IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____________________________________________
EDWARD RICHARDSON )
393 Malvern Lakes Circle, Apt. 101 )
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22406 )
540/207-1666 ) Civil Action No: 1:16-cv-00867(RMC)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) Jury Trial Demanded
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE )
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, )
AGENCY. )
20th and C Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20551, ) Date: August 4, 2016
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
) Amended Complaint
Defendants. )

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, DECLARATORY RELIEF,

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, AND CIVIL PENALTIES

1. The Plaintiff, individually, brings this amended action for injunctive, declaratory

and monetary relief pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a et seq.; the Freedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.; 12 U.S.C. § 1831j et seq.; the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b).

Parties
2. Plaintiff, Edward Richardson (hereinafter sometimes “Plaintiff” or “I”) is a citizen

of the United States and resides in the Commonwealth of Virginia who from June 8, 2009 to

June 7, 2010 served as a law enforcement officer for the Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System (“Defendant”) in its Law Enforcement Unit (“LEU”) within the District of

Columbia.

3. Defendant Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) is an

“agency” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (1); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a) (1); 5 U.S.C. § 552
(f) (1) and; a “Federal Banking Agency” within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (e), and is in

possession and/or control of records pertaining to Plaintiff. The Board is sued herein in its

official capacity.

4. United States of America as a Defendant. Billy J. Sauls, Marvin Jones, Robert E.

Bakale, Tyson L. Coble, Albert E. Pleasant IV, Larence Dublin, and Kevin J. May, all of whom

are named defendants in related case, 16-794, were at all times relevant to this complaint

employed by the Board, an agency of the United States of America. With regard to Plaintiff’s

FTCA claims, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia has certified that the named Board

employees were acting within their scope of employment and, as such, the United States of

America is the appropriate defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Exhibit H.

Jurisdiction

5. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1343;

the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552; 12

U.S.C. § 1831j; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and; the Federal Tort

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b).

Venue

6. Venue is proper in this district and division pursuant to 5 U.S.C § 552a (g) (5); 5

U.S.C. § 552 (B); 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (b); U.S.C.A § 1391 (a) (b), and; 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (b),

because the underlying acts and conduct violating applicable laws and constitutional rights

occurred in this district; and/or each defendant conducts its/his/her affairs in, or is an inhabitant

of, resides in, or has an agent in this district.

Privacy Act Of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a Statute of Limitations

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 7. Plaintiff alleges that the most recently known retaliatory “continuing violation”

committed by the Board occurred on January 11, 2015, violating 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 5 U.S.C. § 552

(b) (6); 12 U.S.C. § 1831j; the 1st Amendment; 4th Amendment, and; 5th Amendment (“due

process”) of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff made discovery of this event on January 15,

2015.

8. Plaintiff asserts that the aforementioned violations, including relevant dates, were

included in his March 20, 2015 filing. See Richardson v. Yellen, et al., 14-1673. However, the

Court in its March 8, 2016 memorandum opinion states “Mr. Richardson alleges no Privacy Act

violation as recent as October 2012.” Plaintiff clearly established January 11, 2015 as the most

recent and otherwise known Privacy Act violation.

9. The Privacy Act of 1974 has a “discovery period” under 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5)

precluding statute of limitation exhaustion due to disclosures and misrepresentation of facts

otherwise unknown to Plaintiff.

10. Plaintiff maintains that 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) applies to his June 2014 discovery

that a total of 22 medical documents had been removed from his personnel file; his July 1, 2014

discovery of falsified allegations by Sauls and Pleasant, and; his January 15, 2015 discovery that

Kevin May had removed and disclosed protected documents from Plaintiff’s personnel and EEO

files not subject to personal or routine use.

11. All violations alleged herein are retaliatory continuing violations relating to

Plaintiff’s protected activity and his disclosures of the defendant’s intentional unprofessional

conduct.

12. In relevant part, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) states: “….. except that where an agency

has materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this section to be

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disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented is material to establishment of

the liability of the agency to the individual under this section, the action may be brought at any

time within two years after discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation.”

Statute of Limitations For FTCA Claims Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b)

13. On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff submitted an Administrative Tort Claim with the

Board. Plaintiff’s claim was denied on June 29, 2016. Plaintiff has therefore exhausted all

available administrative remedies. See Exhibit G

14. The United States Supreme Court has outwardly held that 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) is

subject to equitable tolling when negligence of federal employees is unknown to the victim of

such conduct. United States v. Wong, 13-1074; see also United States v. June, 13-1075.

15. In various instances, relevant information was intentionally withheld from

Plaintiff regarding his wrongful termination from Board employment and for the deliberate

violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act regarding the illegal search and seizure

of Plaintiff’s cellular records, all of which are continuing retaliatory violations.

16. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims under the FTCA are subject to equitable tolling and

he properly files those claims against the United States of America under this cause of action.

Facts
17. The facts alleged herein are retaliatory “continuing violations” occurring between

November 2009 and January 2015 and are subject to 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) [“Discovery Rule”]

provision.

18. On June 8, 2009, Plaintiff was employed by the Board, to serve as a law

enforcement officer.

19. Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated by the Board on, June 7, 2010, due to

intentional and willful misconduct of LEU Chief, Billy Sauls (hereinafter sometimes “Sauls”);

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LEU Lieutenant, Larence Dublin (hereinafter sometimes “Dublin”); LEU Sergeant, Robert

Bakale (hereinafter sometimes “Bakale”); Deputy Chief of LEU Operations, Marvin Jones

(hereinafter sometimes “Jones”), and; LEU Administrative Lieutenant, Tyson Coble (hereinafter

sometimes “Coble”).

20. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated due to false accusations that he had failed

to provide medical documentation supporting his disability related calloffs.

21. Ironically, in a final decision to uphold Plaintiff’s termination during appeal,

Board Ombudsman, Margaret Shanks, informed Plaintiff that he was not terminated for calloffs,

but for tardies, violating Plaintiff’s right to due process.

22. Plaintiff alleges that he was never served with dates alleging tardies by any Board

official.

23. Plaintiff further alleges that Board EEO Counselor, Andre Smith, sought to

retrieve dates of any alleged tardies from LEU personnel for over a month following Plaintiff’s

termination, and was never provided with such information.

24. In or around October 2009, Plaintiff made a verbal request to Bakale for a

reasonable accommodation. Bakale informed Plaintiff he would relay the request to Dublin.

Plaintiff’s request was to support his disability known to the Board, Bakale, Sauls, Coble, Jones,

and Dublin.

25. In or around November 2009, Plaintiff made a second verbal request to Bakale for

a reasonable accommodation. Both of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation requests went

unacknowledged by the Board, Jones, Dublin, Sauls, Bakale, and Board employee relations

specialist, Kevin May (hereinafter sometimes “May”).

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 26. Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for making several reasonable accommodation

requests, Jones, Sauls, Coble, Dublin, Bakale, and May, conspired with one another to remove

numerous medical documents from Plaintiff’s personnel file to promote an adverse action against

him.

27. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he was subjected to harsh name calling and forced

to work three separate shifts weekly while no other LEU officers were forced to do so.

28. In or around November 2009 and subsequent to Plaintiff’s reasonable

accommodation requests, Bakale confronted and falsely accused Plaintiff of failing to provide

supporting medical documentation for several of his disability related calloffs that Plaintiff had

in fact provided documentation for.

29. These daily harassing accusations continued until Plaintiff’s termination from

Board employment on June 7, 2010.

30. In or around April 2010, Plaintiff was summoned to Coble’s office where a

meeting was held between Coble, Bakale, and Plaintiff. Plaintiff was accused of failing to

provide medical documentation supporting 5 of his calloffs, of which Plaintiff had provided

documentation for.

31. Plaintiff alleges he was threatened by Coble and Bakale with disciplinary action

and termination due to the missing medical documents.

32. Plaintiff noticed that 2 of the alleged dates were pre-approved and no supporting

documentation was needed.

33. Plaintiff notified Dublin and Jones of the missing medical documentation

immediately following his meeting with Coble and Bakale.

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 34. It was unknown to Plaintiff at the time of his notification that Jones and Dublin

were aware of Plaintiff’s medical document removal as both were directly involved.

35. On May 12, 2010, Plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with Sauls who informed

Plaintiff that he had 15 calloffs without supporting medical documentation. Plaintiff directly

refuted this accusation and informed Sauls that his medical documents were being intentionally

removed from his personnel file.

36. Prior to entering Sauls’ office, Plaintiff observed that Coble and LEU Assistant

Chief, Charles O’Malley (hereinafter sometimes “O’Malley”) were both in a meeting with Sauls.

37. When Coble exited Sauls’ office, Plaintiff observed his personnel file in Coble’s

possession as he could see his name written on the file folder.

38. This is clear evidence that from April 2010 to May 12, 2010, the day Plaintiff met

with Sauls, an additional 10 medical documents had been intentionally removed from Plaintiff’s

personnel file to promote an adverse action against him.

39. On June 7, 2010, Plaintiff was terminated from Board employment with the

accusation that he had not provided supporting medical documents for his disability related

calloffs.

40. Sauls, in his sworn EEOC affidavit, states that Plaintiff possessed 22 calloffs with

no supporting documentation.

41. This supports evidence that between May 12, 2010 (the meeting with Sauls) and

June 7, 2010, an additional 7 medical documents had been intentionally removed from Plaintiff’s

personnel file.

42. Sauls’ EEOC affidavit supports his direct involvement in the intentional removal

of Plaintiff’s medical documents.

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 43. The removal of 7 additional medical documents was unknown to Plaintiff at the

time of his June 7, 2010 termination. During Plaintiff’s termination meeting, he was never

advised as to the total number of medical documents that had been removed from his file.

44. Plaintiff alleges that he alerted Kevin May of the medical document removal on

May 14, 2010 and June 7, 2010. May took no action to initiate an investigation of Plaintiff’s

complaint.

45. May, a Board employee relations specialist had a duty to investigate Plaintiff’s

complaint of missing medical documentation.

46. Defendant May, in his June 26, 2012 deposition, disclosed his knowledge of

Plaintiff’s medical documentation removal.

47. Dublin, Jones, and Sauls each had a duty to investigate Plaintiff’s missing medical

documentation complaints.

48. Sauls admitted to conferring with May after he and Plaintiff met on May 12,

2010; stating that it was decided that Plaintiff would be terminated from Board employment.

This supports evidence that May was aware of the medical documentation removal prior to

meeting with Plaintiff on May 14, 2010 and prior to issuing Plaintiff’s June 7, 2010 termination.

49. Dublin in sworn testimony stated that he referred Plaintiff’s complaint of missing

medical documentation to Jones. Plaintiff alleges that Dublin had the decision making authority

to initiate an investigative inquiry into Plaintiff’s missing medical documentation complaint.

50. Jones stated that Plaintiff had in fact complained to him of medical documentation

being intentionally removed from his personnel file, but instead took Coble’s word that Plaintiff

simply had failed to turn in medical documents to support his calloffs and that there was no need

to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint.

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 51. Plaintiff asserts that his personnel file containing medical documents had a right

to privacy and were protected by the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, not to mention

medical file storage provisions under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 that covers Plaintiff’s

disability.

52. Plaintiff asserts that his personnel and medical files were subject to numerous

unlawful searches with selected documents from those files being seized by Board personnel

who should not have had access to Plaintiff’s files to begin with; therefore, clearly violating

Plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.

53. Additionally, Plaintiff’s personnel and medical files are 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6)

exempt and gaining access to and releasing information from these files violated this provision.

54. Plaintiff’s personnel file containing his medical documents was kept in what

Coble called an “unlocked” file cabinet drawer inside of his office that all LEU sergeants had

access to. Coble’s testimony was only to shift blame.

55. Dublin alleges that Plaintiff’s medical documents were in a “locked” file cabinet

drawer inside of Coble’s office.

56. Plaintiff asserts that locked or unlocked, the manner in which his medical

documents were kept violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and; the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973; proving the Board’s system of records to be defective.

57. The Rehabilitation Acts requires that “employers keep all medical records and

information confidential and in separate medical files.” Plaintiff and his disability, including

medical records, are of a protected class.

58. On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff [discovered] that in 2010 and 2011, Sauls and Board

OIG Senior Special Agent, Albert Pleasant IV (hereinafter sometimes “Pleasant”), had initiated a

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fictitious spoofing investigation against Plaintiff alleging that he was involved in a falsified

spoofing scandal against the Board. Plaintiff was engaged in protected activity during relevant

times.

59. These alleged events occurred subsequent to Plaintiff’s termination in which

Plaintiff had no apparent knowledge.

60. Plaintiff discovered that Sauls and Pleasant, through a malicious

misrepresentation of facts and under penalty of perjury, utilized 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6 (a) (4) of the

O.I.G Act to obtain Plaintiff’s cellular records without his knowledge, directly violating the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act [“ECPA”] and Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

61. 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6 (a) (4) pertains to information obtained only from federal

agencies and not an individual’s cellular records. Far from speculation, this was in fact reported

by Pleasant’s and Sauls’ defense Counsel in Richardson v. Yellen, et al., 14-1673.

62. Plaintiff asserts that Pleasant and Sauls then released his cellular records and their

contents to O’Malley and non-law enforcement personnel of the Board, including Dick

Anderson, Keisha Hargo, William Spaniel, and Allison Dichoso, violating the Freedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (7) (C).

63. Former LEU Senior Law Enforcement Officer, DeBora Burford (hereinafter

sometimes “Burford”) was threatened with criminal prosecution by Pleasant and Kevin May if

she disclosed the contents of Pleasant’s falsified O.I.G report. Burford was involved in ongoing

EEO activity and was also falsely accused by Pleasant and Sauls of being involved in the

fictitiously alleged spoofing scandal.

64. Burford, fearing severe retaliation from the Board, did not release the contents of

Pleasant’s OIG report to Plaintiff until July 1, 2014.

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 65. On January 15, 2015, Plaintiff [discovered] that Kevin May, by choice, selected

various confidential documents from Plaintiff’s personnel file; removed those documents from

Board property, and; converted them to his personal use by sending them to JaCina Stanton, Esq.

of the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland on January 11, 2015.

66. The wrongful disclosure included Plaintiff’s termination and denial of termination

appeal and was disclosed without Plaintiff’s consent.

67. May, without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, disclosed to Ms. Stanton various

protected documents within Plaintiff’s active and ongoing EEO file.

68. In fact, May informed Ms. Stanton that he “would be happy” to remove additional

documents from Plaintiff’s personnel and EEO files to further damage Plaintiff’s character,

clearly displaying his content and willingness for violating clearly established laws.

69. May had no right to search and seize documents from Plaintiff’s protected files,

removing them from Board property, thereby converting them to his “personal use.”

70. The Attorney Grievance Commission complaint against May solicited no

response from the Board and definitely did not solicit documents from Plaintiff’s protected files.

71. Although Plaintiff displays only the front page of May’s EEO affidavit as Exhibit

F, page 288 of the R.O.I., May, however, provided Ms. Stanton with the entire document. This is

evidence that May was given access to Plaintiff’s EEO R.O.I.

72. The Privacy Act Notice clearly outlines “routine use” as matters involving the

“Agency,” not for those “private and confidential” matters involving agency employees.

73. In Richardson v. Yellen, et al, defense counsels’ did not deny May’s actions and

contended that the documents within Plaintiff’s personnel and EEO files were “routine use” and

11
that May had a right to access, remove, and make use of documents within Plaintiff’s personnel

and ongoing EEO activity files without Plaintiff’s consent.

74. Plaintiff asserts that both his personnel and EEO files are protected by the

Privacy Act of 1974, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy to the documents

contained in both.

75. Moreover, Plaintiff reported to Bakale and Dublin that LEU Lieutenant, James

McCoy, sent a mass email to Board Management Division personnel containing Plaintiff’s

medical information.

76. In initial sworn testimony, Bakale and Dublin both denied knowledge of Plaintiff

having reported the email disclosure. However, in subsequent depositions, Bakale states that he

reported Plaintiff’s disclosure complaint to Dublin. Dublin admits that Plaintiff’s disclosure

complaint was substantiated.

77. Plaintiff reported the mass disclosure to Kevin May on May 14, 2010. May,

however, rejected Plaintiff’s complaint and took no further action.

78. Moreover, Marvin Jones, in an act of retaliation, falsified a suspension notice

dated May 20, 2010, alleging that Plaintiff was suspended from his law enforcement duties on

May 22 and 24, 2010 due to a fictitiously alleged breach of security.

79. Plaintiff alleges that he was never presented with a notice of suspension by Jones,

May, or any other Board official. Nor was Plaintiff suspended from his duties as a Board law

enforcement officer.

80. Plaintiff exhibits pay stubs proving his point.

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 81. Jones placed the falsified suspension notice into Plaintiff’s personnel file and also

provided this document to the EEO for inclusion in the Report of Investigation under a

misrepresentation of facts.

82. Plaintiff asserts that all named individuals (with the exception of Ms. Stanton) are

or were employed by the defendant.

83. The actions of the defendant and its employees (current and past) named herein

had an adverse effect on Plaintiff’s professional and personal characters.

84. As a direct result of the defendant’s actions and named employees thereof,

Plaintiff has involuntarily remained unemployed since his June 7, 2010 termination from Board

employment.

85. Plaintiff received notification by the D.C. Department of Corrections that he was

ineligible for employment due to falsified information contained in his Board personnel file.

86. As a direct result of the defendant’s actions and named employees thereof,

Plaintiff has experienced psychological trauma to a degree that has resulted in a post traumatic

stress disorder diagnosis.

87. Plaintiff has no contact with law enforcement personnel and very limited contact

with government personnel due to reoccurring intrusive memories of the intentionally malicious

and outright atrocious events exhibited against him by the defendant and named employees

thereof.

88. Of relevant note and subsequent to Plaintiff’s termination and through unsolicited

contact, former LEU Senior Officer and Disabled U.S. Army Combat Veteran, David Galloway

(hereinafter sometimes “Galloway”), called Plaintiff frantically alleging that he had just been

13
terminated from Board employment due to allegations that he had failed to provide medical

documentation supporting his disability related call-offs.

89. Galloway stated that he had in-fact turned in medical documentation supporting

each and every call-off and that the documents were intentionally removed from his medical file

to promote an adverse action against him.

90. Galloway also stated that the Board insisted he sign a severance agreement that

would offset any liability against the Board. Signing such an agreement would also waive any

and every right afforded to Galloway in filing an EEOC administrative complaint and subsequent

civil action in Federal District Court.

91. Galloway, not knowing his rights and with 2 small children, spouse, and home

mortgage, signed the agreement.

92. Plaintiff, also a Disabled U.S. Army Combat Veteran, was presented with an

illegal severance agreement by Kevin May during his June 7, 2010 termination that waived his

rights and any liability against the defendant.

93. Knowing the severance agreement to be illegal, Plaintiff refused to sign the

document.

94. Additionally, the EEOC has taken a clear stand on illegal severance agreements,

holding that employees who sign illegally severance agreements can still pursue administrative

claims in the EEOC.

Whistleblower Retaliation Under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j And Defendant “Board’s”

Intentional Violation Of The “No FEAR Act”

95. Plaintiff’s 2-year statute of limitations under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j has not exhausted

in the instant case.

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 96. In fact, the Board violates the No FEAR Act by intentionally concealing from its

website, and elsewhere, which whistleblower protections cover current and former employees of

the Board, therefore; Plaintiff had no way of knowing that his whistleblower rights and

protections were covered under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j. See Exhibit J (Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System No FEAR Act Notice, Revised July 6, 2011, Retrieved by Plaintiff July

27, 2016).

97. The No FEAR Act requires at a minimum, that Federal agencies notify current

and former employees of their rights and remedies available to them under the “employment

discrimination and whistleblower protection laws.” See Exhibit J (U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, No FEAR Act Questions and Answers); See also Exhibit J (FDIC No

FEAR Act Notice displaying 12 U.S.C. § 1831j as a whistleblower protection for FDIC

employees).

98. Nor did Plaintiff receive the required training by the Board as mandated under the

No FEAR Act.

99. Plaintiff asserts that the Board is not exempt from any of the No FEAR Act’s

requirements or provisions.

100. Plaintiff made several discoveries of retaliatory “continuing violations” in June

and July 2014, and on January 15, 2015. With regard to the discoveries in 2014, Plaintiff

reported this misconduct to the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”).

101. In return correspondence, the OSC noted that the Board and its employees are

exempt from the Whistleblower Protection Act (“WPA”) and Prohibited Personnel Practices

codified 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Plaintiff has exhausted any and all remedies under the OSC. [See

Exhibit A].

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 102. Plaintiff has alleged and realleges that in previous filings, the Board has admitted

to and took ownership of the intentional misconduct on behalf of Sauls, Pleasant, May, Jones,

Dublin, Coble, and Bakale, who all engaged in unlawful activities against Plaintiff outside the

scope of their employment.

103. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant and employees thereof maliciously

obfuscated intentional retaliatory conduct from Plaintiff in an effort to use Plaintiff as a

scapegoat all while destroying his professional and personal characters.

104. Plaintiff’s 2-year statute of limitations is tolled under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j because

Plaintiff had no way of knowing of the continuing retaliation.

105. Furthermore, the unlawful and continuous retaliation against Plaintiff by the

defendant and employees thereof was a direct result of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation

requests under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for his engagement in protected activity.

Denial of Plaintiff’s Termination Appeal Violating Plaintiff’s Right to Due Process

106. Plaintiff iterates and reiterates that the Board clearly alleged that Plaintiff’s

termination was due to his alleged failure to submit documentation supporting his disability

related calloffs, in which Plaintiff clearly provided documentation for.

107. Plaintiff also asserts that he provided Board LEU management/supervisory

officials with documentation supporting non-disability related calloffs.

108. Plaintiff prepared his timely appeal surrounding those falsifications alleged by the

Board.

109. However, after Plaintiff submitted his appeal to the Board for review, Margaret

Shanks, Ombudsman for the Board denied Plaintiff’s appeal citing that Plaintiff had not been

terminated for calloffs where Plaintiff had provided documentation, but for tardies.

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 110. Plaintiff had never been tardy for official duty as a Board law enforcement

officer, nor did the Board provide any dates supporting its alleged falsifications.

111. Clearly, the Board waited to review any evidence in Plaintiff’s possession that

directly refuted the allegations as why he was terminated from Board employment before

falsifying new allegations subsequent to Plaintiff’s June 7, 2010 termination.

112. Plaintiff exhibits evidence that his termination and denial of termination appeal

was not for just cause and only served as part of a retaliatory scheme for his several reasonable

accommodation requests and his post termination engagement in protected activity.

113. The Board violated Plaintiff’s rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment of

the United Stated Constitution and his whistleblower protection rights under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j.

Materially False and Intentionally Perjurious Testimony

114. Employees’ of the defendant, in bad faith, provided a high degree of intentionally

contradicting and discrepancy laden testimony that Plaintiff has a right to exploit and exhibit to

further fortify his claims.

115. Materially false statements made by the Board and employees thereof have been

proven to be professionally and personally damaging to Plaintiff, and were made in connection

to a retaliatory scheme as a result of Plaintiff’s protected activity and disclosures.

116. Plaintiff asserts that those federal employees who knowingly and willingly make

materially false and misleading statements under oath during an official EEO investigation can

be held accountable under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) and 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (perjury), as

exhibited by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Perjury in Official EEO

Investigation,” Case No. OIG-447 (2006).

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 117. A falsification is material under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 “if it has a natural tendency to

influence, or was capable of influencing.” United States v. Harrod, 981 F. 2D 1171, 1175 (10th

Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Gaudin, 551 U.S. 506, 509 (1995).

118. Likewise, the MSPB has affirmed a number of cases whereby employees where

severely disciplined for making false statements under oath in administrative proceedings.

119. See, e.g., Carlton v. Dept. of Justice, 103 M.S.P.R. 29 (2006); Hidalgo v. Dept. of

Justice, 93 M.S.P.R. 645 (2003), and; Southers v. Veterans Administration, 36 M.S.P.R. 213

(1988).

120. See also U.S. Court of Appeals case, United States v. Smith, No. 03-4467 (4th Cir.

2004).

121. Each of the Board’s employees named herein, past and current, represent[s] a

position of public trust and each intentionally and willfully violated laws they swore to uphold.

Judicial Review under the Administrative Procedure Act

122. The Administrative Procedure Act “APA” holds that Plaintiff’s can bring a cause

of action against federal agencies for unlawful actions, including an unlawful failure to act.

123. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered various legal wrongs due the Board’s actions

and has therefore been adversely affected by the Board’s actions.

124. Plaintiff is entitled to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 702 for all claims against

the Board alleged herein, other than those claims under the Privacy Act which provides its own

remedial scheme.

125. Plaintiff is entitled to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 703, as amended, for all

claims against the United States of America alleged herein.

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 THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE “BOARD”

First Cause of Action - Privacy Act of 1974/Freedom of Information Act

(Unlawful Access to and Removal of Plaintiff’s Medical Documents)

126. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

127. On 22 individual counts, Plaintiff’s medical documents were both intentionally

and negligently removed from his personnel file by agents of the Board to promote an adverse

action, violating 5 U.S.C. § 552a; 5 U.S.C. § 552, and; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

128. Under this cause of action, Plaintiff seeks maximum compensation on 22

individual counts that represent the known number of medical documents that were intentionally

removed from Plaintiff’s file. The Board’s actions constituted a clearly unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy under exception 6 of 5 U.S.C. § 552.

129. The manner in which the Board maintained Plaintiff’s personnel file and medical

records violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b), (d), (e) (10); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6); the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, and; the Board’s Statement of Responsibility for Handling Personally Identifiable

Information. [See Exhibit E].

130. Plaintiff’s discovery of 7 additional medical documents having been removed

from his file did not occur until June 2014, which is a continuing violation from previous

retaliatory acts against Plaintiff. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) is applicable to Plaintiff’s discovery and

his cause of action is timely.

131. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

132. As a result of the Board’s violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of

Information Act, Plaintiff has suffered adverse and harmful effects, including, but not limited to,

mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present

and future financial opportunities.

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 133. Plaintiff has a legal right under 5 U.S.C. § 552a and 5 U.S.C. § 552 to obtain the

monetary, declarative and injunctive relief he seeks against the Board.

Second Cause of Action

Privacy Act of 1974/Freedom of Information Act/12 U.S.C. § 1831j
(Illegal Access to and Disclosure of Plaintiff’s Personnel File and EEO Documents)

134. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

135. By letter dated January 11, 2015, Plaintiff, through his own January 15, 2015

discovery, was provided with indisputable evidence that Board employee, Kevin May,

unlawfully accessed and searched Plaintiff’s protected personnel file releasing falsified character

damaging documents from that file to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland.

136. In the same event, Kevin May, unlawfully accessed and searched Plaintiff’s

protected ongoing EEO file, releasing documents from that file to the Attorney Grievance

Commission of Maryland.

137. Plaintiff, on good authority, alleges that Kevin May removed the selected

documents from Board property; taking the documents to his home, where; he mailed those

documents to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland with malicious intent, using his

home address.

138. The Board, in its July 27, 2015 filing under Richardson v. Yellen, et al, 14-1673,

clearly states that it gathered these documents for purposes and behaviors such as those that

Kevin May had engaged.

139. Plaintiff alleges that he was not under investigation by the Attorney Grievance

Commission of Maryland and nor did any official of said Agency requests documents from

Plaintiff’s personnel and EEO files. It was Kevin May who was under investigation. May

retaliated against Plaintiff due to Plaintiff’s disclosures.

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 140. Documents contained within Plaintiff’s personnel and EEO files were protected at

the time of Kevin May’s unlawful access and disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552a and 5 U.S.C. §

552 (b) (6).

141. In violation of sections (b); (d), and; (e) (10) of the Privacy Act, the Board failed

to secure written authorization from Plaintiff prior to providing the specific information detailed

above. Nor was disclosure permitted by a routine exception. The Board’s actions constituted a

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under exception (b) (6) of 5 U.S.C. § 552.

142. The Board violated its own Statement of Responsibility for Handling Personally

Identifiable Information. [See Exhibit B]. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) is applicable to Plaintiff’s

discovery and his cause of action is timely.

143. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

144. As a result of the Board’s violation of the Privacy and Freedom of Information

Acts, Plaintiff has suffered adverse and harmful effects, including, but not limited to, mental

distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and

future financial opportunities.

145. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and; 12 U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary,

declarative, and injunctive relief he seeks against the Board.

Third Cause of Action - Privacy Act/Freedom of Information Act/12 U.S.C. § 1831j

(Retaliatory Email Disclosure of Plaintiff’s Medical Information)

146. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

147. Violating 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6), McCoy knowingly and intentionally released

Plaintiff’s medical information in a mass email to Board personnel in retaliation against

Plaintiff’s missing medical documentation disclosures.

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 148. McCoy was aware of Plaintiff’s disclosures concerning his medical

documentation as McCoy was Watch Commander on the evening shift, which was one of three

different shifts that Plaintiff (and only Plaintiff) was forced to work.

149. Bakale and Dublin initially lied about Plaintiff’s complaint of the mass disclosure,

but subsequently admit under deposition that Plaintiff did in fact make disclosure and that no

action was taken. Dublin, in his deposition admits that Plaintiff’s complaint was valid.

150. Plaintiff alleges that Kevin May rejected his complaint and did so without having

conducted an investigation into the matter. May mentions his rejection in testimony.

151. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

152. As a result of the Board’s retaliatory actions under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, and for

violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (6), Plaintiff has suffered adverse and

harmful effects, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment,

humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.

153. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and; 12 U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary,

declarative, and injunctive relief he seeks against the Board.

Fourth Cause of Action – Privacy Act of 1974/12 U.S.C. § 1831j

(Falsified Disciplinary Action and Suspension Notice within Plaintiff’s Personnel File)

154. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

155. Jones alleges that on May 22 and 24, 2010, Plaintiff was suspended from his law

enforcement duties due to an alleged breach of security.

156. Plaintiff asserts that he had no knowledge of an alleged suspension and only

discovered this information in a falsified document contained within the EEO Report of

Investigation [“R.O.I”] that was written by Jones.

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 157. Plaintiff offers Jones’ suspension without pay notice as Exhibit B and Plaintiff’s

own pay advices displaying May 22 and 24, 2010 as Exhibit C. Plaintiff worked on the alleged

suspension dates.

158. Due to the fact that Plaintiff was never suspended or presented with the notice, his

due process rights were nonetheless violated as the document was placed into Plaintiff’s

personnel file as a disciplinary action, also violating his appeal rights.

159. The verbiage contained within the notice of suspension is also intentional falsified

misrepresentation.

160. The Board placed the falsified suspension notice in Plaintiff’s personnel file and

knowing submitted this information to the EEOC as an intentional misrepresentation of facts,

which is how the document was included in the R.O.I.

161. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j and 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) are applicable to Plaintiff’s

discovery and his cause of action is timely.

162. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

163. As a result of the Board’s retaliatory actions under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j and for

violating 5 U.S.C. § 552a, Plaintiff has suffered adverse and harmful effects, including, but not

limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or

jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.

164. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and; 12

U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary, declarative, and injunctive relief he seeks against the

Board.

Fifth Cause of Action - 12 U.S.C. § 1831j

(Retaliation against Plaintiff’s Disclosures of Missing Medical Documentation)

165. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

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 166. Plaintiff was undeniably subjected to retaliation because he made more than

several disclosures to the Board and its agents or employees that medical documents were being

intentionally removed from his file.

167. The Board does not deny the allegations and even accepts them. More

importantly, Plaintiff suffered an adverse action as a result of the document removal. Plaintiff

has been unemployed since his termination from Board employment, and his current

unemployment status is due to continuous retaliation by the Board.

168. Under this cause of action, Plaintiff seeks maximum compensation on 22

individual counts that represent the known number of medical documents that were intentionally

removed from his file.

169. Plaintiff’s discovery of 7 additional medical documents having been removed

from his file did not occur until June 2014, which is in fact a retaliatory continuing violation

from previous retaliatory acts. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j and 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) are applicable to

Plaintiff’s discovery and his cause of action is timely.

170. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

171. As a result of the Board’s retaliatory actions under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, Plaintiff

has suffered adverse and harmful effects, including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional

trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and lost or jeopardized present and future financial

opportunities.

172. Plaintiff has a legal right under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary,

declarative, and injunctive relief he seeks against the Board.

Sixth Cause of Action – Privacy Act/Freedom of Information Act/12 U.S.C. § 1831j

(Board’s Illegal Search, Seizure, and Dissemination of Plaintiff’s Cellular Records)

173. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

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 174. By way of July 1, 2014 discovery, Plaintiff alleges that Pleasant and Sauls

unlawfully and secretly obtained his cellular records, searched those records, and disseminated

those records to non-law enforcement personnel of the Board, including William Spaniel, Allison

Dichoso, Keisha Hargo, Dick Anderson, and Charles O’Malley, without Plaintiff’s knowledge.

175. Pleasant and Sauls had made Plaintiff a suspect in a fictitious investigation due to

Plaintiff’s engagement in protected activity.

176. It was discovered by Plaintiff that Sauls and Pleasant had accused Plaintiff of

vandalizing the vehicles of several Board employees who were also engaged in protected

activity.

177. Using Plaintiff as a scapegoat, and without his knowledge, the Board did not

release relevant information concerning threatening notes referencing the victims’ ongoing EEO

activity that were found at the crime scenes.

178. Pleasant and Sauls attempted to initiate criminal prosecution procedures against

Plaintiff with four individual law enforcement agencies, all without Plaintiff’s knowledge.

179. Burford was threatened with retaliation if she released any information contained

within Pleasant’s OIG report. This serves as the purpose why Plaintiff was never notified of any

of the retaliatory continuing violations against him until July 1, 2014.

180. Abusing their authority, Pleasant and Sauls used 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6 (a) (4) of the

OIG Act to obtain Plaintiff’s cellular records, intentionally violating the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act [“ECPA”].

181. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (7) (C), and 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5) are

applicable to Plaintiff’s discovery and his cause of action is timely.

182. Plaintiff has exhausted all required and available administrative remedies.

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 183. As a result of the Board’s retaliatory actions under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j and for

violating 5 U.S.C. § 552a and 5 U.S.C. § 552, Plaintiff has suffered adverse and harmful effects,

including, but not limited to, mental distress, emotional trauma, embarrassment, humiliation, and

lost or jeopardized present and future financial opportunities.

184. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and; 12 U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary,

declarative, and injunctive relief he seeks against the Board.

Seventh Cause of Action - Denial of Termination Appeal Violating Plaintiff’s Right to Due
Process and Whistleblower Protection Rights under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j

185. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

186. The Board additional allegation that Plaintiff was terminated for tardies is not in

line with its prior allegations as to why Plaintiff was terminated from the Board and was

presented subsequent to Plaintiff submitting his termination appeal to the Board.

187. Plaintiff establishes that the Board’s denial of his appeal was pretext and is

evidenced by the fact that Margaret Shanks gave a whole new reason for upholding Plaintiff’s

termination, even after Plaintiff addressed each falsification contained in his termination letter.

188. Furthermore, Plaintiff has addressed the fact that similarly situated non-protected

employees who had actually violated work rules were treated more favorably than he.

189. During Plaintiff’s June 7, 2010 termination meeting with Kevin May, Marvin

Jones and Charles O’Malley, May clearly told Plaintiff that he was being terminated for calloffs

with no supporting documentation.

190. A retaliatory continuing violation, the Board violated Plaintiff’s right to due

process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

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 191. The Board’s action against Plaintiff also violated his whistleblower protection

rights under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j as he had engaged in protected activity and had even made

disclosures of unlawful conduct to Margaret Shanks in his appeal, in addition to previous

disclosures.

192. Plaintiff has exhausted all available and required administrative remedies.

193. As a result of the Board actions, Plaintiff was denied procedural due process

during the appeal of his wrongful termination and was therefore subjected to intentional unlawful

retaliation in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 1831j.

194. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution and 12 U.S.C. § 1831j to obtain the monetary, declarative, and injunctive relief he

seeks against the Board.

Eighth Cause of Action – Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act

195. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 193 as though fully set

forth herein.

196. To date, the Board has utterly failed, or refused, to comply with the statutorily

mandated requirements of the Privacy Act, FOIA, the anti-discrimination/anti-retaliation

provisions of the No FEAR Act, and the whistleblower protections of 12 U.S.C. § 1831j.

197. In fact, the Board intentionally conceals which whistleblower protections laws are

afforded to its current and former employees by not displaying whistleblower protection laws on

its website, which is in direct violation of the No FEAR Act.

198. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702, Plaintiff brings this right of action expressly, which

waives the Board’s sovereign immunity protections. The Board serves in an official capacity and

under color of legal authority.

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 199. Furthermore, the Board has not disciplined or held accountable any of its current

and former employees who participated in the acts against Plaintiff alleged herein.

200. Nor are the Board’s actions discretionary by law; therefore, the Board has no right

to the Section 701 (a) (2) exception.

201. The Board’s failure to comply with clearly established laws is a violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.

THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”

Ninth Cause of Action – Plaintiff’s Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

202. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

203. Sauls, May, Jones, Bakale, Coble, and Dublin conspired with one another, to

remove 22 medical documents from Plaintiff’s personnel file, which was protected by the

Privacy Act, Freedom of Information Act, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States

Constitution to promote an adverse action against the Plaintiff.

204. The above named Board employees lied under penalty of perjury and

intentionally provided falsified testimony, all while defaming Plaintiff’s character through both

libelous and slanderous statements as to why Plaintiff was terminated from Board employment.

205. Because Plaintiff had made several disclosures to Dublin, Jones, May and Sauls

with regard to the intentional removing of medical documentation having been removed from his

employee file, he was intentionally humiliated and wrongfully terminated from Board

employment in violation of public policy. See Exhibit I.

206. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1831j; the No FEAR Act, and; the District of Columbia

public policy exception, Plaintiff enjoys whistleblowing protections for having reported unlawful

conduct to Board management officials that eventually lead to his wrongful termination.

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 207. The District of Columbia recognizes the doctrine of respondeat superior and the

U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia has certified that the above named Board employees

were acting within the scope of their employment with regard to Plaintiff FTCA claims. See

Exhibit H.

208. The actions and illegal conduct of the current and former Board employees named

within this cause of action constitute the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public

policy under the laws of the District of Columbia.

209. Additionally, Plaintiff was terminated on June 7, 2010 for what was alleged to be

call offs without supporting medical documentation. Plaintiff asserts that the conflict is quite

clear due to the fact that Board Ombudsman, Margaret Shanks, denied Plaintiff’s termination

appeal citing that Plaintiff was not terminated for call offs that he provided documentation for,

but for tardies instead.

210. The aforementioned clearly violated Plaintiff’s right to due process.

211. Plaintiff has remained unemployed since his June 7, 2010 wrongful termination

from Board employment as a result of unlawful conduct exhibited by Board employees named

under this cause of action.

212. Plaintiff has exhausted any and all available administrative remedies.

213. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States of America is liable for

these actions.

214. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified 28 U.S.C. §

1346 (b), to obtain the monetary and injunctive relief he seeks against the United States of

America.

Tenth Cause of Action – Invasion of Privacy - Violations of the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act/Stored Communications Act

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 215. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

216. In Richardson v. Yellen, 14-1673, Agency Counsel states that Plaintiff’s records

were obtained by now former Board employees, Sauls and Pleasant by unlawfully using section

5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6 (a) (4) of the IG Act, which pertains to information obtained only from

Federal agencies.

217. Sauls and Pleasant, with malicious intent, obtained Plaintiff’s cellular records

without his knowledge under false pretenses.

218. On July 2, 2016, Plaintiff received a certified letter from the Board denying his

FTCA claim alleging that Plaintiff’s telecommunications data “was lawfully disclosed to the

agency under the provisions of the act” (referring to the Electronic Communication Privacy Act).

219. Unfortunately, it was previously disclosed that Plaintiff’s cellular data was

unlawfully retrieved under 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6 (a) (4) of the IG Act, therefore, violating various

clearly established laws.

220. In any event, there would not have been reason for Sauls, Pleasant, or any other

employee of the Board to obtain Plaintiff cellular data even under the ECPA, and the illegitimate

reasons for doing so under either the IG Act or ECPA has been clearly exposed by the Plaintiff.

221. Plaintiff’s cellular records were intentionally obtained minus a warrant and

without Plaintiff’s knowledge, also violating 18 U.S.C. § 2701 and 18 U.S.C. § 2703 under

Chapter 121 of the Stored Communications Privacy Act.

222. With regard to Plaintiff’s FTCA claims, Pleasant, like Sauls has been certified to

have been acting within the scope of his employment and under the Federal Tort Claims Act the

United States of America is liable for these actions.

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 223. The actions and illegal conduct of the former Board employees named within this

cause of action constitute violations electronic communication privacy laws under both Federal

and District of Columbia statutes.

224. Plaintiff has exhausted any and all available administrative remedies.

225. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified 28 U.S.C. §

1346 (b), to obtain the monetary and injunctive relief he seeks against the United States of

America.

Eleventh Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress “IIED”

226. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the complaint.

227. The conduct of the current and former Board employees contained herein was so

extreme and outrageous towards Plaintiff, with the intent to cause or with reckless disregard for

the probability of causing Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress leading to a Post Traumatic

Stress Disorder “PTSD” diagnosis.

228. To the extent that said outrageous conduct was perpetuated by certain named

Board employees, the remaining named Board employees, current and former, adopted and

ratified said conduct with a wanton and reckless disregard for the deleterious consequences to

Plaintiff.

229. As a proximate result of said conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to

suffer extreme mental distress, humiliation, anguish, and emotional and physical injuries, as well

as economic losses, all to him damage in amounts to be proven at trial.

230. Those named Board employees, current and former, committed the acts alleged

maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiff, from

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an improper and evil motive amounting to malice and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights,

entitling Plaintiff to recover monetary and punitive damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

231. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States of America is liable for

these actions.

232. Plaintiff has exhausted any and all available administrative remedies.

233. Plaintiff has a legal right under the Federal Tort Claims Act, codified 28 U.S.C. §

1346 (b), to obtain the monetary and injunctive relief he seeks against the United States of

America.

Agency System of Records

234. Plaintiff alleges that the Board maintains a system of records that prohibit

disclosure of personally identifiable records unless such disclosure is made by written request or

with the consent from the individual to which those records pertain.

235. Plaintiff alleges that he did not provide the Board or any of its agents, employees,

or representatives with consent nor did he sign a written requests form authorizing the release of

any documentation alleged of disclosure herein.

236. The Board violated its own established policies and procedures in addition to

clearly established laws.

237. Plaintiff’s files and records are subject to Board filing systems: BGFRS-3, FRB-

Medical Records; BGFRS-4, FRB-General Personnel Records; BGFRS-5, FRB-EEO

Discrimination Complaint File; BGFRS-6, FRB-Disciplinary and Adverse Action Records;

BGFRS-24, FRB-EEO General Files, and; BGFRS-26, FRB-Employee Relations Records.

Demand for Jury Trial

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 238. Based on the posited facts and the malicious and atrocious actions of the

defendant and its employees that brought these facts into existence, Plaintiff hereby demands

trial by jury pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38.

Prayer for Relief

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Edward Richardson requests that the Court award him the
following relief:

(1) Declaration that the Board violated the Privacy Act of 1974; the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA); the Administrative Procedure Act; the Whistleblower
Protection Rights under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, and; the Notification and Federal
Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (No FEAR Act);

(2) Award Plaintiff any actual damages under 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g) (5), per violation,
the exact amount of which is to be determined at trial;

(3) Award Plaintiff any actual damages under 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (c) (2), per
violation, the exact amount of which is to be determined at trial;

(4) Award Plaintiff any actual damages under 5 U.S.C. § 552, per violation, the exact
amount of which is to be determined at trial;

(5) Award Plaintiff any actual damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b), per violation,
the exact amount of which is to be determined at trial;

(6) Invoke its equitable powers to expunge all records or information maintained by
the Board that is inaccurate and/or derogatory to Plaintiff;

(7) Award plaintiff reasonable costs and attorney’s fees as provided in 5 U.S.C. §
552a; 5 U.S.C. § 552; 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, and; 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b);

(8) For a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the Board, its agents,
employees, officers, and representatives from taking any further illegal and
prohibited action against Plaintiff such as those atrocious behaviors alleged
herein;

(9) Refer those Board officials responsible, past and current, for criminal prosecution
for intentionally violating the Privacy Act under 5 U.S.C. § 552a (i) (1); for
intentionally providing false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and; for
intentional perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621;

(10) Expedite this action in every way pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (a);

(11) For punitive damages, and;

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 (12) Grant such other relief, injunctive and otherwise, as the Court may deem just and
proper.

Date: August 4, 2016 Respectfully submitted:

/s/_________________________________
Edward Richardson, Plaintiff

393 Malvern Lakes Circle, Apt. 101

Fredericksburg, Virginia 22406
P. 540/207-1666
E. edwardrichardson27@yahoo.com

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