Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
a Philosophical Theory
of Sense Perception?'
RONALD ARBINI
[3~7]
318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
be f o u n d in his philosophical works, but only in his Dioptrics a n d related
"scientific" texts. I n this c o n n e c t i o n it will be a r g u e d f u r t h e r , b o t h that
Descartes i n t e n d e d this t h e o r y to solve the well-known p r o b l e m s i m p u g n i n g
" e x t e r n a l " sense p e r c e p t i o n a d v a n c e d , b u t n e v e r resolved in his p h i l o s o p h i -
cal works, a n d that such a t h e o r y c a n n o t be r e g a r d e d as a f o r m o f r e p r e s e n -
tationalism. I will first c o n s i d e r the issue o f how his "scientific" a c c o u n t o f
p e r c e p t i o n can be u n d e r s t o o d as the only a c o u n t o f sense p e r c e p t i o n clearly
f o r m u l a t e d by Descartes to p r o v i d e solutions to all o f the philosophical
puzzles specifically i n t e n d e d to i n t r o d u c e p e r c e p t i o n a l doubts. Finally, I wilt
discuss the question o f p e r c e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m in Descartes a n d
s o m e r e m a i n i n g related issues.
3 This peculiarity of Descartes's argument in the Meditations has been noted by Bernard
Williams "... there is another kind of belief, in particular perceptual beliefs about the external
world, with regard to which we are liable to occasional error however hard we try. If we are
going to make perceptual judgments about the external world at all, there are errors which we
will commit however conscientiously we clarify our ideas on the particular occasion. This is for
reasons connected with our being bodily creatures . . . . In the case of these beliefs, God's guar-
antee operates only on the general level, guarding us against systematic error: granted we take
PERCEPTION 319
I should hasten to add that it is not being a r g u e d that Descartes said
n o t h i n g in the Meditations and related philosophical texts o f relevance to the
solution o f those puzzles i n t r o d u c i n g p e r c e p t u a l scepticism. O n the contrary,
he m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d to have a r g u e d that a l t h o u g h n e i t h e r the senses, n o r
the imagination alone is sufficient to the task o f r e m o v i n g p e r c e p t u a l d o u b t
c o n c e r n i n g the actual p r o p e r t i e s o f perceived objects, these faculties to-
g e t h e r with the u n d e r s t a n d i n g are sufficient to that task. W h a t is being
a r g u e d h e r e is that in those philosophical works w h e r e this a r g u m e n t occurs
Descartes does not explain how the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o g e t h e r with the senses
can be u n d e r s t o o d to o p e r a t e in such a way as to r e m o v e the sort o f doubts
i n t r o d u c e d by each o f his p e r c e p t u a l puzzles.
It is precisely Descartes's failure to specify in detail an account o f how the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o p e r a t e s t o g e t h e r with the senses to dispel scepticism c o n c e r n -
ing the o b s e r v e d p r o p e r t i e s o f m a t t e r which motivates o n e o f the objections to
the Meditations. In his response to the Sixth Objections Decartes is called u p o n to
d e f e n d his claim, f r o m the Meditations, that the senses alone c a n n o t identify
certain real p r o p e r t i e s o f matter, His objectors p r o p o s e the familiar epistemo-
logical p r o b l e m o f the h a l f - i m m e r s e d bent-looking stick. T h e y claim that any
visual mistaken impression r e n d e r e d by refraction can be c o r r e c t e d solely by a
f u r t h e r appeal to the senses. In this c o n n e c t i o n they a r g u e that an appeal to
tactile sensation alone will c o r r e c t any visual mistaken impressions with an
accurate j u d g m e n t o f the stick's real p r o p e r t y , straightness.
Descartes r e s p o n d s in the obvious way by asking his objectors how they
know which o f the two c o m p e t i n g sense impressions provide the real p r o p -
erties o f the stick. T h e d i l e m m a c o n f r o n t i n g the objectors is clear:
(1) the senses p r o v i d e two relevant j u d g m e n t s o f the stick's real p r o p e r t y .
(2) T h e y are mutually inconsistent characterizations o f the stick, and if, as
the objectors assert,
(3) o n e o f these characterizations provides the correct p r o p e r t y o f the stick
(i.e., the tactile sensation), t h e n
(4) in o r d e r to p r o v e that (3) is t r u e s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the senses must be
a p p e a l e d to.
T h e objectors are c o n f r o n t e d with a classical dilemma: Either what they
assert, namely (3), is unjustified, or (4) is true, as Descartes maintained. It is
obvious that n e i t h e r h o r n o f his d i l e m m a would p r o v i d e a c o m f o r t a b l e p e r c h
enough care, then our ordinary procedures, even though they are inevitably liable to occasional
error, are sound in principle." (B. Williams Pp. 207-8 ) What Williams has ['ailed to notice is that
according to the argument of the first and sixth Meditations, notd above, the mere possibility of
such "occasional error" is itself sufficient to cast doubt upon all .judgments of the "external
senses" despite "God's guarantee" concerning the possibility of""systematic error."
320 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y
f o r D e s c a r t e s ' s o b j e c t o r s . D e s c a r t e s ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e d i l e m m a is to a s s e r t t h a t
b o t h (3) a n d (4) a r e t r u e , a n d h e a t t e m p t s to e x p l a i n h o w t h e m i n d f u n c t i o n s
in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t r u t h o f (3), a n d h e n c e (4), b y a d i r e c t a p p e a l to t h e
t h e o r y o f t h e Dioptrics. L e t us n o w c o n s i d e r t h a t a p p e a l .
I n c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f his c l a i m t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e stick i n v o l v e s t h r e e
grades of sensation (perception), Descartes explains:
For example, when I see a staff, it is not to be thought that intentional species fly Off
from it and reach the eye, but merely that rays o f light reflected from the staff exite
certain motions in the optic nerve and, by its mediation, in the brain as well, as I have
explained at sufficient length in the Dioptrics. It is in this cerebral motion, which is
c o m m o n to us and to the brutes, that the first g r a d e o f perception (sentiendi) consists.
But from this the second g r a d e to perception (perceptionem) results; and that merely
extends to the perception o f the colour o r light reflected from the stick and is due to
[arises from] the fact that the m i n d is so intimately conjoined with the brain as to be
affected by the motions arising [that take place] in it. Nothing m o r e than this should
be assigned to sense, if we wish to distinguish it accurately from the intellect. For
t h o u g h my j u d g m e n t that there is a staff situated without me, which j u d g m e n t results
from the sensation (sensu) of colour by which I am affected, and likewise my reason-
ing from the extension o f that colour, its boundaries, and its position relatively to the
parts o f my brain, to the size, the shape, a n d the distance o f the said staff, are vulgarly
assigned to sense, and are consequently here r e f e r r e d to the third g r a d e o f sensation
(sentiendi), they clearly d e p e n d u p o n the u n d e r s t a n d i n g [intellect] alone. T h a t magni-
tude, distance and figure can be perceived by reasoning alone, which deduces them one
from another, I have proved in the Dioptrics. T h e difference lies in this alone, that
those j u d g m e n t s which now for the first time arise on account o f some new a p p r e -
hension (animadversionem), are assigned to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g [intellect]; but those
which have been m a d e from o u r earliest years in exactly the same m a n n e r as at
present, about the things that have been wont to affect o u r senses, as similarly the
conclusions o f o u r reasonings, are r e f e r r e d by us to sense. 4
S h o r t l y , I will h a v e o c c a s i o n to q u o t e , a n d d i s c u s s at l e n g t h , t h o s e p a s -
s a g e s f r o m t h e Dioptrics, to w h i c h D e s c a r t e s ' s l a t t e r c i t a t i o n r e f e r s . 5 A t this
p o i n t in t h e d i s c u s s i o n , h o w e v e r , it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e t h a t D e s c a r t e s is h e r e
c l a i m i n g to h a v e " p r o v e d , " in t h e Dioptrics, t h a t r e a s o n i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n
w i t h s e n s e e s t a b l i s h e s t h e t r u t h o f c e r t i a n j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g at l e a s t
s o m e p r o p e r t i e s o f m a t t e r (e.g., t h o s e i n v o l v i n g " m a g n i t u d e , d i s t a n c e a n d
4 R. Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, H, Trans. and eds., E.S. Haldane and
G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover Press, 1955), Pp. 'a51-52. (Hereafter, HR II Pp.~51-5 ~) R.
Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes. pubfie6s par C. Adam, P. Tannery (Paris, Nouvelle Presentation,
1964-1974) Vol. VII. Pp. 437-38 (Hereafter, A T - V I I , Pp. 437-38) My italics.
This discussion is better reserved for that part of this paper where it will be shown how
those solutions to specific philosophical problems concerning perception which invovle "magni-
tude, distance and figure" are "proved" by Descartes.
PERCEPTION 321
q u i r e s n o e l a b o r a t i o n . 7 H o w e v e r , its p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e l e v a n c e , as i n t r o d u c e d b y
the four points summarized above, deserves further comment.
W h a t is o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p o r t a n c e in Dioptrics II, a n d its s e q u e l is t h e
a p p l i c a t i o n o f his d i s c o v e r i e s a b o u t r e f r a c t i o n a n d t h e p r o j e c t i o n o f l i g h t to
t h e p h y s i o l o g y o f t h e e y e a n d his c o n s e q u e n t d i s c o v e r y o f t h o s e c a u s a l p r i n -
ciples determining the relationships between "images" or "impressions" and
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s a b o u t w h i c h t h e s e n s e s , a l o n e , t e n d to
d e c e i v e us a f t e r t h e m a n n e r d e s c r i b e d in Meditations I a n d VI. I t is this i s s u e
to w h i c h w e n o w t u r n .
I n this c o n n e c t i o n , r e c a l l a g a i n t h a t in his r e p l y to t h e Sixth Objections
D e s c a r t e s c l a i m e d h e h a d " p r o v e d , " in t h e Dioptrics, t h a t s u c h p r o p e r t i e s as
"magnitude, distance a n d figure c a n b e p e r c e i v e d b y r e a s o n i n g a l o n e , w h i c h
deduces them one from the other..." ( m y Italics). R e c a l l also, t h a t t h e Sixth
Meditation r e c o u n t s t h e r e s p e c t s in w h i c h p e r c e p t i o n s o m e t i m e s d e c e i v e s us,
a n d h e n c e , a c c o r d i n g to t h e a r g u m e n t o f t h e First Meditation is n o t itself,
a l o n e , to b e u n i v e r s a l l y t r u s t e d . T h e two p a r a d i g m s o f s u c h p e r c e p t u a l d e -
c e p t i o n s i n v o l v e t h e p r o p e r t i e s j u s t r e f e r r e d to.
9 I from time to time observed that those towers which from afar a p p e a r e d to me
to be r o u n d , m o r e closely observed seemed square, a n d that colossal statues raised on
the summit o f these towers, a p p e a r e d as quite tiny statues when viewed from the
bottom; a n d so in an infinitude o f o t h e r cases I f o u n d e r r o r in j u d g m e n t s f o u n d e d
on the external senses. 8
The case of the round/square tower involves the properties of figure and
d i s t a n c e a n d t h e case o f t h e r e m o v e d s t a t u e i n v o l v e s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f m a g -
n i t u d e a n d d i s t a n c e . -~ I t is p r i m a r i l y in t h e s e v e n t h d i s c o u r s e o f t h e Dioptrics
7 Summarized briefly they are as follows: The first two discourses of the Dioptrics, terminat-
ing with the discussion of refraction, comprise Descartes's major theoretical claims concerning
the physics of light. It is there that he investigates the phenomena of rectilinear light projection,
reflection, color, and refraction. The remainder of this work is devoted to the application of
those theoretical findings to the physiology of perception, the phenomena of magnifaction, the
design of lenses, etc. For the most part I will avoid detailed explanation of Descartes's scientific
theories of light projection and its subsequent application to the physiology of perception,
dwelling instead upon matters of more immediate relevance such as the philosophical impor-
tance of these scientific claims for the solution of perceptual problems introduced in the Medita-
tions and related texts.
HR I, t89. (AT-VII, p. 76 )
-~ Similar considerations apply to other examples involving the "external senses" which
Descartes cites elsewhere, such as cases involving the relative perceived size of the sun and a
closely observed coin. Immediately following the tower and statue cases Descartes introduces
other perceptual problems involving "internal" senses; paradigmatic of which is the missing
limb case, treated elsewhere together with other puzzles about the "internal" senses involving
taste, odor and color judgment (see for example Principles I, w w w Because it is clear
that his treatment of those puzzles involving the "'internal senses" also avail themselves of similar
PERCEPTION 323
that Descartes states those principles responsible for knowledge of these
p r o p e r t i e s . T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
between the relevant properties of objects and certain properties of the
c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s o b s e r v e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s to o c c u r o n t h e
r e a r s u r f a c e o f a n e w l y d i s e m b o d i e d e y e a n d its m e c h a n i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t , t h e
camera obscura.
In the case of magnitude and distance there are three principles govern-
i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n i m a g e size a n d t h e m a g n i t u d e , o r d i s t a n c e o f
o b j e c t s . N o t e , in p a s s i n g , t h a t r e f r a c t i o n f i g u r e s r e l e v a n t l y in o n e o f t h e s e
three principles.
As to the size o f the images, it is to be noted that this d e p e n d s solely on three things,
namely, on the distance between the object and the place where the rays that it sends
from its d i f f e r e n t points toward the back o f the eye intersect; next, on the distance
between this same place a n d the base o f the eye; and finally, on the refraction o f
these rays. T h u s it is evident that the image RST would be greater than it is, if the
object VXY were n e a r e r to the place K, were the rays VKR and Y K T intersect, or
r a t h e r to the surface BCD, which causes these rays to intersect, to the back o f the eye
RST; or finally, if the refraction d i d not curve them so much inward toward the
middle point S, but rather, if it were possible, outward. A n d whatever we conceive
besides these three things, there is n o t h i n g which can make this image larger. '~
A s s u m i n g t h a t this a c c o u n t is r o u g h l y c o r r e c t , t h a t o n e is in a p o s i t i o n to
o b s e r v e a d e c r e a s e in i m a g e size, a n d t h a t o n e h a s r e a s o n to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e is
n o a b n o r m a l i n f l u e n c e b y r e f r a c t i o n , u n u s u a l c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t i n g f o c u s , etc.,
o n e c o u l d t h e n i n f e r t h a t t h e i m a g e size d e c r e a s e d b e c a u s e t h e o b j e c t o f t h e
image had been moved farther from the observer. Consequently, one would be
in a p o s i t i o n to a s s e r t a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a n i m a g e a n d a n o b j e c t . T h i s w o u l d
s u g g e s t t h e s o r t o f i n f e r e n c e i n v o l v e d in r e s t o r i n g t h e " d e s t r o y e d . . . f a i t h " in
t h e s e n s e s , w h i c h t h e s t a t u e e x a m p l e is s u p p o s e d to i l l u s t r a t e .
"scientific" treatment (e.g., color as diffuse reflection in Dioptrics 1, and the missing limb as a
neurophysiological phenomenon in Passions of the Soul and Principles,) I will not discuss them
here. Note that I have a tendency here to overlook the importance of the internal sense/external
sense distinction in Descartes's theory of the perception of objects. However, it is very impor-
tant. For example, the sensu of color ("internal") is an instance of "the second grade of percep-
tion" and therefore "assigned to sense" (as opposed to intellect). Yet, the intellect "reasoning
from the extension of that color" deduces the "size, shape and distance" of physical objects. (See
the quotation from the Objections and Replies, p. 32 above.) The importance of this point will be
assessed in some detail below.
'" R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meterology, trans. P. J. Olscamp
(Indianopolis, New York, Kansas City: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) Pp. 117-18 (Hereafter, Discourse,
Pp. 117-18) (AT-V1, Pp, 15e-53 ) The illustrative (redrawn) diagram following this passage
occurs in numerous places in various editions of the Dioptrics. It occurs on the page facing this
passage in the Latin edition of 1656. See R. Descartes, Specimina Philosophiae (Amsterdam:
Elzevir, 1656), Pp. 98-9 .
324 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
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The second sort of objection which can be raised about any analysis such
as D e s c a r t e s ' s s e e m s f a r m o r e s e r i o u s to m e . S u c h o b j e c t i o n s a r e t y p i f i e d b y
q u e s t i o n s l i k e " W h a t is t h e relevance o f b a c k - o f - e y e i m a g e s to w h a t is seen?
Surely one does not see the back of one's eye when one observes something."
A n e x c e l l e n t e x a m p l e o f s u c h a n o b j e c t i o n is p r o v i d e d b y C . M . T u r b a y n e
in his e d i t i o n o f B e r k e l e y ' s W o r k s on Vision. T h e r e h e r e - e v o k e s t h e w e l l - w o r n
s p e c t e r o f t h e " g h o s t in t h e m a c h i n e " w h o s e d i a p h a n o u s s h r o u d is o f t e n u s e d
to o b s c u r e o n e o r a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f C a r t e s i a n i s m . O f t h e camera obscura m o d e l
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h " g e o m e t r i c a l t h e o r i e s " s u c h as D e s c a r t e s ' s , T u r b a y n e says:
9 . the c a m e r a m o d e l nicely illustrates the passive aspect of the m i n d in vision, but it
.
can shed no light on the active process o f perception: It seems to require, b e h i n d the
camera, a ghost with a n o t h e r pair o f eyes who contemplates and interprets the
pictures o f the c a m e r a screen, j u s t as Kepler had to get inside his own c a m e r a
obscura. In o r d e r to meet this difficulty, Descartes merely substituted a d i f f e r e n t
ghost, one who does not see the pictures but w h o feels "the movements by which the
pictures are f o r m e d . " . . . A well-known difficulty, also shared by o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a -
tive theories, is this: How d o we know that o u r sense data r e p r e s e n t physical objects
when the latter cannot be e x p e r i e n c e d ? This difficulty p r o m p t e d philosophers to
p r o d u c e elaborate proofs o f the external world 9 Kepler did not "see" any retinal
images except his own. But Descartes thought he did: "Take the eye o f a newly d e a d
man . . . . You will see, I d a r e say with surprise a n d pleasure, a picture r e p r e s e n t i n g in
natural perspective all the objects outside." T h u s he thought that he could c o m p a r e
the p h o t o g r a p h with the original, but he was d e l u d e d ; according to the theory, he
could contemplate only his own images on the back o f his own camera and c o m p a r e
them now with another. Yet a n o t h e r difficulty is that, according to the theory, we
make deductive inferences to the external world from o u r retinal images, but when
we see, we d o not seem to be aware of the inference or its premise. Accordingly, it
was decided that we p e r f o r m the inference without knowing that we do. T h e final
difficulty is that the Geometrical T h e o r y really provides no solution to the p r o b l e m
o f illusion unless it places a ghost behind the camera screen. But even this is not
enough, for the size, and color o f the p h o t o g r a p h are all that the ghost has to go on.
He can make an inference to the c r o o k e d oar, but he cannot see that it is straight. He
can make an inference to the yellow cup, but he cannot see that it is white. '3
,:3 G. Berkeley, Works on Vision, C.N. Turbayne ed. (Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), Pp. xxv-xxvi. My italics.
,4 At the end of the fourth and the beginning of the sixth discourses of the Dioptrics,
Descartes warns his reader at some length against the misleading character of such a supposi-
tion although some have claimed that he himself is sometimes guilty of speaking as if one could
see these images. For example, see A.J.P. Kenney, "The Homunculus Fallacy," Interpretations of
Life and Mind, ed., M. Grene (New York: Humanities, 1971), Pp. 65-74.
PERCEPTION 327
II
Of my thoughts some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the
title "idea" properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera, of
heaven, of an angel, or [even] of God. But other thoughts possess other forms as
well. For example in willing, fearing, approving, denying, though I always perceive
something as the subject of the action of my mind, yet by this action I always add
something else to the idea (In the Latin version "similitudinem.") which I have of that
thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections, and
others judgments. ~
the case o f sensations, the best that can be said o f their relation to physical
objects is that such objects "dispose" us to have the a p p r o p r i a t e color o r
pain sensations. In the case o f images, as has been n o t e d at length above,
their shape o r figure, r e p r e s e n t the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l objects
in a m a n n e r best described by projective geometry. Now, it is correct to.say
o f Descartes that inferences are m a d e f r o m sensations o f color, a f t e r the
m a n n e r outlined in his reply to the Sixth Objection, to the size, shape a n d
distance o f physical objects. As n o t e d above, it is also correct to say o f him
that it would be a mistake to suppose that in visual p e r c e p t i o n we m a k e
such inferences f r o m images even t h o u g h these images r e p r e s e n t physical
objects after the m a n n e r described by g e o m e t r y . Now, once the a p p r o p r i -
ate passages are conflated, it can be m a d e to a p p e a r that (1) shape is a
sensation just as color is and (2) since it is correct to say that we i n f e r via a
"native g e o m e t r y " f r o m sensations (grade-two perception) to the shapes o f
objects, that (3), for Descartes, p e r c e p t i o n involves an i n f e r e n c e f r o m a
m i n d - d e p e n d e n t sensation o f shape to the shape o f the object which it
represents. Yet, in fact, t h e r e is no m o r e reason to suppose that for Des-
cartes the shape o f an object has a "mental" c o u n t e r p a r t , than to suppose
that its distance f r o m the eye is r e p r e s e n t e d in sensation. While it is clearly
true that, for Descartes, we perceive, o r r a t h e r j u d g e , distance and size via
sensation, and without the intervention o f a "mental" representative, this is
also t r u e o f shape.
T h e e r r o n e o u s conflation o f sensations, like pain, or color with p r o p e r t i e s
like shape occurs once well-known passages illustrating a lack o f resemblance
between relevant sensations and the p r o p e r t i e s o f objects with which they
are sometimes mistakenly assimilated are taken to illustrate the same point as
equally well-known passages in which Descartes also indicates a lack o f exact
resemblance betweem images (usually retinal, or pineal) which are e i t h e r
assumed or observed to r e p r e s e n t the t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l objects to which
they are causally related. Passages o f the f o r m e r sort cited by Maull are
typified by one use o f the "word analogy ''~7 in which Descartes argues that
just as a word causes us to conceive s o m e t h i n g to which it bears no resem-
blance, so too, in nature, sensations n e e d not resemble states o f affairs o r the
surfaces o f objects to which they draw o u r attention. In the following pas-
sage Maull conflates this talk a b o u t the n o n - r e s e m b l a n c e o f sensations to
their physical causes with a passage in t h e Dioptrics w h e r e Descartes is ar-
guing for the limited resemblance b e t w e e n images in o u r brain and their
causes by r e f e r e n c e to the often-cited e n g r a v i n g analogy.
In the Dioptrics, he makes a claim that is somewhat puzzling, since he just previously
utilized the "word analogy" to suggest that no images or pictures are transmitted to
the brain [sic] in perception. He wrote, "And if in order to depart as little as possible
from currently accepted beliefs, we prefer to avow that the objects which we perceive
truly transmit their images to the inside of our brain, we must at least observe that
there are no images that must resemble in every respect the objects that they repre-
s e n t . . . " (my italics). It is sufficient, he went on to say, for images to resemble objects
in a limited way as engravings "represent to us forests, towns, men and even battles
and storms," by resembling them only in shape. And even with respect to shape, he
continued, the resemblance is "very imperfect," for engravings represent a three-
dimensional array on a flat, two-dimensional surface so that, "following the rules of
perspective, circles are often better represented by ovals rather than by circles; and
squares by diamonds rather than by other squares . . . . ,,28
It m u s t be c a u t i o n e d t h a t the w o r d a n a l o g y as it o c c u r s in d i s c o u r s e f o u r ,
p r i o r to this passage, has a d i f f e r e n t p o i n t f r o m the a n a l o g y w h i c h she
p r e v i o u s l y cited f r o m T h e W o r l d . As n o t e d above, in t h e latter case it was
b e i n g a r g u e d t h a t s e n s a t i o n d o e s n o t r e s e m b l e a quality in t h e object w h i c h
causes it a n y m o r e t h a n a w o r d c a n be said to r e s e m b l e the t h o u g h t w h i c h it
occasions. I n d i s c o u r s e f o u r the w o r d / t h o u g h t a n a l o g y is u s e d to d e m o n -
strate t h a t o n e m u s t n o t a s s u m e , as is c o m m o n l y d o n e , t h a t t h e role o f
i m a g e s in p e r c e p t i o n is t h e s a m e as t h a t o f p i c t u r e s w h i c h " r e s e m b l e t h e
object t h e y r e p r e s e n t . " T o this e n d , D e s c a r t e s r e m i n d s his r e a d e r t h a t
" . . . t h e r e a r e m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s besides p i c t u r e s w h i c h c a n s t i m u l a t e o u r
t h o u g h t , s u c h as, f o r e x a m p l e , signs a n d w o r d s w h i c h d o n o t in a n y way
r e s e m b l e the t h i n g s t h e y signify. ''29
I n c o n t r a s t to his use o f the w o r d a n a l o g y in T h e W o r l d it s h o u l d be n o t e d
t h a t D e s c a r t e s is n o t h e r e
~s N. Maull, p. ~6~. It should be noted in passing that Maull is also mistaken in suggesting
that the "word analogy," as it appears prior to this passage, is used by Descartes to show that no
images are transmitted to the brain in perception. On the contrary, Descartes is here arguing in
the manner, often noted above, of his cautions against the "homunculus fallacy." What he
actually argues is that "... we must beware of assuming that in order to sense, the mind needs to
perceive certain images transmitted by the objects to the brain . . . . '" Discourse 89 (AT-VI, p. a 12)
~9 Discourse, 8 9 (AT-VI, p. 1 l~)
I'ERCEPTION 335
sistency in the j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f the w o r d a n d e n g r a v i n g analogies in dis-
c o u r s e f o u r , Dioptrics. T h u s , Descartes's r e f e r e n c e , in the e n g r a v i n g analogy,
to the o c c u r r e n c e o f a partial r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n i m a g e s a n d objects
puzzles Maull simply because she has misassimilated talk a b o u t sensations,
which b e a r n o r e s e m b l a n c e to objects which cause t h e m , with talk a b o u t
c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s which do b e a r a limited r e s e m b l a n c e to their causes. T h i s
b e c o m e s obvious w h e n in the passage following the o n e j u s t q u o t e d she
a t t e m p t s to resovle the puzzle which she has mistakenly i n t r o d u c e d .
Why should Descartes, ostensibly in order to "depart as little as possible from cur-
rently accepted belief" go so far as to introduce a new analogy, one which is, on the
face of it, at odds with his earlier claim that our sensations need not resemble what
they represent? [sic] The answer is that Descartes, far from holding to a strict view of
non-resemblance, utilizes both analogies when he explains perception. His new, addi-
tional suggestion of some resemblance in perception, the one drawn from an analogy
with engravings, is not really inconsistent with the preceding conclusion, the one
drawn from an analogy with words. Descartes still held that we have no direct access
to independently existing physical objects through perception. However, while still
holding this conclusion, he wanted the case for color perception to be very different
from the awareness of figure. Although color and figure are invariably conjoined in
sensation, Descartes assumes that the mind may direct its awareness separtely to one
or the other. -~~
~~ N. Maull, p. 262.
336 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Now among these figures, it is not those imprinted on the organs of external
sense, or on the internal surface of the brain, but only those traced in spirits on the
surface of gland H, where the seat of imagination and common sense is, that should be
taken to be ideas, that is to say, to be the forms or images that the rational soul will
consider directly when, being united to. this machine, it will imagine or will sense any
object.3,
III
I f what I say a b o v e is c o r r e c t a n d Descartes did intend relevant p o r t i o n s o f
the Dioptrics to explain certain o f his m o r e philosophical claims a b o u t r e a s o n
a n d the senses, a n d as solutions to his sceptical claims a b o u t d e c e p t i v e j u d g -
m e n t s o f size a n d s h a p e in Meditation VI, t h e n certain interesting issues arise
c o n c e r n i n g the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f claims which he m a k e s o n related issues.
T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , if Descartes is t a k e n to hold that k n o w l e d g e (conscious
o r nonconscious) o f certain laws o f optics s o m e t i m e s provides t r u e g r a d e -
t h r e e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g m a g n i t u d e , distance, a n d shape, as
a p p e a r s to be the case o n the a b o v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , how is o n e to u n d e r s t a n d
his claims elsewhere in which these p r o p e r t i e s a r e t r e a t e d as extensive m a g -
nitudes or " p r i m a r y qualities" as they w e r e later called? Specifically, is what
he would call a t r u e g r a d e - t h r e e p e r c e p t i o n ( j u d g m e n t ) an instance o f know-
ing a p r i m a r y quality, e.g., shape? A l t h o u g h it would be t e m p t i n g to a n s w e r
this question positively, p r u d e n c e dictates that a n y a n s w e r to such a question
requires qualification extensive e n o u g h to fall b e y o n d the scope o f this
p a p e r . For e x a m p l e , a positive answer, if t r u e would only serve to explain
k n o w l e d g e of" observable p r i m a r y qualities: what Locke would call "sensible"
p r i m a r y qualities; w h e r e a s Descartes s o m e t i m e s claims k n o w l e d g e o f the
p r i m a r y qualities o f insensible particles (e.g., Principles, IV, 2o3ff). Clearly
such k n o w l e d g e o f insensible p r i m a r y qualities would be o f a sort quite
d i f f e r e n t f r o m that p r o v i d e d by g r a d e - t h r e e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s . H o w -
ever, Descartes seems to believe that k n o w l e d g e o f this latter sort is i n f e r r e d
with the help o f k n o w l e d g e o f "sensible" p r i m a r y qualities, a n d hence, de-
p e n d s in p a r t at least u p o n t r u e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o f the third grade. 3~
T w o final points: First, it m a y s e e m to s o m e that taking a "scientific"
theory, such as that o f the Dioptrics, in s u p p o r t o f claims a b o u t the real
p r o p e r t i e s o f o b s e r v e d objects fails to p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e justification for
such claims. I n d e f e n s e o f this objection it could be p o i n t e d out that Des-
:3, R. Descartes, Treatise of Man, trans., Thomas Steel Hall (Cambridge: Harvard, 197~), p.
86. (AT-XI, Pp. 176-7) Note the uncharacteristic use of the term "idea." Although not com-
pletely consistent in this respect, his use of the term "idea" for a mode of res extensa is typical of
his usage throughout the Treatise of Man.
:~ Of course this interpretation requires some justification. Such a justification can be
defended. However, this defense would extend beyond the scope of the present paper. Briefly,
the key passage figuring in such a defense is Principles IV, w 3.
PERCEPTION 337
cartes himself admits that the principles upon which he bases his scientific
conclusions are merely "hypothetical" ("suppositions"), and not based, as he
claimed early in the Rules, upon "intuition and deduction" as they should be.
On this point, I would tend to agree with commentators like Daniel Garber :~:~
who claims that at the time he composed his scientific works Descartes still
maintained the view of the Rules, and that although he based his work on
hypotheses, he is nonetheless convinced that these hypotheses could be justi-
fied by intuition and deduction although for didactic purposes and for con-
venience he chose not to do this.
Finally, it is almost certainly to be objected that a theory of perception such
as the one found in the Dioptrics cannot be philosophically adequate because
adequacy of this sort requires that such a theory establish both the existence of
physical objects and certain of their properties as well as an account of how
those properties are correctly ascribed to such objects. It could be argued
further that, while Descartes's Dioptrics may do the latter after the manner I
have outlined above, it only assumes the former. That is, although Descartes's
theory of optics may explain how one attributes certain properties correctly to
towers, still in doing so it assumes the existence of such things as towers, stars
and statues together with certain of their other properties, e.g., that they
reflect light in certain ways under certain conditions. In short, all of De-
scartes's conclusions are dependent upon assuming that physical objects tog-
ether with some commonly attributed properties of" them exist.
There are two things to be noted about this objection. First, while it may be
justifiable to require certain philosophically adequate theories of perception to
establish assumptions like these, it would be unjustifiable to expect this of
Descartes. For Descartes, this assumption is subject to metaphysical rather
than epistemological justification. T h a t things like towers exist together with
certain of the properties we attribute to them is what Descartes supposes he
has established in his Sixth Meditation proof of the external world.
Secondly, regardless of whether this assumption is or even can be justi-
fied, Descartes's theory of perception as outlined above need not even ad-
dress itself to its justification, because all that can be expected of such a
theory is that it address itself to the perceptual scepticism of the Meditations.
It will be recalled that those puzzles only concern which of the conflicting
extensive properties attributable to a single thing (which is already assumed
to exist pretty much in the [orm it is commonly supposed to have e.g., a
roundish/squarish tower) truly hold of such a thing.
~3 D. Garber, "Science and Certainty in Descartes," Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essay;s,
ed., Michael Hooker (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), Pp. 114- 5.