G.R. No.

L-6705 December 23, 1954

PATROCINIO RAYMUNDO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

DOROTEO PEÑAS, defendant-appellee.

Augusto Francisco for appellant.

Doroteo Penas in his own behalf.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Patrocinio Raymundo has brought up this case by direct appeal on points of law against a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (case No. 1169), denying her petition for a decree of divorce under Act
2710.

The facts are clear and not disputed. Appellant Raymundo and appellee Doroteo Peñas were validly
married to each other in Manila on March 29, 1941. The spouses lived together until 1949, but had no
children, nor acquired conjugal property. Sometime in July 1949, the husband Doroteo Peñas abandoned
his wife, appellant herein, and during August and September, 1949, lived maritally with another woman,
Carmen Paredes. At the instance of the deserted wife, an information for concubinage was filed on
October 3, 1949 (Criminal Case No. 11140). The husband, Peñas, was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 5, 1950. Pending his appeal, on July 14,
1950, the wife instituted the present proceedings, praying for a decree of absolute divorce. The
conviction of Doroteo Peñas was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on October 31, 1951.

The Court below found that the acts of concubinage that gave rise to the action, as well as the judgment
of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance, took place before the repeal of Act 2710 by the
new Civil Code, (which becomes effective on August 30, 1950, as held by this Court in Lara vs. Del
Rosario, 94 Phil., 778 ,50 Off. Gaz., p. 1975).
Nevertheless, the Court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the appellant had acquired no
right to a divorce that the Court bound to recognize after the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Court
reasoned out as follows:

Counsel's argument in support of the alleged right of the plaintiff would be indisputable if (it were ) not
for the following provision of Article 2254 of the new Civil Code.

'Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can raise from acts or omissions which are against the law or
which infringe upon the rights of others.'

The above quoted provisions is entirely new, not found in the old Civil Code. Evidently it is designed to
meet situations like the present. Under its explicit and unequivocal terms no acquired or vested right can
rise from offenses or acts which infringe upon the rights of others. It follows therefore that the acts of
concubinage of the defendant, which are not only against the law, but infringe upon the rights of his
wife, could not and did not give rise to o a vested right in favor of the plaintiff which would entitle her to
secure a divorce from her husband, the defendant herein. Under Article 97 of the new Civil Code the
most that the wife is now entitled to in case of concubinage on the part of the husband is to secure a
legal separation. (Rec. on Appeal, p. 14.

In our opinion, the judgment appealed from is incorrect. It should be apparent, upon reflection, that the
prohibition of Article 2254 must be directed at the offender, not the offended party who is in no way
responsible for the violation of legal duty. The interpretation adopted by the Court below results in
depriving a victim of any redress because of the very acts that injured him. The protection of vested
rights is but a consequence of the constitutional guaranty against deprivation of property can in no way
constitute such due process.

Our view of the true import of Article 2254 is supported by the Report of Code Commission submitted to
the Legislature in explanation of the motives behind the innovations of the proposed Civil Code.
Speaking of Article 2274 of the draft (now Art. 2254 of the Code), the Report states:

It is evident that no one can validly claim any vested or acquired right if the same is founded upon his
having violated the law or invaded the rights of others.
It follows that Article 2254 can not militate against the right of appellant to secure an absolute divorce as
a result of the concubinage of her husband. Despite the change in legislation, plaintiff-appellant is
protected by Article 2253 of the new Civil Code:

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws,
from acts done or events which took place under the regime, even though this Code may regulate them
in a different manner, or may not recognize them.lawphil.net

xxx xxx xxx

Conceding that there can not be a vested right in the continuation of a law recognizing absolute divorce
(Grant vs. Grant, 32 Am. Rep. 506), still , the terms of Article 2253 are sufficiently broad to protect the
rights of the appellant to a remedy against her husband's infidelity in conformity with the terms of the
old legislation. True that the new Civil Code does not recognize absolute divorce, but only legal
separation (Articles 97 to 108), thereby impliedly repealing Act 2710; but other provisions of the Code
clearly safeguard rights and actions arising under the preceding law. Its Article 4 expresses the well
established principle that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided"; and
Article 2258 plainly indicates that rights and actions already existing (and a fortiori, actions already
initiated) should be governed by the prior legislation.

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this
Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the
procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of
the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes
effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties
concerned may choose which methods or course to pursue.

Further, Article 2267 explicitly enumerates the articles that are to apply to actions pending (like the
present) when the new Civil Code became effective, and Articles 97 to 108 on legal separation are not
included therein.

Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the
date this Code becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;.

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.

The plain implication of these provisions is that the Code did not intend its provisions on legal separation
to apply retroactively; and that the change from absolute divorce to legal separation was not designed to
affect at the time the reform was introduced.

Thus the present case is readily distinguished from the case of divorce proceedings instituted under
Executive Order No. 141 of the Japanese occupation Executive Commission, and which were pending at
the liberation of the Islands. We ruled in Peña de Luz vs. Court of First Instance of Leyte, 43 Off. Gaz., p.
4102, that such pending divorce proceedings must be dismissed because the occupation divorce law
ceased to be in force and effect upon liberation of the national territory, and because the proclamation
of General McArthur in Leyte on October 23, 1944, had abrogated all occupation legislation absolutely
and without qualification. The repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil Code is in a different position, since
the transitional provisions of the latter law expressly prescribe, as we have seen, the subsistence of
rights derived from acts that took place under the prior legislation.

It is of no comment that the conviction of the husband only became final after the new Civil Code,
denying absolute divorce, came into effect, for their Court has already ruled in Chereau vs. Fuentebellla
(43 Phil., 220) that section 8 of Act 2710 1is only evidentiary in character, since it merely has reference,
of course, to the species of proof required to establish the basal fact on which the right to the divorce
rests; and the circumstance that this fact is not so proved in no wise impairs the jurisdiction of the
Court.".

The decision appealed from is reversed, and a new judgment shall be entered granting a decree of
absolute divorce as prayed for. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in
its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where
she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a
well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of
undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their
marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned
the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To
facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St.
Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind
of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she
admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the
clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to
be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration
did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name
he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day
in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with
Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental,
to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a
petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition
(Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing
(Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and
that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United
States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and
absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of
her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with
him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August
1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife
and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and
Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable
for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents
on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta
Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by
the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and
both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the
presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under
civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the
time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason,
60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and
the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was
valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of
Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the
time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She
was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident
consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord
with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were
rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,
when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute
divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings,
therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children.
The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine
law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not
new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward
her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp.
270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the
"great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing
to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as
good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite
their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage
be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one
was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but
respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of
affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of
age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his
or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy
motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his
right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness,
even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of
a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford
him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently
been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that
there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a
promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable
to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that
appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second
marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño,
by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must
have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of
the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is
the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 170022, January 09, 2013]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1ςrνl1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
challenging the October 7, 2005 amended decision2ςrνl1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered
its March 22, 2004 decision3ςrνl1 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the
CA set aside the June 5, 2002 decision4ςrνl1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in
Civil Case No. 95-74257, which

The Factual Antecedents

On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5ςrνl1 and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny.6ςrνl1 To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Sometime in 1991,7ςrνl1 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's psychological
incapacity.8ςrνl1

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their
home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.9ςrνl1

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita's infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the
family home.10ςrνl1 He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their
children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11ςrνl1

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12ςrνl1 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any
form of major psychiatric illness[,]”13ςrνl1 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of
her for a good and lasting marital relationship”;14ςrνl1 her "transferring from one job to the other
depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions”;15ςrνl1 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship.”16ςrνl1

The RTC Ruling

In its June 5, 2002 decision,17ςrνl1 the RTC declared Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient
basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.cralawlibrary

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.cralawlibrary

The CA Ruling

The CA originally18ςrνl1 set aside the RTC's verdict, finding that Lolita's abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely
refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly
observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a
marriage.cralawlibrary

Cesar sought reconsideration19ςrνl1 of the CA's decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The
CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its amended
decision,20 the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita's serious psychological incapacity that
resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to
Cesar; and (2) Lolita's willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.cralawlibrary

The OSG then filed the present petition.cralawlibrary

The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal
separation.cralawlibrary

The Case for the Respondent

Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave
and incurable psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary

The Issue

The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage
to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence

on Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations”;21ςrνl1 not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.22ςrνl1 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.23ςrνl1

Cesar failed to prove Lolita's

psychological incapacity

In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on
the dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their
home,24ςrνl1 as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of
the affair,25ςrνl1 but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with Alvin and her
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.cralawlibrary

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26ςrνl1 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations
of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.27ςrνl1 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.cralawlibrary

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from
any major psychiatric illness.28ςrνl1 Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems with co-
workers,29ςrνl1 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was � at
the time of her marriage � psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside
from the time element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with
her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their
marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one
another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison
with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this
purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that Lolita's refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to
work out a good marital relationship30ςrνl1 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact,
a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.cralawlibrary
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.cralawlibrary

Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31ςrνl1 protected by the State. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its
dissolution and nullity.32ςrνl1 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions
made by one party to the other during the marriage.cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.cralawlibrary

Costs against the respondent.cralawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Cardenas & Casal for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Solicitor Luciano for appellee.
MORAN, J.:

On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez
Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part
recites as follows:

Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su vida y se
comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun
concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en
completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of
divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he
contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of
Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of
the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two actions against
the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court
of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused for which he was
sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of
concubinage accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon
appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the
former procedure and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial
court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and
sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this appeal.

As to appellant's plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the office of bigamy for which he
was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two distinct
offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second
marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other hand, in the present
case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes the crime of
concubinage. The first in an offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the
state; the second, an offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party. And no rule is more settled in law than that, on the matter of double jeopardy, the test is
not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in
jeopardy for the same offense. (Diaz v. U. S., 223 U. S., 422; People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 82)
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they
agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for
the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that
by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.

We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party from
instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts
of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed.
We are now convinced that this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as well as the
manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they
are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. (Emphasis ours.)

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have
been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances
as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to
come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers
his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of
the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is
as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an

illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor
entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the
law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in
a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of the
government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our authority.

Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz and Horilleno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO
C. PACETE, petitioners,

vs.

HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents.

Juan G. Sibug and Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioners.

Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in declaring petitioners in default
and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among other things, decreed the legal separation
of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab
initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.

On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion,
as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace
of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that
Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan,
North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor
vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in
the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an
amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an
extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted
the motion. On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second
motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the
lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from 20 December 1979 or
until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to defendants' counsel on 11 January 1980.
Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion
(dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day
period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the
court denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first
extension had expired."1

The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her evidence.2 The court received plaintiff's evidence
during the hearings held on 15, 20, 21 and 22 February 1980.

On 17 March 1980, the court3 promulgated the herein questioned decision, disposing of the case, thus
—

WHEREFORE, order is hereby issued ordering:

1. The issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the marriage between, the plaintiff, Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico L. Pacete, in accordance with the Philippine
laws and with consequences, as provided for by our laws;
2. That the following properties are hereby declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership
of the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, half and half, to
wit:

1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-815 which is a parcel of land situated in the barrio of
Langcong, Municipality of Matanog (previously of Parang), province of Maguindanao (previously of
Cotabato province) with an area of 45,265 square meters registered in the name of Enrico Pacete,
Filipino, of legal age, married to Conchita Alanis as shown in Exhibits "B" and "B-1" for the plaintiff.

2. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20442, with an area of 538 square
meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 2650 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, situated in the
Poblacion of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, together with all its improvements, which parcel of land, as
shown by Exhibits "K-1" was acquired by way of absolute deed of sale executed by Amrosio Mondog on
January 14, 1965.

3. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20424 and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 803 (74), with an area of 5.1670 hectares, more or less, as shown by Exhibit "R", the
same was registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and the same was acquired by Enrico Pacete last
February 17, 1967 from Ambag Ampoy, as shown by Exhibit "R-1", situated at Musan, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato.

4. A parcel of land situated at Lanao, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, with an area of 5.0567 hectares,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 4332 (74), as shown by Exhibit "S", and registered in the name of Enrico
Pacete.

5. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9750, situated at Lika, Mlang, North
Cotabato, with an area of 4.9841 hectares and the same is covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74) and
registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and which land was acquired by Enrico Pacete from Salvador
Pacete on September 24, 1962, as shown by Exhibit "Q-1".

6. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9944, with an area of 9.9566 and
also covered by Tax Declaration No. 8608 (74) and registered in the name of the defendant Enrico L.
Pacete which Enrico L. Pacete acquired from Sancho Balingcos last October 22, 1962, as shown by Exhibit
"L-1" and which parcel of land is situated at (Kialab), Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato.

7. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9227, situated at Kiab, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 12.04339 hectares, more or less, and also covered by Tax Declaration
No. 8607 (74) both in the name of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which he acquired last October 15,
1962 from Minda Bernardino, as shown by Exhibit "M-1".

8. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9228, situated at Kiab, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 10.8908 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also
covered by Tax Declaration No. 5781 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete and which parcel of land he
acquired last September 25, 1962 from Conchita dela Torre, as shown by Exhibit "P-1".

9. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10301, situated at Linao, Matalam,
North Cotabato, with an area of 7.2547 hectares, registered in the name of Enrico Pacete and also
covered by Tax Declaration No. 8716 (74) also in the name of Enrico Pacete which Enrico Pacete acquired
from Agustin Bijo last July 16, 1963, as shown by Exhibit "N-1".

10. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12728 in the name of the defendant,
Enrico L. Pacete, with an area of 10.9006 hectares, situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato and is
also covered by Tax Declaration No. 5745 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, as shown on Exhibit "O" and
which Enrico Pacete acquired last December 31, 1963 from Eliseo Pugni, as shown on Exhibit "0-1".

3. Ordering the Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-34243 covering Lot No. 1066,
issued in the name of Evelina Pacete, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, and ordering the
registration of the same in the joint name of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete as
their conjugal property, with address on the part of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete at Parang,
Maguindanao and on the part of Enrico L. Pacete at Kidapawan, North Cotabato.

4. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. V-20101, covering Lot No.
77, in the name of Eduardo C. Pacete, situated at New Lawaan, Mlang, North Cotabato, and the issuance
of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name of (half and half) Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis
Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete.
5. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. P-29890, covering Lot 1068,
situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 12.1031 hectares, in the name of Emelda C.
Pacete and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name (half and half) of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete; and declaring that the fishpond situated at
Barrio Tumanan, Bislig, Surigao Del Sur, with an area of 48 hectares and covered by Fishpond Lease
Agreement of Emelda C. Pacete, dated July 29, 1977 be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the joint name of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and her husband, Enrico L. Pacete, be registered as their joint
property, including the 50 hectares fishpond situated in the same place, Barrio Timanan, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur.

6. Ordering the following motor vehicles to be the joint properties of the conjugal partnership of
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete, viz:

a. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-783; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T137-20561; Chassis No.
83920393, and Type, Mcarrier;

b. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-784; Make, Dodge; Motor No. T214-229547; Chassis No. 10D-
1302-C; and Type, Mcarrier;

c. Motor vehicle with Plate No. J-PR-818; Make, Ford; Motor No. GRW-116188; Chassis No. HOCC-
GPW-1161-88-C; Type, Jeep;

d. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-583; Make, Ford: Motor No. F70MU5-11111; Chassis No.
HOCC-GPW-1161188-G; Type, Stake;

e. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-584; Make, Hino; Motor No. ED300-45758; Chassis No.
KB222-22044; Type, Stake; and

f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-585; Make, Ford: Motor No. LTC-780-Dv; Chassis No. 10F-
13582-K; Type, Stake.
7. Ordering the defendant Enrico L. Pacete to pay the plaintiff the sum of P46,950.00 which is the
share of the plaintiff in the unaccounted income of the ricemill and corn sheller for three years from
1971 to 1973.

8. Ordering the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, to reimburse the plaintiff the monetary equipment of
30% of whether the plaintiff has recovered as attorney's fees;

9. Declaring the subsequent marriage between defendant Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion to be void ab initio; and

10. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit.4

Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.

Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been dismissed, for, as also pointed
out by private respondents, the proper remedy of petitioners should have instead been either to appeal
from the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment.5 This rule, however, is not
inflexible; a petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even
when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.6 In these
exceptional instances, the special civil action of certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default
is available.7 In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned. The Civil
Code provides:

Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil Code,8 and it is, in substance,
reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code.9

Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily explain the mandatory tenor of
the law. In Brown v. Yambao, 10 the Court has observed:

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case
of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not be made to depend upon the parties
themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855;
Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be
allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or
annulment are fully justified or not.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take
steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the inclusion of
the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in
an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are
impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to
leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. 11 That other remedies,
whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor
excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the proceedings below, including the
Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.

GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought
in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed
father.
The Facts and the Case

In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out
the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from
Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which
listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines,
Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father;
that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a
harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and
that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a
protection order against him.

On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to
compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its
April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her
child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with
this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for
temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

The Court’s Ruling

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include
the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became
apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor
her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied
this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on
her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The child’s remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support
and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an
action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on
the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue
remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether
they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina
failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the
real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is
just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father’s legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the
preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s
Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and
Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.

SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

Joselito J. Coloma for petitioner.

BENGZON, J.:

Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of adultery. The
court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was
confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.

We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which for
convenience are quoted herewith:
ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney
shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it
described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951
with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.

Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above,
directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The
fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion.
The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo,
Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.

According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant
were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as
husband and wife. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with
one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent
her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff
discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose
Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation."

The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's
adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March
1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree with the Court of
Appeals on this point.1

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the
husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation
and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of
the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual
relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the
Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the
defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses
the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.2 This is
not occur.

Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of
judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree
may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented
by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's
confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.

The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from
her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the
complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal.
Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted
the commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals
did not find collusion.)

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.

. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented
in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from
the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60
Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590.).

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial
offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal
separation even in the absence of grounds therefor.

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment
her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal
risk.

In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty
party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove
it. (Williams vs. Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231;
Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S. W. [2d] 688.).

And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
(Pohlman vs. Pohlman, [N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had
left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be
remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates
with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.

Two decisions3 are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the
husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a
vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the
wife who "left" her husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez
David, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12093 June 29, 1959

ESTANISLAO SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

MELCHOR SOLOMON, defendant-appellee.

Constante Pimentel for appellant.

Faustino B. Tobia, Eufrecino T. Tagayana, Pedro R. Arce and Emmanuel U. Ujano for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Estanislao Serrano is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Judge Jose G.
Bautista presiding, declaring null and void the supposed donation propter nuptias on which his
complaint was based and dismissing the later upon motion of the defendant. The motion for dismissal
was filed before the hearing but the trial court deferred action upon it until after submission of evidence
by the parties. Said parties entered into a stipulation of facts after which they declined to submit any
other evidence except Exhibit "A", the supposed deed of donation propter nuptias, the translation of
which, for purposes of reference, is reproduced below:

That, I Melchor Solomon, single, Filipino, of legal age, native of the municipality of Sinait, province of
Ilocos Sur and residing at present in Sinait, having decided to get married with the consent of my
parents, brothers, or sisters and relatives, have announced and manifested my determination and desire
to Mr. Estanislao Serrano to whose family the flower I intend to win belongs, namely Miss Alejandria
Feliciano single, born in Hawaii but is actually residing in Cabugao, Ilocos Sur.

This ardent desire favored by good luck and accepted by the noble lady the one concerned, is to be
realized and complied with under agreement or stipulation which affirms, promotes and vivifies the
union. This agreement donating all my exclusive properties in order that we shall have a basic capital for
our conjugal life and in order that there will be ready maintenance and support of offsprings has come
out voluntarily and expontaneously from me, I the very one concerned.

These which I am donating my exclusive properties because I have honestly acquired the same with the
sweat of my brows and I donate them gladly, to wit . . .;

The referred to properties are donated in accordance with the existing laws of the Philippines and our
children out of the wedlock will be the ones to inherit same inherit same with equal shares. But if God
will not bless our union with any child one half of all my properties including the properties acquired our
conjugal union will be given the (to) my brothers or sisters or their heirs if I, the husband will die before
my wife and if my beloved wife will die before me, one half of all my properties and those acquired by us
will be given to those who have reared my wife in token of my love to her. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Alejandria Feliciano, whose father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides there,
had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care of and raised her from the
age 12 until she reached womanhood. On June 21, 1948, defendant Melchor Solomon married
Alejandria. On the same day of the marriage but before the marriage ceremony he executed the alleged
Deed of Donation, Exhibit "A" above reproduced. Less than nine months after marriage, or rather on
March 2, 1949, Alejandria died without issue. Several months thereafter Estanislao Serrano commenced
the present action to enforce and implement the terms of the alleged donation particularly that portion
thereof to the effect that if Alejandria died before her husband Melchor and left no children, then one
half of Melchor's properties and those acquired by him and his wife would be given to those persons
who had raised and taken care of her namely, Estanislao Serrano.

Acting upon the motion for dismissal the trial court found that the donation could not be regarded as a
donation propter nuptias for the reason that though it was executed before the marriage, it was not
made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important, that the donation was not made to
one or both of the (marriage) contracting parties, but to a third person.

After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with the trial court. Article 1327 of the Old Civil Code
reads:

Art. 1327. Donations by reasons of marriage are those bestowed before its celebration in consideration
of the same, upon one or both of the spouses.

This article was reproduced in the Civil Code under Article 126. Whether we apply Article 1327 for the
reason that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in 1948 before the promulgation of the New Civil
Code in 1950 or whether we apply Article 126 of the New Civil Code the result would be the same.

Was the donation made in considerations of the marriage between Melchor and Alejandria or was it
made consideration of the death of either of them in the absence of any children? True, the Deed of
Donation was executed on the occasion when they married. But, the marriage in itself was not the only
consideration or condition under which terms of the donation would be carried out. The marriage would
have to be childless and one of the spouses would have to die before the other before the donation
would operate. So, strictly, speaking, the donation may not be regarded as one made in consideration of
the marriage.

But assuming for the moment that it was made in consideration of the marriage, still, we have the fact
that the donation was being made not in favor of Alejandria, the wife, but rather in favor of those who
acted as her parents and raised her from girlhood to womanhood in the absence of her father. That does
not place it within the provisions of Article 1327 and Article 126 of the Old Civil Code and the New Civil
Code, respectively. Manresa, in his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the following:

Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after the celebration of marriage; (2)
executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of the marriage; and (3) granted to
persons other than the spouses even though they may be founded on the marriage (6 M. 232).

Having come to the conclusion that the Deed of Donation does not fulfill the requirements of a donation
propter nuptias and that it might be considered a donation inter vivos, can it be considered valid and
effective? Hardly, because it was never accepted by the donee either in the same instrument or donation
or in a separate document as required by law.

Again, may the donation be regarded a donation mortis causa, and given effect? The answer has to be in
the negative for the reason that this Tribunal has heretofore consistently held that a donation to take
effect after the death of the donor, is equivalent to a disposition or bequest of property by last will, an it
should be executed in accordance with the requisites and strict provisions governing the execution
wills;1 and Exhibit "A" does not fulfill said requirements. Moreover, in the present case, the donor is still
alive and naturally, even if the donation were otherwise valid, still, the time and occasion have not
arrived for considering its operation and implementation.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-12707 August 10, 1918

MRS. HENRY E. HARDING, and her husband, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

Lawrence & Ross for appellant.

Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellees.

FISHER, J.:

This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest, alleged to be
due under the terms of a policy of insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount
demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant appeals.

The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this case, and its finding of fact, as follows:

It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that plaintiffs are husband and wife and residents of
the city of Manila; that the defendant is a foreign corporation organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of Great Britain and duly registered in the Philippine Islands, and Smith, Bell & Co. (limited), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its principal domicile in
the city of Manila, is the agent in the Philippine Islands of said defendant.

The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding was the owner of a
Studebaker automobile, registered number 2063, in the city of Manila; that on said date; in
consideration of the payment to the defendant of the premium of P150, by said plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E.
Harding, with the consent of her husband, the defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell &
Company (limited), made its policy of insurance in writing upon said automobile was set forth in said
policy to be P3,000 that the value of said automobile was set forth in said policy (Exhibit A) to be P3,000;
that on March 24, 1916, said automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that the loss thereby to plaintiffs
was the sum of P3,000; that thereafter, within the period mentioned in the said policy of insurance, the
plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, furnished the defendant the proofs of her said loss and interest, and
otherwise performed all the conditions of said policy on her part, and that the defendant has not paid
said loss nor any part thereof, although due demand was made upon defendant therefor.
The defendant, by its answer, admitted the allegations of the residence and status of the parties and
denied all the other allegation of the said complaint, and for a separate and affirmative defense alleged
(1) that on February 17, 1916, at the city of Manila, P.I. the defendant upon request of plaintiff, Mrs.
Henry E. Harding, issued to the said plaintiff the policy of insurance on an automobile alleged by the said
plaintiff to be her property; that the said request for the issuance of said policy of insurance was made
by means of a proposal in writing signed and delivered by said plaintiff to the defendant, guaranteeing
the truth of the statements contained therein which said proposal is referred to in the said policy of
insurance made a part thereof; (2) that certain of the statements and representations contained in said
proposal and warranted by said plaintiff to be true, to wit: (a) the price paid by the proposer for the said
automobile; (b) the value of said automobile at the time of the execution and delivery of the said
proposal and (c) the ownership of said automobile, were false and known to be false by the said plaintiff
at the time of signing and delivering the said proposal and were made for the purpose of misleading and
deceiving the defendant, and inducing the defendant, relying upon the warranties, statements, and
representations contained in the said proposal and believing the same to be true, issued the said policy
of insurance.

The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the said policy of insurance to be null and void,
and that plaintiffs take nothing by this action; and for such further relief as to the court may seem just
and equitable.

The evidence in this case shows that some time in the year 1913 Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for
the Studebaker automobile, sold the automobile No. 2063 to John Canson for P3,200 (testimony of Mr.
Diehl); that under date of October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said automobile to Henry Harding for
the sum of P1,500 (Exhibit 2); that under date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold the
said automobile No. 2063 to J. Brannigan, of Los Baños, Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of P2,000
(Exhibit 3); that under date of December 20, 1915, J. C. Graham of Los Baños, Province of Laguna, P.I.,
sold the said automobile No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city of Manila for the sum of P2,800 (Exhibit 4
and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on or about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave the said
automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of the plaintiffs, as a present; that said automobile
was repaired and repainted at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900 (testimony of Mr. Server); that
while the said automobile was at the Luneta Garage; the said Luneta Garage, acting as agent for Smith,
Bell & Company, (limited), solicited of the plaintiff Mrs. Harding the insurance of said automobile by the
defendant Company (testimony of Mrs. Henry Harding and Mr. Server); that a proposal was filled out by
the said agent and signed by the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding, and in said proposal under the heading
"Price paid by proposer," is the amount of "3,500" and under another heading "Present value" is the
amount of "3,000" (Exhibit 1).
The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was made a representative of the Manila agent
of defendant went to the Luneta Garage and examined said automobile No. 2063 and Mr. Server, the
General Manager of the Luneta Garage, an experienced automobile mechanic, testified that at the time
this automobile was insured it was worth about P3,000, and the defendant, by and through its said agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter issued a policy of insurance upon proposal in which policy
the said automobile was described as of the "present value" of P3,000 and the said defendant charged
the said plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding as premium on said policy the sum of P150, or 5 per cent of the
then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)

The "Schedule" in said policy of insurance describes the automobile here in question, and provides in
part of follows:

"Now it is hereby agreed as follows:

"That during the period above set forth and during any period for which the company may agree to
renew this policy the company will subject to the exception and conditions contained herein or endorsed
hereon indemnify the insured against loss of or damage to any motor car described in the schedule
hereto (including accessories) by whatever cause such loss or damage may be occasioned and will
further indemnify the insured up to the value of the car or P3,000 whichever is the greater against any
claim at common law made by any person (not being a person in the said motor car nor in the insured's
service) for loss of life or for accidental bodily injury or damage to property caused by the said motor car
including law costs payable in connection with such claim when incurred with the consent of the
company."

The evidence further shows that on March 24, 1916, the said automobile was totally destroyed by fire,
and that the iron and steel portions of said automobile which did not burn were taken into the
possession of the defendant by and through its agent Smith, Bell & Company (limited), and sold by it for
a small sum, which had never been tendered to the plaintiff prior to the trial of this case, but in open
court during the trial the sum of P10 as the proceeds of such sale was tendered to plaintiff and refused.

Upon the facts so found, which we hold are supported by the evidence, the trial judge decided that
there was no proof of fraud on the part of plaintiff in her statement of the value of the automobile, or
with respect to its ownership; that she had an insurable interest therein; and that defendant, having
agreed to the estimated value, P3,000, and having insured the automobile for that amount, upon the
basis of which the premium was paid, is bound by it and must pay the loss in accordance with the
stipulated insured value. The assignments of error made on behalf of appellant put in issue the
correctness of those conclusions of law, and some others of minor importance relating to the exclusion
of evidence. Disposing of the minor objections first, as we have reached the conclusion that the trial
court was right in holding that the defendant is bound by the estimated value of the automobile upon
which policy was issued, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of fraud in regard thereto, the exclusion of
the testimony of the witness Diehl is without importance. It merely tended to show the alleged actual
value of the automobile, and in the view we take of the case such evidence was irrelevant.

Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile at the time of the issuance
of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable interest in it. The court below found that the automobile
was given to plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in question. Appellant
does not dispute the correctness of this finding, but contends that the gift was void, citing article 1334 of
the Civil Code which provides that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the family are not included in
this rule."

We are of the opinion that this contention is without merit. In the case of Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil.
Rep., 10), this court said:

It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from plaintiff's husband to her was completely
void under article 1458 of the Civil Code and that, therefore, the property still remains the property of
Edward Cook and subject to levy under execution against him.

In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They are not in a position to challenge the
validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the
transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate, present, remote, or otherwise, in
the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to
wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken
advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or to the
property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship
appears the transfer cannot be attacked.

Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon
it to show that the gift in question does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say,
as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not a moderate one.
Whether it is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is
disclosed by the record.

Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the automobile was a warranty, that the
statement was false, and that, therefore, the policy never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion that
it has not been shown by the evidence that the statement was false — on the contrary we believe that it
shows that the automobile had in fact cost more than the amount mentioned. The court below found,
and the evidence shows, that the automobile was bought by plaintiff's husband a few weeks before the
issuance of the policy in question for the sum of P2,800, and that between that time and the issuance of
the policy some P900 was spent upon it in repairs and repainting. The witness Server, an expert
automobile mechanic, testified that the automobile was practically as good as new at the time the
insurance was effected. The form of proposal upon which the policy was issued does not call for a
statement regarding the value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the applicant for the
insurance, but merely a statement of its cost. The amount stated was less than the actual outlay which
the automobile represented to Mr. Harding, including repairs, when the insurance policy was issued. It is
true that the printed form calls for a statement of the "price paid by the proposer," but we are of the
opinion that it would be unfair to hold the policy void simply because the outlay represented by the
automobile was made by the plaintiff's husband and not by his wife, to whom he had given the
automobile. It cannot be assumed that defendant should not have issued the policy unless it were
strictly true that the price representing the cost of the machine had been paid by the insured and by no
other person — that it would no event insure an automobile acquired by gift, inheritance, exchange, or
any other title not requiring the owner to make a specific cash outlay for its acquisition.

Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows, without dispute, that the proposal upon
which the policy in question was issued was made out by defendant's agent by whom the insurance was
solicited, and that appellee simply signed the same. It also appears that an examiner employed by the
defendant made an inspection of the automobile before the acceptance of the risk, and that the sum
after this examination. The trial court found that Mrs. Harding, in fixing the value of the automobile at
P3,000, acted upon information given her by her husband and by Mr. Server, the manager of the Luneta
Garage. The Luneta Garage, it will be remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation in the
solicitation of the insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state of her own knowledge that the automobile
originally cost P3,000, or that its value at the time of the insurance was P3,000. She merely repeated the
information which had been given her by her husband, and at the same time disclosed to defendant's
agent the source of her information. There is no evidence to sustain the contention that this
communication was made in bad faith. It appears that the statements in the proposal as to the price paid
for the automobile and as to its value were written by Mr. Quimby who solicited the insurance on behalf
of defendant, in his capacity as an employee of the Luneta Garage, and wrote out the proposal for Mrs.
Harding to sign. Under these circumstances, we do not think that the facts stated in the proposal can be
held as a warranty of the insured, even if it should have been shown that they were incorrect in the
absence of proof of willful misstatement. Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be regarded as the
act of the insurer and not of the insured. This question was considered in the case of the Union
Insurance Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in which the Supreme Court of the
United States said:

This question has been decided differently by courts of the highest respectability in cases precisely
analogous to the present. It is not to be denied that the application logically considered, is the work of
the assured, and if left to himself or to such assistance as he might select, the person so selected would
be his agent, and he alone would be responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known, so well that no
court would be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that insurance companies organized under the laws of
one State, and having in that State their principal business office, send these agents all over the land,
with directions to solicit and procure applications for policies furnishing them with printed arguments in
favor of the value and necessity of life insurance, and of the special advantages of the corporation which
the agent represents. They pay these agents large commissions on the premiums thus obtained, and the
policies are delivered at their hands to the assured. The agents are stimulated by letters and instructions
to activity in procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner induced to take out a policy, rarely
sees or knows anything about the company or its officers by whom it is issued, but looks to and relies
upon the agent who has persuaded him to effect insurance as the full and complete representative of
the company, in all that is said or done in making the contract. Has he not a right to so regard him? It is
quite true that the reports of judicial decisions are filled with the efforts of these companies, by their
counsel, to establish the doctrine for the acts of these agents to the simple receipt of the premium and
delivery of the policy, the argument being that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the agent of the
assured. This proposition is not without support in some of the earlier decision on the subject; and, at a
time when insurance companies waited for parties to come to them to seek assurance, or to forward
applications on their own motion, the doctrine had a reasonable foundation to rest upon. But to apply
such a doctrine, in its full force, to the system of selling policies through agents, which we have
described, would be a snare and a delusion, leading, as it has done in numerous instances, to the
grossest frauds, of which the insurance corporations receive the benefits, and the parties supposing
themselves insured are the victims. The tendency of the modern decisions in this country is steadily in
the opposite direction. The powers of the agent are, prima facie, co-extensive with the business
intrusted to his care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not communicated to the person with
whom he deals. (Bebee vs. Ins. Co., 25 Conn., 51; Lycoming Ins. Co. vs. Schoolenberger, 44 Pa., 259; Beal
vs. Ins. Co., 16 Wis., 241; Davenport vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276.) An insurance company, establishing a
local agency, must be held responsible to the parties with whom they transact business, for the acts and
declarations of the agent, within the scope of his employment, as if they proceeded from the principal.
(Sav. Bk. vs. Ins. Co., 31 Conn., 517; Hortwitz vs. Ins. Co., 40 Mo., 557; Ayres vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 176;
Howard Ins. Co. vs. Bruner, 23 Pa., 50.)

In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a full consideration of the authorities, it is said:
"By the interested or officious zeal of the agents employed by the insurance companies in the wish to
outbid each other and procure customers, they not unfrequently mislead the insured, by a false or
erroneous statement of what the application should contain; or, taking the preparation of it into their
own hands, procure his signature by an assurance that it is properly drawn, and will meet the
requirements of the policy. The better opinion seems to be that, when this course is pursued, the
description of the risk should, though nominally proceeding from the insured, be regarded as the act of
the insurers." (Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N.Y., 550.)

The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and they seem to us founded on reason and justice,
and meet our entire approval. This principle does not admit oral testimony to vary or contradict that
which is in writing, but it goes upon the idea that the writing offered in evidence was not the instrument
of the party whose name is signed to it; that it was procured under such circumstances by the other side
as estops that side from using it or relying on its contents; not that it may be contradicted by oral
testimony, but that it may be shown by such testimony that it cannot be lawfully used against the party
whose name is signed to it. (See also Am. Life Ins. Co. vs. Mahone, 21 Wallace, 152.)

The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an inspection of the automobile by its
examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on
the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and
it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute
correctness of such estimated value. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of the First National Bank vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (5 Otto, 673; 24 L. ed., 563), at. p. 565 of the
Lawyers Edition:

The ordinary test of the value of property is the price it will commend in the market if offered for sale.
But that test cannot, in the very nature of the case, be applied at the time application is made for
insurance. Men may honestly differ about the value of property, or as to what it will bring in the market;
and such differences are often very marked among those whose special business it is to buy and sell
property of all kinds. The assured could do no more than estimate such value; and that, it seems, was all
that he was required to do in this case. His duty was to deal fairly with the Company in making such
estimate. The special finding shows that he discharged that duty and observed good faith. We shall not
presume that the Company, after requiring the assured in his application to give the "estimated value,"
and then to covenant that he had stated all material facts in regard to such value, so far as known to him,
and after carrying that covenant, by express words, into the written contract, intended to abandon the
theory upon which it sought the contract, and make the absolute correctness of such estimated value a
condition precedent to any insurance whatever. The application, with its covenant and stipulations,
having been made a part of the policy, that presumption cannot be indulged without imputing to the
Company a purpose, by studied intricacy or an ingenious framing of the policy, to entrap the assured into
incurring obligations which, perhaps, he had no thought of assuming.

Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the effect of a valuation in a policy of fire
insurance is the same as in a policy of marine insurance."

By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of marine insurance is conclusive if
the insured had an insurable interest and was not guilty of fraud.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in question
and had an insurable interest therein; that there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance;
that the valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding upon the defendant
corporation, and that the judgment of the court below is, therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with
interest, the costs of this appeal to be paid by the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-27843 October 11, 1979

CLARA TORELA AND SILVERIANA TORELA, appellants-petitioners,

vs.

FELIMON TORELA, MARCIANA GEPANAGO AND MARCOS MAHILUM AND THE COURT OF APPEALS,
appellees-respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Petitioners, whose complaint was dismissed both in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and
in the Court of Appeals, would have us reverse the decision of the latter and declare the land in litigation
as the conjugal property of their parents so that they wig be entitled to their mother's share who had
died.

The decision of the Court of Appeals which was penned by Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., now
a distinguished member of this Court, is reproduced hereunder in its material aspects for the factual
background of the - case and to enable us to Identify the legal problem.

It appears that on December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the
owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770 of the Cad. Survey of Cauayan) described therein, and
ordering that the same be registered in the name of said Felimon Torela in accordance with the provision
of Land Registration Act (Exh. 3 also Exh. 4). Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 29257
covering said Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan Cadastre was issued in favor of Felimon Torela. As the
certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 29257) was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, Felimon
Torela filed a verified petition for reconstitution, dated December 28, 1953, praying that after due
publication thereof in the Official Gazette, as provided for by law, an order be issued setting the petition
for hearing (Exh. A). Thereafter an order was issued on July 8, 1957, the dispositive portion of which is as
follows -

WHEREFORE, the Court, pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, hereby orders the Register of
Deeds of this province to reconstitute the original as well as the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate
of Title No. 29257, covering Lot No. 3770 of Cauayan Cadastre, this province, on the basis of the above-
mentioned Decree No. 440157 (Exh. D) for the said lot. All liens and incumbrances affecting the above
state lot which appeared noted on the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted at the time of its loss
or destruction. shall be an annotated on the reconstituted certificate of title. Once the reconstitution
herein ordered is duly accomplished, let a second owner's duplicate certificate be issued to the
petitioner.
Thus, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6898 (29257) was issued in favor of Felimon Torela, in lieu of the
lost and/or destroyed one (Exh. D, p. 125, Rec.).

On March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan
Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife,
Graciana Gallego, the Cadastral court ordered that said land be registered in the name of Felimon Torela,
married to Graciana Gallego; that his first wife died many years ago; and that he is married by second
nuptial to Marciana Gepanago. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental to change his (movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of
title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela, married to Marciana
Gepanago" (Exh. E). Acting upon the Motion Ex-Parte, the court, finding no opposition thereto and with
the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon Torela by first marriage, granted the motion and
ordered the Register of Deeds to change the civil status of the movant from "Felimon Torela, married to
Marciana Gepanago", which is the actual civil status of the movant, upon payment of the required fees.
(Order of March 10, 1958, Exh. F.)

On March 4, 1958, Felimon, Torela executed a definite deed of sale (EXH 1), whereby, for and in
consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P.
Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum He also stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower by first
marriage to Graciana Gallego, and now married to Marciana Gepanago; that he is the registered owner
of said Lot No. 3770, having acquired it by inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana
Gallego, deceased. The document (Exh. 1) was acknowledged before Notary Public Jose T. Tabuga. Upon
registration of Exhibit 1, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23078 was issued to said spouses (Exh. 2)

According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their
mother Graciana Gallego clean the lot in question, as it was there, forested. And when their mother
died, their father married Marciana Gepanago. In other words, the plaintiffs want us to believe that the
parcel of land is a conjugal property of their father and mother (Felimon and Graciana), And since their
father succeeded in changing his status and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their right
to the estate appertaining to their mother, alleging that they were deprived of their corresponding share
from the property thus sold.

Under the conflicting claims of the plaintiffs and their father, defendant Felimon Torela, the decisive
question is whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses
Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs' mother).
Felimon Torela declared that he and his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 (t. s. n., p. 18). And the
land in question was decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, (Exh. B, which
is also Exh. 4). According to Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code, the following properties belong to the
conjugal partnership:

1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only;

2. Property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them;

3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage, derived from the
partnership property., or from that which belongs separately to either of the spouses.

Felimon Torela testified that he inherited the contested property from his parents, Pedro Torela and
Soperiana Magbanua. True enough that plaintiff Silveriana Torela and Miguel Pedrosa declared that the
land in question was jointly cleared by Felimon Torela and his first wife Graciana Gallego, but the trial
court did not give credence to their testimonies for the simple reason that Silveriana was not yet born at
the time when said Felimon, together with his father, started living in the land in 1905 (t.s.n., p. 18);
while Miguel Pedrosa was only one year old then, considering that he was 55 years of age when he
testified on February 10, 1959. It is thus plainly obvious that Silveriana and Miguel could not have known
when defendant Felimon and his father moved to the land in 1905. Considering that Felimon was 81
years old when he testified on February 10, 1959, he was already 27 years in 1905, in which case he
must have already helped his father in cleaning and tilling that land. As a matter of fact at the time of his
marriage with his first wife, Graciana Gallego, a portion of said land had already been cultivated by him.
Asked what was the condition of the land in 1915 (the date of his first marriage), he answered: "Only a
portion of the lot was plowed by me." (t.s.n., p. 18.)

In the light of the foregoing, the property in question is not one of those enumerated in Article 1401 of
the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the
marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For
these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his
children by his first marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs' complaint was correctly dismissed by the court
below.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed to take into account Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil
Code, which now correspond to Article 160 of the New Civil Code, and which reads as follows:

Art. 1407, All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that
it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Petitioners claim that since the lot in question was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-
half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother.

While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated,
nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption.
(Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637; Ponce de Leon vs. RFC, L-24571, Dec.
18,1970; 36 SCRA 289.)

In the instant case there is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the
marriage of Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals is to the effect that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is
bolstered by that fact that one of the petitioners herein, Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her father's
Ex-Parte Motion of March 5, 1958, wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon Torela had acquired
the property by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego.

The circumstance that Decree No. 440157 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental which
confirmed the ownership of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as married to
Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that
the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstance that the land was registered
during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land
registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already
existing and which is registerable.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby
affirmed without any special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Santos and De Castro * JJ., concur.