G.R. No.

201363 March 18, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 which affirmed
in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision2

of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati
(appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a
fine of ₱300,000.00.

The Factual Antecedents

On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle
on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in
his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit
(SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as
someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.4

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver.
Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and
confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue
Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the
seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.5

Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the investigator, PO2
Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for
the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated
item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior Inspector Albert
Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8

Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance, tested
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9

Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing
0.03 gram which, when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.11

In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time of the incident,
he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th

Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the person, who
turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which contained
₱1,000.00.12

Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by eight other detainees
under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan Headquarters where two other
police officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range.
There, "Michelle" and "Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his
ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge about the
cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for
proper treatment.14

The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that he was being
charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first charge was eventually dismissed.

The RTC Ruling

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: (1) the appellant is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify falsely
against appellant, coupled with the fact that the former had previously arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs
under Republic Act No. 642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the
RTC found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon at the place
and time of the arrest.

On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up proffered by the appellant,
being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions of PO3 de Leon. It refused to give credence to
appellant’s claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of his money, since he failed to bring the incident to the attention of PO3
de Leon’s superiors or to institute any action against the latter.

Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant
"exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion,"18aggravated by the existence of his
past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.

Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately shown the continuous and
unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was confiscated from appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked
at the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI
Arturo, the forensic chemist, up to the time it was presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue

The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision
convicting appellant of the offense charged.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests,
either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

xxx

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 19 On the other
hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed
it.20

In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required.
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.

In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an "in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as above-quoted.

The Court disagrees.

A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been no lawful warrantless
arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:

FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th

Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?

PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.

Q: What was this incident?

A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his hand, Ma’am.

Q: And exactly what time was this?

A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.

Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?

A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.

Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.

Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?

A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.

Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a shabu?

A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu, Ma’am.21 (Underscoring supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while
simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the
plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to
appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or
at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a
lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 have been
complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a crime had been
indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been committed first, which does not obtain in this
case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was merely
impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same offense. The CA stressed this
point when it said:

It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon saw appellant
holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance. PO3 Renato de Leon was
quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same illegal possession of drug. It was not just a
hollow suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper
appellant was holding and scrutinizing also contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s
person and past criminal record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to
scamper away. For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally familiar
face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid of a tricycle driver.
Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion that appellant was actually in
possession of illegal drug. x x x23

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of
the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as
referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s
previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on "personal knowledge of
facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not what "personal knowledge"
under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.24

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed against him.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt.25It is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons
for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of
various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they appeared to be
dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-
quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to
whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the
urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised without unduly
compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of
People v. Tudtud:31

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their
sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to
three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the
said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.3

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs5 committed on 10
March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic
violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found
to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.6

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September
2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON IN THIS CASE.

(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7

Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.

On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers
and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that
he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in
his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the
accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No.
98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore
be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised
as errors.9

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.11

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is
not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by
the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned
and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor
vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed
in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within
fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for flagging down
vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will
not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR).
Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner
into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning
of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of
the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and
the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s
signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a
detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require
that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A
motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a
short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may
then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators
the answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that
the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the
absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such
stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.

xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated
with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495
(1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still
at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent
of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation
was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part
of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to
have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a
traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a
traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself,"
"which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while
he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time—after the police
officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.16

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims
that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a
secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to
a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20

In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct
a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer
does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist
to alight from the car or doing a patdown:

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x
But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in
the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we
stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking
of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he
danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and
not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter
and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be
less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not.
See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify
the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the
often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they
may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a
"patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant
to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover and
preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the
person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest
at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it
must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the
accused.26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516
affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some
other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 175700 July 5, 2010

SALVADOR V. REBELLION, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The threshold issue confronting us is whether the facts presented in this case make out a legitimate instance of a
warrantless arrest, i.e. under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that some crime was being or
about to be committed or had just been committed.

This petition for review assails the September 26, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248
which affirmed with modification the December 8, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 209, finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended
(otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended).

Factual Antecedents

On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion with violation of Section 16, Article
III of RA 6425, as amended, the accusatory portion thereof reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance and one (1)
piece of aluminum foil strip with trace of white crystalline substance, which were found positive [for]
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, without the corresponding license
and prescription, in violation of the above cited law.

Contrary to law.3

When arraigned on September 6, 2000, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial on the merits
forthwith commenced.

At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3
Sotomayor), together with Michael Fermin and Joseph Apologista, all members of the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC)
of Mandaluyong City, were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two
individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers introduced themselves and then
inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil
which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was "shabu", he confiscated the plastic
sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC
station at the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the
plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
The test on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu.
On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the
other hand, was further investigated by the City Prosecutor’s Office.

Petitioner denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was merely standing in front of a store waiting for the
change of his ₱500.00 bill when he was suddenly accosted by the MAC team.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months of prision correccional as maximum. The trial court gave
credence to the straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and ruled that the elements of the offense
charged were duly established.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was unlawful since he was not committing any crime when he
was arrested.

On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification. The appellate court sustained the
validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding that the latter was caught by the MAC team in flagrantedelicto or
while he was in the act of giving to Clarito a plastic sachet of shabu. The CA brushed aside the self-serving version of
petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated December 8, 2004 of the trial court is affirmed, subject to the modification of
accused-appellant’s imprisonment sentence which should be six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, as the
minimum penalty, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as the maximum
penalty.

SO ORDERED.4

Issue

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us raising a singular issue on:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time he was apprehended, he was not
committing or attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner argues that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search
on his person was also unlawful. Thus, the illicit items confiscated from him are inadmissible in evidence for being
violative of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Our Ruling

We sustain the appellate court in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the trial court.

Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that nowhere in the records did we find any
objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled
that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the
quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.5 In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative plea
and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.6

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private individual under any of the following
circumstances:7

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.

Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected under Section 5(a), or
the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to
Clarito. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted
from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because
of their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what
petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a distance,
PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance. There and
then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination,
the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a regulated drug.

Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then
committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting team. Thus, his case comes
under the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the
attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. As correctly pointed
out by the appellate court in addressing the matter of the purportedly invalid warrantless arrest:

In any event, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was lawful because he was caught by the police officers
in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu". Upon seeing the
exchange, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito Yanson and introduced themselves
as members of the MAC. PO3 Sotomayor confiscated from accused-appellant the plastic sachet of "shabu" while PO3
Garcia confiscated the aluminum foil strips which accused-appellant was also holding in his other hand.

Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to search on the
belongings of the offender and confiscate those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. x x x
Petitioner’s version, on the other hand, cannot stand against the positive evidence of the prosecution. It strains our
credulity to believe his version that at the time of his arrest, he was merely standing in front of the store waiting for the
change of his ₱500.00 bill and that the small plastic sachet was in fact recovered from another male individual standing
in front of him. Petitioner is thus suggesting that he was arrested for no cause at all. We are not swayed by his account.
His version of the incident is simply incredible. Moreover, he was positively, categorically and consistently identified by
the prosecution witnesses who were shown to have no ill motive on their part in testifying against him. Consequently,
their testimonies should prevail over the alibi and denial of petitioner whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.8

In fine, we defer to the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate court, there being no cogent
reason to veer away from such findings. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would substantially affect the disposition of
the case.91avvphi1

The essential elements in illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possess the said drug. All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case.

We now proceed to determine the propriety of the penalty imposed upon petitioner.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted for violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, for having
possessed a sachet of shabu with a weight of 0.03 gram. Section 16 provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from ₱600.00 to ₱4,000.00 on any person found in possession or
use of any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, irrespective of the volume or amount of the
drug involved. However, said Section 16 was amended by RA 765910 which took effect on December 31, 1993. As
amended, Section 16 now provides:

Section 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any
regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

Section 20 of RA 6425 was likewise amended by Section 17 of RA 7659 where the imposable penalty now depends on
the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved. Thus, as amended by Section 17, the pertinent provision of Section 20,
Article IV of RA 6425 now reads:

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. – The
penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

xxxx

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride

xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correcional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Thus, in People v. Tira,11 we classified the penalties and graduated the same by degree where the quantity of
the shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride involved is less than 200 grams, viz:

Under Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than
200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug
subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

less than one (1) gram to 49-25 grams prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98-50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Following the above illustration and considering the shabu found in the possession of the petitioner is only 0.03 gram,
the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellate
court correctly sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months of arresto
mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum.

RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased the penalty for illegal
possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to an imprisonment of 12 years and one
day to 20 years and a fine ranging from ₱300,000.00 to ₱400,000.00. Said law, however, not being favorable to the
petitioner, cannot be given retroactive application in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 26, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29248
affirming the conviction of petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion for the unlawful possession of 0.03 gram of shabuand
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional as maximum is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.198024

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL CUNANAN y DAVID alias "PAENG PUTOL", Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the January 27, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04062, which affirmed
the July 1, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164 in Criminal Case No. 15143-D finding
appellant Rafael Cunanan y David alias "Paeng Putol" (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of2002 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

Antecedent Facts

On October 19, 2006, an Information3 was filed charging appellant with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

On or about October 14, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being
lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1
Dario Gunda, Jr., a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing two centigrams
(0.02gram), of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.4

Appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on April 30, 2007. Trial on the merits immediately followed. In the
course thereof, the testimony of prosecution witness P/Sr. Insp. Lourdeliza G. Cejes (PSI Cejes), the Forensic Chemist of
the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office, was dispensed with after the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the following:

1.That in relation to the arrest of appellant, a request for laboratory examination was made on October 14, 2006 by
P/Sr. Insp. Bernouli D. Abalos (PSI Abalos) of the EPD Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force to the Chief of the
EPD Crime Laboratory Service;

2.That attached to the request is one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing an undetermined amount of
white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu with markings Exh-A RCD/DG dated October 13, 2006, but not as to
the source of the specimen;

3.That the request together with the specimen were delivered by PO2 Michael Familara (PO2 Familara), recorded by
PO1 Menese and received by PSI Cejes;

4.That a qualitative examination on the specimen was conducted by PSI Cejes which gave positive result for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, as shown in Physical Sciences Report No. D-452-
2006E; and

5.The regularity and due execution of the Physical Sciences Report.5

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution’s version of the event as derived from the combined testimonies of PO1 Dario Gunda, Jr. (PO1 Gunda)
and PO2 Familara is summarized as follows:

At about 6:00 p.m. on October 13, 2006, a confidential informant (CI) went to the EPD-District Intelligence Investigation
Division (EPD-DIID) Headquarters of Pasig City and informed PSI Abalos that a certain "Paeng Putol," later identified as
the appellant, was engaged in selling illegal drugs in Purok 4, Barangay Pineda, Pasig City. Acting on the information, PSI
Abalos organized a buy-bust team composed of himself, PO1 Gunda, PO1 Daniel Robiene, PO2 Familara, SPO1 Jessie
Bautista, and PO1 Ambrosio Gam, among others, to entrap appellant. PO1 Gunda was designated as the poseur-buyer
and was thus given two 100-peso bills6 which he marked with his initials "DG," while the rest of the team would act as
back-ups. After a short briefing, PSI Abalos prepared a Pre- Operation Report/Coordination Sheet7 and coordinated the
buy-bust operation with the Pasig City Police Station and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Thereafter,
the team proceeded to and arrived at the target area at 9:20 p.m. PO1 Gunda and the CI walked towards a store along
an alley while the others strategically positioned themselves some five to seven meters away. The CI saw a man wearing
gloves standing beside the store and informed PO1 Gunda that the man was the appellant. Together, they approached
appellant who is familiar to the CI. PO1 Gunda was introduced to appellant as a drug user who wanted to buy shabu
worth P200.00. After receiving the marked money from PO1 Gunda, appellant entered a narrow alley and came back
with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Gunda. Thereupon, PO1
Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to inform the buy-bust team of the consummated transaction and arrested
appellant. When asked to empty his pocket, recovered from appellant were the two marked 100-peso bills used as buy-
bust money. Appellant was then informed of his constitutional rights and the nature of the accusation against him and
brought to the EPD Headquarters. PO1 Gunda stapled the marked money on a bond paper and wrote thereon
"recovered pre-marked buy-bust money dated October 13, 2006." He also marked the plastic sachet with "Exh-A
RCD/DG 10/13/06." The said items were likewise brought to the EPD Headquarters and turned over to PO2 Familara for
further investigation. Later, the seized substance were inventoried and photographed. After this, PO1 Gunda and PO2
Familara brought appellant, together with a request for his drug testing,8 and the seized substance, as well as a request
for its laboratory examination,9 to the EPD Crime Laboratory. The substance with the corresponding marking "Exh-A
RCD/DG 10/13/06" on its plastic sachet was received by PSI Cejes in the morning of October 14, 2006. Per Physical
Sciences Report No. D-452-2006E issued by PSI Cejes,10 the substance weighing 0.02 gram was found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied the charge and interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion. He alleged that after eating
dinner on October 13, 2006, he was watching a bingo game when three men arrived and held him by both hands. They
introduced themselves as policemen and told him that they have a warrant for his arrest. They then handcuffed and
frisked him and took away his wallet and cellphone. The men brought him to a police station where PO2 Familara
threatened to file a case against him unless he gives the police P50,000.00 as settlement. He failed to give the said
amount.

Another witness for the defense, Genedina Guevarra Ignacio, testified that she was outside her house between 7:00
p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of October 13, 2006 when she noticed three men passed by her in haste. The men approached
appellant who was then watching a bingo game across the street and suddenly handcuffed him. She heard appellant
asking the reason for his arrest. She did not know what happened next since she already went inside her house.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its July 1, 2009 Decision,11 the trial court adjudged appellant guilty of the crime charged, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Rafael Cunanan y David alias "Paeng Putol" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00) with the accessory penalties provided for under Section 35 of said R.A.
9165.

The plastic sachet containing shabu (Exhibit "I") is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and turned
over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed appellant’s conviction in its January 27, 2011 Decision,13 viz:

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the trial court, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision dated July 1, 2009 of the RTC, Branch 164, Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 15143-D, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence, this appeal where appellant points out that: (1) there was no in flagrante delicto arrest as he was not committing
any crime at the time he was apprehended but was merely watching a bingo game; (2) it was inconceivable for him to
openly sell illegal drugs as PO1 Gunda himself testified that at the time of the alleged sale transaction there were many
people around the target area; (3) the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines on the proper custody
of the seized dangerous drug, specifically with respect to its inventory and taking of photograph, and this casts doubt on
whether the plastic sachet with white crystalline substance identified in court was the same item allegedly seized and
confiscated from him; and (4) the testimonies of PO1 Gunda and PO2 Familara as to who was in possession of the seized
item from the target area up to the police station were conflicting.

Our Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling an illegal drug in a buy-bust operation;
contrary to his contention, it was not inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in public.

Appellant assails the legality of his arrest contending that he was not caught in flagrante delicto. Appellant’s contention
fails to convince. The testimony of PO1 Gunda who acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation clearly recounts
how the sale transaction between him and appellant transpired, viz:

Q- After you were introduced by this confidential informant to Paeng Putol that you are user of illegal drugs, what was
the reaction of the target person, this Paeng Putol?

A- The confidential [informant] asked him, "Paeng, halagang dos, meron ka ba[?], kukuha kami.

Q- What was the reply of this alias Paeng Putol?

A- Akina iyong pera, sabi niya.

Q- What did you do?

A- I gave to him the two pieces of one[-]hundred peso bill[s].

Q- What happened?

A- Sinabi niya na antayin ninyo ako diyan. Pumasok siya sa eskinita, hindi kalayuan, mga two to three meters.

Q- What did he do?

A- He returned and gave me one plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.

Q- After he handed to you that plastic sachet, what did you do next?

A- Nag pre-arranged signal ako para tulungan ako sa paghuli kay alias Paeng Putol.

xxxx

Q- What happened?

A- Hinawakan ko siya. Tapos pinakuha ko kung ano iyong laman ng bulsa niya. Ayun na recover ko sa kanyang possession
iyong dalawang daan.15

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that a sale transaction took place between appellant and PO1 Gunda. That the said
transaction involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug was sufficiently shown by the prosecution through its
establishment of the following elements of the offense: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor."16 Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully
arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu in a buy-bust operation.

In any event, jurisprudence is settled that "any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in
a motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing [in] which, he is deemed to have waived"17 his
right to question the regularity of his arrest. As the records show, except during the inquest proceedings before the
prosecutor’s office, appellant never objected to the regularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, he even
actively participated in the trial of the case. With these lapses, he is estopped from raising any question regarding the
same.18

Also not persuasive is appellant’s argument that it is inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in a place
where there were many people. The Court has already stated that drug pushers now sell their prohibited articles to any
prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, and even in daytime.19

The identity and evidentiary value of the seized item have been preserved.

Appellant assails the proof of the corpus delicti by pointing out the arresting officers’ non compliance with the
procedure on the proper custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, particularly with respect to the inventory and taking of photograph of the seized item. He
contends that while PO1 Gunda testified that an inventory of the seized item was made and a photograph thereof was
taken, such inventory and photograph were not offered as evidence.

Appellant’s contention is untenable. "This Court has consistently ruled that non-compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of [RA] 9165 will not necessarily render the [item] seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible.
Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized [item] have been preserved, i.e., the [item] being offered in court as [exhibit is], without a specter of
doubt, the very same [one] recovered in the buy-bust operation."20 Thus, the primordial concern is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.21
Here, the records reveal that after the consummation of the sale and the consequent arrest of appellant, the plastic
sachet sold by appellant was marked with "Exh-A RCD/DG/10/13/06"22 by PO1 Gunda at the place where it was
confiscated. Thereafter, appellant and the seized drug were brought to the police station. And as stipulated by the
parties, a request for laboratory examination of a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with marking
"Exh-A RCD/DG/10/13/06" was prepared; the said request and specimen were delivered by PO2 Familara and PO1
Menese to EPD Crime Laboratory and received by PSI Cejes; and, a qualitative examination of the specimen by PSI Cejes
revealed that the same is positive for metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. During trial, the
marked plastic sachet was presented and identified by PO1 Gunda as the same item sold to him by appellant.

From this sequence of events, the prosecution was able to show an unbroken link in the chain of custody of the subject
item which is the proof of the corpus delicti. Its integrity and evidentiary value were shown not to have been
compromised notwithstanding the fact that the inventory and photograph thereof which PO1 Gunda claimed to have
been made were not offered in evidence. Besides, "[t]he integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with."23 In this case, the
defense failed to prove ill motive on the part of the apprehending officers that would have impelled them to fabricate a
serious crime against appellant. Also, the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of PO1 Gunda and PO2 Familara as to
who was in possession of the item from the police station to the EPD crime laboratory did not create any doubt that
what was submitted for laboratory examination and later presented in court as evidence was the same drug actually
sold by the appellant.

Appellant’s defenses of denial and

frame-up/extortion must fail.

Appellant’s defenses of denial and frame-up/extortion must fail in light of the positive testimony of PO1 Gunda, the
poseur-buyer, that appellant sold to him the illegal drug. Moreover, it was not shown that appellant filed any criminal or
administrative charges against the apprehending officers, thus clearly belying his claim of frame-up/extortion against
them.

All told, appellant’s violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 was duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court affirms his conviction.

Penalty

Under RA 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. Here, the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon appellant by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are in order. It must be added, however,
that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.24

WHEREFORE, the January 27, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04062, which affirmed the
July 1, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164 in Criminal Case No. 15143-D finding appellant
Rafael Cunanan y David guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellant shall not be eligible for parole.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers' chance
sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

The Facts and the Case

On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes
Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court
tried her in absentia. 3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence
Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were
conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house
number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and
peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised
tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised
burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce
themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an
improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance,
improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought
Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation
and testing.5

A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6

Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their
house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced
themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said, "D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and
someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the
police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had
been recovered from his house.7

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine
of ₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.
The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz
in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to
PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving
claim of Antiquera.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan’s
credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in
possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision of the
trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The accused is now before this Court seeking
acquittal.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the
act of possessing drug paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the
police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That
valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and
thus seize the paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of
Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the
crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by
entering a plea of not guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14

But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David
Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give
chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running
after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they
heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door open?
Was it totally open, or was it partially open?

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you
have to push the door?

A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer?

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of the
house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house, considering your
admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did
not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and
seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the
confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the
accused.17
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated
November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of
the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.1âwphi1 The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional
liberty.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No 191726 February 06, 2013

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is
distinct from instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or lured or
talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not.

This final appeal is taken by the accused from the decision promulgated on January 29, 20 I 0,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for illegal sale of methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) handed down by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 120, in Caloocan City (RTC) through its decision dated July 12, 20062

Antecedents

On August 13, 2003, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan City charged the accused with illegally selling
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 through the
information reading thus:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 Borban Paras, who posed as poseur buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), knowing the same to be dangerous drug.

Contrary to Law.3

After the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.

The evidence for the State was as follows.

On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU) in
Caloocan City to report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Acting on
the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of ADSOU immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust
operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as
the poseur-buyer. Paras was given a ₱100.00 bill that he marked with his initials BP. It was agreed that the informant
would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to
signal to the buy-bust team that the transaction with the suspect had been consummated. The operation was
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 2003, the team members positioned themselves in
the vicinity of a store. The informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the store and dropped a
cigarette butt in front of the person. Paras, then only two meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of the
cigarette butt. Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The suspect responded: Pre, piso na
lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin mo? Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after
which he handed the marked ₱100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew out a plastic sachet containing white
substances from his pocket and gave the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the
consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team were approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3
Rodrigo Antonio, another member of the team, confiscated the marked ₱100.00 bill from the suspect, who was
identified as Noel Bartolome y Bajo. Paras immediately marked the sachet at the crime scene with Bartolome’s
initials NBB.4

Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory examination of
the contents of the plastic sachet seized from Bartolome.5 PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another member of the buy-bust
team, brought the request and the sachet and its contents to the laboratory. In due course, Forensic Chemical Officer
Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed in Physical Science Report No. D-1038-03 that the
plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6

On his part, the accused claimed that the arresting officers had framed him up because they wanted to extort a
substantial amount from him in exchange for his release. The version of the accused tended to show the following.

On August 9, 2003, at about 12:00 in the afternoon, the accused went to his brother’s house located on Zapote Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, to take a rest from his work as a construction worker. While he and his brother were
watching the television show Eat Bulaga inside the house, two policemen suddenly entered the house. One of the
policemen, whom the accused later identified as PO3 Antonio, frisked the accused but spared his brother because the
latter was asthmatic. The policemen then brought the accused to the police station and detained him. At the police
station, PO3 Antonio inquired from the accused if he was selling shabu, but the accused denied doing so. It was then
that PO3 Antonio demanded ₱20,000.00 from the accused in exchange for his freedom. The accused refused to pay
because he did not have the money.7

Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime charged,8 to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds that accused NOEL BARTOLOME Y BAJO is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 and imposes upon him the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).

The one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the accused assailed his conviction, stating:

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN THE SELLING OF ILLEGAL DRUGS, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED SINCE HE WAS MERELY INSTIGATED BY THE POLICE INTO
DOING IT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE POLICE’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURE IN
THE CUSTODY OF SEIZED PROHIBITED AND REGULATED DRUGS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 WHICH CASTS SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY OF THE SEIZED DRUG
CONSTITUTING THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE.

The accused argued that the operation mounted against him was not an entrapment but an instigation, contending that
without the proposal and instigation made by poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have transpired between them;
that the police team did not show that its members had conducted any prior surveillance of him; and that the
Prosecution should have presented the informant as a witness against him.

On January 29, 2010, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,9 rejecting the assigned errors of the accused, and
affirmed his conviction. It held that the operation against him was not an instigation but an entrapment, considering
that the criminal intent to sell dangerous drugs had originated from him, as borne out by the shabu being inside his
pocket prior to the transaction with Paras; that the accused did not show that Paras had any ill motive to falsely testify
against him; that the conduct of a prior surveillance and the presentation of the informant as a witness were not
necessary to establish the validity of the entrapment; and that the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the
requirements under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations for Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) was not fatal
because there was a justifiable ground for it, and because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs.

Hence, the accused is now before the Court in a final bid for acquittal.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu,
requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller. In short, what is material is the proof showing that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. If a police officer goes through the
operation as a buyer, the crime is consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the
accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police
officer.10

The concurrence of the foregoing elements was conclusively established herein.

To start with, Paras, as the poseur-buyer, testified that the accused sold to him shabu during the buy-bust operation, to
wit:

Q – So when the informant proceeded to the place of Noel Bartolome, what did the informant do?

A – After he threw cigarette in front of Noel Bartolome, I approached him.

xxxx

Q – What happened next?

A – When I approached the accused, I told him.

"Pre-paiskor nga" and he said

"Pre, piso na lang tong hawak ko

Magkano ba ang kukunin mo" and he said

"ayos nay an, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko."

Q – Who handed first you or the accused?

A – I was the one who handed the buy bust money.

Q – After giving him the ₱100.00 pesos to Noel Bartolome where did he place it?

A – Then after that he placed it on his front pocket and then after that he got one (1) plastic sachet from his left front
pocket.

Q – And then after giving you the plastic sachet containing illegal drug, what did you do?

A – I scratched my head, sir.

Q – After scratching your head, what transpired if any?

A – When I saw my companions approaching me, I grabbed Noel Bartolome, sir.11

Secondly, the transmission of the plastic sachet and its contents from the time of their seizure until they were delivered
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical examination was properly documented, starting with the marking of the
plastic sachet at the crime scene by Paras. This was followed by the preparation of the written request by Insp. Cruz at
the ADSOU. PO2 De Ocampo then personally brought the plastic sachet and its contents, together with the written
request, to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where the delivery of the request and of the sachet and its contents was recorded
by SPO1 Bugabuga of that office. In Physical Sciences Report No. D-1038-03, Chemist Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime
Laboratory ultimately certified that the contents of the plastic sachet were examined and found to be 0.06 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.12

And, thirdly, the Prosecution presented the shabu, the marked ₱100.00 bill, and Chemist Dela Rosa’s Physical Sciences
Report No. D-1038-03 at the trial.13

On the other hand, the accused’s claim of being the victim of a vicious frame-up and extortion is unworthy of serious
consideration. The fact that frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders such defenses hard to believe.
Thus, although drug-related violators have commonly tendered such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of
their drug-related violations, the Court has required that such defenses, to be credited at all, must be established with
clear and convincing evidence.14 But the accused did not adduce such evidence here, for all he put up were self-serving
denials. Had the version of the Defense been what really transpired, there was no reason for the accused and his
brother not to have formally charged the police officers with the severely penalized offense of planting of evidence
under Section 2915 of Republic Act No. 9165 and extortion. Thereby, the allegations of frame-up and extortion were
rendered implausible.

Yet, the accused discredits the validity of his arrest by contending that the arrest resulted from an instigation, not from a
legitimate entrapment. He insists that the evidence of the Prosecution did not show him to be then looking for buyers
of shabu when Paras and the informant approached him; that it was Paras who proposed to buy shabu from him; and
that consequently Paras instigated him to sell shabu. He submits that the transaction would not have transpired without
the proposal and instigation by Paras; that Paras initiated the commission of the crime by offering to him ₱100.00 for
the purchase of the shabu; and that he should be acquitted due to the absolutory cause of instigation.16

The Court is not persuaded to side with the accused.

The trial judge and the CA agreed in their findings on the arrest of the accused being the result of a legitimate
entrapment procedure. Such findings were based on the credible testimonies of the poseur buyer and other competent
witnesses of the Prosecution. We concur with their findings. Indeed, the trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses is entitled to respect. This is because of the trial judge’s unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testified before him.17 The rule applies even more if, like here, the trial judge’s assessment was
affirmed by the CA upon review.18 This rule should be obeyed here.

Moreover, we find no glaring errors or misapprehension of facts committed by the RTC in not according credence to the
version of the accused and his brother. In this regard, it is significant that the accused did not ascribe any ill motive to
Paras that could have made the officer testify falsely against him. Considering that the records were patently bereft of
any indicium of ill motive or of any distorted sense of duty on the part of the apprehending team, particularly Paras as
the poseur buyer, full credence was properly accorded to the Prosecution’s evidence incriminating the accused. Without
the clear and convincing indication of the lawmen’s ill motive and irregular performance of duty, it is always good law to
presume them to have performed their official duties in a regular manner.19 That presumption became conclusive for
lack of contravention.

To be clear, then, the insistence by the accused that he was entitled to the benefit of an absolutory cause as the result of
an instigation is unwarranted.

There is a definite distinction between instigation and entrapment. The Court highlighted the distinction in People v.
Bayani, 20 viz:

Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute
him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused
into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in
entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law
enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have
to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the
unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of
Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-
bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.

A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy
solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is a
kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal’s course of conduct.
In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation:

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that
the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs.
They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the
informant induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

Conversely, the law deplores instigation or inducement, which occurs when the police or its agent devises the idea of
committing the crime and lures the accused into executing the offense. Instigation absolves the accused of any guilt,
given the spontaneous moral revulsion from using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons
into lapses that they might otherwise resist.

People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court recognized instigation as a valid defense, and an instance
when it was not applicable:

In United States v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the
government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to persecute him. Smith, the
BIR agent, testified that Phelps’ apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he like smoking
opium on some occasions. Smith’s testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith
who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." In People v. Abella, we acquitted the
accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who
pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to
sell the explosives. We found there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that
outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,
[W]e convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We
stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hong Kong to Cebu
after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did
not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the
Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers.

In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust
operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made difficult by the secrecy
with which drug-related offenses are conducted and the many devices and subterfuges employed by offenders to avoid
detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the ugly reality that in cases involving illegal drugs,
corrupt law enforcers have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons. The distinction between
entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial. The balance needs to be struck between the individual rights and
the presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those engaged in the illegal traffic of narcotics on
the other.

Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to commit the
crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust operation, the
pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is consummated, the pusher is validly
arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the buyer. Here, Paras asked the
accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from
Paras and turning over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to have been ready to sell
the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There is no question that the idea to commit the crime originated from
the mind of the accused.

The accused argues that the absence of a prior surveillance cast doubt on the veracity of the buy-bust operation; and
that the failure to present the informant as a witness against him, as well as the buy-bust team’s failure to comply with
the requirements under Section 21, Article II, of Republic Act No.9165, were fatal to the cause of the Prosecution.21

The argument of the accused lacks merit. We have held that prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust
operation legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the informant.22 That was
what precisely happened here.

Similarly, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution
of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the
informant’s identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement.23Only when the testimony
of the informant is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect
his security be disregarded. Here, however, the informant’s testimony as a witness against the accused would only be
corroborative of the sufficient testimony of Paras as the poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony was unnecessary.24

We consider as unwarranted the contention of the accused about the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the
requirements of the law for the proper seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.

The requirements are imposed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, whose pertinent portion
reads as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof;

xxxx

To implement the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR relevantly states:

xxxx

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items;

xxxx

It is notable that pursuant to the IRR, supra, the non-observance of the requirements may be excused if there is a
justification, provided the integrity of the seized items as evidence is "properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team."

Although it appears that the buy-bust team did not literally observe all the requirements, like photographing the
confiscated drugs in the presence of the accused, of a representative from the media and from the Department of
Justice, and of any elected public official who should be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
of it, whatever justification the members of the buy-bust team had to render in order to explain their non-observance of
all the requirements would remain unrevealed because the accused did not assail such non-compliance during the trial.
He raised the matter for the first time only in the CA. As such, the Court cannot now dwell on the matter because to do
so would be against the tenets of fair play and equity. That is what the Court said in People v. Sta. Maria, 25 to wit:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.1âwphi1 However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse
the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown,
because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’
alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead
raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the
form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

We point out that the non-adherence to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was not a serious flaw that would
make the arrest of the accused illegal or that would render the shabu subject of the sale by him inadmissible as evidence
against him. What was crucial was the proper preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized shabu,
inasmuch as that would be significant in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.26

The State showed here that the chain of custody of the shabu was firm and unbroken. The buy-bust team properly
preserved the integrity of the shabu as evidence from the time of its seizure to the time of its presentation in court.
Immediately upon the arrest of the accused, Paras marked the plastic sachet containing the shabu with the accused’s
initials of NBB. Thereafter, Paras brought the sachet and the contents to the ADSOU,27 where his superior officer, Insp.
Cruz, prepared and signed the request for the laboratory examination of the contents of the marked sachet.28 P02 De
Ocampo handcarried the request and the evidence to the PNP Crime Laboratory.29 SPO 1 Bugabuga of that office
recorded the delivery of the request and the marked sachet, which were all received by Chemist Dela Rosa.30 In turn,
Chemist Dela Rosa examined the contents of the marked sachet, and executed Physical Sciences Report No. D-1 03 8-03
confirming that the marked sachet contained 0.06 gram of shabu.31 In this regard, the accused did not deny that Paras
and Chemist Dela Rosa affirmed the sequence of custody of the shabu during the trial.32

The CA and the RTC correctly imposed life imprisonment and fine of ₱500,000.00. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 states that the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, regardless of the quantity and purity,
shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to P 10,000,000.00.33
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on January 29, 2010; and ORDER the
accused to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011
issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the
Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to
such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of
the Cebu City Police Office, after having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an
entrapment operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal
whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from
Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day,
Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when
the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them ₱100,000, later lowered to
₱40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a
complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants.1âwphi1 A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of
Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500
bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon.
Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by
forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology
(DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.

VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said
Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required
to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call
his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation
of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test despite its dubiousness
having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory
examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional
right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to
convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which
states that drug testing conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would violate a person’s right to privacy. The
appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of hearsay evidence as
basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment,6 saying that "petitioner’s arguments cannot
be the subject of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be
the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the
proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory
examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not the drug test
conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate originals
or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in
violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in
his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply.8

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the
accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a
dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a
suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody,
he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s body is merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three
counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful
acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime.The
phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation,"9 "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ; being "employees and visitors of a den,
dive or resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and
essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or "possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs
"during parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or
culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of original
records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled precursors and essential chemicals."23 To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to
unduly expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons
apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of other
crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15
(Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes
the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for
possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not
incorrect, it would be more in keeping withthe intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to
rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a positive confirmatory test result as required under
Sec. 15.The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue isimprisonment of twelve
years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the
objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at
life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and
the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or
for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and
prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous
drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than
mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of thisprovision would run
counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency,25 to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless
are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only
now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."27

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription.
Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were
all material to the principal cause of the arrest.

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand ofcounsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against
selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
(People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123
[1999]) Hence,it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled
to submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether
he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel
morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced todetermine
its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and
the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was
"merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his
companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM
team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were
also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the
crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was inadmissible in
evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-
accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were
requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the
trial court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the
prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third,
there were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though,
petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the
only available evidencethat was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders intheir
laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be
constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge
society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens
including even members of its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the
Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166061 July 6, 2007

ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12
November 2004, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No.
96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y Quino3 (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:

That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu),
a regulated drug.

Contrary to law.4

During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

Witnesses5 for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:

On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay,
SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia,
SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo Lectura,6 was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on
26 August 1996.7

At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway, Makati. Upon arrival,
they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in serving the warrant. Security Officer
Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.

At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door.8 He was later identified as petitioner. SPO2
Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner.9 Upon entry, the police operatives searched the unit, which was
composed of a small room with a plywood divider separating the sala from the bedroom.10 In the presence of petitioner
and Punsaran, the group started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces
of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty
transparent plastic sachets.11 Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the properties seized and an Affidavit of
Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their presence and that of Punsaran.12

Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the place. The police
operatives did not find any occupant in the room.
Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of evidence gathered by the police
operatives were brought to the NBI for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a
certification stating that upon examination, the specimen submitted yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.13 The following day, the Arrest Report and Joint Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police
operatives leading to the arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.

In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300, 2600 Roxas Boulevard, Manila.14He
also happens to be the registered owner of Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium in Makati City, which he leased to Sung
Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996.15 On 27 August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to collect
payment of rental from Lee. Upon knocking at the door, petitioner was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait
for Lee inside the room while she went out to buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard somebody

knocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who suddenly barged into the room. The
officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium
unit. The police operatives then proceeded to search the house for the next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the
sala. Petitioner was also forced to sign some documents at gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the
PARAC office. Two days later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutor’s Office for inquest and a case was subsequently
filed against him.16

In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that Lee was the actual
occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was arrested.17 Celso Fiesta, petitioner’s driver, also stated in court that
petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he dropped petitioner off at Cityland Condominium between
1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he went back to pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody
poked a gun at him and introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the car and the PARAC team
searched the vehicle. They found a gun and brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the following day.18

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum.19 In convicting petitioner, the trial court relied heavily on the clear, straightforward, and
candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses:

They were all present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland Condominium. No infirmity or
flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the Court considered that they are public officers and there was no
showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or bad faith to falsely testify against the accused. There was no
evidence of intent to harass the accused. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions can be
fairly applied.20

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, modifying however the penalty to be imposed on
petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years
and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum.21

Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of the warrantless
arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the subject shabu
justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of the validity of the enforcement of the search
warrant as basis for the presence of the police operatives in the Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters
may be summarized into two issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly enforced and whether
petitioner was validly arrested without warrant.
The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly implemented necessitates a review of the tenor of the search
warrant, vis-à-vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant. Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585

Plaintiff FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425
- versus - (Dangerous Drug Act 1972)
BERNARD LIM22
Room 615 Cityland Condominium
South Superhighway, Makati City
Respondent.

SEARCH WARRANT

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP SPO4 ISAGANI J. ILAS and his
witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to believe that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been committed or is
about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in his possession and control.

You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises abovementioned and
forthwith seize and take possession of the abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject
of the offense and bring to this Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are further
directed to submit return within ten (10) days from today.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila, Philippines.

HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON

Executive Judge, RTC
Branch XXIII, Manila

NOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue.23

Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner was not
the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway with the search and his resulting arrest. According
to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
described premises and not of a person, the omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such property in the
warrant does not invalidate the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant does not
indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the subject
search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.

This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for
the issuance of search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search
warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises. In Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,24 the Court
has definitively ruled that where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and
not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search
warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is
otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.

A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police officers were ordered to make an immediate search of
the premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu. Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons
to be dealt with as the law may direct." While petitioner may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that he
was caught in flagrante delicto necessitated his valid warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioner’s name was
not indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.

Turning to the second issue, petitioner insists that his apprehension cannot be considered in flagrante delicto because
he was not in possession of the forbidden drug.

In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.25

More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drug. Possession, under
the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is
in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control
over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of possession may be proved
by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and
dominion, as well as the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the
drug in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact
that the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such
premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.26

For the trial court, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly established by the prosecution, to wit:

Prosecution has presented in Court the three (3) plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as well as all paraphernalia seized from the accused consisting of an improvised burner, two (2) pieces of
weighing scale, plastic tubing, aluminum foil, empty transparent plastic sachets, Icom radio, Calculator, Cellular phone,
disposable lighters, and two (2) pieces [of] blank cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2 Sinag clearly testified that they were
found on top of a table in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the afternoon of August 27, 1996 at a time when only the accused
was inside the premises. Thus, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly established.27

The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled
substances may be actual or constructive:
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom of the subject premises,
appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the only person in said premises. Moreover, at the time of entry
of the searching team in the subject premises, appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court
correctly concluded, only "indicates extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises,
of which he was the registered owner.28

Petitioner counters that he was in all his right to be in the leased premises because he had to collect the rentals due him
from his tenant. He further argues that the shabu was allegedly found on top of the table inside the bedroom and not
within the immediate location where he was positioned. When he was found half-naked by police operatives in another
person’s house, petitioner defends his act by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee which made the former
treat Lee’s home like his own.29

In support of the appellate court’s ruling, the Solicitor General maintained that petitioner was in constructive possession
of the subject shabu by citing several circumstances showing petitioner’s control and dominion over the same. First, the
shabu was found on top of a table in Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium when and where only petitioner was present
inside the premises. Second, petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted
that he was at the subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth, petitioner was found naked from
the waist up by the police operatives upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor General stresses that petitioner’s actuation of
being naked from the waist up while opening the door to greet visitors is natural only to someone who owns the
premises.30 Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a divider and a sala. There was no room with a door to be closed and
locked which can prevent petitioner from having free access to the shabu found on the table.

This Court is convinced that petitioner’s control and dominion over the shabu found on top of the table were sufficiently
established by his questionable presence in Unit 615. Petitioner’s explanation that he went to Lee’s unit to collect
rentals and was left by the maid to fend for himself while the latter went out to buy refreshments is highly suspicious.
The maid never came back. The maid’s testimony would have corroborated that of petitioner’s.

Despite the presentation of the testimonies of Cityland Condominium Administrator Luis Alvarez and other witnesses
tending to prove that petitioner is the owner and lessor of Unit 615 and his actual place of residence is in Legaspi Tower,
such pieces of evidence do not necessarily prove that petitioner did not have access and control over the subject
premises. In fact, petitioner’s overt act of getting half-naked while opening the door establishes intimate familiarity with
and over his surroundings. Petitioner seeks to justify such act by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee. This
was, however, belied by the testimony of the building administrator which showed that Lee was a mere walk-in
applicant and he began renting Unit 615 only on 1 May 1996, barely three (3) months before petitioner was
apprehended.31

Petitioner, in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed Lee, whom he barely knew, to occupy the
unit with only one month rental deposit:

Q: Is it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive the rental?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That’s your practice?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How much is the lease price?

A: ₱6,500.00.
Q: Payable monthly?

A: At the second week of the month.

Q: For what month was that rental where [sic] you were suppose to collect?

A: June and July[,] your Honor.

Q: Is it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee should pay the deposit and a few months in advance?

A: Yes, but he promise he does not have any money and to produce later on.[sic]

Q: Which rental he is going to pay?

A: The deposit and the monthly rental.

Q: What you are saying [sic] when he entered the premises of this property he does not paid [sic] anything?

A: He just paid for the month of May.

Q: What you are saying you entered into a lease contract with a person you do not know during the said month, that he
entered the unit he was not able to pay you even the deposit [sic]?

A: He paid me just one month.

Q: And you agreed?

A: Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay later on.32

Equally doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed between petitioner and Lee which purportedly
validates the presence of the former in Unit 615, which was to collect rentals from the latter. As the Solicitor General
correctly observed, the lease agreement is undated and unnotarized.33 During cross-examination, the building
administrator who presented a copy of the lease agreement could not even remember when the contract was
executed.34 Petitioner also testified that the rentals are payable at the second week of each month.35His statement is
inconsistent with his avowed effort to collect payment in the last week of the month, particularly on 27 August 1996.

We further find the Solicitor General’s conclusion that petitioner was privy to the existence of the shabu on top of the
table credible because the unit was a small room with a piece of plywood dividing the sala and the bedroom. With
petitioner seemingly comfortable in moving about the unit, the shabu and other paraphernalia could not have escaped
his vision.

Even more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who conducted the search and subsequent arrest of
petitioner. Inspector Acosta testified that his team conducted a search on Unit 615 and found petitioner inside the room
alone and that the search resulted in the discovery of the shabu, to wit:

Q: In connection with your duties then as the member of the PARAC[,] do you recall if there was any occasion if you
meet a certain person whose name [was] Andy Quelman?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: During what occasion did you meet this person?

A: During [sic] when we conducted the search of the Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this Courtroom[,] can you point him out in the Court?

COURT:

Will you step down on the witness stand and tap on his shoulder?

A: Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

Make of record that the witness stepped down on the witness stand and tapped the shoulder of a person seated on the
gallery who when asked of his name answered his name as Andy Quelman.

Q: You said that you conducted a search, when was this?

A: August 27, 1996.

Q: What time?

A: 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Q: Where did you conduct the search?

A: At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.

xxxx

Q: By what authority did you conduct your search at room or [U]nit 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,]
Makati City.

A: We are armed with [a] search warrant.

Q: Issued by whom?

A: The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of Manila.

xxxx

Q: So upon arriving at the 6th floor what did you do, or what did you do?

A: We knocked at the door of [R]oom 615.

Q: And what happened next?

A: Somebody opened the door.

Q: And after the door was opened[,] what did you and your team do next?

A: We presented our search warrant.

Q: To whom?

COURT:

Would you know who open[ed] the door?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:

Q: Who?

A: Andy Quelman.

PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:

Q: Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,] the appearance of Mr. Andy Quelman when he opened the door?

A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.

Q: What about the upper body?

A: Naked.

Q: Upon presenting the search warrant[,] what did you do next?

A: We proceeded to the room to conduct the search.

xxxx

Q: You said you proceeded to conduct the search. [W]hat was Mr. Quelman doing while you are conducting the search?

A: He was sitting at the table inside the room.

xxxx

Q: Now can you describe to this Court how you conducted the search[,] Mr. Witness?

A: First we proceeded to his room and I saw Mr. Quelman sitting at his table. Later on we found at his table all the
paraphernalia.

Q: Can you enumerate to this Court what[,] if any[,] did you find [sic] during the search?

A: We found 3 transparent plastic containing white crystalline substance.

Q: Where did you find [sic]?

A: Atop the table.

xxxx

Q: What did you do with Mr. Quelman after you found these items which you [have] just enumerated?

A: We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our office.36

The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by SPO4 Isagani Ilas and SPO1 Teodoro Sinag who were both
part of the arresting team. These witnesses positively identified petitioner as the occupant of Unit 615 at the time the
search was conducted and that he was caught in flagrante delicto when the shabu was found in his constructive
possession.
The trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police officers and accorded them the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions.37 The prosecution of drug cases largely depends on the credibility of the
police officers. The factual findings of the trial court especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses
deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts or no speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses'
deportment, demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.38 In this case, the RTC was upheld by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any of the recognized exceptions39 to the
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.

In sum, petitioner’s unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion over the shabu found on top of the
table, was duly established by the following evidence: his presence in Unit 615 at the time of his arrest;40 his
representation to the police that he was the owner of the unit;41 his half-naked state when he opened the door, strongly
implying that he had stayed in the house longer than he claimed to be; and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on
top of a table beside the bed which appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider between the
sala and bedroom.421avvphil

Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives are obligated to apprehend him even without a
warrant of arrest.

We shall now determine the imposable penalty. Both the lower courts erred as to the respective penalties they
imposed. Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, provides that if the quantity of the regulated drug
involved, in this case, shabu, is less than 200 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua. Since petitioner was charged

with the possession of 27.7458 grams of shabu, the imposable penalty is prision correccional.43 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in
its medium period as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum to Three (3) Years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 161266

PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August
2003 and the Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search
warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine
National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises
of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City,
Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at
UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered
Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT).6

On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and
Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified
as witnesses.

According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange or public switch
telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the
Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine
cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country.
The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit.
In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call services to any part of the world by using
PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing
international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is originated."9

On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used to provide a
service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-
paid accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given
access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided
under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number, which included the
country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However,
when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that
the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient
Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by
Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines
registered to WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of
WWC.

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of
equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401
as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because
through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole
business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its
favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues
from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92
of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE)
without first securing type approval license from the latter.

Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09.
PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes,
license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their
floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken.14

On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were
issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:

1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article
309 of the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand
B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and
Nolan B. Sison with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:

a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the process of the information and
supplying the results of this process;

b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and c) Manuals,
application forms, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, communications and documents relating to
securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One,
Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the
information and supplying the results of this process;

c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and
telephone lines and equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a
common cable or transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and
documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and
using telephone lines and/or equipment.

3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article
309 of the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang,
Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building,
Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to
communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;

b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the
information and supplying the results of this process;

c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and
telephone lines and equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a
common cable or transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and
documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and
using telephone lines and/or equipment.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.

Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the
Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants,
citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts
complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants
were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.

In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown
to have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless
(Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services,
which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase
of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT
for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general
warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of
the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

THE CA RULING

PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed
RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.28

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have
filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate
court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30

Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA
Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated the two Petitions.33

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following procedural infirmities:

1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of the search
warrants;

2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained of
allegedly do not constitute theft.

III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrants.

OUR RULING

I.

1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal

action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.

Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity
of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of
"(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the
filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.34

Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal
process," rather than a criminal action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with
the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal
process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is
reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the
issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant
is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and
not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.36(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized
the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the
conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants.

2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued

independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their
position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return the properties
seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American
jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:

Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an
inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's
petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested
against this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character
because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused
therein.39

Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already
filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an
incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy
from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a
search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order
quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing
more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued
were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

II.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their

judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are
in the place to be searched."42

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly
dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable
cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed"
by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded
respect by reviewing courts:

x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be searched.46

The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on 25 September 2001
shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification
on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court
will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the
search warrants.

However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior
determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the first place. In support of their contention that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law
punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the issuance of
the search warrants.

According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively
evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the
government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited,
because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call
been properly routed through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the
elements of the crime are present therein.

On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties
allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are
uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings
and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the
applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s
international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of
PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.48

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of
PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its
consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:

x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical
energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the
latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is
the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later
mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to
correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to
amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of
respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense,
which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the
amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge
against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of personal property in
civil law as "anything susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected
by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of
theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or
"the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using its
complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these communications facilities without its consent
constitutes theft, which is the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business
of providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of telecommunications
equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without previous authority
from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water,
electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers
water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly
possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or
telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)

The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the
hearing of the motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have
connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may
be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the
police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on
matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a
nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53

On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a
search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through
PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through
other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a
deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country
was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55

On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the
warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing
the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.

III.

The requirement of particularity in the description of things to

be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because the descriptions
therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide
discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were not illegal
per se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to determine
whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in
telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.

On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of particularity of description
when it is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the
Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the effort and the time element
involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the
quashal of the search warrants in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the
items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to the OSG, assuming that the
seized items could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the
commission of an offense.

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the
property to be seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.60

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to
abuses.1âwphi1Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have
been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful
reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:

a) Subject of the offense;

b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the
difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are
technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of
Appeals61 ruled as follows:

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not
know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the
officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized is required "wherever and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily
identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.64

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation
that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to
pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In

People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are
difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched
judicial interference."65

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things
described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants
and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."67

In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s milady worded69 description of items to be seized by
virtue of the search warrants, because these items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to bear a
relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20 August
2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald
Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly
sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams, 51.45 grams,
41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98)
grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4

Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be committed in this manner:

That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by law to
possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21 grams,
0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams of
white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.6

Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon motion7 of the appellant,
however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch
41.8 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held
on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts.10

During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector
(P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the
defense presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina
Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16

The Prosecution’s Case

The prosecution’s version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to their office and reported
that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an
employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good
commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to
Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then
instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which
consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was
the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be
held at around 9:00 p.m. on that day at Cindy’s Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only supposed to meet
alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for security reasons.17

At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place with the informant. The
members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp.
Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied
in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00. They also
agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18

In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already
waiting for her outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the
money with her. She brought five genuine ₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money to
make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go
to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of
alias Don’s apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD)
Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to the
target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify
that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to
the address given by alias Don.19

When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked
along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood
in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias
Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her
the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about
10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she
assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to
signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects
tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When
she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her
initials "JSF" on the genuine ₱500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the
buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects’ rights were read to them and they were subsequently
booked.20

P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name
when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the
appellant’s companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo
explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was
present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green
plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen
and brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She
handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on
duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory
weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the laboratory examination.21

P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually
contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated
from the appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the envelope
that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made
them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as
evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime
Laboratory. She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which sachets she also
initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body
search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12 sachets were
varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope.
As to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22

The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardo’s. PO2 Trambulo testified that in the morning of
April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay
then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at
Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias
Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of
shabu and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed
P/Supt. Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with
five genuine ₱500.00 bills together with the boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills
below the name "Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindy’s Restaurant past
10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the boodle money to alias Don and after some time,
they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take place in front
of alias Don’s rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to
familiarize themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter,
P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting
officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the
deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23

The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the direction of alias Don’s apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked
jeepney about 15 to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street
perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don
gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something
first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to
alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw
this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust
money from alias Don’s male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic sachets of
suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was tucked inside alias Don’s waist. PO2 Trambulo
marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of
their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter retained possession thereof. The
envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team
reported the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the required
documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug
specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
along with the drug specimens.25

P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination of the drug specimens seized in
this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was
already assigned to another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical Science
Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and
retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug
specimens and examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the
specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s examination revealed that the white
crystalline substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of 12 heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1"
to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. P/Insp. Dequito’s findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27

The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1) photocopies of the five
original ₱500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for examination
tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit
H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-
O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-
CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play
money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit
HH); (15) Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).

The Defense’s Case

As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. The appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals
provides a concise summary of the defense’s counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:

Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry
Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from
different police agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties, and
during regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena
clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to
testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.

On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m.
Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house,
arriving at 9:45 o’clock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential
informant of the narcotics agents.

On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from
Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the
door and thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others. The door to
Donald’s room was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo
pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One
of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide.
The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for
presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his
wallet containing ₱2,530.00.

Angelina Arejado, Donald’s neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment and apprehending Donald and
Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)

The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn
Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of
Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo
A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit
6).

The Decision of the RTC

On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the
prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the
police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show
that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely
testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e.,
247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact
helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers. Furthermore,
the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the
appellant prevailed over the latter’s bare denials.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the police, the trial court pointed out
that:

[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked help from his Acting Chief
[Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued
to the accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting
Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director
in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said
shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges against
those police officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same. Further,
the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by
Acting Deputy Director) presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the
said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that the prosecution has no opportunity to
cross-examine the same, thus, it has no probative value.47

The trial court, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.

2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine
of ₱5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD
VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation
to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND (₱4,000.00) PESOS.

The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals

On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the
prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony
of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant
failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the
appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part
of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day
of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50

The Ruling of the Court

The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported
illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the
illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at
the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a
warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a
result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant
posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he
was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.

After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we resolve to deny this appeal.

At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v.
Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment,
appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their
voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made
without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds
that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v.
Cabugatan55 that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in
plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
(Citation omitted.)

Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search
upon his person.

We now rule on the substantive matters.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should be
satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs,
"what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.58

In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was
legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer,
positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big
brown envelope for the price of ₱250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination,
the white crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s
testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed and straightforward.
She was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the face of the opposing counsel’s cross-examination.

Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money,
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu.
After the latter was arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the appellant. This
search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The
testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s
narration of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated
from the appellant.

In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution
witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less
satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would falsely
incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60 In the absence of evidence of such ill
motive, none is presumed to exist.61

The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to criminally or administratively
charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would
not have been a daunting task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the
appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him
from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents that
supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the
testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the
mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical
testimonies of the arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable
amount of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some
material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts
and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented
during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are
binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.62

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant
of the crimes charged.

The Penalties

Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:

SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The
penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act
shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined
and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional
to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. (Emphases supplied.)

In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was found to have
sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200
grams required by the law for the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the
death penalty.

Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be applied.1âwphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attended the appellant’s violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the trial court’s imposition of reclusion perpetua. The ₱5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on the
appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, the Court of Appeals properly
invoked our ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug,
less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the
regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

(Emphases ours.)

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant amounted to 4.03 grams,
the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate
sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as
maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be
imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a regular employee of the NBI
Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this
case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66 Such a special aggravating
circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum
period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower courts.

All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February
22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

The facts are briefly stated as follows:

Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and control

One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.

without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records
Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and three
(3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of
kidnapping with ransom.6

After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan,
and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso.
They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter
Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7

Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives
Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but
was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:

On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes,
Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their
guns at him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside
the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room
and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11

Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed
with a search warrant.12

Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and
its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14

On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years,
as maximum. The gun subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.

On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was
denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.

Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative
reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.21

Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for
Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22

In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second
look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense more credible and
thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that
the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search
and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his
authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.

After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSG’s position
recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23

The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second motion for
reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the
same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24

This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of
the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we still
entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered
our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s
evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner
would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after
all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined
the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En
Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and
resolve respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-
examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier
decision.

Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.

We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are
conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots
of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would
always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.29

Now on the substantive aspect.

The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of
the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon
City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched
him, and they found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested
inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom),
some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the
subject firearm.

After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the
OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.

Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to
have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition
inadmissible in evidence against him.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is
required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual.30

To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances where searches and
seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.33

In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured.34

In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless
search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?

We answer in the negative.

For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to
lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v.
Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid
warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well
be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s
reach.39Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of
the person arrested.42

In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that
time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting officers who
were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands,
and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the
locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged
with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest
without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed,
and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked,
could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any
weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.

The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining,
there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.46

It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what
is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.48

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."

The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.49

As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.52

Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve
a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,
the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for
evidence against Valeroso.

Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.1avvphi1

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are
not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss
of liberty.53

Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke
regularity in the performance of official functions.54

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human
beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained
as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power.55

Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict
him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty
for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence
as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.

One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED
and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

SO ORDERED.