EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 & A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411. August 5, 1998]

CESAR B. MERIS, complainant, vs. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.

FRANCISCO R. HERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM

JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, was charged with
various administrative offenses contained in two (2) separate complaints, in addition to several others
previously filed against him, as will be discussed hereunder.

A.M. No. RTJ-1390

On 16 May 1996 respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 against a certain Thomas Jay of
Lalakhan, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, for illegal possession of 3,000 board feet of narra lumber valued more or
less at P360,000.00 in violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The warrant was served immediately the following day. On 20
May 1996 EIIB Operation Officer Baltazar B. Dulalia filed a Return, Compliance and Inventory (re search
warrant).

On 21 May 1996 Thomas Jay filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on the ground that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense and that the warrant contained averments which if true
would make up legal excuses or justifications. Appended to the motion were photocopies of the
following documents: (a) Certificate of Transport Agreement issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya, dated 22 January 1996, re conveyance of the narra lumber (Annex "4");[1] (b) Certificate of
Lumber Origin issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, in favor of Remitans Enterprises, 12
Agueda St., Project 8, Q.C., for 11,754 bd. ft. = 27.71 cu. M. under Auxiliary Invoice No. 180795 and
Official Receipt No. 4529171 dated 22 January 1996 issued by DENR-CENRO, Bayongbong, Nueva
Voscaya (annexes "5" and "5-1");[2] (c) Certificate of Registration of Business Name No. 0298450 issued
by the Department of Trade and industry, NCR, on 26 September 1955, for TJ Furniture owned by Tomas
Jay (Annex "1");[3] (d) Mayor's Permit No. 16840 issued by the Office of the City Mayor of Manila on 18
January 1996 (Annex "2");[4] (e) Delivery Receipt for narra lumber dated 21 March 1996 issued by
Remitans Enterprises to TJ Furniture (Annex "3");[5] and, (f) Tally Sheets of narra lumber (Annexes "7",
"7-1", "7-2" and "7-3").[6]

The motion to quash was set for hearing on 31 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning. However, on 21 May
1996 Jay, through his counsel, Atty. Romeo Y. De Jesus, moved to have the hearing advanced to 28 May
1996 on the ground that, according to him, he was informed that "the calendar of the Court is not
available;" consequently, he requested for 28 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning, undertaking at the same
time to "notify the parties concerned." But counsel for respondent, despite his undertaking, failed to
notify complainant Cesar B. Meris, Regional Director, EIIB, who as a result failed to appear on 28 May
1996.

On 27 May 1996 Atty. Salome T. Cansino, Special Counsel of the Department of Justice, filed an
opposition to the motion to quash the search warrant contending that (a) the pieces of narra lumber
seized were not covered by any legal documents required by the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; (b) the documents submitted by Jay did not cover the lumber seized; and, (c) a criminal
complaint had already been filed against Jay by the DENR for Illegal Possession of Forest Products in
violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

On 28 May 1996, despite the opposition of the special counsel of the Department of Justice, respondent
Judge granted the motion to quash and ordered the immediate release of the narra lumber seized from
Thomas Jay. The explanation of respondent was that the pieces of lumber seized were owned by a
legitimate enterprise and covered by proper documents, emphasizing that he took into consideration
not only the opposition of the Department of Justice but also the deteriorating condition of the pieces of
lumber which were already long exposed to the elements.

On 5 June 1996 complainant, in his capacity as Regional Director for Region III of EIIB, wrote a letter to
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa which is textually quoted hereunder -

THE HONORABLE ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Sir:

I wish to report to HIS HONOR about the actuation of Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada, regional trial
Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan which is prejudicial to the interest of the government by issuing an
Order of Release of Seized/Confiscated Narra Lumber with a commercial value of P150,000.00 by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 for violation of Section 68, PD 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277 without hearing of the case on the merits.

Records show that respondent/owner of seized narra lumber thru Counsel filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant before the Court and set the case for hearing on May 31, 1996 at 8:30 in the morning.

It is sad to note, however, Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada quashed the Search Warrant on May 28, 1996
motu propio and ordered the release of seized narra lumber to the respondent herein, which is two (2)
days prior to the scheduled hearing, May 31, 1996.

That Economic intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) Region III represented by the Regional
Director ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS as Counsel attended the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Quash on
May 31, 1996 but sad to note Judge Ofilada already quashed to Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on May 28,
1996 without affording a day in Court on the part of the Government. Attached hereto are xerox copies
of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96, application for Search Warrant, marked as Annex "A" and "B," Motion
to Quash filed by respondent thru counsel marked as ANNEX "C," Court Order Quashing Search Warrant
No. 20-M-96 dated May 28, 1996 marked as ANNEX "D," Motion for reconsideration marked as ANNEX
"E."

May I request your Honor to look into the matter with the aim in view to enhance the good image of the
Judiciary. Likewise, to encourage the public to report erring Judges to Supreme Court and not to the
media xxxx

Very respectfully yours,

ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS

Regional Director, Counsel for EIIB3
Cabanatuan City

On 3 July 1996 Regional Director Cesar B. Meris, who was also acting as counsel for EIIB, filed an Answer
(actually an opposition to the motion to quash search warrant). On 10 July 1996 he filed his motion for
reconsideration (of the order quashing the search warrant) where he claimed that he attended the
hearing on the motion to quash previously scheduled on 31 May 1996 only to be informed that
respondent Judge had already quashed the search warrant on 28 May 1996 even without the presence
of either the complainant EIIB Regional Director or the Special Counsel representing the Government.
His motion for reconsideration and that of Special Counsel Salome T. Cansino, who protested the
hearing of the motion without proper service and notice, were denied by respondent Judge.

Complainant claims that by ordering the release of the confiscated narra lumber without hearing the
case on the merits and without affording the prosecution a day in court, respondent Judge committed
rave abuse of authority prejudicial to the interest of the Government. Section 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of
Court states-

Sec. 5. Contents of notice. - The notice shall directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
and place for the hearing of the motion.[7]

A perusal of the request for advanced resetting of the motion to quash search warrant would show that
although it stated the time and date of hearing, it failed to comply with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 as the notice
was addressed only to the clerk of court and not to the parties concerned as required.[8] Neither was
there proof of service of the motion on the adverse party despite the undertaking of counsel for movant
to notify the public prosecutor of the request as required by Sec. 6 of Rule 15 -

Sec. 6. Proof of service, to filed with motion. - No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof
of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of te adverse party or
parties are not affected.[9]

In Manakil v. Revilla[10] we held that the court will not act on the motion if there is no proper notice
and/or proof of service of the notice on the adverse party. It is nothing but a useless piece of paper filed
with the court. It is not motion. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no
reason to consider it and the clerk had no right to receive it without that compliance with the rules.
Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to
provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.

Due process demands proper obedience to procedural rules especially when the subject matter of
motion to quash is search warrant. Since searches are in derogation of the inviolable right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,[11] it necessarily follows that the applicant
should rely on the strength of his evidence to support the application or the subsequent legal custody of
the seized articles. Otherwise, upon prima facie proof that the movant for the quashal of the warrant
was the owner of the seized lumber and that he lawfully acquired them, he is entitled to the quashal of
the search warrant and the restoration to him of the seized articles.[12] It is clear therefore that the
exception in Sec. 6, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court cannot apply in a motion to quash search warrant. For
without the proper notice of hearing and proof of service thereof, the rights of either party will be
adversely affected. Moreover, the ground invoked by movant was that the warrant charged no offense.
The fundamental test in considering motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by the law.[13]
A cursory examination of the search warrant will disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charge are sufficiently alleged. It is not right; therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without
any notice of hearing, or to hear the motion ex parte. The issues require a fuller examination especially
since a criminal complaint had already been filed in court. The prosecution, too, must be given its day in
court - the burden of proof thereof being placed squarely on its shoulders. A prudent judge would, in
the absence of the opposing party in the hearing of a motion as pivotal as a motion to quash, inquire
from the other party or verify from the records the proof of service of notice rather than proceed with
the hearing. This is but an elementary notion of fair play. He should not rely on a party's undertaking to
notify the adverse party of a scheduled hearing. The judge must demand what the rule requires, i.e.,
proof of such notice on the adverse party, otherwise, a contentious motion, as the motion to quash in
the case before respondent Judge, should be considered a mere scrap of paper which should not have
even been received for filing.

Respondent's culpability is further compounded by his misrepresentation in the order he issued on 14

August 1996 (denying the motion of the public prosecutor for reconsideration) that he was on extended
leave of absence from 29 May 1996 to 22 July 1996 when the records show that he actually applied for
leave only from 29 May 1996 to 3 July 1996 (not up to 22 July 1996).

A.M. No. RTJ-981411

On 18 April 1994 an Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan against
four (4) accused, namely, Rolando Garcia, Lopito Gumasing, Eric Gumasing and Eduardo Gumasing. The
Information stated that all the accused were at large. No bail was recommended. On 22 April 1994
warrants of arrest were issued against the four (4) accused.

On 7 June 1995, or more than one (1) year that the accused remained at large, Atty. Eufrocio Marquez
appeared before the trail court as counsel for the accused and submitted a "Motion to Voluntarily
Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail" praying that the accused be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P10,000.00 each in cash. At the bottom of page 2 of the motion, the public prosecutor
manifested in writing that he was submitting the matter to the sound discretion of the court provided
that the bail be increased to P15,000 in cash for each accused.

On 16 June 1995 respondent Judge granted the motion and allowed the four (4) accused to post bail in
the amount of P10,000.00 each. After the accused had posted bail, respondent Judge lifted the warrant
of arrest and set the arraignment on 16 August 1995.

At the hearing of 17 July 1995, which does not appear on record to have been previously scheduled,
respondent Judge issued an order citing as grounds for the grant of bail (a) voluntary surrender of the
accused; (b) no evidence was presented by the public prosecutor that the evidence of guilt was strong;
(c) the public prosecutor did not object to the granting of bail; and, (d) the complainant, wife of the
victim, had submitted an affidavit of desistance. The four (4) accused were later arraigned, and the
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant was marked during the pre-trial.

After the prosecution rested, the defense manifested its intention to file demurrer to evidence. In an
order dated 20 January 1997, respondent Judge gave the accused five (5) days within which to file the
intended demurrer and the prosecution the same period to comment thereon.
In an order dated 30 January 1997 respondent Judge admitted the demurrer filed by the accused and
submitted the same for resolution there being no comment from the public prosecutor.

On 20 February 1997 respondent Judge granted the demurrer to evidence and acquitted all four (4)
accused for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently,
on 19 March 1997 respondent Judge ordered the release of the cash bond posted by the accused for
their provisional liberty.

Francisco R. Hernandez, uncle of the deceased victim, filed a complaint-affidavit before this Court
charging respondent Judge with knowingly rendering unjust orders and for improperly granting bail,
manifest bias and partiality in favor of the accused in the conduct of the proceedings. After respondent
Judge filed his comment to the complaint, we referred the case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin Jr.
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

In his report dated 1 June 1998 Justice Martin found respondent Judge guilty of gross incompetence and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for six (6) months with stern warning that
commission of similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

The actuations of respondent Judge in Crim. Case No. 1441-M-94 showed his utter disregard of the rules
and settled jurisprudence thus constituting gross ignorance of the law. In granting the motion for
application of bail which did not contain a notice of hearing directed to the parties and where the
accused had never been placed under the custody of the court, respondent Judge again demonstrated
his lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic principles of law and procedures. A perusal of the
Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail shows that the notice of hearing was
directly solely to the clerk of court and did not contain a place and time of hearing. A motion that does
not meet the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, particularly that the notice
be directed to the parties concerned and stating the time and place for the hearing of the motion, is a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the court has no authority
to act upon.[14]

The records shows that respondents Judge had not been as zealous as he should been observing the
standard and fundamental procedure mandated by the Rules of Court in criminal cases. In granting bail
to the four (4) accused who were at large, respondent Judge violated the rule that bail is unavailing to
the accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet to be placed under legal
custody.[15]

The refusal of the prosecution to adduce evidence that the guilt of the accused was strong or its failure
to interpose an objection to the motion for bail was not a justifiable reason for respondent Judge to
grant bail. It is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing and ask searching and clarificatory
questions[16] for the purpose of determining the existence of a strong evidence against the
accused.[17] On the face of his orders dated 16 June 1995[18] July 1995[19] which granted bail to the
accused, respondent Judge did not make any finding that the evidence against the accused was not
strong as to warrant the grant of bail. Hence, the order should not be sustained or given any semblance
of validity.[20]

Conclusion
The unseemly haste with which respondent Judge granted the motions filed y the accused (a) to quash
search warrant ex parte in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411 and (b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-97- 1390 and (b) for bail
in A.M. No. RTJ-981411 is indicative of his patent injustice, partiality, nay, his gross ignorance of the law
bordering on incompetence. It should be mentioned that respondent Judge was previously charged with
eight (8) other administrative cases ranging from gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority
and discretion , incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a
judge, oppression and direct bribery. Although seven (7) of the eighth (8) cases were dismissed without
hearing for various reasons, in Santos v. Ofilada,[21] the Court through Senior Associate Justice Florence
D. Regalado found the same respondent Judge to have whimsically and arbitrarily granted bail in Crim.
Case No. 1433-M-94 for murder and in Crim. Case No. 1434-M-94 for illegal possession of firearm
without notice to the prosecution in both cases, for which he was fined P20,000.00 and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would definitely warrant a more severe
sanction. Those administrative cases are also enumerated in the Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator dated 15 July 1996 thus-

It is also worthy to inform the Honorable Court that there are at least eight (8) administrative complaints
filed against herein respondents Judge charging him with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority and discretion, incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct, conduct
unbecoming (of a Judge), oppression and direct bribery (RTJ-90-588, RTJ-91-639, RTJ-92-882, RTJ-93-
1040, RTJ-93-1219, RTJ-94-1250, RTJ-94-1267 and RTJ-94-1281). However , these complaints were
subsequently dismissed by this Court. But in RTJ-94-1217 respondent Judge was charged with
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, oppression and grave misconduct relative to criminal cases
filed before this Court wherein he granted bail to the accused without hearing. In the Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 16, 1995, the Court imposed on Judge Carlos C. Ofilada a FINE of P20,000.00
with aw STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more seriously.

It may also be worth to mention that on 17 March 1998 another sworn administrative complaint was
filed before this Court against respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
of a member of the bench.[22] Thereafter, in an endorsement dated 14 April 1998 by Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus P. Guerrero, another complaint which was filed with the Ombudsman
against respondent Judge for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code was referred to this Court for appropriate action.[23] Respondent has yet to submit
his comments on both charges against him.

Be that as it may, this Court finds that respondent Judge has failed to conduct himself in a manner that
will justify his continued stay in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to perform his
official duties competently, honestly , with diligence and impartially. Regretfully, respondent Judge is
found miserably short of the standards set for appropriate judicial conduct, which leaves the Court no
choice but to cut short his membership in and terminate his official relations with the judiciary.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondents JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, GUILTY in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 for grave abuse of authority and evident
partiality, and in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411, for gross incompetence, ignorance of the law and evident
partially, all prejudicial to the interest of the Government and the judicial service. These being his
second and third offenses, respondent is ordered DISMISSED immediately from the service with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and leave credits with prejudice to his reemployment in any
public office including any government owned or controlled corporation.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA is directed to immediately cease and desist from performing the functions of
the Office of Regional Trial Court judge of Malolos, Bulacan, and to turn over all records and property
responsibilities to the Clerk of Court of that court who shall issue that corresponding receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Today is Wednesday, August 08, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994

ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:

Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the
present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue:
Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with
an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a
search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of
respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:

From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22,
1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought
for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990,
respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around
2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the
offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research
(EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms,
explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.
And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal,
Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before
Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.
Velasco.

On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For
the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental
Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally
Obtained.

On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating
subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of
which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within
the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing
court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the
assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising
the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN
CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND
TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying
due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on
November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and
sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.

We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their
submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the
rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of
law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the
difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant
under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search
warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially
discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to
avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim.

Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search
warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of
firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed
by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was
subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was
accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do
so.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.4 A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court.5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity. 6

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search
warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its
original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion,
with the catalogue of authorities herein.

Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by
authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs,
warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a
writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his
property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, 10 or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
process issuing from a court of justice. 11

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation
thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to
require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first
place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction
other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the
consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos
continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over
the same criminal offense.

In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we
need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of
criminal actions and which we quote:

Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. —

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the
place of departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action
may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.

(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)

It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies
to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and
possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if
compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file
their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within
the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.

Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional
strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the
reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both
deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even
Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the
pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a
crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation,
may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a
judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes
ought to have been embraced therein. 14

Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already
been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented
therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper
application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an
incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband
articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The
jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial
jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.

3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the
respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen
judicial regions, 15 invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over which the
particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search
that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular
No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.

We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general
application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had
been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular
exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of
Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-
Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms
and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on
the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts and other crimes.
Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a
bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.

For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of
this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was
the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the
courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. — The Supreme Court shall define the
territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining
the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural
law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on
regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that
"(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station," and
he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region
as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another
station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer
jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would
nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area
within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative
areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance
contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg,
129.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to
the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is
within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same
power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on
applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of
requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the
executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by
amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be
"taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or
by their substitutes enumerated therein.

Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction
on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally
act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous
practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving
search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was,
therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of
human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth,
Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature
of that provision, thus:

4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the
corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated
September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been
assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue
the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the
court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be
conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or
the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such
criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for
the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to
be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is
necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal
case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by
Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.

This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of
search warrants.

II

As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has
the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners
insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.

1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically,
in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant
of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants
of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return
thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a
search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the
extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the
premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court.

We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would
provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the
same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to
be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever
pretext should not be countenanced.

A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs
and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the
approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. 22 On
the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were
enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines,
certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region.
In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:

3. Writs and processes. —

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued
by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in
the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted
polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are
enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and
processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal
provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on
its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly
authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).

2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search
warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect
or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles.
The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the
culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by
imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For
that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections
based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24 the
searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were
conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were
never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general
warrants.

3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously

invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the
enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place
to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed
apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum
shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that
a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated
into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the
issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in
whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with
the ten-day lifetime of the warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not
only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there
are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely
and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.

On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and
then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or
financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in
the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will
necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the
attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of
experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance
in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region
does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be
searched is located. 28

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial
pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the
county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable
before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters
involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both
with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in
the Philippines.

III

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of
jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This
arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted,
this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario
contemplated therein.

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:

1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed
with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to
the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending
on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and
shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court
by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion
to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is
not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in
different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction
over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such
court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants
incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE,
BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP
MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:

Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we
can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy
of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty
English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was
monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and
all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number,
regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the
fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and
protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure
conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in
his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained
(which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.2 The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3
However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the
petitioner. 4

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or
some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No
less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.5

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense.7

The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934
Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the
federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then already embodied in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate,
approved by the Convention.8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:

SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to
him.

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the
above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainant's
two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:

The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on
May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and
Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the
contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10

By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because "the application was
not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if
the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his
own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to
him.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the
aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The
rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their
own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of
the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma,
if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to
be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in
their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of
the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a
"Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard
as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight
men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly,
and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate.
18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber
revolvers. 19

One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so
certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the
first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of
the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted
to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically
coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to
the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and
the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as
we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect
for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an
intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the
petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even
without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered
malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because:
1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly
waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no
right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal
per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were
otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns
reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they
did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the
seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and
articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made
incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may
otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to
prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable
cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of
their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly
agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that
prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer
comes upon them inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents
cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were
deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were
confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution.
While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because
"the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was
nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The
decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action
against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles
must remain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the
quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as
we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing
to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently,
drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies,
the court a quo found the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large
volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo,
Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December
14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue
and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt.
Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other
group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its
front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same
day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to
the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said
specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-
judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.

In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident
differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just
come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old
woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo
arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and
averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she added that
no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or Objection
to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were
allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search
of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a
general search warrant which may be quashed.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-
appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.

4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates
only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution,
which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes
the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest.[4]

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was later
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses,
papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision
guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly
construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of
full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;[9]

6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before
a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.[12]

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched.[13]

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present.
Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion
or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure.

In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a

surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who
may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At
9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later
on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding
Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover,
the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business
address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding
circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant
case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.

In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially
since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was
priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a
moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was
searched while about to cross a street.

In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their
regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants
belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid
warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is
admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a
moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the
place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be
trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried
to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the
warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken
together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and
seizures in each of the cases.

In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13,
1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain
Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon
of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December
14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the
informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the
contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found
dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the
arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they
had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin.
When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized
from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information
the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in
marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant.
This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of
1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to
secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas constitutional right.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have
been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

xxx xxx xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one
nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not
acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger
of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of
any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.
As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits
of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and
an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of
accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second
exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the
NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the
middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.

People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by
government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused
the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned
cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified
themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that
the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was
fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused
to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions
inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing
circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause
to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to
search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.)
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:

Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?

A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our informant
and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.

Q What was her reaction?

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to
the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the
warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most
essential element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making
the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the
warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-
appellant could not be used as evidence against her.

Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing
over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26] where
this Court held:

[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search.
This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he carried, what
did you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to
Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the
search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely
on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v.
Barros:[27]

x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion
of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-

x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts
do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.[28]
(Emphasis supplied)

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:

PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:

Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.

Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).

Q - When he said that, what did you do?

A - We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?

A - He said you can see it.

Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?

A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the
bag.

Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to my
companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had been made,
this Court would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior
consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag,
which is not the case with Aruta.

In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police
officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured only if
accused-appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the
Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.

This argument is untenable.

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched
has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to
be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing
to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM
agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any
way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In
any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:

1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not
guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the courts
jurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search
and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this
far.

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is
that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of
arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused
from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes,
or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful
searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense
counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the
four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We
consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably
and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably
inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering
that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the
fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit
of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is
based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.[35]

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.[36]

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO
y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.[1] The information reads:

"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11)
plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited
law.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the
North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As
arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on
December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.

On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed
of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4)
other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1
Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara,
Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational
expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one
hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana
was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in
the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.

At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in
buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he
got the marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped
in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed
to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police
team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as
his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He
saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside
the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."[8] The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and
the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the
police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The
one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from
"Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were
found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio
Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the
gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain
"Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers,
accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and
accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men
led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes,
accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.

Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as
PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house
for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came
out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where
"Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time,
surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant
Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning
towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. PO3
Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to
police headquarters where they were investigated.

Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she
was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5)
children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged
3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she
carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving
the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in
the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian
well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly
appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later
that the man was PO3 Manlangit.

Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on
top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of
green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied
the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.[12]

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial
court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-
appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of
the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of
Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555,
the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also
of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,

confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @
"Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.

The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
NBI for destruction in accordance with law.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.

SO ORDERED."[13]

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

"I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND
THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND
INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES
NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.

II

THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE
THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND
BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE
RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT
WORST.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO
THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence
obtained therefrom.

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]

Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine
that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes,
particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and
the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal
law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[20]

In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere
purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that
articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to
acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and
his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery,
persuasion or fraud of the officer."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or
fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime;
and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the
innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement
officer.[24]

It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons
violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person
into a criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and
the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the
mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for
the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that
the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the
use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the
nature of a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once
established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as
a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of
intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his
state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.[32] All relevant facts
such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in
committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the
crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather
than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a
police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.[36] Some states, however, have adopted the
"objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State[38]
rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by
judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by
government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.
For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.[40] The test of entrapment is whether
the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other
than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;[41] for purposes of this test, it is presumed
that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by
the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is
permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,[43] or appeals to
sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not.[44] Proponents of
this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls
outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods employed
on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this
reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement
improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the
gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging
what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal person.[46]

Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that
the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an accused was
predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory
practices will be deemed impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition
obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally.
It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.[48] On
the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular
accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important
bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper.[49] The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and
active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]

Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United
States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida
Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this
objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis
by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by
showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded
the standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.

As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of
smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to
commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the
accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."[58] In People v.
Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of
the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting
price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was
inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony,
there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61]
we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law
enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation
and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs
of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:

"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to
prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the
detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to
the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny
is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary."[65]

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.[67] In
People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.
Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed
contrary to public policy and illegal.[71]

It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation
or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to
the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.[72] To determine
whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test
first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless,
adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In
People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-
bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and
held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's
evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did
not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense
that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to
engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-
narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of convenience
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to
crimes mala prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder,
rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.[79]
Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but
against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally
unattended with any particular harm to a definite person.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret
and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of
the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the
enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing
violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the
diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are
committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]

Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant
system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the
apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the
police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For
whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld
and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally
odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the
informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance,
blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial
notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus
operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting
provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which
illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed
secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding
drug cases.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the
arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the
unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]

"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false
arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from
common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the
sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the
employment of illegal means."[88]

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the
offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming
evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3
Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-
appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was
apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.

PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-
presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs
and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,[94] or there are
reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,[95] or
that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,[96] the
testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court
where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[98]

The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The
source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that
the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he
sold and delivered the marijuana.

Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit
was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension,
the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the
carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained
eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from
appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:

"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:

Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?

A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana
brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.

Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with
eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?

COURT So be it.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box
showed to him and brought in front of him.

COURT Noted.

Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?

x x x.

A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.

Q Point to the court, where are those markings?

A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.

PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.

Q Whose signature is that?

ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was
handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?

PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite
reconsideration.

COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court.

ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.

A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"

A Yes, your Honor.

Q What makes you so sure?

A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to
the PCCL, your Honor.

Q What are you sure of?

A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

Q What makes you so sure?

A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it
to the PCCL, your Honor.

x x x.

PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as
Exhibit "D?"

COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."

Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this
plastic?

A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."

Q How about this one?

A I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."

A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.

PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95,
also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there
are other entries included in the enclosure.

COURT Noted. The court saw it.

Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a
piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"

COURT Tag it. Mark it.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.

Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

x x x.

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.

x x x."[99]

The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at
the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic
wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred
seventy (970) grams.[100]

We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost
one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains
credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case
at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires
that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the
poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant.[102]

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests
are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

x x x."[103]

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.[104]

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of
the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is, however, not
absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;[107] (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle;[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[111]

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search
and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant.
It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot
pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct
testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:

"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.

Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.

COURT There is. Answer.

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?

A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.

Q You mentioned "him?"

A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.

Q And what happened?

A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.

x x x."[112]

SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

A To arrest her, sir.

Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?

A Yes, sir.

Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?

A I saw her outside, sir.

Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?

A She was `sa bandang poso.'

Q Carrying a baby?

A No, sir.

Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house,
she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?

A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily
chores. Am I correct?

A I just saw her outside, sir.

Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?

A PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?

A Yes, sir.

Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place,
you were just in the side lines?

A I was just watching, sir.

Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you your
role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?

A PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Q Manlangit got the marijuana?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the money from Aling Neneth?

A I don't know, sir.

Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUTOR:

There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.

PROSECUTOR:

No basis.

COURT:

Sustained.

Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the amount
of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?

A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who
retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?

A I saw it, sir.

Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you
are trying to tell the Court?

A No, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of
the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify
her arrest in "hot pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."[115] The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.[116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[117]

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-
accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant
Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with
whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the
money in her house,[119] with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for
accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was
engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had,
in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[120]

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal
as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that
the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.[121] The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion,
he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be
open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.[127] In
other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.[128] It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.[129]

PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:

"ATTY. VALDEZ:

So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?

A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q This carton, according to you was under a table?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?

A Yes, sir.

Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?

A It was open, sir. Not like that.

COURT

Go down there. Show to the court.

INTERPRETER

Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.

A Like this, sir.

PROSECUTOR

Can we describe it?

ATTY. VALDEZ

Yes.

PROSECUTOR

One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.

COURT

Noted.

Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q And got hold of this carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

A I asked her, what's this...

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo
galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.

Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?

A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.

Q Who got hold of this?

A I was the one, sir.

Q You were the one who got this?

A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved
by Badua?

A Yes, sir.

Q You went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not have any search warrant?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in
possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bust money from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q How far was this from the door?

A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

Q Under the table according to you?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q Somewhere here?

A It's far, sir.

PROSECUTOR

May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

A Here, sir.

Q What you see is a carton?

A Yes, sir, with plastic.

Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"

A Yes, sir.

Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is all that you saw?

A Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR

For the record, your Honor...

Q You were only able to verify according to you...

PROSECUTOR

Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...

ATTY. VALDEZ

That's a piece of plastic.

PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.

ATTY. VALDEZ

What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?

PROSECUTOR

With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a
small one, for record purposes.

COURT

Leave that to the court.

PROSECUTOR

Leave that to the court.

Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw
that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the Court, it
could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?

A Yes, sir.

Q Siopao?

A Yes, sir.

Q Canned goods?

A Yes, sir.

Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...

Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.

A It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ

I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the
prosecutor do that for you.

COURT
Continue. Next question.

x x x."[130]

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by
appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until
appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house,
PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table
and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in
plastic.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same
plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic
wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the
ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside
plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination
that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent
to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.[135] It was
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.[136]

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-
appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.[138] Apropos
is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:

"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more
so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the
realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the
innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself."[140]

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a
prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.

x x x."

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that
the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug,
i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred
seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has
failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said
drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua
must be imposed.[142]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special
Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY TING UY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the September 16, 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Branch XVII, Manila) finding Jerry Ting Uy guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sections 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was charged on July 24, 1998 for violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act in two separate Informations which read:

CRIM. CASE NO. 98-166675

That on or about July 21, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being
authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control white crystalline substance
contained in three (3) separate self-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing one thousand five hundred
ten point eight grams (1,510.8 g) known as SHABU containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.

Contrary to law.

CRIM. CASE NO. 98-166676

That on or about July 21, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute
white crystalline substance contained in a self-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing five hundred five
point six gram (505.6 g) containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license or prescription thereof.

Contrary to law.

(p. 17, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both Informations. A joint trial was thereafter
conducted.

The record shows that at around 3:30 in the afternoon of July 21, 1998, a Chinese-Filipino police
informant went to the Western Police District headquarters at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila to inform
the police officers assigned at the Drug Enforcement Unit thereat that a certain Jerry Ting Uy was
engaged in illegal drug activities in Sta. Cruz, Manila. PO3 Luis Chico asked the police informant to
contact appellant and to negotiate with him for the purchase of shabu. Around 4oclock that same
afternoon, the police informant called appellant but was informed that shabu was not yet available. The
police informant again called up appellant at about 5 oclock in the afternoon, and they agreed that
appellant would deliver half a kilo of shabu to the informant for P200,000.00 at Severino Street, near the
corner of Remigio Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at 6:30 in the evening of that same day. This information was
recorded in the police blotter. Police officers, led by SPO2 Rodolfo Rival, then planned a buy-bust
operation for the entrapment of appellant. Eight genuine P500.00 bills, marked with the letter C, were
prepared. These marked P500.00 bills were then placed at the top and at the bottom of four bundles of
bogus money. The police designated PO3 Chico to be the poseur-buyer.

At around 6 oclock in the evening, 13 police officers, including PO3 Chico, and the police informant left
the police station and proceeded to the designated meeting place. Except for PO3 Chico and the police
informant who waited at the meeting place, the rest of the police officers positioned themselves
strategically in various places along Severino Street. Ten minutes later, appellant arrived on board a
green Mitsubishi Lancer. Appellant stopped in front of the police informant and PO3 Chico, rolled down
the window of his car, and talked to the police informant in Chinese. The police informant then told PO3
Chico to board appellants car. PO3 Chico slid into the front passenger seat while the police informant sat
at the backseat of the car. Appellant then asked for the payment of half a kilo of shabu. PO3 Chico
handed the marked money to appellant. Appellant reached down under his seat, took a plastic bag and
gave it to PO3 Chico. When PO3 Chico opened the plastic bag, he saw a transparent plastic bag
containing substance which he suspected to be shabu. At this point, PO3 Chico introduced himself as a
police officer and immediately arrested appellant. PO3 Chico then retrieved the marked money from
appellants lap. Thereafter, PO3 Chico inspected the space underneath the drivers seat and found three
more plastic bags containing suspected shabu. After Chicos arrest of appellant, SPO2 Rival arrived and
informed appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was then brought to the WPD headquarters.
The marked bills of money and the four plastic bags seized from appellant were handed over to SPO2
Benjamin Nuguit, who then turned over the same to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
laboratory examination.

The very next day, NBI Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen issued a certification which reads:

This certifies that on the above-date at 4:05 p.m. one PO2 Gene Nelson Javier of the DES, DID, NPD, U.N.
Ave., Manila submitted to his Office for laboratory examination/s to wit:

1. White crystalline substance contained in a self-sealed transparent plastic bag marked LPCV- 1 and

Net weight of specimen = 505.6 grams

2. White crystalline substance contained in three (3) self-sealed transparent plastic bags marked JTU-1
respectively.

Total Net Weight of specimen = 1,510.8 grams

All placed in a red plastic bag.

Examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE RESULTS for

METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE. XXX

(P. 47, Record.)

In his defense, appellant claimed that he is a victim of frame-up. Appellants brief narrates the version of
the defense as follows:

At about 2 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1998, appellant deposited money in a bank at Masangkay
Street near the Metropolitan Hospital in Manila. When appellant was about to board his car after
coming from the bank, two vehicles blocked his way (p. 4, tsn., Feb. 9, 2000). Police operatives in civilian
clothes, approached appellant and demanded P200,000 without telling him the reason (pp. 55-6, id.).
When appellant told them that he could not produce the money, he was made to board one of their
vehicles, blindfolded and taken to a house. While inside a room, the police operatives warned him that
they would implicate him for drug pushing if he did not produce the money demanded. But appellant
responded that he did not have money (pp. 7-9, id.). Later, he was taken at a police station where he
was investigated and locked up in a cell (pp. 10-12, id.).

Alex Cruz, while selling buco at about past 2 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1998 at the corner of
Masangkay St. and Recto Ave., saw from about 20 meters distance, men in civilian clothes alight from
their vehicles which suddenly blocked appellants vehicle, appellant alight from his vehicle and board one
of their vehicles (pp. 3-17, tsn., Nov. 18, 1990.

Appellant was booked and arrested for violation of Sections 15 and 16, Article III of RA 6425, as
amended, committed on or about 6:30 p.m. of July 21, 1998 as per report of SPO2 Rodolfo Rival Jr.
dated July 22, 1998 (p. 9, Rec.). a joint affidavit (Exh. F, pp. 6-7, Rec.) was executed on July 22, 1998 by
police officers Rodolfo Rival Jr., Luis Chico, Gene Nelson Javier with seven (7) others, wherein they
narrated how the buy-bust operation transpired wherein appellant was apprehended allegedly for illegal
sale and possession of shabu.

(Appellants Brief, pp. 7-9.)

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on July 6, 2000, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows;

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 98-166675, the accused, Jerry Ting Uy, is hereby convicted of the crime
of Violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425 as amended involving 1,510.8 grams of shabu and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, plus the costs.

In Crim. Case No. 98-166676, the accused, Jerry Ting Uy, is likewise, convicted of the crime of Violation
of Section 15 of R.A. 6425 as amended involving one half kilogram of shabu and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, plus the costs.

The shabu recovered from the accused in the two cases is forfeited in favor of the government and is
ordered turned over the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

Appellant now assails his conviction, raising the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS PO3 CHICO, THE ALLEGED POSEUR-BUYER, ON APPELLANTS SALE AND
POSSESSION OF SHABU DURING A BUY-BUST OPERATION.

II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PRESENT
THE CHINESE INFORMANT AS A WITNESS AS A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH RENDER DOUBTFUL THE
TESTIMONY OF PO3 CHICO ON AN ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERATION.

III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO APPELLANTS
DEFENSE THAT HE WAS A VICTIM OF A FRAME-UP IN AN UNSUCCESSFUL EXTORTION ATTEMPT BY
POLICE OPERATIVES.

IV. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS INADMISSIBLE THE THREE BAGS
CONTAINING SUSPECTED SHABU AS EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-166676 FOR BEING ILLEGALLY
SEIZED EVIDENCE IN A WARRANTLESS ARREST.

V. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN SAID CASES.
This Court has carefully examined the record of this case, and finds no justification to come to
conclusions different from those made by the trial court.

Appellant was arrested by virtue of a buy-bust operation conducted by the Drug Enforcement Unit of
the Western Police District. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plans. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proven itself to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Thus, unless there is a clear and convincing evidence
that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by improper motives or were not properly
performing their duties, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit (People vs. Chua
Uy, G.R. No. 128046, March 7, 2000).

In this case, the evidence shows that it was the police informant who initially contacted and arranged a
drug deal with appellant. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Chico,
who posed as a buyer of shabu. PO3 Chico handed marked money to appellant as payment for half a kilo
of shabu. Appellant was then arrested when he handed a plastic bag containing shabu to PO3 Chico.

The trial court found that PO3 Chico testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward, and categorical
manner. His testimony was unflinching even during cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover,
PO3 Chicos testimony was corroborated on its material points by PO2 Gene Nelson Javier, another
member of the arresting team. As has been repeatedly held by the Court, credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary
(People vs. Guiamil,, 277 SCRA 658 [1997]). As correctly noted by the trial court, there was no evidence
presented as to any ill motive on the part of prosecution witness PO3 Chico which would affect the
credibility of his testimony. PO3 Chico and the other law enforcers involved in the buy-bust operation
would, thus, have in their favor the presumption that they regularly performed their duties. Absent any
showing of palpable error or arbitrariness, as is the case at bar, the Court has no choice but to accord
great respect to and to treat with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of
witnesses.

The defense, in its efforts to establish the innocence of appellant, claims that it is incredible for a drug
peddler to agree to sell his wares without first checking on the possibility of entrapment, given that drug
peddlers pursue their nefarious activities with utmost caution. We are not persuaded. Nowadays, drug
pushers have become increasingly daring, impudent, and even openly defiant of the law. If drug
peddlers are meticulously cautious in carrying out their illicit trade, drug abuse would not have grown to
such alarming proportions as it has today and would certainly not pose a serious threat to society. The
stark reality is that these unscrupulous drug pushers perform their illegal activities without fear of
apprehension and unmindful of the risk of entrapment; in fact, they are only concerned with the swift
disposal of their goods. Thus, we have found in many cases drug pushers selling their prohibited wares
to any and all prospective customers, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even
in the daytime (People vs. Requiz, 318 SCRA 635 [1999]).

Likewise, it is appellants view that the testimony of the police informant is indispensable in this case.
This is not so. The failure to present the informant does not diminish the integrity of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of
the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed
with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when
the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug (People vs. Chua, Uy, supra; People vs.
Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193 [1997]).

Further, appellants defense of frame-up does not convince. In drug-related cases, the claim that the
accused has merely been framed-up by law enforcers for selfish motives is quite often raised by the
defense. Such defense, however, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily
be concocted but is difficult to prove. For this claim to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and
convincing (People vs. Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 [1997]). Appellant, regrettably, has miserably failed to
substantiate his allegations in this respect.

Similarly, appellants claim that he was arrested by the police in order to extort from him the amount of
P200,000.00 is not worthy of belief. Aside from his bare assertions, no evidence was presented to
establish such as fact. Moreover, if the arresting police officers indeed tried to extort money from
appellant, he could have filed the proper charges against the erring police officers. The fact that no
criminal or administrative charges were filed by appellant against the arresting police officers bolsters
our conclusion that the alleged frame-up merely exists as a figment of appellants imagination.

In the same vein, appellants contention that the 1,510.8 grams of shabu seized from him is inadmissible
in evidence must also be rejected. The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without
judicial warrant. Any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding (Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures
may be made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA 668 [1999]).

Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful arrest.
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully
arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police
officers.

A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of a buy-
bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible area within his
reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may
furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs. Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]).
In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the
three plastic bags containing a total of 1,500 grams of shabu were seized inside the car where appellant
himself was arrested. PO3 Chico, in this regard, narrated:

COURT:

Q: You arrested him?

A: Yes, Sir, and I recovered the buy-bust money on the lap of the accused.

Q: At the time the accused was on the drivers seat?

A: Yes, Sir, then my police companions came and they arrested the accused. Upon examination of the
underneath of the drivers seat, I also recovered three plastic bags also containing suspected shabu.

(tsn, May 20, 1999, pp. 17-18.)

Given this scenario, it became advisable, if not necessary, for the police officers to forthwith undertake a
search of the car, the same being within the area of immediate control by appellant.

In sum, in Criminal Case No. 98-166676, this Court is convinced that the prosecutions evidence more
than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal
sale of shabu, to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor (People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 129019, August 16, 2000). In
this case, the identities of the seller and the buyer have been established. Appellant was positively
identified in open court as the seller of the 505.6 grams of shabu by PO3 Chico himself who acted as the
poseur-buyer. The delivery of the shabu to the poseur-buyer, as well as appellants receipt of the marked
money have also been sufficiently shown by the testimony of prosecution witnesses PO3 Chico and PO2
Javier. What is material and indispensable in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited or regulated
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place between the seller and the poseur-
buyer (People vs. Khor, 307 SCRA 295 [1999]).

There is likewise no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 98-166675
was proved beyond reasonable doubt, appellant knowingly carrying with him 1,510.8 grams of shabu -
without legal authority -at the time of the buy-bust operation. The elements of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug (Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 [1997]). All these circumstances
are present in the case at bar.

Finally, pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
in relation to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall sell or possess 200 grams or more of shabu. Appellant, in this case, was caught selling 505.6 grams
of shabu, and possessing 1,510.8 grams of the same substance. Since no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crimes, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00 in each of the two criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y
VALENCIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] For their
conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
two million pesos.

Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:

That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana leaves
wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of Section
4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman
from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big
bulks.

On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police
Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding
in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3
Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint.

At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a
passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.[3] In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the
black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers
invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black
bag.

Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of
the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on
duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the
presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks
of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be
marijuana.

To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga
stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they
were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not
informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of
theirs were present.

The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on
October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She
concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.[4]

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the
evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac
Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to
their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the
tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She
was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was
confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning
the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers seat
inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.

Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The latter
marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on
October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who boarded
their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not
presented in court to attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.

After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article
II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the
following errors:

1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of
accused against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers who
arrested both accused.

2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that the right of the accused
to custodial investigation was deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and
investigated the accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecutions witnesses which inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention and
version of the prosecution.

4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and considered the
documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of
the law.[6]

We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed.

In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest.
She contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her
belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under circumstances when warrantless
search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.

These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers
only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, thus:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[7]

The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates
only against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and
warrants of arrest.[8]

Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a
search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates
to search of moving vehicles.[9] Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.[10] Peace officers
in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to
visual inspection.[11] When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.[12]

In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the
distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused;[13] (b) where an
informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously;[14] (c) where the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana;[15] (d) where Narcom
agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his
possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of
a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do so;[16] (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong -- that said
accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;[17] (g) where the arresting officers had
received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was
established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying
shabu with him;[18] (h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was
carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;[19] and (i)
where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description
given by a civilian asset.[20]

The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The
surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga
transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will
be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later,
riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk.
When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal.

It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless
arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus:

Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

x x x.[21] (emphasis supplied)

Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have
competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein
should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.

These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her custodial
investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its
decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana.
We quote the relevant portion of its decision:

Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to
accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit C) is
inadmissible because they were not assisted by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court
finds the postulate to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.

Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both accused as
evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both accused as a result
of the police interrogation while in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be
resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecutions evidence, both accused can be
convicted.[22] (emphasis supplied)

Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and
documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any
formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.

The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as
they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been
incorporated in the records of the case.[23] All the documentary and object evidence in this case were
properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana.[24]
Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses
properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded.[25] Furthermore, appellants
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.[26]

Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first cites the
inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who
opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag
was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers failure
to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.

Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor
details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential
that they do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that
appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.[27] The
identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it
is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in
some aspects because different persons may have different recollections of the same incident.[28]
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember the
name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown
that the driver was in complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.

To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined
to uphold this presumption.[29] In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper
motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.

Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and
alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30] It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[31] The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial
and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant.
Hence, we reject her defense.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to
R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two
million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region,
Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond reasonable
doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6,
dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of indeterminate sentence
law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty,
pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties,
as provided for by law.

As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38,
Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government,
to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or
propaganda seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:

That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess and without the
necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper government agencies, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and custody
one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which
firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations
by one Alias Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and
violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection
of contributions from the members.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an
intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on
May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about
9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused.

Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00)
per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).

Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15)
members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982, was
dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at
1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of Pedro
Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages
6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his
firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later,
upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to
a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14,
1982).

Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.

After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents which he
allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his house. Then
Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of
notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of
eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated
December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa
Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D"
for the prosecution.

Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the same as
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of
the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of
Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).

To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was presented, who
declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben
Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his
house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their
purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of
which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).

Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his family will
be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities. Because of the
threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend
a seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a
.38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused,
which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN,
pages 72, 73, and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).

On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok,
Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present in the
seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and
one alias Jamper.

The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his
companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the
government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and
if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.

Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally shouted, the
NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B",
"C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)

Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise expounded their
own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be
responsible for the collection of the contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing-
January 4, 1983)

On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19, 1982, he administered
the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.

Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that
accused was not represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent
to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.

Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan language, resulting
to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and
signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.

Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights to remain
silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question propounded or not.

With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal
Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent outside
the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15,
1982)

Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-
charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was
presented and testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in
the name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of persons who
applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.

After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits, which were
all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was accordingly
overruled.

On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as
follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the PC
Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At about
8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they
were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to the subject
firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its ownership. Because of his
refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional attachment,
described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.

He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A",
for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was subjected to
further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black
cloth with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in
his body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly
irritating with pungent pain.

All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating, mauling, pain and/or
ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he
fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of his senses,

Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he was seriously
warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be salvaged,
and no longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject
firearm.

After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign his affidavit marked
as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the certification of the
administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15, 1983)

In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation and
commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial
statement, attributed his answers to those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat
and intimidation of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected
by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the
subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.

To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support his denial
to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday
Arellano, said Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions
embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to
such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true because on the date referred on
April 28, 1982, none of the persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet
the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally charged with
subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but
said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio
Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122,
in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del
Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive
activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally
attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and
farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the authorities in
his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and were not formally charged in Court
because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in
relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and
who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on
May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that
they will leave it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She
said, her husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not inform him
about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities, for fear of the life of her
husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)

On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm, was wearing a
mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)

After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in support of accused's
through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or in the alternative for
violation merely of simple illegal possession of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-
114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)

Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation
of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the
evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for
the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly
recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search
warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin
(48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto
confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle.
Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this
constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no
legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).

The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of
Court, provides the exceptions as follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities
received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report
of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."

If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok was
sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it
lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was
not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully
his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need
to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more
clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the
search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere
incidents to a valid arrest.

Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does
not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out
by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).

That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is
evident from the records:

A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest warrant?

A None Sir.

Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?

A No Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?

A But he was twenty meters away from his house.

Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?

A Yes Sir.

Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?

A Yes Sir.

Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?

A No Sir.

Q What did you tell him?

A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he denied but
when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was
wrapped with a cellophane.

Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution
considering that he was purposely under arrest?

A I did not.

Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?

A Yes Sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?

A It was buried down in his horse.

Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?

A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)

Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows
that they are inadmissible as evidence.

There is another aspect of this case.

In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused
himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.

Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
winch provides:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right.. . .

The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.

The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence.
The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and
third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.

The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.

With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.

We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in
People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx

. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to observe the
demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this
rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance
which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.

The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs. Capadocia
(17 SCRA 98 1):

. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how much
credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands uncorroborated.
Ternura was the only witness who testified on the mimeographing incident. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended upon how much he
cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in
the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura
cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .

In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.

Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982
i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who
could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):

It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after
stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it was made
clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one
of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v.
Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74
SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80
SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124
SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be
a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even
as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their
legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum in
Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:

While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the
lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is
taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he
has been charged.

The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138382-84. February 12, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ASPIRAS, accused-appellant.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Branch 259
finding accused-appellant Rolando Aspiras and accused Rodolfo San Lorenzo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of unlawfully selling marijuana, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425,
as amended, and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum. For violation of Section 8
thereof, only accused-appellant Aspiras was found guilty of possessing prohibited drugs and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
P500,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 95-1009 accused-appellant Aspiras and accused Lorenzo were charged with
violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping one another, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another for P50.00 dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in
five (5) separate aluminum foils weighing 9.7034 grams, which is a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

In Criminal Case No. 95-1010 the information against accused-appellant Aspiras alleged:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody 1.4440 kilograms of
dried marijuana flowering tops in two bricks which is a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In Criminal Case No. 80148, accused Lorenzo was similarly charged with possession of 1.440 kilograms of
dried marijuana, to wit:

That on or about the 27th day of December, 1994, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused not being
lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody 1.440 kilograms of
dried marijuana flowering tops in two bricks which is a prohibited drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Upon motion of the defense counsel, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.[4]

On February 9, 1995, in Criminal Case No. 95-1009, only accused Lorenzo was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the charge.[5] Meanwhile, the arraignment of accused-appellant Aspiras in Criminal Cases Nos.
95-1009 and 95-1010 was deferred pending the ascertainment of the quantity of prohibited drug stated
in the information.[6]

On February 21, 1995, accused-appellant Aspiras was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty in both
criminal cases.[7]

At the trial, police aid Jerry Sabino and PO3 Jose Soreta testified for the prosecution. The testimony of
Forensic Chemist Edwin Purificando was dispensed with since the parties adopted his testimonial and
documentary evidence given before MTC Branch 77 in Criminal Case No. 80148[8] prior to its
consolidation with Criminal Cases Nos. 95-1009 to 95-1010. For the defense, accused-appellant Aspiras
and accused San Lorenzo testified.

The prosecution established the following facts:

On December 26, 1994, Sr. Inspector Valdez of Paraaque Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement
Unit received a telephone call, informing him that a certain alias Rolly, later identified as Rolando
Aspiras, herein accused-appellant, of Tambo Paraaque was peddling prohibited drugs. Upon such
information, Sr. Insp. Valdez constituted PO3 Jose Soreta, Police Aides (P/A) Abelardo Soto and Jerry
Sabino to conduct a surveillance operation on Rolando Aspiras. On the same day, surveillance was
conducted at J. Puyat Compound where the house of the suspected peddler was located. Afterwards,
the surveillance team went back to the police station and planned a buy-bust operation. On December
27, 1994, at around 7 in the evening, P/A Jerry Sabino acted as the poseur-buyer while PO3 Soreta, P/A
Soto and Crisanto Cruz positioned themselves approximately ten meters away from Aspiras house.
When Sabino called for Aspiras, Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo alias Bukol went out and inquired what Sabino
wanted. Sabino related to San Lorenzo that he wanted to score or buy marijuana for P50.00 pesos.
Sabino then gave to San Lorenzo the marked 5 pieces of ten peso bills worth P50.00. Upon receipt of
such amount, San Lorenzo entered Aspiras house. Soon after, Aspiras came out and asked Sabino if he
was the one who wanted to score. When Sabino confirmed, Aspiras handed five (5) pieces of aluminum
foils. Upon verifying its contents as marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions to make the arrest. When
Aspiras saw the rest of Sabinos companions, he rushed inside his house and the police team sought after
him. Thereat, the marked money was recovered from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta seized two bricks of
marijuana flower tops wrapped in plastic bag under a table. Afterwards, Aspiras and San Lorenzo were
brought to the headquarters and the marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI for examination.
Charges were then filed against Aspiras and San Lorenzo for violation of Sections 4 and 8 of R.A. 6425, as
amended.

The defense told an entirely different story. Accused-appellant Aspiras testified that on December 27,
1994 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, he was in his house at 16th St. Puyat Compound Tambo, Paraaque
with his wife and five (5) children. At around 7 in the evening, PO3 Soreta, wearing a police uniform, and
his three (3) companions, in civilian clothes, forcibly entered his house while one (1) stayed outside. At
gunpoint, he was ordered to stand and was handcuffed by Soreta. He asked what the problem was and
the police asked him where he hid the shabu. Upon responding that there was none, the police began
searching but nothing was found. Soreta instructed him to bow his head. Thereafter, P/A Sabino
proceeded to the kitchen. Aspiras noticed that there was something bulging in P/A Sabinos jacket as the
latter approached the kitchen. After less than 2 minutes, Sabino came out and uttered: Sir, meron pa
lang itinatagong marijuana dito. Aspiras denied ownership of the marijuana. He was informed that the
marijuana bricks were taken from the ceiling. Afterwhich, Aspiras was brought out of his house and
walked more or less 20 meters towards Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzos residence. When they arrived at San
Lorenzos house, accused-appellant Aspiras saw San Lorenzo in handcuffs and both of them were
brought to the Coastal Police Headquarters.

For his part, accused Rodolfo San Lorenzo testified that on December 27, 1994 at around 5:00 to 6:00
p.m. while he was resting in his house with his wife and children in Puyat Compound, he heard someone
knocking at his door. When he opened the door, he saw P/A Soto who invited him to go to the police
station at Coastal. Upon inquiring for the reason, P/A Soto asked if he was selling shabu. When he told
him that he has no knowledge thereof, P/A Soto pushed him inside his house and PO3 Soreta and P/A
Sabino immediately followed and forced their way in and started to search the house. While the search
ensued, P/A Sabino asked accused San Lorenzo about his source of the prohibited drugs. San Lorenzo
replied that he could not show any shabu. Thereafter, he was brought out of his house where he saw
accused-appellant Aspiras in handcuffs. They were brought to the Coastal police headquarters and
detained. The following day, both him and accused-appellant Aspiras were investigated by Chief
Inspector Valdez and charges for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended were filed against them.

On January 30, 1996, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting accused-appellant Aspiras and
accused San Lorenzo of selling marijuana in violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended.
With respect to the charge of possessing prohibited drugs under Section 8 thereof, accused San Lorenzo
was acquitted while accused-appellant Aspiras was convicted. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds both Rolando Aspiras y Layuga and Rodolfo Aha
San Lorenzo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 4 Article II, R.A. 6425 as amended.

Section 4 reads as follows:

Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and transportation of Prohibited Drugs The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.

Section 17, R.A. 7659 further reads:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the
Crime. The penalties for offenses under Sections 3,4,8 and 9 of Art. II and Sections 14, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more shabu or methilamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride;

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from
prision correctional to reclusion perpetua depending on the quantity.

Both accused Rolando Luyaga Aspiras and Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo are therefore sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as the minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correctional as the maximum thereof.

Further, this Court finds Rolando Aspiras GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Sec. 8 Art. II
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659, Sec. 13 of R.A. 7659 reads as follows:

xxx Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof.

Accused Rolando Aspiras is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA there
being no aggravating circumstances and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
PESOS.

There being no sufficient evidence against San Lorenzo as regards his knowledge or participation with
respect to the marijuana bricks found in the house of Rolando Aspiras the Court pronounces him NOT
GUILTY of the crime of Violation of Section 8 Article II R.A. 6425 as amended in Crim. Case No. 80148.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Only Rolando Aspiras appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals raising the following errors:[10]

I. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE PUT UP BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ROLANDO ASPIRAS; and

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SEC.8 ARTICLE II OF R. A.
6425, AS AMENDED

On March 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the conviction of accused-
appellant Aspiras in Criminal Case No. 95-1009 for violation of Sec 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425, as amended. As
for violation of Sec. 8 thereof, considering that the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the cases
were certified to this Court for final determination and appropriate action. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PURSUANT TO Section 13, Rule 124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures and Article 8,
Section 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines and finding the appealed decision in Criminal Case No.
95-1009 to be in accordance with law and the evidence, the same must be affirmed; and further, finding
Rolando Aspiras y Luyaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II,
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, we certify these cases to the
Honorable Supreme Court for final determination and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[11]
In this appeal, accused-appellant Aspiras questions the existence of the buy-bust operation, imputes ill-
motive on the police officers and asserts that the evidence against him is planted.

Is the evidence presented before the trial court sufficient to warrant accused-appellants conviction?

The evidence shows that upon an information of alleged involvement of accused-appellant in the sale of
prohibited drugs, the PNP-Drug Enforcement Unit surveyed the area and identified accused-appellants
residence. After the surveillance, a buy-bust operation was planned and the serial numbers of five (5)
pieces of P10.00 bills were written in the office logbook. Then, the day after the surveillance, the buy-
bust operation was conducted.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in

flagrante delicto. It has been defined as the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. The idea to commit the crime originates from the accused; nobody
induces or prods him into committing the offense.[12]

The testimonies of P/A Sabino and PO3 Soreta had sufficiently established how the crime was
committed. The fact that accused-appellant handed to P/A Sabino the five marijuana aluminum foils
amounting to P50.00 pesos constitute the illegal sale of marijuana. There is no fixed procedure for
conducting buy-bust operation and no rule of law requires the simultaneous exchange of the marked
money and the prohibited or regulated drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher or seller. The
well-entrenched principle is that the crime of illegal sale is committed as soon as the sale transaction is
consummated, whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.[13]

The trial court found the version offered by the defense to be totally without merit and unworthy of
belief. The prosecution has established that the buy-bust team was able to buy from accused-appellant
five pieces of aluminum foils containing dried marijuana flower tops worth P50.00 pesos. Through the
buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was caught in flagrante selling marijuana.

The trial court correctly pointed out that there is no improper motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses to testify against accused-appellant. The buy-bust operation was formed by the police officers
precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the perpetrator. The testimonies of
the apprehending officers who caught accused-appellant red-handed should be given full faith and
credence since they are presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties as police
officers.

Basically, accused-appellants assignment of errors is focused on the issue of credibility. The rule is
settled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case.[14] We do not find any such oversight on the part of the trial court.

While the conviction of accused-appellant in selling prohibited drugs is warranted, accused-appellant

should be liable only for such crime and his acquittal for possessing two bricks of marijuana flower tops
is called for.

It appears that the police officers justification for the seizure of the prohibited drugs was rooted from
the fact that the intrusion and search was pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest after selling
marijuana to a member of the buy-bust team. A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the
person of one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. [15]

Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[16]
Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following elements: (a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search.[17]

The record shows that the two bricks of marijuana flower tops with the total weight of 1.440 kilograms
were recovered under the table, wrapped in a plastic bag. On this note, PO3 Jose Soreta testified:

FISCAL RAMOLETE:

Q: At whose house were you able to recover the said marijuana flowering tops?

A: From the house of Alias Rolly.

Q: Rolando Aspiras, the accused in this case?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Would you inform this Honorable Court the quantity of the dried marijuana flowering tops which you
recovered inside the house of Rolly Aspiras?

A: One and a half bricks, sir.

Q: Showing to you a brick of dried marijuana flowering tops marked earlier for the prosecution as Exh.
D-1 and another half brick marked as Exh. D on May 18, 1995 with markings RLA, dated December 27,
1994, 7:00 pm, will you please go over these two items and inform this Honorable Court what relation
has these got to do with the bricks of marijuana flowering tops recovered inside the house of Rolando
Aspiras?

A: These are the bricks of marijuana I recovered under the table in the house of Rolando Aspiras.

Q: Why did you say that those are the very ones that you recovered from or inside the house of Rolando
Aspiras?

A: It was wrapped in plastic placed under the table.

Q: And you are referring to a plastic marked Uniwide Warehouse Club with markings DDM-94-824
Ecp/NM. By the way, there are markings on the half brick 27 December 1994 RLA, would you happen to
know, whose marking are these?

A: Those are the markings of SPO2 Nestor Serona.

Q: What was his participation?

A: He was the investigator.[18]

In the recent case of People vs. Salanguit,[19] we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered that
was wrapped in newsprint. We likewise reiterated our previous decision that rendered inadmissible the
marijuana seized by the NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which
gave no indication of its contents. As explained by this Court-

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had
no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant
refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
recovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was
within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and
not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.

While it is true that the police officers had prior justification for intrusion, permitting a warrantless
seizure of any piece of evidence incriminating an accused, nonetheless, applying the plain view doctrine,
such must be limited to those evidence that the police officer came across inadvertently. The
prosecution failed to show whether or not the plastic bag was transparent that would prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the plain view of such plastic bag would readily disclose that its contents are
marijuana. In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts
the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[20] If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.[21] Corollarily, the two
bricks of marijuana are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

With the foregoing facts duly established, accused-appellant must be, and is hereby held liable, only for
the sale of marijuana.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant Rolando Aspiras guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended is hereby
AFFIRMED. For violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425, as amended, accused-appellant Aspiras is
hereby ACQUITTED.

It appearing that accused-appellant has been detained since December 27, 1994 per Order of Judge
Zosimo V. Escano dated January 30, 1996,[22] much beyond the maximum range of his indeterminate
sentence, his immediate release from custody is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997]

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ limited,
flexible responses -- like stop-and-frisk -- which are graduated in relation to the amount of information
they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the
citizens constitutional rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.

The Case

This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its
Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alain
Manalili y Dizon.

In an Information dated April 11, 1988,[1] Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged by Assistant
Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
allegedly committed as follows:[2]

That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control crushed marijuana
residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the same to be such.

Contrary to Law.

Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[3] With the
agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.[4] After
trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal
Court, rendered on May 19, 1989 a decision[5] convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana
residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:[6]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
(Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx.

Appellant remained on provisional liberty.[7] Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the defense, filed a
Notice of Appeal[8] dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court[9] promulgated its
assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial court:[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
Costs against appellant.

Respondent Court[11] denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1994,
disposing:

ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellants motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby DENIED.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:[12]

At about 2:10 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in
front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the
Police Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug
addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.

Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then
chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person
was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried
to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his
hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu
took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the
wallet and its marijuana contents.

The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the
accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.

Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong
wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.
The white sheet of paper was marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller
sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).

Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section
requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter
prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried
the referral slip (Exhibit D) to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana
residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit
D.
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana
residue at 7:40 oclock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.

It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of the specimen
which she identified. (Exhibit E)[13] Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as crushed marijuana
leaves in her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit F).[14] These crushed marijuana leaves gave
positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.

Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she
also found that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a
Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit G).

After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and
sealed it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).

Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to
Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City
Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit C)

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the
cemetery when he was apprehended.[15]

Version of the Defense

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:[16]

At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a
tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger
were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside
the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the accused and
the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he was being searched and the
policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the
persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they
brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again
search the accused.

On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow
him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival
thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another
companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to
look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the
companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was
led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his
pants.

At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought outside the cell and
was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen to call his parents in order to settle the
case. The policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl.
Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did
not call his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.

At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the office of an
inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was found on his person but the
Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.

Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and the accused were
stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen
found nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were searched on April
11, 1988.

Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the Kalookan City
Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched the accused who was made to
take off his pants at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the accused.

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several pictures showing
that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.[17]

The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on the strength of
the arresting officers testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were neutral and disinterested
witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the performance of their duties. Substantially, they
asserted that the appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as
crushed marijuana residue.

The trial court disbelieved appellants defense that this charge was merely trumped up, because the
appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.

On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was based on
speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the
essential veracity of the narration. It further found petitioners contention -- that he could not be
convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue -- to be without merit, because the forensic chemist
reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.

Issues

Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court:

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court.

II
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling that the guilt of
the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were material and substantial and not minor.

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was framed for the
purpose of extorting money.

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented is consistent with
both innocence and guilt.

VI

The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are inadmissible in
evidence.

Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence against him, (2) the
credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense
of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession, contending that they
were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, dated July 5, 1994, which was
adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was
waived because petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search
was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.

We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the
landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,[18] a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the
right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.[19]

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of effective crime
prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient
probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer
McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he
observed to have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not
waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a
third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years experience to have failed
to investigate this behavior further.

In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what
justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.

It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.

In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject
to challenge.[20] Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a
fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute.[21] The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver
by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.[22] In People vs.
Encinada,[23] the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition,
probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,[24] the Court held that there are many instances
where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped
petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioners bag one
.38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear
gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to
search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much
too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that
appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop
petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioners possession:[25]

FISCAL RALAR:

Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan
City?

A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini
Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and one Arnold
Enriquez, what happened, if any?

A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then when we called his
attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as police
officers in a polite manner.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon him?

A That person seems like he is high on drug.

Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was high on drug?

A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner.

Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?

A He was roaming around, sir.

Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?

A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, sir.

Q How did you introduce yourselves?

A In a polite manner, sir.

Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?

A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding in his hands?

A He tried to resist, sir.

Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?

A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his hands.

Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?

A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was he holding?

A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic) crushed residue.

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto
during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived
existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.[26] Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce acquiescence from the
failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have
waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the
appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be
pleaded for the first time on appeal.[27]

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers testimony contained polluted, irreconcilable and
unexplained contradictions which did not support petitioners conviction.

We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great weight
and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified
before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the
trial court which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a
departure from this rule.[28]

We concur with Respondent Courts ruling:

(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies in the prosecution
witnesses testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their
narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that As long as the witnesses concur on the material points,
slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
statements.

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, the
bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritus testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record. Despite
Pat. Lumabas contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is supported by the Joint Affidavit[29] signed by
both arresting policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside petitioners wallet or
inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance.
Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioners
possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor, and does not destroy Espiritus credibility.[30]

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[31]

The substance found in petitioners possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be
crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioners lack of authority to possess these leaves was established. His
awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the
policemen and that he resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such
behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by
law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient grounds to
believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case against
the arresting officers or present any evidence, other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for
his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail
as early as April 26, 1988.[32] Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no
longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this Court with
disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.[33]

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside
from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the imposition of an indeterminate
penalty:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)

SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (Underscoring
supplied)

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following penalty for illegal
possession of marijuana:

Sec. 8. x x x x

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years.[34]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS,
as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 129756-58. January 28, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN DEEN ESCAO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and
JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused.

VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-appellants.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 95-936 with violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as amended. Escao and Usana were also charged in
Criminal Case No. 95-937 and No. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-936 reads as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms of
"HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[2]

The charge against accused Julian D. Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937 reads as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) pc. of cal. .45 pistol,
government model with Serial No. 990255, with magazine containing 7 live ammos and two (2) more
magazines for cal. .45 pistol containing 7 live ammos each, without first securing the necessary license
or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearm and ammunitions he carried
outside of his residence.[3]

The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, direct custody and control One (1) pc. of rifle carbine
with Serial No. 7176644 with a banana type magazine loaded with 28 live ammunitions without first
securing the necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearms
and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence.[4] Es-mso

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

In its Decision of 30 May 1997,[5] which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted
Escao and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937, and
appellant Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938.

Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation and
Withdrawal of Appeal,[6] which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997.[7]

Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997,[8] manifesting therein that they were
appealing to this Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 was appealed to this Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the
appeal from Criminal Case No. 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997,[9] the trial court gave due course to
the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case No. 95-936 to this Court and the
record of Criminal Case No. 95-938 to the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-936 that is now before this
Court.

Due to the differing versions of the parties, there is a need to narrate each of the testimonies of the key
players in this case.

The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban,
some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato, SPO4
Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico,[10] were manning a checkpoint at the corner of
Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).[11] They were checking the cars going to
Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At
about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.[12] PO3 Suba saw a long
firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana.
They asked the driver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1
US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the
other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they
seized from Escao.[13]

The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by
PO3 Nonato.[14] Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4
de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk.[15] Escao readily
agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key.[16] They noticed a blue bag inside it,[17] which they
asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape,[18] which, upon examination by
National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish
weighing 3.3143 kilograms.[19] lex
A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escao was not a licensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and
caliber. Usana, however, according to the same certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol
Colt .45 caliber with license issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. Usana also has an
application for a pistol Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of the two guns seized were licensed/registered with the
NAPOLCOM.[20]

For his part, Escao (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995, between 11:00 and 11:30 in the
morning, he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel, at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, to meet with his
business partners, including Usana and Lopez. He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at Philippine
Airlines, Ramon Cabrera, who had borrowed his wifes car. Since it was his wifes birthday the following
day, he asked Cabrera if he could get back the car. Cabrera readily gave him the keys of the car.[21]

He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Using his wifes car, they cruised
southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and turned right at Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue. They
stopped before crossing SLEX because the traffic light turned red. From the other side of SLEX, he could
see a group of policemen. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down by one of the policemen, so he
slowed down and stopped. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down the window and demanded to see his
license. He asked if he had committed any violation, but PO3 Nonato accused him of being drunk, which
he denied. The policemen persisted in asking for his license, but he did not budge and instead reiterated
that there was no reason for him to surrender his license for he had not committed any violation. A
verbal tussle ensued resulting in the drawing of firearms by the policemen which prompted Usana to
suggest that they go to the police station because the policemen were carrying guns and they have not
done anything wrong.[22] Jjj uris

He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian St. with his
companions. He parked the car then they were brought to the office of the Deputy Station Commander,
Lieutenant Eco.[23] The policemen asked if they could search his car. He then inquired if he was not
entitled to a lawyer and why they needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he
had violated. Apparently, he thought they were there only for verification purposes. Lt. Eco explained
that that was the reason why they were going to search his car, to see if he had done anything illegal.
Although the police were insistent in asking for the keys to his car, he continuously refused. Lt. Eco
asked his men to usher the trio into the detention cell.[24]

After two hours, he was brought back to Lt. Ecos office. Lt. Eco pointed to a bag, a rifle, a pistol and a
package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his desk, and said these items constituted
evidence of illegal possession of firearms and transporting of drugs. He was surprised that they found
those items from his car because his key had been with him all the time. He was handcuffed, brought to
his car, and again was surprised to see its trunk open.[25]

On the other hand, Lopez had a different story. He claimed he was the mechanic of Usana and they lived
in the same subdivision.[26] On 4 April 1995, he was working on Usanas pick-up truck at the latters
house when Escao dropped by at around 4:30 in the afternoon looking for Usana who was then working
in Forbes Park.[27] At around 5:30 p.m., they left Usanas house in Escaos metallic gray Kia Pride. Inside
the car, he saw a .45 caliber pistol and two spare magazines tucked in the right side and left side of
Escaos waist. He also saw a carbine under the right passenger seat. When he inquired about the guns,
Escao replied that such did not pose any problem since they were licensed. Before going to Usana, they
went to Pasay City to see a certain Jerry.[28] They met Usana at the Sen. Gil Puyat Station of the LRT at
around 9:00 p.m. He gave his seat to Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed the rifle beneath the
seat.[29] Lexj uris

They went home via Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint after crossing SLEX. The
policemen directed their flashlights at them and one opened the front passenger door.[30] The latter
saw the rifle under Usanas seat. Usana and Escao were ordered to get out of the car. PO3 Nonato
immediately saw the gun tucked in Escaos waist and asked if he was a policeman. Escao replied that
everything would be explained at the police station. He was also asked to step out. No firearm was,
however, found in his possession.[31]

When confronted about the guns, Escao tried to intercede for his two companions and said that "...
these two dont know anything about it, I just took them for a drive." They subsequently went to police
station Block 5. A certain Toto, a policeman, drove the Kia Pride to Block 5.[32]

Upon reaching the police station, Escao was immediately brought to the office of Lt. Eco while he and
Usana were asked to sit on the bench. After a few minutes, PO3 de los Santos came out of the office of
Lt. Eco to talk to him. He told him that all he knew about Escao is that he was a wealthy flight attendant
with military connections. After returning to Lt. Ecos office, PO3 de los Santos went out of the police
station with Lt. Eco and Escao. The three came back with a blue bag which he had never seen before.
The bag was opened before the three suspects. Escao reiterated that his two companions had nothing
to do with the bag.[33]

He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escao in the morning of April 5. At around 4:00
p.m., they were transferred to the CID and stayed in the office of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escao
admitted he owned the bag/case.[34]

For his part, Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was gainfully employed by
Rolando de Asis and Taytay Management Corporation.[35] He admitted owning a licensed .45 caliber
pistol.[36] In March 1995, he hired as mechanic Lopez, who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II where
he also lives. Escao on the other hand, was introduced to him by a certain Roberto Samparado, a
neighbor of Lopez. Escao, an international flight attendant of Philippine Airlines and a businessman who
owns Verge Enterprises, also supplied materials to the Philippine Army and planned to engage in a
construction business.[37]

On 4 April 1995, at around 7:30 p.m., he paged Escao to talk about the materials for the five prototype
gunship helicopters they were supposed to supply. They talked on the phone, agreeing to meet between
8:30 and 9:00 p.m. at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Station of the Light Rail Transit,[38] and met at around a
quarter past nine. Escao was on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the passenger seat. Lopez
vacated the seat for him. They went to Magallanes Village to meet a certain Norman Garcia and talk
about the documents[39] relating to the helicopter gunship of the Air Force. They arrived there at 11:30
p.m. While they were talking with Garcia, he noticed a gun and magazines tucked in Escaos waist. Upon
inquiry, Escao said it was not a problem and only for his protection.[40] On their way to Roxas
Boulevard, they were stopped at a checkpoint along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Policemen knocked on the car
windows so he and Escao rolled down their windows. A person in civilian clothes suddenly opened the
right door, took something from the side of his seat and shouted, "Theres a gun." He was surprised
because he did not carry anything when he boarded the car; neither did he see anything inside the car
because it was dark and he was not wearing his eyeglasses.[41] The person who took the gun asked if he
was a policeman, and he said he was an architect. He was then asked to alight from the car, then frisked.
Escao was also asked to alight from a car. They saw a gun tucked in his waist, so they asked if he was a
policeman, and Escao answered in the negative. Lopez was then ordered to get out of the car by the
person in civilian clothes and was also searched. They rode the Anfra service vehicle of the police. One
of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff him and Escao. The policeman who asked Escao to get out of
the car drove the Anfra van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the morning of 5 April.[42] J lexj

He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco while Escao was inside with the arresting officers. Lt.
Eco came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth. He heard Lopez say that they were both just
with Escao and that they knew nothing about the guns; neither do they own any. SPO4 de los Santos
entered the office of Lt. Eco and came out five minutes later with Escao, Lt. Eco, and the other arresting
officers, Nonato, Suba and Erwin Eco, the person in civilian clothes. All six went out to the parking area
and returned after about five minutes. Lt. Eco was carrying a bag which he placed on top his desk. Lopez
and Escao were asked about the contents of the bag. The two replied it was the first time they saw that
bag. Lt. Eco opened the bag before them. They all saw something in brown paper. He and Lopez
simultaneously exclaimed that they knew nothing about the contents of the bag, and they implored
Escao to tell the police that they had nothing to do with it.[43]

The trial court found the prosecutions version more credible than that of any one of the accused, and
ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused as charged. It
decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 95-936, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN, VIRGILIO USANA y TOME and JERRY
LOPEZ y CASABAAN are GUILTY as charged and are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board the 3.314 kilograms of
Hashish (marijuana) for its appropriate disposition in accordance with law; and

2. In criminal Cases Nos. 95-937 and 95-938, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN and VIRGILIO USANA y
TOME are GUILTY as charged in the two separate informations respectively filed against them and are
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term from TEN (10) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum,
as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
maximum as maximum.[44] Court

The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are still with the City Prosecutors
Office are forfeited in favor of the Government are directed to be turned over to the Firearms and
Explosive Unit, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for its appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED. [45]

Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following arguments:

1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized without search warrant when the
police officers already had the opportunity to secure a search warrant before searching the bag found at
the baggage compartment at the back of the car;
2. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence, the trial court erred in finding appellants to have
conspired with Escao in transporting the hashish when the evidence clearly shows that the hashish was
owned and possessed solely by Escao;

3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of hashish despite the fact that they
were neither in actual nor constructive possession of the illegal drug; and

4. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of Julian Escao in favor of
appellants.

Before going any further, some words are in order regarding the establishment of checkpoints.

Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They
contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced.
They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.

We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution[46] imposing a gun ban during the
election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the
second Monday of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the
election period. Supreme

This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.[47] For, admittedly,
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during
which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.[48]

The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search
of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to
bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were
carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without
opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in
this as this is what the situation demands.

We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of
checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are
operated.[49]

Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting the three accused
for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police of the trunk
of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1)
search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs
searches; (5) consented warrantless search;[50] and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.[51]

Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search
of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escao was consented to by
him. Both Lopez and Usana testified that Escao was with the police officers when they searched the
car.[52] There was no apparent objection made by Escao as he seemed to have freely accompanied the
police officers to the car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escao readily agreed to open the
trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos.[53] But according to Escao, he refused the request of the
police officers to search his car.[54] We must give credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Not only is it
buttressed by the testimony of Usana and Lopez that Escao freely accompanied the police officers to the
car, it is also deemed admitted by Escao in failing to appeal the decision. The findings of fact of the trial
court are thus deemed final as against him. Esmsc

Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car
belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the
accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was
stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without
the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the
cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to
link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the
latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and
without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing,
or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accused-appellants
VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C. LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No
6425, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their immediate release from confinement
at the New Bilibid Prison, unless their further detention is justified for any lawful ground. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the release of said accused-
appellants within five (5) days from notice of this decision.

SO ORDERED.