THE INSTABILITY OF THE

ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES
OF FEMINIST THEORY

SANDRA HARDING

Feministtheorybeganbytrying toextendand reinterpret thecategoriesof

discoursesso thatwomen'sactivitiesand socialrelations
varioustheoretical
could become analyticallyvisible withinthe traditionsof intellectual
discourse.'Ifwomen'snaturesand activitiesare as fullysocialas are men's,
thenour theoreticaldiscoursesshouldrevealwomen'slives withjust as
muchclarityand detail as we presumethe traditional approachesreveal
men's lives. We had thoughtthat we could make the categoriesand
conceptsof the traditionalapproachesobjectiveor Archimedeanwhere
theywere not already.
As we all have come to understand,these attemptsrevealed that
neitherwomen's activitiesnor gender relations(both inter-and intra-

1 My thinkingabouttheseissueshas been greatlyimprovedbythecommentsofMargaret

Andersenand theanonymousreviewersforSigns:JournalofWomenin Cultureand Society,
as well as by discussionsover the lastseveralyearswithmanyofthefeminist sciencecritics
citedin thispaper. I am gratefulforsupportforthisresearchand thelargerprojectofwhichit
is a partprovidedby theNationalScience Foundation,a Mina ShaughnessyFellowshipfrom
theFund fortheImprovement ofPost-Secondary Education,UniversityofDelaware Faculty
ResearchGrants,and a Mellon Fellowshipat theWellesleyCenterforResearchon Women.
For the largerproject,see The ScienceQuestionin Feminism(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniver-
sityPress, 1986).

[Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Societyvol. 11, no. 4]

? 1986 by The UniversityofChicago. All rightsreserved.0097-9740/86/1104-0009$01.00

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

gender relations)can be added to these theoreticaldiscourseswithout

distorting thediscoursesand oursubjectmatters.The problemhereis not
a simpleone, because liberalpoliticaltheoryand itsempiricistepistemol-
ogy, Marxism,criticaltheory,psychoanalysis, structural-
functionalism,
ism, deconstructionism, hermeneutics,and the othertheoreticalframe-
workswe have exploredbothdo and do notapplytowomenand to gender
relations.On the one hand,we have been able to use aspectsor compo-
nentsof each of these discoursesto illuminateour subjectmatters.We
have stretchedtheintendeddomainsofthesetheories,reinterpreted their
centralclaims,or borrowedtheirconceptsand categoriesto makevisible
women's lives and feministviews of gender relations.Afterour labors,
thesetheoriesoftendo notmuchresemblewhattheirnonfeminist creators
and usershad in mind,to putthepointmildly.(Thinkofthemanycreative
uses to whichfeminists have put Marxistor psychoanalyticconceptsand
categories;of how subversivethese revisedtheoriesare of fundamental
tendenciesin Marxismand Freudianism.)On theotherhand,ithas never
been women'sexperiencesthathaveprovidedthegrounding foranyofthe
theoriesfromwhichwe borrow.It is notwomen'sexperiencesthathave
generated the problems these theories attemptto resolve, nor have
women'sexperiencesservedas thetestoftheadequacyofthesetheories.
When we begininquirieswithwomen'sexperiencesinsteadofmen's,we
quicklyencounterphenomena(such as emotionallabor or the positive
aspectsof "relational" personalitystructures)thatwere made invisibleby
the conceptsand categoriesof these theories.The recognitionof such
phenomenaunderminesthelegitimacy ofthecentralanalyticalstructures
ofthese theories,leadingus to wonderifwe are notcontinuingto distort
women'sand men's lives by our extensionsand reinterpretations. More-
over, the very fact that we borrowfromthese theoriesoftenhas the
unfortunate consequence ofdivertingour energiesintoendless disputes
withthe nonfeminist defendersofthesetheories:we end up speakingnot
to otherwomenbut to patriarchs.
Furthermore, once we understandthe destructively mythicalcharac-
teroftheessentialand universal"man"whichwas thesubjectand paradig-
matic object of nonfeminist theories,so too do we begin to doubt the
usefulnessofanalysisthathas essential,universalwomanas itssubjector
object-as its thinkeror the object of its thought.We have come to
understandthatwhateverwe havefoundusefulfromtheperspectiveofthe
social experienceof Western,bourgeois,heterosexual,whitewomen is
especiallysuspectwhenwe beginouranalyseswiththesocialexperiences
ofanyotherwomen.The patriarchal theorieswe trytoextendand reinter-
pretwere createdto explain notmen's experiencebutonlytheexperience
of those men who are Western, bourgeois,white, and heterosexual.
Feminist also
theorists come primarilyfromthesecategories-notthrough
but the
conspiracy through historically commonpatternthatitis people in

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

these categorieswho have had the time and resourcesto theorize,and

who-among women-can be heard at all. In tryingto develop theories
thatprovidetheone, true(feminist) storyofhumanexperience,feminism
risksreplicating in theoryand publicpolicythetendencyinthepatriarchal
theoriesto police thoughtby assumingthatonlythe problemsof some
women are human problemsand that solutionsforthem are the only
reasonableones. Feminismhas playedan important role in showingthat
thereare not now and never have been any generic"men" at all-only
genderedmenand women.Once essentialand universalmandissolves,so
does hishiddencompanion,woman.We have,instead,myriadsofwomen
livingin elaboratehistoricalcomplexesofclass, race, and culture.
I wantto talkhere about some challengesfortheorizingitselfat this
momentin history, and, inparticular,
forfeministtheorizings. Each has to
do withhow to use our theoriesactivelyto transform ourselvesand our
social relations,while we and our theories-the agents and visionsof
reconstruction-arethemselvesunder transformation. Consider,forin-
stance,thewayin whichwe focuson someparticularinadequatesexistor
earlierfeministanalysisand showitsshortcomings-often withbrilliance
and eloquence. In doingso, we speakfromtheassumptions ofsomeother
discoursefeminismhas adopted or invented.These assumptionsalways
include the belief thatwe can, in principle,constructor arriveat the
perspectivefromwhichnatureand sociallifecan be seen as theyreallyare.
Afterall, we argue that sexist(or earlierfeminist)analysesare wrong,
inadequate,or distorting-notthattheyare equal in scientific or rational
groundingto our criticisms.
However, we sometimesclaim that theorizingitselfis suspiciously
patriarchal,foritassumesseparationsbetweentheknowerand theknown,
subjectand object, and the possibilityof some powerfultranscendental,
Archimedeanstandpoint fromwhichnatureand sociallifefallintowhatwe
thinkis theirproperperspective.We fearreplicating-tothedetriment of
womenwhose experienceshave notyetbeen fullyvoicedwithinfeminist
theory-whatwe perceiveas a patriarchal associationbetweenknowledge
and power.2Our abilityto detectandrocentrism in traditionalanalyseshas
escalatedfromfinding itin thecontentofknowledgeclaimstolocatingitin
the formsand goals of traditionalknowledgeseeking.The voice making
thisproposalis itselfsuper-Archimedean, speakingfromsome "higher"
plane,suchthatArchimedes'followers incontemporary intellectuallifeare
2
See, e.g., MariaC. Lugonesand ElizabethV. Spelman,"Have We Gota TheoryforYou!
FeministTheory,CulturalImperialismand theDemand for'theWomen'sVoice,'" Hypatia:
A Journalof FeministPhilosophy(specialissue ofWomen'sStudiesInternationalForum)6,
no. 6 (1983):573-82; manyoftheselectionsinNew FrenchFeminisms, ed. Elaine Marksand
Isabelle de Courtivron(New York:SchockenBooks, 1981); JaneFlax, "Gender as a Social
Problem: In and For FeministTheory"AmericanStudieslAmerika Studien(June 1986);
Donna Haraway,"A ManifestoforCyborgs:Science,Technology,and SocialistFeminismin
the 1980's," SocialistReview80 (1983): 65-107.

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

heardas simplypartoftheinevitablefluxand imperfectly understoodflow

of humanhistory.(And thisis true even when the voice marksits own
historicalparticularity,itsfemininity.) Whenitis unreflective, thiskindof
postmodernism-a kind of absolute relativism-itselftakes a definitive
stand fromyet furtheroutside the politicaland intellectualneeds that
guide our day-to-day thinking and socialpractices.In reactionwe wonder
howwe can notwantto saythewaythingsreallyare to "ourrulers"as well
as to ourselves, in order to voice oppositionto the silences and lies
emanatingfromthe patriarchaldiscoursesand our own partiallybrain-
washedconsciousnesses.On theotherhand,thereis goodreasonto agree
with a feministpostmodernistsuspicion of the relationshipbetween
accepted definitions of "reality"and sociallylegitimatedpower.
How then are we to constructadequate feministtheory,or even
theories-whetherpostmodernornot?Whereare we to findtheanalytical
conceptsand categoriesthatare freeofthepatriarchal flaws?Whatare the
analyticalcategoriesforthe absent,the invisible,the silencedthatdo not
simplyreplicatein mirror-image fashionthe distortingand mystifying
categoriesand projectsofthe dominantdiscourses?Again,thereare two
ways to look at this situation.On the one hand, we can use the liberal
powers of reason and the will, shaped by the insightsgained through
engagingin continuing politicalstruggles, topiece whatwe see beforeour
eyes in contemporary social life and historyinto a clear and coherent
conceptualform,borrowing fromone androcentric discoursehere,another
one there,patchingin betweenin innovativeand oftenilluminating ways,
and revisingour theoreticalframeworks week by week as we continueto
detectyetfurtherandrocentrisms in the conceptsand categorieswe are
using. We can then worry about the oftheanalyticalcategories
instability
and thelackofa persisting framework fromwhichwe continuetobuildour
accounts. (Afterall, there should be some progresstowarda "normal"
discourse in our explanationsif we are to create a coherentguide to
understandingand action.) On the other hand, we can learn how to
embracetheinstability oftheanalyticalcategories;to findin theinstability
itselfthe desired theoreticalreflectionof certainaspects of the political
realityinwhichwe liveand think;to use theseinstabilities as a resourcefor
our thinking and practices.No "normalscience"forus!3I recommendwe
take the second course,an uncomfortable goal, forthe followingreason.
The sociallifethatis ourobjectofstudyand withinwhichouranalytical
categoriesare formedand testedis in exuberanttransformation.4 Reason,

3 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structureof ScientificRevolutions(Chicago: Universityof

Chicago Press, 1970). "Normalscience"was Kuhn'stermfora "maturescience,"one where
conceptualand methodologicalassumptionsare sharedby the inquirersin a field.
4 Perhapsithas alwaysbeen. But theemergenceof"statepatriarchy" fromthe"husband
patriarchy"of the firsthalfof the century,the risingof people of color fromcolonized

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

will power,reconsidering the material-even politicalstruggle-willnot

slow these changesin waysover whichour feminisms shouldrejoice. It
wouldbe a delusionforfeminism to arriveat a mastertheory,at a "normal
science" paradigmwithconceptualand methodological assumptionsthat
we presumeall feminists accept. Feministanalyticalcategoriesshouldbe
unstable-consistentand coherenttheoriesin an unstableand incoherent
worldare obstaclesto bothour understanding and our social practices.
We need to learn how to see our theorizingprojectsas illuminating
"riffing"betweenand overthebeatsofpatriarchal theories,ratherthanas
rewriting thetunesofanyparticular one (Marxism,psychoanalysis, empir-
icism,hermeneutics, deconstructionism, tonamea few)so thatitperfectly
expresseswhatwe thinkat themoment we wanttosay.The problemis that
we do not knowand should not knowjust whatwe wantto say about a
numberofconceptualchoiceswithwhichwe are presented-exceptthat
the choices themselvescreate no-windilemmasforour feminisms.
In the fieldin which I have been working-feminist challengesto
science and epistemology-thissituationmakesthe presentmomentan
excitingone in whichto live and think,but a difficult one in whichto
conceptualize a definitiveoverview. That is, thearguments betweenthose
ofus who are criticizingscienceand epistemology are unresolvablewithin
the frameworks in whichwe have been posingthem.We need to begin
seeing these disputesnotas a processofnamingissuesto be resolvedbut
insteadas opportunities to come up withbetterproblemsthanthosewith
whichwe started.The destabilization ofthoughtoftenhasadvancedunder-
standing more than
effectively restabilizations, and thefeminist criticisms
of science pointto a particularlyfruitfularena in whichthe categoriesof
Westernthoughtneed destabilization.Thoughthesecriticisms began by
raisingwhat appeared to be politicallycontentiousbut theoretically in-
nocuousquestionsaboutdiscrimination againstwomenin thesocialstruc-
tureofscience,misusesoftechnology, and androcentric bias in the social
sciencesand biology,theyhave quicklyescalatedintoones thatquestion
the most fundamentalassumptionsof modern,Westernthought.They
therefore implicitlychallengethe theoreticalconstructs withinwhichthe
originalquestions were formulated and mightbe answered.
Feminismsare totalizingtheories.Because womenand genderrela-
tions are everywhere,the subject mattersof feministtheoriesare not
containablewithinany singledisciplinary framework or any set ofthem.
"The scientificworldview"has also takenitselfto be a totalizingtheory-
anythingand everything worthunderstanding can be explainedor inter-

subjugations,and theongoingshiftsin international

capitalismall insurethatthismoment,at
anyrate,is one ofexuberanttransformation.See AnnFerguson,"Patriarchy, SexualIdentity,
and the Sexual Revolution,"Signs:JournalofWomenin Cultureand Society7, no. 1 (1981):
158-99, fordiscussionof the shiftsin formsofpatriarchy.

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

preted withinthe assumptionsof modernscience. Of course there is

anotherworld-the worldof emotions,feelings,politicalvalues, of the
individualand collectiveunconscious,ofsocialand historicalparticularity
exploredin novels,drama,poetry,music,and art,and the worldwithin
whichwe all live mostofour wakingand dreaminghoursunderconstant
threatofitsincreasingreorganization by scientific One ofthe
rationality.5
projectsof feminist theoristsis to reveal the relationships betweenthese
twoworlds-how each shapesand informs the other.In examining feminist
ofscience,then,we mustconsiderall thatsciencedoes not,the
criticisms
reasonsforthese exclusions,how these shape science preciselythrough
theirabsences-both acknowledgedand unacknowledged.
Insteadoffidelity to theassumptionthatcoherenttheoryis a desirable
end in itselfand the only reliable guide to action,we can take as our
standardfidelity to parametersofdissonancewithinand betweenassump-
tionsofpatriarchaldiscourses.This approachto theorizingcaptureswhat
some take to be a distinctively women'semphasison contextualthinking
and decision makingand on the processesnecessaryforgainingunder-
standingin a worldnotofour own making-thatis, a worldthatdoes not
encourageus to fantasizeabouthowwe could orderrealityintotheforms
we desire.6It locates the waysin whicha valuably"alienatedconscious-
ness," "bifurcatedconsciousness,""oppositionalconsciousness"might
functionat the level of active theorymaking-as well as at the level of
skepticismand rebellion.We need to be able to cherishcertainkindsof
intellectual,political,and psychicdiscomforts, to see as inappropriate
and
even self-defeating certainskindsof clear solutionsto the problemswe
have been posing.

"Bad science" or "science as usual"?

Are sexistassumptionsin substantivescientific researchthe resultof"bad

science"or simply"scienceas usual"?The firstalternative offers hopes of
reforming the kindof science we have; the second appears to deny this
possibility.
It is clearthatfeminist ofthenaturaland socialscienceshave
criticisms
5 MilanKundera,in thearticle"The Noveland Europe" (NewYorkReviewofBooks,vol.
31, no. 12 [July19, 1984]),asksifitis an accidentthatthenoveland thehegemonyofscientific
rationality arose simultaneously.
6 This
emphasisis expressedin different ways by Sara Ruddick,"MaternalThinking,"
FeministStudies 6, no. 2 (Summer 1980): 342-67; Carol Gilligan,In a DifferentVoice:
PsychologicalTheoryand Women'sDevelopment(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1982); DorothySmith,"Women's Perspectiveas a Radical Critique of Sociology,"
SociologicalInquiry44, no. 1 (1974):7-13; and"A SociologyforWomen,"inThePrismofSex:
Essaysin theSociologyofKnowledge,ed. J.Shermanand E. T. Beck(Madison:University of
WisconsinPress, 1979).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

identifiedand describedsciencebadlypracticed-thatis,sciencedistorted
bymasculinebias inproblematics, theories,concepts,methodsofinquiry,
observations,and interpretations ofresultsofresearch.7 Thereare factsof
the matter,these criticsclaim, but androcentricscience cannotlocate
them.By identifying and eliminating masculinebias throughmorerigor-
ous adherenceto scientific methods,we can getan objective,de-gendered
(and in thatsense, value-free)pictureofnatureand social life.Feminist
inquiryrepresentsnota substitution ofone genderloyaltyfortheother-
one subjectivismforanother-but the transcendenceof gender which
therebyincreasesobjectivity.
In thisargument,we use empiricistepistemology because itsends are
thesameas ours:objective,value-neutral resultsofresearch.Thisfeminist
empiricismarguesthatsexismand androcentrism are socialbiases. Move-
mentsforsocialliberation"makeitpossibleforpeople to see theworldin
an enlargedperspectivebecause theyremovethecoversand blindersthat
obscureknowledgeand observation."8 Thus thewomen'smovementcre-
ates the opportunity forsuch an enlargedperspective-just as did the
bourgeoisrevolutionofthe fifteenth to seventeenthcenturies,the prole-
tarianrevolutionof the nineteenthcentury,and the revolutionsover-
throwing Europeanand U.S. colonialismin recentdecades. Furthermore,
thewomen'smovementcreatesmorewomenscientists and morefeminist
scientists(men as well as women),who are morelikelythannonfeminist
men to noticeandrocentric bias.
Feministempiricismoffers a powerfulexplanation-thougha mislead-
ing one-for the greaterempiricaladequacy of so much of feministre-
search. It has the virtueof answeringthe question of how a political
movementsuchas feminism could be contributing to thegrowthofobjec-
tivescientific In this
knowledge. making argument, however,we avertour
eyesfromthefactthatthisappeal toempiricism infactsubvertsempiricism
in threeways. (1) For empiricism,the social identityof the observeris
supposed to be irrelevantto the qualityof researchresults.Feminist
empiricismarguesthatwomen(orfeminists, menand women)as a group
are morelikelyto produceunbiased,objectiveresultsofinquirythanare
men (or nonfeminists) as a group. (2) We claim that a key originof
7 See, e.g., the Signs review
essays in the social sciences,and the papers in Brighton
Women and Science Group, Alice throughthe Microscope(London: ViragoPress, 1980);
RuthHubbard,M. S. Henifin,and BarbaraFried,eds., BiologicalWoman:The Convenient
Myth(Cambridge,Mass.: SchenkmanPublishingCo., 1982); MarianLowe and RuthHub-
bard, eds., Woman'sNature: Rationalizationsof Inequality(New York:PergamonPress,
1983); Ethel Tobach and BettyRosoff,eds., Genes and GenderI, II, III, IV (New York:
GordianPress,1978, 1979, 1981, 1984)(Hubbardand Lowe are theguesteditorsforvol. 2 in
the series, subtitledPitfallsin Research on Sex and Gender); Ruth Bleier, Science and
Gender:A CritiqueofBiologyand Its TheoriesonWomen(NewYork:PergamonPress,1984).
8 MarciaMillmanand RosabethMoss Kanter,"Editorial
inAnotherVoice:
Introduction,"
FeministPerspectiveson Social Lifeand Social Science(New York:AnchorBooks,1975),vii.

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

androcentric bias lies in the selectionofproblemsforinquiryand in the

definitionof what is problematicabout them. Empiricisminsiststhatits
methodological norms are meanttoapplyonlytothecontextofjustification
and notto the contextofdiscoverywhereproblematicsare identifiedand
defined.Hence we have shownthe inadequacy,the impotence,ofscien-
tificmethodsto achievetheirgoals. (3) We oftenpointoutthatitis exactly
followingthe logical and sociologicalnormsof inquirywhichresultsin
androcentric resultsofresearch-appealingto thealreadyexisting(West-
ern, bourgeois,homophobic,white,sexist)scientific community forcon-
firmationof the results of research; generalizingto all humans from
observationsonlyof males. Our empiricistcriticismsof"bad science" in
factsubvertthe veryunderstandings of science theyare meantto rein-
force.
These problemssuggestthatthemostfundamental categoriesofscien-
tificthoughtare malebiased.Manyofthecriticsof"bad science"also make
thissecondcriticism thoughitundercutstheassumptions ofthefirst.9
Here
theypointto historians'descriptionsof how sexual politicshave shaped
science, and science, in turn,has played a significant role in advancing
sexual politics.Each has provideda moraland politicalresourceforthe
other.'?Furthermore,theyshow that"pure science"-inquiry immune
fromthetechnological and socialneeds ofthelargerculture-existsonlyin
theunreflective mentallifeofsomeindividualscientists and in therhetoric
ofscienceapologists.Thatis, one does nothave to impugnthemotivesof
individualphysicists, chemists,or sociologistsin orderto makea convinc-

9 This tensionbetweenthe twokindsofcriticisms is pointedout by Helen Longinoand

RuthDoell, "Body,Bias and Behavior:A ComparativeAnalysisofReasoninginTwo Areasof
BiologicalScience," Signs9, no. 2 (1983):206-27; and by Donna Haraway,"In theBeginning
Was theWord:The GenesisofBiologicalTheory,"Signs6, no. 3 (1981):469-81. Longinoand
Doell think"feminists do nothave to choosebetweencorrecting bad scienceor rejectingthe
entire scientificenterprise"(208) and that "only by developinga more comprehensive
understanding oftheoperationofmale bias in science,as distinctfromitsexistence,can we
movebeyondthesetwoperspectivesin our searchforremedies"(207). Longinoand Doell's
analysisis helpfulindeed in creatingthisunderstanding, but sincetheydo notcome to grips
withthe criticismsof "science as usual," my remedypartsfromtheirs.Harawaydoes not
propose a solutionto the dilemma.
10See, e.g., Elizabeth Fee, "NineteenthCenturyCraniology:The Studyofthe Female
Skull,"BulletinoftheHistoryofMedicine53, no. 3 (1979):415-33; SusanGriffin, Womanand
Nature:The RoaringinsideHer (NewYork:Harper& Row,1978);Diana LongHall, "Biology,
Sex Hormonesand Sexismin the 1920's,"PhilosophicalForum5 (1973-74): 81-96; Donna
Haraway,"AnimalSociologyand a NaturalEconomyoftheBodyPolitic,Parts1, 2," Signs4,
no. 1 (1978): 21-60; RuthHubbard,"Have Only Men Evolved?" in Hubbard,Henifin,and
Fried, eds. (n. 7 above); L. J.Jordanova,"NaturalFacts:A HistoricalPerspectiveon Science
and Sexuality,"in Nature,Cultureand Gender,ed. Carol MacCormackand MarilynStrath-
ern(New York:CambridgeUniversity Press,1980);CarolynMerchant,The Death ofNature:
Women,Ecologyand theScientific Revolution(New York:Harper& Row, 1980);EvelynFox
Keller,Reflections on Genderand Science(New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press,1985).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

ingcase thatthe scientific and symbolically

enterpriseis structurally part
and parcel of the value systemsof those culturesthatmaintainit. This
argumentposes difficulties forus, nonetheless,sinceiftheveryconceptsof
nature,ofdispassionate,value-free, objectiveinquiry,and oftranscenden-
tal knowledgeare androcentric, white,bourgeois,and Western,thenno
amountof more rigorousadherenceto scientificmethodwill eliminate
suchbias, forthe methodsthemselvesreproducetheperspectivesgener-
ated by these hierarchiesand thusdistortour understandings.
Whilethesenew understandings ofthehistory ofscienceand sexuality
expand our understandingimmensely,they do not tell us whethera
science apparentlyso inextricably intertwined withthe historyof sexual
politics can be pried loose to serve more inclusive human ends-or
whetherit is strategically worthwhileto tryto do so. Is historydestiny?
Would the completeeliminationofandrocentrisms fromscienceleave no
scienceat all? But isn'tit important to tryto degenderscienceas muchas
we can ina worldwherescientific claimsare themodelofknowledge?How
can we affordto choose between redeemingscience or dismissingit
altogetherwhen neitherchoice is in our best interest?

Successor science or postmodernism

The dilemmathatarises in criticismsof"bad science"and of"science as

usual" reappearsat a metalevelin feministtheory'sconflictingtendencies
towardpostmodernism and whatI shallcall thefeminist
successorscience
projects.Feministempiricismexplains(albeitsubversively) the achieve-
mentsof feministinquiry-of thatpurportedcontradiction in terms:a
inquiry-byappeal to thefamiliar
politicizedscientific empiricistassump-
tions. In contrast,the feministstandpointepistemologiesarticulatean
understanding ofscientific
knowledgeseekingthatreplaces,as successor
to, the Enlightenment visioncapturedby empiricism."Both the stand-
pointand postmoderntendencieswithinfeminist theoryplace feminism in
an uneasyand ambivalentrelationship to patriarchal
discoursesand proj-

"l Importantformulationsoftheepistemologyfora feminist"successorscience"havebeen

providedbyJaneFlax, "PoliticalPhilosophyand the PatriarchalUnconscious:A Psychoana-
lyticPerspectiveon Epistemologyand Metaphysics,"in DiscoveringReality:FeministPer-
spectiveson Epistemology,Metaphysics,Methodology and PhilosophyofScience,ed. Sandra
Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka(Dordrecht:D. Reidel PublishingCo., 1983); Nancy
Hartsock,"The FeministStandpoint:Developing the Groundfora SpecificallyFeminist
HistoricalMaterialism,"in Hardingand Hintikka,eds., and chap. 10 of Money,Sex and
Power(Boston:Northeastern UniversityPress,1983);HilaryRose, "Hand, Brainand Heart:
A FeministEpistemologyforthe NaturalSciences," Signs9, no. 1 (1983): 73-90, and "Is a
FeministScience Possible?" (paper presentedat MIT, Cambridge,Massachusetts,1984);
D. Smith,"Women's Perspectiveas a RadicalCritiqueofSociology,"and "A Sociologyfor
Women" (bothin n. 6 above).

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 Harding I FEMINISTTHEORY

ects (just as did feministempiricism).There are good reasonsto thinkof

both as imperfectand convergingtendenciestowarda postmodernist
reality,but thereare also good reasonsto nourishthe tendenciesin each
whichconflict.
The feministstandpointepistemologiesuse for feministends the
Marxistvision in which science can reflect"the way the worldis" and
contribute tohumanemancipation.Feministresearchclaimsinthenatural
and social sciences do appear to be truerto the world,and thus more
objectivethanthesexistclaimstheyreplace.Theyprovidean understand-
ing ofnatureand sociallifethattranscendsgenderloyaltiesand does not
substituteone gender-loyalunderstandingfor another. Furthermore,
thesefeminist appeals to truthand objectivitytrustthatreasonwillplaya
role in the eventualtriumphoffeminism, thatfeminism correctlywillbe
perceivedas morethana powerpolitic-thoughitis that,too. The succes-
sor science tendenciesaim to provide more complete, less false, less
distorting, less defensive,less perverse,less rationalizing
understandings
of the naturaland social worlds.
Thisis alreadya radicalproject,fortheEnlightenment visionexplicitly
denied thatwomen possessed the reason and powers of dispassionate,
objective observationrequiredby scientificthinking.Women could be
objectsof(masculine)reasonandobservation butneverthesubjects,never
the reflectingand universalizinghuman minds.Only men were in fact
envisionedas ideal knowers,foronlymen (ofthe appropriateclass, race,
and culture) possessed the innate capacities for sociallytranscendant
observationand reason.The ends and purposesof such a science turned
out to be farfromemancipatory foranyone.
Marxismreformulated this Enlightenmentvision so thatthe prole-
tariat,guided by Marxisttheoryand by class struggle,became the ideal
knowers,the groupcapable ofusingobservationand reasonto graspthe
true formof social relations,includingour relationswithnature.'2This
Marxistsuccessortobourgeoissciencewas,likeitspredecessor,toprovide
one socialgroup-here, theproletariat-withtheknowledgeand powerto
lead the restofthespecies towardemancipation.Marxism'sepistemology
is groundedin a theoryoflaborratherthana theoryofinnate(masculine)
faculties;so just as not all human facultiesare equal in the bourgeois
version,herenotall laboris equal. Itwas throughstruggle intheworkplace
thattheproletariat wouldgenerateknowledge.In neithersocialistpractice
norMarxisttheorywereanywomeneverconceptualizedas fundamentally
definedby theirrelationto the meansofproduction,regardlessoftheir

12 in TheMarxand EngelsReader,
FriedrichEngels,"Socialism:Utopianand Scientific,"
ed. R. Tucker(New York:W. W. Norton& Co., 1972);GeorgeLukacs,"Reification and the
ConsciousnessoftheProletariat,"Historyand Class Consciousness(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT
Press, 1968).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

workforceparticipation. Theywereneverthoughtofas full-fledged mem-

bers ofthe proletariatwho could reasonand thusknowhow theworldis
constructed.Women's distinctivereproductivelabor, emotionallabor,
"mediating"labor thusdisappearedwithinthe conceptualframework of
Marxisttheory,leavingwomeninvisibleas a classor socialgroupofagents
of knowledge.(Otherformsof nonwageor nonindustrial labor similarly
disappearedfromthe centerof this conceptualscheme, mystifying the
knowingavailable to slaves and colonizedpeoples.)
This standpointtendencyin feministepistemologyis groundedin a
successortheoryoflabor or, rather,ofdistinctively humanactivity,and
seeks to substitutewomenor feminists (the accountsdiffer) forthe pro-
letariatas the potentiallyideal agents of knowledge. Men's (sexists')
perceptionsofthemselves,others,nature,and the relationsbetweenall
three are characteristically not only partialbut also perverse.'3Men's
characteristic social experience,like thatof the bourgeoisie,hides from
them the politicallyimposed natureof the social relationstheysee as
natural.Dominantpatternsin Westernthoughtjustifywomen'ssubjuga-
tionas necessaryfortheprogressofculture,and men'spartialandperverse
viewsas uniquelyand admirablyhuman.Womenare able to use political
struggleand analysisto providea less partial,less defensive,less perverse
understandingof human social relations-includingour relationswith
nature. The standpointtheoristsargue that this analysis,not feminist
empiricism, accountsfortheachievements offeminist theoryand research
because it is politicallyengagedtheoryand researchfromtheperspective
of the social experienceof the subjugatedsex/gender.
The secondlineofthought,one thatcan be foundwithinmanyofthese
verysamewritings, expressesa profoundskepticism towardtheEnlighten-
ment vision of the power of "the" human mind to reflectperfectlya
readymadeworldthatis outthereforthereflecting. Manyfeminists sharea
rejectionofthevalue oftheformsofrationality, ofdispassionateobjectiv-
ity, of the Archimedeanperspective,which were to be the means to
knowledge.Here theyare ambivalently relatedto such otherskepticsof
modernismas Nietzsche,Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault,Lacan, Fey-
erabend,Rorty,Gadamer,and thediscoursesofsemiotics,psychoanalysis,
structuralism, and deconstructionism. 14Whatis strikingis howthesucces-

13
Hartsock,especially,discussestheperversityoftheandrocentric vision(n. 11 above). I
shallsubsequentlyreferto the menvs. womendichotomy sincethatis thewaymostofthese
standpointtheoristsputtheissue. However,I thinkthesecategoriesare inadequateeven for
thestandpointprojects:itis feministsvs. nonfeminists
(sexists)we shouldbe discussinghere.
14
JaneFlax discussesthispostmodernstrainin feministtheoryin "Gender as a Social
Problem:In and For FeministTheory"(n. 2 above) and citestheseas amongthekeyskeptics
ofmodernism:FriedrichNietzsche,On theGenealogyofMorals(New York:Vintage,1969),
and Beyond Good and Evil (New York:Vintage,1966); Jacques Derrida, L'ecritureet la
Difference(Paris:Editionsdu Seuil, 1967);MichelFoucault,TheOrderofThings(New York:

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

sor science idea and the postmodernskepticismof science are both

embracedby these theorists,thoughthe conceptsare diametrically op-
posed in the nonfeminist discourses.'5
From the perspectiveofthispostmoderntendencyin feministthink-
ing,thefeminist successorscienceprojectcan appearstilltoofirmly rooted
in distinctively masculinemodesofbeingintheworld.As one theoristputs
the issue, "Perhaps 'reality'can have 'a' structureonlyfromthe falsely
universalizing perspectiveofthe master.That is, onlyto the extentthat
one person groupcan dominatethe whole, can 'reality'appear to be
or
governedbyone setofrulesorbe constituted byone privilegedsetofsocial
relations." How
16 can feminism radicallyredefinetherelationshipbetween
knowledgeand powerif it createsyet another epistemology, yetanother
set of rules forthe policingofthought?
However,thispostmodernprojectcan appear viciouslyutopianfrom
the perspectiveofthe successorsciencetendency.17It seems to challenge
thelegitimacy oftrying todescribethewaytheworldis froma distinctively
feminist perspective.It can appearofa piece withmasculineandbourgeois
desiretojustifyone's activitiesbydenyingone's social,embodiedlocation
in history;to attemptto transcendone's objectivelocationin politicsby
appeal to a mea culpa, all-understanding, bird's-eyeview (the transcen-
dentalego in naturalistic garb)ofthefrailty ofmerehumans.Thatis, in its
uneasyaffiliation withnonfeminist postmodernism, thefeminist postmod-
ernisttendencyappearstosupportan inappropriate stancebythe
relativist
subjugatedgroups,one thatconflicts withfeminism's perceptionthatthe
realitiesofsexualpoliticsin ourworlddemandengagedpoliticalstruggle.
It appears to supportan equally regressiverelativismforthose mildly

Vintage,1973),and TheArchaeologyofKnowledge(New York:Harper& Row,1972);Jacques

Lacan, Speech and Languagein Psychoanalysis (Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press,
1968),and The Four FundamentalConceptsofPsychoanalysis (New York:W. W. Norton&
Co., 1973); Paul Feyerabend,AgainstMethod(New York:SchockenBooks, 1975); Richard
Rorty,Philosophyand the Mirrorof Nature(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress,
1979); Hans-GeorgGadamer,PhilosophicalHermeneutics ofCalifornia
(Berkeley:University
Press, 1976); Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty(New York:Harper & Row, 1972), and
PhilosophicalInvestigations(New York:MacmillanPublishingCo., 1970). See also Jean-
FrancoisLyotard,ThePostmodern Condition:A Reporton Knowledge,trans.G. Bennington
and B. Massumi (Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress, 1984).
15However, different weightis given to one or the othertendencyby each theorist.
Nevertheless,all are explicitlyawareofthetensionin theirownworkbetweenthetwokinds
of criticismsof modern,Westernepistemology.It is anotherprojectto explainhow each
attemptsto resolve this tension.See Harding(n. 1 above) forfurtherdiscussionof these
theorists'work.
16 Flax, "Gender as a Social Problem"(n. 2 above), 17.
17
Flax appearsto be unawareofthisproblem.Engelsdistinguishes utopianand scientific
socialisms(n. 12 above).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

estrangedmembers of the subjugatinggroups with doubts about the

legitimacyof theirown objectiveprivilegeand power (see list above of
nonfeminist skepticsofmodernism).It is worthkeepingin mindthatthe
articulationof relativismas an intellectualpositionemergeshistorically
onlyas an attemptto dissolvechallengesto the legitimacy ofpurportedly
universalbeliefsand waysoflife.It is an objectiveproblem,ora solutionto
a problem,onlyfromthe perspectiveof the dominatinggroups. Reality
mayindeedappeartohavemanydifferent structuresfromtheperspectives
ofourdifferent locationsin socialrelations,butsomeofthoseappearances
are ideologiesin the strongsense ofthe term:theyare notonlyfalseand
"interested"beliefsbut also ones thatare used to structure socialrelations
fortherestofus. For subjugatedgroups,a relativist stanceexpressesa false
consciousness.It acceptsthedominantgroup'sinsistencethattheirrightto
holddistortedviews(and,ofcourse,to makepolicyforall ofus on thebasis
of thoseviews) is intellectually legitimate.
Are notthepolicingofthoughtin theserviceofpoliticalpowerand the
retreatto purportedlypoliticallyinnocent,relativistic, mere interpreta-
tionsoftheworldthetwosidesoftheEnlightenment andbourgeoiscointo
whichfeminismis opposed? Is it nottrue-as thesetheoristsall arguein
different ways-that men's and women's different kindsof interactions
withnatureand sociallife(different "labor")providewomenwithdistinc-
tive and privilegedscientificand epistemologicalstandpoints?How can
feminism afford to giveup a successorscienceprojectifitis to empowerall
womenin a worldwheresociallylegitimatedknowledgeand the political
powerassociatedwithit are firmly lodged in white,Western,bourgeois,
compulsorilyheterosexual,men's hands? Yet how can we give up our
distrustof the historiclinks between this legitimatedknowledgeand
politicalpower?
One wayto see thesetwotendenciesinfeminist theoryis as converging
approachesto a postmodernist world-a worldthatwillnotexistuntilboth
(conflicting) tendenciesachieve theirgoals. From thisperspective,at its
bestpostmodernism envisionsepistemology ina worldwherethoughtdoes
notneed policing.It recognizestheexistencetodayoffarless thantheideal
speech situation,but disregards(or failsto acknowledge)the political
strugglesnecessaryto bring about change. The standpointtendency
attemptsto moveus towardthatidealworldbylegitimating and empower-
ingthe "subjugatedknowledges"ofwomen,withoutwhichthatpostmod-
ern epistemologicalsituationcannotcome intoexistence.It failsnonethe-
less to challengethemodernistintimaciesbetweenknowledgeand power,
orthelegitimacy ofassumingtherecanbe a single,feminist storyofreality.
Whetheror notthisis a usefulwayto see therelationship betweenthetwo
tendencies,I am arguingthatwe mustresistthe temptationto explain
awaytheproblemseach addressesand tochooseone totheexclusionofthe
other.

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

The feministstandpoint and other "others"

Feministsuccessorscience projectsstandin an uneasyrelationto other
emancipatoryepistemologiesinsofaras the formerseek to ground a
uniquelylegitimateanddistinctive scienceandepistemology on theshared
characteristicsofwomen'sactivity.HilaryRose locatesthese groundsin
the way women'slabor unifiesmental,manual,and caringlabor. Nancy
Hartsockfocuseson thedeeperoppositiontothedualitiesofmentalversus
manual labor to be foundin women'sdaily,concreteactivitiesboth in
domesticlife and wage labor. Jane Flax identifiesthe relativelymore
reciprocalsense ofselfwomenbringtoall theiractivities.She suggeststhat
the small gap between men's and women'sconceptsof self,others,and
natureprefigures thepossiblelargergapbetweenthedefensively dualistic
knowledgecharacteristic ofmale-dominant socialordersand therelational
and contextualknowledgepossible in a futuresocietyof "reciprocal
selves."DorothySmitharguesthatwomen'ssociallaboris concreterather
thanabstract,thatitcannotbe articulatedtoeitheradministrative formsof
rulingor the categoriesof social science, and thatit has been socially
invisible-combiningto create a valuablyalienatedand bifurcatedcon-
sciousnessin women.'8However,otheremancipatory perspectivesclaim
as resourcesfortheirpoliticsand epistemologiessimilaraspectsof their
own activity.
On the one hand, ofcourse,feminismis rightto identify womenand
men as classes in oppositionat thismomentin history.Everywherein the
worldwe findthesetwoclasses,and virtually everywherethe men subju-
gatethewomeninone wayoranother.19Furthermore, even malefeminists
receivebenefitsfroman institutionalized sexismtheyactivelystruggleto
eliminate.Objectively,no individualmencan succeedinrenouncingsexist
privilegeanymorethanindividualwhitescan succeedin renouncing racist
privilege-the benefitsof gender and race accrue regardless of thewishes
of the individualswho bear them. Gender, like race and class, is not a
voluntarilydisposable individualcharacteristic. Afterall, fundamentally
our feminismsaddressthe extractionand transfer of social benefitsfrom
women to men as groups of humans,on a worldwidescale. Thus the
standpointtheorists,in identifying thecommonaspectsofwomen'ssocial
experiencecross-culturally, contributesomethingimportant to ourwork.
On theotherhand,thedistinctive ofwomen'sactivities
characteristics
thatRose, Hartsock,Flax, and Smithidentify forourcultureare probably
to be foundalso in the labor and social experienceof othersubjugated

18Flax (n. 11 above); Hartsock(bothitemscitedin n. 11 above); Rose (n. 11 above); Smith

(n. 6 above).
19"Virtually everywhere"to givethebenefitofthedoubtto anthropologists' claimsabout
"egalitariancultures."See, e.g., Eleanor Leacock, Mythsof Male Dominance(New York:
MonthlyReview Press, 1981).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

groups. There are suggestionsin the literatureon Native Americans,

Africans,and Asiansthatwhatfeministscall feminineversusmasculine
personalities,ontologies,ethics,epistemologies,and worldviewsmaybe
whattheseotherliberationmovementscall non-Western versusWestern
personalitiesand worldviews.20 Thus, should there not also be Native
American,African,and Asian sciencesand epistemologies,based on the
distinctivehistoricaland social experienceof these peoples? Would not
such successorsciences and epistemologiesprovidesimilaranalysesto
thoseofthestandpoint theorists? (I setaside thecrucialand fatalcomplica-
tionforthisway ofthinking-thefactsthatone-halfofthesepeoples are
womenand thatmostwomenare notWestern.)On whatgroundswould
thefeminist sciencesand epistemologies be superiortotheseothers?What
is and should be the relationshipof the feministprojectsto these other
emancipatory knowledge-seeking projects?
It is a vastovergeneralization to presumethatall Africans, let alone all
colonizedpeoples, sharedistinctive personalities,
ontologies,ethics,epis-
temologies,or worldviews.But is it anyworsethanthepresumption that
thereare commonalities tobe detectedinall women'ssocialexperiencesor
worldviews?Let us note thatwe are thinking here aboutperspectivesas
inclusiveas thosereferred toinsuchphrasesas the"feudalworldview,"the
"modernworldview,"orthe"scientific worldview."Moreover,we women
also claim an identitywe were taughtto despise;2'aroundthe globe we
insiston the importanceof our social experienceas women,notjust as
gender-invisiblemembersof class, race, or culturalgroups. Similarly,
ThirdWorldpeoplesclaimtheircolonizedsocialexperienceas theground-
ingfora sharedidentity and as a commonsourceofalternative understand-
ings.Whyis itnotreasonabletoexplorehowtheexperienceofcolonization
itselfshapes personalitiesand worldviews?How can white Western
womeninsiston the legitimacy ofwhatwe thinkwe sharewithall women
and notacknowledgetheequal legitimacy ofwhatcolonizedpeoples think
theysharewitheach other?In short,we cannotresolvethisproblemfor
the feministstandpointby insistingon the culturalparticularity of indi-

20Russell
Means, "FightingWordson theFutureoftheEarth,"MotherJones (December
1980):167;VernonDixon,"WorldViewsand ResearchMethodology," inAfricanPhilosophy:
Assumptionsand Paradigmsfor Researchon Black Persons,ed. L. M. King,V. Dixon, and
W. W. Nobles (Los Angeles: Fanon Center Publication,Charles R. Drew Postgraduate
MedicalSchool,1976)(butsee also PaulinHountondji,AfricanPhilosophy:Mythand Reality
[Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1983]); JosephNeedham, "Historyand Human
Values: A Chinese PerspectiveforWorld Science and Technology,"in Ideologyof/inthe
Natural Sciences,ed. HilaryRose and Steven Rose (Boston: SchenkmanPublishingCo.,
1979). I have discussedthissituationmorefullyin "The CuriousCoincidenceofAfricanand
Feminine Moralities,"in Womenand Moral Theory,ed. Diana Meyers and Eva Kittay
(Totowa,N.J.: Rowman& Allenheld,1986), and in chap. 7 of Harding(n. 1 above).
21 Michele
Cliff,Claimingan IdentityTheyTaughtMe to Despise (Watertown,Mass.:
PersephonePress, 1980).

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

viduals in othercultureswhile at the same timearguingforthe gender

similaritiesofwomencross-culturally.
One resolutionofthisdilemmaforthestandpoint tendencywouldbe to
say thatfeministscience and epistemologywill be valuable in theirown
rightalongsideand as a partofthese otherpossible sciencesand episte-
mologies-not superiorto them.Withthisstrategy we have relinquished
the totalizing,"mastertheory"characterofour theorymakingwhichis at
leastan implicitgoalofmuchfeminist theorizing,andwe havebrokenaway
fromthe Marxistassumptionsthatinformed thefeminist successorscience
projects.This responseto theissuehas managedto retainthecategoriesof
feministtheory(unstablethoughtheybe) and simplyset themalongside
thecategoriesofthetheorymakingofothersubjugatedgroups.Insteadof
the "dual systems"theorywithwhich socialistfeministswrestle,22 this
responsegivesus multisystems theory.Ofcourse,itleaves bifurcated (and
perhapseven morefinelydivided)the identitiesofall exceptruling-class
whiteWesternwomen.Thereis a fundamental incoherencein thiswayof
thinkingabout the groundsforfeministapproachesto knowledge.
Anothersolutionwouldbe to renouncethegoalofunityaroundshared
social experiencesin favorof solidarityaround those goals thatcan be
shared. 23Fromthisperspective,each standpoint epistemology-feminist,
ThirdWorld,gay,workingclass-names thehistoricalconditionsproduc-
ing the politicaland conceptualoppositionsto be overcomebut does not
therebygenerateuniversalconceptsand politicalgoals. Because genderis
byclassand raceas well
also a classand racialcategoryinculturesstratified
as bygender,no particular women'sexperiencecan uniquelygeneratethe
groundings forthevisionsand politicsthatwillemancipateus fromgender
hierarchy. varietyof social groupsare currently
A strugglingagainstthe
hegemony of the Western, white, bourgeois, homophobic androcentric
worldviewand the politicsit both generatesand justifies.Our internal
racial, sexual, and class struggles,and the differencesin our cultural
historieswhich defineforus who we are as social beings, preventour
federating aroundoursharedgoals.It is historythatwillresolveordissolve
this problem, not our analyticefforts.Nevertheless,white, Western,
bourgeoisfeminists shouldattendto theneed fora moreactivetheoretical
and politicalstruggleagainstour own racism,classism,and culturalcen-
trismas forcesthatinsurethecontinuedsubjugationofwomenaroundthe
world.

22IrisYoung,"BeyondtheUnhappyMarriage:A CritiqueoftheDual SystemsTheory,"in

Womenand Revolution,ed. L. Sargent(Boston:South End Press, 1981).
23See Bell Hooks, FeministTheoryfromMarginto Center(Boston:South End Press,
1983), esp. chap. 4; and Haraway,"A ManifestoforCyborgs"(n. 2 above).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

Culture versus nature and gender versus sex

Historiansand anthropologists showthatthewaycontemporary Western

societydraws the bordersbetween cultureand natureis clearlyboth
modernand culturebound.24The cultureversusnaturedichotomyreap-
pears in complexand ambiguouswaysin a numberofotheroppositions
centralto modern,Western thinking:reason versus the passions and
emotions;objectivity versussubjectivity; mindversusthebodyand physi-
cal matter;abstractversusconcrete;publicversusprivate-to namea few.
In our culture,and in science,masculinity is identifiedwithcultureand
femininity withnatureinall ofthesedichotomies.In each case, thelatteris
perceivedas an immenselypowerful threatthatwillriseup andoverwhelm
the formerunless the formerexertssevere controlsover the latter.
Thisseriesofassociateddualismshas been one oftheprimary targetsof
feministcriticismsofthe conceptualschemeofmodernscience. It is less
oftenrecognized,however,howthedualismreappearsinfeminist thinking
aboutgender,sex,or thesex/gender system.In precedingsections,I have
talkedabout eliminating genderas ifthesocialcouldbe cleanlyseparated
fromthe biologicalaspectsofour sexualidentities,practices,and desires.
In feminist discourses,thismode ofconceptualizing sexualityis clearlyan
advance over the biologicaldeterministassumptionthatgender differ-
ences simplyfollowfromsex differences. Since biologicaldeterminism is
alive and flourishingin sociobiology,endocrinology, ethology,anthropol-
ogyand, indeed,mostnonfeminist discourses,I do notwanttodevaluethe
powerfulanalyticalstrategy ofinsistingon a clean separationbetweenthe
known(and knowable)effectsof biologyand of culture.Nevertheless,a
verydifferent pictureofsexualidentities,practices,and desiresemerges
fromrecentresearchin biology,history,anthropology, and psychology.25
Surprisingly, itcould also be called biologicaldeterminism, thoughwhatis
determinedon this account is the plasticityratherthan the rigidityof
sexual identity,practice,and desire. Our species is doomed to freedom
frombiologicalconstraints in these respects,as existentialists
would put
the issue.
The problemforfeministtheoryand practicehere is twofold.In the
firstplace, we stressthathumansare embodiedcreatures-notCartesian
mindsthathappen to be located in biologicalmatterin motion.Female
embodimentis different frommale embodiment.Thereforewe want to
knowtheimplications forsocialrelationsand intellectuallifeofthatdiffer-

24See esp. theresponsesto SherryOrtner's"Is Female to Male as NatureIs to Culture?"

(in Woman, Culture and Society,ed. M. Z. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere [Stanford,Calif.:
StanfordUniversityPress, 1974]) in MacCormackand Strathern, eds. (n. 10 above).
25See referencescited in nn. 10 above.
7,

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

ent embodiment.Menstruation, vaginalpenetration, lesbiansexualprac-

tices,birthing,nursing,and menopauseare bodilyexperiencesmen can-
not have. Contemporary feminismdoes not embracethe goal oftreating
women"justlikemen"inpublicpolicy.Se we need toarticulatewhatthese
differences are. However,we fearthatdoingso feedsintosexualbiological
determinism(considerthe problemswe have had articulating a feminist
on
perspective premenstrualsyndrome and work-related reproductive
hazards in ways that do not victimizewomen). The problem is com-
pounded when it is racial differencesbetween women we want to
articulate.6How can we choose betweenmaintaining thatour biological
differencesought to be recognizedby public policyand insistingthat
biology is not destiny eitherwomenor men?
for
In the second place, we have troubleconceptualizing thefactthatthe
cultureversusnaturedichotomy and itssiblings are not simplyfigments of
thoughtto be packed up in the atticof outmoded ideas. The tendency
towardthiskindofdualismis an ideologyinthestrongest senseoftheterm,
and such tendenciescannotbe shuckedoffby mentalhygieneand will
poweralone. The culture/nature dichotomy structures publicpolicy,insti-
tutionaland individualsocialpractices,theorganization ofthe disciplines
(thesocialvs. thenaturalsciences),indeedtheverywaywe see theworld
aroundus. Consequently,untilour dualisticpracticesare changed(divi-
sions of social experienceinto mentalvs. manual,intoabstractvs. con-
crete,intoemotionalvs. emotiondenying),we areforcedtothinkand exist
withinthe very dichotomizingwe criticize.Perhaps we can shiftthe
assumptionthatthe naturalis hardto changeand thattheculturalis more
easilychanged,as we see ecologicaldisastersand medicaltechnologieson
theone hand,and thehistory ofsexism,classism,and racismon theother.27
Nonetheless,we should continueinsistingon the distinctionbetween
cultureand nature,between gender and sex (especiallyin the face of
biologicaldeterminist backlash),even as we analytically and experientially
noticehowinextricably theyare intertwined in individualsand incultures.
These dichotomiesare empiricallyfalse,but we cannotaffordto dismiss
themas irrelevantas long as theystructureour lives and our conscious-
nesses.

Science as craft:Anachionism or resource?

imageofthe
Traditionalphilosophiesof science assume an anachronistic
inquireras a sociallyisolatedgenius,selectingproblems pursue,formu-
to

26Inez SmithReid, "Science, Politics,and Race," Signs 1, no. 2 (1975): 397-422.

27JaniceG. Raymondmakesthispointin "Transsexualism: An Issue ofSex-RoleStereo-
typing,"in Tobach and eds.,
Rosoff, vol. 2 (n. 7 above).

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 Summer1986 / SIGNS

latinghypotheses,devisingmethodsto test the hypotheses,gathering

observations,and interpreting the resultsofinquiry.The realityofmost
scientificresearchtodayis quite different, forthesecraftmodesofproduc-
ing scientificknowledgewere replaced by industrializedmodes in the
nineteenthcenturyforthe naturalsciences, and by the mid-twentieth
centuryforthe vast majorityof social science research.Consequently,
philosophyofscience'srulesand normsforindividualknowledgeseekers
are irrelevantto theconductof,and understanding of,mostofcontempo-
raryscience, as a numberof science criticshave pointedout.28
However, it is preciselyin areas of inquirythatremainorganizedin
craftwayswhere the mostinteresting feministresearchhas appeared.29
Perhapsall ofthe mostrevolutionary claimshave emergedfromresearch
situationswhere individualfeminists (or smallgroupsofthem)identify a
problematicphenomenon,hypothesize a tentative
explanation, design and
carryout evidence gathering,and then interpretthe resultsof this re-
search. In contrast,when the conceptionand executionof researchare
performedby different socialgroupsofpersons,as is the case in the vast
majorityofmainstreamnaturalscienceand muchsocialscienceresearch,
the activityofconceptualizingthe researchis frequently performed by a
privilegedgroup and the of
activity executing theresearch a
by subjugated
group.This situationinsuresthattheconceptualizers willbe able to avoid
challengesto the adequacy of theirconcepts,categories,methods,and
interpretations of the resultsof research.
This kindofanalysisreinforces thestandpoint theorists'argumentthat
a prescriptive of
theory knowledge-an epistemology-shouldbe based on
a theoryoflaboror humanactivity,noton a theoryofinnatefacultiesas
empiricistepistemologyassumes. In fact,the feministepistemologies
mentionedabove areall groundedina distinctive theoryofhumanactivity,
and in one thatgainssupportfroman examination ofthepreconditions for
theemergenceofmodernscienceinthefifteenth toseventeenthcenturies.
Feministspointto the unification ofmental,manual,and emotionallabor
in women'sworkwhichprovideswomenwitha potentially morecompre-
hensiveunderstanding ofnatureand sociallife.As womenincreasingly are
drawnintoand seek men'swork-fromlawand policy-making to medicine
and scientificinquiry-our laborand social experienceviolatethe tradi-
tional distinctionsbetween men's and women's work,thus permitting
women'sways of understanding realityto begin to shape public under-
standings.Similarly, it was a violationofthe feudaldivisionoflaborthat
8 JeromeRavetz, ScientificKnowledgeand Its Social Problems(New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1971); Rose and Rose, eds. (n. 20 above); RitaArditti,Pat Brennan,Steve
Cafrak,eds., Science and Liberation(Boston:South End Press, 1980).
29HilaryRose in particularhas pointedthisout in "Hand, Brainand Heart,"and in "Is a
FeministScience Possible?" (n. 11 above). Perhapsall new researchparadigmsmustbe
establishedthroughcraftactivity,as Kuhn argued.

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 Harding / FEMINISTTHEORY

made possible the unityof mentaland manuallabornecessaryto create

science's new experimentalmethod.30
Traditionalphilosophyofscience'sprescriptive imageofthe scientific
inquirer,as craftsman, then,is irrelevantas a modelforthe activitythat
occupies the vastmajorityofscientific workerstoday.This imageinstead
reflectsthepracticesoftheveryfewscientifically trainedworkerswhoare
engagedin the construction ofnew researchmodels. However,sincethe
scientific
worldviewthatfeminism criticizeswas constructedto explainthe
activity,results,and goalsofthecraftlabor thatconstituted sciencein an
earlierperiod,and sincecontemporary feminist craftinquiryhas produced
some ofthemostvaluablenew conceptualizations, itlookslikewe need to
thinkmore carefullyabout whichaspects of the scientificworldviewto
reject and retain. Perhaps the mainstreamenterpriseof today is not
scientificat all in theoriginalsenseoftheterm!Can itbe thatfeminism and
similarlyestrangedinquiriesare thetrueoffspring ofCopernicus,Galileo,
and Newton? Can this be true while at the same time these offspring
underminethe epistemologythat Hume, Locke, Descartes, and Kant
developed to explainthebirthofmodernscience?Once again,we are led
to whatI propose shouldbe regardedas fruitful ambivalencetowardthe
science we have. We should cultivateboth "separatist"craft-structured
inquiryand infusetheindustrially structured scienceswithfeminist values
and goals.
These are some of the centralconceptualinstabilities thatemergein
consideringthe feministcriticismof science. Several of them arise in
feministtheorizingmore generally.I have been arguingthatwe cannot
resolvethese dilemmasin the termsin whichwe have been posingthem
and thatinsteadwe shouldlearnhowto regardtheinstabilities themselves
as valuable resources.If we can learn how to use them,we can match
Archimedes'greatestachievement-his inventivenessin creatinga new
kindof theorizing.

Departmentof Philosophy
of Delaware
University

30EdgarZilsel,"The SociologicalRootsofScience," AmericanJournalofSociology47, no.

4 (1942): 545-60.

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