SELF-EXECUTING and NON-SELF-EXECUTING provisions of the Constitution the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will
tion of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a
- Are provisions of the Constitution self-executory? Or is there a need for legislation to implement these
provisions?
A constitutional provision is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation, and there
is nothing to indicate that legislation is intended to make it operative. For example, a constitutional provision
that any municipality by vote of four-sevenths of its qualified electors may issue and sell revenue bonds in
order to pay for the cost of purchasing a municipally owned public utility is self-executing and effective
without a legislative enactment.
Constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely set forth a line of policy or principles without
supplying the means by which they are to be effectuated, or if the language of the constitution is directed to
the legislature. As a result, a constitutional provision that the legislature shall direct by law in what manner
and in what court suits may be brought against the state is not self-executing.
Just as with constitutional provisions, statutes and court judgments can be self-executing.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
1. Right to life
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they
agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries
cited by the speaker is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception
begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law
is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that
the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2. Right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases
gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo
under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives
without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling
its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of
the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for
the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight
and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE
PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE
PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE
THE SAME.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was
filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive
and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly
withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by
the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all
existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not only on the
appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept
of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence
that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. One of these is the reduction of the
earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”.
Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs. The defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel existing TLAs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance
to the prayer of the complaints
Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these
TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
HELD:
The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit. The subject matter of
complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court found difficulty in
ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated. A denial or violation
of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to
a cause of action. The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs
should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE
OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights. On this basis, these
actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.
Despite the Constitution’s non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause
cannot be invoked. Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so
required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705). Furthermore, Section 16 of
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” The right to a balanced
and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government. The said
right is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded. It is not a contract, property or property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Tañada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997
THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate
of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the
phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
II. THE ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did
not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out
the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
“mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence
on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it
means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to
prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while
serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of
a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty
in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy
of cooperation and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in
such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree
with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97.
But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To
do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the
Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic
globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators
via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine
economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for
granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our
own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate
did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative
restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it
should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is
isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected
officers, make their free choice.
BFAR Employees vs. COA, GR 169815, Aug. 13, 2008
Facts: The BFAR Employees Union issued a resolution requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket
Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living which makes it hard to sustain even the four basic
needs. On post-audit, COA disallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance for being unconstitutional as it contravenes the
fundamental principle of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Issue: Is the disallowance in question unconstitutional?
Held: The court denied the petition. Social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies
giving guidelines for legislation and that they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Separation of Powers – pp. 677-678
Non-Delegation of Powers - pp. 685-696
Separation of Powers
Essence. In essence, separation of powers means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
executive, settlement of legal controversies to the judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of
others. (Bernas, Commentary 656, 2003 ed.)
Division and Assignment. Its starting point is the assumption of the division of the functions of the
government into three distinct classes—the executive, the legislative and the judicial. Its essence consists in
the assignment of each class of functions to one of the three organs of government.
Theory. The theory is that “a power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be
surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another
department or agency.”
Reason. The underlying reason of this principle is the assumption that arbitrary rule and abuse of authority
would inevitably result from the concentration of the three powers of government in
the same person, body of persons or organ.
More specifically, according to Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to:
1.Secure action
2. To forestall overaction
3. To prevent despotism
4. To obtain efficiency
History. Separation of powers became the pith and core of the American system of government largely through
the influence of the French political writer Montesquieu. By the establishment of the American sovereignty in
the Philippines, the principle was introduced as an inseparable feature of the governmental system organized
by the United States in this country.
Limitations on the Principle
1. System of Checks and Balances
2. Existence of overlapping powers
Republicanism
The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of
public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited
period only, after which they are replaced or retained at the option of their principal
Checks and Balances
The Constitution fixes certain limits on the independence of each department. In order that these limits may be
observed, the Constitution gives each department certain powers by which it may definitely restrain the other
from exceeding their authority. Thus, checks and balances are formed.
To carry out the system of checks and balances, the Constitution provides:
1. The acts of the legislative department have to be presented to the executive for approval or disapproval.
2. The executive department may veto the acts of the legislature if in its judgment they are not in conformity
with the Constitution or are detrimental to the interests of the people.
3. The courts are authorized to determine the validity of legislative measures or executive acts.
4. Through its pardoning power, the executive may modify or set aside the judgments of the courts.
5. The legislature may pass laws that in effect amend or completely revoke decisions of the courts if in its
judgment they are not in harmony with its intention or policy which is not contrary to the Constitution.
6. President must obtain the concurrence of Congress to complete certain significant acts.
7. Money can be released from the treasury only by authority of Congress
Justiciable Questions vs Political Questions:
A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts like issues arising out of obligations and contracts,
and violations of laws, etc. The courts have jurisdiction over these things, meaning they can hold a trial and
issue judgments.
Political questions, on the other hand, are beyond the reach and jurisdiction of courts and are better decided by
the people using their sovereign rights and discretion. A classic example is who should win in an election? The
courts cannot dictate who is the better candidate, as this is a political question that only the people can decide.
But if there is cheating during the election, the court can decide whether there was cheating or not because
there are laws that determine it, hence, this is a justiciable issue.
A ‘political question’ is one the resolution of which has been vested by the Constitution exclusively in either
the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity, or in which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to a co-equal branch of the Government.
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
- 1935 Constitution
- 1973 Constitution
- 1987 Constitution
Republicanism
o Manifestations of Republicanism
§ OURS IS A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF MEN
(Villavicencio vs. Lukban, GR L-14639, March 25, 1919)
§ Rule of the majority (Plurality in elections)
§ Accountability of public officials
§ Bill of Rights
§ Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
§ SEPARATION OF POWERS
§ NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
Villacicencio Vs Lukban
Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent
and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and
the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak
their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the
respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave
abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite
uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of
the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even
being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported
to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
O Under 1987 Constitution
O Why is it observed in our Government?
O What is the purpose?
O Acc. to Justice Laurel,
- to secure action
- to forestall overaction
- to prevent despotism
- to obtain efficiency
O To be understood not as INDEPENDENCE but INTERDEPENDENCE
O Doctrine of Blending of Powers
O Doctrine of Checks and Balances, Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
Which department ensures the constitutional distribution of powers?
- Does it mean such department is superior to the other departments?
Angara vs. Electoral Commission (see session 2)
DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district
of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file
election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and
praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that
the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of
protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people
and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department
of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary
in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to
the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution
fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly,
the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in
any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the
petitioner.
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima, GR 166715, Aug. 14, 2008;

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act
(RA) 9335
(Attrition Actof 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and theBureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets byproviding a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a RevenuePerformance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status2.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reformlegislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials andemployees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as
they will do their best only in consideration of suchrewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrineof separation of powers,
for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhanceits understanding of and
influence over the
implementation
of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to
determine whether agenciesare properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority,and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to beintrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of governmentWith this backdrop, it is clear that
congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes anencroachment on the executive power to implement laws
nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral tothe checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as
itprevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basicand related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specifiedunder the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressionaloversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connec
tion withit, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matterpertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and(2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries inaid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in thisclass. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules andregulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprovesuch
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of aninward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than
through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to whichCongress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power asit entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013 (note: case involves
various issues, but focus only on issue about “separation of
powers”)
WHAT IS THE TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A GIVEN POWER HAS
BEEN VALIDLY EXERCISED BY A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT?
O FIRST, SC determines whether the power has been constitutionally conferred
upon the department. Conferment of power is either:
1. EXPRESS – Art. VI, VII, VIII of the 1987 Constitution
2. IMPLIED - DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION
§ Angara vs. Electoral Commission (see session 2)
3. INHERENT OR INCIDENTAL
§ Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago GR 82544, June 28, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months
close surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna.
Two days after apprehension 17 opted for self deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was
charged by another offense, working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation
proceedings.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitute shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. There were also posters
and other literatures advertising the child prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any authority to arrest
and detained petitioner pending determination of the existence of a probable cause
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against unreasonable search and
seizure is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be
based upon probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the
arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records
show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens.
That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found
with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia"
defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children"
(DOCTRINE OF ACT OF STATE)
SECOND, after sustaining the exercise of power (meaning, there is
determination of valid constitutional grant of power to exercise), the SC’s
official action does not stop there; it now then determines whether the act in
question had been performed in accordance with the rules laid down by the
constitution.
- But you should qualify whether the question involved is Justiciable or Political –
o Justiciable vs. Political Questions?
Co vs. HRET GR 92191,July 30, 1991
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election of Northern Samar was held.Among the candidate is herein
respondent Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district
of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a
naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualificationsince Ong does not own any property
in Samar.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
2.) Whether respondent is a citizen of the Philippines; and
3.) WhetherOng is a resident of Samar.
RULING:
1.) Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power,
no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
2.) Yes. On April 28, 1955, Jose OngChuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared a
Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar. At the time Jose OngChuan took his oath, the private respondent then is a
minor of nine years, was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. Hence, there is no
ground to deny the Filipino citizenship of respondent Ong. Respondent Ong was also born of a natural-born
Filipino mother, thus the issue of citizenship is immaterial.
3.) Yes. The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word residence which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which
was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present. Hence, the residency of
respondent Ong has sufficiently proved.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bengzon vs. Senatte Blue Ribbon Committee GR 89914, Nov. 20, 1991
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First
Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it
and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa
and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly
prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of
the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil
case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has
provided that the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation
or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future
legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile
did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with
the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because
he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses,
but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Tanada vs. Angara GR 118295, May 2, 1997
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared
the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as
president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only
other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.”
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate “minority,” Sen.
Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party —
numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on
the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by
the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the
minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition
for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and    exercising the position
of Senate minority leader 
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it
was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a
motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) “in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;” and (2) because the resolution
of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to
hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of
the Court’s power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the
Senate’s “full discretionary authority,” but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider
and determine the issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper
House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise
by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient
proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the
members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions
and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or
of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated,
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
O General rule is non-delegation
Potestas Delegata Non Potest Delegare
states that “no delegated powers can be further delegated.” It is also known as delegatus non potest delegare
which means “one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power.” One who has the
power or authority from another to do an act must do it himself/herself as this is a trust or confidence reposed
in that person personally. It cannot be assigned to stranger whose ability and intergrity might not be known to
the principal.
Jaworski vs. PAGCOR, GR 144463, Jan. 14, 2004
Facts: PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD 1869, issued on 11 July
1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. The PAGCOR was granted, subject to the terms and conditions
established in theDecree, for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, the rights, privileges and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports,
gaming pools, i.e. basketball,football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines. On 31March 1998, PAGCOR¶s board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming",
which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintainSports Betting station in PAGCOR¶s casino
locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the
satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensurethe integrity and
fairness of the games. On 1 September 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll.Reyes, and
SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao,executed
the document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting
gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available
at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Senator Robert S. Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that
PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized
SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. Hecontends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative
franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not
have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment the internet was yet inexistent
and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further,he argues that the internet, being an
international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and
the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes thelimitation in PAGCOR¶s
franchise.Issue: Whether PAGCOR¶s legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE, with
the authority tooperate Internet gambling.Held: A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the
state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concernwhich cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but
should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose onthem in the interest of
the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus
the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business,the
charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising
thefranchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. Herein, PAGCOR has acted beyond
the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE. While PAGCOR is allowed under
its charter to enter into operator¶s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to
relinquish or share itsfranchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
PAGCOR can not delegate its power inview of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest,
inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013 (note: case
involves various issues, but focus only on issue about “nondelegability
of legislative power”)
O Not absolute, because there are exceptions (PERMISSIBLE
DELEGATIONS) – take note of the permissible delegations!
Chapter 7- Delegation of Powers
•Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers.
•Potestas delegata non delegari potest- What has been delegated cannot be delegated
•Such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and notthrough the intervening mind of another.
•The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the government but is
especially important in the case of thelegislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is
permitted.
Permissible Delegation
•Delegation of tariff powers to the President.
oSection 28(2). The Congress may by law authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations andrestrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts, within theframework of the national development program of the
Government.
oReason for the delegation: The necessity, not to say expediency, of giving the Chief Executive the authority
to act immediately on certainmatters affecting the national economy lest delay result in hardship to the people.
•Delegation of emergency powers to the President.
oSection 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President,
for a limited period andsubject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unlesssooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon its next adjournment.”
oWhen emergency powers are delegated to the President, he becomes in effect a constitutional dictator.
oConditions for the vesture of emergency powers in the President are the following:
There must be a war or other national emergency.
The delegation must be for a limited period only.
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by the Congress.
oOther national emergency” may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood or
other similar catastrophe of nation-wide proportions or effect.
oConferment of emergency powers on the President is NOT MANDATORY on the Congress.
oThe emergency does not automatically confer emergency powers on the President.
•Delegation to the people at large.
oReferendum- a method of submitting an important legislative measure to a direct vote of the whole people.
oPlebiscite
- a device to obtain a direct popular vote on a matter of political importance, but chiefly in order to create a
some more or less permanent political condition.
•Delegation to the local government.
oBased on the recognition that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national lawmaking body on
matters of purely localconcern and are therefore in a better position to enact the necessary and appropriate
legislation thereon.
oLocal affairs managed by local authorities and General affairs by the central authority.
•Delegation to administrative body.
oWith this power administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details which the Congressmay not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
oThis is effected by their promulgation of what are know as SUPPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS.
oThey may also issue contingent regulations pursuant to a delegation of authority to determine some fact or
state of things upon which theenforcement of law depends. In other words, they are allowed to ascertain the
existence of particular contingencies and on the basis thereof enforce or suspend the operation of a law.
Tests of Delegation
Question of whether or not the delegation has been validly made.
oCompleteness Test
The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there
will be nothing leftfor the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it.
If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filed, the delegate will then
have been given theopportunity to step into the shoes of the legislature and to exercise a discretion essentially
legislative in order to repair theomission. This is INVALID DELEGATION.
oSufficient Standard Test
It is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and
indicating thecircumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected.
PURPOSE: to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate.
O Tests of Delegation
1. Again, general rule is, there is non-delegation of powers;
2. But there are exceptions, where powers can be permissibly delegated;
3. Assuming it falls under the exception, you still have to determine whether these exceptions (permissible
delegations) has been validly made;
4. To be valid, delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions (otherwise, delegation is
tantamount to abdication of
legislative authority, a total surrender by legislature of its prerogatives in favor of the delegate);
- COMPLETENESS TEST
o People vs. Dacuycuy, G.R. L-45127, May 5, 1989
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They
also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000,
or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the
said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.
Held:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if
the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative
power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws
to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of
legislative powers
People vs Dacuycuy
GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989
FACTS: several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for
public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for (1)lack of jurisdiction
(2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack of merit. The private respondents filed a
petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of
Section 32 the following reasons: (1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment is left to the discretion of the
court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670 particularly Section 32 is
valid and constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional
HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment. Too
much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it undue delegation of power of the legislature.
Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard. If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the
rules of separation of powers but also the delegability of legislative powers.
Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the municipal court where it
was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34. Although Sec 32 was declared
unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.
- SUFFICIENCY STANDARD TEST
o Chiongbian vs. Orbos GR 96754, June 22, 1995
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
MuslimMindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao,Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of
RA 6734 which authorizesthe President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O
No. 429 providing for theReorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.Petitioners contend that
Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegateslegislative power to the
President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regionsor at any rate
provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is notexpressed in the
title of the law.aw libraryThey also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power
granted by RA 6734 to the Presidentis only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainlynot to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President’s discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination the existing
regionsfollowing the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely
followed the patternset in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions
in 1972. The choice of thePresident as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is
intended to facilitate not only theadministration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires shouldhave regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in theConstitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are notterritorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power toadjust municipal
boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the linesseparating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local governmentunits
by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services
o Gerochi vs. Department of Energy GR 159796, July 17,
2007
Facts: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought
to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects,
was enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that theimposition of the universal charge on all
end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the
consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
Issue: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.
Held: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but anexaction in the exercise of the State’s police power.
That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of
the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably
serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed
(e.g. to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the
same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objectives
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation ismerely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a
tax.
The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of the power
to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people.
Delegation of Powers
Department Secretary alter ego of Congress.
Congress delegated the power of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent to the Secretary of Finance. The legislature has made the operation of
the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006 contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire
operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary
of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not
subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being
the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the
findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply
granted the Secretary the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is exists, the Secretary, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. There
is no undue delegation of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. (Abakada Guro Party List, etc., et al. vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056,
and other cases, September 1, 2005).
Q — Section 34 of RA 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 200_”
(EPIRA) imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity (a charge imposed for the recovery of
stranded cost; stranded debts refer to any unpaid financial obligations of the NPC which has not been
liquidated by the proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC Assets; stranded contract costs of NPC or
distribution utility refer to the excess of the contract cost of electricity under eligible contracts over the actual
selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the market.
ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining Universal Charge refers to the charge, if
any, imposed for the recovery of Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC and Stranded Contract
Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA.
(Rule 4 (rrr, IRR).
National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for
Missionary Electrification.
The ERC decided the NPC’s petition authorizing it to draw up to P70, 000, 000.00 from PSALM for
its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged Romeo P.
Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting
from the month of July 2003.
Hence, this original action.
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same
are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented
under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and
self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said
power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited
authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.
3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts
to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the
operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993, 220
SCRA 703;Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 521;
and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, L-77194, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 626, invoked by the respondents
clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In
said cases, the respective funds were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to
act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which
cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers to
administrative bodies. They posited that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose.
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
Decide.
ANS: 1. As to the first issue.
No, the Universal Charge is not a tax. In exacting the said charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the
State’s police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced from Sec. 34
which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, and which can be amply discerned
as regulatory in character.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.
(Osmeña v. Orbos, Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, 151
SCRA 208, 216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955)). In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. and
in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, it was held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar
Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated
in Osmeña v. Orbos, with respect to the OPSF.
With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration of PSALM.
As aptly pointed out by the OSG, evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund,
under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive and non-waivable power
and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival and well-being of the
community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily
in the pursuit of the State’s police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures attainment and perpetuity
of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country’s electric
power industry. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).
2. As to the second issue.
No, there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-
users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount
nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided by the law itself when it provided for the
promulgation and enforcement of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code.
This is also the case when the EPIRA law authorized the PSALM to compute the stranded debts and
stranded costs of the NPC which is to form the basis of the ERC in determining its universal charge.
As to the second test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following:
“interest of law and order;” “adequate and efficient instruction;” “public interest;” “justice and equity;”
“public convenience and welfare;” “simplicity, economy and efficiency;” “standardization and regulation of
medical education;” and “fair and equitable employment practices.” Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among
others, “to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of
the supply of electric power”, and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).
Note:
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC’s conferred powers were challenged.
In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432
SCRA 157, it has been held:
“In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the
EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirely, because a statute is
passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from
any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of
Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has
expanded the jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the
reforms sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of
the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC’s predecessors. To
sustain the view that the ERC possess only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is
to frustrate the objectives of the law.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the delegation of
powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:
 Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the
preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier
times. Police power now requires the State to “assume an affirmative duty to eliminate the excesses and
injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy.” Police power is not exerted “to
further the public welfare – a concept as vast as the good of society itself.” When the police power is delegated
to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power
takes on an even broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more
active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the
ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We should have exceptionally good
grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of electric
power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that
affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting
business. The engines of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired.
Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power outrages or unreliable electric power services. The State
thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory
Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, where it was held that the ERC, as
regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors
affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we there fore hold there is no undue delegation of legislative power
to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition
of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per Resolution of August 3, 2004.
Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which
essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, the Court is precluded from reviewing the same.
Note:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It
established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new
thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of the industry as the large government debt
and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical
constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the industry
had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the
distribution side was fragmented with over 10 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws
have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates;
poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable performance of the government power sector; high
system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization
of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the
delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division
of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized
thereafter. (Freedom from Debt Coalition v. ERC, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157).
O Principle of Sub-delegation of powers
1. Transmission of power from head of agency to his subordinates for
purposes of expediency and achieving maximum efficiency in public
service
2. Example is DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY
Doctrine of qualified political agency or alter ego principle means that the acts of the secretaries of the
Executive departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, G.R. No. L46570, April 21, 1939)
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In cases wherein the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or by the law to act in person or
2. the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments.
All the different executive and administrative organizations are mere adjuncts of the executive department.
This is an adjunct of the Doctrine of Single Executive.
The heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. [Villena v.
Sec. of Interior (1939)]
In the case of Abakada Guro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, Sept. 1, 2005, the SC held that the
Secretary of Finance can act as an agent of the Legislative Dept. to determine and declare the event upon
which its expressed will is to take effect. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the latter
cannot alter, or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
REASON:
Since the President is a busy man, he is not expected to exercise the totality of his power of control all the
time. He is not expected to exercise all his powers in person. He is expected to delegate some of them to men
of his confidence, particularly to members of his Cabinet.
President delegate certain powers to members of cabinet, who
are his alter egos;
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, GR L-46570, April 21,
1939
FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the Interior, conducted an inquiry
into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have
committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the Philippines, in which it was
verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary
injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend and order investigation
over Villena.
RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor Villena. As to the power
to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the
authority to supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86
of the same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over administration of
provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order
investigation because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
power real and effective.”However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor
was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary of Interior to suspend a
Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of
suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.
The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department secretaries,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised by the President.
It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the
President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the departments are
assistants and agents of the President.
Held:
Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:
The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the
decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.
The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an
official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may summon,
witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant to the
investigation.

The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices under
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to section 86 of
the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior “executive supervision over the administration
of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.” Therefore, the Secretary of
the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges against the petitioner and to
appoint a special investigator for that purpose.

Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For
minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable he
shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to
the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges against the officer
shall be filed with the board within five days.” The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly
granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is
necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.

The suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of
the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.

Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.