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Did Descartes Have

a Philosophical Theory
of Sense Perception?'
RONALD ARBINI

IT IS ALL but universally a c k n o w l e d g e d a m o n g readers o f Descartes that he


either consciously m a i n t a i n e d o r was s o m e h o w c o m m i t t e d to one or a n o t h e r
f o r m o f p e r c e p t u a l representationalism. T h e justification for this interpreta-
tion almost always involves citing o n e or a n o t h e r o f a host o f m o r e or less
obscure and o f t e n inconsistent r e f e r e n c e s to ideas, their content, causes,
resemblances (or the lack o f same) to thoughts (obscure), images, pictures,
engravings, etc. in the Meditations and related philosophical texts. It is also
widely a c k n o w l e d g e d by those who cite such r e f e r e n c e s seeking an obvious,
c o h e r e n t or clearly consistent expression o f p e r c e p t u a l representationalism
in Descartes's philosophical texts that n o n e can be f o u n d . ~
In contrast to this interpretation, it will be a r g u e d below that the only
clear c o h e r e n t account o f sense p e r c e p t i o n to be f o u n d in Descartes is not to

' I wish to express my thanks to my colleague Professor N. W. Gilbert for translating


various passages discussed below. His contributions to the cited translations are contained in
brackets. Alternate translations are contained in square brackets. Further thanks are due to my
Berkeley colleague Professor Janet Broughton f'or her helpful critical comments on an early
draft. Finally, thanks are due to Professor Fred Berger of U.C. Davis, and a referee of this
journal for valuable criticisms contributing to the clarification and editing of the last draft of
this article.
See for example: B. Williams, Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1979) pp. 985-6 A. J. P. Kenny, Descartes (New York: Random House 1968 ),
Pp. lo5ff. M. D. Wilson Descartes (London, Henly and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Pau, 1978)
p. 2o 3. It should be noticed that each of the above has expressed some hesitation over attribut-
ing to Descartes a clearly consistent or obvious doctrine of the relationship between ideas of
sense and what or how they are supposed to represent. In fact Wilson wonders whether any
philosophical causal or representational theory can be attributed to Descartes at all because his
"meager" conclusions in the Meditations concerning this relationship are "too tenuous, too nearly
void of cognitive significance."

[3~7]
318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
be f o u n d in his philosophical works, but only in his Dioptrics a n d related
"scientific" texts. I n this c o n n e c t i o n it will be a r g u e d f u r t h e r , b o t h that
Descartes i n t e n d e d this t h e o r y to solve the well-known p r o b l e m s i m p u g n i n g
" e x t e r n a l " sense p e r c e p t i o n a d v a n c e d , b u t n e v e r resolved in his p h i l o s o p h i -
cal works, a n d that such a t h e o r y c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as a f o r m o f r e p r e s e n -
tationalism. I will first c o n s i d e r the issue o f how his "scientific" a c c o u n t o f
p e r c e p t i o n can be u n d e r s t o o d as the only a c o u n t o f sense p e r c e p t i o n clearly
f o r m u l a t e d by Descartes to p r o v i d e solutions to all o f the philosophical
puzzles specifically i n t e n d e d to i n t r o d u c e p e r c e p t i o n a l doubts. Finally, I wilt
discuss the question o f p e r c e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m in Descartes a n d
s o m e r e m a i n i n g related issues.

At the time he c o n c l u d e d the sixth Meditation it seems to h a v e e s c a p e d


Descartes's a t t e n t i o n that a l t h o u g h he could be t a k e n to h a v e d i s p a t c h e d the
evil d e m o n a n d the d r e a m puzzle, thus ruling out the possibility o f universal
a n d systematic d e c e p t i o n , this a l o n e fails to account f o r his puzzles o f per-
ception which d o not d e p e n d f o r their force u p o n the p r o s p e c t o f such
c o m p l e t e a n d universal d e c e p t i o n . T h a t is, the puzzles o f "internal" a n d
" e x t e r n a l " p e r c e p t i o n i n t r o d u c e d in the Meditations r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by
r e m o v i n g the possibility o f systematic universal deception; for it is clear that
despite this possibility it r e m a i n s possible that o n e will c o n t i n u e to take
r o u n d towers f o r s q u a r e ones, " p e r c e i v e " the size o f the o b s e r v e d sun to be
that o f a closely held coin o r candle flame, mislocate the origin o f a pain in a
" p h a n t o m limb", etc. I n this way, the puzzles o f p e r c e p t i o n i n t r o d u c e d in the
Meditations, a n d related philosophical texts r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by the r e m o v -
al o f d o u b t s e m i n a t i n g f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s involving d e m o n s , deceivers, a n d
d r e a m s . T h a t is, the possibility, i n t r o d u c e d in Meditation I, that b e i n g de-
ceived, a f t e r the m a n n e r o f the a b o v e puzzles, is sufficient g r o u n d s f o r not
placing c o m p l e t e trust in the senses alone, r e m a i n s a possibility at the close
o f the Meditations. In short, at the close o f the Meditations the a r g u m e n t s
specifically i n t e n d e d to i n d u c e p e r c e p t i o n a l scepticism r e m a i n in force de-
spite the fact that p e r c e p t u a l d o u b t s i n t r o d u c e d by the possibility o f univer-
sal a n d systematic d e c e p t i o n h a v e b e e n dispelled. :~

3 This peculiarity of Descartes's argument in the Meditations has been noted by Bernard
Williams "... there is another kind of belief, in particular perceptual beliefs about the external
world, with regard to which we are liable to occasional error however hard we try. If we are
going to make perceptual judgments about the external world at all, there are errors which we
will commit however conscientiously we clarify our ideas on the particular occasion. This is for
reasons connected with our being bodily creatures . . . . In the case of these beliefs, God's guar-
antee operates only on the general level, guarding us against systematic error: granted we take
PERCEPTION 319
I should hasten to add that it is not being a r g u e d that Descartes said
n o t h i n g in the Meditations and related philosophical texts o f relevance to the
solution o f those puzzles i n t r o d u c i n g p e r c e p t u a l scepticism. O n the contrary,
he m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d to have a r g u e d that a l t h o u g h n e i t h e r the senses, n o r
the imagination alone is sufficient to the task o f r e m o v i n g p e r c e p t u a l d o u b t
c o n c e r n i n g the actual p r o p e r t i e s o f perceived objects, these faculties to-
g e t h e r with the u n d e r s t a n d i n g are sufficient to that task. W h a t is being
a r g u e d h e r e is that in those philosophical works w h e r e this a r g u m e n t occurs
Descartes does not explain how the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o g e t h e r with the senses
can be u n d e r s t o o d to o p e r a t e in such a way as to r e m o v e the sort o f doubts
i n t r o d u c e d by each o f his p e r c e p t u a l puzzles.
It is precisely Descartes's failure to specify in detail an account o f how the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o p e r a t e s t o g e t h e r with the senses to dispel scepticism c o n c e r n -
ing the o b s e r v e d p r o p e r t i e s o f m a t t e r which motivates o n e o f the objections to
the Meditations. In his response to the Sixth Objections Decartes is called u p o n to
d e f e n d his claim, f r o m the Meditations, that the senses alone c a n n o t identify
certain real p r o p e r t i e s o f matter, His objectors p r o p o s e the familiar epistemo-
logical p r o b l e m o f the h a l f - i m m e r s e d bent-looking stick. T h e y claim that any
visual mistaken impression r e n d e r e d by refraction can be c o r r e c t e d solely by a
f u r t h e r appeal to the senses. In this c o n n e c t i o n they a r g u e that an appeal to
tactile sensation alone will c o r r e c t any visual mistaken impressions with an
accurate j u d g m e n t o f the stick's real p r o p e r t y , straightness.
Descartes r e s p o n d s in the obvious way by asking his objectors how they
know which o f the two c o m p e t i n g sense impressions provide the real p r o p -
erties o f the stick. T h e d i l e m m a c o n f r o n t i n g the objectors is clear:
(1) the senses p r o v i d e two relevant j u d g m e n t s o f the stick's real p r o p e r t y .
(2) T h e y are mutually inconsistent characterizations o f the stick, and if, as
the objectors assert,
(3) o n e o f these characterizations provides the correct p r o p e r t y o f the stick
(i.e., the tactile sensation), t h e n
(4) in o r d e r to p r o v e that (3) is t r u e s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the senses must be
a p p e a l e d to.
T h e objectors are c o n f r o n t e d with a classical dilemma: Either what they
assert, namely (3), is unjustified, or (4) is true, as Descartes maintained. It is
obvious that n e i t h e r h o r n o f his d i l e m m a would p r o v i d e a c o m f o r t a b l e p e r c h

enough care, then our ordinary procedures, even though they are inevitably liable to occasional
error, are sound in principle." (B. Williams Pp. 207-8 ) What Williams has ['ailed to notice is that
according to the argument of the first and sixth Meditations, notd above, the mere possibility of
such "occasional error" is itself sufficient to cast doubt upon all .judgments of the "external
senses" despite "God's guarantee" concerning the possibility of""systematic error."
320 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

f o r D e s c a r t e s ' s o b j e c t o r s . D e s c a r t e s ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e d i l e m m a is to a s s e r t t h a t
b o t h (3) a n d (4) a r e t r u e , a n d h e a t t e m p t s to e x p l a i n h o w t h e m i n d f u n c t i o n s
in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t r u t h o f (3), a n d h e n c e (4), b y a d i r e c t a p p e a l to t h e
t h e o r y o f t h e Dioptrics. L e t us n o w c o n s i d e r t h a t a p p e a l .
I n c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f his c l a i m t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e stick i n v o l v e s t h r e e
grades of sensation (perception), Descartes explains:

For example, when I see a staff, it is not to be thought that intentional species fly Off
from it and reach the eye, but merely that rays o f light reflected from the staff exite
certain motions in the optic nerve and, by its mediation, in the brain as well, as I have
explained at sufficient length in the Dioptrics. It is in this cerebral motion, which is
c o m m o n to us and to the brutes, that the first g r a d e o f perception (sentiendi) consists.
But from this the second g r a d e to perception (perceptionem) results; and that merely
extends to the perception o f the colour o r light reflected from the stick and is due to
[arises from] the fact that the m i n d is so intimately conjoined with the brain as to be
affected by the motions arising [that take place] in it. Nothing m o r e than this should
be assigned to sense, if we wish to distinguish it accurately from the intellect. For
t h o u g h my j u d g m e n t that there is a staff situated without me, which j u d g m e n t results
from the sensation (sensu) of colour by which I am affected, and likewise my reason-
ing from the extension o f that colour, its boundaries, and its position relatively to the
parts o f my brain, to the size, the shape, a n d the distance o f the said staff, are vulgarly
assigned to sense, and are consequently here r e f e r r e d to the third g r a d e o f sensation
(sentiendi), they clearly d e p e n d u p o n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g [intellect] alone. T h a t magni-
tude, distance and figure can be perceived by reasoning alone, which deduces them one
from another, I have proved in the Dioptrics. T h e difference lies in this alone, that
those j u d g m e n t s which now for the first time arise on account o f some new a p p r e -
hension (animadversionem), are assigned to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g [intellect]; but those
which have been m a d e from o u r earliest years in exactly the same m a n n e r as at
present, about the things that have been wont to affect o u r senses, as similarly the
conclusions o f o u r reasonings, are r e f e r r e d by us to sense. 4

S h o r t l y , I will h a v e o c c a s i o n to q u o t e , a n d d i s c u s s at l e n g t h , t h o s e p a s -
s a g e s f r o m t h e Dioptrics, to w h i c h D e s c a r t e s ' s l a t t e r c i t a t i o n r e f e r s . 5 A t this
p o i n t in t h e d i s c u s s i o n , h o w e v e r , it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e t h a t D e s c a r t e s is h e r e
c l a i m i n g to h a v e " p r o v e d , " in t h e Dioptrics, t h a t r e a s o n i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n
w i t h s e n s e e s t a b l i s h e s t h e t r u t h o f c e r t i a n j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g at l e a s t
s o m e p r o p e r t i e s o f m a t t e r (e.g., t h o s e i n v o l v i n g " m a g n i t u d e , d i s t a n c e a n d

4 R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, H, Trans. and eds., E.S. Haldane and
G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover Press, 1955), Pp. 'a51-52. (Hereafter, HR II Pp.~51-5 ~) R.
Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes. pubfie6s par C. Adam, P. Tannery (Paris, Nouvelle Presentation,
1964-1974) Vol. VII. Pp. 437-38 (Hereafter, A T - V I I , Pp. 437-38) My italics.
This discussion is better reserved for that part of this paper where it will be shown how
those solutions to specific philosophical problems concerning perception which invovle "magni-
tude, distance and figure" are "proved" by Descartes.
PERCEPTION 321

figure"), as he had asserted in the Meditations. This is particularly worthy of


note in view of the fact, to be discussed in detail later, that the qualities of
magnitude, distance and figure are precisely and exclusively, those pro-
perties of observed objects toward which the sceptical arguments, in the
Meditations and related philosophical works, impugning the reliability of the
"external senses" are directed.
As a specific instance of reason's role in determining the truth of percep-
tual j u d g m e n t s the case of the bent-looking stick provides an excellent ex-
ample. From what Descartes says in the above quotation we would expect
him to maintain that reason somehow utiltizes certain principles expounded
in the Dioptrics in justification of the truth of certain perceptual judgments
(third-grade sensations). It is equally to be expected that for Descartes such
an employment of reason is, for the most part, unconscious. Further, in the
example of the refracted stick the relevant subconscious principles utilized
by reason to correct the third grade perceptual j u d g m e n t that the stick is
bent will surely invovle the causes of this visual phenomenon. Descartes does
not disappoint us in any of these expectations.
In explanation of the views expressed in the above passage from the
Objections, Descartes makes the following points:
1. T h e causes of the p h e n o m e n o n of refraction make the immersed staff
appear to us in such a way as it would appear to children and the preju-
diced "who judged that it was broken."
2. Presumably by understanding the causes of such phenomena, reason "cor-
rects" the mistaken judgments based upon visual sense in favor of judg-
ments based upon "tactual" data.
3- These correct "tactual judgments" of "the intellect" are sometimes falsely
ascribed to sense (e.g., by his objectors).
4- Although he does not here assert it, it would seem to follow that those
trustworthy "operations of the mind" sometimes function without the
conscious awareness of those who j u d g e in favor of the "tactual judg-
ments" (presumably by virtue of what he refers to in Dioptrics VI, as a
"natural geometry"). For clearly, such correct judgments are commonly
made without conscious awareness of the causes of refraction. 6

T h e above response to his critics is particularly instructive when one recalls


that the p h e n o m e n o n of refraction is itself the topic of Dioptrics, Discourse H.
Descartes's contribution to the "scientific" literature in this connection re-

r HR II, Pp, ~5~-3 ( A T - V I I , Pp. 438-39)


322 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

q u i r e s n o e l a b o r a t i o n . 7 H o w e v e r , its p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e l e v a n c e , as i n t r o d u c e d b y
the four points summarized above, deserves further comment.
W h a t is o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p o r t a n c e in Dioptrics II, a n d its s e q u e l is t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n o f his d i s c o v e r i e s a b o u t r e f r a c t i o n a n d t h e p r o j e c t i o n o f l i g h t to
t h e p h y s i o l o g y o f t h e e y e a n d his c o n s e q u e n t d i s c o v e r y o f t h o s e c a u s a l p r i n -
ciples determining the relationships between "images" or "impressions" and
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s a b o u t w h i c h t h e s e n s e s , a l o n e , t e n d to
d e c e i v e us a f t e r t h e m a n n e r d e s c r i b e d in Meditations I a n d VI. I t is this i s s u e
to w h i c h w e n o w t u r n .
I n this c o n n e c t i o n , r e c a l l a g a i n t h a t in his r e p l y to t h e Sixth Objections
D e s c a r t e s c l a i m e d h e h a d " p r o v e d , " in t h e Dioptrics, t h a t s u c h p r o p e r t i e s as
"magnitude, distance a n d figure c a n b e p e r c e i v e d b y r e a s o n i n g a l o n e , w h i c h
deduces them one from the other..." ( m y Italics). R e c a l l also, t h a t t h e Sixth
Meditation r e c o u n t s t h e r e s p e c t s in w h i c h p e r c e p t i o n s o m e t i m e s d e c e i v e s us,
a n d h e n c e , a c c o r d i n g to t h e a r g u m e n t o f t h e First Meditation is n o t itself,
a l o n e , to b e u n i v e r s a l l y t r u s t e d . T h e two p a r a d i g m s o f s u c h p e r c e p t u a l d e -
c e p t i o n s i n v o l v e t h e p r o p e r t i e s j u s t r e f e r r e d to.

9 I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar a p p e a r e d to me
to be r o u n d , m o r e closely observed seemed square, a n d that colossal statues raised on
the summit o f these towers, a p p e a r e d as quite tiny statues when viewed from the
bottom; a n d so in an infinitude o f o t h e r cases I f o u n d e r r o r in j u d g m e n t s f o u n d e d
on the external senses. 8

The case of the round/square tower involves the properties of figure and
d i s t a n c e a n d t h e case o f t h e r e m o v e d s t a t u e i n v o l v e s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f m a g -
n i t u d e a n d d i s t a n c e . -~ I t is p r i m a r i l y in t h e s e v e n t h d i s c o u r s e o f t h e Dioptrics

7 Summarized briefly they are as follows: The first two discourses of the Dioptrics, terminat-
ing with the discussion of refraction, comprise Descartes's major theoretical claims concerning
the physics of light. It is there that he investigates the phenomena of rectilinear light projection,
reflection, color, and refraction. The remainder of this work is devoted to the application of
those theoretical findings to the physiology of perception, the phenomena of magnifaction, the
design of lenses, etc. For the most part I will avoid detailed explanation of Descartes's scientific
theories of light projection and its subsequent application to the physiology of perception,
dwelling instead upon matters of more immediate relevance such as the philosophical impor-
tance of these scientific claims for the solution of perceptual problems introduced in the Medita-
tions and related texts.
HR I, t89. (AT-VII, p. 76 )
-~ Similar considerations apply to other examples involving the "external senses" which
Descartes cites elsewhere, such as cases involving the relative perceived size of the sun and a
closely observed coin. Immediately following the tower and statue cases Descartes introduces
other perceptual problems involving "internal" senses; paradigmatic of which is the missing
limb case, treated elsewhere together with other puzzles about the "internal" senses involving
taste, odor and color judgment (see for example Principles I, w w w Because it is clear
that his treatment of those puzzles involving the "'internal senses" also avail themselves of similar
PERCEPTION 323
that Descartes states those principles responsible for knowledge of these
p r o p e r t i e s . T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
between the relevant properties of objects and certain properties of the
c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s o b s e r v e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s to o c c u r o n t h e
r e a r s u r f a c e o f a n e w l y d i s e m b o d i e d e y e a n d its m e c h a n i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t , t h e
camera obscura.
In the case of magnitude and distance there are three principles govern-
i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n i m a g e size a n d t h e m a g n i t u d e , o r d i s t a n c e o f
o b j e c t s . N o t e , in p a s s i n g , t h a t r e f r a c t i o n f i g u r e s r e l e v a n t l y in o n e o f t h e s e
three principles.

As to the size o f the images, it is to be noted that this d e p e n d s solely on three things,
namely, on the distance between the object and the place where the rays that it sends
from its d i f f e r e n t points toward the back o f the eye intersect; next, on the distance
between this same place a n d the base o f the eye; and finally, on the refraction o f
these rays. T h u s it is evident that the image RST would be greater than it is, if the
object VXY were n e a r e r to the place K, were the rays VKR and Y K T intersect, or
r a t h e r to the surface BCD, which causes these rays to intersect, to the back o f the eye
RST; or finally, if the refraction d i d not curve them so much inward toward the
middle point S, but rather, if it were possible, outward. A n d whatever we conceive
besides these three things, there is n o t h i n g which can make this image larger. '~

A s s u m i n g t h a t this a c c o u n t is r o u g h l y c o r r e c t , t h a t o n e is in a p o s i t i o n to
o b s e r v e a d e c r e a s e in i m a g e size, a n d t h a t o n e h a s r e a s o n to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e is
n o a b n o r m a l i n f l u e n c e b y r e f r a c t i o n , u n u s u a l c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g f o c u s , etc.,
o n e c o u l d t h e n i n f e r t h a t t h e i m a g e size d e c r e a s e d b e c a u s e t h e o b j e c t o f t h e
image had been moved farther from the observer. Consequently, one would be
in a p o s i t i o n to a s s e r t a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a n i m a g e a n d a n o b j e c t . T h i s w o u l d
s u g g e s t t h e s o r t o f i n f e r e n c e i n v o l v e d in r e s t o r i n g t h e " d e s t r o y e d . . . f a i t h " in
t h e s e n s e s , w h i c h t h e s t a t u e e x a m p l e is s u p p o s e d to i l l u s t r a t e .

"scientific" treatment (e.g., color as diffuse reflection in Dioptrics 1, and the missing limb as a
neurophysiological phenomenon in Passions of the Soul and Principles,) I will not discuss them
here. Note that I have a tendency here to overlook the importance of the internal sense/external
sense distinction in Descartes's theory of the perception of objects. However, it is very impor-
tant. For example, the sensu of color ("internal") is an instance of "the second grade of percep-
tion" and therefore "assigned to sense" (as opposed to intellect). Yet, the intellect "reasoning
from the extension of that color" deduces the "size, shape and distance" of physical objects. (See
the quotation from the Objections and Replies, p. 32 above.) The importance of this point will be
assessed in some detail below.
'" R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meterology, trans. P. J. Olscamp
(Indianopolis, New York, Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) Pp. 117-18 (Hereafter, Discourse,
Pp. 117-18) (AT-V1, Pp, 15e-53 ) The illustrative (redrawn) diagram following this passage
occurs in numerous places in various editions of the Dioptrics. It occurs on the page facing this
passage in the Latin edition of 1656. See R. Descartes, Specimina Philosophiae (Amsterdam:
Elzevir, 1656), Pp. 98-9 .
324 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

/
i

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t


.-.... .%,
-**- ..o **.
..*** :z**
.-**: ///
.~ i!
.....
.***.
/:
s
; "?
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9..... .* s

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PERCEPTION 325
Granted, there is much about this analysis of distance and magnitude
which when applied to the case of sense deceptions remains unsatisfactory
from the viewpoint of critical philosophical appraisal. For example, this analy-
sis prompts at least two sorts of questions. The first involves justification for
the application of one or more of these three principles. Typical questions of
this sort seek reasons for ruling out alternative explanations related to what is
referred to above as "background conditions." For example, "What conditions
allow one to rule out the abnormal influences of refraction, eye shape, etc.?" I
think that because of the very nature of these cases, there can be no general
answers to such questions. This is so for the same sorts of reasons which
prevent a general characterization of background conditions figuring in the
application of any general scientific law to particular confirming observations.
In the case of convergence distance from the back of the eye for example, an
adequate general characterization would have to account for such diverse
phenomena as the possible influence of near-sightedness and far-sighted-
ness, '~ together with possible malfunctions involving the neurophysiology of
the optic system, the involuntary muscles influencing eye shape, etc. It is the
very diversity of such phenomena which militates against the adequacy of
general formulations of background conditions. Descartes handles this sort of
objection by noting that in making such inferences the mind is aware of the
relevant bodily states (e.g., the elongation of the eye, the rotation of the eyes
to affect binocular depth perception) thus enabling it to rule out certain of the
above influences, and together with a "native geometry" rightly or wrongly
producing judgments in accordance with the remaining one. The analogy he
employed in this respect is the inference made by a blind man who, by his
awareness of his bodily state (i.e., the angles formed by his outstrected arms to
the trunk of his body), is able to utilize triangulation in judging the distance
from his chest that the sticks he is holding make contact. Analogously, by
monitoring the movement of the eyes when they focus binocularly and from
brain states associated with the resulting image, the mind infers the distance
of an object. '~ (The distance between the eyes define the base line of the
triangle and each eye is the apex of a base angle which is known when binocu-
lar focus occurs.) Thus, it is not image size (and its corresponding effect on
the brain) alone which enables the mind to judge distance and magnitude, but
rather a complex of factors functioning together, enabling the intellect to
determine the relevance, in specific cases, of image size and associated brain
states to distance and magnitude.

'~ Conditionswhich Descartes discusses early in Dioptrics VII.


'~ See Discourse Pp. lO4-6. (AT-VI, Pp. 134-137)
326 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The second sort of objection which can be raised about any analysis such
as D e s c a r t e s ' s s e e m s f a r m o r e s e r i o u s to m e . S u c h o b j e c t i o n s a r e t y p i f i e d b y
q u e s t i o n s l i k e " W h a t is t h e relevance o f b a c k - o f - e y e i m a g e s to w h a t is seen?
Surely one does not see the back of one's eye when one observes something."
A n e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e o f s u c h a n o b j e c t i o n is p r o v i d e d b y C . M . T u r b a y n e
in his e d i t i o n o f B e r k e l e y ' s W o r k s on Vision. T h e r e h e r e - e v o k e s t h e w e l l - w o r n
s p e c t e r o f t h e " g h o s t in t h e m a c h i n e " w h o s e d i a p h a n o u s s h r o u d is o f t e n u s e d
to o b s c u r e o n e o r a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f C a r t e s i a n i s m . O f t h e camera obscura m o d e l
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h " g e o m e t r i c a l t h e o r i e s " s u c h as D e s c a r t e s ' s , T u r b a y n e says:
9 . the c a m e r a m o d e l nicely illustrates the passive aspect of the m i n d in vision, but it
.

can shed no light on the active process o f perception: It seems to require, b e h i n d the
camera, a ghost with a n o t h e r pair o f eyes who contemplates and interprets the
pictures o f the c a m e r a screen, j u s t as Kepler had to get inside his own c a m e r a
obscura. In o r d e r to meet this difficulty, Descartes merely substituted a d i f f e r e n t
ghost, one who does not see the pictures but w h o feels "the movements by which the
pictures are f o r m e d . " . . . A well-known difficulty, also shared by o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a -
tive theories, is this: How d o we know that o u r sense data r e p r e s e n t physical objects
when the latter cannot be e x p e r i e n c e d ? This difficulty p r o m p t e d philosophers to
p r o d u c e elaborate proofs o f the external world 9 Kepler did not "see" any retinal
images except his own. But Descartes thought he did: "Take the eye o f a newly d e a d
man . . . . You will see, I d a r e say with surprise a n d pleasure, a picture r e p r e s e n t i n g in
natural perspective all the objects outside." T h u s he thought that he could c o m p a r e
the p h o t o g r a p h with the original, but he was d e l u d e d ; according to the theory, he
could contemplate only his own images on the back o f his own camera and c o m p a r e
them now with another. Yet a n o t h e r difficulty is that, according to the theory, we
make deductive inferences to the external world from o u r retinal images, but when
we see, we d o not seem to be aware of the inference or its premise. Accordingly, it
was decided that we p e r f o r m the inference without knowing that we do. T h e final
difficulty is that the Geometrical T h e o r y really provides no solution to the p r o b l e m
o f illusion unless it places a ghost behind the camera screen. But even this is not
enough, for the size, and color o f the p h o t o g r a p h are all that the ghost has to go on.
He can make an inference to the c r o o k e d oar, but he cannot see that it is straight. He
can make an inference to the yellow cup, but he cannot see that it is white. '3

O f c o u r s e , D e s c a r t e s d o e s n o t a r g u e t h a t o n e c a n "see," " f e e l , " " c o n t e m -


p l a t e " o r o t h e r w i s e " g o o n " o n e ' s o w n b a c k - o f - e y e i m a g e s in o r d e r to " M a k e
d e d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e s " to t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . I n s t e a d h e a r g u e s
t h a t o n e c a n n o t in g o o d s e n s e b e s a i d to see t h e s e " i m a g e s . '''4 T h o s e p a s s a g e s

,:3 G. Berkeley, Works on Vision, C.N. Turbayne ed. (Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), Pp. xxv-xxvi. My italics.
,4 At the end of the fourth and the beginning of the sixth discourses of the Dioptrics,
Descartes warns his reader at some length against the misleading character of such a supposi-
tion although some have claimed that he himself is sometimes guilty of speaking as if one could
see these images. For example, see A.J.P. Kenney, "The Homunculus Fallacy," Interpretations of
Life and Mind, ed., M. Grene (New York: Humanities, 1971), Pp. 65-74.
PERCEPTION 327

in which he rejects this role of images as observed entities in the process of


perception anticipate similar warnings concerning recent discussions of im-
ages in philosophy and psychology. For example,
. . . no one writing in this book (nor any of the other serious participants in the
debate) thinks that people can literally see and manipulate real internal pictures.
Brain scientists have found no pictures in the brain and even if they had, the pre-
sence of pictures wouldn't explain the phenomena unless the brain also contained an
internal eye to view them and an internal flashlight and internal hands to manipulate
them, etc. (And even if we postulate an internal eye, would there be still another eye
in that eye's brain?) ~5
For Descartes the role of the back-of-eye image in the process of percep-
tion is a theoretical one and not one providing an object of observation.
Whatever else is wrong with criticisms like those outlined by Turbayne, it
should be clear that they systematically confuse the roles of observable and
theoretical entities in geometrical theories like those of Descartes and Kep-
ler. Briefly put, for Descartes the back of the eye forms a grid of neurophys-
iological sensors. Each receptor provides a signal in the form of a unique
"motion" which passes to the "cleavages" of the brain and together with
numerous other such motions is finally interpreted by the mind, and not by a
further set of sensory receptors as the above objection supposes. Descartes
believed that the receptors are affected uniquely in ways corresponding to
aspects of the image (see, for example, the conclusion of Discourse Five,
Dioptrics). As dubious and unclear as this belief may be it cannot be doubted
that it/s Descartes's view, and although it is less than obvious, ! think that he
would regard this claim as testable in principle, if not in practice. As in his
explanation of the phantom limb phenomenon, artifical stimulation of a
receptor, usually affected only by certain specific "movements of light,"
which normally produce a retinal image would influence the mind's judg-
ment in predictable ways; as for example, when a blow to the eye causes one
to "see lightning flashes" even when no light is entering the eye. '6 In the
latter case certain color sensations normally associated with those "move-
ments of light" producing the image of firewords in the eye have been
artifically produced, prejudicing the mind's perceptual judgments in certain
predictable ways.
Thus there is a theoretical correspondence between a property of the
image and a neurophysiological signal which affects sense judgments of the

~5 N. Block, ed., Imagery (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1981), "Introduction,"


p. 2.
,6 See, for example, Discourse, Pp. 99-1o2 and following. (AT-VI, x3off. ) See also, HR I, p.
295. ( A T - V I I I - 3 2 2 )
398 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

third g r a d e (e.g., that "fireworks" are flashing b e f o r e m y eyes). W h a t is


i m p o r t a n t h e r e is that, were such a t h e o r y acceptable, it would explain why
u n d e r " n o r m a l " circumstances, what is seen (i.e., part o f a fireworks
display) '7 c o r r e s p o n d s to p r o p e r t i e s o f the image. T h u s I think Descartes is
to be f o r g i v e n if he at times a p p e a r s to be claiming that o n e sees images w h e n
looking at fireworks, for what is correct in such cases, is that looking at the
back o f a d i s e m b o d i e d eye (or its mechanical model: the c a m e r a obscura) tells
o n e what p r o p e r t i e s o f a fireworks display would be seen ~7 if one's eyes were
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y affected by the light o f an e x p l o d i n g skyrocket. O t h e r vari-
ables affecting p e r c e p t i o n such as those n o t e d in the above q u o t a t i o n f r o m
the D i o p t r i c s can be e x p e r i m e n t a l l y duplicated by m a n i p u l a t i n g a disem-
b o d i e d eye thus affecting c h a n g e s in the image c o r r e s p o n d i n g to those
c h a n g e s in eye shape which affect focus a n d h e n c e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s
such as those a b o u t a statue's size o r a tower's shape.
Descartes s u m m a r i z e s his findings c o n c e r n i n g j u d g m e n t s o f size a n d
shape a n d how these are effectively influenced a n d c o r r e c t e d by k n o w l e d g e
o f the conditions affecting such images.
As to the manner in which we see the size and shape of objects, I need not say
anything in particular, inasmuch as it is all included in the manner in which we see
the distance and the position of their parts. Thus, their size is estimated according to
the knowledge, or the opinion, that we have of their distance, compared with the size
of the images that they imprint on the back of the eye; and not absolutely by the size
of these images, as is obvious enough from this: while the images may be, for ex-
ample, one hundred times larger when the objects are quite close to us than when
they are ten times farther away, they do not make us see the objects as one hundred
times larger because of this, but as almost equal in size, at least if their distance does
not deceive us. And it is also obvious that shape is judged by the knowledge, or
opinion, that we have of the position of various parts of the objects, and not by
resemblance of the pictures in the eye; for these pictures usually contain only ovals
and diamond shapes, yet they cause us to see circles and squares. 18

It should now be clear that Descartes i n t e n d e d his t h e o r y o f optics to


provide an a c c o u n t o f how k n o w l e d g e influences a n d corrects p e r c e p t u a l
j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g those very p r o p e r t i e s o f m a t t e r which were subject to
the M e d i t a t i o n s ' sceptical a r g u m e n t s , c o n c e r n i n g ' j u d g m e n t s f o u n d e d o n the
external senses" (e.g., j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g specific m o d e s o f size, distance
a n d shape).

17 For Descartes, this would be a true perceptual judgment of grade three.


,a Discourse, p. 1o7. (AT-VI, p. 14o) I understand this passage to provide evidence against
claims, like those of Turbayne, to the effect that, for Descartes, eye images serve as objects of
observation or contemplation in the process of perception. For further discussion of the com-
monly alledged "representative" function of images and ideas in Descartes's theory of percep-
tion, see II below.
PERCEPTION 329

II

I now t u r n to the issue o f whether, in contrast to that view outlined above


f r o m his "scientific" works, Descartes can o r should be taken to hold a
version o f representationalism. Typical o f the problems c o n f r o n t i n g those
who seek to discover the basis for a " s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d " t h e o r y o f sense per-
ception in the Meditations o r related philosophical works is that all such
accounts fasten u p o n r a t h e r obscure claims about the relationship between
ideas (or images) a n d the physical objects they are s u p p o s e d to r e p r e s e n t or
be caused by. First off, it is far f r o m obvious that Descartes i n t e n d e d such
claims to be claims about sense p e r c e p t i o n despite his n u m e r o u s r e f e r e n c e s
to the similarity such " t h o u g h t s " bear to images, pictures, etchings, words,
etc, all o f which could be taken to r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g or o t h e r in some
respect or other. It is certainly not unusual to find philosophers using simi-
lar visual anologies a b o u t " t h o u g h t s " o f a distinctly n o n - p e r c e p t u a l n a t u r e
(e.g., involving propositions, j u d g m e n t s , beliefs, etc.). T h u s , for example,
propositions are sometimes said to "picture," " m i r r o r , " "diagram," o r " m a p "
things and their properties, empirical facts, etc..
I find it difficult to suppose, without s u p p o r t i n g a r g u m e n t , that similar
visual analogies in Descartes's philosophical works are m e a n t to suggest a
t h e o r y o f sense p e r c e p t i o n (as o p p o s e d , say, to a causal t h e o r y o f empirical
knowledge) for two reasons. T h e first and most obvious reason is that Des-
cartes does not p u t f o r w a r d such claims as claims about sense p e r c e p t i o n p e r
se; whereas, in his m o r e scientific works he is quite articulate a b o u t exactly
what p r o p e r t i e s can be "attributed to sense." Finally, those puzzles involving
sense p e r c e p t i o n in the Meditations do not even make tacit r e f e r e n c e to ideas,
w h e t h e r c o n s t r u e d as images or not.
T h u s , the a r g u m e n t f r o m Meditation VI which Descartes claims "de-
stroyed all f a i t h . . , in my senses" contains no m e n t i o n o f ideas o r images at
all. T h e " e r r o r s " r e f e r r e d to are e r r o r s " . . . in j u d g m e n t s f o u n d e d on the
external senses. ''9 In addition, t h e r e is no evidence t h e r e or elsewhere for
the assumption that such e r r o r s can be c o r r e c t e d by getting clear a b o u t the
"connection b e t w e e n ideas a n d things . . . . ' .... T h e best that can be said a b o u t
this assumption is that it is widely held. T h r o u g h o u t his discussion o f grade-
t h r e e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s t h e r e is no significant m e n t i o n o f ideas. More-
over, his conclusion is that such j u d g m e n t s are not p r o p e r l y attributed to
"simple sense p e r c e p t i o n " at all. In addition if c o n f r o n t e d with the claim that
w h e n looking at a h a l f - i m m e r s e d staff, we always see or otherwise a p p r e -

'~ HR I, p. x89. (AT-VII, 76 )


~" See the Wilson passage referred to in note ~ above.
330 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

h e n d s o m e t h i n g which is not identical with that s t a f f but is s o m e h o w related


to it (causally?) or, in s o m e way, r e p r e s e n t s it, Descartes would p r o b a b l y not
h a v e r e c o g n i z e d it as a t h e o r y which he could o r s h o u l d h a v e held. I n fact, in
the o p e n i n g s e n t e n c e o f the r e l e v a n t discussion Descartes claims that we see
the s t a f f a n d not s o m e t h i n g that r e p r e s e n t s it. T h e r e is no r e a s o n to believe
that he r e g a r d e d the case discussed in Meditation VI differently.
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the p r e s e n c e o r absence o f p e r c e p t u a l significance asso-
ciated with the t e n u o u s l y alleged c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n ideas a n d things in the
Meditations, it should be clear that Descartes held that u n d e r n o r m a l c i r c u m -
stances, in the case o f veridical p e r c e p t i o n , we see things like h a l f - i m m e r s e d
sticks, a n d i n f e r (judge) their c o r r e c t p r o p e r t i e s , a n d in the case o f n o n -
veridical p e r c e p t i o n we see things like towers, a n d statues, a n d falsely i n f e r
(judge) their p r o p e r t i e s . Descartes did not wish to hold that, in cases w h e r e it
would be c o r r e c t to say o n e is looking at a thing, o n e always sees, feels o r
otherwise c o n t e m p l a t e s , s o m e t h i n g (an idea, an image, sense d a t u m , etc.)
which is not identical with what o n e is looking at. T h u s Descartes did not
(consistently) hold a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h e o r y o f sense p e r c e p t i o n n o r would
he have w a n t e d to hold such a t h e o r y if it w e r e e x p l a i n e d to him. O f course,
he d o e s a p p e a r to hold a causal t h e o r y o f empirical k n o w l e d g e (or j u d g -
ment), but this point was n e v e r at issue. I f this m e a n s that Descartes c a n n o t
"be ascribed a t h e o r y o f sense p e r c e p t i o n s at all, in the o r d i n a r y philosophi-
cal sense. ''~' t h e n so be it. H o w e v e r the r e a s o n for this is clearly not a lack o f
"cognitive significance" o n Descartes's part.
T h e only passages s u g g e s t i n g either a causal o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e role for
ideas in sense p e r c e p t i o n are a d m i t t e d l y u n c l e a r c o n c e r n i n g the exact n a t u r e
o f that role, for Descartes. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , w h e n classifying ideas in
Meditation III, he says:

Of my thoughts some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the
title "idea" properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of
heaven, of an angel, or [even] of God. But other thoughts possess other forms as
well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying, though I always perceive
something as the subject of the action of my mind, yet by this action I always add
something else to the idea (In the Latin version "similitudinem.") which I have of that
thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and
others judgments. ~

I would like to sketch an alternative to the s t a n d a r d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t ' s


i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a b o v e passage f r o m Meditation III. As noted, the stan-
d a r d a c c o u n t o f this passage r e p r e s e n t s Descartes as m a i n t a i n i n g that a d v e n -

~' HR I, p. 159. (AT-VII, 37) My italics.


~ See for example, A.J.P. Kenny, Descartes, Pp. 1o5-6
PERCEPTION 331

titious ideas are to be r e g a r d e d as (like) images or pictures o f objects. In


themselves such ideas cannot be r e g a r d e d as false. (With the possible excep-
tion of ideas like color, heat, pain, etc., which somehow carry with t h e m the
p r e s u m p t i o n o f "a certain material falsity.") ~3 However, when, t h r o u g h an
act of the will, the m i n d j u d g e s o f the idea (image) which it is aware o f that it
(the idea or image) either correctly or incorrectly characterizes an object, the
resulting j u d g m e n t is then true (or false). I will not here go into the s t a n d a r d
objections to such a view, a l t h o u g h some are noted above and below, for
some of them are as misconceived as the view itself.
T h e view, which I claim is Descartes's, departs f r o m the standard one in
respects which make discussion of such objections unnecessary. It is in sub-
stance, the one d r a w n f r o m the reply to Objection VI discussed above, and it
differs f r o m instances of the standard representative interpretation in one
or all o f following significant respects:
~. As noted above, Descartes there claims, o f the external senses, that a
grade-three perception is about the shape o f an object, and not about
whether the p r o p e r t y of an image or idea represents a property o f that
object. (See his reply to Objection VI and the passages from the Dioptrics
quoted at length above.) Moreover, as will be shown shortly below, shape can
no more be a property of an image (whether representational or not) t h a n
can distance or object size.
2. These grade-three perceptions are strickly speaking, j u d g m e n t s of the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and not, strictly speaking, sense perception although com-
monly ascribed to sense perception.
3. All that is strictly a matter o f sense perception are the first and second
grades of perception. These are limited to the internal perception (i.e., sen-
sation) of color resulting f r o m reflected light and motions in the nerves.
4. A third grade perceptual j u d g m e n t "results f r o m the sensation o f
color by which I am affected a n d likewise my reasoning from the extension
of that color, its boundries, and its position relatively to the parts of my brain
to the size, shape and distance of the said staff. TM
5. It is clear also that this reasoning f r o m the extension of color (grade-
two perceptions) together with such d e d u c e d principles as are f o u n d in the
Optics cannot be conscious, as noted above.
6. Hence the perceptions (i.e. j u d g m e n t s ) of size, shape and distance
which "result from" this reasoning cannot d e p e n d u p o n a conscious infe-
rence f r o m the perceivers' awareness o f his own sense data (grade-two
perceptions).

~3 HR I, p. 164. (AT-VII, p. 43)


'24 HR II, p. 252. (AT-VII, p. 438)
33~ HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

7. N o r can they be said to be a b o u t (have as their objects) such grade-two


perceptions.
Now insofar as the s t a n d a r d view outlined above must reject o n e o r m o r e
o f these points, it is clearly inconsistent with the view o f Reply VI. Whereas, it
is not equally clear that the view o f Reply VI is inconsistent with Meditations
III, IV and VI in view o f the vague use o f terms like "idea" and "image" in
the latter work.
T h e most plausible f o r m u l a t i o n o f the s t a n d a r d representationalist view
has recently been p r o p o s e d by Nancy Maull. Basing h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u p o n
the Dioptrics and related works she summarizes her view as follows:
We cannot assume, according to Descartes, that say sensational content--color or
figure--resembles the object it represents. However, figures, unlike colors, can be
the subject matter of geometry. Upon reflection, we even find ourselves in possession
of rules (actually the rules of perspective) for the projection of three-dimensional
figures onto a two-dimensional plane. We need only "reverse" these rules to apply a
natural geometry and to form perceptual judgments about three-dimensional objects.
At least this is Descartes' way of explicating a sense in which the content of our
sensations may be "similar" to the physical objects that they represent: in more or less
the way that an engraving resembles what it represents. ~,~

W h a t she h e r e refers to as "sensational content" is what she assumes is the


object o f the mind's "direct awareness" in perception. Whereas, t h e r e is no
"direct awareness" o f physical objects in perception. T h u s her view seems to
be that the figure o f an object is i n f e r r e d f r o m the figure o f "sensational
content" directly perceived. W h a t strikes o n e as implausible a b o u t such a
view is that there could be a visual sensation o f figure. '~6 It should be clear
f r o m 4. above that the relevant "sensational content" is limited to color, and
that "reasoning" f r o m this internal (grade-two) sensation does not involve
r e a s o n i n g f r o m a "mental" r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f figure to the figure o f an
object. T h e so-called " b o u n d a r i e s " o f the relevant color sensations were not,
and i n d e e d c a n n o t in good sense be, characterized as a sensation (i.e., inter-
nal perception) o f figure o r shape by Descartes.
Maull's e r r o r in this c o n n e c t i o n is e x t r e m e l y serious. It is a failure to
distinguish passages in which Descartes speaks o f the respect in which "inter-
nal perceptions" or sensations, p r o p e r l y speaking, r e p r e s e n t p r o p e r t i e s o f
(or in) physical objects, f r o m passages in which he speaks o f the respect(s) in
which images (pineal or retinal) r e p r e s e n t p r o p e r t i e s o f (or in) objects. In

45 N a n c y Maull, "Cartesian Optics a n d t h e G e o m e t r i z a t i o n o f N a t u r e , " The Review of Meta-


physics, Vol. X X X I I , # 2 . 1978, 27~.
~ O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is, p e r h a p s , plausible to s u p p o s e that o n e m i g h t have a tactile
s e n s a t i o n o f s h a p e or figure; as, for e x a m p l e , w h e n o n e g r o p e s a b o u t in a d a r k r o o m .
PERCEPTION 333

the case o f sensations, the best that can be said o f their relation to physical
objects is that such objects "dispose" us to have the a p p r o p r i a t e color o r
pain sensations. In the case o f images, as has been n o t e d at length above,
their shape o r figure, r e p r e s e n t the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l objects
in a m a n n e r best described by projective geometry. Now, it is correct to.say
o f Descartes that inferences are m a d e f r o m sensations o f color, a f t e r the
m a n n e r outlined in his reply to the Sixth Objection, to the size, shape a n d
distance o f physical objects. As n o t e d above, it is also correct to say o f him
that it would be a mistake to suppose that in visual p e r c e p t i o n we m a k e
such inferences f r o m images even t h o u g h these images r e p r e s e n t physical
objects after the m a n n e r described by g e o m e t r y . Now, once the a p p r o p r i -
ate passages are conflated, it can be m a d e to a p p e a r that (1) shape is a
sensation just as color is and (2) since it is correct to say that we i n f e r via a
"native g e o m e t r y " f r o m sensations (grade-two perception) to the shapes o f
objects, that (3), for Descartes, p e r c e p t i o n involves an i n f e r e n c e f r o m a
m i n d - d e p e n d e n t sensation o f shape to the shape o f the object which it
represents. Yet, in fact, t h e r e is no m o r e reason to suppose that for Des-
cartes the shape o f an object has a "mental" c o u n t e r p a r t , than to suppose
that its distance f r o m the eye is r e p r e s e n t e d in sensation. While it is clearly
true that, for Descartes, we perceive, o r r a t h e r j u d g e , distance and size via
sensation, and without the intervention o f a "mental" representative, this is
also t r u e o f shape.
T h e e r r o n e o u s conflation o f sensations, like pain, or color with p r o p e r t i e s
like shape occurs once well-known passages illustrating a lack o f resemblance
between relevant sensations and the p r o p e r t i e s o f objects with which they
are sometimes mistakenly assimilated are taken to illustrate the same point as
equally well-known passages in which Descartes also indicates a lack o f exact
resemblance betweem images (usually retinal, or pineal) which are e i t h e r
assumed or observed to r e p r e s e n t the t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l objects to which
they are causally related. Passages o f the f o r m e r sort cited by Maull are
typified by one use o f the "word analogy ''~7 in which Descartes argues that
just as a word causes us to conceive s o m e t h i n g to which it bears no resem-
blance, so too, in nature, sensations n e e d not resemble states o f affairs o r the
surfaces o f objects to which they draw o u r attention. In the following pas-
sage Maull conflates this talk a b o u t the n o n - r e s e m b l a n c e o f sensations to
their physical causes with a passage in t h e Dioptrics w h e r e Descartes is ar-
guing for the limited resemblance b e t w e e n images in o u r brain and their
causes by r e f e r e n c e to the often-cited e n g r a v i n g analogy.

47 See N. Maull, Pp. 259-60


334 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Dioptrics, he makes a claim that is somewhat puzzling, since he just previously
utilized the "word analogy" to suggest that no images or pictures are transmitted to
the brain [sic] in perception. He wrote, "And if in order to depart as little as possible
from currently accepted beliefs, we prefer to avow that the objects which we perceive
truly transmit their images to the inside of our brain, we must at least observe that
there are no images that must resemble in every respect the objects that they repre-
s e n t . . . " (my italics). It is sufficient, he went on to say, for images to resemble objects
in a limited way as engravings "represent to us forests, towns, men and even battles
and storms," by resembling them only in shape. And even with respect to shape, he
continued, the resemblance is "very imperfect," for engravings represent a three-
dimensional array on a flat, two-dimensional surface so that, "following the rules of
perspective, circles are often better represented by ovals rather than by circles; and
squares by diamonds rather than by other squares . . . . ,,28

It m u s t be c a u t i o n e d t h a t the w o r d a n a l o g y as it o c c u r s in d i s c o u r s e f o u r ,
p r i o r to this passage, has a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t f r o m the a n a l o g y w h i c h she
p r e v i o u s l y cited f r o m T h e W o r l d . As n o t e d above, in t h e latter case it was
b e i n g a r g u e d t h a t s e n s a t i o n d o e s n o t r e s e m b l e a quality in t h e object w h i c h
causes it a n y m o r e t h a n a w o r d c a n be said to r e s e m b l e the t h o u g h t w h i c h it
occasions. I n d i s c o u r s e f o u r the w o r d / t h o u g h t a n a l o g y is u s e d to d e m o n -
strate t h a t o n e m u s t n o t a s s u m e , as is c o m m o n l y d o n e , t h a t t h e role o f
i m a g e s in p e r c e p t i o n is t h e s a m e as t h a t o f p i c t u r e s w h i c h " r e s e m b l e t h e
object t h e y r e p r e s e n t . " T o this e n d , D e s c a r t e s r e m i n d s his r e a d e r t h a t
" . . . t h e r e a r e m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s besides p i c t u r e s w h i c h c a n s t i m u l a t e o u r
t h o u g h t , s u c h as, f o r e x a m p l e , signs a n d w o r d s w h i c h d o n o t in a n y way
r e s e m b l e the t h i n g s t h e y signify. ''29
I n c o n t r a s t to his use o f the w o r d a n a l o g y in T h e W o r l d it s h o u l d be n o t e d
t h a t D e s c a r t e s is n o t h e r e

l) C o n c e r n e d with the r e s e m b l a n c e , o r lack t h e r e o f , b e t w e e n s e n s a t i o n a n d


objects; in fact, he is n o t h e r e c o n c e r n e d with sensations at all.
(2) N o r , is he h e r e d e n y i n g a r e s e m b l a n c e o r partial r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n
i m a g e s a n d objects.

It is o n l y by w r o n g l y i d e n t i f y i n g these two distinct uses o f Descartes's


w o r d a n a l o g y a n d h e n c e by c o n f l a t i n g claims a b o u t sensations with i m p o r -
tantly d i f f e r e n t claims a b o u t i m a g e s , t h a t o n e c o u l d e v e n s u p p o s e a n i n c o n -

~s N. Maull, p. ~6~. It should be noted in passing that Maull is also mistaken in suggesting
that the "word analogy," as it appears prior to this passage, is used by Descartes to show that no
images are transmitted to the brain in perception. On the contrary, Descartes is here arguing in
the manner, often noted above, of his cautions against the "homunculus fallacy." What he
actually argues is that "... we must beware of assuming that in order to sense, the mind needs to
perceive certain images transmitted by the objects to the brain . . . . '" Discourse 89 (AT-VI, p. a 12)
~9 Discourse, 8 9 (AT-VI, p. 1 l~)
I'ERCEPTION 335
sistency in the j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f the w o r d a n d e n g r a v i n g analogies in dis-
c o u r s e f o u r , Dioptrics. T h u s , Descartes's r e f e r e n c e , in the e n g r a v i n g analogy,
to the o c c u r r e n c e o f a partial r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n i m a g e s a n d objects
puzzles Maull simply because she has misassimilated talk a b o u t sensations,
which b e a r n o r e s e m b l a n c e to objects which cause t h e m , with talk a b o u t
c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s which do b e a r a limited r e s e m b l a n c e to their causes. T h i s
b e c o m e s obvious w h e n in the passage following the o n e j u s t q u o t e d she
a t t e m p t s to resovle the puzzle which she has mistakenly i n t r o d u c e d .
Why should Descartes, ostensibly in order to "depart as little as possible from cur-
rently accepted belief" go so far as to introduce a new analogy, one which is, on the
face of it, at odds with his earlier claim that our sensations need not resemble what
they represent? [sic] The answer is that Descartes, far from holding to a strict view of
non-resemblance, utilizes both analogies when he explains perception. His new, addi-
tional suggestion of some resemblance in perception, the one drawn from an analogy
with engravings, is not really inconsistent with the preceding conclusion, the one
drawn from an analogy with words. Descartes still held that we have no direct access
to independently existing physical objects through perception. However, while still
holding this conclusion, he wanted the case for color perception to be very different
from the awareness of figure. Although color and figure are invariably conjoined in
sensation, Descartes assumes that the mind may direct its awareness separtely to one
or the other. -~~

Far f r o m resolving the r e s e m b l a n c e / n o n - r e s e m b l a n c e "puzzle," it is clear


f r o m the a b o v e that figure has b e e n mistakenly conflated with color as a
sensation, a l t h o u g h in the r e l e v a n t passage m e n t i o n i n g figure, Descartes is
clearly talking a b o u t c o r p o r e a l images, a n d not m e n t a l entities like sensations.
O f c o u r s e o n c e this mistake is m a d e , the stage is set for Maull's misassimilation
o f Cartesian figure to a B e r k e l e a n "idea o f s h a p e " a n d h e r c o n s e q u e n t sym-
p a t h y with the g o o d bishop's rejection o f cartesian " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m "
which they b o t h mistakenly attribute to Descartes' Dioptrics.
I n point o f fact, e v e n if Descartes w e r e to have a c c e p t e d the h o m u n c u l a r -
ian i n f e r e n c e f r o m i m a g e - s h a p e to object-shape, which he actually rejects, it
would be difficult to u n d e r s t a n d how he could be accused o f " r e p r e s e n t a -
tionalism." F o r on that a s s u m p t i o n the m i n d would be directly c o n f r o n t e d
not with a m e n t a l entity, b u t with a physical entity. T h u s , on such an as-
s u m p t i o n he w o u l d h a v e to be r e g a r d e d not as a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l realist, but
as a direct realist. C o n t r a r y to g o o d sense, a n d n u m e r o u s passages to the
c o n t r a r y w h e r e he r e f e r s to ideas as nonphysical, t h e r e is s o m e evidence in
his Treatise of Man a n d e l s e w h e r e that Descartes actually c o n s i d e r e d such a
f o r m o f direct realism.

~~ N. Maull, p. 262.
336 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Now among these figures, it is not those imprinted on the organs of external
sense, or on the internal surface of the brain, but only those traced in spirits on the
surface of gland H, where the seat of imagination and common sense is, that should be
taken to be ideas, that is to say, to be the forms or images that the rational soul will
consider directly when, being united to. this machine, it will imagine or will sense any
object.3,

III
I f what I say a b o v e is c o r r e c t a n d Descartes did intend relevant p o r t i o n s o f
the Dioptrics to explain certain o f his m o r e philosophical claims a b o u t r e a s o n
a n d the senses, a n d as solutions to his sceptical claims a b o u t d e c e p t i v e j u d g -
m e n t s o f size a n d s h a p e in Meditation VI, t h e n certain interesting issues arise
c o n c e r n i n g the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f claims which he m a k e s o n related issues.
T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , if Descartes is t a k e n to hold that k n o w l e d g e (conscious
o r nonconscious) o f certain laws o f optics s o m e t i m e s provides t r u e g r a d e -
t h r e e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g m a g n i t u d e , distance, a n d shape, as
a p p e a r s to be the case o n the a b o v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , how is o n e to u n d e r s t a n d
his claims elsewhere in which these p r o p e r t i e s a r e t r e a t e d as extensive m a g -
nitudes or " p r i m a r y qualities" as they w e r e later called? Specifically, is what
he would call a t r u e g r a d e - t h r e e p e r c e p t i o n ( j u d g m e n t ) an instance o f know-
ing a p r i m a r y quality, e.g., shape? A l t h o u g h it would be t e m p t i n g to a n s w e r
this question positively, p r u d e n c e dictates that a n y a n s w e r to such a question
requires qualification extensive e n o u g h to fall b e y o n d the scope o f this
p a p e r . For e x a m p l e , a positive answer, if t r u e would only serve to explain
k n o w l e d g e of" observable p r i m a r y qualities: what Locke would call "sensible"
p r i m a r y qualities; w h e r e a s Descartes s o m e t i m e s claims k n o w l e d g e o f the
p r i m a r y qualities o f insensible particles (e.g., Principles, IV, 2o3ff). Clearly
such k n o w l e d g e o f insensible p r i m a r y qualities would be o f a sort quite
d i f f e r e n t f r o m that p r o v i d e d by g r a d e - t h r e e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s . H o w -
ever, Descartes seems to believe that k n o w l e d g e o f this latter sort is i n f e r r e d
with the help o f k n o w l e d g e o f "sensible" p r i m a r y qualities, a n d hence, de-
p e n d s in p a r t at least u p o n t r u e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o f the third grade. 3~
T w o final points: First, it m a y s e e m to s o m e that taking a "scientific"
theory, such as that o f the Dioptrics, in s u p p o r t o f claims a b o u t the real
p r o p e r t i e s o f o b s e r v e d objects fails to p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e justification for
such claims. I n d e f e n s e o f this objection it could be p o i n t e d out that Des-

:3, R. Descartes, Treatise of Man, trans., Thomas Steel Hall (Cambridge: Harvard, 197~), p.
86. (AT-XI, Pp. 176-7) Note the uncharacteristic use of the term "idea." Although not com-
pletely consistent in this respect, his use of the term "idea" for a mode of res extensa is typical of
his usage throughout the Treatise of Man.
:~ Of course this interpretation requires some justification. Such a justification can be
defended. However, this defense would extend beyond the scope of the present paper. Briefly,
the key passage figuring in such a defense is Principles IV, w 3.
PERCEPTION 337

cartes himself admits that the principles upon which he bases his scientific
conclusions are merely "hypothetical" ("suppositions"), and not based, as he
claimed early in the Rules, upon "intuition and deduction" as they should be.
On this point, I would tend to agree with commentators like Daniel Garber :~:~
who claims that at the time he composed his scientific works Descartes still
maintained the view of the Rules, and that although he based his work on
hypotheses, he is nonetheless convinced that these hypotheses could be justi-
fied by intuition and deduction although for didactic purposes and for con-
venience he chose not to do this.
Finally, it is almost certainly to be objected that a theory of perception such
as the one found in the Dioptrics cannot be philosophically adequate because
adequacy of this sort requires that such a theory establish both the existence of
physical objects and certain of their properties as well as an account of how
those properties are correctly ascribed to such objects. It could be argued
further that, while Descartes's Dioptrics may do the latter after the manner I
have outlined above, it only assumes the former. That is, although Descartes's
theory of optics may explain how one attributes certain properties correctly to
towers, still in doing so it assumes the existence of such things as towers, stars
and statues together with certain of their other properties, e.g., that they
reflect light in certain ways under certain conditions. In short, all of De-
scartes's conclusions are dependent upon assuming that physical objects tog-
ether with some commonly attributed properties of" them exist.
There are two things to be noted about this objection. First, while it may be
justifiable to require certain philosophically adequate theories of perception to
establish assumptions like these, it would be unjustifiable to expect this of
Descartes. For Descartes, this assumption is subject to metaphysical rather
than epistemological justification. T h a t things like towers exist together with
certain of the properties we attribute to them is what Descartes supposes he
has established in his Sixth Meditation proof of the external world.
Secondly, regardless of whether this assumption is or even can be justi-
fied, Descartes's theory of perception as outlined above need not even ad-
dress itself to its justification, because all that can be expected of such a
theory is that it address itself to the perceptual scepticism of the Meditations.
It will be recalled that those puzzles only concern which of the conflicting
extensive properties attributable to a single thing (which is already assumed
to exist pretty much in the [orm it is commonly supposed to have e.g., a
roundish/squarish tower) truly hold of such a thing.

University of California, Davis

~3 D. Garber, "Science and Certainty in Descartes," Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essay;s,
ed., Michael Hooker (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), Pp. 114- 5.

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