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• SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 173775 a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
2016
[LAND TITLES AND DEEDS]
Agcaoili Book; Atty. Panes Lectures; LA Notes
Sec. 1 Title of Decree – This decree shall be known as the Property Registration
Decree.
Regalian Doctrine (Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 PC)
- all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to
the State
Jura Regalia
private title to a land must be traced to some grant, express or
implied, or from its successors
- The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the
Philippines. This refers to Royal Rights that all lands were formerly
held by the King.
- (Maam Panes): refers to private ownership and how private
ownership of lands were given by virtue of the royal rights possessed
by the King
Exceptions to Regalian Doctrine
1) Native Title (Carino v. Insular)– refers to pre-conquest rights to
lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have
been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/Indigenous
Peoples, have never been public lands, and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held the same way since before Spanish
Conquest
▪ Time Immemorial - A period of time when as far back as
memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of an owner, and
utilized a defined territory developed to them, by operation
of customary law or inherited from their ancestors with
their customs and traditions
2) Ancestral Domain (Cruz v. Secretary)
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PGMA classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.
During the pendency of the 1st case, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064
classifying Boracay Island into
1. (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
2. (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (A/D).
3. (15m) buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails,
reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants , owners of beach resorts in Boracay
filed with this Court an action to nullify PGMA’s proclamation claiming that it
infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay; there is no need for
a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land; and Being classified
as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first PLA. Thus,
their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
OSG argued that petitioners-claimants Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into A&D. There is a
need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions
in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right
to secure title under other pertinent laws.
HELD:
REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RECLASSIFY
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
1) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;
2) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos; and
3) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

SECRETARY OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP 1935 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION
October 8, 2008 CONSTITUTION
1. agricultur 1. agricultural 1. agricultural
This case involves 2 petitions regarding the right of the present occupants of al 2. industrial/commer (maybe
Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. 2. forest or cial A/D)
timber 3. residential 2. forest/timb
FIRST CASE: G.R. No. 167707 Certiorari on CA decision affirming RTC granting 4. resettlement er
declaratory relief field by Mayor Jose Yap et al and ordered the survey of 5. mineral 3. national
Boracay for titling purposes 6. timber/forest parks
1976, (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, 7. grazing lands 4. mineral
which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. 8. others by law
President Marcos declared the area as tourist zones and marine reserves
under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Hence, Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
subsequent issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 to implement Proclamation No. 1801. expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.
- Petitioners claim that Proclamation and PTA Circular precluded them Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
survey of land for titling purposes; Marcos’ declaration raised doubts THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands and Since the to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has
ownership; Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have
the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
imperfect titles. presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
OSG invoked Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code that the State as part of the inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private
of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was NOT available for ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the
disposition and since Boracay Island had not been classified as A & D whatever plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of
ISSUE: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. RTC neither Proclamation nor
the Circular mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the SPANISH RULE
subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
- Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve. The Laws Of The First introduced Regalian doctrine and laid the foundation
- The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Indies And The that all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
Island were covered by OCT in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Royal Cedulas either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain
Tirol. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933. Ley Hipotecaria provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds
- CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a Or The Mortgage as well as possessory claims.
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were Law Of 1893.
part of a forest reserve. The Royal Decree partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws
Of 1894 Or The of the Indies. It established possessory information as the

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Maura Law method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894.
under certain conditions which were set forth in said
decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an Amendments of this Requirement
1) informacion posesoria or possessory information ▪ Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
title, ▪ OCENPO 30 Years
2) when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is ▪ PD No. 1073,
converted into a title of ownership ▪ OCENPO since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
3) only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
4) uninterrupted possession which must be actual, There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect
public, and adverse, or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
5) from the date of its inscription. (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
6) However, possessory information title had to be possession and occupation of the subject land by
perfected one year after the promulgation of the himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
lands would revert to the State. or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) The classification of the land as alienable and
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be disposable land of the public domain.
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: ▪ discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
a) titulo real or royal grant; PD No. 892 land registration proceedings. Under the decree, all
b) concesion especial or special grant; February 16, holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for
c) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; 1976 registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six
d) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and Spanish Titles (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on
e) informacion posesoria or possessory information title. may no longer February 16, 1976.
be used as ▪ Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall
evidence of be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
ownership due Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
to the rise of ▪ Evidences of Ownership during Spanish Regime
AMERICAN RULE several 1) Royal Grant
Philippine Bill conflicting 2) Special Grant
1) AGRICULTURAL ( those public lands acquired from claims of 3) Adjustment Title
of 1902
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands) ownership 4) Title by Purchase
US assumed
2) MINERAL 5) Possessory Information Title
administration
a. absolute grant (freehold system) 6) Gratuitous Title
of the Phil. Is.
b. lease (leasehold system) ▪ Amended and updated the Act. No. 496
After the 1898
3) TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS. ▪ enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration
Treaty of Paris
established a system of registration by which recorded of property
Act No. 496 PD No. 1529,
title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and ▪ governs registration of lands under the Torrens system
Land Property
imprescriptible. This is known as the TORRENS as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
Registration Registration
SYSTEM. mortgages.
Act Decree
Made the Court of Land Registration ▪ Broadened the jurisdiction of RTCs with regard to
On February 1, June 11, 1978
Does not create title nor vest one, simply confirms and original registration of title to lands
1903 ▪ Created the former LRC which is now Land Registration
register
introduced the HOMESTEAD SYSTEM , Authority
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of
Act No. 926
imperfect titles
First Public A POSITIVE ACT DECLARING LAND AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
i. OCENPO of agricultural lands for the next ten (10)
Land Act REQUIRED. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
years preceding July 26, 1904
October 7, 1903 time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
SALE OR LEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS.
title to public such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of
lands in the disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No.
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
Philippines 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been
purchase lands of the public domain
remained in the officially delimited and classified.
judges of courts have the authority to determine
gov’t and its title
classification of lands
sprung from THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE
CFI’s had power to adjudicate cases relating to land
Treaty of Paris OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS ON THE PERSON
titles and disputes
APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION (or claiming ownership), who must prove that
Cadastral system of registration – when in the the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
opinion of the President, the public interest requires that presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
the title to any lands be settled and adjudicated, he shall of the application (or claim) is A/D.
order the DoL to make survey thereof, w/ notice to all
Act. No. 2259 persons claiming an interest therein. Thereafter, DoL 1) presidential proclamation or P
Cadastral Act shall be represented by SG, shall institute the 2) an executive order; E
Feb. 11, 1913 registration proceedings by filing a petition in the proper 3) an administrative action; A
court against the possessors stating that public interest 4) investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a R
requires the titles to such lands be settled and 5) legislative act or a statute. L
adjudicated.
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land
agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the and disposable.
same privileges. In this case records bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Act No. 2874 Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
Second Public proclamation that the land is A/D. Matters of land classification or reclassification
occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or
Land Act cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
since July 26, 1894, was required.
November 29,
***POSITIVE ACT REQUIRED
1919 Who may classify lands?
Courts are no longer authorized to determine
Under Jones  JUDICIARY (ANKRON AND DE ALDECOA )These cases were decided
classification of lands
Law under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
Gave the executive through the President the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands into A & D, mineral (October 7, 1926). During that time, the President had no power to classify
or forest. After declaration of A&D, this law requires lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. Hence,
publication and notice the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable
CA No. 141 remains as the existing general law governing the cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
PUBLIC LAND classification and disposition of lands of the public preponderance of the evidence. To aid the courts in resolving land
ACT domain other than timber and mineral lands, and registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
1935 privately owned lands which reverted to the State. presumption on land classification that in the absence of evidence to the
Constitution; ▪ Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the contrary, lands are considered agricultural. However, this presumption did
December 1, requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession not automatically converted all lands of the public domain as A&D
1936 and occupation of lands of the public domain agricultural lands for it would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in
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Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought
under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases
dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative
conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply
to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest,
who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them,
their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State. In any case, the assumption in
Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the
end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited
for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land despite the presumption.
 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Since 1919, courts were no longer free to
determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except
those that have already became private lands. Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave
the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive
prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of
lands of the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the HEIRS OF CIRIACO TIROL who were
issued their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS CONTINUED POSSESSION UNDER ACT NO. 926
DOES NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS ALIENABLE.
Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a
title in their name.A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in
Collado v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of
the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands
in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States.
The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property
of the government and the friar lands. Thus, it is plain error for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable. (Emphasis Ours)
 EXCEPT FOR LANDS ALREADY COVERED BY EXISTING
TITLES, BORACAY WAS AN UNCLASSIFIED LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1064. SUCH
UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC FOREST
UNDER PD NO. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by
President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a
PUBLIC FOREST as a mass of lands of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
 The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million
peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its
character as public forest.
 Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushesA forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis
supplied)
PROCLAMATION NO. 1801 IS NOT A POSIITIVE ACT. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
 Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land but merely recognizes that
the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
its powers under CA No. 141. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801
cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo
did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No.
1801.
 The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801shows that the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism
and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
alienability.
IT WAS PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 OF 2006 WHICH POSITIVELY
DECLARED PART OF BORACAY AS ALIENABLE AND OPENED THE SAME
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP.
 Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the
President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head,
who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. In issuing
Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public
domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of
public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department,
through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released and rendered open to disposition.
 PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
 That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No.
705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural
land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public
domain despite PD No. 705., the prohibition under the CARL applies
only to a reclassification of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with
the opinion of the Department of Justice on this point: Thus,
obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply
to those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest
under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE UNDER CA NO. 141. NEITHER DO
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THEY HAVE VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE OCCUPIED LANDS UNDER THE
SAID LAW. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1) OCENPO of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
 Why pb of 1902 and act. No. 926 and pn 1801 reliance must fail?
because of the absence of the 2 nd of a/d their entitlement to a
government grant under our present public land act presupposes that
the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and
disposable. this is clear from the wording of the law itself. where the
land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
 Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those
lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of OCENPO of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.
All is not lost, however. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed
by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to
acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements
under the present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for
Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary
to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to
appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a
forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however,
does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are
needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent
and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in
Director of Forestry v. Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy
that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not
without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects
of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction
to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a
lumbermans decalogue.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
FACTS: Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for registration of 4
parcels of land located in Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the
subject lands having acquired them from LID Corporation. LID Corp. acquired the
land from Calderon, Moraga, Monje and their predecessors in interest who have
been in OCENPO for more than 30 years. She believes that the lots are not
mortgaged nor encumbered.
RP opposed the application alleging
1) No OCENPO since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
2) muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or of his OCENPO ;
3) applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that
4) parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to RP not
subject to private appropriation.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat which was subsequently
affirmed by the CA. Hence, the appeal before the SC. The Republic faults the CA
on its finding which respects the length of Naguiat’s occupation of the subject
property and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the
lands in question have been declassified from forest land to A&D property.
ISSUE: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of
forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
RULING: SC had an opportunity to discuss the concept of Regalian Doctrine in
this case. It states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State that is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. Public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof to overturn the presumption that the land subject of an
application is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The SC said that
the CA, in this case, assumed that the lands in question are already A&D. CA
ratiocinated that the possession of Naguiat of the lands created a legal fiction
where without judicial declaration, the same ceases to be a public land and
becomes private property ipso jure.
Respondent Naguiat did not present any incontrovertible proof that there has
been a positive act from the government which reclassified the land applied for
as A&D. The tax receipts cannot be a sufficient proof for there is no information
about the classification of the property on it. Instead, the applicant could have
obtained a Certificate of Land Classification from the DENR as a valid proof.
Since the land is unclassified, according to SC, the same cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation. Occupation on such land in the concept of an owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered title. To this,
the application of Naguiat to have the lands registered is denied.
ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
347 SCRA 128
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of
certain provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together
with its implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA
is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For
this reason, it prays that the petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa
countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also, that the
law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”, it might include private lands found
within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same.
According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The
constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganiban’s Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371’s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains.
That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that
only agricultural lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable
and disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the country’s natural
resources and 1/3 of the country’s land will be concentrated to 12 Million
IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These
figures violates the constitutional principle of a “more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income, and wealth” among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and
Cannot be Alienated or Ceded
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Sec. 2 Nature of Registration Proceedings, Jurisdiction of Courts 1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
Judicial Proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be have been in OCENPO of AD lands of the public domain under a
▪ in rem bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
▪ Based on generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system 2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over under the provisions of existing laws
▪ all applications for original registration of title to lands, 3) Those how have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
▪ including all improvements and interests therein, and river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws
▪ over all petitions filed after original registration of title, 4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
▪ with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. provided by law
The court through its clerk of court shall
▪ furnish the Land Registration Commission with Where and how to file the application for Registration?
o 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed  With in
or issued the RTC of the province or city where the land is situated. The
applications or petitions for land registration, TC shall issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing,
o with the exception of stenographic notes, and the public shall be given notice thereof by means of publication,
▪ within 5 days from the filing or issuance thereof mailing and posting. Any person claiming an interest in the land may
appear and file an opposition, stating all his objections to the
application. The case shall be heard and all conflicting claims of
ownership shall be determined by the court.
 Once the judgment becomes final, the court shall issue an order for
History the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title in
- conceptualized by Sir Robert Torrens from South Australia favour of the person adjudged as entitled to registration.
- the purpose is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of  Thereupon. The LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY shall prepare
the system the corresponding decree of registration as well as the original and
duplicate certificate of title which shall be sent to the Register of
What is Torrens System? Deeds of the city or province where the land lies for registration.
- Those systems of registration of transaction with interest in land
whose declared object is, under governmental authority; Jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to property
- To establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and Sec. 19(2), BP 129
indefeasible title to realty,  With the RTC where assessed value of the property exceeds 20k
- To simplify its transfer  If Manila, if the assessed value of the property exceeds 50k
Exceptions
What are the Purposes of Torrens System? (Legarda v. Saleeby) o Forcible entry
1) To quiet title to land; o Unlawful detainer of lands or buildings
2) To put a stop forever to any question of the legality of title
Exception
Claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
or which may arise subsequent thereto TITLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
 once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure without Source of right Merely confirms a title already existing
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the Foundation of ownership Mere evidence of ownership
“mirador de su casa” to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Best evidence of ownership Best evidence of title
Advantages of the Torrens System
1) Substitutes security for insecurity
2) Reduced the cost of conveyances and time occupied LEGARDA V. SALEEBY
3) Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
4) Simplified ordinary dealings
5) Affords protection against fraud CASE: Land is registered under the name of two persons
6) Restored to their just value many estates, held under good holding FACTS:
titles, but depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical
defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults o That the plaintiffs LEGARDA and the defendant SALEEBY occupy, as
owners, adjoining lots which existed a number of years a stone wall
THREE PRINCIPLES in the TS between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs
1) Mirror Principle LEGARDA. Upon petition to the Court, Legarda was able to obtain a
o if there are several transfers, the TCT will be a ‘mirror’ in decree of registration which included the stonewall.
that it should be identical to the current facts. If the seller o Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
sells the land, the old title must be identical to the new LEGARDA discovered that the wall which had been included in the
one in terms of technical description, so as to reinforce certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
the concept that the buyers should be able to rely on the granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the
face of the title.
Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error
o Exception committed
a) when a person deals with a registered land o The lower court however, without notice to the defendant SALEEBY
with someone that is not the registered owner denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the
b) when the party has actual knowledge of facts petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
which should impel a reasonably cautious objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of
mind to make such inquiry to the lack of title; the defendant SALEEBY.
c) in cases of banking and financing institutions
2) Curtain Principle
ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in granting to SALEEBY the stonewall as
o The concept that the buyer should be able to rely on the his registered property? NO
face of the title, and should not go beyond the certificate.
In a way, the buyer does not have to go behind the curtain RULING:
to ascertain the truth of the title, because the Torrens The REAL PURPOSE OF THAT SYSTEM is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
Certificate guarantees him that. forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
3) Insurance Principle at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
o Equates registration to a guarantee by the State thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
LAWS PRIOR TO 1529, See Table under Sec. v. Yap possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the
PD 1529 proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
How is jurisdiction over the RES acquired?
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms
A: Sec. 23 of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in
1) Publication rem.
2) Mailing
3) Notice While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does
an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
Who may apply for registration? registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
A: Sec. 14, p. 1-4 OPAL third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are
foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the
burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the
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registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same
questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law.
THE REGISTRATION, UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM, DOES NOT GIVE
THE OWNER ANY BETTER TITLE THAN HE HAD. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a
precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner.
The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly
the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even
by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land
which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between
the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow
that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who
are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, EXCEPT as to rights
which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with
certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title
once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious
possession. REGISTERED TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM CAN NOT
BE DEFEATED BY PRESCRIPTION (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once
registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT IN THE CASE OF TWO
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE, PURPORTING TO INCLUDE THE SAME LAND,
THE EARLIER IN DATE PREVAILS, WHETHER THE LAND COMPRISED IN
THE LATTER CERTIFICATE BE WHOLLY, OR ONLY IN PART, COMPRISED
IN THE EARLIER CERTIFICATE. Hogg adds however that, "IF IT CAN BE
VERY CLEARLY ASCERTAINED BY THE ORDINARY RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, THAT THE
INCLUSION OF THE LAND IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIOR DATE
IS A MISTAKE, THE MISTAKE MAY BE RECTIFIED BY HOLDING THE
LATTER OF THE TWO CERTIFICATES OF TITLE TO BE CONCLUSIVE." (See
Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the
excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.)
Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport
to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the
prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of
the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered
owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that WHERE TWO
CERTIFICATES PURPORT TO INCLUDE THE SAME REGISTERED LAND,
THE HOLDER OF THE EARLIER ONE CONTINUES TO HOLD THE TITLE" (p.
237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration
obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
GENERAL RULE: "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in
any court,
EXCEPTION: fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year.
Q: If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for
fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set
aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent
certificate or decree of registration?
We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory
provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is
registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real
property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person
acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes
that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes
and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that
in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of
two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In the present case, the appellee SALEEBY was the first negligent (granting
that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he cannot complain)
in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. Granting that he
was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose
the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of
fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment.
There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be
applied to the appellants than to him.
IN CASE OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION
ACT, THAT THE OWNER OF THE EARLIEST CERTIFICATE IS THE OWNER
OF THE LAND. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied
to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or
the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original
certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the
right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later
certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections
38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and
be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak
of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of
the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right
or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections.
UNDER THE RULE OF NOTICE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE PURCHASER
HAS EXAMINED EVERY INSTRUMENT OF RECORD AFFECTING THE TITLE.
Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of
innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law
requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by
proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may
be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule
that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a
rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages
to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage
is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea
of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such
lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from
the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a
bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons
must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know
the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It
would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from
the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a
part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another,
not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should
not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of
land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of
the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what
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the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior
registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order
to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate
under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system,
the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice
to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in
good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under
the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included
in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants,
the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these
rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of
the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor
for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in
the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his
negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens
system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS Corp. vs.CA
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title on
a parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite which was allegedly registered by Virata
in his name by fraudulently obtaining a title through an administrative
reconstitution of a non-existent original title of the land, and that by reason of said
reconstitution, there now exists a cloud on the title of Solid State. Solid State
alleges that it bought the land from Julian Peñaranda who obtained the same
through the grant of application for the sale of a friar land from the government.
The land was registered in the name of Peñaranda in 1969 under CA 32.
Peñaranda's occupation of the land is derived through a voluntary assignment of
right of the former occupant, Mabini Legaspi, and that the same is free from
claims and conflicts and that the said applicant has established his rights over the
subject land, in view of which, said investigator recommended that said lot be
awarded to applicant Julian Peñaranda according to law.
Virata countered saying that he bought the land from Mabini Legaspi who
obtainedownership in 1957 on the subject land after the Director of Lands sold
the same at public auction. Official Receipts of payment for the instalments were
shown as a proof. The title was reconstituted since the Provincial Capitol of
Cavite was burned including the ROD office which holds the title to the subject
property. Legaspi also denied that she sold the land to Julan Peñaranda. RTC
ruled in favor of Virata which was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this appeal before the SC.
..
Issue:
WON CA correctly held that Virata is the true and lawful owner of the subject
property? NO.
Ruling:
Solid State contends that Act No. 1120 or Friar Lands Act provides the
procedure for the sale and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons. The acquisition by Peñaranda was in
compliance with all legal requisites laid down by the law for the validity of the
sale. He further contended that the issuance to Mabini Legaspi of a COT in her
favor was a violation of the Friar Lands Act as there was no required approval by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and
occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a
certificate stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter
then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and
in the instalments and at the interest specified in the certificate. Subject to a
resolutory condition that non-payment of price in full may cancel the sale. The
court said that the title Peñaranda has the valid acquisition from the government
of the subject friar land since it was in compliance with law and hence, the sale in
favor of Solid State is valid and binding. Contrary to that, the
SC said while the sale of the lot to Legaspi occurred much earlier in time, the
same cannot be considered as a ground to for him to be considered the true
owner of the land. Legaspi did not present an evidence showing that a certificate
of sale was ever issued by the BoL in his favor. The existence of the official
receipts showing payment of the price of the land by Legaspi does not prove that
the land was legally conveyed to her without any contract of sale. Legaspi also
alleged that he purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which procedure is
nowhere provided in the pertinent laws conveying friar lands. The law expressly
state that an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied by him
at a private sale not in a public auction. There was also absence of a deed of
conveyance to Legaspi by the government after the full payment of the
instalments on the disputed lot.
Time and again, registration does not vest title to the land, but merely a
procedure to establish
evidence over realty. Even if the 1 year period has already lapsed, the title did
not become incontrovertible but it is a null and void for not complying with the
requirements of the law. Therefore, Virata could not have validly obtained title to
the land
FULLTEXT RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this Court to
discuss them jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the respondent
appellate court and supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however
accept the legal conclusion made by the appellate court and trial court that the
registered title of private respondent to the land should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act
provides the procedure for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private
persons; that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest Julian Peñaranda of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of
the friar lands estate, was in compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act
No. 1120, for the validity of the sale by the government in favor of Peñaranda of
such friar lands.
It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Mabini
Legaspi, and the issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in violation of
the Friar Lands Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
There is no dispute here that the land involved in this case is a friar land and that
the laws which are applicable are Act No. 1120, known as the Friar Lands Act,
providing for the administration and temporary leasing and sale of certain
haciendas and parcels of land, commonly known as friar lands, and
Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15, 1936 as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 316 dated June 9, 1938, which provided for the
subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar lands estated remaining
undisposed of.
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has
agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him at
the price so fixed payable as provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one
hundred and twenty two of the Land Registration Act.
Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior. (Emphasis ours)
Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in part:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona
fide occupants of any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten
hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private
sale and at a price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, after taking into
consideration its location, quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its
value, the provisions of section 12, of Act 1120, as amended, to the contrary, . . .
(Emphasis ours)
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It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired by the government.
1) The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that
the government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or
occupant.
2) The occupant then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the
purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest
specified in the certificate.
3) The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so
called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the
property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be
cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full.
The purchaser becomes the owner upon the issuance of the
certificate of sale in his favour subject only to the cancellation thereof
in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No. L-
16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.)
4) Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interests, the government shall then issue a final deed of
conveyance in favor of the purchaser.
5) However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved
by the Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120. Later
laws, however, required that the sale shall be approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the
validity of the sale.
It is undisputed that SOLID STATE’s predecessor, Julian Peñaranda was the
actual occupant of Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase the said lot
on November 22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources approved the sale of the lot without auction to
Peñaranda; that a sales contract was executed between the Director of Lands
and Peñaranda on February 28, 1969 for a consideration of P 1,198.00 payable
in 10 monthly installments; that upon the full payment of the price, the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the final deed of
conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of Peñaranda. Subsequently, the Register of
Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of Peñaranda, and when the
latter sold the land to petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
80889 was issued in favor of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Peñaranda was in compliance
with law. The execution of the sales contract vested the right of ownership in
Peñaranda over the land. There is no doubt whatsoever that the said sale was
valid as it was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Hence, the sale made by Peñaranda in favor of the petitioner transferred the
ownership of the land in favor of the latter resulting in the proper issuance of TCT
No. T-80889 in its name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title by
respondent VIRATA are clearly shown in the records. The latter's predecessor,
Mabini Legaspi bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public auction held on May 5,
1943 conducted by the Bureau of Lands and friar lands agent Severino Rivera,
and paid the purchase price thereof in installments in 1943; that on December
12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite
requesting the issuance of certificates of title to several persons including Mabini
Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that subsequently on
December 6, 1957, she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata, which was
evidenced by a deed of sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on
December 10, 1957; that on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was issued in the
name of Virata. Due to the fire which gutted the building housing the Registry of
Cavite on June 7, 1959, the latter administratively reconstituted the original of
TCT No. 11520 on September 1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate
and renumbered the same as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier than the
date of acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the evidence
presented by respondent Virata indicates that the latter's predecessor paid the
purchase price of Lot No. 7449 on installments. Nowhere in the evidence for
the respondent or in the records of this case however, would show that a
certificate of sale was ever issued by the Bureau of Lands, which would
vest ownership and title over the land in favor of Mabini Legaspi. The
existence of the official receipts showing payment of the price of the land by
Legaspi does not prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without any
contract of sale having been executed by the government in her favor. Viewed
from all angles, the acquisition of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and
void, and not in compliance with the procedure mandated by law for the
sale of friar lands. For one thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly purchased the land
in a sale at public auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in Act No. 1120
or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316. The laws expressly state that an actual
occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied by him at a private sale and
not in a sale at public auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as amended). Further, neither was
there any deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the government after the full
payment of the installments on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there was neither allegation nor
proof that the sale was with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. The absence of such approval made the supposed sale null and
void ab initio. Without the certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the
ownership of the land from the government Mabini Legaspi and without the
required approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, We
find that Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner acquire ownership over the
land in 1943. The ownership or title over the friar land, specifically Lot No. 7449
remained in the government until Peñaranda, petitioners predecessor,
lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by
virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest
ownership upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the
lot, which is null and void. Time and again, it has been held that registration
does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title
than that what he actually has (De man et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. L-
46935 December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No. 56232, June
22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the
certificate of title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale
from the government, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null
and void since the acquisition of the property was in violation of law.
Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its
action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In one case, this Court ruled that an
adverse claimant of a registered land who is in possession thereof for a long
period of time is not barred from bringing an action for reconveyance which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property against a registered owner relying upon
a Torrens title which was illegally or wrongfully acquired. In actions for
reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained
of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would be unavailing.
Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and the subsequent titles
issued pursuant thereto produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est
nullum producit affectum. There being no title to the land that Mabini Legaspi
acquired from the government, it follows that no title to the same land could be
conveyed by the former to respondent Virata. Even assuming that respondent
Virata was a purchaser in good faith and for value, the law is, as between two
persons both of whom are in good faith and both innocent of any negligence, the
law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee
of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights . Further if a person happened to
obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of another with or without bad faith,
the certificate of title which may have been issued to him under the
circumstances may and should be cancelled or corrected. Our unavoidable
conclusion in this case is that the title of petitioner under the Torrens land
system should be upheld considering that no previous valid title to the
same land existed.
Petition granted.
GREY ALBA VS. DE LA CRUZ
17 SCRA 49
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of Segunda Alba Clemente. They, as co-owners sought for
the registration of a parcel of
land located in Baliuag, Bulacan. The land is said to be an agricultural one used
for the raising of rice and sugar cane. This petition for registration was granted by
the court. Subsequently, Anacleto Dela Cruz objected before the court asking
for the revision of the case. Dela Cruz alleged that the decree of registration was
fraudulently obtained by the petitioners and that included in the parcels of land
Albas sought to register is the two parcels of land he inherited from his father
which was a state grant. To this the court revised its decision which excludes the
two parcels of land claimed by Dela Cruz.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Anacleto De La
Cruz? YES.
Ruling:
It is admitted that Dela cruz was occupying the two parcels of land at the time the
appellants presented their petition for registration. That Dela Cruz did not appear
in the petition as an occupant and also that he is alleged to be a tenant for the
Albas the reason why the latter did not include his name in the petition as
occupant. It is proved that the Uncle of the petitioners, who took care of them
after their parents died, have leased the property to Anacleto’s Father. Anacleto
agreed that there was a lease but the two parcels of land he is claiming were not
included in the lease contract. The fact that the petitioners were able to have the
subject land registered will tell us that such registration is conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the government, whether their names are
mentioned in the application or included in the general description “to all who it
may concern”. By express provision of the law, such as the Land Registration
Act, the world are made parties-defendant by the description in the notice “to
all whom it may concern”.Though, Anacleto De la Cruz was not served with
notice, he was already made a party defendant by publication and the
entering of the decree in 1908 must be held conclusive against all persons
including him. The SC said it was error for the lower court to have opened
the decree and modified the judgment on account of absence, infancy, or
other disability. It could have been opened only on the ground that the
decree was obtained through fraud.
While it was alleged that there was fraud, the SC did not consider such
allegation. It ruled that the petitioners
honestly believed that Anacleto was occupying the lands as their tenant.
Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in
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some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be
actual or positive fraud.To this, the SC said that the Lower Courts decision be
reinstated and the decision of the Appellate Court be reversed.
RULING: While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition
below was clearly that of improper venue, the Solicitor General confuses venue
with jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn.

JURISDICTION OVER THE VENUE OF AN ACTION

SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES nature of an action is conferred only as fixed by statute may be changed by
VENUE by law. It may not be conferred by the consent of the parties, and an
RTC’s Exclusive Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 (2) of PD 1529) consent or waiver upon a court which objection on improper venue may be
1) All applications for original registration of title to lands, including otherwise would have no jurisdiction waived by the failure of the defendant
improvements and interests therein over the subject matter of an action to raise it at the proper time.
2) All petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear Rules as to jurisdiction can never be In such an event, the court may still
and determine all question arising upon such applications or petition left to the consent or agreement of the render a valid judgment
MTC’s delegated jurisdiction parties.
MTCs may hear and determine land registration cases in the following instances: jurisdictional Procedural (may be waived); to provide
1) Lot sought to be registered is not subject to controversy or opposition convenience to the parties rather than
2) Lot is contested, but the value thereof does not exceed 100, 000 restrict their access to the courts as it
a. Such value is ascertained by relates to the place of trial.
 by the affidavit of the claimant
 by the agreement of the respective claimants (if there be more than one), or Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
 from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property a. laying of venue is procedural
rather than substantive.
b. It relates to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person rather
than the subject matter.
SC Administrative Circular 6-93-A c. Provisions relating to venue
Nov. 15, 1995 establish a relation between
1) Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this A.C. the plaintiff and the defendant
shall be transferred by the Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction and not between the court and
over the cases to E.J. of the appropriate Courts of limited jurisdiction for the subject matter.
the required raffle among the branches of the court under his d. Venue relates to trial not to
administrative supervision jurisdiction, touches more of the
2) But those already commenced as of the date of effectivity shall remain w/ convenience of the parties
said courts, except when the parties agree otherwise rather than the substance of the
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., case.
vs. RoD Paranaque.
[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:
➢ The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial
FACTS:
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable
PETITIONER CORPORATION was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz,
to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc and was approved by the
VENUE, IN INFERIOR COURTS AS WELL AS IN THE CFI (NOW RTC), MAY
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 1997. As a consequence
BE WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY Dismissing the complaint on the
of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the TCTs over real
ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name,
stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the
Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on November
courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC of Paraaque City
the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
impleading as respondent the ROD of Pasay City, apparently because the titles
provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be
sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of
held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City.
Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of
THOUGH TECHNICALLY WRONG, MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES
the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
FOR WHOSE CONVENIENCE THE RULES ON VENUE HAD BEEN
Amended Petition now impleading ROD of Paraaque City, and alleged that its
DEVISED. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion
lands are located in Paraaque City. Court dismissed due to improper venue
to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all
since properties are in Pasay In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998,
practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of
acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds
devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to
of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. [7]MR denied
the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.
PETITIONER BEFORE SC
INDEED, IT WAS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for
HAVE TAKEN A PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT BY DISMISSING MOTU
the following reasons:
PROPRIO the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper
the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we
venue;
are for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take
2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless
primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court
still a matter of right on petitioners part to amend its petition in order to
faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the
correct the wrong entries therein; and
plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.[18]
3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in
Paraaque City, so venue was properly laid despite that erroneous
allegation in the original petition. [11]
PETITIONER CORRECTLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN SEEKING THE AMENDMENT OF ITS
OSG
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE. The jurisdiction of the RTC over matters involving
The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment said that trial court
the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is
did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original
conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property
petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of
Registration Decree, viz:
the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have
Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings
acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall
be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
PETITIONER’S REPLY JURISDICTION V. VENUE On February 15, 1999,
petitioner filed its Reply. TC had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have
appeared to be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the
exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands,
location of the properties.
including improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
upon such applications or petitions.
improper venue? NO.
The COURT through its CLERK OF COURT shall

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1. furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies
of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration,
2. WITH THE EXCEPTION of stenographic notes,
3. within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces
of the titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the
lands are situated, pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of
real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. [19]
VDA. DE ARCEO VS. CA
185 SCRA 489
Facts:
Spouses Arceo are owners of four parcels of unregistered lands located in
Bulacan. They had one Son named Esteban who had 5 children. Esteban’s
children and their children are the parties involved in this case. In 1941, Spouses
Arceo executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Jose, one of Esteban’s children.
Since 1942, Jose paid the taxes, took personal possession of the land and
claimed it as his own. In 1941, also, Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa to give away the subject properties in
favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. However, the said document was
notarized in 1944 only after Mrs. Arceo died.
Subsequently, the wife of Jose, together with their children, filed with the
cadastral court an application for
registration in their names the subject lands. This was contested by Pedro and
Lorenzo, Jose’s siblings contending that they are entitled to a part of the subject
parcels of land. The cadastral court rejected the registration and distributed the
properties according to law on intestate succession instead. The CA affirmed its
decision.
Issue: WON the cadastral court has jurisdiction in determining the ownership of
lands?
Ruling:
As to the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of PD 1529 provides that RTC, sitting as
a land registration court, is no
longer circumscribed as it is in the previous law. PD 1529 eliminated the general
jurisdiction of RTC and the limited jurisdiction of RTC acting merely as a
cadastral court; the purpose of this is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
In this case, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction in the
determination of issues on
ownership, which at the same time involves the issue on the right of registration.
There would be a multiplicity of suits or the registration will be prolonged if not
impossible should the cadastral court decide not to pass upon the issue of
ownership.
As to the issue of co-ownership:
Jose’s wife contends that they acquired the lot through acquisitive prescription.
This was rejected by the SC. The Civil Code provides that prescription does not
lie against co-owners, unless the following requisites concur.
a. There is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated
the co-ownership.
b. He has made known to the co-owners that he is assuming
exclusive ownership over the property.
c. Clear and convincing evidence thereof.
d. His possession is OCEN.
This circumstances were not present in the case at bar. The fact of paying taxes
cannot defeat the right of coowners to their right to enjoy the use of their
property, the same does not confer title upon a claimant.
Nonetheless, the SC granted the petition and have the lands registered under the
name of Jose and his heirs by
virtue of the valid deed of donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court further ruled
that the donation mortis causa did not revoke the first donation. The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable subject to
few exceptions. Finally, the court said that the disposition in favor of Jose of the
subject properties should be respected.
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system
of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought
under the operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for
unregistered lands provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided,
that all instruments dealing with unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered
under Section 113 of this Decree.
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No
deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land
not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the
parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner
herein prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary
Entry Book and a Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall
contain, among other particulars,
1. the entry number,
2. the names of the parties,
3. the nature of the document,
4. the date, hour and minute it was presented and received.
5. The recording of the deed and other instruments relating to
unregistered lands shall be effected by any of annotation on the
space provided therefor in the Registration Book, after the same
shall have been entered in the Primary Entry Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the
Register of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner
provided herein. In case the Register of Deeds refuses its administration
to record, said official shall advise the party in interest in writing of the
ground or grounds for his refusal, and the latter may appeal the matter to
the Commissioner of Land Registration in accordance with the
provisions of Section 117 of this Decree. It shall be understood that any
recording made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third
party with a better right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse
among other things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file
number and the date as well as the hour and minute when the document
was received for recording as shown in the Primary Entry Book, returning
to the registrant or person in interest the duplicate of the instrument, with
appropriate annotation, certifying that he has recorded the instrument after
reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or city assessor
as required by existing law.
(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and
other instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to
unregistered lands, if made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be
admissible to record under this section.
(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this
section, he shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar
services for the registration of deeds or instruments concerning registered
lands.
REGISTRATION UNDER THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW
TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD NO. 4136 The case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz
would soon be the core of subsequent decisions declaring the infamous Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as a forgery foisted upon the courts and bereft of any
validity and efficacy as evidence of ownership. In this case, petitioners-heirs did
not adduce
evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the
operation of P.D. No. 892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Proof of compliance with P.D.
No. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
REGISTRATION UNDER ACT NO. 3344; ineffective as against 3 rd persons
The inscription under Act No. 3344 of a transaction relating to unregistered land
was held not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the law on
double sale of the same property. The registration should be made in the
property registry to be binding upon third persons; mere registration of a sale in
one’s favour does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
CHAPTER II
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient
execution of the laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive
and accelerated land reform and social justice program of the government, there
is created a commission to be known as the Land Registration Commission
under the executive supervision of the Department of Justice.
Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land
Registration Commission shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known,
respectively, as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land
Registration who shall be appointed by the President.
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The Commissioner shall be
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar
with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and
shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance.
The Deputy Commissioner, who shall
possess the same qualifications as those required of the
Commissioner,
shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos per
annum less than that of the Commissioner.
He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration during the
absence or disability of the Commissioner and
when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall
have been designated or appointed in accordance with law.
The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other functions as
the Commissioner may assign to him.
They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in
the interest of the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the
Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each receive
compensation at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less
than that of the Deputy Commissioner.
All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission including
those of the Registries of Deeds whose salaries are not herein provided, shall
receive salaries corresponding to the minimum of their respective upgraded
ranges as provided under paragraph 3.1 of Budget Circular No. 273, plus sixty
per centum thereof across the board, notwithstanding the maximum salary
allowed for their respective civil service eligibilities.
The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without
prejudice to such benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted
by the President or by the legislature to government employees.
All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
Section 6. General Functions.
(1) The Administrator of Land Registration shall have the following
functions:
a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the
courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by
the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and
other personnel of the Commission;
c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision
of, Registers of Deeds;
d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and
personnel of the Courts of First Instance throughout the Philippines
with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in relation
to the registration of lands;
e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative
to the registration of lands
and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules
and regulations therefor;
f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496
except those covered by P.D. No. 957.
(2) The Land Registration Authority shall have the following functions:
a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the
implementation of the land reform program of the government;
b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings;
c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration
of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and
consolidation plans of titled lands.
SEC. 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. — There shall be at least one Register
of Deeds for each province and one for each city.
Every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos
during the last three years shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds,
and every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than three hundred thousand
pesos
during the last three years, shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds and
o one second Deputy Register of Deeds.
The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction
of each Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, with the end in view of making every registry easily accessible to
the people of the neighboring municipalities. The province or city shall furnish a
suitable space or building for the office of the Register of Deeds until such time
as the same could be furnished out of national funds.
Registry of Property
in accordance with Sec. 51 of PD 1529 which provides that “no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument – except a will-
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is
not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but
it does not affect innocent 3 rd persons.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned.
Between the two buyers of the same immovable property registered
under the Torrens System, the law gives ownership priority to
1) First registrant in good faith
2) First possessor in good faith
3) Buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
Effect of Registration
Constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing, or entering.
SEC. 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other
subordinate personnel; salaries. — Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. Deputy Registers of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the
Registries of Deeds shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration. The salaries of
Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shall be at the following rates:
(1) First Class Registries — The salaries of Registers of Deeds in first
class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per
annum less than that of the Deputy Commissioner.
(2) Second Class Registries — The salaries of Registers of Deeds in
second class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos
per annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in first class
Registries.
(3) Third Class Registries — The salaries of Registers of Deeds in third
class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per
annum less than those of Registers of Deeds in second class
Registries.
(4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and Second Deputy
Registers of Deeds shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per
annum less than those of their corresponding Registers of Deeds and
Deputy Registers of Deeds, respectively.
(5) The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, shall cause the reclassification of Registries
based either on work load or the class of province/ city, whichever will
result in a higher classification, for purposes of salary adjustments in
accordance with the rates hereinabove provided.
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of
Deeds. — No person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been
admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been actually
engaged in such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a like
period in any branch of government the functions of which include the registration
of property.
The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided,
however, That no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office
as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed
from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for cause
and upon compliance with due process as provided for by law.
SEC. 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. — The office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments
affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province
or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary
and science stamps and that
the same are properly cancelled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
o deny registration thereof and
o inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
o stating the ground or reason therefor, and
o advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
Office of the Register of Deeds
Public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city
wherein such office is situated
NATURE OF THE DUTIES OF LRA
General Rule:It’s duty is ministerial – those acts of functions that conform to an
instruction or a prescribed procedure. They act under the orders of the court and
the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record. If the LRA is in doubt as to the issuance and preparation
of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. In this sense,
they act as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is
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the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
The validity of the document is not for the register to determine for it is a function
of a court of competent jurisdiction. Validity is to be decided after the registration
in a litigation. In case of doubt, it shall be referred to the LRA
LRA shall after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the
step to be taken on the doubtful question which shall be conclusive
and binding upon all RoDs
Exception: LRA officials may exercise discretion in the following
instances:
a) When obeying the court’s order would result to double titling;
b) When there are several copies of title but only one is presented with
the instrument to be registered
c) Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of
conveyance bears the signature of only one spouse;
d) Where there is pending case in court where the character of the land
and the validity of conveyance is in issue;
o In this case, the matter of registration may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of
the interested parties could be protected by the filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.
e) Where required certificates and documents are not submitted
May the RoD be compelled by mandamus?
No. Since the registration is a judicial function, it cannot be compelled by
mandamus. The interested party must resort to the available administrative
remedy before he can have recourse to the courts.
SEC. 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc.
— 2)
1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a province
or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion of the
absence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to
discharge his duties, said duties shall be performed by the following
officials, in the order in which they are mentioned below, unless the
Secretary of Justice designates another official to act temporarily in his
place:
a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of
Deeds, by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second
Deputy Register of Deeds, should there be one;
b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second
Deputy Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or
any Assistant Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal.
2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds
without pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice
may, in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional compensation
to the official acting as Register of Deeds, such additional compensation
together with his actual salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the
position thus filled by him.
3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of a
Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for
the new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province or
city shall be the ex-officio Register of Deeds for said new province or city.
SEC. 12. Owner’s Index; reports. — There shall be prepared in every Registry
an index system which shall contain the names of all registered owners
alphabetically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall be prepared
in the name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all lands
registered in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within
ten days after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on collections
and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of
December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his
Registry.
SEC. 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. — There shall be a Chief Geodetic
Engineer in the Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical adviser
of the Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall be responsible to
him for all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in
said office. He shall perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be
assigned to him by the Commissioner.
PD 239
- Only the LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU has authority to approve
original survey plans for registration purposes.
- The grant of authority to the LRC to approve original survey plans has
resulted in wasteful overlapping or duplication of functions. There was
therefore a need to centralize in one agency, the LMB, the function of
verifying and approving original survey plans for all purposes in order
to assure compliance with established standards and minimize
irregularities in the execution of land surveys
Survey Plan
- serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land portion thereof already covered by
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility of which by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
LABURADA V. LRA
FACTS: Spouses Laburada were the applicants for registration of a parcel of
land located in Mandaluyong City, RTC, acting as land registration court, granted
such application. After the finality of the decision, the Sps filed a motion before
the RTC requiring LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration, which
was then granted by RTC. However, the LRA refused to do so. To this, the Sps
Laburada filed an action for mandamus.
LRA contends that such refusal is grounded on the fact that a portion of the
subject property was a subject of a land decree in court of land registration, that if
it will be pursued, it will result to double titling which destroys the policy and
purpose of the Torrens System. The SG sought to have the petition of the Sps
Laburada dismissed after it found out on its investigation that the title issued for
the subject lot cannot be located.
ISSUE: w/n the LRA can be compelled to issue the decree of registration through
an action for mandamus (for ministerial duties)? NO
HELD:
There are three reasons why Mandamus is not the right remedy
1) JUDGMENT IS NOT YET EXECUTORY
- The judgment Sps Laburada seek to enforce is not yet executory and
incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. They do not have
any clear legal right to implement it. It was ruled previously that a
judgment of registration does not become incontrovertible until after
the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of
registration.
A VOID JUDGMENT IS POSSIBLE
- LRA’s refusal to issue a decree is based on documents which, if
verified, may render the judgment of the TC void. To this, LRA’s
hesitation to issue a decree is understandable, even imperative. If it
issues the decree, it will destroy the integrity of the Torrens System.
LRA is mandated to refer to the courts any doubt it may have in
regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration.
They are specifically called upon to “extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. Since in this
case, the subject property has already been decreed by the court for
registration. Hence, LRA is divested of jurisdiction.
3) ISSUANCE OF A DECREE IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
- It is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial
act, which may be compelled thorough mandamus. This is because it
is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. Writ of mandamus
can only be had when the plaintiff’s legal right to the performance of
the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial
doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
ABRIGO V. DE VERA
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to
the first registrant in good faith
then, the first possessor in good faith; and
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.
FACTS:
Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-
Go covered by a tax declaration. ‘Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a
Cave-Go, Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved. The
said free patent was later on cancelled by a TCT.
‘On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the
Spouses Abrigo.
‘On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera
registered the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo
before the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against
Villafania.
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The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the
instant (RTC) case that neither of them can physically take possession of the
property in question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment
case was dismissed.
RTC JUDGMENT
Compromise Agreement approved.
Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy
back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in
favor of Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the
plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand.
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot
in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses
Abrigo as well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners
and private respondent] damages and attorney’s fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
CA JUDGMENT
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid
one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since
Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also
dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis
to award them moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith
and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the
Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.
HELD: DE VERA
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria
Villafania first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from
whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was
executed by Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
“Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property
“Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands
registered under the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of
the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they
registered their respective sales under Act 3344 For her part, respondent
registered the transaction under the Torrens system because, during the sale,
Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the
property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper
registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present
case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners’
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the
Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the
Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed
of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the “priority in time” principle
was not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens
system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the
same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera
under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over
the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
NOTES:
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of
PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument — except a will — purporting to convey or affect registered land shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale
is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does
not affect innocent third persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules of
registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:
“Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is
‘without prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has
been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
“The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein
that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered
under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of
the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and
was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a
complaint for a sum of money filed against the said original owners. Applying
[Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the
execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second
sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the purchaser of
unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale only steps into the shoes of
the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter’s interest in the
property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
“Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of
petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment
debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.
3. Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire
the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of
title is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration.We explained the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:
“Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second
buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property.
Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he governing principle is primus tempore,
potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer
of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the second
buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by
the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing
of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against
the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since
such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price
exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to
displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the
first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the
first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) —- from the time of acquisition until the
title is transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of
possession.’”34 (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value and in
good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted
and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a person dealing with registered land
is not required to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the
property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or
certificate of title.Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as
regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as
against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry
of Deeds at the time of the sale.
CHAPTER III
(ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS)
SECTION 14
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Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro
may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the
applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of
any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating
the trust.
Registration – the entry of instruments or deeds in book or public registry. To
register, means to enter in a register, to record formally or distinctly, to enroll; to
enter in a list.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) The first title issued in the name of a
registered owner by the ROD over a parcel of land registered under the Torrens
System by virtue of
a) Judicial or
b) Administrative proceedings.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Subsequent issuance of ROD pursuant to
any voluntary and involuntary instrument relating to the same land.
Note: Registration proceedings may be in rem or in personam. The following are
its distinctions.
In rem Binds the whole world
In personam To enforce a personal right against a person
Quasi in rem Deals with status, ownership or liability of a particular property. It
only operates on the question between the parties.This is not to ascertain or cut
off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
SECTION 14 (1) – OCENPO
-Registration under the first paragraph of Section 14 requires the concurrence of
the following
REQUISITES:
(1) Land applied for is an agricultural public land classified as alienable and
disposable land at the time;
(2) Application for registration is filed with the proper court;
(3) Applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
OCENPO thereof, under bona fide claim of ownership;
(4) Such possession and occupation has been effected since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
SECTION 14 (2) – PRESCRIPTION
PRESCRIPTION LACHES
an extraordinary mode of acquiring or the unreasonable delay in the bringing
losing of ownership and other real of a cause of action before the courts
rights through the lapse of time in the of justice. It is also referred to as
manner and under the conditions laid ‘sleeping on your rights
down by law.
A matter of time A question of equity
It is statutory not statutory
It is based on law based on equity
based on a fixed time the period varies
on a case-to-case basis
The basis for Sec. 14 (2) is found in Article 1113 of the Civil Code
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
Maam: You have to be specific, because not all lands of ‘public domain’ are
inalienable. Patrimonial properties of the State are still considered public domain.
Patrimonial property – Property owned by the State but which is not devoted to
public use, public service, or the development of national wealth. It is wealth
owned by the State in its private capacity.
For private lands, which are patrimonial properties of the State, to be
acquired via prescription, the following must concur:
1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription, 10 years possession in good faith and
with just title; or
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription, uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith and
just title; and There must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
Facts:
In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed that he purchased
the land from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in OCENPO of the land for more than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanan’s witness, testified before the court that the
property originally belonged to a 22- hectare property owned by Lino Velazco,
her great-grandfather. Lino had 4 sons – Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban. Esteban is Aristedes’ grandfather. The property was divided among the
4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Esteban’s wife, became the administrator of all the
properties of the Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died, their son
Virgilio succeded them in administering the properties, including the subject land,
which is owned by his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was presented
verifying the said land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of Malabanan. Republic
appealed, now represented by the OSG, CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/Ruling:
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER TO BE
REGISTRABLE UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF JUNE 12, 1945.
The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12, 1945 cannot be
registered either under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government form giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D. Such unreasonableness
is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945, Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state. The SC cited the case of Naguit. Such decision
provides that the Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 only requires the property sought to
be registered as already A&D at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the application, it
is presumed that the State is still reserving its right to utilize the property. But in
this case, the property was already classified as A&D, this shows an intention of
the State to abdicate its authority over the land.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT A LAND CLASSIFIED AS A&D BE
DEEMED PRIVATE LAND AND THEREFORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
ACQUISITION BY PRESCRIPTION.
In this case, the petitioners primarily based their registration bid on Sec. 14 (2) of
PD 1529 or prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that “All things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.”
SC said, unlike Sec 14(1), Sec 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. The SC also said that the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code is applicable in Sec 14 (2).Article 1113 of the Civil Code
says that only the patrimonial property of the state can be subject to prescription.
Also it is clear that land which is part of public dominion cannot be alienated even
if it is declared A&D. There must be a declaration of the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial for the period of
prescription to run. Without these, the property remains to be of public dominion.
Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession while
Sec. 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under
Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act, while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
Also, Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act is based on possession,
Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code. The rules on prescription under the Civil Code do not apply to Sec 14 (1)
since there is no such intent manifested by the legislature and that PD 1529 is
neither superior nor inferior than Civil Code, legislature is not bound to adhere on
Civil Code framework.
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AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT MALABANAN IS ENTITLED TO
REGISTER THE PROPERTY BASED ON SECTION 14 (1) OR SECTION 14(2)
OF PD 1529 OR BOTH.
The SC said that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan thas acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since June, 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, as evidenced a tax declaration, is to the year 1848.
Therefore, they cannot register the land under Sec. 14 (1). Neither can
petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared A&D in 1982, there is no competent evidence that
is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of the
national wealth. The classification of the subject property as A&D land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription
RP V. CA AND NAGUIT
Section 14 (1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable “at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. A contrary interpretation renders par. (1) Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as A&D.
SEC. 14 (3) – ACCESSION AND ACCRETION
A. Accession – Refers to the right of an owner of a thing to its products as
well as whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an accessory. The
accessory follows the principal.
Basis in the Civil Code
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially.
Requisites of Accession (applies to lakes, creeks, and streams):
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the river.
B. Accretion and Alluvion
Accretion – defined as the addition of portions of soil, by gradual
deposition through the operation of natural causes, to that already in the
possession of the owner. (Black’s Law)
Alluvion – It refers to the accretion made by flow of rivers. A form of
accession natura , which is provided for in Articles 457 and 461.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed.
Requisites of Accretion or Alluvion:
1) The change must be sudden;
2) The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and not
temporary over flooding of another’s land;
3) The change of the river must be a natural one, not by artificial means;
4) There must be definite abandonment by the government;
5) The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up
or disappear.
Rationale of the law on accretion:
- It is primarily anchored on the principle or right of accession in Art.
457. Also, to compensate the owner for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his lands.
➢ ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP IN ANY MANNTER PROVIDED FOR BY
LAW
o RESERVATION FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC PURPOSE
GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners Grande are the owners of a parcel of land located in the Municipality
of Magsaysay, province of Isabela. They inherited the said land from their mother
who inherited the same from her parents. The land is registered in the name of
the parents of their mother. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration in
1930, the northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, a gradual
accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River. That by 1958, an alluvial deposit of 19, 964 square meters, more
or less, had been added to the registered area.
In 1958, Grandes filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion.
They alleged that they and their predecessor-in-interest were formerly in peaceful
and continuous possession of the said land until the Calalungs entered upon the
said land under claim of ownership in 1948. The Calalungs, on the other hand,
asserts that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of
the land since prior to the year 1933 up to the present.
RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered Calalungs to vacate the premises.
The lower court said that the land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land, the same belongs to Grandes. That the same cannot be acquired
by prescription since it is considered a registered property under Section 46, Act
496, hence, it could not be acquired by prescription. CA overturned RTC’s
decision saying that prescription has already set in favor of the Calalungs.
Issue: WON Calalungs acquired the alluvial property in question through
prescription?
Ruling:
It is undisputed that under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners Grande are the
lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. Any alluvial deposits adjoining one’s land does not become
ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. To obtain
the protection of imprescriptibility, the land must be placed under the operation of
the registration laws where in certain judicial procedures have been provided.
In this case, Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property until the
present action. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and
hence is not entitled to the protection of imprescriptibility, which means it was
subject to acquisition through prescription by 3rd persons. Furthermore, in this
case, the CA found that Calalungs were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934 until 1958. The law on prescription applicable to the case is that
provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code since the New Civil
Code rules on prescription were not yet in force. The SC finally said that
Calalungs acquired
the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription.
Alluvial formation along the seashore forms part of the public domain
- It may only be disposed of if there is a formal declaration by the government
that the same is A and D. Its
disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Land
Management Bureau.
SEC. 14 (4) – IN ANY OTHER MANNER PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
1) Presidential proclamation reserving lands for specific public purpose
The president has the authority to set aside lands from sale/public
acquisition and reserve them to public use, even though this might
defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation
are not subject to entry and may not be the subject of lawful
settlement.
Example:
1) Proclamation 791. It set aside a parcel of land for the University of the
Philippines’ College of Agriculture even though a logger-corporation had
been possessing the land by virtue of a timber license. (International
hardwood vs. University of the Phil.)
2) Proclamation 350 was a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center even
though the occupant possessed a sales patent. (Republic & Mindanao
Medical Center vs. CA)
3) Proclamation 180 set aside a parcel of land upon which a public school was
to be built. The occupant could not prove OCENPO and could not therefore
assert a superior right over the school. (Republic vs. Doldol)
RP BY MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER V. CA
FACTS:
In 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,
applied with Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a land situated in Davao City,
the subject property applied for was a portion of what was known as Davao
Cadastre. Bureau of Lands accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the land.
The Director of Lands annulled the auction sale by reason of non-participation of
Eugenio due to non-service of notice.
Bidding was held where Eugenio was the lone bidder, he equaled the bid
previously submitted by Dr. Ebro which is P100.50 per hectare. An order of
award was then given to Eugenio. Thereafter, A survey was conductedand the
same was approved. In 1936, the DL ordered the amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio saying that a portion of the property is needed by the
Philippine Army for military campsite. The area excluded was identified was Lot
1176 – B – 2, the land in question which consists of 12.8 hectares. In the same
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year, President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing the
subject lot from sale
and settlement and reserving it for military purposes. Then, Eugenio paid for
the installment for the Sales Patent, this payment did not include the military
campsite after it was excluded from the application. Finally, in 1948, the Sales
Patent was awarded to him by DL and by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Subsequently, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked
Proclamation No. 85 which opened the subject property to disposition
under the provisions of the Public Land Act for resettlement of the squatters.
However, the same revocation was superseded by another order reserving
the lot for medical center site. In 1969, Mindanao Medical Center applied for
the registration of the land under Torrens System claiming a “fee simple” title.
Respondents De Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father has
prior vested right on the property.
RTC Davao ruled in favor of MMC. CA overturned RTC’s decision recognizing De
Jesus’ alleged vested right.
ISSUE: WON De Jesus has vested right and is consequently entitled to the
registration of the property in dispute?
RULING:
No. President Magsaysay’s proclamation (No. 350) legally effected a land grant
to MMC of the whole lot and not only a portion thereof. Such land grant
amounts to a “fee simple” title or absolute title in favor of MMC.
Section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president “to
reserve from sale or other disposition to the private domain of the Government of
the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.” The land
reserved “shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such Executive
Order until otherwise provided by law.
Section 83 of the Public Land Act authorizes the President to issue
proclamation to declare lands reserved for public use or when the public interest
requires it.
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege
rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed
to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that
unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain
portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title,
or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents,
the property must be held to be part of the public domain
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenior de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would
anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site
when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936.
B. LAND ACQUISITION BY PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Ownership by Corporations
History
1935 It allowed private juridical entities to acquire alienable lands of
Constitution public domain, which shall only be less than 1, 024 hectares.
1973 Section 11, Article 14 of the said constitution stated that no
Constitution private corporation xxx may hold alienable lands except by
lease not to exceed 1000 hectares in area.
1987 Section 3, Article 12 retained the 1973 Constitution’s limitations,
Constitution but added lease period not exceeding 25 years and
renewable for not more than 25 years.
General Rule: Corporations are disqualified from owning alienable lands of
public domain except through lease.
Exception: Where at the time the Corporation acquired the land, its
predecessors-in-interest have complied with OCENPO as to entitle him
registration in his name. The Constitutional prohibition will no longer apply as the
land, by virtue of prescription has become private. (Suzi vs. Razon)
DOL V. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER
146 SCRA 509
Facts:
In 1981, Acme Plywood and Veneers Co. Inc. applied for a land registration of 5
parcels (481, 390 sqm) of land it allegedly acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
both member of the Dumagat tribe. The Infiels substantiates their ownership
saying that their ancestors have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until it came into their possession. Acme contended in
its application that their adverse and continuous possession since 1962 and by
tacking their possession to that of the possession of the Infiels, they have already
acquired title over it; that the ownership of lands by corporations is governed by
the 1935 Constitution. Acme further proves that the subject land is a private land
after it ownership was given to the non-Christian tribes pursuant to RA
3872. That also, they have introduced more than 45 million pesos worth of
improvements on the land. Also that their ownership is recognized by Municipality
of Isabela through the donation it made which was accepted by the former.
The Director of Lands opposed to nothing of the allegations except the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution. DL contends that the registration was
commenced only in 1981 which was long after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Article 14 Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares. This proscription is not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force the time Acme bought the land in question.
Hence, it cannot be registered under Sec. 48 of CA 141. RTC and CA ruled in
favor of the Director of Lands.
Issue: WON the title Infiels transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of Acme? And WON 1973 Constitution should apply?
Ruling:
The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
transferable title in 1962 when Acme purchased it. Acme also had a perfect right
to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 constitution prohibiting
Corporations from acquiring and owning private lannds. Even if the land
remained technically “public” land despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no question to Acme’s right
to acquire the same since there is no prohibition for corporation to acquire
incomplete or imperfect title. The only limitation was that corporations
could not hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1, 024. 1973
Constitution also cannot defeat a right already vested before the law came
into effect, or invalidate transaction then perfectly valid and proper
What is a Corporation Sole?
It is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. It
consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one
at a time), who are incorporated by law to give them some legal capacity
to administer church properties that come into their possession.
They are not treated as ordinary private corporation. As by the nature of
its incorporation, it is empowered by law to purchase and hold real estate
and personal property.
Vested rights
It is some right or interest in property, which has become fixed and
established and no longer open to doubt or controversy. It cannot be
impaired without violating one’s right to due process.
➢ Judicial confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
AYOG VS. CUSI
146 SCRA 15
FACTS:
In 1953, the Director of Lands granted Binan Development Co., Inc. its Sales
Application of the land located in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares.
There were protesters but then their protest was dismissed by the Director and
ordered them to vacate the subject lot. No appeal was made from the decision.
Despite that, the “squatters” defied the Director of Land’s order to vacate. An
ejectment suit was brought which caused the delay of the issuance of the patent.
The Director of Lands recommended to the Secretary of Natural Resources the
approval of the Sales Patent saying that the Corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, that the
land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the
patent was legal, and the said issuance is an exception to the prohibition of
ownership by private corporation.
The Secretary of Natural Resources noted that the applicant had acquired a
vested right to issuance. Subsequently, the ejectment suit was decided in favor of
the corporation. However, the “squatters” alleged that the adoption of the
1973 Constitution was a supervening fact that will make the issuance of
patent illegal since no private corporation is allowed to hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.
ISSUE: WON BInan Development Corporation may validly acquire the Sales
Patent despite the prohibition embodied in the 1973 Constitution? Yes.
RULING:
The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Corp. because it has already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time of the 1973 Constitution took effect. Such vested right
has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
A vested right is defined as when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some person as a present interest, or, it is some right or interest in
property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt
or controversy. In this case, it is undisputed that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its
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compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the effect of On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the
segregating the said land from public domain. The petitioners contention that necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property should fail, the SC they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for
said, they should have applied for patent applications if it is true. its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the
Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private
ZARA V. DOL oppositors-appellees.
FACTS:
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of 107 (SECTION 48 (b) of CA 141)
hectares parcel of land pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged Period of possession for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect title:
that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, Historical Background
who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de LAW DATE OF RULE
Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of EFFECTIVITY
the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits PLA- 926 Oct. 17, 1903 OCENPO of agricultural lands for 10 years
of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as before the effectivity of this Act
amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in 2 PLA –
nd
Nov. 29, 1919 OCENPO of ‘agricultural lands’ (excluding
continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 2874 timber and mineral lands) of the public
30 years immediately preceding the application. domain, under bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since JULY 26, 1894
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by RPLA – 141 Dec. 1, 1936 Possession and occupation of lands of the
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites: public domain since JULY 26, 1984 only
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting limited to Filipinos
of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land RA 1942 June 22, 1957 Possession and occupation for atleast 30
applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case years immediately preceding the filing of the
No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then application
incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that
PD 1073 January 25, Land must be A&D (not anymore ‘agricultural
the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public
1977 lands’ of the public domain, it must be
land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and
possessed and occupied since June 12,
Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a
1945
period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and
which possession, according to them, was OCENCO that the proceeding being in
The amendment from ‘agricultural lands’ to ‘A & D’ is not a substantial
rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
amendment because only agricultural lands are alienable. The prevailing
to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from
rule for OCENPO is not anymore 30 years. It is now ‘since June 12, 1945
raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil
or earlier’. The amendment was made to ‘jive’ with Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-
G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-judicata" — in other words,
Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr requirement for
the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this
OCENPO) preclude application for registration of alienable lands of public
Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court
domain commenced only after June 12, 1945?
in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
No, considering Section 14(2) still allows acquisition of alienable lands of
public domain through prescription. In civil law, prescription is one of the
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as
wars of acquiring public land. So even if the possession was commenced
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its
later than June 12, 1945, you may still qualify under Section 14(2).
opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been
declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.
Requirements for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
1) The land must form part of the A&D agricultural lands of the public
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss
domain;
by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is
2) Applicant must have been in OCENPO
declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be
3) Under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or since
the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only
June 12, 1945
the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free
patent or by homestead."
RA 8371
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands
Oct. 29, 1997
nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS ACT
CARINO V. INSULAR
ISSUE:
Facts:
whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of
Carino applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Benguet province.
Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public
Carino alleges that:
land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial
a. His predecessors has been in the possession of the land for more than 50
confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
years.
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
b. He was inherited the land under the Igorot customs.
amended.
However, it was not shown that Carino has a document of title to prove
ownership such as royal grant. The dispute arose when the government opposed
HELD:
the registration contending that the land in question belonged to the State.
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
That the Spanish law provides that all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended
(Jura Regalia), and it could not have been acquired by Carino since prescription
by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
does not lie against the crown.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative:
- for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or
Issue: WON Carino’s application should be granted? YES.
- for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on
Ruling:
adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years.
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title. The Supreme
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case
Court of the United States through Justice Holmes had this to say: “It might
the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first
perhaps be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or
alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a
ownership. It will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the
the Spanish Conquest, and never to have been in Public Land.” It was further
judgment declared the land in question to be public land.
ruled that Carino’s kind of title, a native title, is an exception to Jura Regalia.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or
CRUZ V. DENR
foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated
FACTS:
in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of
land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein
certain provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together
is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the
with its implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA
public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty
is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
resources to indigenous people.
to a Government grant.

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On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For
this reason, it prays that the petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa
countered the constitutionality of IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources. Also, that the
law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands”, it might include private lands found
within the said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same.
According to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The
constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Justice Panganiban’s Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371’s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains.
That this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that
only agricultural lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable
and disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the country’s natural
resources and 1/3 of the country’s land will be concentrated to 12 Million
IPs, and while 60 million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These
figures violates the constitutional principle of a “more equitable distribution
of opportunities, income, and wealth” among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot
be Alienated or Ceded
Ancestral Domain- refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
Ancestral Land – refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual
or traditional ownership
Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains, which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs.
Time Immemorial – period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner
IPRA connotes group or communal ownership. Ancestral domains are
private, but community property
Private- since it is not part of the public domain
Community – ancestral domain is owned in common and not by 1
particular person
Ownership over the natural resources STILL belong to the State
- ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them
for future generation. The rights of IPs take the form of management
and stewardship
Modes of Acquisition of Ancestral domains and ancestral lands by the IP
a) Applicant must be a member of indigenous cultural group;
b) He must have been in possession of an individually-owned ancestral
land for not less than 30 years
c) By operation of law (IPRA), the land is already classified as A&D
land, even if it has a slop of 18% hence there is no need to submit a
separate certification that the land is A&D
Transfer of land or property rights
1) Only the members of the ICCs/IPs
2) In accord with customary laws and customs
3) Subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15
years if the land was transferred to a non-member of ICCs/IPs
Mining Operations on Ancestral Land
General Rule: Not allowed
Exception: If the ICCs concerned consent to it
In the event of an agreement of mining operations
1) Parties shall agree upon the Royalty payment
2) The Royalty payment shall form part of trust fund for the socio-
economic well-being of the ICC
Members of the cultural communities are given priority in awarding of SMALL-
SCALE MINING CONTRACTS- Sec. 7, 7076
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
1) Jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs
o Condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdictions:
Exhaustion of all remedies provided under their
customary laws and a certification from the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle
the dispute and that it was not resolved.
2) It has the authority to issue Certificates of Ancestral Lands Title
(CALT) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
3) It has OEJ over petition for cancellation of CADT and CALT
alleged to have been fraudulently acquired to any person
4) Issuance of certification as a precondition to grant of permit for
disposition
5) Power to cite for contempt and issue restraining orders
Ancestral Domains Office
- Responsible for identification, delineation, and recognition of
ancestral lands/domains
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT, AFFIDAVIT
OF NON-TENANCY
SEC. 104. Provisional Register of Documents. — The Department of Agrarian
Reform shall prepare by automate data processing a special registry book to be
known as the “Provisional Register of Documents issued under PD-27”
which shall be kept and maintained in every Registry of Deeds throughout the
country.
Said Registry Book shall be a register of:
a) All Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued pursuant to P.D. No. 27; and
b) All subsequent transactions affecting Certificates of Land Transfer such as
adjustments, transfer, duplication and cancellations of erroneous
Certificates of Land Transfer
SEC. 105. Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents.
— The Department of Agrarian reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27 issue in
duplicate, a Certificate of Land Transfer for every land brought under “Operation
Land Transfer,” the original of which shall be kept by the tenant-farmer and the
duplicate, in the Registry of Deeds.
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant
of title under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously
titled or untitled property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on the aforementioned
Emancipation Patent and shall assign an original certificate of title number in
case of unregistered land, and in case of registered property, shall issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title without requiring the surrender of the
owner’s duplicate of the title to be cancelled.
In case of death of the grantee, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall
determine his heirs or successors-in-interest and shall notify the Register of
Deeds accordingly. In case of subsequent transfer of property covered by an
Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from an Emancipation
Patent, the Register of Deeds shall effect the transfer only upon receipt of the
supporting papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform.
No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged or imposed in connection
with the issuance of an original Emancipation Patent and for the registration of
related documents.
TENANT EMANCIPATION DECREE
(PD 27)
(Oct. 21, 1972)
Applicability/Coverage
▪ This applies to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease
tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not
Retention Limits/Award Ceiling
▪ A farmer shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size
farm of
o 6 hectares if not irrigated
o 3 hectares if irrigated
Landowner Retention Limit
o 7 hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will
now cultivate it
Cost of Land/Compensation
 The land shall be equivalent to 2 ½ times the average harvest of 3
normal crop years
 It shall be paid by the tenant in 15 equal annual amortizations
including interest at the rate of 6% per annum
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residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority
1) Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
Requisite before the title to the land owned be actually issued to the tenant 2) Regular farmworkers;
farmer 3) Seasonal farmworkers;
 Tenant farmer should become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized 4) Other farmworkers;
farmer’s cooperative 5) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands
6) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries
Transferability of title acquired to PD 27 7) Others directly working on the land
 Only through hereditary succession or to the Govt in accordance w/
pertinent laws  children of landowners who are qualified shall be given preference. Actual
land-tillers shall not, however, be ejected or removed therefrom
 A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible
 Support services shall be extended equally to women and men agrarian
reform beneficiaries
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
(RA 6657)
Aug. 7, 2009 Retention Limits of Landowners
Agrarian Reform - redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, o Maximum of 5 hectares
to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial o 3 hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner subject to
arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the following qualifications
the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to 1. Atleast 15 years of age
the physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor 2. He is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow  Retention limits shall not apply to LGUs acquiring private agricultural land
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work by expropriation or other modes of acquisition be used for public purposes

Agricultural land – land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and Disposition or Sale of retained land by land owner
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land.  Valid, as long as the total landholding that shall be owned by the transferee
thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding
Agricultural activity – cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit ceilings
trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in Award ceiling to beneficiaries
conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or o 3 hectares
juridical. o It may be a contiguous tract or several parcels of land cumulate up to
the prescribed award limits
Coverage
 All public and private agricultural lands including lands of public domain Landless Beneficiary – owns less than 3 ha. Of agricultural lands
suitable for agriculture Determination of just compensation
 All lands in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress 1. Cost of acquisition of the land
 All other lands owned by the gov’t devoted to or suitable for agriculture 2. Value of the standing crop
 All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the 3. Current value of like properties
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon 4. Its nature, actual use, and income
o Except landholdings of landowners with a total area of 5 5. Sworn valuation by the owner
hectares below 6. Tax declarations
7. Assessment made by government assessors
Exemptions and Exclusions from CARP coverage 8. 70% zonal valuation by the BIR
1) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, Manner of Payment
watersheds and mangroves;  It shall be paid by the beneficiaries to the LBP in 30 annual amortization of
2) Private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms 6% interest per annum
and fishponds, provided that the same have not been distributed and  Payment for the first 3 years may be at reduced amounts
Certificate of Land Ownership Award issued to agrarian reform  LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded, it may be
beneficiaries under the CARP; foreclosed by the LBP for nonpaymnet of an aggregate of 3 annual
3) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be amortizations
necessary for:  Beneficiary whose land was foreclosed shall be permanently disqualified
a. National defense, school sites and campuses, including from becoming a beneficiary
experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seeding Transferability of awarded lands (CLOA)
research and pilot production center  only through hereditary succession, to the government, or to the LBP, or to
b. Church sites and convents, mosque sites and Islamic other qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a period of 10 years
centers, common burial grounds
c. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by Voluntary Land Transfer
inmates  landowners of agricultural lands may enter into a voluntary arrangement to
d. Government and private research and quarantine centers direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to guidelines
e. All lands with 18% slope and over, except those already set in the law
developed  Payment shall be made by the farmer-beneficiary to the land owner under
Agricultural lands reclassified by LGU’s into residential, terms to be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
commercial or industrial uses excluded  It shall be binding upon them, upon registration with the approval by the
▪ This is based on DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides DAR
that with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered  Approval is deemed given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the
by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration
DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the  In case they don’t agree on the price, the procedure for compulsory
date of its effectivity or on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands acquisition shall apply
already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before  LBP may extend financing to the beneficiaries
that date no longer need any conversion clearance from the
DAR.
When the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
Homesteads agricultural purposes, or that the land will have greater economic value for
▪ While PD No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from residential, commercial or industrial purposes
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of The DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the land-owner, may authorize
the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, it cannot defeat the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition Provided that the
the very purpose of the Public Land Act which has been beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation Irrigated and irrigable lands, shall
enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. not be subject to conversion

Jurisdiction of DAR
a) Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
Qualified Beneficiaries reform
Landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless b) Resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems
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c) Approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or appropriated. The word “initial” simply means that additional amounts may
d) readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, be appropriated later when necessary.
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses
4) Finally, on the contention that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it
Appeals
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
DAR decision
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of
 15 days from the receipt CA by certiorari
payment allowed, the Court held that the law “is not an ordinary
 Notwithstanding appeal to the CA, the decision of the DAR shall be
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is
immediately executory.
sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
Jurisdiction of DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
local purpose,” but deals with “a revolutionary kind of expropriation (which)
a) Determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
affects all private agricultural lands.” “(S)uch a program will involve not
implementation of CARP
mere millions of pesos (but) hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed,
b) Cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of EPs and
far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which
CLOAs which are registered with the ROD.
is already staggering as it is by our present standards.”
For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be a tenancy relationship
Based on the slogan: Land for the Landless
between the parties which has the following elements:
1935 constitution – mandated the policy of social justice to “ensure the well-being
1. Parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee
and economic security of all the people”, especially the less privileged.
2. Subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land
3. Consent between the parties to the relationship
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
4. Purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
- founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
lessee
- who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
6. Harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
- in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
agricultural lessee
thereof.
Note: If the action is brought before the trial court, it must determine first the
To this end, the State shall
existence of tenancy relationship. If there is, then it should dismiss the case. It
- encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
there is no such relationship, then it has jurisdiction over the case. Finding by
- subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress
DAR of such relationship is merely preliminary and does not bind the courts.
may prescribe,
o taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just
An action to enforce rights as a tenant is barred by prescription
compensation.
 If not filed within 3 years
- In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
Special Agrarian Court designated by the RTC shall have the following
landowners.
original and exclusive jurisdiction
o The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
1) All petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners,
land-sharing.”
and
2) Prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657
3844 - Agricultural land reform code (aug. 8, 1963)

PD 27 - compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-

Titles issued pursuant to PD 27 and RA 6657 shall become indefeasible and farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for land owners (Oct. 21, 1972)
imprescriptible after 1 year from their registration in the ROD
EO 228 - full ownership in favor of PD 27 beneficiaries and providing valuation of
still unvalued lands
Jurisdiction of DAR and DARAB
DAR DARAB PP 131- CARP and EO 229 providing mechanisms for its implementation
Prior to registration with the ROD After registration with ROD RA 6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, by P. Aquino (June
Case involving issuance, recall or Issuance, correction or cancellation of 10, 1988)
cancellation of CLOAs and EPs CLOAs or EPs

MODES OF ACQUIRING PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND NATALIA REALTY V. DAR

1) Operation Land Transfer
2) Volutary Offer to Sell
3) Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme
4) Compulsory Acquisition
5) Voluntary Stock Distribution in the case of corporation
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable
agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 are
outside its coverage– Natalia vs. DAR
Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of CARL are outside its coverage
HELD:
Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL.
These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than DAR. Thus, for instance,
the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision for residential use and
developed such prior to the passage of the law excluded the area for CARL
coverage because it ceased to be devoted to agricultural activity.

Lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of  Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988,
agricultural land. It declared as unconstitutional the provision in RA 6657 insofar respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to
as it included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform – Luz Farms vs. include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the
Secretary of DAR coverage of CARL.”

LUZ FARMS V. SECRETARY

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SAR (1989)
1) the requirement of public use has been settled by the Constitution itself. It
noted that “(n)o less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform which
is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their
owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits.” The Court also
declared that the law is a valid exercise by the State of the police power
and the power of eminent domain.
Farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine not covered
in determining the area of land to be excluded, AO No. 9 fixed the following
retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of
animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded
from the operations of the CARL.

2) On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters
have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be
differently treated.

3) And on the alleged payment of public money as just compensation without

the corresponding appropriation, the Court said that there is no rule that
only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law.
The earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although
denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum
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