PIMENTEL vs.

AQUIRRE
G.R. No. 132988
19 JULY 2000

FACTS:
• Subject of this action is Administrative Order No. 372 (AO 372) requires local
government units (LGU) to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services (Sec. 1); and allows the LGUs to
withhold a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

• Petitioner filed to the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition, contending

that the President, in issuing the said AO, was in effect exercising the power of
control over LGUs; & that the directive to withhold a portion of their IRA is in
contravention of Sec. 286 of the LGC & Sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether Secs. 1 & 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the President’s power of
general supervision over LGUs.

HELD: Sec. 1 – YES; Sec. 4 – NO

RATIO:
• The Court held that Sec. 1 of AO 372, being merely an advisory is well within
the powers of the President. It is not a mandatory imposition, and such directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

• Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. The AO is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures
that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance.

• The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local
fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met:
o (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
o (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues;
o (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department
of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and
o (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.

• However, Sec. 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Section 4 which orders the withholding of a portion of the LGU’s IRA clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) – Digest

Facts:
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that
the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because of its resolution.

Issue:
Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction
of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given
to the two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?

Ruling:
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by
Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential
Decree provides that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization
of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The president exercises “general
supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law.” He has not control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free
to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree

creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy through decentralization of power.
The Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage
chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be
invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member
and speaker of the Sanggunian.

San Juan vs. Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal
Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the
latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended
private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most
qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner
protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service
Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to
the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly
nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with
the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art.
II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend
cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent
DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the
petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in
public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized
power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments
to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The
exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If
none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining
why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits
of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter
ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control
given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized
that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ
one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from
this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision
of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

G. R. No. 79956
January 29, 1990

Cordillera Broad Coalition

vs.
Commission on Audit

Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed
that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and
violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body
that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake
consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the
R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the
Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was
then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the
City of Baguio.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by
issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had
virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act
and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional

Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous
region in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the
President saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the
Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created. At this time, the President was still exercising
legislative powers as the First Congress had not yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of
government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220
did not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O.
No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the
National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of
the act which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the
Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Alfredo M. de Leon vs Benjamin Esguera

GR. No. 78059, August 31 1987

Facts:

In the barangay elections held in May 17, 1982 petitioner Alfredo M. de Leon was
elected Barangay Captain and other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta Ana,
Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelito J. de la Rosa, and Jose Ressurreccion, as a Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Tagaytay Rizal under Batas Pambasa Blg, 22,
otherknown as the Baramgay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner
Alfredo M. de Leaon received a memorandum antedated Decemeber 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esquerra on February 8 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Brgy. Captain of the said place. It
was contended that the designation made was “by authority of the Minister of Local
Government”. Also in the memorandum the OIC Governor designated Remigio M.
Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanieta, Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz,a nd Teresita
Tolentino as Memebers of Barangay Council.

The petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that to prohibit the respondents from taking over the positions.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to the Sec.3 of the BP Blg. 222, their term of
office shall be 6 years which shall commence on June 7 1982 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified, “or upto June 7 1988. It
is also in their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the OIC
Governor nolonger has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors. On the otherhand the respondents rely on Section2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25 1986, which provided [All
elective and appointed officials under 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of a year from February 25 1986.

Issue
1. Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one year period which ended on Feb. 25 1987.
2. Whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on Feb. 2 1987 the date of plebecite for
its for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on Feb. 11, 1987, the date its
ratification was proclaimed.

Ruling:
 The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebesite February 2, 1987. By that
date, therefore, the provisional Constitution must be deemed superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Sec. 2, Art
111, therefore to designate respondents to the elective position occupied by
petitioners. Until Office of the barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore the term of office of six years provided in the Barangay Election Act of
1982 should still govern.
The Supreme Court also find nothing inconsistent between the term of six years for
elective Barangay Officials and the 1987 Constitution.

The memoranda issued by the OIC Governor, therefore be declared null and
void and the Writ of Prohibition is granted which bar the respondents from taking
over petitioners position in Barangay Council.

Chiongbian vs. Orbos

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-
Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by
Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that
Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative
determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard for the
exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that
the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge regions IX and XII
but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly
not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President’s discretion.

HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative
determination the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country
into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires
should have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves
are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature.”
(Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves
no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative
regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential
services

Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration

(G.R. No. 92649 February 14, 1991)

Facts: The case concerns a land dispute between the spouses Leonor and Rosa
Badua and a certain David Quema. Both parties claimed ownership of two parcels of
land in Villaviciosa, Abra which led to Quema's filing of a case before the Barangay
Council. When the Barangay Council failed to settle the dispute, Quema filed it in the
tribal court of the Maeng Tribe, (a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting
the interior mountain of Villaviciosa, Abra).
The Maeng Tribal Court decided to award the parcels of land to Quema and ordered
the spouses to pay for the expenses of the case and a fine of P5, 000.00. When the
spouses did not immediately vacate the lot, they received a "warning order" from
the Zone Commander of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, the military arm of
the Cordillera Bodong Administration.
On April 2, 1990, the spouses filed a petition on certiorari and prohibition before the
Supreme Court, claiming that the Maeng Tribal Court has neither judicial power nor
jurisdiction over the parties.

Issue: Whether or not a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can
render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petioners.

Citing their ruling in the case of Cordillera Regional Assembly Member Alexander
Ordillo vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that since the plebiscite that was held
on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766 was rejected, the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be. As a logical consequence of that
judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the indigenous and
special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region, and
the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force or a regional
command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, do not legally exist.
Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence, the
Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under
R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing
under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community and such
tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the
Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. Thus, they
do not possess judicial power.