Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN DOCTRINES
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila [G.R. No. 14355,
October 31, 1919]
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation
Before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question,
they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority
is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the
purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of
these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance
with law.
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating
private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it
may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is
well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent
of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of
constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the
consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all
questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts
have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those
of the representatives of the people.+--
Judicial Inquiry of the Power of Eminent Domain
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a
municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a
question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that
right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of
their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make
inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case,
and not the general authority.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of
eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in
their character. The determination of those questions (the necessity
and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative
department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to
review it (the necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature)
may designate the particular property to be condemned, and its
determination in this respect cannot be reviewed by the courts.
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted
to take property for some public use unless some public necessity
existed therefor. The right to take private property for public use
originates in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such
necessity
Chinese Cemetery is Public in nature
the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis
on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under
governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order
creating the same, used the following language:
The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been
founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal
contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials,
benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the
Government of the Islands its internal administration, government
and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional
practices of those born and educated in China in order that the
sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually
effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be
used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general
acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the
cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course,
the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the
city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate
public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the
lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a
cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.
Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. [G.R. No. L-
18841, January 27, 1969]
the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection
of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT
As the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable
that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to
allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is
not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a
burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of
the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare,
transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a
public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone
systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action
is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's
facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection
were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of
Telecommunications from properly discharging its functions, to the
prejudice of the general public.
"Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with
a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner
can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it
subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest
or privilege conferred for their benefit.
People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958]
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 Invalid
The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by
requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal
are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards;
standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance
of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se
lawful, is invalid.
It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the special permission of the
city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled
power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it others;
to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that
of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for
precisely the same privileges under the same circumstances. The
danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary
discriminations and abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested.
The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently
divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every
structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its
own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the
highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their
land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result,
the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that
it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The
only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and
actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the
burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would
relieve him of that burden.
xxxxx Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the
power of the municipal council to require the issuance of building
permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of
the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no
showing in this case that the municipal council had either established
fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds
of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it
passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was
not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec.
2243 (c) aforequoted
Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi [G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally
as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period,
and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously
affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances
must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This
circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the
lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of
the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI,
page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief
life; operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third
International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when
applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be
construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent.
The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable
from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic,
through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent
nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year
to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of
the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the
premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the
property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred
from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
"intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the
lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed
by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as
in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and
proof of mistake or fraud — the question being not what the intention
was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v.
Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v.
Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention
of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the
intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy
permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease
entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement
renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this
land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it
expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same
time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a
jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic
to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly
mere notice - much less an implied notice — of such intention on the
part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and
could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The
expropriation must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs.
Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered
as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the
Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded
that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is
present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as
owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract
from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the
lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the
beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was
bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly
rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain
on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two
essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2)
that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from
the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present
when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in
1947.
Fair Value and Just Compensation
The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease
agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by
the lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring the property in the same
condition as of the time when the lessee took possession of the
property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase price, for
purchase was never intended by the parties to the lease contract. It is
a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However general the
terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to
comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil
Code).
We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should
not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied
the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the "taking"
of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just
compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs.
Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-
962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on
August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.
Nature of the Land in Question
We find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be
devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become
adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had
actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential subdivisions
even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain. In
the case of City of Manila vs. Corrales (32 Phil. 82, 98) this Court laid
down basic guidelines in determining the value of the property
expropriated for public purposes. This Court said:
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the
same consideration are to be regarded as in a sale of property
between private parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is
the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference
to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the
uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from
its availability for valuable uses?
as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner
is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is
suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the
community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate
future. (Miss. and Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the
right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the
market. 17 The owner may thus show every advantage that his
property possesses, present and prospective, in order that the price
it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. 18
The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division
into village or town lots. 19
The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other
circumstances, the proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to
be expropriated in finding that those lands are residential lots. This
finding of the lower court is supported not only by the unanimous
opinion of the commissioners, as embodied in their report, but also
by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of the province of Pampanga
composed of the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor and the
District Engineer. In the minutes of the meeting of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13-Castellvi) We
read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:
3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its
proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not being
devoted to agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a
subdivision for residential purposes. The taxes due on the property
have been paid based on its classification as residential land;
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation
proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far
as the court is concerned.
29 In our analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find points
that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for
their lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made
ocular inspections of the lands and had considered the nature and
similarities of said lands in relation to the lands in other places in the
province of Pampanga, like San Fernando and Angeles City. We
cannot disregard the observations of the commissioners regarding
the circumstances that make the lands in question suited for
residential purposes — their location near the Basa Air Base, just like
the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the
facilities that obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central
of the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class town of
Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are not in the
territory of San Fernando and Angeles City, but, considering the
facilities of modern communications, the town of Floridablanca may
be considered practically adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles City.
It is not out of place, therefore, to compare the land values in
Floridablanca to the land values in San Fernando and Angeles City,
and form an idea of the value of the lands in Floridablanca with
reference to the land values in those two other communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is
awarded the just compensation for his property. We have carefully
studied the record, and the evidence, in this case, and after
considering the circumstances attending the lands in question We
have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10.00 per square
meter, as recommended by the commissioners and adopted by the
lower court, is quite high. It is Our considered view that the price of
P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in
question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners
thereof.
Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]
No Immunity from suit in the case at bar
If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for
property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then
a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law
at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it
"have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to
appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If
there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would
not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that
precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the
part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at
the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner,
she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land
in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it
could and should have done years ago.
Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119694, May 22,
1995]
Compelling=Taking
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less
than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property
for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended
frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the
period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or
everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during
the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation
or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of
the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates
ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be
appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private personal
property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the
necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the
taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec
for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that
Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and
administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed.
It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government
offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase
print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and
regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be
brought to the attention of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized
by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation"
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be
avoided by respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for
Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to
publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No.
2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print
space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No.
2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain.
No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or
urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that
purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or
other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard
to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or
magazines located in differing parts of the country, to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was made
to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the
taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero [G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987]
the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
limitations imposed by the constitution
1. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9);
2. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).
1. Public use
Socialized Housing
Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres.
Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of
people, bereft of public character."
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units
for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the
construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities"
(Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to
include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the
middle and lower income groups of the society, including the
construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities;
b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum
dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots
to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangemeant and
re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the
construction and provision of basic community facilities and services,
where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage,
water and power system schools, barangay centers, community
centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other
recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the
development of commercial and industrial estates and such other
facilities to enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to
provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people
under Presidential Decree No, 757, (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)
The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial
trend has been summarized as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when
it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the
people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost
decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of
small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphaisis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public
character of housing measures does not change because units in
housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is
not possible to provide housing for are who need it, all at once.
Size of Property
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under
Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a
purely quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional
provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I see no cogent
reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and peace,
should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions,
involving a considerable number of individuals, and eschew small
controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem before
taking remedial action.
The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in
Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which
held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private
lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who
stood to be benefited. Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern
of adherence to the "number of people to be benefited test"
This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs.
Reyes [G.R. No. 49439, June 29,1983, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)] which
upheld Pres. Decree No. 464, as amended by - Presidential Decree
Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259.
In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed
out that:
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL
the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
xxx xxx xxx
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering
several barrios or even an entire total with the exception of the
poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The
value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation
for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as
directional has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are
described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials
and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax
values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made
by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
overwhelming mass of landowners accept unquestioningly what is
found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the
statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. (pp.
12-3)
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996.]
National landmarks
National landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an
event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a
turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the
founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who,
admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture
has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places
invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the
power of eminent domain may be authorized
it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of the
Government charged with the maintenance and care of national
shrines, monuments and landmarks and the development of
historical sites that may be declared as national shrines, monuments
and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution of condemnation
proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by the Office of
the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
Exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain in the Case at Bar
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an
inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on
the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the
exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as
the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the
government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. [9] It is a right
to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public
use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty. [10] The only direct constitutional qualification is that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. [11] This proscription is intended to provide a
safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
Public Use
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency. [16] Black summarizes the
characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis
for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes,
public use is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in
terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public
advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public
use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the
right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a
use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular
individuals. But each and every member of society need not be
equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected
by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is
sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct.
689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public
usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted
locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual.
The use must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be
surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when
it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any
doubt, determines what is public use.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership
of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may
be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others
could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few
would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. [23]
EPZA vs. Dulay [G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987]
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically
would still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared
either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due
process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled
since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the
lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or
independence in determining what is just or fair
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint
commissioners to assess the just compensation of these properties
under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling
that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from
expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time
when possession thereof was actually taken by the province, plus
consequential damages — including attorney's fees — from which the
consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the
legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the
date of actual taking.'
Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the
determination of just compensation on the value declared by the
owner or administrator or as determined by the Assessor, whichever
is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of
due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as
mandated by the Constitution.
Just Compensation
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the
petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu
municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was
not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were
stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value.
The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at
the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the
value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and
at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be
arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering
several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the
poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The
value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation
for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as
"cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described
in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values
can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made
by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is
found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the
statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to
prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And
it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail
over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and
considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases
is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
"just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp. [G.R. No. 127820,
July 20, 1998]
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs,
other public entities and public utilities. [25] An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and
restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. [26] In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates
to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters
for its exercise. It provides as follows:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through
its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted. [27]
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the
power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal
council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that
the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for
a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members. [33]
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain
through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the
language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did
not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code,
Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals [43] and the trial court,
[44] all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in
this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and
cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata,
which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, [45]
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power
of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute
and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use. [46] All
separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the
highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government,
or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and
they have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires it. [47] Thus, the State or its
authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right
by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal
requirement.
Republic vs. Lim, [G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005]
Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying
what was due to the landowners.
The expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late
1940s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the
Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court while
continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the
prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to the rules of fair
play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the
land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years,
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss.
To allow the taking of the landowners properties, and in the
meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of
compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it
will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently
decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowners, is
undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must
never be sanctioned.
Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De
Villaroya,[9] similar to the present case, this Court expressed its
disgust over the governments vexatious delay in the payment of just
compensation, thus:
The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be
paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As
a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever
it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all
required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation.
The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays
before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich
source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of
swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of
middle or lower level bureaucrats.
While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government may take them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the
Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of
expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation.[10]
From the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to
compensate the owner for his loss.[11]
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against
the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the
individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore
be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and
liberally in favor of the property owner.[12]
Ironically, in opposing respondents claim, the Republic is invoking this
Courts Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could
the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its
owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50
years? The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment
of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[13] thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings
does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act,
or the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is
filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal
is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains
in the owner until payment is actually made.
The right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a
public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him.
this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two
stages, to wit:
x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation
is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation,[16] we ruled that, the process is not completed until
payment of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic
to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57
years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots,[26] however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)[27]
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle
that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment.[28] To be sure, the five-year period limitation will
encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This
is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against
their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29] we defined just compensation as
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered just.
Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court
Expropriation
Section 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be
exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall state with
certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or
personal property sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants
all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof
or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate
interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be
expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise
obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect
shall be made in the complaint. (1a)
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to
the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of
a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on
demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be promptly fixed
by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other
proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court
with service of copies to the parties. (2a)
Section 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection
or defense to the action or the taking of his property, he may file and
serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that effect,
specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims
to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter,
he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in
the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his
property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the
summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and
extent of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and
defenses to the taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or
any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the
court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the
answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof.
However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation whether or not
a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present
evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award. (n)
Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property
are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall
not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be
permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)
Section 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the rendition of
the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall
designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be
held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their
report shall be submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to the
appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with the court
within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty
(30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the
objections. (5a)
Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners. — Before entering upon
the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take and
subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties as
commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other
proceedings in the case. Evidence may be introduced by either party
before the commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on
hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties
consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties, to attend,
view and examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either party
may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall
assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and
deduct from such consequential damages the consequential benefits
to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or
the carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking
the property. But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed
exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be
deprived of the actual value of his property so taken. (6a)
Section 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. — The
court may order the commissioners to report when any particular
portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and
may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the
commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions
of the property sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time
so deal with such property. The commissioners shall make a full and
accurate report to the court of all their proceedings, and such
proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted
their report and rendered judgment in accordance with their
recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the
court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date
the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time
may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such
report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all
interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days
within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so
desire. (7a)
Section 8. Action upon commissioners' report. — Upon the expiration
of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or
even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested
parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of
agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith, or, for cause shown, it
may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of
facts, or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners;
or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part and it may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to
the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. (8a)
Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership
of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit
of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto.
But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can
enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if
entry has already been made. (9a)
Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. — Upon
payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the compensation fixed
by the judgment, with legal interest thereon from the taking of the
possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so
fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to
enter upon the property expropriated and to appropriate it for the
public use or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should
he have taken immediate possession thereof under the provisions of
section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves
from the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same
shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall have
the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the
person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Section 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. — The
right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the defendant and
appropriate the same for public use or purpose shall not be delayed
by an appeal from the judgment. But if the appellate court determines
that plaintiff has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be
rendered ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the
restoration to the defendant of the possession of the property, and
to determine the damages which the defendant sustained and may
recover by reason of the possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners
shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs,
except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by
the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property
and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal
shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Section 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. — The judgment
entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest therein
expropriated, and the nature of the public use or purpose for which it
is expropriated. When real estate is expropriated, a certified copy of
such judgment shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place
in which the property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the
plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such public use or
purpose. (13a)
Section 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. — The guardian
or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially declared to be
incompetent may, with the approval of the court first had, do and
perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing respecting the
expropriation for public use or purpose of property belonging to such
minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent, which such
minor or person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in
such proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)
POWER OF TAXATION DOCTRINES
Sison vs. Ancheta, [G.R. No. L-59431, July 25, 1984]
Power to Tax
Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called
upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or
group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times." 11 Hence the need for more revenues. The
power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure
the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of
public funds. To praphrase a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood
of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of the
essence. 12
Limitations
The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an
attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of
government." 13 It is, of course, to be admitted that for all its
plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions.
The Constitution sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does
properly rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses
may properly be invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in
appropriate cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there
would -be truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy."
. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a
taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount
to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power.
It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary
act amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. That
properly calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also
been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a
retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack
on due process grounds. 19
equal protection.
The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of
this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise
of the police power or the power of eminent domain is to
demonstrated that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For
the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances which if not Identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 20
That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures remedies.
The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." 21 Hence
the constant reiteration of the view that classification if rational in
character is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz V.
Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to
hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free
to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'"
7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity.
According to the Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be uniform
and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel
in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in 1940, when the tax
"operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject may be found. " 26 He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity
does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this
is hardly attainable." 27 The problem of classification did not present
itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when the
Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that
all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28
As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained
of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity”
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories
There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the
applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories. To repeat, it. is enough that the classification must rest
upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case
of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135,
the, discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the
income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible
items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax
rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of
compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically
no overhead expense, these taxpayers are e not entitled to make
deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same
situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals
in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity
in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would
not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero
deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates
on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the
Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income
taxation as regards professional and business income.
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December
29, 1960]
legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose
a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential
character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage
of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid
by the use public money
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised
for public purposes only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis
supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum
states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for public purpose. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and
the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of
public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public
interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the
time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts
performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective
operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder
roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said
roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on,
became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill
was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum
became effective, or on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act).
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that
said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and
void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after
the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the
petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or
legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of
said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality
of said appropriation.
that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation
the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public
moneys
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers,
on the other hand, and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other,
is not identical to that obtaining between the people and taxpayers
of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic
viewpoint, to that existing between the people and taxpayers of each
state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the
Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more
fully direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple
and unitary type of our national government is not subject to
limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution
upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the Union. For this reason, the rule
recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds — which has been
upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101
U.S. 601) — has greater application in the Philippines than that
adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L-4817, May 26,
1954]
We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in
addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter
is peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the
courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat
of the National Government and with a population and volume of
trade many times that of any other Philippine city or municipality,
Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the
professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be
made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the
provinces.
Double Taxation
The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one
tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1
Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that
there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license
fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling
or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof
Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-19201, June
16, 1965]
Tax Exemptions
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof
are highly disfavored by law, and the party claiming exemption must
justify his claim by a clear, positive, or express grant of such privilege
by law
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in Section 22(3),
Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes
exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be
construed fairly though strictly and in such manner as to give effect
to the main intent of the lawmakers.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the
assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or
properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift primary purpose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to
tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition
of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the
learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as
employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to
mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear,
positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of
petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]

Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds

application in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of
the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes ...

Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No.

470 as amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the
Assessment Law, provides:

The following are exempted from real property tax under the
Assessment Law:

(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all

lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific or educational purposes.

Taxation and Incidental Use

Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for

charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use
to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and
recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents'

The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City
Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).

It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more

liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively
used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI, Section
22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable
emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of