court
in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it
granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal void. 45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal
of an accused should be able toclearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was
deprived of its authority to dispense justice."46
In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where
necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice." 47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s
July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry
and public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the
indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be
the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the
prosecution’s evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the
case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the banking industry is
impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection and engaged in
intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
Page 17 of 101
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code 48 are: "(a)
that money,goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust oron commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation orconversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand
by the offended party to the offender."49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return the same; thus, the term
"demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simpleloan. Article
1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x savingsx x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions
shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank
and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and
the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary nature of banking."This fiduciary
relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe ‘high standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed
written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family." 51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with respect to the bank’s funds, and he
holds the same in trust or for administration for the bank’s benefit. From this, it may beinferred that when such bank
president makes it appear through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact such
individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the loan proceeds and converts the same, estafa is
committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s Check Nos.0000003340 and
0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds which clearly belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then
deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the
named payee therein. Next, the money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-
000015-0 and used to fund his seven previously-issued personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48, which checks
were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the evidence strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his
own personal use and benefit. "The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of
another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. x x x In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the
items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.Thus, the merepresumption of misappropriation or
conversion is enough to conclude thata probable cause exists for the indictment x x x." 53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the misappropriation of OCBC’s
funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the bank has been placed under receivership, and the
depositors’ money is no longer under their unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank demanded the return of the funds, it has
nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a
criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or
property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of
misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not an element of the offense of estafa through
abuse of confidence; even a verbal query satisfies the requirement. 55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court,
demand was not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa through abuse of confidence, orunder paragraph
1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document under Art. 172 57 are: "(1) that
the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act
of falsification is committed ina commercial document." 58 As to estafa through falsification of public, official or
commercial documents, it has been held that –
Page 18 of 101
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing Estafa, because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official
or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified
public, official or commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.59
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval memorandums, and the resultant
promissory notes and other credit documents – by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting or signatures
constitute falsification of commercial and public documents.
As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice it to state that as the
beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. The fact that previously, his personal
checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored, and the day after, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 was
immediately credited to his account, which included funds from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347 or the loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
accounts, bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents [which he used to] his
advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises." 60
x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or
uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings account, his subsequent
withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight at the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter more
than sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the falsification. 61
Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As OCBC SVP and COO and
member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed
the February 2, 1997 OCBC Disclosure Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions to
deposit the proceeds of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Go’s OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she was a signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate Accounts – Account
Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval Memorandum and recommended the approval of
the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order – concluded that based on the evidence
adduced, the respondents could not have falsified the loan documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. since the individuals who assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged were not presented
incourt to testify on such claim; that the prosecution witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the
designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto
Branch – were not present when the loan documents were executed and signed, and thus have no personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers of OCBC,
respondents could not be expected to have prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests
otherwise; it shows that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The loan
documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident in the record, the trial court committed
substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
Page 19 of 101
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and
0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s, Inc., respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc.
and Zeta International, and there are no documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan proceeds to these two
entities, then it cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it
is doubtful that the two manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for deposit in Go’s savings account, since
theydo not contain the required indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and individuals/payees
who received the checks and the proceeds thereof, and the respective account numbers of the respondents; and the
checks were presented beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that a cash deposit slip – and
not a check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the checks raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that
the manager’s checks were deposited and credited to Go’s savings account.
The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of mere "letters and
unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was
made" in the preparation and issuance of Manager’s CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two
checks are claimed to be just a few of several checks – numbering thirteen in all – the rest of which werenever
questioned by the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added that the prosecution should have presented further
evidence as to where the money went after being deposited inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying thus the
recipients of Go’spersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank
accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if
not rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may be seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of petitioner was money held in trust or
administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that
petitioner became the owner of the ₱8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if
the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information
for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification,
made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it
cannot be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s fiduciary
with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands. 67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to entities other than the alleged
borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported
Timmy’s, Inc.’s and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned to them that
are printed on the face of the checks; the connection between the checks and the purported loans is thus established.
In the same vein, the CA’s supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made
inthe preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the bottom line is that they were
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof were deposited in Go’s bank savings and current accounts and
used to fund his personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that the recipients of Go’s personal
checks be identified. For purposes of proving the crime, it has been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own
personal use when they were deposited in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the funds were
debited from his account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on the
supposed loan documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was proper.
They are both public and private documents which may be received in evidence; notably, petitioner’s documentary
evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the
presumption remains that "therecording of private transactions has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary course
of business has been followed."69
Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the viabilityand full payment" of the
accounts under examination – which included the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others –
is an offer of compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.70
Page 20 of 101
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x
x.71
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court, any dissection of the truly
questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which should merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a
patent ignorance of procedure, if not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – becomes
unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or conforméto PDIC’s Motion for
Reconsideration should have rendered the trial court’s assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the fact that
they were inherently null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in court and their
right to exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could have caused immeasurable damage to the
banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or
final order; it may simply be ignored."72 More appropriately, the following must be cited:
x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not
merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about
by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law
against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law. 73
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be exercised with caution,
taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be
vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private
complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be
wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x." 74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January 22, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the
said cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 5
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013

vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment 2of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
Page 21 of 101
The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on
the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even ("manabla ko"). 3 Afterwards, he uttered
that he would burn his house.4
At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went
out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its
contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who
was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the
air.6 The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. 7
Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric also returned to his
house to save his belongings.9
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the incident, and
concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional. 10 Barangay
Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City
Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing the damage.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. 12 He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 p.m. on
December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he
went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He
denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots
heard by his neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the appellant carry a
revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-law, stated that he and
the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire
broke out.16
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. 18 In its
judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings since these
findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that the totality of the
presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive,
Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no
direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction
provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial
Page 22 of 101
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused."19
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable
conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron
lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while
he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house;
third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his
house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house;
fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his
house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire
marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been
intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his
house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in
his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual
whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural
order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and
firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to
note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep
inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s
indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with
his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any
improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no
misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended, which reads:
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually
gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental
to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building
or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or for
public use, entertainment or leisure.1âwphi1
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
Page 23 of 101
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives
or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.
In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons."20
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law
provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in
Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes simple arson with a lesser
penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than
destructive arson.23
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been proven in the present case.
The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited
houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
the trial and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection
which stated that damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification
from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses were used as
dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the
appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does
not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts
punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his
own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the
criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts
committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.
Page 24 of 101
The Proper Penalty
Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which
has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose
maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not adequately reflect any
concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek recovery of actual damages, it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable.25
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson under Section
3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and
(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 6
G.R. No. 163437 February 13, 2008
ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ON appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming
that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, convicting petitioner Ernesto Pideli of theft in the amount
of P49,500.00 belonging to his brother’s business partner. The appeal zeroes in on the questions of ownership,
unlawful taking and intent to gain. In short, is it estafa or theft?
The Facts
Sometime in March 1997, Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership
agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project at Tongcalong, Tinongdan Dalupirip Road, Itogon,
Benguet. Placido and Wilson agreed to undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL), the contractor
awarded the development project by the Department of Public Works and Highways. 3
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of
his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. Petitioner was an
employee of the Provincial Planning and Development Office of Benguet, likewise based in La Trinidad. With the said
Page 25 of 101
arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an assortment of construction
materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract.4
On November 17, 1997, after the completion of the project, ACL summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting.
Placido, Wilson and petitioner were in attendance. At the meeting, ACL management informed Placido and Wilson
that the final payment for the work that they have done would be withheld. It was learned that they failed to settle their
accountabilities with the MTFSH.5
Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the accountable ACL personnel, a certain Boy Candido, to
facilitate the release of their payment. They assured Boy that the matter of the unpaid obligations to MTFSH has
been resolved. Boy acceded to the request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido and Wilson,
amounting to P222,732.00.6
Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income of P130,000.00.
Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as his share in the project. Petitioner,
however, advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the hardware
store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with express instructions to pay
MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them.7
The following day, or on November 18, 1997, Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to
obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly, petitioner
informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier. 8 Despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract. 9
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli.
Eventually, an Information bearing the following allegations was instituted against petitioner:
The undersigned accuses ERNESTO PIDELE (sic) of the crime of THEFT, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1977, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain (sic) and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away, cash money in the amount of P65,000.00, belonging to PLACIDO CANSIO (sic) y
TALUKTOK, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of SIXTY-
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Then, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the People portraying the foregoing facts was supplied by private complainant Placido, the lone
prosecution witness.
Petitioner’s defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Ernesto Pideli, 43 years old, married, government employee and a resident of Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet.
He is a government employee at the Provincial Planning and Development Office, Capitol, La Trinidad,
Benguet. He was first employed at the Provincial Engineer’s Office on April 11, 1978. Sometime in 1980, he
was appointed as Project Development Officer of the Provincial Planning and Development Office and
continuously up to the present.
Wilson Pideli is his brother. In 1997, his brother Wilson had a construction project along Tinongdan, Itogon,
Benguet. His brother asked him if he knows of a hardware which can extend him credit for construction
materials. He approached the manager of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware, Mrs. Editha Paayas, who
then said that they could extend credit to his brother. As of 1997, his brother owed the hardware the amount
of P279,000.00 for the construction materials supplied by the hardware, namely: reinforcement bars,
cement, tire wires and other construction materials. This amount was paid to the hardware by installment.
The first installment was paid in June 1997 when the main contractor paid his brother. His brother gave
Page 26 of 101
him P179,000.00 at his residence and he was the one who paid the hardware which issued him a receipt
(Exhibit 1-C). After the project was completed, his brother gave him P100,000.00 on November 18, 1997
while he, his brother and Placido Cancio were at the Rose Bowl Restaurant. He went to the hardware but
the manager was not there. One of the staff then informed him that the manager will still have to compute
the interest of their loan credit and so he deposited P75,000.00 which was covered by a receipt (Exhibit 1-
B). Their account was finally computed in December 1997 and so he paid their balance of P25,000.00. All in
all, he paid the hardware the amount of P279,000.00.
When his brother tendered to him the P100,000.00 at the Rose Bowl Restaurant, Placido Cancio was also
there discussing the expenses. The money which his brother got from the main contractor, Boy Cupido, the
partner of the late Engineer Lestino, was being held by his brother and not Placido Cancio.
The total cost of the materials taken by his brother from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply is P279,000.00. On June
10, 1997, he paid the initial payment of P179,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-C issued by the sales boy Cris.
The second partial payment was made on November 18, 1997 in the amount of P75,000.00 covered by
Exhibit 1-B issued by Mrs. Editha Paayas. The last time that he paid was on December 18, 1997 in the
amount of P25,000.00. This was not yet the full payment because according to Mrs. Paayas she still has to
compute for the interest. (TSN, May 2, 2000, pp. 19-20). Aside from the amount of P279,000.00
representing the materials taken by his brother, he still has an outstanding account with Mt. Trail Farm
Supply charged in his name. This is the reason why in the receipt it was noted as part payment (TSN, May
2, 2000, p. 21).
On cross-examination, Ernesto Pideli said that he was never a partner of his brother. It was only in 1997 that
his brother sought his assistance to look for a hardware where he can buy construction materials on credit.
All materials ordered by Wilson for the project were placed in his account because it was easier for the
hardware to contact him at their office which is nearer. After the project in Itogon, Wilson stopped his
construction project. He denies having taken the P65,000.00. He does not also know where the amount
went (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 18).
On redirect, he said that when he tendered the first payment of P179,000.00, a statement of account was
prepared by the salesboy of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (Exhibit 1-D). He was furnished a copy of
the statement of account. After the first and second payment, other materials were obtained by his brother,
this is the reason why they still have a balance of P20,000.00 to be settled within the
hardware.11(Underscoring supplied)
RTC and CA Dispositions
On March 13, 2001, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction, disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft and hereby sentences him after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as maximum (applying Art. 309(1) of the Revised Penal
Code) and to reimburse the private complainant the amount of P49,500.00 plus interest thereon at the rate
of 6% per annum from date of filing of the complaint up to the time it is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:
x x x Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court finds the lone testimony of the private
complainant more credible than the testimony of the defense witnesses. The testimony of the private
complainant is positive and credible, sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration.
The testimony of defense witness Wilson Pideli was glaringly inconsistent and contradictory on material
points. At the initial stages of his (Wilson Pideli) testimony on direct examination, he categorically stated that
it was he and his laborers who implemented the project (rip rap project along Dalupirip Road, Itogon,
Page 27 of 101
Benguet) awarded to him by ACL Construction. The private complainant had no participation in the project
(TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 9-10). Later, in his narration of what actually transpired between him, his
brother Ernesto Pideli and private complainant at the Rose Bowl Restaurant on November 17, 1997, he said
that after computing their expenses, he entrusted to the private complainant the following amounts:
1. P15,000.00 to be given by the private complainant to the laborers who excavated for the project;
2. P500.00 to be given by the private complainant to Mr. Apse as payment for the cement test;
3. P10,500.00 because he (private complainant) was pestering him (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 14-16). The
question is, if the private complainant had no real participation in the project subject of this case, why would
Wilson Pideli be entrusting such amounts to the former. If really private complainant has no involvement
whatsoever in the project, why was he present at the: 1. Mido Restaurant where Josephine Bentres was
disbursing final payments to the subcontractors of the project, and 2. At the Rose Bowl Restaurant when the
Pideli brothers were computing the expenses incurred in the project and also presenting his list of expenses
(Exhibit B, Exhibit 2). Later, in his testimony on direct, Wilson Pideli said that when he started the project,
private complainant asked him to join him and he (Wilson Pideli) agreed provided the private complainant
share in the expenses. Private complainant did not, however, share in the expenses nor did he provide any
equipment (TSN, October 18, 1999; p. 13) yet he entrusted the aforementioned amounts to Cancio. On
cross-examination, Wilson Pideli admitted that he gave private complainant P10,500.00 despite the fact that
he did not share in the expenses for the implementation of the project (TSN, November 22, 1999, pp. 5-6).
Such act is abnormal and contrary to human behavior and experience. The only plausible and logical
conclusion is, private complainant and Wilson Pideli were partners in a joint venture. Just as private
complainant did, in fact, stated, he was the one who provided the laborers and some equipments used in the
project. Thus, it is only logical that the money for the payment of the wages and the cement test were
entrusted to him because it was his responsibility/obligation to pay them and not because they were his
neighbors as the defense would like this court to believe. The reason propounded by Wilson Pideli to explain
his actuations is too flimsy for this court to believe. Furthermore, Wilson Pideli admitted on cross that while
the case was filed by private complainant against his brother Ernesto Pideli, he submitted an affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In Paragraph 1 of the said affidavit which was read into the
records of the case, he (Wilson Pideli) alleged that "Placido Cancio was his companion in the project at
Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet which he subcontracted for ACL Construction." When asked by the Public
Prosecutor what he meant by his statement, Wilson Pideli categorically admitted that Placido Cancio (the
private complainant) is his partner in the endeavor along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet (TSN, November
22, 1999, p. 8). The testimony of Wilson Pideli, instead of being corroborative, in effect, weakened the cause
of the defense. The rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. It has not been uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Gondora, 265 SCRA
408). Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies (People v.
Ferrer, 255 SCRA 190).
It is unfortunate that the evidence on record does not disclose the agreement between the private
complainant and Wilson Pideli with regards to the sharing of the capital (expenses) and profits on the
project. Article 1790 of the Civil Code, however, provides: "Unless there is stipulation to the contrary, the
partners shall contribute equal shares to the capital of the partnership." Paragraph 1 of Article 1797 of the
same code further provides: "The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the agreement. If
only the share of each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be
in the same proportion." Thus, it is safe for the court to conclude that as a partner in the joint venture,
Placido Cancio is entitled to 1/2 share in the net proceeds, i.e. P130,000.00 + 2 = P65,000.00.
The accused insists that private complainant and his brother were not partners in the subcontract project.
According to him, he merely acted as guarantor of his brother so the latter can withdraw construction
materials on credit from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware. As the guarantor, he was also the one
who paid his brother’s credit when his brother was able to collect payment. Thus, denying the charges filed
against him. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving
evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Paragua, 257 SCRA 118). Affirmative
testimony is stronger than a negative one. As between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of
truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other hand, the former is generally held to prevail (People v.
Tuvilla, 259 SCRA).
Finding the testimony of the private complainant to be more credible than that of the accused and his
witnesses, the court rules that the presumption of innocence guaranteed by law in favor of the accused has
been overturned and must be convicted of the crime charged.
Page 28 of 101
Article 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than P12,000.00, but does not exceed P22,000.00; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of the code
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be." x x x
The penalty imposed upon those guilty of theft depends on the amount stolen. Accused carted
away P65,000.00 representing private complainant’s share in the next proceeds of the project. Accused’s
brother, Wilson Pideli, however, gave the private complainant and this was admitted by the latter the amount
of P10,500.00 when the latter kept on pestering him at the Rose Bowl Restaurant and P5,000.00 at the
initial (first) payment. Thus, the amount of P10,500.00 and P5,000.00 should be deducted from his net share
of P65,000.00 leaving a balance of P49,500.00 which is now the basis for the construction of the
penalty.13(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CA. In a decision promulgated on April 30, 2003, the CA affirmed 14 the trial court
disposition.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the adverse judgment. The motion was, however, denied with finality through a
Resolution dated March 9, 2004.15
Issues
In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors, viz.:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING THAT THE
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN WAS OWNED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THERE WAS AN
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE ALLEGED
TAKING BY THE PETITIONER WAS ATTENDED WITH INTENT TO GAIN.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, the thrust of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of
law.17Any peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the ambit of this mode of review.18 Indeed,
well-entrenched is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law.19
The petition at bench raises not only questions of law but also of facts. We are asked to recalibrate the evidence
adduced by the parties and to reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. On this ground alone, the petition is dismissible.
We, however, deem it proper to delve into the merits of the present petition considering that an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case wide open for review.20
Page 29 of 101
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft, viz.:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent. x x x
Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.21
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners Placido
and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement,
petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective
shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for theft of the unaccounted funds. The
monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. As an agent of partner Wilson, intent to gain cannot
be imputed against petitioner.
The CA correctly debunked petitioner’s postulation in the following tenor:
We likewise find no merit in appellant’s contention that the money did not belong to the private complainant
as the latter was only claiming for his share of P65,000.00; that it was owned by the partnership and was for
payment of materials obtained from the supplier. Complainant’s share in the amount of P65,000.00
manifestly belonged to and was owned by the private complainant.
Appellant’s argument that since the money belonged to the partnership, hence, cannot be the object of the
crime of theft as between the partners, and that appellant as their agent acted in good faith and without
intent to gain, holds no water. Parenthetically, this argument is inconsistent with the assertion of the defense
witnesses that complainant had no participation at all in the project, and, hence, had no right to a share in its
payment. In any case, appellant was not complainant’s partner but his brother. As for his alleged acting in
good faith and without intent of gain, it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a mental state, the existence
of which is made manifest by overt acts of the person. The intent to gain is presumed from the taking of
property appertaining to another.
Appellant presented a receipt dated November 18, 1997 allegedly evidencing his payment of P75,000.000 to
Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware store. Granting arguendo that appellant paid P75,000.00 to the Mt.
Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (which the trial court did not grant credence), the same still does not
exculpate him from liability. The net income earned and disbursed to the partnership of private complainant
and Wilson Pideli was P130,000.00 and a balance of P55,000.00 still remained despite the alleged payment,
which should be divided into two (2) or P27,000.00 for each of them. However, not a single centavo of this
amount was received by private complainant.
When appellant received the disbursement, he had only physical custody of private complainant’s money,
which was supposed to be applied to a particular purpose, i.e. settle the account with the supplier.
Appellant’s failure to do so or to return the money to the private complainant renders him guilty of the crime
of theft. This is in line with the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. De Vera, 43
Phil. 1000 (1929) that the delivery of money to another for a particular purpose is a parting with its physical
Page 30 of 101
custody only, and the failure of the accused to apply the money to its specific purpose and converting it to
his own use gives rise to the crime of theft. The basic principles enunciated in the De Vera case was
reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, an Anti-Carnapping case, where the High
Court ruled that the unlawful taking or deprivation may occur after the transfer of physical possession and, in
such a case, "the article (is considered as being) taken away, not received, although at the beginning the
article was, in fact, given and received." We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
appellant had but the material/physical or de facto possession of the money and his act of depriving private
complainant not only of the possession but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the money
such that he (the appellant) could dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of "taking" in the
crime of theft.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De
Vera,23 the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his
commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined:
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.24
In De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for the
purpose of having a silversmith examine the same, and bank notes amounting to P200.00 to have them exchanged
for silver coins. Accused appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court ruled that the crime committed was
theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal property did not have the effect of transferring the juridical
possession, thus such possession remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful intent and lack of
owner’s consent constituted the crime of theft.
In People v. Trinidad,25 defendant received a finger ring from the offended party for the purpose of pledging it as
security for a loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended party. Instead of pledging the ring, the defendant
immediately carried it to one of her neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated the money to her own
use. The Court, citing De Vera, similarly convicted defendant of theft.
In People v. Locson,26 this Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the
material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the
beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical
possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited cases, beginning
with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and
not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s
possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
In People v. Isaac,27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and not estafa when he did not return the jeepney
to its owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its owner, although physically held by the driver.
The Court reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public Service Law and its
regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract with any person if by the terms
thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed rental basis. The contract with the
accused being under the "boundary system," legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an employee of the
owner. Thus, the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of the owner’s.
The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v. People.28
Now, on the penalty. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes theft in the following tenor:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
Page 31 of 101
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years.29 (Underscoring supplied)
The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership. However,
he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily,
only P49,500.00 is due private complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the
abovequoted first paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years,
plus one (1) year for every additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two (2) years
for the excess amount of P27,500.00.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be twelve (12) years while the minimum term
would fall under the next lower penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
Both the trial court and the CA sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional medium, as minimum term, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum term. We
sustain it. Petitioner’s civil liability is likewise maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
Case no. 7
G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007

NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 22 May 1996, petitioner Nomer Ocampo, Elmer Miranda, and Danilo Cruz were charged with the crime of robbery
with physical injuries. The Information reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1995, at around 8:15 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay San Nicolas I,
Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force
and intimidation grab one Rommel Q. Misayah by the neck and armed with a bladed weapon attack the latter,
inflicting upon him physical injuries which required and did require medical attendance, and on the occasion thereof,
accused in furtherance of their intent to gain did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away with them the following, to wit:
a) One (1) Icom radio . . . ₱4,500.00
b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00
c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00
d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00
e) Cash . . . 29,000.00
Page 32 of 101
with a total value of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (₱34,345.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by the said Rommel Q. Misayah, to the damage and prejudice
of the owner, in the afore-said [sic] amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Records show that there was an Amended Information2 dated 17 July 1996 changing the crime charged to Robbery
with Violence and Intimidation against all of the accused–Ocampo, Cruz and Miranda. Arraignment ensued on 19
July 19963 where all of the accused pleaded not guilty. Accused Cruz jumped bail during the pendency of the trial and
was tried in absentia.4
The prosecution presented and offered the testimony of Rommel Q. Misayah and several documentary evidence.
Misayah testified that on 14 November 1995, at around 8:10 p.m., he was walking along San Nicolas Street on his
way home when three male individuals approached him. 5 As the place was sufficiently lighted by a nearby post, he
was able to identify the trio as accused Cruz, Ocampo and Miranda. When the three accused were already near him,
Cruz grabbed Misayah’s neck and choked him while Miranda held his shoulder and got his shoulder bag. 6Ocampo
meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife, warning him not to fight back. Sensing that he would be harmed
anyway, Misayah fought back by pushing the hands of the accused and trying to parry their blows. He and Cruz then
fell on the ground with Cruz on top of him. When the handle of his shoulder bag snapped, all of the accused ran away
with the shoulder bag.7
By reason of the incident, Misayah sustained wounds in his hands caused by the bladed weapon held by Ocampo
when he attempted to evade Ocampo’s blows.8 The shoulder bag taken from Misayah contained the items
enumerated in the aforequoted Information.
At the nearby Municipal Hall, Misayah reported the incident to Police Officers de Leon, Mon Mendoza, and Catalino
Mutuc.9 Misayah was brought to Balitucan Emergency Hospital for treatment and thereafter proceeded to the
precinct. After further investigation, he then executed a statement before Sr/Insp. Catalino Mutuc and SPO4 de
Leon.10
In their defense, accused Ocampo, Miranda, and another witness, Oliver Santos, gave their version of what
happened that night.
Miranda testified that he was with Ocampo in the afternoon of 14 November 1995 to accompany the latter to borrow a
wheelbarrow from a certain Lut Ocampo.11 Miranda and Ocampo played chess until 6:00 in the evening at Lut
Ocampo’s place while waiting for him to arrive. As they were leaving that place, they met Cruz. Instead of proceeding
home, Ocampo invited Miranda for a drink at an establishment identified as "Irma’s" and Cruz went along with them.
That was already about 7:30 in the evening. While on their way to
Irma’s, Cruz and Misayah "bumped each other and had an altercation." 12 Then Miranda informed his companions that
he would go ahead. Miranda was about one yard away from Cruz and Misayah when he saw Cruz strangle Misayah.
Claiming that he did not want to get into trouble, he did not pacify Cruz and Misayah. He hurriedly left and proceeded
to Sally Feliciano’s house and stayed there until 11:00 in the evening. As he was in a hurry to leave the incident
where the altercation happened, he did not notice what happened to Ocampo. 13
Ocampo, on his behalf, testified that he knew Misayah who has a drug store in Magalang, Pampanga. At about 8:00
p.m. of 14 November 1995, he was walking with Miranda and Cruz on their way to Vannie’s Restaurant when Cruz
crossed the street and approached Misayah.14 Ocampo and Miranda continued walking when Ocampo saw Cruz
choke Misayah and then have an exchange of fist blows. Ocampo and Miranda did not assist Cruz as it was only a
brief fist fight. Ocampo saw Cruz run away while he and Miranda were left behind. Ocampo and Miranda saw
Misayah run towards the Municipal Hall and the two proceeded to their respective homes.15
Defense witness Oliver Santos who knew the three accused testified that on the evening of 14 November 1995, he
was at Vannie’s videoke having a drinking spree with his friends. At 9:00 p.m., he asked leave from his friends to go
ahead. While waiting for a motorcycle ride outside of Vannie’s videoke, he saw Cruz and Misayah, whom he knew as
the owner of a drug store, acting as if they were strangling each other. The fight took about a minute. He did not
bother to do anything because he was afraid and also because fighting was a common incident in that area. 16Santos
Page 33 of 101
was somewhat inebriated when he witnessed the incident as he had consumed one (1) pitcher of draft beer.
However, he still recognized the faces of Misayah and Cruz. On that occasion, he also saw Ocampo and Miranda
walking towards the town proper.17
All three accused were convicted by the trial court in a decision 18 dated 31 May 2000, which held:
WHEREFORE, finding the three (3) accused, Danilo Cruz, Nomer Ocampo and Elmer Miranda @ Mitoy guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 294 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code, with the presence of an aggravating circumstance of conspiracy, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer each an imprisonment in an indeterminate penalty of from [sic] eight (8) years to twenty one (21) days of
prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Rommel Q. Misayah the amount of ₱34,345.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Ocampo and Miranda appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals. However, in its decision19 dated 10 February
2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision, stating thus:
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Considering the attendant
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court), which is not offset
by any mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, which is prision
mayor medium or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months. Thus, appellants should have been meted the indeterminate penalty of from [sic] 4 years and two months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from [sic] four (4) years and two months
of prision correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellants,
SO ORDERED.20
Miranda did not challenge the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Ocampo filed
a Motion for Reconsideration21 which was denied through a Resolution dated 20 May 2004. 22 Ocampo alone then
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.23
Ocampo argues that the appellate court erred in finding him criminally liable because: (i) Misayah’s testimony was
uncorroborated; (ii) it was unbelievable that Misayah would just walk on a slightly lighted street when he is carrying a
considerable amount of cash and other items; (iii) there was no clear record that the prosecution presented any of the
police officers who apprehended and investigated petitioner; (iv) the court failed to give credence to the testimony of
Santos simply because he was tipsy; (v) although Misayah claimed that he had been grabbed by the neck, his
medical certificate does not show any injury on the neck or on the arm to confirm if he was indeed held by Miranda on
that part of his body; (vi) the examining doctor was not presented to confirm the authenticity of the issued medical
certificate and to be cross-examined thereon; and (vii) it is very unlikely that Misayah’s shoulder bag could
accommodate all the items he claimed to have been contained therein. In sum, petitioner reiterates that the
prosecution failed to prove that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for which he is being charged.
Before proceeding to the merits of this case, certain observations from the trial and appellate courts’ decisions have
to be clarified.
The initial information filed by the prosecution in this case designated the offense charged as Robbery with Physical
Injuries.24 This was later amended to Robbery with Violence and Intimidation. 25 Yet, the trial court’s decision
convicted the accused of Robbery with Physical Injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code. The
appellate court, on the other hand, affirmed the conviction under Article 294 (5) but classified the crime as robbery
with violence against persons.
Page 34 of 101
The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to the false impression that robbery with physical injuries
under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code is distinct from robbery with intimidation as well as robbery with
violence against persons. The title or heading of Article 294 reads "Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons." Said heading is clearly the general nomenclature given to all five (5) types of robbery enumerated
thereunder.26 Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physical injuries. 27 Paragraph 5, in particular, defines what is
known as simple robbery. Simple robbery involves only slight or less serious physical injuries. 28 For conviction under
this paragraph, the injury inflicted should not fall within the categories provided for in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294.
Thus, over and above the dichotomy of the terms employed, it is certain and beyond dispute that the three accused
were tried for the crime under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code.
Now, to the merits.
The core of Ocampo’s arguments in this instant petition is that the findings of the appellate court do not conform to
the evidence on record. It should be emphasized that factual matters cannot be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court as this Court is limited to reviewing only questions of law. 29 The findings of fact of the
trial court are binding upon this Court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 30 Exceptions to this rule are when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record.31 Absent any ground to apply the exception to this instant case, there is no
reason, therefore, to disturb the findings of the lower courts.
Petitioner claims it was erroneous for the appellate court to give credence to Misayah’s uncorroborated evidence
because it failed to establish where his money and other valuables came from and his injuries did not conform to the
nature of the attack made on him as well.
Based on the records, we cannot see how and why the questions raised by petitioner can cast doubt on the credibility
of the testimony of Misayah. As Misayah owns a drug store, it is not unlikely that Misayah would have ₱29,000.00
cash in his possession as he returned home from a day’s work. With respect to the injuries suffered by Misayah, he
stated in his cross examination that he tried to parry the blows made by all the accused by the use of his
hands.32 Thus, it is believable that his hands would bear the brunt of the blows. Further, Miranda himself admitted
during his direct examination that he "personally saw" Cruz strangle Misayah. 33
Moreover, we give weight to the trial court’s observation that Misayah testified "in a straightforward manner" and
positively identified not only Cruz as the one who choked him but also the other
two (2) accused.34 The testimony of a sole witness, though uncorroborated, is sufficient for conviction if it is free from
any sign of impropriety or falsehood.35 The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial
court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and
had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. 36 Indeed, the testimony of a single
witness is sufficient and needs no corroboration, save only in offenses where the law expressly prescribes a minimum
number of witnesses.37
On the lower court’s disregard of defense witness Santos’s testimony, we have consistently held that where the
credibility of witnesses is an issue, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court unless
some facts and circumstances may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of the
case.38 The Court accords deference to the trial court’s appraisal on a witness’s credibility, or lack thereof, because of
its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying.39 Given that the
observation of the trial court with respect to Santos is supported by evidence, there is no ground to discredit the trial
and appellate courts’ assessment of Santos’s testimony.
Petitioner likewise alleges that Misayah’s testimony was filled with inconsistencies such as his allegation that he
immediately executed an affidavit after the incident when in fact his affidavit was dated 20 November 1995 or six
days after the incident. However, it is not beyond reason if a victim like Misayah would immediately report the incident
but subsequently make a sworn statement days after the incident especially when the victim, as did Misayah,
suffered injuries requiring medical attention. Moreover, the RTC records also show that Misayah executed a separate
sworn statement before SPO1
Page 35 of 101
Mutuc, investigator of Magalang Police Station, on 16 November 1995 40 and the prosecution submitted another
affidavit by Misayah taken before SPO2 Rivera41 in its formal offer of evidence. It is not unlikely, therefore, that
several affidavits were in fact executed by Misayah in the days immediately following the incident.
Even as petitioner challenges the evidence of the prosecution, he downplays the inconsistencies of the testimonies of
the witnesses for the defense. Said inconsistencies, particularly on the witnesses’ accounts of what proceeded after
the incident, are material and have rendered their testimonies implausible. It is hard to believe that there was a mere
lapse of memory of either Miranda or Ocampo on whether they were indeed left behind together or whether one of
them fled and the other was left behind even before the departure of Cruz.42 Certainly, one cannot fail to observe or
at least recall later who was with whom considering the gravity of the incident and the fact that only three of them
were together that evening.
More fundamentally, the defense’s version of the incident is contrary to human experience and behavior. As correctly
pointed out by the trial court:
It is incredible that accused Nomer Ocampo and Elmer Mirand[a] have not done anything when their companion
Danilo Cruz was in a fight with complainant. The least they could do was to pacify the two protagonists yet, they did
not do this and
they proceeded to go to their respective way home as if nothing has happened. If indeed the incident happened so
fast and that the accused Danilo Cruz and complainant Rommel Misayah separated immediately after that "sudden
strangling" of each other" [sic], the least that Ocampo and Miranda could do [sic] was to wait and ask Cruz what
happened. Yet, again, they did not do this. x x x x43
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself,
such that the common experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable under the
circumstances.44And, the best test of the credibility of a testimony is its compatibility with human knowledge,
observation and common experience of man.45 Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and
lies outside of judicial cognizance.46
On the conspiracy aspect, it is worthy of note that while the Court of Appeals in the body of its decision sustained the
existence of conspiracy as held by the lower court47 yet in the penultimate paragraph of the decision as well as in the
dispositive portion, it ruled out the presence of conspiracy. Thus:
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Considering the attendant
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength (not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court),48 which is not
offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, which is prision mayor medium or from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable
penalty shall be the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correctional medium,
in any of its periods, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, appellant
should have been meted the indeterminate penalty of from 4 years and two months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants
are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years and two months of prision
correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.49
It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision prevails over the opinion, the former being the final
order while the opinion is an informal expression of the views of the court, thus forming no part of the
judgment.50Following this rule, the appellate court thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance but not conspiracy.
Page 36 of 101
The appellate court is correct in ruling out conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. The
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 51 Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. 52 Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 53 It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. All taken together, however, the evidence therefor
must be reasonably strong enough to show a community of criminal design. 54
In the case at bar, there is no convincing evidence that all of the accused had resolved to rob Misayah prior to the
actual robbery. What is evident is that the robbery that transpired was a spur of the moment decision among the three
accused. For one, Miranda and Ocampo were consistent in their statement that they were on their way to have a
drink at the common time of the incident. For another, they saw Misayah by chance. Still for another, there was no
evidence that all of the accused knew beforehand that Misayah would be passing by the street where the robbery
occurred that fateful evening. Neither was it shown that the street was part of Misayah’s regular route on his way
home.
According to Misayah in his testimony, Cruz grabbed his neck and choked him while Miranda held his
shoulder.1avvphi1Ocampo meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife and warning him not to fight back. While the
evidence did not prove the existence of conspiracy, it indelibly established that the accused took advantage of their
superior strength.55
Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code fixes the penalty for simple robbery at prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, the range of which is from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day to ten (10) years.56 Considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its periods, the range of which is four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.57
We note that the appellate court’s decision did not order the accused to indemnify Misayah the amount of
₱34,345.00. The records do not show that this amount had already been paid pursuant to the Decision of the trial
court dated 31 May 2000. Thus, we modify the appellate court’s decision in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused Ocampo is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Petitioner Ocampo together with his other
co-accused Miranda and Cruz are ordered to indemnify Rommel Q. Misayah the amount of ₱34,345.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 8
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus
C. Castillo, reads as follows:
Page 37 of 101
That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused confederating
together and helping one another, with intent to gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside,
hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away
cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner
Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic)
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused
and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a police line-up
by Nerissa and her grandmother.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate,
who personally examined the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala the rape-victim, 17 years old, a third year high school
student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the robbery with rape transpired at
Consuelo's house.
The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then
16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the former's house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26,
1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under
the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them,
one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped
by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape, appellant and
his two companions counted the money they took from the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued at P6,000 and two
wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for
medical examination. In the Medical Report presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen at 4:00 o'clock and 7:00 o'clock positions (fresh
wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying in the house of
Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning business
where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his defense and stated that
accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay Bangon.
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the accused. The
dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim
Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim
Nerissa Tagala the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 3
Page 38 of 101
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that:
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXIST TO
ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in identifying him as one of the
perpetrators of the crime charged. He claims that the complaining witness could not have positively identified him as
there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the incident which took place at 9:00 o'clock in the evening.
Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by Nerissa, and made
contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied,
and later stated that accused-appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer, Dr.
Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into
one.
The appellee insists that appellant's lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the positive identification made by the
victim, and avers that the victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed, was motivated by a
sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor General also recommends an additional award of
compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother in the latter's
house when the accused-appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the house. Regala
pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took of her
panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse ("itot") with her while
she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened.
She could not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two companions of the accused-
appellant entered the room as she was being raped. Two rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one
"Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and money was taken by the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her
in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to
the kitchen, still hogtied, and rape again, 5 On cross-examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no
electricity, and the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time
Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and there
was "some reflection" on the face of Regala. 6 She remembered the face of Regala because of an earring on his left
ear 7 which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up. 8
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. Nerissa Regala entered the house
with two companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual intercourse with
Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her aparador, and got a stainless Seiko wristwatch and
two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala because of his earring on his left ear, and
because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She was not able to shout at the time because her mouth
was gagged with a piece of cloth by Regala. 9 On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to
see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala
because of his earring and his flat top hair cut.10
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the
identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of robbery accompanied
by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the
time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of the accused beamed the flashlight towards the
money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they
entered the house, they removed their masks later. 11
Page 39 of 101
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be sufficient
illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious. 12
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo
when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" 13 or "after" 14 she and Nerissa were hogtied exposed the fact
that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot
detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a flashlight used to
focus at the money while it was being counted and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and
Consuelo remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside
the police station.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday's testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that Nerissa voluntarily
submitted to the sexual advances of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings point to the fact that
Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the
sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of penetration as shown by the two lacerations at
4 o'clock and at 7 o'clock which were fresh wounds. That the act was involuntary was clearly established by the facts
that Nerissa was hogtied when she was sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-
year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely
implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by this Court, it simply would be
unnatural for a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a
sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. 15
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are cases 16 holding that the
additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.
Martinez,17accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with the
special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death
after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the
Court did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of robbery
with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on
that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."
There are likewise cases 18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario 19 where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who robbed the
victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia, 20 ruled that "(T)he
characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several
rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account raising the penalty to death."
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as
aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating circumstances
where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would
result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape
would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. 21 However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal
law is liberally construed in favor of the offender 22 and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly
made so by the statute. 23
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be considered as
aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
Page 40 of 101
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor General that compensatory
damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an award of civil indemnity ex
delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended party in rape. 24 Also a conviction for rape carries with it
the award of moral damages to the victim since it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and
necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 25
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an additional
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Case No. 9
G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information therefor in the place where
the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is found to have later been
acquired?
The above query is the sole issue in this Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines,
praying for the reversal, annulment and setting aside of the Order of 28 February 1986 1 of the respondent Judge,
who has ruled in the negative, as well as his Order, dated 21 March 1986, 2 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner prays that the respondent Judge be directed to assume jurisdiction over, and to proceed with the trial
of, the criminal case.
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various
pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An information, dated 30 September
1985, was instituted against the perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed
thereat asCriminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078.3
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known
as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara,
from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.4
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the accused [now private respondents], issued the now
questioned order of 28 February 1986, viz:
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash, filed by the accused thru counsel, praying that the
information filed against both accused be quashed, on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction
to try the offense charged. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per police investigation, the
crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason, Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an
independent crime, separate and distinct from that of Robbery. The accused claims, likewise, that
Page 41 of 101
jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court within which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing
took place.
The Prosecution filed an opposition thereto, alleging among others, that there is nothing in the law
which prohibits the filing of a case of fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the principal
offense of robbery was committed. The prosecution claims further, that the consideration in the
enactment of PD 1612 was to impose a heavier penalty on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes robbery or theft.
On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was
committed, or anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place. 5
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court, and considering that all criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the
Municipality or Province where the offense took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have
jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without prejudice to the filing of the
corresponding action against the accused in the Court having proper jurisdiction.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the court's order of 21 March 1986.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the commission of robbery, in
this case committed in Quezon City, the information therefor filed in said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise jurisdiction
thereover constitutes a serious error of law and a grave abuse of discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing
offense." He explains that the Anti-Fencing Law has been enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier penalty on
persons who profit from the effects of the crime of robbery or theft, no longer merely as accessories under Article 19,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.
In People vs. Ledesma,6 we said:
. . . A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series ofacts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there
being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts each of which, although of a
delictual character merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such
concurrence of delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." For it to exist there should be plurality
of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or
violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same
penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. 7 "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose
of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. 8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the
accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission
of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order
that it can be consummated. True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either
robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for
instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should
thereby be triable likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted. 9
Page 42 of 101
We are not unaware of a number of instances 10 when the Court would allow a change of venue in criminal cases
"whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a
trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice." 11 Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are
we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in its questioned orders.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders appealed from are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Case No 10
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for
ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and
found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as
Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the
following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y
MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated
on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and
ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and,
in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma.
Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential
Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly
be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4
Page 43 of 101
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the
People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page
references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the
version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called
Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the
personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account
of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had
to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic)
take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes
Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of
Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the
driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma.
Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get
money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let
her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that
but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed.
Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said
he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked
Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow
a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car
again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to
the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag
down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on
the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-
26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to
appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even
slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell
down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7
Page 44 of 101
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and
parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later,
when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was
in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to
what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime
could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the
accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the
same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion
thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific
nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the
latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute
separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual
performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason
of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise,
it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the
compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on
his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I
know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam,
(sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but
they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely
on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of
her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held
that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time
but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty
is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the
P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic)
being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Page 45 of 101
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow
her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the
checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we
will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is
(sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we
reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended
by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will
already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the
immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the
money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks
demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in
the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim
upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold
that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial
court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information
that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise
admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with
her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable
under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery
on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree,
"P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of
the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This
is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in
the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with
our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the
proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more
than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American
occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subject and are of continuing validity:
Page 46 of 101
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart
of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the
purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It
would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band
actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members
were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime
would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of
more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In
the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular
robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law
legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not
have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the
time when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition
or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and
not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility
of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are

among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts
of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as
their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from
one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social
progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways
and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be
at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are
brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only
against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the
highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage which is maintained in
Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for
that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Page 47 of 101
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by
appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside
from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts
the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a
literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter
thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the
letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in
favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of
Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of
our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that
the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is,
to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the
unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory
the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter
of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway
and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard
the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was
committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the
situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely
defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and
committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished
under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the
aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate,
the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as
decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery
upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is
necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor
thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged
in an information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the
offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as formulated,
allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through
intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could
negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in
Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the
amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page 48 of 101
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 138470 April 1, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ARTEMIO GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, accused.
REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated March 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
21, in Criminal Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of Carnapping with
Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping with each other, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of violence and intimidation, forcibly take from the driver Wilfredo Elis a brand
new Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UJL-761 owned by Fernando Ignacio;
That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof, the said accused, armed with bladed
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Wilfredo Elis in different parts of his body causing mortal
wounds which directly resulted in his death.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter, the case was tried on the
merits.
It appears from the record that on December 17, 1996, Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan,
was approached by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new Mitsubishi L300 van for their
trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for
P475,500.00.3 Ignacio agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00. Bernabe and
Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 driver’s fee.
They agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol. 4
In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX at
his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the
two accused left for Bicol.5
Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe. Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had
borrowed from Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis’
wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and asked where her husband was.6
In the afternoon of December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of the Moncada, Tarlac Police notified the Chief of
Police that two suspicious looking persons were seen selling a vehicle in Anao, Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price
of P50,000.00. The Chief of Police immediately formed a team,7 but when they reached Anao, Tarlac, they found out
that the two accused had already left for Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team thereafter coordinated with the Nueva
Ecija Police. The two accused were seen in front of a store in Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they
failed to produce documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police Station for
investigation.8
Page 49 of 101
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the Tamaraw FX belonging to
Ferdinand Ignacio. In the early morning of December 24, 1996, a joint team of police officers composed of members
of the Moncada and Marilao Police, together with the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, were
accompanied by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac, where the latter positively identified Ignacio’s Tamaraw FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They admitted to him that they stabbed Elis and dumped him
along the highway near the "sabana" in San Rafael, Bulacan. They claimed that they were compelled to eliminate Elis
when he refused to join their plan to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia brought the policemen, together with Cortez and
the Barangay Captain, to San Rafael, Bulacan where he pointed to the place where they killed Elis. However, the
police were unable to find Elis’ body. After returning to Moncada, Cortez immediately inspected the interior of the
vehicle and found bloodstains on the side and back of the driver’s seat. He also found several personal items
belonging to Elis, such as his clothes and driver’s license, 9 as well as Garcia’s bag which contained bonnets, tear
gas, the warranty card and the car registration papers.10
On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received information that a male cadaver was found in San Rafael,
Bulacan, submerged in mud ten meters away from where they searched earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of
Wilfredo Elis by his wife, Nancy.11
Dr. Benito Caballero, Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal Officer of the province of Bulacan, who performed
the autopsy, found four stab wounds in the posterior, one stab wound in the lateral and one on the left side of the
thorax. He opined that the wounds which penetrated the abdomen and lungs were fatal. 12
In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed to rent the subject vehicle for a period of five days from
December 18, 1996; that Garcia and Elis had a fight because the latter allegedly did not want to go with them to
Nueva Ecija; that Elis, while driving the Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger jeepney along Baliuag Highway; that they
left Elis along the Baliuag Highway at 3:30 a.m. so he can inform Cortez that they were already in Bulacan and were
en route to Nueva Ecija to have the dented portion of the vehicle fixed.13
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution has been able to
establish the accused’s criminal culpability. In view thereof, Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Carnapping with Homicide in violation of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Accordingly, absent any circumstances that will aggravate the commission thereof, both of them are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, both accused are hereby ordered jointly and
severally to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the sum of P50,000.00; to pay them the amount of
P100,000.00 for moral damages; P15,290.00 for actual/ compensatory damages; and P250,000.00 for loss
of earnings.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
Both accused appealed from the decision of the trial court. On March 31, 2000, accused Garcia filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal,15 which was granted in a Resolution dated September 27, 2000.
Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS
DEFINED IN REPUBLIC ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PRESENT AND DULY
PROVEN.
II
Page 50 of 101
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS PART OF
AN ALLEGED CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE BASIS
OF HIS ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping", defines "carnapping" as
"the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."16 More specifically, the elements of the
crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.17
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this case.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.18
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the appellant’s possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially
lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed
the character of said possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the
Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that
they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been
freely and voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant. 19 Thus, the duration of
the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as
claimed by the prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the unlawful
taking occurred within the period of the lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his co-accused in
killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate,
the prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the victim to death because he
refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking
through violence, rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the
deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of
property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal
property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong to the offender.
Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of
personal property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful
taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender. 20
Furthermore, at the time of their apprehension, appellant Bernabe and Garcia were unable to give a plausible
explanation why they still had the Tamaraw FX in their possession. Appellant Bernabe claims that he and his co-
accused went to Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija to have the dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the other hand,
testified that there was no such damage. A person in possession of a stolen article is presumed guilty of having
illegally and unlawfully taken the same unless he can satisfactorily explain his possession of the thing. 21
Appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-accused to commit the crime of carnapping.
Page 51 of 101
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,22 which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.23 In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one
concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.24
In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito Cortez, hired the brand new
Toyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18, 1996,
they left for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga of
Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously looking persons, who turned out to be Garcia
and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that
the two were finally apprehended with the subject vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac and
Nueva Ecija Police.
While there may be no direct evidence of the commission of the crime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial
evidence sufficient to warrant Garcia’s and Bernabe’s conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence
to sustain a conviction were met, to wit: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.25 The circumstances indeed form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia were the perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. 26
The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they were responsible for taking the
vehicle and killing the victim, Elis. On December 24, 1996, Cortez went to the Moncada Municipal Jail and talked to
them while they were detained. Both admitted to him that they forcibly took the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed him
and thereafter dumped him at San Rafael, Bulacan.27 Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio went
to Moncada and confronted the two in their cells. Garcia admitted to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle
because they were in dire need of money, while Bernabe kept quiet. 28
Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence his admission to Cortez and Ignacio on
the grounds that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission made by Garcia should not prejudice him;
and (c) assuming he made such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under duress and
intimidation.29
In People v. Andan,30 it was held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to
preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, and not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, appellant’s voluntary admission to Cortez that he and
his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the latter opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible
as evidence against him.
Anent Garcia’s extrajudicial confession implicating appellant in the commission of the offense, it appears that the
latter did not oppose or affirm Garcia’s statement. Neither did he make an attempt to refute the same insofar as his
participation in the commission of the crime was concerned. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "he cannot invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his right. He ought to speak and failing to do so,
his silence weighs heavily on him. Thus, it was not accused-appellant’s Garcia’s admission that prejudiced accused-
appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when it was ‘such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true’."31
Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
We likewise find no merit in the allegation that duress was employed on appellant. Suffice it to state that such bare
allegation of force and duress is not enough to prove that he was indeed tortured to admit complicity in the offense
charged.
Page 52 of 101
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, to wit:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months,
when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellant Bernabe and his co-accused,
Garcia.
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim should be affirmed. When death occurs
as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as indemnity for the death, without need
of any evidence of proof of damages.33 This is in addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50 which was duly
substantiated by proof.34 We, however, reduce the award of moral damages to P50,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.35
Lastly, we find the court a quo’s award of P250,000.00 for loss of earning capacity to be without basis. Nancy testified
that her husband Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior to his death, 36 however, she failed to produce evidence to
substantiate her claim. As held in the case of People v. Panabang,37 a self-serving statement is not enough; the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity must be duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21,
finding appellant Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P15,290.00 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. The award
of P250,000.00 for loss of earnings is DELETED for lack of factual basis.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Case no. 12
G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990

LAURO SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioner,
CRUZ, J.:
The factual findings of the lower courts are as a matter of policy not disturbed by this Court in the absence of any of
the recognized exceptions that will justify reversal. As none of these exceptions appears in the case at bar, the
petitioner's conviction, based on such findings, must be affirmed.
The evidence of the prosecution is, in the view of the Court, conclusive of the petitioner's guilt.
Page 53 of 101
Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion Peñalosa, entrusted her car, a 1976 Ford
Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost P300.00. A week later,
Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within a period of two months. 1
After two months, Peñalosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur Highway, Malabon, to retrieve her car.
Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs. As she did not have the money
then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return, she could not find Santos although she waited
five hours for him. She went back to the shop several times thereafter but to no avail. 2
Peñalosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable to recover her car, she filed a
complaint for carnapping against Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group in Camp Crame. The case was
dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that the complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He
submitted for this purpose a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase in his favor. 3
This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Peñalosa's complaint was filed against Santos in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City on October 26,1982. After trial, the accused was found guilty as charged and sentenced to "an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months as
maximum, both of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P38,000.00 which is the
value of the car without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with costs." 4
On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of qualified theft and not estafa. The dispositive
portion of the decision of the respondent court 5 read:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED: the offense committed by the appellant is
qualified theft and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify Encarnacion Peñalosa the sum of P20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and, to pay the costs.
In his defense, the petitioner now quibbles about the supposed inconsistences of the complaining witness that he
says make her testimony questionable. Our ruling is that such inconsistencies are minor lapses and do not impair
Peñalosa's credibility as a whole. Santos also wonders why, if it is true that she had asked him to repair and repaint
her car, she had not even made an advance payment. One reason could be that he himself did not ask for such
advance, considering that they were members of the same bowling team. There is even the suggestion that he was
smitten with her although she says she rejected his suit. 6
The petitioner's main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase which he submitted at the trial
to prove that Peñalosa had sold the car to him and now had no claim to it.
The lower courts were correct in rejecting this shoddy evidence. It is a wonder that it was even considered at all when
the case filed in Camp Crame was dismissed.
A cursory look at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are alterations and deletions that are not
even initialed to authenticate the changes. Two entire paragraphs are cancelled. The name and address of the
supposed original vendee are crossed out and those of the petitioner are written in place of the deletions. Moreover,
the so-called deed is not notarized.
It would have been so easy to re-type the one-page document to express clearly and indubitably the intent of the
parties and then have it properly acknowledged. But this was not done. The petitioner insists that the document was
originally intended to be concluded between Peñalosa and Domingo Corsiga but was hastily changed to make
Santos the buyer and mortgagee.7 Surely a vendee would not be so rash as to depend for his title to the thing
purchased on such a shabby and dubious deed of sale.
The petitioner also makes much of the fact that Peñalosa did not even sign a job order or get a receipt when she
delivered her car to him for repairs. In fact, she did not even check where his repair shop was. He forgets that he was
no less trusting either. He himself does not explain why the amount of P6,000.00 he allegedly gave for the car was
not acknowledged by Peñalosa in the Deed of Sale or in a separate instrument. There was no proof at all of such
payment.
Page 54 of 101
Given these circumstances, we find it easier to believe that Peñalosa had signed the original document with the
intention of selling her car to Domingo Corsiga, the party first named therein, but later changed her mind. She left the
unused document in her car and Santos, chancing upon it when the vehicle was delivered to him, decided to modify it
to suit his purposes.
Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why would Santos still demand from Peñalosa the cost of the
repairs on the car if he claims he had already bought it from her? And there is also the glaring fact that Santos was
unable to register the car in his name despite the lapse of all of two years after his alleged purchase of the vehicle.
In his supplemental memorandum, the petitioner says he could not register the car because it had merely been
mortgaged to him and he had to wait until the expiration of the period of repurchase. 8 Yet, during his cross-
examination on March 5, 1984, Santos repeatedly declared that the car belonged to him and that the right of
repurchase expired after two months from November or December 1980. He also said that rather than register it, he
could cannibalize the car and sell the spare parts separately at greater profit. 9
The Court also notes that, according to Santos, he accompanied Peñalosa to redeem her car from Corsiga and that
he himself gave her the money for such redemption in Corsiga's presence. 10 Having made that allegation, it was for
the petitioner himself to present Corsiga as his witness to corroborate that statement. Santos did not, and so failed to
prove what was, to begin with, an improbable defense. Ei incumbit probatio ui dicit.
Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is settled that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the information. 11 And as
described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.12
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book on the Revised
Penal Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
factopossession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession
of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13
The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle and so no crime was
committed.1âwphi1 In U.S. v. De Vera, 14 we held that the subsequent appropriation by the accused of the thing
earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead of estafa.
Illustrating, the Court declared:
... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a certain quantity of rice at a
certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the
measuring required before the payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the
different sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be asked: Did not B
receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he
owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's
consent?- No.
This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according to which, when the thing is
received and then appropriated or converted to one's own use without the consent of the owner, the crime
committed is not that of theft.
It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the fact that the object
of the crime was a car was not alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance. 15 Santos would have had
reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as
qualified theft carries a higher penalty.
Page 55 of 101
But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be considered aggravating,
having been proved at the trial. 16 Hence the imposable penalty for the theft, there being no other modifying
circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.
According to the Solicitor General:
The value of the car is P38,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty should be the maximum period of the prescribed penalty plus one
year for each additional P10,000.00. Thus the imposable penalty is the maximum of prision mayor with a
range of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS plus an additional ONE (1) YEAR for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, raising the maximum penalty into Reclusion Temporal in the
minimum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being one aggravating and no mitigating circumstance the
imposable penalty recommended is from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to THIRTEEN
(13) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
We approve the above observations and sentence the petitioner accordingly,
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein modified. The petitioner is declared guilty of theft and
sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal. He is
also ordered to restore the car in question to the private respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to pay her the
value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Case No. 13
G.R. No. 134120 January 17, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LEA SAGAN JULIANO, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This case was certified to us for review by the Court of Appeals after finding appellant Lea Sagan Juliano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case
No. 2053, and that the proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
Appellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos.
2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2053.
The pertinent Information for Estafa reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2053
That on or about July 27, 1991, at Kalawag II, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to defraud and by means of false
pretense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, [purchase] one hundred ninety (190) Bags of Rice
from JCT Agro-Development Corporation and in payment thereof, the said accused [did] make or draw and issue in
favor of the said Corporation Check No. 142254 post-dated July 30, 1991 for a value of EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (₱89,800.00), Philippine Currency, drawn against the Philippine Commercial International
Bank, Isulan Branch, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, knowing at the time of issue that she did not have funds with the drawee
bank for payment of the said check and when presented for encashment, the same was dishonored by the said bank
for reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds", and on August 20, 1991, the said accused again issued PCIB Check
Nos. 145452 and 145454 in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 and ₱39,800.00, respectively, in replacement of PCIB Check
No. 142254 which was earlier dishonored, and when the said replacement checks were presented for encashment,
the same were again dishonored by the drawee bank for the same reason, to the damage and prejudice of JCT Agro-
Development Corporation in the said amount of ₱89,800.00.
Page 56 of 101
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.1
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. Joint trial of the three criminal cases ensued.2
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records,3 are as follows:
At about 10:00 a.m. of July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased 190 sacks of milled rice worth ₱89,800
from the sales office of complainant JCT Agro-Development Corporation ("JCT") in Kalawag II, Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat. She issued postdated Check No. 142254 drawn against the Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIB), Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, dated July 30, 1991 for ₱89,800 in payment of the goods. The sale was evidenced by
Ordered Goods Slip No. 54524 dated July 27, 1991, with the check number written thereon.
On July 30, 1991, Remedios Torres, JCT’s cashier and acting manager, encashed the check, but the drawee bank
refused payment because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Thereafter, Torres requested one Mrs. Graza to tell
appellant to visit JCT’S office because the check she issued bounced.
Appellant went to JCT’s office and Torres showed her the check that bounced. Appellant pleaded that Torres accept
two checks to replace the first check that was dishonored, and Torres agreed. The replacement checks payable to
JCT were (1) PCIB Isulan Branch Check No. 1454525 dated August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000; and (2) PCIB Isulan
Branch Check No. 1454546 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800. The Ordered Goods Slip was then revised upon
Torres’ instruction. Torres surrendered the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant when she accepted the
two replacement checks.
On their due dates, Torres encashed the two replacement checks, but they were dishonored by the drawee bank.
The bank issued two Check Return Slips7 indicating that payment was refused because the checks were "Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds." JCT, through Torres, sent a demand letter8 dated August 31, 1991 to appellant informing
her of the dishonor of the replacement checks. Appellant received the demand letter on September 6, 1991.
Thereafter, appellant went to the office of JCT. Torres brought appellant to one Major Salvador of the PNP, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat. Before him, appellant executed a promissory note 9 dated September 10, 1991 wherein she promised
to pay JCT as follows: (1) ₱20,000 on September 16, 1991; (2) ₱19,800 on September 23, 1991; (3) ₱20,000 on
September 30, 1991; (4) ₱20,000 on October 7, 1991; and (5) ₱10,000 on October 14, 1991, which all amount to
₱89,800.
Through her driver, appellant sent JCT ₱10,000 for the installment due on September 16, 1991. JCT rejected the
payment because it was short by ₱10,000. Appellant no longer made any payment. JCT then sent her a demand
letter10 dated October 21, 1991, through registered mail, reiterating the dishonor of the checks she issued and giving
her five days from receipt of said letter to pay the amount of ₱89,800; otherwise, legal action would be taken against
her.
The trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code
for issuing PCIB Check No. 142254, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing PCIB Check Nos. 145452
and 145454. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
law, and of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).
Accordingly, the Court hereby sentences:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2051
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs of
suit;
Page 57 of 101
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to pay a fine of FORTY THOUSAND (₱40,000.00) PESOS; and to pay the costs
of suit.
1. the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to pay to the JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, the sum of
EIGHTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED (₱89,800.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, representing the value of
ONE HUNDRED NINETY (190) BAGS of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of the
Information in this case, until fully paid; and to pay the costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Appellant appealed her conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 2053 to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
found appellant guilty of the offense. It pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 818, which took effect on October 22,
1975, increased the penalty12 provided in Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. It held that pursuant
to the said amendatory law and considering that the amount of the unpaid check is ₱89,800, appellant should be
penalized by reclusion perpetua. Hence, the Court of Appeals referred the case to us in accordance with Section 13,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant raised the following issues:
1. The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit
constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.
2. Appellant’s failure to deposit the amount of PCI Bank check numbered 142254 for ₱89,800.00 in
this case does not give rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
3. The appellant could not be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code
due to the dishonor of the replacement checks because these were issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation.13
The trial court held appellant liable for Estafa for the following reasons: (1) The fact that appellant had insufficient
funds in the bank to cover the check at the time she postdated or issued Check No. 142254 is sufficient to make her
liable for Estafa; and (2) appellant’s failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover her check within three days from
receipt of notice from the payee or holder that said check had been dishonored for insufficiency of funds is prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In the first and second assigned errors, appellant contends that she could not be found guilty of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she
employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.
Appellant alleges that when she issued postdated PCIB Check No. 142254 on July 27, 1991, she represented that
the check would be fully funded on July 30, 1991. She stated that when complainant JCT accepted the postdated
check, it was aware that the funds for the said payment would become available only on the maturity date of the
check. JCT was also aware that the postdated check would be fully funded from the proceeds of another check which
had not yet been cleared for payment.
Appellant asserts that when JCT agreed to accept the postdated check, it was aware of and in effect accepted the
risk that the postdated check would not be funded in case the check that was supposed to fully fund the same would
not be cleared. She alleges that the officers of JCT must have known that notwithstanding her representation, there
was always a chance that the said check would not be funded on its maturity date for a variety of reasons, among
them force majeure. Some of those who purchased rice on credit from her (appellant) may not pay their obligations.
The fact that she (appellant) was mistaken in her belief that she would be able to fund the check on its maturity date
does not prove deceit.
Page 58 of 101
Appellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to defraud. After she was notified of the
dishonor of the first check, she did not hide or abscond, but she offered to replace the first check with two checks.
Appellant also contends that when JCT accepted the replacement checks in place of PCIB Check No. 142254, she
was relieved of her obligation of funding said check. Hence, she alleges that she is not covered by the prima
faciepresumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. She claims that since deceit
is absent in this case, she is not liable for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow…:
...
2. By means of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
...
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the
offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the
payee has been defrauded.14 Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be established with
satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or
simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check.15 The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check, otherwise, a prima faciepresumption of deceit
arises. 16
As regards the first reason of the trial court in holding appellant liable for Estafa, we find that appellant did not deceive
complainant JCT by stating that she had sufficient funds in the bank on the date of issuance of the check. JCT knew
that the postdated check was not yet funded as of the date of its issuance and that it would be funded on July 30,
1991. Prosecution witness Remedios Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
...
Q:- The check which you said … was used by Lea Sagan Juliano which is PCIB Check No. 142254
dated July 30, 1991, why is it dated July 30 when the transaction occurred on July 29?
A: - She placed it post dated with her assurance that she deposited at PCIB and it is not yet cleared
and it will be cleared on July 30, 1991.
Q:- You said her deposit was not yet cleared, why, did she tell you that she deposited a check at
the PCIB of Isulan?
A: - Yes, sir."17
Page 59 of 101
As regards the second reason of the trial court for holding appellant liable for Estafa, we note that
appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from
receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of said check because complainant JCT had accepted the
replacement checks and surrendered the first check to appellant, which indicated that JCT no
longer held appellant liable for the payment of her obligation under the first check.
It has been established that after the dishonor of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254,
Remedios Torres, JCT’s acting manager, verbally informed appellant at JCT’s office that she was
unable to encash said check due to insufficiency of funds, but she did not demand that appellant
make good PCIB Check No. 142254 within three days from receipt of said notice. Instead, on the
same occasion, Torres accepted PCIB Check No. 145452 dated August 20, 1991 for ₱50,000 and
PCIB Check No. 145454 dated August 22, 1991 for ₱39,800 as the replacement of PCIB Check
No. 142254, which first check she surrendered to appellant. JCT was then holding appellant liable
for payment under the replacement checks, PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454, and no longer
under PCIB Check No. 142254. Torres testified, thus:
...
PRO. DE PERALTA:
Q: - And since you said PCIB Check No. 142254 in the total amount of ₱89,800.00 [bounced]
because of insufficiency of funds, what did you do next?
A: - I went to the residence of Mrs. Graza to [ask] Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano is she still purchasing
from her the same rice and I found out she had been there very often so I asked Mrs. Graza to help
or tell us if ever Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano to come over and visit our office because the check she
issued in payment of the 190 sacks of rice in the total amount of [P]89,800 [bounced].
...
Q: - When Mrs. Lea Sagan Juliano appeared in your Office at Kalawag II, what did you tell her?
A: - When she arrived at our office I showed her the check that [bounced].
Q: - And what transpired next?
A: - Then afterwards she told me she asked for consideration to give or allow certain period to pay
that said check by issuing us again another check to be staggard so that she can be able to pay the
amount because of her pleadings I let her issue by surrendering the previous check and she issued
me the two checks dated August 20 and 22.
Q: - When you said surrendered the check in the amount of ₱89,800.00, are you referring to PCIB
check no. 142254?
A: - That was the check I returned to her.18
In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant instead of demanding payment
under the first check (PCIB Check No. 142254) on the same day that JCT’s Acting Manager informed appellant of
the dishonor of the first check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary amount
to cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellant’s balance in
her account with PCIB Isulan Branch was ₱78,400. It is possible that appellant could have deposited ₱11,400 to
make good the first check worth ₱89,800 if JCT made it clear that it was demanding payment under the first check.
It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after appellant’s receipt of the verbal
notice of dishonor of the first check, because by then the prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to
deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been established.l^vvphi1.net
Page 60 of 101
Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the
first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit
against appellant. For it was due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and
surrendering the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount necessary to
cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her
liable for payment under the said check. The surrender of the first check, PCIB Check No. 142254, to appellant would
explain why the prosecution failed to submit said check in evidence, and merely relied on testimonial evidence to
prove the issuance of the check.
In failing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
Nevertheless, appellant’s civil liability to JCT remains, in the amount of ₱89,800, which is the value of the sacks of
rice she purchased.
The third assigned error need not be discussed since the trial court did not convict appellant of Estafa for the
issuance of PCIB Checks Nos. 145452 and 145454.1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No.
2053, is set aside and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant is ordered to pay JCT Agro-Development Corporation, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat, the sum of Eighty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (₱89,800.00), representing the value of 190
bags of milled rice, with legal rate of interest from the date of filing of the Information in this case, until fully paid.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Case No. 14
G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 15993,
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-
25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a
townhouse unit in the latter's project at Bacoor, Cavite.
Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in
the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.
After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the
townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the
effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and
specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip and 12 out of 14 unit
buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered
by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint
as to the alleged defects.
Page 61 of 101
Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its
possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated
checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank
charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's
checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.
On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910 reads:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and
issue in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a check 813514 drawn against Citibank, a duly established
domestic banking institution in the amount of P9,304.00 Philippine Currency dated/postdated October 30,
1990 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that she/he did not have any funds
in the drawee bank of (sic) the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for
payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr.
did not have any funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still
fails and refused (sic) to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Francel
Realty Corporation in the amount aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
25910, except for the dates, and check numbers 2 were consolidated and jointly tried.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial then proceeded.
The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:
The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24, 1989, at the office of the private
complainant Francel Realty Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip, Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private
complainant Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among a number of other checks),
each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay to the order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 with
Citibank, to wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh. C), Check No. 813515 dated November
30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check No. 813518 dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516 dated
December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated January 30, 1991 (Exh. G) and Check No. 813519
dated March 30, 1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the
house and lot subject of the written contract executed and entered into by and between FRC as seller and
Francisco as buyer on said date of August 24, 1989 (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase
price for the house and lot was P451,700.00, of which Francisco paid FRC in the sum of P135,000.00 as
down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committing himself to pay the balance of P316,000.00 in 48
equal monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum already includes interest on successive monthly
balance) effective September 30, 1989 and on the 30th day of each month thereafter until the stipulated
purchase price is paid in full. The said six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawn,
issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as and in partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly
installments under their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in September 1989, the Building
Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject house — a residential townhouse — was issued (Exh. N)
and Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy of the subject house and
lot.1âwphi1.nêt
When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to the Citibank for payment on their respective
due dates, they were all returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason: account closed as indicated
in the drawee bank's stamped notations on the face and back of each check; in fact, as indicated in the
corresponding record of Francisco's account no. 815515 with Citibank, said account already had a zero
Page 62 of 101
balance as early as September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that FRC, first thru its
executive vice president and project manager and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally
and in writing, of the checks' dishonor and demanded from him the payment of the amount thereof, still
Francisco did not pay or make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K). . .3
The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking possession and starting in the use and
occupancy of the subject townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various construction defects; that
he called the attention of FRC, thru its project manager, requesting that appropriate measures be forthwith
instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not acknowledge, much less attend to them; that
Francisco thus mailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum giving notice that effective
June 1990, he will cease and desist "from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of
Unit No. 14 of FRC Townhomes referred to above, unless and until your Office satisfactorily complete(s) the
construction, renovation and/or repair of my townhouses (sic) unit referred to above" and that should FRC
"persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) days from your receipt of this Verified Notice,
forthwith petition the [HLURB] for Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief from my
obligation to pay my monthly amortization to your good Office and allow me to deposit said amortizations
with [HLURB] pending your completion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question"; that Francisco thru counsel
wrote FRC, its president, and its counsel notices/letters in sum to the effect that Francisco and all other
complainants in the [HLURB] case against FRC shall cease and desist from paying their monthly
amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of their units in accordance with
the plans and specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURB] and as warranted by the FRC in their
contracts and that the dishonor of the subject checks was a natural consequence of such suspension of
payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or deposit all other postdated checks issued by Francisco
and the other complainants and still in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that Francisco and the other
complainants filed the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision was handed down therein and the
same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of
presentation of the subject checks for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at least P150,000.00
cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco closed his account no. 845515 with Citibank
conformably with the bank's customer service officer's advice to close his said account instead of making a
stop-payment order for each of his more than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's possession at the time, so
as to avoid the P600.00-penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject of a stop-payment order.4
On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-
25914 and Q-91-25915, the Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each
case to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs. Further, the accused is hereby ordered to
pay the offended party, Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total sum of fifty-five
thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos (P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
commencement of these actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
15993. But on February 29, 1996, the appellate court ruled:
On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold that appellant has no basis to rely on the
provision of PD 957 to justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his checking account and the
notices sent by him to private complainant that he will stop paying his monthly amortizations. 6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was denied per Resolution dated April 22, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
Page 63 of 101
I
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO STOP OR
OTHERWISE PREVENT THE PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO
HAVE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT
AND THE TOWNHOUSE PROJECT.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER
THE SUBJECT CHECKS UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.7
The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, considering
that he had cause to stop payment of the checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the
buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his amortization payments, should the subdivision or
condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project in accordance with duly-approved plans and
specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private complainant's townhouse project were
incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspend payments should not render him liable under B.P.
Blg. 22.
The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent
and circumstances surrounding the issuance of a worthless check are immaterial. 8 The gravamen of the offense
charged is the act itself of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. In his view, P.D.
No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense against the charges against him.
Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), 9 an offense is committed when the following
elements are present:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 10
In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 64 of 101
To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's issuance
that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates
a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present. 11 But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment
in favor of the issue, which it supports. 12 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency
of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." 13But such
presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented
evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense
charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.
Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its
face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. 14 The checks
in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records
no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank
would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. 15 On the contrary, there is testimony by
petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.
As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for
insufficiency of funds. It was made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each
time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated checks in private respondent's
possession. 16 Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But it
establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time said checks were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely
had no knowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment.
He could not have foreseen that he would be advised by his own bank in the future, to close his account to avoid
paying the hefty banks charges that came with each "stop payment" order issued to prevent private respondent from
encashing the 30 or so checks in its possession. What the prosecution has established is the closure of petitioner's
checking account. But this does not suffice to prove the second element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which
explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are
presented for encashment.
To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue the
import of requirements for conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed. Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the punishable act must come clearly
within both the spirit and letter of the statute. 17
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 it is difficult to see how conviction
of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded
the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No. 957. 19 A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to
carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the legislature. 20 Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one
statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. 21 More so, when it will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled
and given due effect.
Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such time as the
owner or developer had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. 22 This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment
payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged
with.
Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other units of the
subject condominium bought on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to order
his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third element of "subsequent dishonor of the check. . . without valid
cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As already stated, the prosecution tried to establish the
crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a valid
cause to stop payment, thereby negating the third element of the crime.1âwphi1
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code, but
the Code is supplementary to such a law. 23 We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the
Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article 11 (5) 24 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner's
exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against him.
Page 65 of 101
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges
against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Case No. 15
G.R. No. 149858 September 5, 2007

FRANCISCO M. BAX, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ILYON INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated December
19, 2000 and its Resolution dated September 5, 2001 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 affirming in toto the Decision dated
December 14, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, Pasig City declaring petitioner guilty of nine (9)
counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
On August 16, 1994, Francisco M. Bax, petitioner, was charged with violations of B.P. 22 (10 counts) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 71, Pasig City,3 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 14354 to 14363.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 14354 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Ilyon Industrial Corporation to apply on account or for
value the check described below:
Check No.: : AGRO94438

Drawn against : United Coconut Planters Bank
In the amount : P47,250.00
Dated/Postdated : March 13, 1994
Payable to : Ilyon Industrial Corp. rep. by Benedict Tan
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check
could have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the accused, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to "Stop Payment", and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to
pay said payee the face amount of the said check or made arrangement for full payment thereof within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except as to the numbers and dates of the other nine checks issued by petitioner, and the reason for their dishonor
(drawn against insufficient funds), the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355-14363 and the above Information
are similarly worded.
The facts are:
Page 66 of 101
Sometime in October 1993, petitioner, for and in behalf of Vachman Industries, Inc. (VACHMAN), purchased 80
metric tons of chemical compounds, known as caustic soda flakes, from Ilyon Industrial Corporation (ILYON),
respondent.
On December 6, 1993, ILYON delivered 27 metric tons of caustic soda flakes to petitioner. Again in January 1994,
ILYON delivered another 27 metric tons of caustic soda flakes to petitioner. In payment therefor, petitioner issued ten
(10) checks amounting to P464,750.00 in favor of ILYON.
Upon presentment of the checks to the United Coconut Planters Bank for payment, they were dishonored for being
drawn against insufficient funds. Despite ILYON’s demand, petitioner failed to make good the bounced checks for the
reason that he has been encountering financial problems. As a result, ILYON caused the filing of ten (10)
Informations against petitioner.
After hearing or on March 27, 1998, the MeTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused,
Francisco Bax, "GUILTY" of the crime of Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, (10) counts, and
accordingly sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months in each case and to pay the offended
party the sum of P464,750.00, the amount of all the ten (10) checks and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 70, Pasig City, presided by Judge Pablito Rojas, rendered a Joint Decision dated
December 14, 1998 affirming with modification the MeTC Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) accused is ACQUITTED in Criminal case No. 14354;
(b) the sentence imposed on accused in Criminal Case Nos. 14355 to 14363 of six (6) months imprisonment
for each is hereby increased to ONE (1) YEAR in each case; and
(c) the total amount of indemnity to be paid by the accused to the complainant-corporation is PHP
417,500.00.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal,4 the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23356 rendered its Decision on December 19, 2000 affirming in
toto the RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated September 5, 2001.
Hence the instant petition.
The basic issue is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Solicitor General contends that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the RTC Joint Decision sustaining
that of the MeTC because all the elements of violation of B.P. 22 are present in each case. Petitioner, on the other
hand, maintains that since he did not receive a written notice of dishonor, not all the elements of the offense have
been established by the prosecution. Accordingly, he should be acquitted.
We agree with petitioner.
Page 67 of 101
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even finality on appeal, except when it
has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result
of the case. This exception is present here.5
Section 1 of B.P. 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by
a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Thus, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements of the offense:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 6
We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second element.
To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the
time the check was issued.7 Hence, the law provides that he must be notified of the dishonor, thus:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit, unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.8
While it is true that ILYON, through its president, Benedict Tan, asked petitioner to pay the dishonored checks,
however, such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22.
Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently
dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he
or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. 9
In Domagsang v. Court of Appeals,10 we held that the notice of dishonor of a check to the maker must be in writing. A
mere oral notice to the drawer or maker of the dishonor of his check is not enough, thus:
Page 68 of 101
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law. i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere
oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court
is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be
punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the
accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes
have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, obviously, there is no way of determining
when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time he issued the checks did not arise. 11
We thus find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of
violations of B.P. 22.
However, petitioner should pay the face value of the nine (9) dishonored checks plus legal interest. It is well settled
that the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where such acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. 12
We however modify the award of petitioner’s civil liability to ILYON from P417,500.00 to P425,250.00. In Criminal
Case No. 14354, petitioner was acquitted by the RTC since the reason for the dishonor was his "stop payment
order" to the drawee bank to enable VACHMAN to reconcile its accounts with ILYON. Hence, only the face value of
the remaining nine (9) checks should be included in the computation of petitioner’s civil liability. Each check has a
face value of P47,250.00 which, if we multiply by nine, yields P425,250.00.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Francisco M. Bax is acquitted in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14355 to 14363 for violations of B.P. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered, however, to pay the offended party, ILYON, the face value of the nine (9) checks in
the total amount of P425,250.00 with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Informations until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Case No. 16
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX
CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the commission
of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
Page 69 of 101
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the
crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death
of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application
of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-
in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince
Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one
(1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached
as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging
to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in
Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of
Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and
thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign
involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years
prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other
niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the
second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they were in
connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and
made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc.
2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc.
No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee
Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale
were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her
grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the property covered by
TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds
Page 70 of 101
were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother,
Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000.00 for the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to
William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual
knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory
thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father’s
orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently
secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the
sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and
to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. 4 On appeal,
however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means
of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said
document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at
Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735,
Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
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registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special
power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds
of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for ₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
₱250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale
of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of
damages from ₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the actual amount received
by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his
relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting
circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity
between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,]
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and
obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather
against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil.
473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed
for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied
in the original)
The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
Page 72 of 101
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or
existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship
by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private
respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further
pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato
joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent,
William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-
in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We
cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-
in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where none
is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver
intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading
into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the
plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato. 14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-
ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the
estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on January 28,
1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land
could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such
right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the
spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage
with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided
under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the
members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s provision
exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her
liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
Page 73 of 101
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls
for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving
spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It
limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to
the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions are
parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather
who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her
stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson; 20 by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment
of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial
and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in
the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some who
believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs.
Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is
that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is
dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it
(Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite
the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of
the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this
view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the
marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse
to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether
the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution
of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers
that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these
people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
parties.30
Page 74 of 101
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest. 31 On the
other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity
view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in
general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and
the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his
or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence
to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of
the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.35The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the
marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the
accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one’s
relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave
offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the
said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information
or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other words, it is the recital of
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facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged
in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named.43 The
determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not
binding on the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato,
by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and
thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of
the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who
participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of
signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such
intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of
Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it
involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal that she
execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special
power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief
that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely
attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato]
made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that
Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author
thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase
the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount
of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of
₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were
public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration stated in
the deeds.
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Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary
means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is required
for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in
Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a
public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the
nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of
that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate
simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as
separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime
of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the
said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in
the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the
protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component
crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same
criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words,
while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the
right to life, theft which violates the right to property), 49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical
Page 77 of 101
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself. 50 Since only a single criminal
intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the
complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent
results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is
different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for
each of which the accused incurs criminal liability. 52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of complex
crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single
penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component
crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)
—∞——∞——∞—
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case
where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. 54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the elements of
both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and
considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are
not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification
of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and
material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished
individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315
(3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be
falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered
as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
Page 78 of 101
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a "necessary
means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. 55 In
People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle
his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two
crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. 58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime of
falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing the falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission
of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public
document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution
of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly
when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the
time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the
falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale
of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by,
and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed
would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita
herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what
was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated
January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 17
G.R. No. 179934 May 21, 2009
vs.
ERLINDA ABORDO and VINA CABANLONG, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the 21 June 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01701. The Court
of Appeals affirmed with modification the 10 May 2001 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan,
Page 79 of 101
Branch 50, convicting Erlinda Abordo (Abordo) of estafa in Criminal Case No. V-0654 and of illegal recruitment in
Criminal Case No. V-0655, and convicting Abordo and Vina Cabanlong (Cabanlong) of estafa in Criminal Case Nos.
V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772 and of illegal recruitment in Criminal Case Nos. V-0768, V-0770, and V-0771.
The Facts
The Informations against the accused read as follows:
Criminal Case No. V-0654 (Estafa)
That during the period from February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994, at Poblacion Zone II, Municipality of Villasis, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (Erlinda
Abordo), by means of deceit, deliberately misrepresenting herself to be capable of causing the employment of
laborers abroad, knowing fully well that she is not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Jesus Rayray y Bascos the
sum of ₱14,000.00, Philippine currency with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter,
despite repeated demands, the said accused who failed to cause complainant’s employment abroad, failed and
refused to return the said amount of ₱14,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for her own use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Jesus Rayray y Bascos in the said amount.3
Criminal Case No. V-0655 (Illegal Recruitment)
That during the period from February 3, 1994 to March 3, 1994 at Barangay Poblacion Zone II, Municipality of
Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused (Erlinda Abordo), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Jesus Rayray y Bascos for
employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.4
That during the month of December, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (Erlinda Abordo and Vina
Cabanlong), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of deceit, deliberately
misrepresenting [themselves] to be capable of causing the employment of laborers abroad, knowing fully well that
they are not duly or legally authorized to recruit laborers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Jaime Fernandez y Simon the sum of ₱45,000.00, Philippine
currency with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and thereafter, despite repeated demands, the
said accused who failed to cause complainant’s employment abroad, failed and refused to return the said amount of
₱45,000.00, thereby appropriating and converting the same for their own use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of said Jaime Fernandez y Simon in the said amount.5
Cabanlong), conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit Jaime Fernandez y Simon for employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment. 6
unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar the sum of ₱45,000.00, Philippine
currency with the undertaking of working for his employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated demands, the
Page 80 of 101
prejudice of said Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar in the said amount. 7
feloniously recruit Exequiel Mendoza y Olivar for employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license or
That during the month of September, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan,
feloniously recruit Esmenia Cariño y Millano for employment abroad, without first securing the requisite license or
That during the month of September, 1994 at Barangay San Blas, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan,
unlawfully and feloniously demand and receive from Esmenia Cariño y Millano the sum of ₱15,000.00, Philippine
currency with the undertaking of working for [her] employment abroad and, thereafter, despite repeated demands, the
prejudice of said Esmenia Cariño y Millano in the said amount.10
The prosecution established that sometime in January 1994, Abordo recruited Jesus Rayray (Rayray) for possible
employment abroad and collected a total of ₱14,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured Rayray that he could soon
leave for abroad. Rayray was unable to leave as promised and only saw Abordo again when she was already in jail. 11
Sometime in September 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Esmenia Cariño (Cariño) in Lipay,
Villasis, Pangasinan, to persuade her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Cariño and Cabanlong used to be
neighbors in San Blas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Upon being convinced by the accused, Cariño gave a total of ₱15,000
as placement fee. Despite this payment, Cariño was unable to leave for abroad. 12
Sometime in December 1994, Abordo and Cabanlong went to the house of Segundina Fernandez (Segundina) in
Caramitan, Villasis, Pangasinan. Cabanlong and Segundina are first cousins. Cabanlong introduced Abordo as a
recruiter. The accused told Segundina that they could secure employment for her son, Jaime, in Hong Kong upon
payment of the placement fee. Segundina and Jaime agreed to the proposition. Segundina gave the accused cash
and other valuables amounting to ₱45,000. Abordo gave a plane ticket to Jaime, which turned out to be fake; hence,
Jaime was unable to leave for abroad.13
Sometime in December 1994, the accused went to the house of Exequiel Mendoza (Mendoza) in San Blas, Villasis,
Pangasinan to convince him to work in Hong Kong as a security guard. Mendoza agreed to be recruited and to pay
₱45,000 as placement fee. Abordo assured him that as soon as he could pay the placement fee, he could work
abroad. Mendoza gave Abordo cash and pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱39,000. Despite several promises from
Abordo, Mendoza was unable to leave for Hong Kong. Thus, he demanded from the accused the return of his money
and pieces of jewelry, but to no avail.141avvphi1
Adonis Peralta, Dagupan District Officer of the Department of Labor and Employment, issued certifications dated 29
September 1993 and 3 August 1993 stating that the accused were not included in the Philippine Overseas and
Employment Agency list of those licensed to recruit in Pangasinan. 15
Page 81 of 101
The accused denied the charges against them. In their brief, the accused claimed that they could not be held liable
for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code since the element of deceit was not established. They
alleged that they received the placement fees on behalf of the travel agency. They argued that it was unclear whether
the false statements or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the
money by the complainants.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After the trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan rendered a Decision dated 10 May 2001
disposing of the cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale in Crim. Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768,
V-0770 and V-0771, defined and penalized under Art. 38, par. (a) in relation to Art. 39, par. (a) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended by P.D. 2018, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay, jointly and severally, fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (100,000.00).1avvphi1
Accused Erlinda Abordo is, likewise, found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Crim. Case No.
V-0654, as provided under Art. 315, par. 2(a), and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the minimum, to FOUR
(4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Jesus Rayray the amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(₱14,000.00).
Further, accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
estafa and hereby sentences them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of:
1) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in it minimum and medium periods, as the
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Jaime
Fernandez the amount of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱45,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0767;
2) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse Exequiel
Mendoza the amount of THIRTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (₱39,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0769; and
3) SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, as the
minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as the maximum, and to reimburse Esmenia Carino the
amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱15,000.00) in Crim. Case No. V-0772.
SO ORDERED.16
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution sufficiently established the accused’s guilt for illegal recruitment. The
accused cooperated with each other in convincing complainants to pay placement fees for employment abroad. The
accused received money from the complainants. The act of the accused of recruiting complainants for employment
abroad without the necessary license from the POEA constitutes the offense of illegal recruitment.
The Court of Appeals also found that the prosecution has established accused’s guilt for estafa. The Court of Appeals
stated that the very same evidence proving the accused’s commission of the offense of illegal recruitment also
established that the accused connived in defrauding complainants by misrepresenting that they had the power,
influence, agency and business to obtain overseas employment for complainants upon payment of placement fees.
Complainants suffered damages to the extent of the various sums of money they delivered to accused.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalties imposed on the accused as each information involved only one
complainant. The accused cannot be convicted for illegal recruitment in large scale based on several informations
each filed by only one complainant. The trial court erred in considering the three complainants in the two criminal
Page 82 of 101
cases when it convicted the accused of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since the accused were prosecuted under
several informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each information. To convict the
accused of illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one information that must include all the complainants.
Otherwise, the accused should be held liable only for simple illegal recruitment.
The dispositive portion of the 21 June 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
(1) In Criminal Case No. V-0655, accused-appellant Erlinda Abordo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and is sentenced to suffer a prison term of Six (6) years and
One (1) day as minimum, to Twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. V-0768, V-0770 and V-0771, Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are found Guilty
of three (3) counts of Simple Illegal Recruitment, and are sentenced to suffer a prison term of Six (6) years
and one (1) day as minimum, to twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of ₱200,000 on each
count.
(3) Accused Erlinda Abordo is, likewise, found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa in Crim.
Case No. V-0654, as provided for under Art. 315, par. 2(a), and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum, and to reimburse
Jesus Rayray in the amount of FOURTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱14,000).
(4) Further, accused Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
(3) counts of estafa and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of:
a) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse
Jaime Fernandez in the amount of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱45,000) in Crim. Case No.
V-0767;
b) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
as the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, medium, as the maximum and to reimburse
Exequiel Mendoza in the amount of THIRTY NINE THOUSAND PESOS (₱39,000) in Crim. Case
No. V-0769; and
c) SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
as the minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum, and to
reimburse Esmenia Cariño in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (₱15,000) in Crim. Case No. V-
0772.17
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment and estafa under Article
315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The Court affirms the conviction of the accused for the crimes charged. However, the Court modifies the penalties
imposed on the accused in the estafa cases.
The elements of illegal recruitment are (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.18 Recruitment and placement is "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contact
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any
Page 83 of 101
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."19
The prosecution sufficiently established Abordo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of simple illegal
recruitment in Criminal Case No. V-0655. Without the necessary license, Abordo unlawfully recruited Rayray for
deployment abroad. In exchange for this promised overseas job, Rayray paid Abordo ₱14,000.
Conniving with Cabanlong, Abordo also illegally recruited Jaime, Mendoza, and Cariño who paid the accused
₱45,000, ₱39,000 and ₱15,000, respectively, as placement fees. Despite their payments of the placement fees, all
the complainants were unable to depart the country for work abroad.
The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the accused are guilty of simple illegal recruitment only, modifying the
trial court’s ruling that the accused are guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since the accused were prosecuted
under several informations for different complainants, the penalty imposed should be for each information
charged.20 To convict the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale, there must be one information that must
include all the complainants.21 Otherwise, the accused should be convicted only for simple illegal
recruitment.22 Accordingly, the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. V-0655, V-0768, V-
0770, and V-0771 (for simple illegal recruitment) are likewise correct. 23
The Court also affirms the conviction of Abordo for estafa committed against Rayray and the conviction of Abordo
and Cabanlong for estafa committed against Jaime, Mendoza, and Cariño. Conviction under the Labor Code for
illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa. 24 The
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The prosecution established that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas employment,
the accused deceived the complainants into believing that they would provide them overseas work. Their assurances
made complainants pay the placement fees required in exchange for the promised jobs. The elements of deceit and
damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present; hence, the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case Nos. V-
0654 (against Abordo), V-0767, V-0769, and V-0772 (against Abordo and Cabanlong) should be affirmed.
Under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is punished by "the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years) to prision mayor in its minimum period (6 years and 1 day
to 8 years), if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty x x x shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. x x x."
The penalty prescribed for estafa is composed of only two, not three, periods. In such a case, Article 65 of the
Revised Penal Code requires the division into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and
forming one period of each of the three portions. Therefore, the maximum, medium, and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years25
If the amount defrauded does not exceed ₱22,000 and there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period, or 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional to 6
years, 8 months and 20 days of prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed.
Page 84 of 101
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 is prision correccional in
its minimum period (6 months, 1 day to 2 years and 4 months) to prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). From this, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be
taken.26
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving ₱14,000), Abordo is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days of prision
correccional, as maximum. Abordo should also refund to Rayray the amount of ₱14,000 with legal interest from the
filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving ₱45,000), Abordo and Cabanlong are sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The accused should also refund to Jaime the amount of ₱45,000 with legal interest from the filing of the
information until this amount is fully paid.
indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 9 years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The accused should also refund to Mendoza the amount of ₱39,000 with legal interest from the filing of
the information until this amount is fully paid.
indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and 11 days
of prision correccional, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Cariño the amount of ₱15,000 with legal
interest from the filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
The penalties in this case consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature
of such penalties.27 Hence,since the accused are sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should
be served successively.28
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the 21 June 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01701
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. V-0654 (for estafa involving ₱14,000), Erlinda Abordo is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months and
11 days of prision correccional, as maximum. Abordo should also refund to Jesus Rayray the amount of
₱14,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this amount is fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. V-0767 (for estafa involving ₱45,000), Erlinda Abordo and Vina Cabanlong are
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Jaime Fernandez the amount of
years of prision mayor, as maximum. The accused should also refund to Exequiel Mendoza the amount of
years, 5 months and 11 days of prision correccional, as maximum. The accused should also refund to
Esmenia Cariño the amount of ₱15,000 with legal interest from the filing of the information until this amount
is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Page 85 of 101
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 18
G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution2 dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No.
30603. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the September 27, 2006 decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 202, Las Piñas City, finding petitioner Mark C. Soledad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 9(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484, or the Access Devices Regulations Act of 1998; while the assailed
Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone from a certain "Tess"
or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a Citifinancing loan
assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, private complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his
office in Quezon City. While in his office, Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her immediate boss, a
certain "Arthur" [later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone conversation, [petitioner] told private complainant to
submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong). Private complainant submitted
various documents, such as his Globe handyphone original platinum gold card, identification cards and statements of
accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan status but he failed to get in touch with either
[petitioner] or Ronald Gobenchiong.
During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe handyphone statement of account
wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers which were not his. Upon verification with the phone
company, private complainant learned that he had additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name, and the application
for said cellular phone lines bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant also checked
with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database information was altered and he had a
credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation (Metrobank).
Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank’s junior assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres lodged a complaint
with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted an entrapment operation.
During the entrapment operation, NBI’s Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche [Arteche], together with some
other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Piñas around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed as the delivery boy of the Metrobank
credit card. Upon reaching the address written on the delivery receipt, [Arteche] asked for Henry Yu. [Petitioner]
responded that he was Henry Yu and presented to [Arteche] two (2) identification cards which bore the name and
signature of private complainant, while the picture showed the face of [petitioner]. [Petitioner] signed the delivery
receipt. Thereupon, [Arteche] introduced himself as an NBI operative and apprehended [petitioner]. [Arteche]
recovered from [petitioner] the two (2) identification cards he presented to [Arteche] earlier.4
Petitioner was thus charged with Violation of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for "possessing a counterfeit access device
or access device fraudulently applied for." The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with certain Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a.
Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain Ronald Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo and all of them mutually helping and aiding each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY YU by applying a credit
card, an access device defined under R.A. 8484, from METROBANK CARD CORPORATION, using the name of
complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the
name of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of
Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Page 86 of 101
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued. After the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging that he was not in physical and legal possession
of the credit card presented and marked in evidence by the prosecution. In an Order dated May 2, 2006, the RTC
denied the Demurrer to Evidence as it preferred to rule on the merits of the case.6
On September 27, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a. "Henry Yu,"
"Arthur" GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484 (Access Device Regulation
Act of 1998). Accordingly, pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act 8484 and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to not more than ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, accused is also ordered to pay a
fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for the offense committed.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC by deleting the
terms prision correccional and prision mayor.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the Information is valid;
(2) Whether or not the Information charges an offense, or the offense petitioner was found guilty of;
(3) Whether or not petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against him;
(4) Whether or not petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case. 8
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner was charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically Section 9(e), which reads as follows:
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. – The following acts shall constitute access device fraud and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently applied for.
Petitioner assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was not informed of the accusation against him. He
explains that though he was charged with "possession of an access device fraudulently applied for," the act of
"possession," which is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
We do not agree.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a
complaint or information. It states:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
Page 87 of 101
In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly stated that the accused is petitioner "Mark Soledad y Cristobal
a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur." It was also specified in the preamble of the Information that he was being charged with
Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently
applied for. In the accusatory portion thereof, the acts constituting the offense were clearly narrated in that
"[petitioner], together with other persons[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private complainant by
applying [for] a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank Card Corporation, using
the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit
card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and
addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu." Moreover, it was identified that the
offended party was private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about the 13th day of August
2004 in the City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained all the necessary details of the offense
committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by
respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, although the word "possession" was
not used in the accusatory portion of the Information, the word "possessing" appeared in its preamble or the first
paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, he was apprised that he was being charged with violation
of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The Court’s discussion in People v. Villanueva9 on the relationship between the preamble and the accusatory portion
of the Information is noteworthy, and we quote:
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive words and phrases.
It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory paragraph itself. The preamble in fact
complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the
charge in general terms; while the accusatory portion only provides the necessary details. The preamble and the
accusatory paragraph, together, form a complete whole that gives sense and meaning to the indictment. x x x.
xxxx
Moreover, the opening paragraph bears the operative word "accuses," which sets in motion the constitutional process
of notification, and formally makes the person being charged with the commission of the offense an accused. Verily,
without the opening paragraph, the accusatory portion would be nothing but a useless and miserably incomplete
narration of facts, and the entire Information would be a functionally sterile charge sheet; thus making it impossible for
the state to prove its case.
The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but as one whole document serving one
purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full panoply of state authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is
not to determine whether allegations in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to
ensure that the constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled x x x. 10lawph!l
Besides, even if the word "possession" was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the Information, the acts
constituting it were clearly described in the statement "[that the] credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully
issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
prejudice of the real Henry Yu." Without a doubt, petitioner was given the necessary data as to why he was being
prosecuted.
Now on the sufficiency of evidence leading to his conviction.
Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the subject credit card because he was arrested immediately after
signing the acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not yet know the contents of the envelope delivered and had no
control over the subject credit card.11
Again, we find no value in petitioner’s argument.
The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for, penalized by R.A. No.
8484. The law, however, does not define the word "possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523 of
the Civil Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right." The acquisition of possession
involves two elements: the corpus or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or the intent to
possess it.12 Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on
Page 88 of 101
attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as
the surrounding circumstances.13
In this case, prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private complainant various
documents showing the latter’s identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using private complainant’s identity.
Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name and personal circumstances of private
complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the "messenger" (an NBI agent) required two valid
identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them, but bearing the name
and forged signature of private complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope delivered, petitioner signed
the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the content of the envelope was the
Metrobank credit card.
Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to petitioner’s
contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered to him, the above
narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the identification cards
purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess the same. Had he not
actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his signature on the
acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred to him as the recipient.
Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card, as clearly indicated in the
acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity of private complainant.
Lastly, we find no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8484
prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and not more than ten (10) years, and a fine of
₱10,000.00 or twice the value of the access device obtained, whichever is greater. Thus, the CA aptly affirmed the
imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six years to not more than ten years imprisonment, and a fine of
₱10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated August 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30603 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 19
G.R. No. 188726 January 25, 2012

CRESENCIO C. MILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARKET PURSUITS, INC. represented by CARLO V. LOPEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the 22 April 2009 Decision 1 and 8 July 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the Decision of the trial court finding petitioner Cresencio C. Milla (Milla) guilty of two counts of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
Respondent Carlo Lopez (Lopez) was the Financial Officer of private respondent, Market Pursuits, Inc. (MPI). In
March 2003, Milla represented himself as a real estate developer from Ines Anderson Development Corporation,
which was engaged in selling business properties in Makati, and offered to sell MPI a property therein located. For
this purpose, he showed Lopez a photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216445 registered in the name
of spouses Farley and Jocelyn Handog (Sps. Handog), as well as a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed
by the spouses in favor of Milla.3 Lopez verified with the Registry of Deeds of Makati and confirmed that the property
was indeed registered under the names of Sps. Handog. Since Lopez was convinced by Milla’s authority, MPI
purchased the property for ₱2 million, issuing Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) Check No. 154670 in the amount
Page 89 of 101
of ₱1.6 million. After receiving the check, Milla gave Lopez (1) a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 March
2003 executed by Sps. Handog in favor of MPI and (2) an original Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 216445. 4
Milla then gave Regino Acosta (Acosta), Lopez’s partner, a copy of the new Certificate of Title to the property, TCT
No. 218777, registered in the name of MPI. Thereafter, it tendered in favor of Milla SBTC Check No. 15467111 in the
amount of ₱400,000 as payment for the balance.5
Milla turned over TCT No. 218777 to Acosta, but did not furnish the latter with the receipts for the transfer taxes and
other costs incurred in the transfer of the property. This failure to turn over the receipts prompted Lopez to check with
the Register of Deeds, where he discovered that (1) the Certificate of Title given to them by Milla could not be found
therein; (2) there was no transfer of the property from Sps. Handog to MPI; and (3) TCT No. 218777 was registered in
the name of a certain Matilde M. Tolentino.6
Consequently, Lopez demanded the return of the amount of ₱2 million from Milla, who then issued Equitable PCI
Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 dated 20 and 23 May 2003, respectively, in the amount of ₱1 million each. However,
these checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When Milla ignored the demand
letter sent by Lopez, the latter, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the MPI Board of Directors, filed a Complaint
against the former on 4 August 2003. On 27 and 29 October 2003, two Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Public Documents were filed against Milla and were raffled to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Makati City, Branch 146 (RTC Br. 146).7 Milla was accused of having committed estafa through the
falsification of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777 purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds
of Makati, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034167
That on or about the 25th day of March 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document denomindated as "Deed of Absolute Sale", duly notarized by Atty. Lope M. Velasco, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, denominated as Doc. No. 297, Page No. 61, Book No. 69, Series of 2003
in his Notarial Register, hence, a public document, by causing it to appear that the registered owners of the property
covered by TCT No. 216445 have sold their land to complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. when in truth and in fact the
said Deed of Absolute Sale was not executed by the owners thereof and after the document was falsified, accused,
with intent to defraud complainant Market Pursuits, Inc. presented the falsified Deed of Sale to complainant, herein
represented by Carlo V. Lopez, and complainant believing in the genuineness of the Deed of Absolute Sale paid
accused the amount of P1,600,000.00 as partial payment for the property, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant in the aforementioned amount of P1,600,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 034168
That on or about the 3rd day of April 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a document denominated as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218777 purportedly issued by the
Register of Deeds of Makati City, hence, a public document, by causing it to appear that the lot covered by TCT No.
218777 was already registered in the name of complainant Market Pursuits, Inc., herein represented by Carlo V.
Lopez, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew that the Register of Deeds of Makati did not issue TCT
No. 218777 in the name of Market Pursuits Inc., and after the document was falsified, accused with intent to defraud
complainant and complainant believing in the genuineness of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218777 paid accused
the amount of P400,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of complainant in the aforementioned amount of
P4000,000.00 (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Milla filed, with leave of court, his Demurrer to Evidence. 9 In its Order dated 26
January 2006, RTC Br. 146 denied the demurrer and ordered him to present evidence, but he failed to do so despite
having been granted ample opportunity.10 Though the court considered his right to present evidence to have been
consequently waived, it nevertheless allowed him to file a memorandum. 11
Page 90 of 101
In its Joint Decision dated 28 November 2006,12 RTC Br. 146 found Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Cresencio Milla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and considering
that the amount involved is more than P22,000,00 this Court should apply the provision that an additional one (1)
year should be imposed for every ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos in excess of P22,000.00, thus, this Court is
constrained to impose the Indeterminate (sic) penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count.
Accused is adjudged to be civilly liable to the private complainant and is ordered pay (sic) complainant the total
amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with legal rate of interest from the filing of the Information until the
same is fully paid and to pay the costs. He is further ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) of the total
amount due as and for attorney’s fees. A lien on the monetary award is constituted in favor of the government, the
private complainant not having paid the required docket fee prior to the filing of the Information.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in the assailed Decision dated 22 April 2009, affirmed the findings of the trial
court.14 In its assailed Resolution dated 8 July 2009, it also denied Milla’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. 15
In the instant Petition, Milla alleges that the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals were not in
accordance with law and jurisprudence. He raises the following issues:
I. Whether the case should be reopened on the ground of negligence of counsel;
II. Whether the principle of novation is applicable;
III. Whether the principle of simple loan is applicable;
IV. Whether the Secretary’s Certificate presented by the prosecution is admissible in evidence;
V. Whether the supposed inconsistent statements of prosecution witnesses cast a doubt on the guilt of
petitioner.16
In its Comment, MPI argues that (1) Milla was not deprived of due process on the ground of gross negligence of
counsel; (2) under the Revised Penal Code, novation is not one of the grounds for the extinction of criminal liability for
estafa; and (3) factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive. 17
On the other hand, in its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that (1) Milla was accorded due
process of law; (2) the elements of the crime charged against him were established during trial; (3) novation is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability for estafa; (4) the money received by Milla from Lopez was not in the nature
of a simple loan or cash advance; and (5) Lopez was duly authorized by MPI to institute the action. 18
In his Consolidated Reply, Milla reiterates that the negligence of his former counsel warrants a reopening of the case,
wherein he can present evidence to prove that his transaction with MPI was in the nature of a simple loan. 19
In the disposition of this case, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the negligence of counsel deprived Milla of due process of law
II. Whether the principle of novation can exculpate Milla from criminal liability
III. Whether the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, should be reviewed on
appeal
Page 91 of 101
We resolve to deny the Petition.
Milla was not deprived of due process.
Milla argues that the negligence of his former counsel, Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), deprived him of
due process. Specifically, he states that after the prosecution had rested its case, Atty. Mendoza filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, and that the former was never advised by the latter of the demurrer. Thus, Milla was purportedly surprised
to discover that RTC Br. 146 had already rendered judgment finding him guilty, and that it had issued a warrant for
his arrest. Atty. Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Motion for New Trial, which Milla claims to have
been denied by the trial court for being an inappropriate remedy, thus, demonstrating his counsel’s negligence. These
contentions cannot be given any merit.
The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is
so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client. 20 In this case, Milla was able to file
a Demurrer to Evidence, and upon the trial court’s denial thereof, was allowed to present evidence. 21 Because of his
failure to do so, RTC Br. 146 was justified in considering that he had waived his right thereto. Nevertheless, the trial
court still allowed him to submit a memorandum in the interest of justice. Further, contrary to his assertion that RTC
Br. 146 denied the Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest thereafter filed by his former counsel, a reading of the 2 August
2007 Order of RTC Br. 146 reveals that it partially denied the Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Recall of Warrant of
Arrest, but granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Avail of Remedies under the Rules of Court, allowing him to file
an appeal and lifting his warrant of arrest.22
It can be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that Milla was given opportunities to defend his case and was
granted concomitant reliefs. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so
gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process.
The principle of novation cannot be applied to the case at bar.
Milla contends that his issuance of Equitable PCI Check Nos. 188954 and 188955 before the institution of the
criminal complaint against him novated his obligation to MPI, thereby enabling him to avoid any incipient criminal
liability and converting his obligation into a purely civil one. This argument does not persuade.
The principles of novation cannot apply to the present case as to extinguish his criminal liability. Milla cites People v.
Nery23 to support his
contention that his issuance of the Equitable PCI checks prior to the filing of the criminal complaint averted his
incipient criminal liability. However, it must be clarified that mere payment of an obligation before the institution of a
criminal complaint does not, on its own, constitute novation that may prevent criminal liability. This Court’s ruling in
Nery in fact warned:
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby
criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal
liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original petition, whether or not it was such that its breach would not
give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is
resorted to (cf. Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581; Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
Even in Civil Law the acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the original relation between the
complainant and the accused, can not produce novation. For the latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to
extinguish the original relationship, and such intent can not be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on
account of what is totally due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the
nullification of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this Court has
ruled that the offended party’s acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the amount misapplied does not
obliterate the criminal offense (Camus vs. Court of Appeals, 48 Off. Gaz. 3898). 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, in Quinto v. People,25 this Court exhaustively explained the concept of novation in relation to incipient
criminal liability, viz:
Page 92 of 101
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement
of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a necessary element of novation which may be effected
either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that
their object in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is
required for an implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two
contracts. While there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change that
can bring about novation, the touchstone for contrariety, however, would be an irreconcilable incompatibility between
the old and the new obligations.
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the effect of
extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been explicitly
stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on
every point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its
independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily,
changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must
take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof;
otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment. There was really no substitution of
debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the payment but did not give her consent to enter into a new
contract. The appellate court observed:
xxx xxx xxx
The acceptance by complainant of partial payment tendered by the buyer, Leonor Camacho, does not evince the
intention of the complainant to have their agreement novated. It was simply necessitated by the fact that, at that time,
Camacho had substantial accounts payable to complainant, and because of the fact that appellant made herself
scarce to complainant. (TSN, April 15, 1981, 31-32) Thus, to obviate the situation where complainant would end up
with nothing, she was forced to receive the tender of Camacho. Moreover, it is to be noted that the aforesaid payment
was for the purchase, not of the jewelry subject of this case, but of some other jewelry subject of a previous
transaction. (Ibid. June 8, 1981, 10-11)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa and penalizes any person who shall defraud another by
"misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other property. It is axiomatic that the gravamen of the offense is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The terms "convert" and
"misappropriate" have been held to connote "an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own
or devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon." The phrase, "to misappropriate to one’s own use"
has been said to include "not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. Verily, the sale of the pieces of jewelry on installments (sic) in contravention of the
explicit terms of the authority granted to her in Exhibit "A" (supra) is deemed to be one of conversion. Thus, neither
the theory of "delay in the fulfillment of commission" nor that of novation posed by petitioner, can avoid the incipient
criminal liability. In People vs. Nery, this Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal liability for estafa already committed is then not affected by the subsequent novation of contract, for it is
a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State in its own conation. (Emphasis supplied.) 26
In the case at bar, the acceptance by MPI of the Equitable PCI checks tendered by Milla could not have novated the
original transaction, as the checks were only intended to secure the return of the ₱2 million the former had already
given him. Even then, these checks bounced and were thus unable to satisfy his liability. Moreover, the estafa
Page 93 of 101
involved here was not for simple misappropriation or conversion, but was committed through Milla’s falsification of
public documents, the liability for which cannot be extinguished by mere novation.
The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court’s finding of guilt.
Finally, Milla assails the factual findings of the trial court. Suffice it to say that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on and accorded great respect by this Court. 27
There was no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it affirmed the finding of the trial court that
Milla was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa through falsification of public documents. The
prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime charged. The relevant provisions of the
Revised Penal Code read:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. – The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification enumerated in the next preceding article in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx xxx xxx
It was proven during trial that Milla misrepresented himself to have the authority to sell the subject property, and it
was precisely this misrepresentation that prompted MPI to purchase it.1âwphi1 Because of its reliance on his
authority and on the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 218777, MPI parted with its money in the amount of
₱2 million, which has not been returned until now despite Milla’s allegation of novation. Clearly, he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa through falsification of public documents.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the Petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Case No. 20
G.R. No. 158312 November 14, 2008
Page 94 of 101
JOHN DY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
This appeal prays for the reversal of the Decision 1 dated January 23, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated May 14, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23802. The appellate court affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated
November 17, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City, which had convicted petitioner
John Dy of two counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46711 and Q-93-46713, and two counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 224 (B.P. Blg. 22) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-46712 and Q-93-46714.
The facts are undisputed:
Since 1990, John Dy has been the distributor of W.L. Food Products (W.L. Foods) in Naga City, Bicol, under the
business name Dyna Marketing. Dy would pay W.L. Foods in either cash or check upon pick up of stocks of snack
foods at the latter's branch or main office in Quezon City. At times, he would entrust the payment to one of his drivers.
On June 24, 1992, Dy's driver went to the branch office of W.L. Foods to pick up stocks of snack foods. He
introduced himself to the checker, Mary Jane D. Maraca, who upon confirming Dy's credit with the main office, gave
him merchandise worth P106,579.60. In return, the driver handed her a blank Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC) Check with Check No. 553602 postdated July 22, 1992. The check was signed by Dy though it did not
indicate a specific amount.
Yet again, on July 1, 1992, the same driver obtained snack foods from Maraca in the amount of P226,794.36 in
exchange for a blank FEBTC Check with Check No. 553615 postdated July 31, 1992.
In both instances, the driver was issued an unsigned delivery receipt. The amounts for the purchases were filled in
later by Evelyn Ong, accountant of W.L. Foods, based on the value of the goods delivered.
When presented for payment, FEBTC dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds. Raul D. Gonzales, manager
of FEBTC-Naga Branch, notified Atty. Rita Linda Jimeno, counsel of W.L. Foods, of the dishonor. Apparently, Dy only
had an available balance of P2,000 as of July 22, 1992 and July 31, 1992.
Later, Gonzales sent Atty. Jimeno another letter5 advising her that FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60 was
returned to the drawee bank for the reasons stop payment order and drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD), and
not because it was drawn against insufficient funds as stated in the first letter. Dy's savings deposit account ledger
reflected a balance of P160,659.39 as of July 22, 1992. This, however, included a regional clearing check
for P55,000 which he deposited on July 20, 1992, and which took five (5) banking days to clear. Hence, the inward
check was drawn against the yet uncollected deposit.
When William Lim, owner of W.L. Foods, phoned Dy about the matter, the latter explained that he could not pay since
he had no funds yet. This prompted the former to send petitioner a demand letter, which the latter ignored.
On July 16, 1993, Lim charged Dy with two counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) 6 of the Revised Penal
Code in two Informations, which except for the dates and amounts involved, similarly read as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there [willfully] and feloniously defraud W.L. PRODUCTS, a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with business address at No. 531 Gen. Luis St., Novaliches, this
City, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representation which he made to complainant to the effect that Far East Bank and Trust Co. check No.
553602 dated July 22, 1992 in the amount of P106,579.60, payable to W.L. Products is a good check and
will be honored by the bank on its maturity date, and by means of other deceit of similar import, induced and
succeeded in inducing the said complainant to receive and accept the aforesaid check in payment of snack
foods, the said accused knowing fully well that all his manifestations and representations were false and
untrue and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact he did obtain the aforesaid snack foods
valued at P106,579.60 from said complainant as upon presentation of said check to the bank for payment,
Page 95 of 101
the same was dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason stop payment and the said accused,
once in possession of the aforesaid snack foods, with intent to defraud, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same or the value thereof to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said W.L. Products, herein represented by RODOLFO BORJAL, in
the aforementioned amount of P106,579.60, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.7
On even date, Lim also charged Dy with two counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in two Informations which likewise
save for the dates and amounts involved similarly read as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of June, 1992, the said accused, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS to apply on account or for value a Far East
Bank and Trust Co. Check no. 553602 dated July 22, 1992 payable to W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS in the
amount of P106,579.60 Philippine Currency, said accused knowing fully well that at the time of issue
he/she/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented 90 days from the date thereof was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Payment stopped" but the same would have been
dishonored for insufficient funds had not the accused without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, the said accused despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, failed to pay said W.L. Food Products
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five (5) banking
days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On November 23, 1994, Dy was arrested in Naga City. On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to all charges.
Thereafter, the cases against him were tried jointly.
On November 17, 1999 the RTC convicted Dy on two counts each of estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The trial
court disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN DY) is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of swindling (ESTAFA) as charged in the Informations in Criminal Case No. 93-46711 and in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-46713, respectively. Accordingly, after applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and P.D. No. 818, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 and of ten (10) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, in
Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713.
Likewise, said accused is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of B.P. 22 as charged
in the Informations in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 and in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment of one (1) year for each of the said offense and to pay a fine in the
total amount of P333,373.96, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
FINALLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of private complainant, W. L. Food Products, herein
represented by Rodolfo Borjal, and against herein accused JOHN JERRY DY ALDEN (JOHN DY), ordering
the latter to pay to the former the total sum of P333,373.96 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from September 28, 1992 until fully paid; and, (2) the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Dy brought the case to the Court of Appeals. In the assailed Decision of January 23, 2003, the appellate court
affirmed the RTC. It, however, modified the sentence and deleted the payment of interests in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46711 (for estafa), the accused-appellant JOHN JERRY DY
ALDEN (JOHN DY) is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
Page 96 of 101
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum plus eight (8) years in excess of [P]22,000.00. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 (for violation
of BP 22), accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify W.L.
Food Products, represented by Rodolfo Borjal, the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE PESOS and 60/100 ([P]106,579.60). In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713 (for
estafa), accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum. Finally,
in Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 (for violation of BP 22), accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify W.L. Food Products, represented by Rodolfo Borjal, the
amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR PESOS AND
36/100 ([P]226,794.36).
SO ORDERED.10
Dy moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied in the Resolution dated May 14, 2003.
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
ESTAFA ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
VIOLATION OF BP 22 ON TWO (2) COUNTS?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING

DAMAGES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, W.L. FOOD PRODUCTS, THE TOTAL SUM OF
[P]333,373.96?11
Essentially, the issue is whether John Dy is liable for estafa and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
First, is petitioner guilty of estafa?
Mainly, petitioner contends that the checks were ineffectively issued. He stresses that not only were the checks
blank, but also that W.L. Foods' accountant had no authority to fill the amounts. Dy also claims failure of
consideration to negate any obligation to W.L. Foods. Ultimately, petitioner denies having deceived Lim inasmuch as
only the two checks bounced since he began dealing with him. He maintains that it was his long established business
relationship with Lim that enabled him to obtain the goods, and not the checks issued in payment for them. Petitioner
renounces personal liability on the checks since he was absent when the goods were delivered.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, avers that the delivery of the checks by Dy's driver to
Maraca, constituted valid issuance. The OSG sustains Ong's prima facie authority to fill the checks based on the
value of goods taken. It observes that nothing in the records showed that W.L. Foods' accountant filled up the checks
in violation of Dy's instructions or their previous agreement. Finally, the OSG challenges the present petition as an
inappropriate remedy to review the factual findings of the trial court.
We find that the petition is partly meritorious.
Before an accused can be held liable for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885,12 the following elements must concur: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in
Page 97 of 101
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and (3) damage to the payee thereof.13 These elements are present in the instant case.
Section 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law14 defines "issue" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in
form, to a person who takes it as a holder. Significantly, delivery is the final act essential to the negotiability of an
instrument. Delivery denotes physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to
convey title to the payee and recognize him as a holder.15 It means more than handing over to another; it imports
such transfer of the instrument to another as to enable the latter to hold it for himself.16
In this case, even if the checks were given to W.L. Foods in blank, this alone did not make its issuance invalid. When
the checks were delivered to Lim, through his employee, he became a holder with prima facie authority to fill the
blanks. This was, in fact, accomplished by Lim's accountant.
The pertinent provisions of Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law are instructive:
SEC. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.-Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person
in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a
signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be
converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any
amount. …. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the law merely requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or maker.
From such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material particular, the law presumes
agency to fill up the blanks.17 Because of this, the burden of proving want of authority or that the authority granted
was exceeded, is placed on the person questioning such authority. 18 Petitioner failed to fulfill this requirement.
Next, petitioner claims failure of consideration. Nevertheless, in a letter 19 dated November 10, 1992, he expressed
willingness to pay W.L. Foods, or to replace the dishonored checks. This was a clear acknowledgment of receipt of
the goods, which gave rise to his duty to maintain or deposit sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks.
More significantly, we are not swayed by petitioner's arguments that the single incident of dishonor and his absence
when the checks were delivered belie fraud. Indeed damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and
must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. 20 Deceit as an element of estafa is a specie of
fraud. It is actual fraud which consists in any misrepresentation or contrivance where a person deludes another, to his
hurt. There is deceit when one is misled -- by guile, trickery or by other means -- to believe as true what is really
false.21
Prima facie evidence of deceit was established against petitioner with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 which was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The letter22 of petitioner's counsel dated November 10, 1992 shows beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner received notice of the dishonor of the said check for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner,
however, failed to deposit the amounts necessary to cover his check within three banking days from receipt of the
notice of dishonor. Hence, as provided for by law,23 the presence of deceit was sufficiently proven.
Petitioner failed to overcome the said proof of deceit. The trial court found no pre-existing obligation between the
parties. The existence of prior transactions between Lim and Dy alone did not rule out deceit because each
transaction was separate, and had a different consideration from the others. Even as petitioner was absent when the
goods were delivered, by the principle of agency, delivery of the checks by his driver was deemed as his act as the
employer. The evidence shows that as a matter of course, Dy, or his employee, would pay W.L. Foods in either cash
or check upon pick up of the stocks of snack foods at the latter's branch or main office. Despite their two-year
standing business relations prior to the issuance of the subject check, W.L Foods employees would not have parted
with the stocks were it not for the simultaneous delivery of the check issued by petitioner. 24Aside from the existing
business relations between petitioner and W.L. Foods, the primary inducement for the latter to part with its stocks of
snack foods was the issuance of the check in payment of the value of the said stocks.
In a number of cases,25 the Court has considered good faith as a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a
check. This good faith may be manifested by making arrangements for payment with the creditor and exerting best
efforts to make good the value of the checks. In the instant case petitioner presented no proof of good faith.
Noticeably absent from the records is sufficient proof of sincere and best efforts on the part of petitioner for the
payment of the value of the check that would constitute good faith and negate deceit.
Page 98 of 101
With the foregoing circumstances established, we find petitioner guilty of estafa with regard to FEBTC Check No.
553615 for P226,794.36.
The same, however, does not hold true with respect to FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60. This check was
dishonored for the reason that it was drawn against uncollected deposit. Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his savings
deposit account ledger as of July 22, 1992. We disagree with the conclusion of the RTC that since the balance
included a regional clearing check worth P55,000 deposited on July 20, 1992, which cleared only five (5) days later,
then petitioner had inadequate funds in this instance. Since petitioner technically and retroactively had sufficient
funds at the time Check No. 553602 was presented for payment then the second element (insufficiency of funds to
cover the check) of the crime is absent. Also there is no prima facie evidence of deceit in this instance because the
check was not dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient
funds. The prima facie presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency
of funds. Notably, the law speaks of insufficiency of funds but not of uncollected deposits. Jurisprudence teaches that
criminal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused. 26 Hence, in the
instant case, the law cannot be interpreted or applied in such a way as to expand its provision to encompass the
situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of the accused.
Clearly, the estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a check
is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected
deposit.27 Corollarily, the issuer of the check is not liable for estafa if the remaining balance and the uncollected
deposit, which was duly collected, could satisfy the amount of the check when presented for payment.
Second, did petitioner violate B.P. Blg. 22?
Petitioner argues that the blank checks were not valid orders for the bank to pay the holder of such checks. He
reiterates lack of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds and reasons that the checks could not have been issued to
apply on account or for value as he did not obtain delivery of the goods.
The OSG maintains that the guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It cites pieces of evidence
that point to Dy's culpability: Maraca's acknowledgment that the checks were issued to W.L. Foods as consideration
for the snacks; Lim's testimony proving that Dy received a copy of the demand letter; the bank manager's
confirmation that petitioner had insufficient balance to cover the checks; and Dy's failure to settle his obligation within
five (5) days from dishonor of the checks.
Once again, we find the petition to be meritorious in part.
The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 28 The
case at bar satisfies all these elements.
During the joint pre-trial conference of this case, Dy admitted that he issued the checks, and that the signatures
appearing on them were his.29 The facts reveal that the checks were issued in blank because of the uncertainty of the
volume of products to be retrieved, the discount that can be availed of, and the deduction for bad orders.
Nevertheless, we must stress that what the law punishes is simply the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto. 30 If inquiry into the reason for which the
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions of their issuance is required, the public's faith in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes will certainly erode.31
Moreover, the gravamen of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum
prohibitum. The only valid query, then, is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad
check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer. 32 Indeed, non-fulfillment of the obligation is
immaterial. Thus, petitioner's defense of failure of consideration must likewise fall. This is especially so since as
stated above, Dy has acknowledged receipt of the goods.
Page 99 of 101
On the second element, petitioner disputes notice of insufficiency of funds on the basis of the check being issued in
blank. He relies on Dingle v. Intermediate Appellate Court33 and Lao v. Court of Appeals34 as his authorities. In both
actions, however, the accused were co-signatories, who were neither apprised of the particular transactions on which
the blank checks were issued, nor given notice of their dishonor. In the latter case, Lao signed the checks without
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, knowledge she was not expected or obliged to possess under the
organizational structure of the corporation.35 Lao was only a minor employee who had nothing to do with the
issuance, funding and delivery of checks.36 In contrast, petitioner was the proprietor of Dyna Marketing and the sole
signatory of the checks who received notice of their dishonor.
Significantly, under Section 237 of B.P. Blg. 22, petitioner was prima facie presumed to know of the inadequacy of his
funds with the bank when he did not pay the value of the goods or make arrangements for their payment in full within
five (5) banking days upon notice. His letter dated November 10, 1992 to Lim fortified such presumption.
Undoubtedly, Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553615. When said check was dishonored for
insufficient funds and stop payment order, petitioner did not pay or make arrangements with the bank for its payment
in full within five (5) banking days.
Petitioner should be exonerated, however, for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553602, which was dishonored for the
reason DAUD or drawn against uncollected deposit. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored
by the bank because the check deposit made by petitioner, which would make petitioner's bank account balance
more than enough to cover the face value of the subject check, had not been collected by the bank.
In Tan v. People,38 this Court acquitted the petitioner therein who was indicted under B.P. Blg. 22, upon a check
which was dishonored for the reason DAUD, among others. We observed that:
In the second place, even without relying on the credit line, petitioner's bank account covered the check she
issued because even though there were some deposits that were still uncollected the deposits became
"good" and the bank certified that the check was "funded." 39
To be liable under Section 140 of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
In the instant case, even though the check which petitioner deposited on July 20, 1992 became good only five (5)
days later, he was considered by the bank to retroactively have had P160,659.39 in his account on July 22, 1992.
This was more than enough to cover the check he issued to respondent in the amount of P106,579.60. Under the
circumstance obtaining in this case, we find the petitioner had issued the check, with full ability to abide by his
commitment41 to pay his purchases.
Significantly, like Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, B.P. Blg. 22 also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and
does not treat of uncollected deposits. To repeat, we cannot interpret the law in such a way as to expand its provision
to encompass the situation of uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of the
accused. Again, criminal statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the
accused.42
As regards petitioner's civil liability, this Court has previously ruled that an accused may be held civilly liable where
the facts established by the evidence so warrant.43 The rationale for this is simple. The criminal and civil liabilities of
an accused are separate and distinct from each other. One is meant to punish the offender while the other is intended
to repair the damage suffered by the aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of indemnifying the latter, the offense need
not be proved beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of evidence. 44
We therefore sustain the appellate court's award of damages to W.L. Foods in the total amount of P333,373.96,
representing the sum of the checks petitioner issued for goods admittedly delivered to his company.
As to the appropriate penalty, petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 81845 (P.D. No. 818).
Page 100 of 101

Under Section 146 of P.D. No. 818, if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000, the penalty of reclusión temporal is
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000 but the total penalty shall not exceed
thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusión perpetua.47Reclusión perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the
offense, but merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. John Dy is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
46711 for estafa, and Criminal Case No. Q-93-46712 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, but he is ORDERED to pay W.L.
Foods the amount of P106,579.60 for goods delivered to his company.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46713 for estafa, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prisión mayor, as
minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusión perpetua, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-46714 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
and John Dy is hereby sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify W.L. Foods in the amount
of P226,794.36.
SO ORDERED
Page 101 of 101

Title X Case No. 1 People V. Mateo GR 198012 April 22, 2012

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Title X Case No.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Hence, the present appeal.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal utterly lacks merit.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court’s Ruling

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8

Ruling of the RTC

NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

It does not so appear in this case.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014

The following facts appear from the account of the CA:

In the Petition, it is alleged that –

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT –

(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN

The Court grants the Petition.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013

THE COURT’S RULING

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

The Crime Committed

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly instructive, thus:

REYES, R.T., J.:

Petitioner’s defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial court as follows:

RTC and CA Dispositions

Costs against the accused.

In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:

In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors, viz.:

Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:

1. That there be taking of personal property;

2. That said property belongs to another;

3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;

The CA correctly debunked petitioner’s postulation in the following tenor:

The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v. People.28

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.

G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007

a) One (1) Icom radio . . . ₱4,500.00

b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00

c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00

d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00

Now, to the merits.

G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000

The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:

which alleged errors were discussed jointly.

We affirm the judgment of conviction.