SECOND DIVISION
Division of this Court resolved -
[G.R. No. 122954. February 15, 2000]
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO
MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE
MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and
THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal
case subsequent to conviction of the accused will not
render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant
the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas
corpus. The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial
records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of
the defense.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the
Decision dated April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpusfiled by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1,
1995, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As
hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of
respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the
parties, the antecedents of the present petition are as
follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under
detention since May 21, 1981, up to present[1] by reason of
his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, in
Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of
United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene
Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner
sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,[2] but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding
Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot
be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information.[3] It was then discovered that the entire records
of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were
missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of
petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal
Case No. 60677 could not be found in their respective
offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to
have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the
second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November
3, 1986.[4]
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus[5] with the Supreme
Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his
discharge from confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal
and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,[6] the Second
" x x x (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas
Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE
of this case among the incumbent judges
thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge
to whom this case is raffled to SET the
case for HEARING on Thursday, October
13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the
same on the merits and thereafter
FURNISH this Court with a copy of his
decision thereon; [2] the respondents to
make a RETURN of the Writ on or before
the close of office hours on Wednesday,
October 12, 1994 and APPEAR
PERSONALLY and PRODUCE the person
of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the
aforesaid date and time of hearing to the
Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3]
the Director General, Philippine National
Police, through his duly authorized
representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and
Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as
provided by law and, specifically, his duly
authorized representative(s) to APPEAR
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person
of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of hearing."
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, which on November 15, 1994, after
hearing, issued an Order[7] dismissing the case on the
ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does
not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize
the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy
would be reconstitution of the records of the case which
should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals,
which on April 28, 1995, rendered the assailed
Decision[8] affirming the decision of the trial court with the
modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of
justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner
may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements
(Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice
to the reconstitution of the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order
having been denied for lack of merit,[9] petitioner is now
before us on certiorari, assigning the following errors of
law:[10]
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE
PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF
CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
PETITIONERS CONTINUED
INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER
THE LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL
OF HEREIN APPELLANTS PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN
CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A
JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE
JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED
AS A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS
INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE
RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL
 RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD Possession of Firearm in
BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT Criminal Case No. 60678
AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN and Robbery in Band in
CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE Criminal Case No.
PRISONER, WHOSE LIBERTY IS 60867. ... In Criminal
RESTRAINED. Case No. 60677
(Robbery with
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there Homicide) the accused
exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections admitted in open Court
1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,[11] and that the that a decision was
evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals read to him in open
in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish Court by a personnel of
the contents of such judgment. Petitioner further contends the respondent Court
that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, (RTC Branch II)
77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the sentencing him to Life
duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been Imprisonment (Habang
modified or abandoned in the subsequent case of Ordonez buhay)..." (emphasis
v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994), wherein supplied)
we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the
records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the Commitment Order of the Above Entitled Criminal Case
custodians of those records." dated June 8, 1993,[17] petitioner himself stated that -

In its Comment,[12] the Office of the Solicitor General
contends that the sole inquiry in this habeas
corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis to
detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public
respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and
under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the
discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment is not authorized. Petitioners remedy, therefore, is
not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is
traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.[13] It secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court
of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether
he is held under lawful authority.[14] Consequently, the writ
may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c)
an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence
is void as to such excess.[15] Petitioners claim is anchored
on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of
a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial
court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the
fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal
basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions,
both verbal and written, that he was charged with and
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang buhay".
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila,
Branch 9, made the finding that -[16]
"During the trial and on manifestation and
arguments made by the accused, his
learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander
G. Gesmundo who appeared for the
respondents, it appears clear and
indubitable that:
(A) Petitioner had been
charged with Robbery
with Homicide in Criminal
Case No. 60677, Illegal
"COMES NOW, the undersigned accused
in the above entitled criminal case and
unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge
of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the
court found the accused guilty and
given a Life Sentence in a promulgation
handed down in 1985; (emphasis
supplied)
3. That after the sentence was
promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the
councel (sic) that accused has the right to
appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel
appealed the decision is beyond the
accused comprehension (sic) because the
last time he saw the counsel was when
the decision was promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of
Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts
were made to get the Commitment Order
so that transfer of the accused to the
Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but
all in vain;"
Petitioners declarations as to a relevant fact may be given
in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption
that no man would declare anything against himself, unless
such declaration were true,[18] particularly with respect to
such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule
129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim
any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly
Report dated January 1985[19] of then Judge Rosalio A. De
Leon, attesting to the fact that petitioner was convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985.
Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records
under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein
stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy
of Peoples Journal dated January 18, 1985, page
2,[20] issued by the National Library, containing a short news
article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment."
However, newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence,
twice removed"[21] and are therefore not only inadmissible
but without any probative value at all whether objected to or
not,[22] unless offered for a purpose other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication does
exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by
the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its
face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it
is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter
that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such
process.[23] If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of
lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the
petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint
is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides:
"SEC. 13. When the return evidence, and
when only a plea.If it appears that the
prisoner is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law, the
return shall be considered prima facie
evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he
is restrained of his liberty by any alleged
private authority, the return shall be
considered only as a plea of the facts
therein set forth, and the party claiming
the custody must prove such facts."
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground
for the detention, petitioners release from confinement is
not warranted under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court which provides that -
"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or
discharge authorized. - If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason
of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge
of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment."
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458
(1946), accused was convicted by the trial court of the
crime of rape, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison.
Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of
the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely
destroyed or lost. Accused then filed a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:
"The petition does not make out a case.
The Director of Prisons is holding the
prisoner under process issued by a
competent court in pursuance of a lawful,
subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself
admits the legality of his detention. The
mere loss or destruction of the record of
the case does not invalidate the judgment
or the commitment, or authorize the
prisoners release."
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no
showing that petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for all intents and
purposes, such judgment has already become final and
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment,
order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus.[24] Put another way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be
void for lack of jurisdiction.[25] Thus, petitioners invocation of
our ruling in Reyes v. Director of Prisons, supra, is
misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and
ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t
does not appear that the prisoner has been sentenced by
any tribunal duly established by a competent authority
during the enemy occupation" and not because there were
no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of
the mittimusis available. And, indeed, petitioner does not
raise any jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or
public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the
judgment of the case under either Act No. 3110,[26] the
general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or
under the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any
time the records of their finished cases in accordance with
Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[27] Judicial
records are subject to reconstitution without exception,
whether they refer to pending cases or finished
cases.[28] There is no sense in limiting reconstitution to
pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally
adjudicated.[29]
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by
the Government to reconstitute the missing records of the
trial court. We reiterate, however, that "reconstitution is as
much the duty of the prosecution as of the
defense."[30] Petitioners invocation of Ordoez v. Director of
Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since the
grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was
premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of
Informations against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he
government has failed to show that their continued
detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the
pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate
cause whatsoever." In this case, the records were
lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged. Further,
the same incident which gave rise to the filing of the
Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to
another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,[31] the
records of which could be of assistance in the reconstitution
of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R
TIJING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of
petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children.
The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April
27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since
Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them
there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer
went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later.
She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to
discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and
also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could
not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her
problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this
time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of
his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first
time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was
pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas
Lopez.1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the
boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez.
The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the
delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with
her clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter
was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and
bumped his private part against the edge of a banca
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-
bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with
children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother
of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to
John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She
added, though, that she has two other children with her real
husband, Angel Sanchez.4 She said the birth of John
Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on
August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it
ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners. The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent
Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately
release from her personal custody minor John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or
surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing,
immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby
commanded to implement the decision of this
Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery
of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr.,
the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.6
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of
appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff
implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of
the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita
peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over the
custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court
expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of
the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing
the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and
directing the custody of the minor John Thomas
 Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita
Diamante, said minor having been under the care
of said respondent at the time of the filing of the
petition herein.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted
decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition
alleging:
I
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION
THAT THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE
PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS" AND
DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE
MINOR JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS
PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO
R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.11
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the
following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper
remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and
is the son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are
closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child.13 It must be stressed too that
in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is
relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions
including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the
propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first
whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to
be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez,
whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first
determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the
minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be
adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be
distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the
minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is
the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke
with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and
evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to
the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its
impugned decision, resolution or order.15 But since the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the
trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the
record to determine which findings should be preferred as
more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish
that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth
of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez
Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had
that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered
no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988
or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly
delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were
ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him
that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan
Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.
Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for
fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of
the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the
alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending
physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The
certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate
of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy,
Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent
had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry
puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish
parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion
should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity
to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures
of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject
minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas
corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test19 for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge.21 Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not
necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it
would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of
parentage and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES,
JR., respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the resolution promulgated on August 1,
1991 by the Sandiganbayan which granted the private
respondent's motion to quash the information for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on
the ground of prescription of the crime charged.
Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and
December 9, 1986, with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo
Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife
of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur,
shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza
as OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March
1986 (p. 235, Rollo). Gelacio's complaint questioned the
issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the
provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No.
3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area of 1,391 sq. m., more or less,
in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur.
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of
Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor
Paredes. However, the subpoena was
served on, and received by, the Station
Commander of San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes.
Despite the absence of notice to Paredes,
Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal
Ernesto M. Brocoy conducted a After the parties had filed their written arguments, the
preliminary investigation ex-parte. He
recommended that an information be filed
in court. His recommendation was
approved by the Tanodbayan who, on
August 10, 1989, filed the following
information in the Sandiganbayan where it
was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:
That on or about January 21, 1976, or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur,
having been duly appointed and qualified
as such, taking advantage of his public
position, did, then and there, wilfully and
unlawfully persuade, influence and induce
the Land Inspector of the Bureau of
Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison
to violate an existing rule or regulation
duly promulgated by competent authority
by misrepresenting to the latter that the
land subject of an application filed by the
accused with the Bureau of Lands is
disposable by a free patent when the
accused well knew that the said land had
already been reserved for a school site,
thus by the accused's personal
misrepresentation in his capacity as
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur and
applicant for a free patent, a report
favorably recommending the issuance of a
free patent was given by the said
Armando L. Luison, land inspector,
thereby paving the way to the release of a
decree of title, by the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the
accused, in outright prejudice of the public
interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan. Claiming that the information and the
warrant of arrest were null and void because he had been
denied his right to a preliminary investigation. Paredes
refused to post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas
corpus praying this Court to order his release (Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we denied her petition
because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail
bond of P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his
provisional liberty, and move to quash the information
before being arraigned.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An
Urgent Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant
of Arrest" alleging that:
1. he is charged for an offense which has
prescribed:
2. the preliminary investigation, as well as
the Information prepared by the
Tanodbayan and the Warrant of Arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan were invalid
for lack of notice to him of the preliminary
investigation conducted by Deputized
Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and
Tanodbayan Prosecutor Josephine Z.
Fernandez; and
3. his constitutional right to due process
had been violated by the long delay in the
termination of the preliminary
investigation.
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution on August 1, 1991
granting the motion to quash on the ground of prescription
of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination
of its resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been
committed "on or about January 21, 1976"
when the accused allegedly
misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of
the Bureau of Lands that the land subject
of the herein movant's Application for a
Free Patent was disposable land. This
misrepresentation allegedly resulted in the
issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free
Patent to the herein accused-movant.
This, the Information avers, was
prejudicial to the public interest because
the land in question had been reserved for
a school site and was, therefore, not
disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of
Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the
accused had allegedly persuaded,
induced and influenced the Public Lands
Inspector to violate existing law, rules and
regulations by recommending approval of
the free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time
of the alleged commission of the crime
(January 21, 1976) the period of
prescription was ten (10) years under Sec.
11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should
have prescribed in 1986. The prosecution
seems to agree with the movant's
statement as to the term of the
prescriptive period with the qualification
that the period of prescription should have
commenced to run from March 28, 1985,
when the complaint was allegedly filed by
the Republic for the cancellation of the
title.
xxx xxx xxx
The question then is this: when should the
period of prescription have commenced to
run as to the alleged misrepresentation
which persuaded, influenced and induced
the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of
Lands resulting in the approval of the
application of the accused for a free
patent?
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that
even in the case of falsification of public
documents, prescription commences from
its recording with the Registry of Deeds
when the existence of the document and
the averments therein theoretically
become a matter of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The matter of improper inducement,
persuasion or influence upon the Lands
Inspector allegedly applied by the accused
through his misrepresentation may have
been unknown to others besides the two
of them because their interaction would
presumably have been private. The fact of
the improper segregation of the piece of
land in question and the grant thereof to
the accused, however, became,
presumptively at least, a matter of public
knowledge upon the issuance of a Torrens
Title over that parcel of non-disposable
public land.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Notice to the whole world must be
presumed at the very latest on May 28,
1976 when the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 8379 in the name of the
accused as a result of the grant of the
patent on the school site reservation;
5. The act of filing the approved free
patent with the Registry of Deeds is notice
duly given to the various offices and
officials of the government, e.g., the
Department (Ministry) of Agriculture and
the Bureau of Lands, who are affected
thereby specially because it is the Bureau
of Lands which files the approved patent
application with the Registry of Deeds. If
the land in question was indeed reserved
for as school site, then the Department
(Ministry) of Education would also know or
would be presumed to know. (pp. 28-
33, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands
Inspector (Luison) who was supposedly induced by
Paredes to violate the law, and who did violate it by
recommending approval of Paredes' free patent application
was not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan
concluded:
It would seriously strain credulity to say
that while the violation of law, rules or
regulation by the Lands Inspector was
obvious and public (since the school site
had been titled in the name of the alleged
inducer Pimentel **), the beneficiary
thereof could not have been suspected of
having induced the violation itself. It would
be grossly unfair and unjust to say that
prescription would run in favor of the
Lands Inspector who had actually violated
the law but not to the public official who
had benefitted therefrom and who may
have, therefore, instigated the favorable
recommendation for the disposition of
non-disposable land.
In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to
Quash the Information is granted. (p.
36, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No.
3019 is a special law, the computation of the period for the
prescription of the crime of violating it is governed by
Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the
violation of the law becomes the operative date for the
commencement of the period of prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison
to recommend approval of his application for free patent
(which both of them denied doing), the date of the violation,
for the purpose of computing the period of prescription,
would be the date of filing his application on January 21,
1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period
should not commence upon the filing of Paredes'
application because no one could have known about it
except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct
for, as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not
only the Lands Inspector who passes upon the disposability
of public land . . . other public officials pass upon the
application for a free patent including the location of the
land and, therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p.
30, Rollo). Indeed, practically all the department personnel,
who had a hand in processing and approving the
application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected
the land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the
surveyor who prepared its technical description: (3) the
regional director who assessed the application and
determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands
who prepared the free patent: and (5) the Department
Secretary who signed it, could not have helped
"discovering" that the subject of the application was
nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime"
whether it was the filing of Paredes application for a free
patent in January 1976 or his supposedly having induced
Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten (10)
years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint,
dated October 28, 1986, was filed late.
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to
prosecute a crime after the lapse of the statutory limitation
period for filing the criminal action, is that:
Statutes of Limitation are construed as
being acts of grace, and as a surrendering
by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or
of its right to prosecute at its discretion,
and they are considered as equivalent
to acts of amnesty. Such statutes are
founded on the liberal theory that
prosecutions should not be allowed to
ferment endlessly in the files of the
government to explode only after
witnesses and proofs necessary to the
protection of accused have by sheer lapse
of time passed beyond availability. They
serve, not only to bar prosecutions on
aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also
to cut off prosecution for crimes a
reasonable time after completion, when no
further danger to society is contemplated
from the criminal activity. (22 CJS 573-
574.)
In the absence of a special provision
otherwise, the statute of limitations begins
to run on the commission of an offense
and not from the time when the offense is
discovered or when the offender becomes
known, or it normally begins to run when
the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585;
Emphasis supplied.)
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run
from the registration and issuance of the free patent title by
the Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being
constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive
period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or
five (5) months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more
than thirteen (13) years before judicial proceedings
were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by
the filing of the information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March
16, 1982, amending Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by
increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for
the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given
retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed
by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it should be prejudicial
to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive
benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under
Section 11, R.A. 3019, which was an essential element of
the "crime" at the time he committed it.
Protection from prosecution under a
statute of limitation is a substantive right.
Where the statute fixes a period of
limitation as to a prosecution for a
particular offense, the limitation so fixed is
jurisdictional, and the time within which the
offense is committed is a jurisdictional
fact, it being necessary that the indictment
or information be actually filed within the
time prescribed. (22 CJS 574.)
Fact that the statute of limitations is
jurisdictional necessarily determined that a
prosecution within the period specified is
an essential element of the offense.
(People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927,
Emphasis supplied.)
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly
retrospective in their terms, they do not
apply to crimes previously committed (22
CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun 282;
Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61; Emphasis
ours.)
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post
facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage
by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already
been extinguished under the law existing when it was
committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:
A law passed after the occurrence of a
fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or
deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the
states are forbidden to pass "any ex post
facto law". Most all state constitutions
contain similar prohibitions against ex post
facto laws.
An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law
which provides for the infliction of
punishment upon a person for an act done
which, when it was committed, was
innocent; a law which aggravates a crime
or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the
punishment or inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; a law that
changes the rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than
was required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to
convict the offender; a law which,
assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty
or the deprivation of a right which, when
done, was lawful; a law which deprives
persons accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or of the
proclamation of amnesty; every law which,
in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v.
Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution
(Sec. 22, Article 111, 1987 Constitution), the
Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that
Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed
violation of R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg.
195 was approved on March 16, 1982. The new
prescriptive period under that law should apply only to
those offense which were committed after the approval of
B.P. 195.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 13800 is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95939. June 17, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FLORENTINO BRACAMONTE y ABELLAR,
MANUEL REGINALDO y SAPON, and ERNIE
LAPAN y CABRAL alias ERNING
BULAG, defendants-appellants.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the
felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be
no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is
in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi
must be such that it would have been physically impossible
for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that
no person can be in two places at the same time. The
excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no
exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused's
presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel
Reginaldo y Sapon, and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning
Bulag, stand charged with the crime of Robbery with
Double Homicide under the following Information, dated
October 6, 1987:
"The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Fiscal for the City of
Cavite accuses Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar, Manuel
Reginaldo y Sapon and Ernie Lapan y Cabral alias Erning
Bulag of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide,
committed as follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other,
with intent to gain did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman
Parnala, and once inside, by means of violence and
intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth
P600.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee
Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta Sayaman Parnala, without
the consent of the said owner and to his damage and
prejudice in the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine
Currency and that on the occasion of the said robbery, and
in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab
Jay Vee Parnala inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala Custodio 3
incised and 15 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca
Rosalinas 1 incised and 6 stab wounds on the different
parts of their body, which ultimately caused their deaths.
Contrary to law.''[1]
Ernie Lapan y Cabral was tried and convicted of the
crime in a Decision of the court a quo, dated February 13,
1989, and his case is on appeal with this Court. Manuel
Reginaldo y Sapon is at large.
Appellant Bracamonte had been at large until his
arrest on October 27, 1989. He had been in hiding for more
than two years.
The present appeal deals solely with the conviction by
the court a quo of herein appellant Bracamonte.
Arraigned on November 13, 1989, appellant pleaded
"not guilty" to the crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City,
Branch XVII, rendered judgment on September 21, 1990
finding appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double
Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee Parnala and
Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000 each and to pay
unto Violeta Parnala P1,100.00 corresponding to the value
of the articles lost without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the cost."[2]
Hence, appellant interposed the present appeal,
assigning the following errors:
I
"x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION
WITNESS' DECLARATION CONCERNING THE POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
ONE OF THE THREE (3) MEN WHO ALLEGEDLY
EMERGED FROM THE GARAGE DOOR OF THE
VICTIM'S HOUSE AND SPRINTED AWAY THEREFROM
ALMOST IMMEDIATELY.
II
x x x IN APPRECIATING THE THEN EXTANT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES AS INDICATIVE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT.
III
x x x IN ITS PRONOUNCEMENT THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT EVADED ARREST BY HIDING AFTER HIS
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE HEINOUS CRIME
IMPUTED AGAINST HIM.
IV
x x x IN DISREGARDING COMPLETELY THE DEFENSE
OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[3]
At the trial in the court a quo, the following facts appear to
have been proven:
On September 23, 1987, at about 8:30 in the evening,
Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband, Clark Din,
arrived home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's
Witnesses. She rang their doorbell and when she got no
response, she pounded on the garage door while her
husband went to the back of their house and stoned the
window of their son's room. Then, she heard somebody
trying to remove the padlock of the garage door and saw a
man, prompting her to shout, "magnanakaw, magnanakaw."
After the door was opened, three (3) men rushed out, one
after the other, whom she recognized as appellant
Bracamonte, Ernie Lapan and Manuel Reginaldo.
Upon hearing his wife shouting, Clark Din rushed to
her and saw a man about to turn at the other street. He ran
after him but could not catch up. He thus proceeded back to
their house. By this time, some of their neighbors, roused
by the shouting of Violeta, came out of their houses, among
whom were Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal. The two (2)
policemen went with Clark Din inside the house and saw
the television set on. Din turned on the lights and started to
look for his son. He tried the bathroom but it was locked. He
then went to their room, got the keys and opened the
bathroom where he saw their maid, Teresita M. Rosalinas,
hands tied with her mouth gagged, and bathed in her own
blood. Thereafter, he saw their son, Jay Vee Parnala, in the
dirty kitchen, his head and body immersed in a pail of
water, dead.
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer of Cavite City,
conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of Jay Vee and
Rosalina. His findings disclosed that Rosalina sustained six
(6) stab wounds and one (1) incised wound, while Jay Vee
sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds and three (3) incised
wounds on different parts of the body.[4] In the case of
Rosalina, the most fatal wounds were wounds Nos. 6 and 7
while in the case of Jay Vee, almost all of the wounds were
fatal due to his age.[5] Jay Vee was only six years old at the
time of his death.
Appellant Florentino Bracamonte denied the charge
and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he
was not in Cavite City at the time the crime was committed,
but was then in the premises of the RM Motor Works
located in Paraaque, Metro Manila. This shop is owned by
Rafael Diaz. Appellant worked as an all around employee,
alternating as a mechanic and shopkeeper of Rafael Diaz.
We affirm the conviction of the herein appellant.
The defense of alibi is a handy but shabby excuse
which indictees never seem to tire of.[6] At the risk of
sounding like a broken record, we reiterate once more the
oft-repeated rule that the defense of alibi is worthless in the
face of positive identification.[7] In the case at bench, Violeta
Parnala, witness for the prosecution and mother of one of
the victims, positively testified that she saw appellant
Bracamonte, together with Manuel Reginaldo and Ernie
Lapan, come out of their garage door, obviously
immediately after the incident in question. The situation was
that the accused were still inside the Parnala residence
when the spouses Parnala arrived thereat. This
circumstance and the fact that the three accused left Violeta
in a hurried manner and without paying their respects to the
house owner as would have been the case if their presence
in the Parnala house were legitimate, constitute
circumstantial evidence of their culpability. Violeta clearly
saw the three (3) men because they were only about an
arm's length from where she was when they scampered out
of the garage door. As they came out, they were practically
facing her. Moreover, although the light coming from the
electric post, admittedly, was dim, there was additional
illumination coming from the houses nearby sufficient to
enable her to identify the malefactors: Thus:
"Q: Following your testimony, you were outside
the small door knocking, then these three
persons came out from the garage?
A: They were still in the garage when suddenly
they opened the door of the garage. I
thought he is our maid and I told him that I
was knocking here for a long time already
why did you wake up just now.
Q: And the distance between you and the place
where they came out was very short
distance?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What is the distance?
A: About an arm (sic) length.
Q: And you said they walked very fast?
A: Not so fast. When they were already outside
they ran so fast.
Q: Mrs. Witness, is there a lighting facilities (sic)
in your door?
A: There is an electric post that has a light.
Q: And would it be 8 to 10 meters from the door
of your garage?
A: It could be not so far (sic) because our house
is at the corner.
Q: Page 35 of your transcript of stenographic
notes shows it is about 8 to 10 meters. What
is the kind of light?
A: Electric bulb.
Q: Not the fluorescent?
A: Bulb.
Q: And it was about how high?
A: The height of an electric post.
Q: It could be about 20 feet?
A: I am not sure.
Q: And you will agree with me that that light was
not sufficient enough to be able to clearly
see the faces of the persons going out of
the garage?
A: The house nearby have also light. The place
was also lighted by the houses of the
neighbor which has a light."[8]
Violeta Parnala was unswerving in her identification in
open court of appellant Bracamonte as one of the felons
who emerged from their house, considering that the latter
used to drive her son to school. As further recounted by
Violeta, viz:
Q: In your direct testimony when you were asked
this question. Q: Why do you know the
accused? A: Because my son used to ride
in his jeepney on his way to school. How
young was your son Jay Vee Parnala
Custodio when the incident happened?
A: He was six years old?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And during those times when this Teresita
Rosalinas and your son Jay Vee Parnala
Custodio were going to school, you do not
mind who the driver was of the jeepney they
were taking?
A: I also looked at him.
Q: But your concern was merely to reach their
destination, not to identify the driver of the
jeepney?
A: Of course when my child leaves the house, I
used to see who was the driver because I
have much concern about my son in case
something might happen.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What is in the driver taking your son to school
(sic) or the distinguishing feature that made
you say that you came to know the accused
because he used to ride in the jeepney of
his?
A: Of course the feature of his face and the built
of his body.
Q: Was there any distinguishing feature in his
face or in his body, what is it?
A: His face a little bit round.
Q: If that accused is in the courtroom today, will
you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, Ma'am (He is there, witness pointing to
the accused.)
 Q: How many times more or less did your son
Jay Vee and Teresita Rosalinas ride in this
jeepney being driven by this Bracamonte?
A: I cannot remember already how many times
but I could see them very often riding in the
jeepney.
Q: And this accused Bracamonte is not living in
your neighborhood?
A: He is also living in that place but a little bit far
from our place."[9]
Appellant countered, however, that witness Violeta
could not have known him personally since her son and
maid rode coincidentally on appellant's jeepney only on
occasions whenever he passed by the witness' house in the
course of regular work. Their relationship was impersonal,
not conducive to close and regular relationship thereby
ruling out intimate knowledge of each other.[10] The
implication is that Violeta could not have positively identified
him as one of those who emerged from the garage door of
the victims' house, they being complete strangers to each
other.
This averment is of no consequence, because
nowhere in the testimony of Violeta did she claim that she
knows the appellant personally. What she testified to was
that she used to see her son and maid ride in appellant's
jeepney very often,[11] which is the reason why she became
familiar with appellant's physical appearance. There is
nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as a
condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a
positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he
must first know the latter personally. If this were the case,
the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in
most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to
the victim. No further requirement is imposed by law on the
prosecution than that the identification made by its witness
be direct, firm, unequivocal, and, most importantly,
credible. The witness' degree of closeness or familiarity
with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means
an indispensable requirement for purposes of positive
identification.
To corroborate his defense of alibi, appellant
presented Rafael Diaz, owner of RM Motor Works in
Paraaque, where appellant used to work as an all around
employee and where he allegedly spent the night on
September 23, 1987, the time when the crime was
committed. Diaz' testimony contributed very little, if at all, to
his defense. The direct examination of Diaz reveals the
following:
"Q: Please recall the specific date of September
23, 1987, have you gone to your shop?
A: As far as I know, I cannot remember. At that
date because of too long to recall (sic) but
what can say is that I know that he stayed in
the shop. He sleep (sic) in the shop.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said that you used to visit, inspect
your shop usually in the morning. Now, tell
us Mr. Witness have you done that in
September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your doing such inspection, where was
Florentino Bracamonte?
A: He was in the shop.
Q: For the whole month of September 1987?
A: Yes, sir.[12]
However, on cross-examination, Diaz became more
ambivalent:
"Q: And you are definite that on September 23,
1987 as you mentioned earlier you did not
know if the accused left your shop or not?
A: In the afternoon.
Q: On September 23, 1987?
A: I am not sure.
COURT:
Q: You are not sure he did not leave?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I am not sure.[13]
The above testimony, whose purpose is to corroborate
appellant's defense of alibi, failed to serve its purpose for it
was hardly clear and convincing. Thus, the trial court did
not commit any error in refusing to give probative value to
this piece of evidence. Settled is the doctrine that the trial
court's evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony
given before it by witnesses must be accorded great
respect.[14] It has been said that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order
that this defense may prosper, it must be established
clearly and convincingly not only that the accused is
elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but
that likewise it would have been physically impossible for
him to be at the vicinity thereof.[15] In the instant case,
appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and
convincing proof, that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the victims' house at the time the crime was
committed, apart from his self-serving declaration that he
was at RM Motors Works in Paraaque on the fateful night of
September 23, 1987, seconded by the discredited
testimony of his alleged employer, Rafael Diaz.
With marked relevance is the fact that there appears
to be no motive on the part of Violeta Parnala to falsely
accuse appellant, other than her sincere desire to seek
justice for the deaths of her son and maid. Appellant himself
admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive
why Violeta should testify falsely against him.[16] Positive
identification by an independent witness who has not been
shown to have any reason or motive to testify falsely must
prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the
accused.[17]
Appellant insists that, as proof of his innocence, he did
not escape nor evade arrest after the commission of the
crime imputed against him. He contends that he stayed in
his place of employment in Paraaque, Metro Manila, from
1986 to 1989, regularly performing his job, when he was
apprehended on the strength of a warrant of arrest.
This is contrary to the finding of the court a quo which
held that:
"Accused Florentino Bracamonte y Abellar also stayed at
large until his arrest on October 27, 1989 after more than
two years of hiding to evade the scales of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [A]ccused chose to flee from the scene of the crime
and to stay beyond the clutches of the law x x x, thus
spotlighting the legal maxim 'the guilty fleeth while the
innocent stands fast, bold as a lion."'[18] The evidence on
record does not warrant reversal of this finding by the trial
court. It is this Court's bounden duty to refrain from
reviewing findings of fact by the lower court, considering
that it has all the opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses and to determine by their demeanor on the stand
the probative value of their testimonies.[19]
In any case, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
appellant's claim of non-flight is true, there is no law or
principle which guarantees that non-flight per se is proof, let
alone conclusive proof, of one's innocence and, as in the
case of alibi, such a defense is unavailing when placed
astride the undisputed fact that there is positive
identification of the felon.[20]
Finally, appellant claims that the evidence against him
is purely circumstantial which is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. He submits that there is no solitary piece of
evidence directly linking him to the commission of the crime
imputed against him, hence he should be acquitted.
This argument is specious. Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue.[21] In
this jurisdiction, direct evidence is not only the basis upon
which the guilt of an accused may be proved; it may also be
established through circumstantial evidence.[22] Under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence will
support and justify a conviction if the following requisites
concur:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.[23]
In the case at bench, the circumstances pointing to
accused-appellant's guilt are as follows:
(1) He was not an inmate of private complainant's
house and so, his presence therein at a late
hour in the evening indicate his and his
companions' evil designs.
(2) He and his cohorts were seen coming out of
the victims' house immediately after the crime
of robbery with homicide was perpetrated.
(3) After coming out, the culprits immediately fled.
(4) He and Sapon went into hiding for more than
two (2) years. Bracamonte was arrested on
October 27, 1989.
The above circumstances, highlighted by the
testimony of Violeta Parnala which was straightforward and
clear as to the identity of the appellant as one of the
malefactors, clearly point to appellant Bracamonte's
guilt. Thus was overcome, by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the presumption of innocence in appellant's favor.
In contrast, appellant merely relies on denial and alibi,
weak defenses, to support his claim of innocence, which
defenses were overthrown by the prosecution.
The Court notes that appellant, together with his two
(2) other co-accused, were charged and convicted of
robbery with double homicide. The charge and the
corresponding conviction should have been for robbery with
homicide only although two persons were killed.[24] In this
complex crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of
killings accompanying the robbery.[25] The multiplicity of the
victims slain, though, is appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.[26]
Although Republic Act No. 7659 reimposed the death
penalty for certain heinous crimes, including robbery with
homicide,[27] the capital punishment could not be imposed in
the case at bench.The crime here was committed way back
in September 23, 1987, while R.A. No. 7659 took effect only
on December 31, 1993.[28] To impose upon appellant the
death penalty would violate the basic rule in criminal law
that, if the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in
force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
applied,[29] which in this case is Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code sans the death penalty clause by
virtue of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which provides, viz:
"x x x Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the conviction is for
robbery with homicide, and the indemnity for the heirs of the
two victims is hereby increased from P30,000 to
P50,000[30] each.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and
Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case
No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year
and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the
accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the
validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application
of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the
5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a
person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep in his possession, custody and direct
control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and
four (4) empty shells without first securing
the necessary permit or license to possess
the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused
entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly
held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was
in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described
in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He,
however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor
of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from
the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and
carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-
mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment
from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10,
1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in

your civic spirit, and trusting that you will
be an effective agent in the detection of
crimes and in the preservation of peace
and order in the province of Batangas,
especially with respect to the suppression
of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and
the detection of unlicensed firearms, you
are hereby appointed a SECRET
AGENT of the undersigned, the
appointment to take effect immediately, or
as soon as you have qualified for the
position. As such Secret Agent, your
duties shall be those generally of a peace
officer and particularly to help in the
preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to
me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of
authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic
cancellation of your appointment and FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
immediate separation from the service. In
accordance with the decision of the Kind: — ROHM-Revolver
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated
December 23, 1959, you will have the
Make: — German
right to bear a firearm, particularly
described below, for use in connection
with the performance of your duties. SN: — 64

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and Cal:— .22

enter upon the performance of your duties
by taking your oath of office and filing the
original thereof with us.
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the
PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential
Agent with duties to furnish information regarding
smuggling
V activities, wanted persons, loose firearms,
subversives
e and other similar subjects that might affect the
peace
r and order condition in Batangas province, and in
connection
y with these duties he was temporarily authorized
to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his
personal
t protection while in the performance of his duties.
r
u
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view
l his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and
of
y
Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
y
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision
o People vs. Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The
in
u court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of
trial
rrecord the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent
s
and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the
,
PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the
complaint,
( nevertheless held the accused in its decision
dated
S December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal
possession
g of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that
the
d rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of
. Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned
in
) People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as
mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused
as
F Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
E
L us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang,
Let
Isupra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra.
C Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
In
I
conviction against the accused because it was shown that
A
at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and
N
ammunition without license or permit, he had an
O
appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent
to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the
L
detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said
firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is
true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's
appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance
of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently
placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent
even to a member of the municipal police who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under
the circumstances of the case, the granting of the
temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the
batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine
in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following
ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter
specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms,
or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, Revised
Administrative Code.) The next section
provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of
provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised
Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No
provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret
Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by
Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v.
Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing
the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question
in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The
Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws,
are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this
is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way,
a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant
conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated
in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor,
appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO
CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG
alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of
the Anti-Subversion
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines
and other "subversive associations," and punishes any
person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party
or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case
against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the
corresponding information. The twice-amended information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December
5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became
an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion, or any other illegal
means for the purpose of establishing in
the Philippines a totalitarian regime and
placing the government under the control
and domination of an alien power, by
being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung
University, the training school of recruits of
the New People's Army, the military arm of
the said Communist Party of the
Philippines.
That in the commission of the above
offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in
contempt of or with insult to public
authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a
band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion
Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint
was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo
Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as
amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of
Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly
designated by the Secretary of Justice to
collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of
Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June
5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo
S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY)
CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL
ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias
COMMANDER MELODY and several
JOHN DOES, whose identities are still
unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT
No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-
Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for
sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in
the Province of Tarlac, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-
named accused knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts organized, joined and/or
remained as offices and/or ranking
leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization
as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that
BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by over acts joined and/or
remained as a member and became an
officer and/or ranking leader not only of
the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking
leaders of the aforestated subversive
organizations, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, willfully and
feloniously commit subversive and/or
seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise
publicly and tumultuously and take up
arms against the government, and/or
engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots
to overthrow the government of the
Republic of the Philippines by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means among which are the
following:
1. On several occasions within the
province of Tarlac, the accused conducted
meetings and/or seminars wherein the
said accused delivered speeches
instigating and inciting the people to unite,
rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means; and
toward this end, the said accused
organized, among others a chapter of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio
Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed
purpose of undertaking or promoting an
armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies,
and/or riots and/or other illegal means to
discredit and overthrow the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a
Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY
REYES alias TABA, together with
FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above
subversive and/or seditious activities in
San Pablo City by recruiting members for
the New People's Army, and/or by
instigating and inciting the people to
organize and unite for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines through armed
revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of
the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and
(b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the
validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied
him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in
its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute
void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action
for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No
bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill
of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban
against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation
of the judicial function.7 History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a
definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a
legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of
attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned
by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and
feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
"continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to
the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the
trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the
judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards
of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the
only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused
is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to
overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be
seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in
section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term "Communist Party of the
Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the
Philippines but also to "any other organization having the
same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of
the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was
held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a
member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member
of any executive board or similar
governing body, business agent, manager,
organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively
clerical or custodial duties) of any labor
organization.
during or for five years after the
termination of his membership in the
Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this
section shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes
disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the
Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of
any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United
States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec.
504 of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill
of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation designed to
keep from positions affecting interstate
commerce persons who may use of such
positions to bring about political strikes. In
section 504, however, Congress has
exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth
a generally applicable rule decreeing that
any person who commits certain acts or
possesses certain characteristics (acts
and characteristics which, in Congress'
view, make them likely to initiate political
strikes) shall not hold union office, and
leaves to courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed
the specified acts or possessed the
specified characteristics. Instead, it
designates in no uncertain terms the
persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold
union office without incurring criminal
liability — members of the Communist
Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625,
81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our
conclusion. That case involved an appeal
from an order by the Control Board
ordering the Communist Party to register
as a "Communist-action organization,"
under the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et
seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which
the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3
of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ...
which (i)is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign
government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist
movement referred to in section 2 of this
title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance
the objectives of such world Communist
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the
argument that the Act was a bill of
attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which
the deprivations setforth in the Act are to
be imposed, but instead sets forth a
general definition. Although the Board has
 determined in 1953 that the Communist
Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the
statutory definition not to be so narrow as
to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found,
and the Court of Appeals has sustained its
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by
virtud of the activities in which it now
engages, comes within the terms of the
Act. If the Party should at anytime choose
to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
provides adequate means of relief. (367
US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it
would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in
court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to
secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that
their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and
that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character
and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to
overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control
and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of
knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is
precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred
to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be
correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with
specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party.
That is what section 4 means when it requires that
membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The
ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of
the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes
an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the
organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies
individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as
officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be
subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to
the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-
bound society having a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who becomes a
member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation
it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux
Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the
Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the
Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the
effect that they are not members of the Communist Party
and that they are not members of any organization which
teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this
Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon
this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had
taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the
United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or
from exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the
payment of further compensation to individuals named in
the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in
subversive activities, 23 or which made it a crime for a
member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or
employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills
of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so
universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially
noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and
judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York
legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound
society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who joined or remained a member of
such a society failing to register. While the statute did not
specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to
the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the
claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while
exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like
masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United
States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle
shown in the cases just cited and reached
the conclusion that the classification was
justified by a difference between the two
classes of associations shown by
experience, and that the difference
consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on
the part of one class to make the secrecy
surrounding its purpose and membership
a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, and (b)
in the absence of such a tendency on the
part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku
Klux Klan, the principal association in the
included class: "It is a matter of common
knowledge that this organization functions
largely at night, its members disguised by
hoods and gowns and doing things
calculated to strike terror into the minds of
the people;" and later said of the other
class: "These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them
having been in existence for many years.
Many of them are oath-bound and secret.
But we hear no complaint against them
regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others."
Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of
common knowledge that the association
or organization of which the relator is
concededly a member exercises activities
tending to the prejudice and intimidation of
sundry classes of our citizens. But the
legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor
unions have a recognized lawful purpose.
The benevolent orders mentioned in the
Benevolent Orders Law have already
received legislative scrutiny and have
been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them
beneficial rather than harmful agencies."
The third court, after recognizing "the
 potentialities of evil in secret societies,"
and observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially
demonstrated," — meaning in that state,
— said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions
and college fraternities have existed for
many years, and, while not immune from
hostile criticism, have on the whole
justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before
it such information as was readily
available including the published report of
a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th
Congress relating to the formation,
purposes and activities of the Klu Klux
Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside
controverted evidence — that the order
was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features
borrowed from the Know Nothing and the
A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
memberships was limited to native-born,
gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its
constitution and printed creed it
proclaimed the widest freedom for all and
full adherence to the Constitution of the
United States; in another exacted of its
member an oath to shield and preserve
"white supremacy;" and in still another
declared any person actively opposing its
principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in
the body politic of our country and an
enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious
and race prejudices; that it was striving for
political power and assuming a sort of
guardianship over the administration of
local, state and national affairs; and that at
times it was taking into its own hands the
punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has
been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932
we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an
illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the
objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the
Philippines a communist form of government similar to that
of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently,
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the
Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the
New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the
evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts
about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and
have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or
groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the
prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that
it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as
a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter
observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly
objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is
the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is
also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post
facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City
of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be
eligible for any public office or employment
in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in
any office or department thereof, either
elective or appointive, who has within five
(5) years prior to the effective date of this
section advised, advocated, or taught, or
who may, after this section becomes
effective, become a member of or affiliated
with any group, society, association,
organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said
period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by
force or violence of the Government of the
United States of America or of the State of
California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective
application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might
have as to the charter provision insofar as
it purported to apply restrospectively for a
five-year period to its effective date. We
assume that under the Federal
Constitution the Charter Amendment is
valid to the extent that it bars from the
city's public service persons who,
subsequently to its adoption in 1941,
advise, advocate, or reach the violent
overthrow of the Government or who are
or become affiliated with any group doing
so. The provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable
regulation to protect the municipal service
by establishing an employment
qualification of loyalty to the State and the
United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and
ordinance under which petitioners were
removed, the statute in the Lovett case did
not declare general and prospectively
operative standards of qualification and
eligibility for public employment. Rather,
by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named
individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the
legislative background, the statutewas
held to have imposed penalties without
judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is
thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it
mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of
"outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that
the conduct which it regulates is
describedwith such particularity that, in
probability, few organizationswill come
within the statutory terms. Legislatures
may act tocurb behaviour which they
regard as harmful to the public
 welfare,whether that conduct is found to
be engaged in by manypersons or by one.
So long as the incidence of legislation
issuch that the persons who engage in the
regulated conduct, bethey many or few,
can escape regulation merely by altering
thecourse of their own present activities,
there can be no complaintof an
attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-
Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the
prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully
and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines
and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after
June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of
the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time
of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of
purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and
under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly
provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt
such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed
by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2
of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is
inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of
guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression
and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are
thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the
hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any
limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence
of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting
the statute in question Congressconducted careful
investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble,
thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the
Philippines althoughpurportedly a political
party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto
overthrow the Government of the Republic
of the Philippinesnot only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversionand
other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien dominationand
control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities
of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
constitutes a clear, present andgrave
danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized,
systematice and persistentsubversion,
national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of
the Philippines and its activities,there is
urgent need for special legislation to cope
withthis continuing menace to the freedom
and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento
question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe
statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed
judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper
account of the distinction between legislative
fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages
containingmore than 3.2 per cent of
alcohol would raise a question of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard
has a reasonable relationto public health,
morals, and the enforcement problem.
Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as
to require supplementation by rule-
making)would raise a question of
adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that
beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on
governmental action imposed by the
Constitution. Of course what we mean by
fact in each case is itselfan ultimate
conclusion founded on underlying facts
and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that
legislative facts — those facts which are
relevant to the legislative judgment — will
not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rationalbasis for
believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the
legislative enactment to the litigant — are
to be demonstrated and found according
to the ordinarystandards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted
by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are
seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio."
The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin
the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950
(that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the
foreign government controlling the worldCommunist
movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S.
Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the
validity of theselegislative findings and
reject them....They are the productof
extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a
half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot
dismiss them as unfoundedirrational
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as
we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal
by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to
existing governmentin the United States,
but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize
that thepower of Congress to regulate
Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of
thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself
againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require
elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of
society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value,
"forif a society cannot protect its very structure from
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be
protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said
in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to
the argumentthat there is a 'right' to
rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis
without force where the existing structure
of government provides for peaceful and
orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of
preparationfor revolution, which principle,
carried to its logical conclusion,must lead
to anarchy. No one could conceive that it
isnot within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the
government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as
explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed
its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as
distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a
sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders
aid and encouragement to the
organization; and when membership is
acceptedor retained with knowledge that
the organization is engaged inan unlawful
purpose, the one accepting or retaining
membershipwith such knowledge makes
himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in
which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad
because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the
Government and overthrow may be achieved
by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4.
Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different
acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to
be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear
thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other
illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2
appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to
deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use
of violent and other illegal means. Only in a
metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow
ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use
ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is
hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the
"overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What
thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition
is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it
should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in
which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word
'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise.
The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his
audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument
designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant
wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against
conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force,
violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in
freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed
by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the
Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the
overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis
similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe
Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to
organize anysociety, group, or assembly
of persons who teach, advocate,
orencourage the overthrow or destruction
of any such governmentby force or
violence; or becomes or is a member of,
or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose
thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or
imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or
both, and shall be ineligible for
emplymentby the United States or any
department or agencythereof, for the five
years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said
in Scales vs. United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with
which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and
itwas further established that a
combination to promote suchadvocacy,
albeit under the aegis of what purports to
be a politicalparty, is not such association
as is protected by the firstAmendment. We
can discern no reason why membership,
whenit constitutes a purposeful form of
complicity in a group engagingin this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive
anygreater degree of protection from the
guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the
problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-
preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and
intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of
personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the
judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen
other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it
restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an
effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order
and individual freedom,and when the legislative
compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the
court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its
resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional
commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle
of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who
conspires with anyother person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic
ofthe Philippines, or the government of
any of its political subdivisionsby force,
violence, deceit, subversion or illegal
means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder
the control and domination of any lien
power, shallbe punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with allthe
accessory penalties provided therefor in
the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly
membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor
similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two
persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to
establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime,
evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic
power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even
an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwanor Indonesia."
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a)
that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led
Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an
organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government
by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under
thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined
theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and
byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime
or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave
this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of
September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe

Communist Party of the Philippines and
SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and
forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1
providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short
title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject
matter is subversionin general which has for its
fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely
subversion by Communistconspiracies..

The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its

contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a
valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature,
scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be
avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin
order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the
Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusion and Guidelines

In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-

Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor
prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the
following basic guidelines to be observed in any
prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to
proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must
establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive
association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe

Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of
the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of
the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian
regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so
knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant.
Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El
Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon
various parcels of real property situated in the city of
Manila. The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906,
and was executed by the original defendant herein,
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security
for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906,
the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing
interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at
the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this
mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in
question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess
of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument
by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to
have been his native country; and he there died, upon
January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine
Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the
institution of the present action, it was necessary for the
plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the
defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was
accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was
made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At
the same time that the order of the court should deposit in
the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the
summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his
last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the
Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the
following provision contained in section 399 of the Code of
Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a
nonresident or absent defendant is known, the
judge must direct a copy of the summons and
complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the
person to be served, at his place of residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not
affirmatively appear. There is, however, among the papers
pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908,
signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee of the
attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had
deposited in the Manila post-office a registered letter,
addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila,
containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit,
the summons, and the order of the court directing
publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's
receipt that Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained
from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that
the letter emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First
Instance; and the defendant not having appeared, judgment
was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon
July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had
been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said
about this notice having been given mail. The court, upon
this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant
amounted to P249,355. 32, with interest from March 31,
1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should,
on or before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk
of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment,
and it was declared that in case of the failure of the
defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period, the
mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be
exposed to public sale. The payment contemplated in said
order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court
ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon
July 30, 1908, and the property was bought in by the bank
for the sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale
was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to
the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion was made in this
cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to
set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the
judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the
order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were
void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant or over the subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate
the judgment was denied, and from this action of the court
Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, has appealed. No other feature of the case is
here under consideration than such as related to the action
of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which
will be discussed in what appears to be the sequence of
most convenient development. In the first part of this
opinion we shall, for the purpose of argument, assume that
the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the
order of the court in the matter of mailing the papers which
he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in
this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court
acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed
with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether
those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to
constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of
exercising judicial power, is used in several different,
though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to
the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of
action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over
the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines
the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes
its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions
which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary
appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal
process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the
litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law,
the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court, may never be
taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in
attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the
beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its
progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation.
An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the
res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land
under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property
assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property
and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against
all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a
mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which
is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its
narrow application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property
alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation
upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi
rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance
that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the
author of a well known treaties, has said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to
vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they
treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the
qualification above-mentioned, they are
substantially property actions. In the civil law, they
are styled hypothecary actions, and their sole
object is the enforcement of the lien against
the res; in the common law, they would be different
in chancery did not treat the conditional
conveyance as a mere hypothecation, and the
creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in both,
the suit is real action so far as it is against property,
and seeks the judicial recognition of a property
debt, and an order for the sale of the res. (Waples,
Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the
defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as
such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in
rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to
the principles governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure
proceeding and an action of attachment, concerning which
the Supreme Court of the United States has used the
following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes
mainly a suit in personam, with the added incident,
that the property attached remains liable, under the
control of the court, to answer to any demand
which may be established against the defendant by
the final judgment of the court. But, if there is no
appearance of the defendant, and no service of
process on him, the case becomes, in its essential
nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of
which is to subject the property attached to the
payment of the defendant which the court may find
to be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10
Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is
not personally served, the preliminary seizure is to, be
considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon
the court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired by
the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to
subject the property to that lien. If a lien already exists,
whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the
preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court
proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner provided by
law precisely as though the property had been seized upon
attachment. (Roller vs. Holly, 176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed.,
520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an
attachment the property may be seized at the inception of
the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not taken
into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not
materially affect the fundamental principle involved in both
cases, which is that the court is here exercising a
jurisdiction over the property in a proceeding directed
essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance in a mortgage foreclosure, it is
evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the
action primarily from the statutes organizing the court. The
jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the
cause of action is obvious and requires no comment.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if acquired at
all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary
submission of the defendant or by the personal service of
process upon him within the territory where the process is
valid. If, however, the defendant is a nonresident and,
remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the
court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never
acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the
property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded
and is the responsible object which is the subject of the
exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of
the court in such case is based exclusively on the power
which, under the law, it possesses over the property; and
any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case.
The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered
as the exclusive object of such action, is evidently based
upon the following conditions and considerations, namely:
(1) that the property is located within the district; (2) that the
purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to
an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the
court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the
property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for
the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious
corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this
proceeding than such as can be enforced against the
property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the
following proposition relative to the foreclosure proceeding
against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to
come in and submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of
the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from
the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that
jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is
nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must
be limited to such as can be enforced against the property
itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be
clearly apprehended, for there are many expressions in the
American reports from which it might be inferred that the
court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the
case. In truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the
person of a nonresident cannot be acquired by publication
and notice was never clearly understood even in the
American courts until after the decision had been rendered
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading
case of Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In
the light of that decision, and of other decisions which have
subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the
proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus
acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to
question; and it is now fully established that a personal
judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a
nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This
doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted
process, including service by publication and personal
service outside of the jurisdiction in which the judgment is
rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the
case where the nonresident defendant has expressly or
impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note to Raher
vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A.,
585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff
(supra) proceeds is that the process from the tribunals of
one State cannot run into other States or countries and that
due process of law requires that the defendant shall be
brought under the power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to
authorize the court to pass upon the question of his
personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme
Court of the United States on this point, being based upon
the constitutional conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved
in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or
quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served
personally within the state, and who does not appear, the
relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey
vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter
vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.)
Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the
deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279;
Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment
entered in the court below offends against the principle just
stated and that this judgment is void because the court in
fact entered a personal judgment against the absent debtor
for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it
is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to
ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring
the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a
necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present
case the judgment which was entered contains the
following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, is
indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the
interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' . . .
therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the
above amount etc., etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it
is clearly intended merely as a compliance with the
requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and
that the evidence of this it may be observed that according
to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against
the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after
the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the
mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever
may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk
of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to
the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no
wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our
opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more
secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that
could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe
that we are fully aware that many reported cases can be
cited in which it is assumed that the question of the
sufficiency of publication or notice in a case of this kind is a
question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court
is sometimes said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the
publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally
adopted by the court because of the analogy between
service by the publication and personal service of process
upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested,
prior to the decision of Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) the
difference between the legal effects of the two forms of
service was obscure. It is accordingly not surprising that the
modes of expression which had already been molded into
legal tradition before that case was decided have been
brought down to the present day. But it is clear that the
legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar
language in which the courts have expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether
the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such
gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law"
which was secured by the Act of Congress in force in these
Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of
July 1, 1902, sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the
application of the constitutional provisions relating to due
process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has
refrained from attempting to define with precision the
meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea
expressed therein is applicable under so many diverse
conditions as to make any attempt ay precise definition
hazardous and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial
proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that
the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall
have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a
foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the
nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which
appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as
essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally
provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for
the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is
known. Though commonly called constructive, or
substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely
a means provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such
steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of this
character a distinguish master of constitutional law has
used the following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings,
and personal notice is provided for, it is rather from
tenderness to their interests, and in order to make
sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall not be
lost to them, than from any necessity that the case
shall assume that form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d.
ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79,
80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not
involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall
thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the
publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the
chances that he should discover the notice may often be
very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability
of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent
upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded
as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail
service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of
our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely
require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every
event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence
is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that
actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not,
under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the
efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of
actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed
to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a
nonresident, to take measures that in some way he
shall be represented when his property is called
into requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to
get notice by the ordinary publications which have
usually been required in such cases, it is his
misfortune, and he must abide the consequences.
(6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p. 450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by
legal process upon the constructive notice, then
our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere
empty legislative declarations, without either force,
or meaning; for if the person is not within the
jurisdiction of the court, no personal judgment can
be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate
upon the property, then no effective judgment at all
can be rendered, so that the result would be that
the courts would be powerless to assist a citizen
against a nonresident. Such a result would be a
deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233;
52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory
provisions relative to publication or other form of notice
against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and
in respect to the publication of notice in the newspaper it
may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements
of the law has been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust
etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S., 137,
138), it was held that where newspaper publication was
made for 19 weeks, when the statute required 20, the
publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to
the sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the
judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by
the clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the
notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be
of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due
regard to the principles upon which the giving of such notice
is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property
must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take
the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to
perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the
mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy
the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should
reach its destination and be delivered to him. This idea
seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing
upon the clerk the duty of sending notice by mail, the
performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control
of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that
so much of section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure as
relates to the sending of notice by mail was complied with
when the court made the order. The question as to what
may be the consequences of the failure of the record to
show the proof of compliance with that requirement will be
discussed by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the
conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in
fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as
amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our
opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was
absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this
irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a
question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due
process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no
distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the
mailing of notice should be considered as a step
antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no
escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step
was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of
the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is
clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction
being once established, all that due process of law
thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be
heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper,
it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to
mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to
reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is
supposed to have been violated and the principle
underlying the exercise of judicial power in these
proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we
think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law has not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two
conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk to send the
notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the
jurisdiction of the court and (2) that such irregularity did not
infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a
consequence of these conclusions the irregularity in
question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still
necessary, however, to consider its effect considered as a
simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle to
pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave
enough. From this point of view, however, it is obvious that
any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the
irregularity in question must fail unless it shows that the
defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity. The least,
therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such a
motion is to show that he had a good defense against the
action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is,
however, shown either in the motion or in the affidavit which
accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an
irregularity or defect in the proceedings is usually required
to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on
which the relief is sought, and in addition to this showing
also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a
general statement that a party has a good defense to the
action is insufficient. The necessary facts must be averred.
Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of
the existence of a meritorious defense is not necessary. (10
R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting
this aspect of the case. In this connection we quote the
following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in
course of publication:
 Where, however, the judgment is not void on its
face, and may therefore be enforced if permitted to
stand on the record, courts in many instances
refuse to exercise their quasi equitable powers to
vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay
which it was entered, except in clear cases, to
promote the ends of justice, and where it appears
that the party making the application is himself
without fault and has acted in good faith and with
ordinary diligence. Laches on the part of the
applicant, if unexplained, is deemed sufficient
ground for refusing the relief to which he might
otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the
finality of judgments, and acquiescence or
unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this
character, since courts are always reluctant to
interfere with judgments, and especially where they
have been executed or satisfied. The moving party
has the burden of showing diligence, and unless it
is shown affirmatively the court will not ordinarily
exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R. C. L.,
694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio
Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died January 29,
1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was
executed far back in 1906; and the proceedings in the
foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the
sale dated August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of
human credulity to suppose that a man who had placed a
mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had
then gone away from the scene of his life activities to end
his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long
remained in ignorance of the fact that the mortgage had
been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that
he had no knowledge of those proceedings while they were
being conducted. It is more in keeping with the ordinary
course of things that he should have acquired information
as to what was transpiring in his affairs at Manila; and upon
the basis of this rational assumption we are authorized, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that he did
have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of his
property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares
that there is a presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and
we cannot conceive of a situation more appropriate than
this for applying the presumption thus defined by the
lawgiver. In support of this presumption, as applied to the
present case, it is permissible to consider the probability
that the defendant may have received actual notice of these
proceedings from the unofficial notice addressed to him in
Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Grannis vs. Ordeans
(234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of
the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in
making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we
think the presumption is clear and strong that this notice
reached the defendant, there being no proof that it was ever
returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was
delivered in Manila, instead of being forwarded to Amoy,
China, there is a probability that the recipient was a person
sufficiently interested in his affairs to send it or
communicate its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of
the process of law depended upon the mailing of the notice
by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging
would be idle and frivolous; but the considerations
mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of
applying to this situation the legal presumption to which
allusion has been made. Upon that presumption, supported
by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to
found the conclusion that the defendant voluntarily
abandoned all thought of saving his property from the
obligation which he had placed upon it; that knowledge of
the proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he
acquiesced in the consequences of those proceedings after
they had been accomplished. Under these circumstances it
is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have already
stated, adversely affected in a high degree by the delay in
asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the
proponent of this motion is an administrator who only
qualified a few months before this motion was made. No
disability on the part of the defendant himself existed from
the time when the foreclosure was effected until his death;
and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the
administrator and institution of this action is a circumstance
which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they
may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted
an action in their own right to recover the property, it would
have been different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered
prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank became the
purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price
greatly below that which had been agreed upon in the
mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this
connection, it appears that in article nine of the mortgage
which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by
the notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this
mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that the value
therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve
as a basis of sale in case the debt should remain unpaid
and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset
price stated in that stipulation for all the parcels involved in
this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the
appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the
sum of P110,200 it violated that stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage
providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not prevent a
foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the
foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy
Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs.
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the
cases here cited the property was purchased at the
foreclosure sale, not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a
third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a
case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser
has apparently not been decided by this court in any
reported decision, and this question need not here be
considered, since it is evident that if any liability was
incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that
fixed in the stipulation, its liability was a personal liability
derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have
already demonstrated such a liability could not be the
subject of adjudication in an action where the court had no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff
bank became liable to account for the difference between
the upset price and the price at which in bought in the
property, that liability remains unaffected by the disposition
which the court made of this case; and the fact that the
bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise
affect the validity of the judgment entered in the Court of
First Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show
either a meritorious defense to the action or that the
defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can
take notice, we may be permitted to add that in our opinion
a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with
favor, unless based upon grounds which appeal to the
conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial
proceedings be upheld. The maximum here applicable is
non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer,
afterwards a member of the Supreme Court of the United
States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be
upheld, and that titles obtained in those
proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of
 collateral attack. If technical defects are adjudged
potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will
never realize that value of the property, for no
prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and
buying that title which he has reason to fear may
years thereafter be swept away through some
occult and not readily discoverable defect. (Martin
vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was
made to annul certain foreclosure proceedings on the
ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication
was based erroneously stated that the State of Kansas,
when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held
that this mistake did not affect the validity of the
proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk
failed to send the notice by post as required by the order of
the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a
proper assumption; and the proposition which we propose
to establish is that there is a legal presumption that the
clerk performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the
court, which presumption is not overcome by any other
facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil
Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption "that
official duty has been regularly performed;" and in
subsection 18 it is declared that there is a presumption "that
the ordinary course of business has been followed." These
presumptions are of course in no sense novelties, as they
express ideas which have always been recognized. Omnia
presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in
contrarium. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption
that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice;
and we think that strong considerations of policy require
that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full
force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an
action has no control over the clerk of the court; and has no
right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the
performance of his duties. Having no control over this
officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see that
the duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen
the conclusion just stated. There is no principle of law better
settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required,
every act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be
presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to
every judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of
the proceedings from their initiation to their completion
(Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S.,
449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact
which must have been established before the court could
have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was
properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon
vs. Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a
decedent] the court are presumed to have
adjudged every question necessary to justify such
order or decree, viz: The death of the owners; that
the petitioners were his administrators; that the
personal estate was insufficient to pay the debts of
the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as
to the manner of sale, were within the constitutional
power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions
of the law as to notices which are directory to the
administrators have been complied with. . . . The
court is not bound to enter upon the record the
evidence on which any fact was decided.
(Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.)
Especially does all this apply after long lapse of
time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117
U. S., 255) contains an instructive discussion in a case
analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared
that in order to foreclose a mortgage in the State of
Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary
that publication should be made in a newspaper for a
specified period of time, also be posted at the front door of
the court house and be published on some Sunday,
immediately after divine service, in such church as the court
should direct. In a certain action judgment had been
entered against a nonresident, after publication in
pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity
of the proceedings was called in question in another action.
It was proved from the files of an ancient periodical that
publication had been made in its columns as required by
law; but no proof was offered to show the publication of the
order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of
the court-house. It was insisted by one of the parties that
the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction.
But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court
of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to
be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . . It is to be
presumed that the court before making its decree
took care of to see that its order for constructive
service, on which its right to make the decree
depended, had been obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the
subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while in the case at
bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding
for relief against it. The same general presumption,
however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of
general jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or
indirect attack the only difference being that in case of
indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be
valid unless the record affirmatively shows it to be void,
while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its
validity may in certain cases be overcome by proof extrinsic
to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that
the court made its decree with the knowledge that the
requirements of law had been complied with appear to be
amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice
was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that
there ought to be found among the papers on file in this
cause an affidavit, as required by section 400 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so
sent by the clerk; and no such affidavit appears. The record
is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very
purpose of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to
enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the face of
such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in
this case is void because the proper affidavit is not present
in the file of papers which we call the record, the result
would be that in the future every title in the Islands resting
upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for
its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit
among the papers and would be liable at any moment to be
destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We
think that no court, with a proper regard for the security of
judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by law
been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a
conclusion. In our opinion the proper course in a case of
this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty still maintains notwithstanding the
absence from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under
the practice prevailing in the Philippine Islands the word
"record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating
the collective mass of papers which contain the history of all
the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally
deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial
of the litigation. It is a matter of general information that no
judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in
our courts for the purpose of recording the pleadings and
principal proceedings in actions which have been
terminated; and in particular, no such record is kept in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is,
indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which
directs that such a book of final record shall be kept; but
this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been
generally ignored. The result is that in the present case we
do not have the assistance of the recitals of such a record
to enable us to pass upon the validity of this judgment and
as already stated the question must be determined by
examining the papers contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit
of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that upon April 4, 1908,
he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the
defendant at Manila, Philippine Islands, should be accepted
as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his
duty and that, instead of himself sending the requisite
notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo to send it
for him. We do not think that this is by any means a
necessary inference. Of course if it had affirmatively
appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply
with this order and had directed the notification to Manila
when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be
conclusive that he had failed to comply with the exact terms
of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk of the
attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to
the defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion
very slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have
sent notice to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position
that when the record states the evidence or makes an
averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be
presumed that there was other or different evidence
respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than
stated. If, to give an illustration, it appears from the return of
the officer that the summons was served at a particular
place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that
service was also made at another place or in a different
manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a
person other than the defendant, it will not be presumed, in
the silence of the record, that it was made upon the
defendant also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366;
Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we
believe that these propositions are entirely correct as
applied to the case where the person making the return is
the officer who is by law required to make the return, we do
not think that it is properly applicable where, as in the
present case, the affidavit was made by a person who, so
far as the provisions of law are concerned, was a mere
intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to
consider is whether a motion in the cause is admissible as
a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the
motion prevails the judgment of July 2, 1908, and all
subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation
will be renewed, proceeding again from the date mentioned
as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted.
The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being
permitted to interpose a defense. His purpose is merely to
annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the
litigation may again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure
which expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of First
Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal
of the litigation in the same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the
court may relieve a party or legal representative
from the judgment, order, or other proceeding
taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
Provided, That application thereof be made within
a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding
was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is
supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first
paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this
discussion, provides as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First
Instance upon default, and a party thereto is
unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of
First Instance which rendered the judgment has
finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy
exists in that court, the party so deprived of a
hearing may present his petition to the Supreme
Court within sixty days after he first learns of the
rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter,
setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment
set aside. . . .
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section
is intended to supplement the remedy provided by section
113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is
no other means recognized by law whereby a defeated
party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the
litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete
system of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions
describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken
in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines
with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and
concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by
section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the
procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that
the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are
exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and
continuation of a litigation which has been once concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the
requirements of either of these provisions; and the
consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an
irregularity of procedure, we cannot suppose that this
proceeding would have taken the form of a motion in the
cause, since it is clear that, if based on such an error, the
came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as
we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of
the court as void for want of jurisdiction over the defendant.
The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch
as the judgment is a nullity it can be attacked in any way
and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its
face, that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its
own recitals, there might possibly be something in this.
Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it
may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense.
It is entirely regular in form, and the alleged defect is one
which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if
the judgment could be shown to be void for want of
jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party
aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate
proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles of law
and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper
remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or review has
passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to
enjoin the judgment, if not already carried into effect; or if
the property has already been disposed of he may institute
suit to recover it. In every situation of this character an
appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property has been
taken without due process, the law concedes due process
to recover it. We accordingly old that, assuming the
judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of
this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have
already seen our Code of Civil Procedure defines the
conditions under which relief against a judgment may be
productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a
proceeding as proper under conditions different from those
defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved,
we refer to the case of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607)
wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a
judgment after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the
judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases, after the
lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not
void on its face; and all cases, after the lapse of such time,
when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a
proceeding in court for that purpose an action regularly
brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be
noted taken verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).

The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the

judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is
accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002]
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, petitioner, vs. LEONOR B.
RAON, AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF NOVELETA,
CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY,
HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF
DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY and THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G.
Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties
left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of
land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners
Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against
petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment,
docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the Municipal Trial Court
of Noveleta, Cavite.[1]They alleged that during the lifetime of
Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to
petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that
the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter;
and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite
demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother
of petitioner.[2] At the time of service of summons at
petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment
and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2,
1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the
trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to
comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the
reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for
him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he
can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation
Committee.[3]
The trial court, despite the written certification from
NBI-TRC, granted respondents motion to declare petitioner
in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-
parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of respondents as follows:
FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant ordering the latter and other person/s claiming
rights under him:
1. To vacate immediately the land in
question after the finality of the
decision.
2. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 monthly from
January, 1992 up to the time he
surrenders the premises considered
as damages for the use of the
subject land.
3. For the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P
10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees
with an additional P800.00 as
appearance fees.
4. To pay the plaintiffs P 100.00 as filing
fee.
SO ORDERED.[4]
After learning of the adverse decision against him,
petitioners counsel filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside judgment. The
motion was treated as an appeal and docketed as Civil
Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the RTC affirmed the
decision of the MTC.[5]
The aforesaid decision became final. Accordingly, the
court of origin issued on September 17, 1996 a writ of
execution.[6] Petitioner was given a grace period of one
month within which to vacate the premises. His real
property situated in Noveleta, Cavite, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and sold at
public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of the
monetary award.[7]
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief from
judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.[8] In support
thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit,[9] alleging
in fine that the parcel of land from which he was being
evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-
Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 13, 1988.[10]
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC
issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment.[11] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14,
1997.[12] On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued
commanding the sheriff to remove the building and
improvements made by petitioner on the subject premises
and to deliver the possession thereof to respondents.[13]
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
432O2.[14] On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.[15] Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on November 14,
1997.[16] Hence this petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant
must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to
defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendants dwelling house or
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendants
office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of
summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service
first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly
served in person will substituted service be availed of.[17]
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
We have long held that the impossibility of personal
service justifying availment of substituted service should be
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted
towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and
circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return;
otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It is
only under exceptional terms that the circumstances
warranting substituted service of summons may be proved
by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of
summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential
for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly
justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.[18]
In this connection, Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 59 was issued on November 19, 1989 to stress
the importance of strict compliance with the requisites for a
valid substituted service, to wit:
Delays in court proceedings have been caused by faulty
and erroneous implementation of Section 8, Rule 14, Rules
of Court on Substituted Service of Summons.
The Trial Judges of all lower courts, as well as the Clerks of
Court in their capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriffs together with
the Deputy Sheriffs are reminded of the provision of Section
8, Rule 14, Rules of Court on substituted service as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The manner of effecting substituted service as prescribed
in Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305, must
be strictly complied with, thus:
The substituted service should be availed only when the
defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the
proof of service. This is necessary because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
Substituted service is a method extraordinary in character,
and hence may be used only as prescribed in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the statutory
requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully and any substituted service other than
authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
For immediate compliance.
In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons
simply states:
This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I
have caused the service of summons, together with the
attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above
entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his
signature at the lower left portion of the original summons
hereto attached.
WHEREFORE, the attached original summons is hereby
respectfully returned to the court of origin duly served for
information and record purposes.
Noveleta, Cavite, February 9, 1996.[19]
Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason
why personal service could not be made. It failed to state
that prompt and personal service on the defendant was
rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were
made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts
failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated
above, these requirements are indispensable because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind
the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though
notice of such action is served not upon him but upon
another whom law could only presume would notify him of
the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to
faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.[20]
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in
the records of this case is it shown that petitioners brother,
on whom substituted service of summons was effected,
was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
petitioners residence.
There being no valid substituted service of summons,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of
summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the
latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against
him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service
of summons is as much an issue of due process as of
jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his
property, he should first be informed of the claim against
him and the theory on which such claim is premised.[21]
By reason of the ineffective service of summons,
petitioner was not duly apprised of the action against him.
Consequently, he was prevented from answering the claims
against him. He was not given a chance to be heard on his
defenses. What made matters worse was that the trial court
had actual knowledge that petitioner was then indisposed
and unable to file his answer to the complaint, as he was
then confined at the NBI-TRC. The trial courts failure to give
petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer
violated his right to due process. Perforce, the judgment
rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.
The trial court should not have been too rash in
declaring petitioner in default, considering it had actual
notice of valid reasons that prevented him from answering.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in
setting aside orders of default for default judgments are
frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that
the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The
issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather
than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate
refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the
trial court.[22]
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits
and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often
admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of
default as default judgments are frowned upon and not
looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive
and considerable injustice to the defendant and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a
careful examination of the grounds upon which the
defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is
empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular
case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof
tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.
We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency
of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment
against petitioners. However, being the court of last resort,
we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation
of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the
order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent The Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ
default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if of Demolition dated January 14, 1997, and the certificate of
petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well
claims.[23] as all acts and deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil
Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
In addition, the Regional Trial Court committed SO ORDERED.
reversible error in dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment for having been filed out of time. According to the Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-
Regional Trial Court, the petition for relief, filed on Martinez, JJ., concur.
November 25, 1996, was late because petitioner had actual
knowledge of the judgment in the ejectment case since
March 1996. The period within which to file a petition for
relief should have been reckoned from the date petitioner
learned of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. It
should not have been counted from the date of the
Municipal Trial Courts decision because, precisely,
petitioner appealed the same. It was the Regional Trial
Courts decision that became final and, hence, was the
proper subject of the petition for relief from judgment. It is
axiomatic that a petition for relief is only available against a
final and executory judgment.[24]
Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that a verified petition for relief must be
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or
final order has been entered or such proceeding has been
taken. It must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense.[25]
It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when
petitioner learned of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What
appears is that the said decision became final only on
August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime
thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November
25, 1996 was well within the six-month period prescribed by
the Rules.
Finally, the records show that petitioner raised a
meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He alleged
therein that the property from which he was being ejected
had been sold to him by its registered owner. Ownership is
a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While
possession is the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of
the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that an
owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same.
Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of
possession to defeat that of respondents. Indeed, an owner
who cannot exercise the seven "juses or attributes of
ownership - the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse
or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to
recover or vindicate and to the fruits - is a crippled owner.[26]
All told, the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta and the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City did not have jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner. Hence, all proceedings had as
regards petitioner were null and void. Necessarily, the
enforcement of the writ of execution as well as the sale at
public auction of petitioners real property to satisfy the void
judgment must also be declared of no legal effect.
There is a real need to resolve the issue of ownership
over the premises in order to determine who, as between
petitioner and respondents, has a better right to possess
the property in dispute. This can only be done in the proper
proceeding before the trial court wherein petitioner will be
afforded every right to present evidence in his behalf.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This
case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue proceedings
in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner Regalado P.
Samartino a chance to file his answer and present evidence
in his defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the case.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111397 August 12, 2002
HON. ALFREDO LIM and RAFAELITO
GARAYBLAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO REYES
and BISTRO PIGALLE, INC., respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25,
1993,2 and its Resolution dated July 13, 19933 which
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The assailed
Decision sustained the orders dated December 29, 1992,
January 20, 1993 and March 2, 1993,4 issued by Branch 36
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court’s orders
enjoined petitioner Alfredo Lim ("Lim" for brevity), then
Mayor of Manila, from investigating, impeding or closing
down the business operations of the New Bangkok Club
and the Exotic Garden Restaurant owned by respondent
Bistro Pigalle Inc. ("Bistro" for brevity).
The Antecedent Facts
On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a
petition5 for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila.
Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s
instructions inspected and investigated Bistro’s license as
well as the work permits and health certificates of its staff.
This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and
restaurant operations.6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s
application for a business license, as well as the work
permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.7
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lim’s refusal to issue the
business license and work permits violated the doctrine laid
down this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,8 to wit:
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. They may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their business."
Acting on Bistro’s application for injunctive relief, the trial
court issued the first assailed temporary restraining order
on December 29, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, respondent and/or his agents and
representatives are ordered to refrain from
inspecting or otherwise interfering in the operation
of the establishments of petitioner (Bistro Pigalle,
Inc.)."9
At the hearing, the parties submitted their evidence in
support of their respective positions. On January 20, 1993,
the trial court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. The dispositive portion of
the trial court’s order declared:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
Petitioners’ application for a writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction is granted, and Respondent,
and any/all persons acting under his authority, are
and (sic) ordered to cease and desist from
inspecting, investigating and otherwise closing or
impeding the business operations of Petitioner
Corporation’s establishments while the petition
here is pending resolution on the merits.
Considering that the Respondent is a government
official and this injunction relates to his official
duties, the posting of an injunction bond by the
Petitioners is not required.
On the other hand, Petitioners’ application for a writ
of mandatory injunction is hereby denied, for to
grant the same would amount to granting the writ
of mandamus prayed for. The Court reserves
resolution thereof until the parties shall have been
heard on the merits."10
However, despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a
closure order on Bistro’s operations effective January 23,
1993, even sending policemen to carry out his closure
order.
On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for
Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped
Bistro’s operations on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of
the motion for contempt on January 29, 1993, Bistro
withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the
court’s injunction.
However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March
1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and
policemen, again disrupted Bistro’s business operations.
Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed a motion to
dissolve the injunctive order of January 20, 1993 and to
dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial establishments and
their staff is implicit in the statutory power of the city mayor
to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses.
This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11
(l), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lim’s motion to dissolve the injunction
and to dismiss the case in an order dated March 2, 1993,
the dispositive portion of which stated:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby orders:
(1) The denial of respondent’s motion to dissolve
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction or the
dismissal of the instant case;
(2) Petitioner-corporation is authorized to remove
the wooden cross-bars or any other impediments
which were placed at its establishments, namely,
New Bangkok Club and Exotic Garden Restaurant
on February 12, 1993 and February 15, 1993,
respectively, and thereafter said establishments
are allowed to resume their operations;
(3) All the other petitioners are allowed to continue
working in the aforenamed establishments of
petitioner-corporation if they have not yet reported;
and
(4) The hearing on the contempt proceedings is
deferred to give sufficient time to respondent to
 elevate the matters assailed herein to the Supreme
Court."11
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial
judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction.
On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision.12 In a resolution dated July 13, 1993, the
Court of Appeals denied Lim’s motion for reconsideration.13
On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No. 778314 took
effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police
District Command to permanently close down the
operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at
once.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying Lim’s petition, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it
issued the writ after hearing on the basis of the evidence
adduced.
The Court of Appeals reasoned thus:
"x x x. A writ of preliminary injunction may issue if
the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable
injury to the movant or destroy the status quo
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
the case.
A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or
preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a
litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of
the principal action. It is primarily intended to
maintain the status quo between the parties
existing prior to the filing of the case.
In the case at bar, We find that the respondent
Judge did not act improvidently in issuing the
assailed orders granting the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to maintain the status quo, while
the petition is pending resolution on the merits. The
private respondent correctly points out that the
questioned writ was regularly issued after several
hearings, in which the parties were allowed to
adduce evidence, and argue their respective
positions.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
within the limits of the sound exercise of discretion
of the court and the appellate court will not
interfere, except, in a clear case of abuse thereof. x
x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE
COURSE and is accordingly DISMISSED."16
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMIT GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS
SAID ASSAILED ORDERS OF DECEMBER 29,
1992, JANUARY 20, 1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993?"
2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN RENDERING
ITS ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25, 1993
AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION OF JULY 13,
1993?"
3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712 AND
SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381 BECOME MOOT
AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK
CLUB AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN
RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WERE CLOSED ON JULY 1, 1993 PURSUANT
TO ORDINANCE NO. 7783?"
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Considering that the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 7783
was not raised before the trial court or the Court of Appeals,
and this issue is still under litigation in another case, 17 the
Court will deal only with the first two issues raised by
petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistro’s cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition
proceedings before the trial court is the violation of its
property right under its license to operate. The violation
consists of the work disruption in Bistro’s operations caused
by Lim and his subordinates as well as Lim’s refusal to
issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its
staff for the year 1993. The primary relief prayed for by
Bistro is the issuance of writs of mandatory and prohibitory
injunction. The mandatory injunction seeks to compel Lim to
accept Bistro’s 1993 business license application and to
issue Bistro’s business license. Also, the mandatory
injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept the applications of
Bistro’s staff for work permits. The writ of prohibitory
injunction seeks to enjoin Lim from interfering, impeding or
otherwise closing down Bistro’s operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This
enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing
down Bistro’s operations pending resolution of whether Lim
can validly refuse to issue Bistro’s business license and its
staff’s work permits for the year 1993.
Lim contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the prohibitory injunction. Lim relies primarily on his power,
as Mayor of the City of Manila, to grant and refuse
municipal licenses and business permits as expressly
provided for in the Local Government Code and the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila. Lim argues that the
powers granted by these laws implicitly include the power to
inspect, investigate and close down Bistro’s operations for
violation of the conditions of its licenses and permits.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the legal provisions
relied upon by Lim do not apply to the instant case. Bistro
maintains that the Local Government Code and the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila do not expressly or impliedly
grant Lim any power to prohibit the operation of night clubs.
Lim failed to specify any violation by Bistro of the conditions
of its licenses and permits. In refusing to accept Bistro’s
business license application for the year 1993, Bistro claims
that Lim denied Bistro due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the prohibitory
preliminary injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and
permits is beyond question. The law expressly provides for
such authority. Section 11 (l), Article II of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, reads:
"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the
mayor. The general duties and powers of the
mayor shall be:
x x x.
(l) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or
permits of all classes and to revoke the
same for violation of the conditions upon which
they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or
municipal ordinances are being committed under
the protection of such licenses or in the premises in
which the business for which the same have been
granted is carried on, or for any other reason of
general interest." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local
Government Code provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and
Compensation: xxx.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical
governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) x x x.
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any
violation of the condition upon which
said licenses or permits had been
issued, pursuant to law or ordinance."
(Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power
of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke
or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to
suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits
and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the "violation of
the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were
issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses
and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these
powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate
private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the
mayor has no power to order a police raid on these
establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating
these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his
authority when he directed policemen to raid the New
Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act
of Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618 which expressly
prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit:
"Section 1. No member of the Western Police
District shall conduct inspection of food and other
business establishments for the purpose of
enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting
licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal
revenue and customs laws and regulations. This
responsibility should be properly exercised by
Local Government Authorities and other concerned
agencies." (Emphasis supplied)
These local government officials include the City Health
Officer or his representative, pursuant to the Revised City
Ordinances of the City of Manila,19 and the City Treasurer
pursuant to Section 470 of the Local Government Code.20
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any
business establishment in Manila without due process of
law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There
is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting
the mayor authority to close down private commercial
establishments without notice and hearing, and even if
there is, such provision would be void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have
given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it
violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations
must always be exercised in accordance with law, with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law.21 Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
In the instant case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power
violated Bistro’s property rights that are protected under the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the
conditions of its business license or permits. Still, Lim
closed down Bistro’s operations even before the expiration
of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also
refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in
effect denying the application without examining whether it
complies with legal prerequisites.
Lim’s zeal in his campaign against prostitution is
commendable. The presumption is that he acted in good
faith and was motivated by his concern for his constituents
when he implemented his campaign against prostitution in
the Ermita-Malate area. However, there is no excusing Lim
for arbitrarily closing down, without due process of law, the
business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court
properly restrained the acts of Lim.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding
the trial court’s orders. The sole objective of a writ of
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard fully. It is generally availed
of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of
the case can be disposed of.22 In the instant case, the
issuance of the writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction did
not dispose of the main case for mandamus. The trial court
issued the injunction in view of the disruptions and
stoppage in Bistro’s operations as a consequence of Lim’s
closure orders. The injunction was intended to maintain
the status quo while the petition has not been resolved on
the merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 30381 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.
Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing
Corp.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to
review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication
Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of
Appeals reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287
dismissing private respondent Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex
parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a
canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as Board
Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation
with plant and place of business at 999 General
Pascual Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is
involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles
with wastewater of about 30 gpm. being directly
discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on
findings in the Inspections conducted on 05
November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the
volume of untreated wastewater discharged in the
final out fall outside of the plant's compound was
even greater. The result of inspection conducted
on 06 September 1988 showed that respondent's
Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted
unoperational and the combined wastewater
generated from its operation was about 30 gallons
per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being
directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by means of a by-
pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into
the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment Plant
(WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken
from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is
highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and
Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of
respondent in spite of directives to comply with the
requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
Effluent Regulations.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984
and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater
pollution source installation and discharging its
untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading
to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River effective
immediately upon receipt hereof and until such
time when it has fully complied with all the
requirements and until further orders from this
Board.
SO ORDERED.1
We note that the above Order was based on findings of
several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and
12 November 1986 by the National Pollution
Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of
the Board ;2 and
b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988
by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's
wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its
plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater,
80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage
canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The
remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled
through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant.
Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents showed
the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was
permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its Implementing
Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26
September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board
was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal
with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22
September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued
an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another
inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct
the inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition
being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's
petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as
the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals
which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order of
dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of
Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the
same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to
whatever action the appellee [Board] may take
 relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation'
of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities.3
The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a
proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may
result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while
the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled.
Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without
success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review
basically arguing that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and
the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance
with law and were not violative of the requirements
of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are
not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the
Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section
7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there
is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of
which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by
the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that
the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of
Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima
facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982
Effluent Code.
Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's
own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only
if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life."
In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection
reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's
wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section
7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex
parte cease and desist orders under the following
circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever
the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable
standards set by the Commission, the
Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order
directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of
the establishment or person generating such
sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
immediately executory and shall remain in force
until said establishment or person prevents or
abates the said pollution within the allowable
standards or modified or nullified by a competent
court. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section
7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order
may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes
discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat
to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant
life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one
hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or
to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and
desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds
that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of
wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease
and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where,
however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been the
subject matter of allowable standards set by the
Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis
when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater
or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life."
Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible
or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the
general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life"
remains necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the
extant allowable standards have been set by the
Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or
neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal or plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the
maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater
treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed
"when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class
A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC
Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros
River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section
68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in part
provides that:
Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The
quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a
safe and satisfactory condition according to their
best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be
classified according to the following beneficial
usages:
(a) Fresh Surface Water
Classification Best usage
x x x x x
x xxx
Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock
watering and industrial cooling and
processing.
x x x x x
x xxx
(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's
wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986
and 6 September 1988 set forth the following Identical
finding:
a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules
and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of
the Effluent Regulations of 1982.6
Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation
of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings of without completing first and operating its existing
the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection WTP. The analysis of results on water samples
reports, we get the following results: taken showed that the untreated wastewater from
the firm pollutes our water resources. In this
connection, it is recommended that appropriate
legal action be instituted immediately against the
firm. . . .10
"Inland Novembe Septembe
Waters r r The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:
(Class C & D7 1986 1988
Report8 Report9
Station 1 Station 1 1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching
and rinsing operations during the inspection. The
a Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125 combined wastewater generated from the said
) platinum (Apparent operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per
cobalt Color) minute. About 80% of the wastewater was traced
units directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to
b pH 6- b) pH 9.3 8.7 the Tullahan-Tinejeros river by means of a bypass.
) 8.5 The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperatur existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP).
ture in °C e
(°C) 2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational-
some accessories were not yet
d Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
installed.1âwphi1 Only the sump pit and the
) mg.1 mg./1.
holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared
e Suspende 75 e) Suspended 340 80 seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
) d solids in channeled was noted held indefinitely into the
solids in mg./1. collection tank for primary treatment. There was no
mg./1. effluent discharge [from such collection tank].
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
mg./1. mg./1 3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was
g oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the
) in mg./1. mg./1. analyses show that the bypass wastewater is
polluted in terms of color units, BOD and
h Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93 suspended solids, among others. (Please see
) mg./1." mg./1. attached laboratory resul .)11
MBAS
i) Dissolved 0 From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there
oxygen, was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the
mg./1. effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5 maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
Matter, substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there
mg./1. was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that
k) Total Dis 800 610
the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing
solved
Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20
Solids
December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from
mg./1.
carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment
l) Total Solids 1,400 690 plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner,
m) Turbidity NTU / 70 informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March
ppm, SiO3 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a hearing on
13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test
conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986. Petitioner
The November 1986 inspections report concluded Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist
that: order until after the November 1986 and September 1988
re-inspections were conducted and the violation of
Records of the Commission show that the plant applicable standards was confirmed. In other words,
under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably
Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards
December 1985 directing same to cease and vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very
desist from conducting dyeing operation until such casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive
time the waste treatment plant is already effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably
completed and operational. The new owner Solar loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater
Textile Corporation informed the Commission of Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
1986 (sic). In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of
on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing establishment,
during the inspection/water sampling test after finding that the records showed that:
conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of
the Legal Division a re- inspection/sampling text 1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is
should be conducted first before an appropriate true that the matter of determining whether there is
legal action is instituted; hence, this inspection. a pollution of the environment that requires control
if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the essentially addressed to the then National Pollution
new owner continuously violates the directive of Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
 Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the
mayor of a town has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue
of his police power, he may deny the application for
a permit to operate a business or otherwise close
the same unless appropriate measures are taken
to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emission in
the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6,
1989, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose
offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its
operation until further orders and it was required to
bring the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Region III-Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution
permit. (Annex A-2, petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response
to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the
Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B,
petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was
issued only after an investigation was made by
Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8,
1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant
of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has
been installed. (Annex A-9, petition)
xxx xxx xxx
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary
permit to operate by the then National Pollution
Control Commission on December 15,1987, the
permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-
12, petition). Petitioner had not exerted any effort
to extend or validate its permit much less to install
any device to control the pollution and prevent any
hazard to the health of the residents of the
community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order
was issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the
Government charged with the task of determining whether
the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply
with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely
because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of
the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted
litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken,
which of course may take several years. The relevant
pollution control statute and implementing regulations were
enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection
of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police
power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here
involved, through the exercise of police power. The
Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of
course, have compelled Solar temporarily to stop its plant
operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have
avoided by simply absorbing the bother and burden of
putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial
establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce
their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase
their profits by imposing upon the public threats and risks to
its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by
disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution statutes and
their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here
saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ
of Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing
before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected
by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the
correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the
Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment
would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of
such ex parteorder. That such an opportunity is
subsequently available is really all that is required by the
due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that
we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the
public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to
the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of
P.D. No. 984 and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what
Solar should have sought instead of going to court to seek
nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and
instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be
recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority
temporarily to continue operations until still another
inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then
another analysis of effluent samples could be taken and
evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since
we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution
were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board,
the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition
for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an
appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar
did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE
COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in
A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order
of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ
of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court dated
21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice
to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis
of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public
hearing before the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61689 June 20, 1988
RURAL BANK OF BUHI, INC., and HONORABLE JUDGE
CARLOS R. BUENVIAJE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CENTRAL BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES and CONSOLACION
ODRA, respondents.
Manuel B. Tomacruz and Rustico Pasilavan for petitioners.
I.B. Regalado, Jr. and Pacifica T. Torres for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with preliminary
mandatory injunction seeking the reversal of the orders of
the Court of Appeals dated March 19, 1982 and March 24,
1982 and its decision * (HATOL) promulgated on June
17,1982 in CA-G.R. No. 13944 entitled "Banko Central ng
Pilipinas at Consolacion Odra Laban Kina Rural Bank of
Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc." and praying for a restraining
order or a preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain
respondents from enforcing aforesaid orders and decision
of the respondent Court, and to give due course to the
petitioners' complaint in IR-428, pending before Hon. Judge
Carlos R. Buenviaje of Branch VII, CFI, Camarines Sur.
The decretal portion of the appealed decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang utos ng pinasasagot sa
Hukom noong ika-9 ng Marso, 1982, ay
isinasang-tabi. Kapalit nito, isang utos and
ipinalabas na nag-uutos sa pinasasagot
sa Hukom na itigil ang anumang
pagpapatuloy o pagdidinig kaugnay sa
usaping IR-428 na pinawawalang saysay
din ng Hukumang ito.
SIYANG IPINAG-UUTOS.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
The petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as Buhi) is a juridical entity existing under the laws of the
Philippines. Buhi is a rural bank that started its operations
only on December 26,1975 (Rollo, p. 86).
In 1980, an examination of the books and affairs
of Buhi was ordered conducted by the Rural Banks and
Savings and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of
the Philippines, which by law, has charge of the supervision
and examination of rural banks and savings and loan
associations in the Philippines. However, said petitioner
refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial
assistance was suspended.
On January 10, 1980, a general examination of the bank's
affairs and operations was conducted and there were found
by DRBSLA represented by herein respondent,
Consolacion V. Odra, Director of DRBSLA, among others,
massive irregularities in its operations consisting of loans to
unknown and fictitious borrowers, where the sum of P
1,704,782.00 was past due and another sum
of P1,130,000.00 was also past due in favor of the Central
Bank (Rollo, p. 86). The promissory notes evidencing these
loans were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As
a result thereof, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced
its depositors and creditors.
Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, submitted a report
recommending to the Monetary Board of the Central Bank
the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the
designation of the Director, DRBSLA, as receiver thereof.
On March 28, 1980, the Monetary Board, finding the report
to be true, adopted Resolution No. 583
placing Buhi, petitioner herein, under receivership and
designated respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, as Receiver,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No.
265 as amended (Rollo, p. 111).
In a letter dated April 8, 1980, respondent Consolacion V.
Odra, as receiver, implemented and carried out said
Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies
of the receiver to take control, possession and charge
of Buhi, its assets and liabilities (Rollo, p. 109).
Imelda del Rosario, Manager of herein petitioner Buhi, filed
a petition for injunction with Restraining Order dated April
23, 1980, docketed as Special Proceedings IR-428 against
respondent Consolacion V. Odra and DRBSLA deputies in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII,
Iriga City, entitled Rural Bank of Buhi vs. Central Bank,
which assailed the action of herein respondent Odra in
recommending the receivership over Buhi as a violation of
the provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No.
265 as amended, and Section 10 of Republic Act No. 720
(The Rural Banks Act) and as being ultra vires and done
with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction
(Rollo, p. 120).
Respondents filed their motion to dismiss dated May 27,
1980 alleging that the petition did not allege a cause of
action and is not sufficient in form and substance and that it
was filed in violation of Section 29, Republic Act No. 265 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1007 (Rollo, p. 36).
Petitioners, through their counsel, filed an opposition to the
motion to dismiss dated June 17, 1980 averring that the
petition alleged a valid cause of action and that
respondents have violated the due process clause of the
Constitution (Rollo, p. 49).
Later, respondents filed a reply to the opposition dated July
1, 1980, claiming that the petition is not proper; that Imelda
del Rosario is not the proper representative of the bank;
that the petition failed to state a cause of action; and, that
the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 had
been faithfully observed (Rollo, p. 57).
On August 22, 1980, the Central Bank Monetary Board
issued a Resolution No. 1514 ordering the liquidation of the
Rural Bank of Buhi (Rollo, p. 108).
On September 1, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General,
in accordance with Republic Act No. 265, Section 29, filed
in the same Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Branch VII, a petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
Buhi, which petition was docketed as SP-IR-553, pursuant
to the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1514 (Rollo, pp. 89;
264).
Meanwhile, respondent Central Bank filed on September
15, 1981, in Civil Case No. IR-428 a Supplemental Motion
To Dismiss on the ground that the receivership of Buhi, in
view of the issuance of the Monetary Board Resolution No.
1514 had completely become moot and academic (Rollo, p.
68) and the fact that Case SP-IR-553 for the liquidation
of Buhi was already pending with the same Court (Rollo, p.
69).
On October 16, 1981, petitioners herein filed their amended
complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 alleging that the
issuance of Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 was plainly
arbitrary and in bad faith under aforequoted Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265 as amended, among others (Rollo, p.
28). On the same day, petitioner herein filed a rejoinder to
its opposition to the motion to dismiss (Rollo, p. 145).
On March 9,1982, herein petitioner Judge Buenviaje,
issued an order denying the respondents' motion to
dismiss, supplemental motion to dismiss and granting a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
further managing and administering the Rural Bank of Buhi
and to deliver the possession and control thereof to the
petitioner Bank under the same conditions and with the
same financial status as when the same was taken over by
herein respondents (defendants) on April 16, 1980 and
further enjoining petitioner to post a bond in the amount of
three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) (Rollo, p. 72).
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in the light of
petitioners' opposition, for want of
sufficient merit is denied. Respondents are
hereby directed to file their answer within
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
order. (Rollo, p. 4).
On March 11, 1982, petitioner Buhi through counsel,
conformably with the above-mentioned order, filed a Motion
to Admit Bond in the amount of P300,220.00 (Rollo, pp. 78-
80).
On March 15,1982, herein petitioner Judge issued the order
admitting the bond of P300,220.00 filed by the petitioner,
and directing the respondents to surrender the possession
of the Rural Bank of Buhi, together with all its equipments,
accessories, etc. to the petitioners (Rollo, p. 6).
Consequently, on March 16, 1982, herein petitioner Judge
issued the writ of execution directing the Acting Provincial
Sheriff of Camarines Sur to implement the Court's order of
March 9, 1982 (Rollo, p. 268). Complying with the said
order of the Court, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went to the
Buhi premises to implement the writ of execution but the
vault of the petitioner bank was locked and no inventory
was made, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Report (Rollo, pp.
83-84). Thus, the petitioner herein filed with the Court an
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow Sheriff Calope to Force
Open Bank Vault" on the same day (Rollo, p. 268).
Accordingly, on March 17, 1982, herein petitioner Judge
granted the aforesaid Ex-Parte Motion to Force Open the
Bank Vault (Rollo, p. 269).
On March 18, 1982, counsel for petitioner filed another
"Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager of City Trust to
Allow Petitioner to Withdraw Rural Bank Deposits" while a
separate "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Manager of
Metrobank to Release Deposits of Petitioners" was filed on
the same date. The motion was granted by the Court in an
order directing the Manager of Metro Bank-Naga City
(Rollo, p. 269) to comply as prayed for.
In view thereof, herein respondents filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13944
against herein petitioners, seeking to set aside the
restraining order and reiterating therein that petitioner
Buhi's complaint in the lower court be dismissed (Rollo, p.
270).
On March 19, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution (KAPASIYAHAN) in tagalog, restraining the
Hon. Judge Carlos R. Buenviaje, from enforcing his order of
March 9,1982 and suspending further proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. IR-428 pending before him while giving the
Central Bank counsel, Atty. Ricardo Quintos, authority to
carry out personally said orders and directing the "Punong
Kawani" of the Court of Appeals to send telegrams to the
Office of the President and the Supreme Court (Rollo, p.
168).
Herein petitioners did not comply with the Court of Appeals'
order of March 19, 1982, but filed instead on March 21,
1982 a motion for reconsideration of said order of the Court
of Appeals, claiming that the lower court's order of March 9,
1982 referred only to the denial of therein respondents'
motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss and
that the return of Buhi to the petitioners was already an
accomplished fact. The motion was denied by the
respondent court in a resolution dated June 1, 1982 (Rollo,
p. 301).
In view of petitioners' refusal to obey the Court of Appeals'
Order of March 19, 1982, herein respondents filed with the
Court of Appeals a Motion to Cite Petitioners in Contempt,
dated April 22, 1982 (Rollo, p. 174).
The Court of Appeals issued on May 24, 1982 an order
requiring herein petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc., through
its then Acting Manager, Imelda del Rosario and herein
petitioner Judge Carlos Buenviaje, as well as Manuel
Genova and Rodolfo Sosa, to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why they should not be held in contempt
of court and further directing the Ministry of National
Defense or its representative to cause the return of
possession and management of the Rural Bank to the
respondents Central Bank and Consolacion Odra (Rollo, p.
180).
On June 9, 1982, petitioners filed their objection to
respondents' motion for contempt dated June 5, 1982
claiming that the properties, subject of the order, had
already been returned to the herein petitioners who are the
lawful owners thereof and that the returning could no longer
be undone (Rollo, p. 181).
Later, petitioners filed another motion dated June 17, 1982
for the reconsideration of the resolution of June 1, 1982 of
the Court of Appeals alleging that the same contravened
and departed from the rulings of the Supreme Court that
consummated acts or acts already done could no longer be
the subject of mandatory injunction and that the respondent
Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the order
unless it was in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, claiming that
the case (CA-G.R. No. 13944) did not come to it on appeal
(Rollo, p. 302).
As aforestated, on June 17, 1982, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered its decision (HATOL) setting aside the
lower court's restraining order dated March 9,1982 and
ordering the dismissal of herein petitioners' amended
complaint in Civil Case No. IR-428 (Rollo, p. 186).
On July 9, 1982, petitioners (respondents in CA-G.R. No.
13944) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
dated June 17, 1982 insofar as the complaint with the lower
court (Civil Case No. IR-428 was ordered dismissed (Rollo,
p. 305).
On August 23, 1982, the respondent Court of Appeals
issued its Resolution denying for lack of merit, herein
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution
issued by the respondent Court of Appeals on June 1, 1982
and set on August 31, 1982 the hearing of the motion to cite
the respondents in CA-G.R. No. SP-13944 (herein
petitioner) for contempt (Rollo, p. 193).
At said hearing, counsel for Rural Bank of Buhi agreed and
promised in open court to restore and return to the Central
Bank the possession and control of the Bank within three
(3) days from August 31, 1982.
However on September 3,1982, Rosalia Guevara, Manager
thereof, vigorously and adamantly refused to surrender the
premises unless she received a written order from the
Court.
In a subsequent hearing of the contempt incident, the Court
of Appeals issued its Order dated October 13,1982, but
Rosalia Guevara still refused to obey, whereupon she was
placed under arrest and the Court of Appeals ordered her to
be detained until she decided to obey the Court's Order
(Rollo, pp. 273-274).
Earlier, on September 14, 1982 petitioners had filed this
petition even while a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of June 17,1982 was still pending consideration in
the Court of Appeals.
In the resolution of October 20, 1982, the Second Division
of this Court without giving due course to the petition
required respondents to COMMENT (Rollo, p. 225).
Counsel for respondents manifested (Rollo, p. 226) that
they could not file the required comment because they were
not given a copy of the petition. Meanwhile, they filed an
urgent motion dated October 28, 1982 with the Court of
Appeals to place the bank through its representatives in
possession of the Rural Bank of Buhi (Camarines Sur), Inc.
(Rollo, p. 237).
On December 9, 1982, petitioners filed a Supplemental
Petition with urgent motion for the issuance of a restraining
order dated December 2, 1982 praying that the restraining
order be issued against respondent court (Rollo, p. 229).
In the resolution of December 15,1982, the Court resolved
to require petitioners to furnish the respondents with a copy
of the petition and to require the respondents to comment
on both the original and the supplemental petitions (Rollo,
p. 243).
In a resolution of February 21, 1983, the Court NOTED
Rosalia V. Guevara's letter dated February 4, 1983 (Rollo,
p. 252) addressed to Hon. Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, requesting that she be allowed to file a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus (Rollo, p. 256).
At the hearing of the said petition on February 23, 1983
where the counsel of both parties appeared, this Court
noted the Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as
the release of petitioner Rosalia V. Guevara from detention
by the National Bureau of Investigation. After hearing
aforesaid counsel and petitioner herself, and it appearing
that the latter had resigned since January 18,1983 as
Manager of the Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. and that the
Central Bank might avail of more than adequate legal
measures to take over the management, possession and
control of the said bank (and not through contempt
proceedings and detention and confinement of petitioner),
with Assistant Solicitor General Andin manifesting that
respondents were not insisting on the continued detention
of petitioner, the Court Resolved to SET the petitioner at
liberty and to consider the contempt incident closed (Rollo,
p. 339).
On April 11, 1983, respondents filed their comment on the
original and supplemental petitions.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals, acting on respondents'
urgent motion filed on October 28, 1982 ordered on April
13, 1983 the return to the petitioners (herein respondents)
or their duly authorized representatives of the possession,
management and control of subject Rural Bank (Rollo, p.
319), together with its properties.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed an urgent motion: (1) to
give due course to the petition and (2) for immediate
issuance of a Restraining Order against the respondent
court to prevent it from enforcing its aforesaid resolution
dated April 13, 1983 and from further proceeding in AC-
G.R. No. 13944-SP (Rollo, p. 315).
On May 16, 1983, this Court resolved to deny the petition
for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 321). On July 25, 1983,
petitioners filed their verified Motion for Reconsideration
(Rollo, p. 337) praying that the HATOL dated June 17, 1982
of the Court of Appeals be set aside as null and void and
that Special Proceedings No. IR-428 of CFI-Camarines Sur,
Iriga City, Branch VII, be ordered remanded to the RTC of
Camarines Sur, Iriga City, for further proceedings.
A Motion for Early Resolution was filed by herein petitioners
on March 12,1984 (Rollo, p. 348).
Petitioners raised the following legal issues in their motion
for reconsideration:
I. UNDER SEC. 29, R.A. 265, AS AMENDED, MAY THE
MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE CENTRAL BANK (CB)
PLACE A RURAL BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE TO SAID RURAL BANK TO
ENABLE IT TO BE HEARD ON THE GROUND RELIED
UPON FOR SUCH RECEIVERSHIP?
II. UNDER THE SAME SECTION OF SAID LAW, WHERE
THE MONETARY BOARD (MB) OF THE CENTRAL BANK
(CB) HAS PLACED A RURAL BANK UNDER
RECEIVERSHIP, IS SUCH ACTION OF THE MONETARY
BOARD (MB) SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW? IF SO,
WHICH COURT MAY EXERCISE SUCH POWER AND
WHEN MAY IT EXERCISE THE SAME?
III. UNDER THE SAID SECTION OF THE LAW, SUPPOSE
A CIVIL CASE IS INSTITUTED SEEKING ANNULMENT
OF THE RECEIVERSHIP ON THE GROUND OF
ARBITRARINESS AND BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
THE MONETARY BOARD (MB), MAY SUCH CASE BE
DISMISSED BY THE IAC (THEN CA) ON THE GROUND
OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE EVEN IF THE TRIAL
COURT HAS NOT HAD A CHANCE YET TO RECEIVE
EVIDENCE AND THE PARTIES HAVE NOT YET
PRESENTED EVIDENCE EITHER IN THE TRIAL COURT
OR IN SAID APPELLATE COURT? (Rollo, pp. 330-331).
I. Petitioner Rural Bank's position is to the effect that due
process was not observed by the Monetary Board before
said bank was placed under receivership. Said Rural Bank
claimed that it was not given the chance to deny and
disprove such claim of insolvency and/or any other ground
which the Monetary Board used in justification of its action.
Relative thereto, the provision of Republic Act No. 265 on
the proceedings upon insolvency reads:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency.—
Whenever, upon examination by the head
of the appropriate supervising and
examining department or his examiners or
agents into the condition of any banking
institution, it shall be disclosed that the
condition of the same is one of insolvency,
or that its continuance in business would
involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the
department head concerned forthwith, in
writing, to inform the Monetary Board of
the facts, and the Board may, upon finding
the statements of the department head to
be true, forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank,
or a person of recognized competence in
banking, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for
these purposes including, but not limited
to, bringing suits and foreclosing
mortgages in the name of the banking
institution.
The Monetary Board shall thereupon
determine within sixty days whether the
institution may be recognized or otherwise
placed in such a condition so that it may
be permitted to resume business with
safety to its depositors and creditors and
the general public and shall prescribe the
conditions under which such redemption
of business shall take place as the time for
fulfillment of such conditions. In such
case, the expenses and fees in the
collection and administration of the assets
of the institution shall be determined by
the Board and shall be paid to the Central
Bank out of the assets of such banking
institution.
If the Monetary Board shall determine and
confirm within the said period that the
banking institution is insolvent or cannot
resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general
public, it shall, if the public interest
requires, order its liquidation, indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall,
by the Solicitor General, file a petition in
the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which have been taken and
praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of the banking institution. The
Court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all
that is necessary to preserve the assets of
the banking institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board
shall designate an official of the Central
Bank or a person of recognized
competence in banking, as liquidator who
shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The
liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking
institution to money or sell, assign or
otherwise dispose of the same to creditors
and other parties for the purpose of paying
the debts of such bank and he may, in the
name of the banking institution, institute
such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover
accounts and assets of the banking
institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this
Act shall be final and executory, and can
be set aside by the court only if there is
convincing proof that the action is plainly
arbitrary and made in bad faith. No
restraining order or injunction shall be
issued by the court enjoining the Central
Bank from implementing its actions under
this Section and the second paragraph of
Section 34 of this Act, unless there is
convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith and the petitioner or
plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the
court in which the action is pending a bond
executed in favor of the Central Bank, in
an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be
refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond,
which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier's check, in an
amount twice the amount of the bond of
the petitioner, or plaintiff conditioned that it
will pay the damages which the petitioner
or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court insofar as they are applicable and
not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Section shall govern the issuance and
dissolution of the restraining order or
injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be
understood to mean the inability of a
banking institution to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary
course of business: Provided, however,
that this shall not include the inability to
pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank
caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic commonly evidenced by
a run on the banks in the banking
community.
The appointment of a conservator under
Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the
Monetary Board, the provision of any law,
general or special, to the contrary not
withstanding.
It will be observed from the foregoing provision of law, that
there is no requirement whether express or implied, that a
hearing be first conducted before a banking institution may
be placed under receivership. On the contrary, the law is
explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the
Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately
take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are:
(a) an examination made by the examining department of
the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the
Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that the bank
is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors.
Supportive of this theory is the ruling of this Court, which
established the authority of the Central Bank under the
foregoing circumstances, which reads:
As will be noted, whenever it shall appear
prima facie that a banking institution is in
"a condition of insolvency" or so situated
"that its continuance in business would
involved probable loss to its depositors or
 creditors," the Monetary Board has
authority:
First, to forbid the institution to do
business and appoint a receiver therefor;
and
Second, to determine, within 60 days,
whether or not:
1) the institution may be
reorganized and
rehabilitated to such an
extent as to be permitted
to resume business with
safety to depositors,
creditors and the general
public; or
2) it is indeed insolvent or
cannot resume business
with safety to depositors,
creditors and the general
public, and public interest
requires that it be
liquidated.
In this latter case (i.e., the bank can no longer resume
business with safety to depositors, creditors and the public,
etc.) its liquidation will be ordered and a liquidator
appointed by the Monetary Board. The Central Bank shall
thereafter file a petition in the Regional Trial Court praying
for the Court's assistance in the liquidation of the bank." ...
(Salud vs. Central Bank, 143 SCRA 590 [1986]).
Petitioner further argues, that there is also that
constitutional guarantee that no property shall be taken
without due process of law, so that Section 29, R.A. 265, as
amended, could not have intended to disregard and do
away with such constitutional requirement when it conferred
upon the Monetary Board the power to place Rural Banks
under receivership (Rollo, p. 333).
The contention is without merit. It has long been
established and recognized in this jurisdiction that the
closure and liquidation of a bank may be considered as an
exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be
subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to
be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or
a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution (Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106
SCRA 155 [1981]).
The evident implication of the law, therefore, is that the
appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary
Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to
judicial inquiry to insure the protection of the banking
institution. Stated otherwise, due process does not
necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior
hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting
in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be
wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the
entire banking community.
In Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, (106 SCRA 130), the
Supreme Court held:
The pivotal issue raised by petitioner is
whether or not the appointment of a
receiver by the Court of First Instance on
January 14, 1969 was in order.
Respondent Court correctly stated that the
appointment of a receiver pendente lite is
a matter principally addressed to and
resting largely on the sound discretion of
the court to which the application is made.
This Tribunal has so held in a number of
cases. However, receivership being
admittedly a harsh remedy, it should be
granted with extreme caution. Sound
reasons for receivership must appear of
record, and there should be a clear
showing of a necessity therefor. Before
granting the remedy, the court is advised
to consider the consequence or effects
thereof in order to avoid irreparable
injustice or injury to others who are
entitled to as much consideration as those
seeking it.
xxx xxx xxx
This is not to say that a hearing is an
indispensable requirement for the
appointment of a receiver. As petitioner
correctly contends in his first assignment
of error, courts may appoint receivers
without prior presentation of evidence and
solely on the basis of the averments of the
pleadings. Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of
Court allows the appointment of a receiver
upon an ex parte application.
There is no question that the action of the Monetary Board
in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has
been held that the courts may interfere with the Central
Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not
a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated.
Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include
arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos vs. Central
Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
It has likewise been held that resolutions of the Monetary
Board under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, such as:
forbidding bank institutions to do business on account of a
"condition of insolvency" or because its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to depositors or
creditors; or appointing a receiver to take charge of the
bank's assets and liabilities, or determining whether the
bank may be rehabilitated or should be liquidated and
appointing a liquidator for that purpose, are under the law
"final and executory" and may be set aside only on one
ground, that is "if there is convincing proof that the action is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith" (Salud vs. Central
Bank, supra).
There is no dispute that under the above-quoted Section 29
of the Central Bank Act, the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of whether or not the
action of the Monetary Board directing the dissolution of the
subject Rural Bank is attended by arbitrariness and bad
faith. Such position has been sustained by this Court in
Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (supra).
In the same case, the Court ruled further that a banking
institution's claim that a resolution of the Monetary Board
under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act should be set
aside as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, may be
asserted as an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b],
Rule 6, Rules of Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule
6; Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in the
proceedings for assistance in liquidation or as a cause of
action in a separate and distinct action where the latter was
filed ahead of the petition for assistance in liquidation (ibid;
Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143 [1981]).
III. It will be noted that in the issuance of the Order of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VII, Iriga
City, dated March 9, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 72-77), there was no
trial on the merits. Based on the pleadings filed, the Court
merely acted on the Central Bank's Motion to Dismiss and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, denying both for lack of
sufficient merit. Evidently, the trial court merely acted on an
incident and has not as yet inquired, as mandated by
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, into the merits of the
claim that the Monetary Board's action is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith. It has not appreciated certain facts
which would render the remedy of liquidation proper and
rehabilitation improper, involving as it does an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties properly belonging to the trial court and not properly
cognizable on appeal (Central Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, supra, p. 156).

Still further, without a hearing held for both parties to

substantiate their allegations in their respective pleadings,
there is lacking that "convincing proof" prerequisite to justify
the temporary restraining order (mandatory injunction)
issued by the trial court in its Order of March 9, 1982.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is MODIFIED; We hereby order the remand of this
case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, but
We LIFT the temporary restraining order issued by the trial
court in its Order dated March 9, 1982.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ.,

concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO,
manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant
Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como
colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea
para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad
de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el
plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la
obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han
celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se
han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en
la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros
de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un
contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos
obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un
paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in
incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley
No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a
readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen
a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que
tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other
hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to
the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September
26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported
by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine
Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT
with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG
TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of
which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's
printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their
rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth
Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code
which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of
a modern labor legislation of American origin
where the industrial peace has always been the
rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of
unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to
the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein
after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it
necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of
this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations regarding the nature
of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be
observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-
examined the entire record of the proceedings had before
the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have
found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that
these statements and expressions of views of counsel have
no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It
is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or
farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of
labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor
as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determinating the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in
order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September
13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It
shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative
policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated
by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the
avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the
Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of
Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the
language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without
the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without
notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support it is a nullity, a
place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and
a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November
29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81
Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d
985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed
incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44,
24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law.
ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry.
Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or
rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
(Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
 Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4,
Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case
against them. It should not, however, detract from
their duty actively to see that the law is enforced,
and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself
of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose
of investigating and determining the facts in any
given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter
under its consideration or advisement to a local
board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the
peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the
said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)
they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations",
and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply
of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served
if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing
the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance
with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and
Moran, JJ., concur.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its

judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally
Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the
difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other
subordinates to render final decision, with the right
to appeal to board or commission, but in our case
there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all

controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is

sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren
and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession

of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor
Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharged all the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions
of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath
that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153166 December 16, 2005
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and set aside the
decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
dismissing her from government service.
Petitioner Teresita L. Vertudes was a fingerprint examiner
at the Alien Registration Division of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI). In a facsimile letter4 dated July 27, 1998, a
certain Peng Villas, a news editor of the Philippine Weekly
Newspaper, referred to then BI Commissioner Rufus
Rodriguez the complaints of private respondent Julie
Buenaflor, Amy Cosino and Manuelito Lao, against
petitioner.
According to Villas, private respondent Buenaflor
complained of having been convinced by petitioner into
paying the total amount of ₱79,000.00 in exchange for the
processing of her visa, passport and other travel documents
for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner
Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in
the amounts of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00, respectively,
and cash worth ₱29,000.00. However, no visa was
delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return
her money, to no avail.
Villas also referred to Commissioner Rodriguez the
complaint of Lao who allegedly told him that he paid
₱60,000.00 to petitioner in exchange for a Chinese Visa
and a passport for Taiwan. Likewise, Villas referred
Cosino’s complaint that the latter collected from Virfinia
Dumbrique, Jaime Santos Flores and Mariano Evangelista,
the amounts of ₱20,000.00 each, upon petitioner's word
that they would be in exchange for tourist visas. Both Lao
and Cosino claimed that the promised passport and visas
did not materialize and despite many requests for the return
of the amounts paid to petitioner, she refused to comply.
Allegedly, "Vertudez threatened them that they cannot force
her to pay back the said amount as she has the back up [of]
higher BID officials."
Acting upon Villas' letter, Commissioner Rodriguez issued a
memorandum,5 directing the petitioner to submit a sworn
written explanation. In her sworn written
memorandum,6 petitioner assailed the credibility of Villas.
She alleged that Villas was not a member of the National
Press Club as he claimed to be. She averred that the sum
of ₱50,000.00, as evidenced by SB Check Nos. 0014797
and 0014798, was extended to her by private respondent
Buenaflor as a loan. She was constrained to borrow money
from private respondent and other close friends when her
brother became seriously ill. However, she claimed that she
had fully settled her obligation to private respondent
through installment. She also claimed that private
respondent was the one engaged in illegal recruitment
through the use of falsified or forged passports. Private
respondent was allegedly using petitioner’s name in dealing
with some immigration officials and employees to expedite
the processing of the documents of her (private
respondent’s) clients. Petitioner allegedly informed said
officers and employees that she was not connected to
private respondent in any way. Private respondent allegedly
resented this "abrupt disassociation." Also, her repeated
refusal to "escort" private respondent's clients who were
leaving for abroad using falsified travel documents allegedly
led private respondent to threaten her that she could easily
use SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 as evidence to
file charges against petitioner by making it appear that she
(private respondent) gave the money because of
petitioner's promise to facilitate her travel to Japan.
Petitioner denied having received the sum of ₱29,000.00
from private respondent, contending that such claim is
"pure falsehood because of the absence of document to
prove the alleged receipt." As regards the complaints of Lao
and Cosino, petitioner denied having met or known said
persons.
Finding petitioner’s explanation "unsatisfactory and [her]
defense weak," Commissioner Rodriguez issued Personnel
Order No. RBR 98-60,7 preventively suspending her for
sixty (60) days pending the investigation of the case. The
instant case was assigned to Special Prosecutor Norberto
dela Cruz, who issued a subpoena8 ordering private
respondent and petitioner to appear before him on October
15, 1998 for the formal investigation of the case. It appears
that in the meantime, Villas died and private respondent
personally took on the instant complaint with the BI for
Grave Misconduct against petitioner, docketed as
Administrative Charge No. 0004. Lao and Cosino filed their
respective complaint-affidavits9 with the BI which became
the subject of another administrative case against
petitioner.10
On August 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (Re: Personnel Order No. RBR-98-60) with
Motion to Dismiss.11 On September 2, 1998, petitioner filed
a Manifestation with Urgent Prayer to Resolve Motion to
Dismiss,12 averring that the complaint instituted by Villas in
behalf of private respondent was a harassment case
against her. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the instant
action on the ground that in addition to the instant
administrative case, private respondent had personally filed
her complaint-affidavit "of similar nature and character" with
the Manila City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as 98-H-
44000-1, and with the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed
as OMB-98-1701.
Private respondent narrated the pertinent events in her
complaint-affidavit13 as follows:
1. That I met Ms. Teresita Vertudes, an employee of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in the middle part of 1996;
2. That from that time on, we became friends because we
come from the same region and that she used to tell us that
she is capable of deploying job applicants to Japan;
3. That during one of those times that I dropped by her
office, she intimated to me that a group of Immigration
Officers are scheduled to leave for Japan for training and
that she was the one who received a call from a Japanese
Consul;
4. That Ms. Teresita Vertudes asked me if I am interested in
going to Japan because she will find a way to
accommodate me and I told her that I am deeply interested
but my problem was that my passport was left in Bacolod
City and she volunteered to work-out [and] facilitate the
processing of my passport and visa and that [all] I need to
do is give her my picture which I did;
5. That she even added that she has a brother in Japan
who could also help me find a job and I will be going there
along with her son, Jimmy V[e]rtudes Santos. She showed
to me her son's passport and application for a Visa, copies
of which are attached and marked as Annexes "A", "B" and
"C";
6. That according to Ms. Vertudes I will be receiving a
salary of one lapad per day as a factory worker and that
should I accept to her offer, all that will be required of me is
to give her the amount of ₱80,000.00;
7. That on December 24, 1997 Ms. Vertudes received from
me Security Bank Check No. 0014797 in the amount of
₱30,000.00 which she was able to encash and likewise
Security Bank Check No. 0014798 in the amount of
₱20,000.00 x x x Annexes "D" and "E";
8. That on February 8, 1998, because of her insistence and
persistence that I should deliver the balance of ₱30,000.00
to her so that I could leave in a week's time, I was forced to
produce the said amount by requesting a friend to pawn my
jewelry in the amount of ₱29,000.00 and the aforesaid
amount was handed to Ms. Vertudes in the presence of Ms.
Joy Gutierrez at her office in (BID), Intramuros, Manila;
9. That after that last payment, I have been asking her as to
when I am suppose[d] to leave because I was already
prepared to leave and have in fact told my relatives and
friends that I will be leaving soon for Japan but she did not
stop making promises;
10. That upon the advi[c]e of a lawyer and to be able to
know once and for all whether I could still leave, I requested
my lawyer to write a letter to Ms. Vertudes for her to refund
the sums of money which I delivered to her in the total
amount of ₱79,000.00 for the processing of my Passport
and Visa for job deployment abroad but she did not even
answer the letter and neither called up my lawyer to explain
her side; letter is attached as Annex "E";
11. That for Ms. Teresita Vertudes' failure to make good her
promise to deploy me after receiving the amount of
₱79,000.00 in consideration of a job placement in Japan, I
hereby charge her for the crime of Illegal Recruitment and
Estafa; x x x
Annexed to private respondent's complaint-affidavit were:
a) the affidavit of a certain Jessilyn Gutierrez14 who attested
that she accompanied private respondent in going to the
office of petitioner and she was with private respondent
when the latter delivered to petitioner the checks amounting
to ₱50,000.00 and cash worth ₱29,000.00 for private
respondent's job placement to Japan; b) copies of the
passport and application for a visa of petitioner's son, to
prove that petitioner showed these documents to her so she
would believe that she would be going to Japan with
petitioner's son; c) copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and
0014798, to prove petitioner's receipt of the total amount of
₱50,000.00 from private respondent; and d) letter of private
respondent's counsel to petitioner demanding the refund of
₱79,000.00 from petitioner.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner, accompanied by her
counsel, and private respondent appeared before Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz for the formal investigation of the
case.15 The second hearing took place on October 27,
1998, during which, petitioner submitted her Counter-
Affidavit16 and the affidavits of her witnesses. Her version
was:
4.1. I first met Ms. Buenaflor sometime in 1996 when I was
still assigned at the General Services Division of the Bureau
of Immigration;
4.2. At that time, Ms. Buenaflor represented to me that she
was connected with a travel agency assigned to
process/facilitate documents of their clients in the Buereau
of Immigration;
4.3. Indeed, I saw Ms. Buenaflor processing and making
follow-ups of documents in the different
Divisions/Departments of the Bureau of Immigration similar
to what were being done by the representatives of other
travel agencies transacting business therewith;
4.4. During that period, Ms. Buenaflor and me became
close friends because she frequently visited me in my office
at General Services Division and would even stay thereat
while processing documents and waiting for their release. In
fact, she often took her lunch and merienda with me and
sometimes, with the other employees of our division;
4.5. Sometime in the third week of December 1997, I was
informed by my relatives in our hometown that my brother,
Mariano "Dido" Vertudes was seriously ill and was
thereafter confined on December 22, 1997 at Gingoog
General Hospital located at Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental;
4.6. The type of illness of my brother required extensive
treatment and medication; and for this reason, they
requested for financial assistance to defray the expenses
therefor;
4.7. Since I was then in financial distress, I was constrained
to borrow money with interests from Ms. Buenaflor and
other close friends of mine. As a kind gesture on the part of
Ms. Buenaflor she extended to me a loan in the total
amount of ₱50,000.00 as represented by Security Bank
check nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the respective
amounts of ₱30,000.00 and ₱20,000.00 (citation omitted);
4.8. It is however our agreement that I would pay the
amount of ₱50,000.00 with the additional amount of
₱10,000.00 representing the interests therefore for a total of
₱60,000.00;
4.9. We further agreed that I would pay my financial
obligation to Ms. Buenaflor on or before the last day of May
1998 from December 1997 on installment basis;
4.10. With the aforementioned amount of ₱50,000.00
loaned to me by Julie Buenaflor and the other amounts x x
x from other friends, I was able to contribute the total
amount of ₱100,000.00 for the treatment and
hospitalization of my brother. It was, however, to no avail
because my brother died on January 6, 1998;
4.11. Pursuant to our agreement, I was able to pay Ms.
Buenaflor on installment basis the total amount of
₱60,000.00 at my earlier indicated address on the following
dates:
DATE AMOUNT
February 28, 1998 ₱15,000.00
March 31, 1998 15,000.00
April 30, 1998 15,000.00
May 30, 1998 15,000.00
4.12. I tendered the said payments to Ms. Buenaflor at my
residence on the dates earlier enumerated in the presence
of my housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes; x x x
Petitioner averred that private respondent misrepresented
to her (petitioner's) son, Jimmy Santos, Jr., that she (private
respondent) would facilitate his travel to and employment in
Japan. She also assailed the credibility of private
respondent by accusing her of using several passports
under different names. Attached to petitioner's counter-
affidavit were: a) a copy of a passport application in the
name of Honna Sumadia Araneta showing the photographs
of private respondent; b) referral slip of the Pasay City
Police Station and the sworn statement of a certain
Armando Gambala charging private respondent with Estafa
and Illegal Recruitment;17 c) affidavits of petitioner's son,
Jimmy Santos, Jr.,18 and a certain Enrico Tuazon, showing
that they likewise filed a case for Estafa and Illegal
Recruitment against private respondent; and d) a copy of
the Certificate of Business Name and Certification19 issued
by Prudential Bank, to prove that private respondent
misstated the address of her business establishment.
Petitioner also submitted to Special Prosecutor dela Cruz
the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay20of her two
housemaids, Eliza Compo and Jocelyn Reyes, to prove that
she had fully paid her obligation to private respondent.
Likewise, she submitted the handwritten joint sworn
statement21 of Ernesto V. Cloma and Jhun M. Romero,
media practitioners, to prove that Villas asked for
petitioner’s forgiveness before he died, admitting that he
only sent his letter dated July 27, 1998 to Commissioner
Rodriguez in consideration of the amount given by private
respondent.
On the same hearing, the parties agreed to submit the
instant case for resolution.22 Thus, in his Resolution dated
November 12, 1998,23 Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her
dismissal from the service.
Meantime, the case instituted by private respondent with
the Office of the Ombudsman was referred to the Office of
the City Prosecutor, thus:
After evaluation, the undersigned finds that the charges
imputed against the respondent are not office related and
that the administrative aspect of the case had already been
undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration.
In view thereof, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be referred to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.24 (emphases supplied)
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open25 with the BI,
contending that the finding of the Ombudsman that "the
charges imputed against [petitioner] are not office related"
clearly shows that she is not administratively liable for grave
misconduct. She moved for the re-opening of the case "to
allow her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the
findings of the Ombudsman." The motion, however, was
denied for lack of merit.26
On January 12, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez issued an
order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz, viz:
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita L. Vertudez is hereby
found liable for grave misconduct under PD No. 807 and
the Administrative Code of 1987. Accordingly, she is
ordered dismissed from the service effective immediately
with forfeiture of all benefits under the law, with prejudice to
her reinstatement in this Bureau and all its branches.
SO ORDERED.27
The order quoted the pertinent portion of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz's resolution, viz:
After carefully weighing and evaluating the versions of the
complainant and the respondent, this Office is more
incline[d] to give credence to complainant's declarations
that she was indeed duped by the respondent into parting
with the hard-earned money of ₱79,000.00 on the promise
of the respondent that she would secure a passport and
visa for the complainant to Japan.
Respondent's alibi that the said amount was a loan from the
complainant, who is her friend, is highly unbelievable.
Complainant does not appear to be a rich person who
would so easily part with such big amount of money without
any security without any hope or assurance of being re-
paid.
The fact that complainant paid ₱79,000.00 to the
respondent so she could get a passport and a visa to work
in Japan as a factory worker clearly showed that she was
desperately in need of a job. For her to give such amount to
the respondent as an unsecured loan is extremely
incredulous.
Respondent's claim that the present complaint is pure
harassment by the complainant is completely bereft of
credence. What benefit or advantage would the
complainant achieve in fabricating charges against the
respondent?
If the complainant filed this complaint, it was because she
was wronged by the respondent.
Likewise, respondent's allegation that the ₱50,000.00 she
received from the complainant was a loan because she
(respondent) was then in a financial distress and she
needed money to help her sick brother in the province was
belied by her own son, Jimmy V. Santos, Jr., who declared
in his Affidavit that sometime in December 1997, he gave
₱50,000.00 to the complainant so that the latter could
obtain a tourist visa for him to Japan. Why should the
respondent bother to get a ₱50,000.00 loan from the
complainant to assist her ailing brother when she could
readily obtain this amount from her own son?
As to respondent's assertion that she was able to pay the
₱50,000.00 to the complainant, there is nothing to support
such payment. The statements of her two (2) maids -- Eliza
C[o]mpo and Jocelyn Reyes -- in their Sinumpaang
Salaysay that respondent paid to the complainant the total
amount of ₱60,000.00 during the months of February 1998
to May 1998 cannot be believed. Being the housemaids of
the respondent, it is but natural and to be expected of these
persons to come to the aid of their employe[r].28
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New
Trial,29 reiterating her argument in her Motion to Re-open.
Again, the motion was denied.30 Subsequently, the assailed
order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.31
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,32 raising the issues of lack
of due process and lack of substantial evidence. On
November 19, 1999, the CSC dismissed petitioner's appeal.
It held, in part, that:
A careful study of the records in the light of the arguments
of appellant reveals that the requirements of due process
have been duly observed in the proceedings had in this
case.
xxx
As to the second issue, the Commission finds substantial
evidence to prove that respondent receive[d] money in
exchange for her services in facilitating the issuance of
passport and visa of Julie Bernardo (sic).
The complaint-affidavit of Julie Buenaflor is reproduced in
part as follows: x x x
In the absence of any improper motive or malice on the part
of the witness to foist said charges on respondent, the
Commission is inclined to give credence to the statements
of witness Bernardo (sic). In fact Vertudez has admitted that
she received money from Buenaflor but argued that the
money was a mere loan. However, if this were true,
Buenaflor should have demanded for a collateral,
considering the amount involved. Vertudez failed to present
any evidence that she gave any security in return for said
loan which makes her version highly incredible. x x x33
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration34 of the CSC's
Resolution, to no avail. The CSC held:
In so far as Vertudez'[s] illegal recruitment activities are
concerned, the Commission finds the existence of clear
substantial evidence to establish the same. Evidence
presented all point to the fact that Vertudez solicited money
from BI clients in return for a visa to Japan. The witnesses
against Vertudez include Peng Villas (Deceased), Julie
Buenflor (sic), Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito
Lao and Jaime Santos Flores. The affidavits of said
witnesses all speak of the modus operandi of Vertudez at
the BI, where she approaches BI clients and offers them a
visa, passport and an employment contract in exchange for
₱120,000.00. In the case of witness Julie Buenaflor, she
testified that respondent assured her of a visa, a passport
and a job in Japan for a fee of ₱80,000.00 and that
Vertudez after getting paid failed to fulfill her promise.
It is observed that Vertudez seeks to destroy the credibility
of witness Buenaflor by implying that the former has a
pending case for illegal recruitment and estafa. Records,
however, show that the charges against witness Buenaflor
all came up after Vertudez was formally charged by the BI
and that such charges have no reasonable connection with
her administrative case pending before the Commission. In
this regard, "There being nothing in record to show that
witnesses were actuated by any improper motive, their
testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit."(People v.
Flores, 252 SCRA 31)35
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the
CA, raising the issues of: a) whether or not the BI and CSC
violated petitioner's right to due process; b) whether or not
respondents erred in finding that the alleged illegal
recruitment activity of the petitioner had a direct relation to
and connected with the performance of her duties and
responsibilities as an employee of the BI; and c) whether or
not there is substantial evidence to support the finding that
petitioner is an illegal recruiter, thus, warranting her removal
from public service.36
On February 12, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. The CA found that "petitioner was given more
than ample opportunity to ventilate her defense and
disprove the charges leveled against her, hence, there can
be no denial of her right to due process."37 Moreover, it held
that "there is more than substantial evidence proving the
charge of grave misconduct against petitioner."38 The CA
ratiocinated that:
In the proceedings a quo, it was established that petitioner,
indeed, received and encashed the two (2) checks given by
private respondent in the total amount of Php50,000.00.
This fact, therefore, gives credence to the claim of private
respondent that she gave petitioner two (2) checks in
consideration of the latter's promise to facilitate her
employment abroad. This being the case, the burden was
shifted to petitioner to refute this established fact through
equally weighty and competent evidence.
Now, petitioner admitted having received, and encashed,
the two checks from private respondent but offered the
excuse that the same was extended to her as a loan. Aside
from her testimony and that of her household helpers to
prove this assertion, no other independent and unbiased
evidence was offered to prove the fact of loan. As it is, her
theory of loan stands on flimsy ground and is not sufficient
enough to overthrow the fact established by complainant.
This considering that it is highly improbable and even
contrary to human experience for a person to loan a huge
amount of money as Php50,000.00 without any document
evidencing such loan nor a collateral to secure its payment.
Note even that the two checks were made payable to
"cash," a bearer instrument, and was not even crossed on
its face, hence, can be encashed by any person holding the
negotiable instrument. If, indeed, private respondent gave
the two checks to petitioner as a clean loan (without any
collateral) without any separate document embodying their
loan agreement, the latter should have at least been made
the payee of the checks and a memorandum written at the
back of the check to the effect that it is being extended as a
loan, in order to protect the interest of the lender. This is
conventional business practice which is altogether absent in
the case at bar, hence, petitioner's theory of loan must
necessarily crumble.39
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 contending
that the CA failed to resolve the issue of whether
petitioner's alleged illegal recruitment activities are directly
connected with her duties and responsibilities as a
Fingerprint Examiner of the BI. This motion was denied.41
Undaunted, petitioner filed this petition, summing up the
issues as follows:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT MAY REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 58766;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
RESOLVED THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED IN THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BEFORE IT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS THAT
PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT;
4. WHETHER OR NOT A PROMISE TO FACILITATE
EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER ABROAD CONSTITUTES
GRAVE MISCONDUCT[;]
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ACCORDED
DUE PROCESS;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT CONSTITUTING GRAVE
MISCONDUCT MUST HAVE A DIRECT RELATION TO
THE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC OFFICE HELD BY
RESPONDENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES; AND
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED ACT COMMITTED
BY THE PETITIONER IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO ANY
OF HER FUNCTIONS AS FINGERPRINT EXAMINER AT
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.42
The petition is denied.
We shall first resolve the issue of due process. Petitioner
contends that the essential requirements of due process as
laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations43 and Doruelo v. COMELEC44 were violated in
the case at bar. First, she contends that she was denied of
her right to a full hearing when she was not accorded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her, as
provided under Section 48, par. 5, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987. She allegedly raised this
issue in her appeal before the CSC.45
The argument is unmeritorious.
We have explained the meaning of the right to cross-
examination as a vital element of due process as follows:
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
part of due process. However, the right is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to
remain in the record.46 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot argue that she was
deprived of due process simply because no cross-
examination took place. Nothing on record shows that
petitioner asked for cross-examination during the formal
investigation conducted by Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.
Notably, two hearings were conducted, during which, both
private respondent and petitioner appeared. During the
hearing dated October 27, 1998, both parties agreed to
submit the case for resolution after petitioner submitted her
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of her witnesses. In fact,
when petitioner filed her Motion to Re-open the case with
the BI, she did not question the lack of cross-examination
during the investigation proceedings. She merely based her
motion on the order of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
the charge against her as "not office related." In the same
pleading, she admitted that "[a]s early as October 27, 1998,
the instant administrative action has been submitted for
resolution after the contending parties have submitted
their respective evidence" and that her move for the re-
opening of the administrative case was merely "to allow
her to adduce further evidence mainly based on the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman." Again, in her
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial of
Commissioner Rodriguez's order of dismissal, she merely
reiterated her arguments in her Motion to Re-open. She
never complained that she was deprived of her right to
cross-examination during the investigation of Special
Prosecutor dela Cruz. The right to cross-examination being
a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived
this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and
not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the
BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.47 This was clearly
satisfied in the case at bar. Records show that petitioner not
only gave her sworn written explanation of the charges
against her during the initial stage of the investigation, she
also submitted: a) a sworn counter-affidavit refuting the
charges against her, with all the attached annexes as
evidence; b) a Motion to Re-open the case with the BI; c) a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial with the BI; d)
an Appeal to the CSC; e) a Motion for Reconsideration with
the CSC; f) an Appeal to the CA; g) a Motion for
Reconsideration with the CA; and h) the instant petition for
review.
Second, petitioner contends that Commissioner Rodriguez
violated the principle that "the tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision"
when his denial of her Motion to Re-open and his order
finding her guilty of grave misconduct were based
exclusively on the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz.48
This argument is likewise unavailing.
There is nothing essentially wrong in the head of a bureau
adopting the recommendation of a subordinate. Section 47,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the chief
of bureau or office or department the power to delegate the
task of investigating a case to a subordinate.49 What due
process demands is for the chief of the bureau to personally
weigh and assess the evidence which the subordinate has
gathered and not merely to rely on the recommendation of
said investigating officer.50
In the case at bar, the order of Commissioner Rodriguez
enjoys the disputable presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed. That his decision quotes the
resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz does not
necessarily imply that he did not personally examine the
affidavits and evidence presented by the parties.
Petitioner's bare assertion that Commissioner Rodriguez
did not personally examine the evidence, without more, is
not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
Third, petitioner contends that the CSC did not have basis
in finding: a) that the affidavits of "Peng Villas (Deceased),
Julie Buenaflor, Amy Cosino, Virginia Lubriano, Manuelito
Lao and Jaime Santos Flores x x x all speak of the modus
operandi of Vertudez at the BI" as these affidavits were not
submitted to the CSC; and b) that petitioner "solicited
money from BI clients" inasmuch as private respondent
never alleged that she was a BI client. Moreover, the CSC's
finding that private respondent "testified that respondent
assured her of a visa, a passport and a job in Japan for a
fee of ₱80,000.00 and that Vertudez, after getting paid,
failed to fulfill her promise" is not supported by the
complaint-affidavit of private respondent which merely
stated that petitioner "volunteered to work-out and facilitate
the processing of [private respondent's] passport and visa"
and that petitioner "has a brother in Japan who could also
help [private respondent] find a job."51 Petitioner also assails
the failure of the BI and CSC to consider the handwritten
joint sworn statement of media practitioners Cloma and
Romero and the joint affidavit of the housemaids of
petitioner, Compo and Reyes.52
Again, these arguments fail to impress.
It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.53 It is not the function of this Court, in a petition
under Rule 45, to scrutinize, weigh and analyze evidence
all over again.54 Well-settled is the rule that the findings of
fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the BI and the CSC, are
accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence.55 Substantial
evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might
conceivably opine otherwise.56
In the case at bar, we note that contrary to petitioner's
stance, the affidavits of Lao and Cosino do appear in the
records of the CSC.57 In any case, the affidavits of Villas,
Cosino, Lubriano, Lao and Flores are of little relevance to
the case at bar. If any, they are merely corroborating
evidence. Note that it was only in the CSC's resolution on
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration that said affidavits
were mentioned. These affidavits were not used as basis
for the decision rendered by the BI, the main decision of the
CSC denying the appeal of petitioner and the decision of
the CA. We find the unanimous finding of guilt of the BI, the
CSC and the CA amply supported by the following evidence
on record: a) the complaint-affidavit of private respondent;
b) the affidavit of Jessilyn Gutierrez; c) copies of the
passport and application for a visa of petitioner's son; d)
copies of SB Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798; and e)
letter of private respondent's counsel to petitioner
demanding from petitioner the refund of the ₱79,000.00 that
private respondent paid to petitioner.
As to the other contentions, we note that in addition to the
self-serving quotations of petitioner from the complaint-
affidavit of private respondent, said complaint-affidavit
categorically alleged that petitioner told private respondent
that the latter would "be receiving a salary of one lapad per
day as a factory worker and that should [she] accept
[petitioner's] offer, all that [would] be required of [her was] to
give [petitioner] the amount of ₱80,000.00." Private
respondent also categorically alleged that she was charging
petitioner for her "failure to make good her promise to
deploy [her] after receiving the amount of ₱79,000.00 in
consideration of a job placement in Japan." Thus, contrary
to petitioner's stance, the assailed findings of the CSC are
supported by private respondent's complaint-affidavit.
Moreover, it is well-settled that it is not for the appellate
court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence
and the credibility of the witnesses. Administrative decisions
on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect
and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. None of these vices has
been shown in this case.58
We shall now proceed to the other issue: whether petitioner
is guilty of grave misconduct warranting her removal from
government service.
Citing Sarigumba v. Pasok,59 petitioner contends that
"[m]isconduct, warranting removal from office of a public
officer, must have a direct relation to and connected with
the performance of official duties, amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office." Since the BI is a
government agency principally responsible for the
administration and enforcement of immigration, citizenship
and alien admission and registration laws, "by no stretch of
imagination" can there be a direct relation between the
function of a fingerprint examiner and the alleged promise
to facilitate private respondent's employment
abroad.60Petitioner also capitalizes on the allegation of
private respondent in her complaint-affidavit that she and
petitioner "became friends" to contend that the acts being
imputed against her are personal and not office-related.61
These arguments lack merit.
The allegations in private respondent’s complaint-affidavit
indicate that petitioner used her position as a BI employee
to assure private respondent that she could facilitate
petitioner's deployment to Japan. Private respondent
alleged that "during one of those times that [she] dropped
by [petitioner's] office, [petitioner] intimated to [her] that a
group of Immigration officers [were] scheduled to leave
for Japan for training and that [petitioner] was the one
who received a call from a Japanese Consul." Petitioner
"asked [private respondent] if [she was] interested in going
to Japan because [petitioner] will find a way to
accommodate [her]."
Even petitioner's own admissions show that her position as
an employee of the BI may be utilized in connection with
illegal recruitment. In her memorandum to Commissioner
Rodriguez, as reiterated in her counter-affidavit, petitioner
alleged that private respondent was engaged in illegal
recruitment and "was using [petitioner's] name in her
dealings with some immigration officials and
employees, presumably to expedite the processing of
the documents belonging to her clients." Petitioner
likewise claimed that she "declined [private respondent's]
proposal that [she] 'escort' some of [private
respondent's] clients who would be leaving for foreign
countries but with falsified travel documents." Private
respondent even told her that the "proposed scheme could
easily be done because being an employee of this
Bureau, [petitioner has] several connections not only at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) but also
in Mactan International Airport."
That her position is designated as "fingerprint examiner" is
not determinative of the issue of whether the charge against
her is work-related. The allegations in the complaint against
petitioner and her own admissions show that her duties go
beyond her job title and that the charge against her is
connected with her position as an employee of the BI.
Finally, petitioner contends that "a promise to find a way to
accommodate private respondent and a representation that
petitioner has a brother who could help private respondent
find a job are not misconduct warranting the dismissal of
petitioner from office" but, "[a]t most," only "entitle[s] private
respondent to civil indemnity." Petitioner contends that the
CA's finding that petitioner merely made a "promise to
facilitate" private respondent's employment abroad, as
distinguished from the CSC's finding that petitioner
committed "shameful illegal recruitment activities,"
practically absolved petitioner from the charge of grave
misconduct.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing
or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a
government official.62 As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct.63 Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.64 An act
need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as
grave misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral
turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal
under the Administrative Code.65
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges
against her. Whether the charges against petitioner satisfy
the elements of illegal recruitment to make her criminally
liable for such crime is not the issue at bar. At the very
least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her
position as an employee of the BI to falsely promise, for
pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private respondent's travel
to Japan, including the processing of her passport, visa and
other travel documents. Worse, she was found to have
refused to reimburse the amounts paid to her by private
respondent even when the promised passport, visa, and
travel documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly, these
acts involve "corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule." Under Section 23(c),
Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
these acts constitute a grave offense for which petitioner
must suffer the penalty of dismissal.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 12, 2002 and Resolution
dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Republic of the Philippines vs.
SUPREME COURT JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING
Baguio City JUDGE, BRANCH 03 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BAGUIO CITY, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 160025 April 23, 2014
G.R. No. 173043
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO
CITY, Petitioner, JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS
vs. CORPORATION, Petitioner,
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS vs.
CORPORATION, Respondent. CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent.

x-----------------------x x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 163052 G.R. No. 174879

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS

CORPORATION, Petitioner, CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. vs.
MAYOR BERNARDO M. VERGARA, CITY MAYOR OF ACTING CITY MAYOR AND FORMERLY VICE MAYOR
BAGUIO, VICE MAYOR BETTY LOURDES F. TABANDA, AND PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG
VICE MAYOR OF BAGUIO, COUNCILOR BRAULIO D. PANLUNGSOD NG BAGUIO, REINALDO A. BAUTISTA,
YARANON, COUNCILOR ELMER O. DATUIN, JR., MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
COUNCILOR ANTONIO R. TABORA, JR., COUNCILOR NG BAGUIO, LEONARDO B. YANGOT, JR., ROCKY
GALO D. WEYGAN, COUNCILOR EDILBERTO B. THOMAS A. BALISONG, EDILBERTO B. TENEFRANCIA,
TENEFRANCIA, COUNCILOR FEDERICO J. FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, GALO P. WEYGAN, FEDERICO
MANDAPAT, JR., COUNCILOR RICHARD A. CARINO, J. MANDAP AT, PERLITA L. CHAN-RONDEZ, ANTONIO
COUNCILOR FAUSTINO A. OLOWAN, COUNCILOR R. TABORA, JOSE M. MOLINTAS AND RUFINO M.
DELFIN V. BALAJADIA, COUNCILOR RUFINO M. PANAGAN AND CITY LEGAL OFFICER MELCHOR
PANAGAN, CITY SECRETARY RONALDO B. PEREZ, CARLOS R. RABANES, Respondents.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG
BAGUIO,Respondents. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 181488

G.R. No. 164107 CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Petitioner,

vs.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION, HON.
CORPORATION, Petitioner, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
vs. ACTING BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT, AND
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent. HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
x-----------------------x LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

G.R. No. 165564 DECISION

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS SERENO, CJ:

CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. Before this Court are nine (9) Petitions involving essentially
CITY MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondent. the same parties - officials of the City Government of
Baguio and Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation
x-----------------------x (Jadewell). The only party here that is neither an official of
the City Government of Baguio nor an officer of Jadewell is
former Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
G.R. No. 172215

The two principal parties executed a Memorandum of

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 3 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA,
PATERNO AQUINO, RICHARD LABERINTO, ROLANDO
ABELLERA, FERNANDO SANGALANG, ALLAN ATOS,
ANGELINO SANGALANG, CITY OF BAGUIO, AND CITY
MAYOR BRAULIO D. YARANON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 172216
JADEWELL PARKING
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
Agreement (MOA) on 26 June 2000, whereby the City of
Baguio authorized Jadewell to regulate and collect parking
fees for on-street parking in the city, as well as to
implement the installation of modern parking meters.
The legal disputes embodied in the nine Petitions began
when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City
(Sanggunian) revoked the MOA through City Resolution
No. 037, Series of 2002 (Resolution 37), alleging
substantial breach of the MOA on the part of Jadewell.
Then Mayor Alfredo Vergara vetoed the Resolution. The
Sanggunian Panlungsod overrode the veto through an
unnumbered Resolution dated 17 April 2002. These twin
Resolutions constitute what we call here as the first act of
Rescission1 of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
SYSTEMS Jadewell denied the breach and commenced an action
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio,2questioning the validity of the MOA’s revocation
and the Sanggunian’s capacity to pass a resolution
revoking the MOA.
There was a second act of rescission that the city officials
of Baguio performed in 2006, the circumstances of which
will be narrated later on.
While the main case was under litigation, and then under
appeal, the parties filed contempt charges against each
other. Six of these cases are part of the consolidated
Petitions before us.
These nine highly-voluminous cases, however, all boil down
essentially to just these five sets of legal questions requiring
resolution:
(a) The validity or invalidity and legal efficacy of
Saggunian’s two distinct acts of rescission of the
MOA;
(b) The duty of a trial judge to dismiss a case
assailing the validity of the MOA and the city
resolution approving it in view of the pendency of
the various petitions before this Court;
(c) the liability of : (i) respondent city officials of
Baguio, for various counts of indirect contempt of
this court, (ii) some respondents, who are lawyers
at the same time, for acts that require the
disciplinary action of disbarment, (iii) respondent
Judge Pamintuan, for taking cognizance of a civil
case allegedly in defiance of this Court’s authority;
(d) the validity of the administrative suspension of
one of the respondents herein, former Mayor
Braulio Yaranon, by the Office of the President in
relation to his acts of non-recognition of the MOA;
and
(e) the nullification of certain acts of officials of
Baguio City directed against Jadewell pursuant to
their belief that the latter had no authority to
continue implementing the terms of the MOA.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization3 of
the administration of on-street parking in Baguio City using
Schlumberger’s DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter
(hereinafter "DG4S P&D"), which it touted as
"technologically advanced, up to the level of more
progressive countries and which would make the city as the
first and only city in the Philippines, if not in Asia, to have
metered parking as an important part of its traffic and
parking system."4
Respondent Sanggunian acted favorably on the
proposal.5 On 31 May 2000, it passed Resolution No. 159,
Series of 1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to
negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with
Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking
technology.6
On 16 July 1999, the City Mayor of Baguio wrote to
Jadewell, transmitting to it the finalized draft of the MOA,
with amendments emanating from his office. The City
Mayor informed Jadewell that the finalization of the MOA
would be subject to the appropriate action of the
Sanggunian and the passage of an enabling ordinance.7
On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City
Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000 (Ordinance No. 003-
2000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983,
outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the
administration of on-street parking in the city streets of
Baguio.8 For this purpose, the City of Baguio authorized the
intervention of a private operator for the regulation,
charging and collection of parking fees and the installation
of modern parking meters, among others.
On 10 April 2000, the City Legal Officer of Baguio City
advised the City Mayor that the project for the regulation of
on-street parking and installation of parking meters was not
an infrastructure. Hence, the project was not covered by the
Build-Operate-Transfer Law9 and did not require publication
of a notice for its validity.10
Nevertheless, for the sake of transparency, the City Legal
Officer recommended the publication of the appropriate
notice on the project and an invitation to bid. An invitation to
bid for the proposed regulation of on-street parking and
installation of parking meters on Baguio City’s streets was
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10
May 2000. Four interested bidders submitted their
proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell
was the only one not disqualified; hence, it was awarded
the project.11
On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between
Jadewell and the City of Baguio – through its then City
Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan – for the installation,
management and operation of the DG4S P&D parking
meters.12
On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA
through its Resolution No. 205-2000.13
On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental
MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham parking space, owned
by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed by the
City of Baguio, in the project.14 This supplemental
agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the
Sanggunian.
In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take
over the parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park
area.15 Around this time, questions arose regarding the
compliance by Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA,
notably on matters such as obtaining the recommendation
from the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the
legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its
parking attendants prior to the installation of the parking
meters at Burnham Park.16
On 20 December 2000, Jadewell wrote then Vice-Mayor
Daniel T. Fariñas to inform him of the progress of the
deputization by the Department of Transportation and
Communications–Land Transportation Office (DOTC-LTO)
of parking attendants required for the implementation of the
MOA. Jadewell explained that they were still working on the
required deputization of Jadewell’s parking attendants.
Nevertheless, it claimed that its parking attendants were
authorized to collect parking fees pending the actual
installation of the parking meters. It also claimed that the
parking meters had not yet been installed because the
necessary civil works were yet to be completed.17
Shortly thereafter, a case was filed by Edgar M. Avila, et al.
with the RTC-Baguio City (Branch 61), assailing Ordinance
No. 003-2000 as unconstitutional and seeking to restrain
the City Government of Baguio from implementing the
provisions of the MOA. It further alleged that the City
Government could not delegate the designation of pay
parking zones to Jadewell, that the parking attendants
deployed by Jadewell were not deputized, and that the
questioned ordinance creates class legislation as the
designated taxi and jeepney stands were discriminatorily
removed. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4892-
R.18 This was dismissed on motion by Jadewell joined by
the City Government of Baguio. The lower court declared
that Ordinance No. 003-2000 is constitutional and that all
acts emanating from it are deemed "reasonable and non-
discriminatory...having been enacted in accordance with the
powers granted to Baguio City by law."19 Complainants’
Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied.
On 24 August 2001, Edgar Avila, et al., filed a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the
Supreme Court assailing the RTC’s dismissal of their
Complaint. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 149642.
On 10 October 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition of Avila, et al. for failure to state in
their petition the material dates when they received the
appealed resolution and order, and to append the original
or certified true copies of the questioned resolution and
order subject of their petition.20 There was no resolution on
the merits. The Resolution became final and executory on 2
April 2002.21
A case was also filed by Nelia G. Cid against then Mayor
Bernardo Vergara, et al. when her vehicle was clamped,
towed away, and impounded by Jadewell after the latter
found her car to be illegally parked. She refused to pay the
corresponding fees to Jadewell and as a result, the latter
refused to release her vehicle.22 Cid filed a case for replevin
and questioned the validity of Ordinance No. 003-2000 and
the MOA, as well as the authority of Jadewell to clamp
down/tow away vehicles whose owners refuse to pay
parking fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
5165-R and was assigned to Branch 7 of RTC-Baguio. On
24 May 2002, an Omnibus Order was issued by this RTC
that addressed several pending incidents related to the
authority of Jadewell to clamp down/tow away vehicles. The
Omnibus Order upheld Jadewell’s authority to retain the
vehicle of petitioner Nelia G. Cid pending her payment of
the parking and towage fees to Jadewell, and held that the
authority of Jadewell was lawfully provided in Ordinance
No. 003-2000 and the MOA. Also, the RTC-Baguio took
cognizance of the ruling by this Court in G.R. No. 149642
which, in its mistaken view, upheld the validity of the
questioned ordinance and the MOA.23
Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14
parking meters in three (3) areas of Baguio City: six (6) on
Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on
Lake Drive.24 At the time that these meters were installed,
there were already verbal complaints being raised against
Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged
violations:
a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking
space as specified in Section 3-F of Ordinance No.
003-2000;25
b. Failure to install a convenient and
technologically advanced parking device that is
solar-powered and can measure the time a vehicle
stays in a parking slot;26
c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's
share of the collected parking fee;27
d. Failure to post a performance bond in the
amount of ₱1 million after its previous bond
expired.28
The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of
2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its obligations under
the MOA for the installation of the necessary number of
parking meters.29
On 15 March 2001, Jadewell wrote to the City Mayor in
response to the mentioned Resolution, informing the said
office that the former had started operation of the off-street
parking on 2 December 2000 and of the on-street parking
on 15 December 2000.30 On 27 January 2001, Jadewell
also wrote the City Treasurer that the former had completed
installation of the parking meters.31
In response to the letter of Jadewell, the City Treasurer
demanded the remittance of Baguio’s share of the parking
fees collected by Jadewell since it started operations.
Jadewell responded by saying that it had complied with this
obligation.32
On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution
37,33 expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with
Jadewell. The said Resolution enumerated in the
"Whereas" clauses the alleged violations of Jadewell
prompting it to rescind the MOA. It reads:
xxxx
WHEREAS, it now appears from verified facts that:
1. contrary to its commitment to install a
technologically based P & D parking system, at no
cost to the City, including "such equipment and
paraphernalia to meter the length of usage of the
affected parking spaces for purposes of payment of
the parking fees", Jadewell has installed only
fourteen (14) parking meters (only 12 of which are
working) in only three (3) streets, and Jadewell
does not intend to install anymore [sic]; instead it
has resorted as a rule to an exceptional
circumstance of manual collection of parking fees
by parking attendants who, despite express
provisions of the Ordinance, are not duly deputized
by the DOTC-LTO. Despite assurances to the
Honorable City Mayor that Jadewell would stop
collection of parking fees until the parking meters
have been duly installed, Jadewell continues to
collect parking fees manually by using undeputized
parking attendants to do the collection;
2. contrary to its commitment to install a
technologically based P & D parking system, at no
cost to the City, Jadewell has charged the cost of
such and similar equipment as direct costs, thus
substantially eroding the share of the City in the
parking fees;
3. contrary to its obligation to post a performance
bond, Jadewell has not fully complied, and when
required to update its performance bond Jadewell
refused to do so rationalizing its non-compliance by
the assertion that they are already performing and
therefore are no longer obligated to post a
performance bond;
4. contrary to its obligation to remit the share of the
City within the first ten (10) days of the following
month, Jadewell had initially resisted making
payments to the City on the pretext that the profits
cannot be determined until after the end of the
fiscal year and initially failed to have their tickets
pre-numbered and registered with the Office of the
City Treasurer;
5. contrary to its promise that the City would derive
substantial revenue from the on-street pay parking
system, Jadewell has not paid a single centavo of
the City share in on-street parking operation;
whatever Jadewell has remitted to the City are
properly chargeable against the share of the City in
the MOA on off-street parking (the Burnham
Parking Area near Ganza), and it appears less
than what the City is entitled thereto; and
6. contrary to its representations that the P & D
System which it proposed would eliminate fraud in
 the collection of parking fees, Jadewell has
perpetrated fraud on the City by, according to the
affidavit of its former bookkeeper, Mr. Adonis
Cabungan, doctoring the financial statements
before the same are submitted to City authorities.34
WHEREAS, there has been no substantial improvement of
the traffic situation in the City even with the introduction of
the P & D Parking System and thus it increasingly appears
that the system introduced by Jadewell is more for revenue
raising than for regulatory purposes. As a consequence the
legal principle applies that the collection of taxes cannot be
let to any person. In other words, government cannot allow
private persons to collect public funds for themselves with
the agreement that part thereof or as it turned out in this
case no part thereof is shared with the City;
WHEREAS, in its financial reports to the City showing
substantial loses [sic] and in its statement to other persons
that it is losing money on the project, the kindest thing that
the City can do for Jadewell is to prevent Jadewell from
incurring anymore [sic] loses.
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Hon. Bautista, and Hon.
Cariño, seconded by Hon. Yaranon, Hon. Weygan and
Hon. Tabora, be it RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to
rescind the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed
between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking System
Corporation dated 26 June 2000 on the basis of the
foregoing premises and exercising its rights under Section
12 of the MOA on the subject of On-Street Parking
executed between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking
Systems Corporation dated 26 June 2000 and, more
importantly, performing its duty to protect and promote the
general welfare of the people of Baguio City.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to direct the City Legal Officer to
cause the proper notice of rescission to Jadewell Parking
Systems Corporation forthwith and to take all appropriate
steps to implement and enforce the intent of this
Resolution.
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, to inform all City officials
and employees and all other persons concerned to be
guided accordingly.35
On 1 March 2002, the then City Mayor of Baguio, Bernardo
M. Vergara, vetoed Resolution 37, through a letter dated 1
March 2002 addressed to the Vice-Mayor, as Presiding
Officer of the Sanggunian, and its members. Mayor Vergara
reasoned that it was premature for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to rescind the MOA, because the latter
provides for a minimum period of five years before the right
of rescission can be exercised; and, that the right of
Jadewell to due process was violated due to the lack of
opportunity to hear the latter’s side. The City Mayor
proposed a re-negotiation of the MOA with Jadewell as a
solution to the problem.36
Meanwhile, on 13 March 2002, the DOTC–Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DOTC-CAR) issued a cease and
desist order to Jadewell prohibiting it from clamping down
and/or towing away vehicles in Baguio City for violation of
traffic rules and regulations.37
On 17 April 2002, the Sanggunian resolved through a
Resolution of the same date, to override the veto of the City
Mayor, worded thus:
NOW THEREFORE, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City
Council) in Regular Session assembled, by twelve
affirmative votes constituting more that [sic] a two-thirds
vote of all its Members, has resolved to override, as it
hereby overrides, the veto of His Honor, Mayor Bernardo M.
Vergara, of City Resolution Numbered 037, Series of 2002,
entitled "Rescinding the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
Executed Between the City of Baguio and Jadewell Parking
Systems Corporation Dated 26 June 2000."38
Also at this time, Braulio D. Yaranon, who was then a
member of the Sanggunian, requested a special audit from
the Commission on Audit–Cordillera Autonomous Region
(COA-CAR) on the operations of Jadewell as regards the
pay parking project embodied in the MOA.
On 27 May 2002, Jadewell filed with the RTC of Baguio City
a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, assailing the validity of Resolution No. 037-2002,
which rescinded the MOA between the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Jadewell.39 The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 5285-R and was raffled off to RTC-Baguio
(Branch 61).
On 8 October 2002, the RTC Br. 61 promulgated its
Decision40 finding the Sanggunian’s rescission of the MOA
unlawful. The Sanggunian then filed an appeal assailing the
RTC’s decision with the Court of Appeals; the case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74756.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 74756
before the CA, the Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 089,
Series of 2003. The resolution sought the assistance of the
DOTC-CAR specifically, for it to take immediate action
against the officers and personnel of Jadewell for defying
the 13 March 2002 cease-and-desist Order it issued
prohibiting the latter from clamping down and/or towing
away vehicles.41 On 27 May 2003, City Mayor Vergara
approved and signed Resolution No. 089-2003. In
response, Jadewell filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt
with the CA against Mayor Vergara, the Sanggunian and
other local government officers. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 77341. The original petition was followed
by three (3) supplemental petitions filed by Jadewell in the
same case.
On 7 July 2003, the CA rendered a Decision42 in CA G.R.
SP No. 74756, affirming the assailed Decision of the trial
court which declared as invalid the Sanggunian’s rescission
of the MOA. The Sanggunian filed a Motion For
Reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA through a
Resolution dated 4 September 2003.43 Aggrieved by the
denial of their appeal, the Sanggunian filed a Rule 45
Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the 7 July 2003 Decision and its
Resolution dated 04 September 2003 of the CA. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 160025, the first of the
consolidated petitions herein.44
In CA-G.R. SP No. 77341, the CA dismissed in a
Decision45 promulgated on 28 July 2004 the contempt
petitions filed by Jadewell for lack of merit. The latter’s
Motion For Reconsideration was likewise denied by the
CA.46Jadewell elevated the dismissal of its contempt
petitions to this Court on 8 December 2004 by filing a Rule
45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 166094. This is not among the
consolidated petitions herein.
On 13 July 2003, the COA-CAR promulgated the requested
Report.47 The Report’s objective was to ascertain
compliance by the contracting parties – the City of Baguio
and Jadewell – with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA.
The COA-CAR Report has 12 findings, essentially as
follows:
1) The provisions of the MOA and its Supplement
as regards the sharing of the fees are
contradicting, hence the share of the City
Government cannot be determined;48
 2) There was no proper segregation by area of the
parking fees collected, hence the proper share of
Baguio City cannot be determined;49
3) The City Government did not strictly implement
the collection of penalties arising from the late
remittances of Jadewell, hence additional revenues
were not collected;50
4) The City Treasurer did not conduct an audit of
the books and accounts of Jadewell, thus the City
Government’s share from parking fees cannot be
ascertained;51
5) The use of the P&D parking meters were [sic]
not maximized due to Jadewell’s non-compliance
with Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA,
resulting in the collection of meager income from
its use;52
6) The MOA does not specify the guidelines for
determining the economic viability of installing the
parking meters and the period within which to
install it [sic];53
7) The Supplemental MOA was not confirmed by
the City Council of Baguio in violation of R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code);54
8) The coverage of the parking operations
contained in Annex "A" of the MOA was not
confirmed by the City Council in violation of R.A.
No. 7160;55
9) The City Government failed to ensure proper
compliance by Jadewell with the MOA provisions;56
10) The pay parking project was awarded to a
bidder who did not have all the qualifications as
stated in the "Invitation to Bid" in violation of R.A.
No. 7160 and Audit Circular No. 92-386;57
11) The provisions on deputization in Ordinance
No. 003-2000 and the MOA are contrary to R.A.
No. 4136 (the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code), thus rendering it invalid;58
12) The monthly minimum amount to be remitted to
the City Government is doubtful due to the
discrepancy in the amounts collected and
expenses for the year 1999 provided by the City
Government to Jadewell as against the amount
certified by the Office of the City Architect and
Parks Superintendent-Burnham Parks Office for
the City Government overseeing the Ganza-
Burnham parking spaces.59
On 11 February 2004, after G.R. No. 160025 was filed and
pending resolution by this Court, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod adopted Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004.
The said Resolution informs the general public that
Jadewell had neither the authority nor the police power to
clamp, tow, or impound vehicles at any place in the City of
Baguio.60 Also, on the same date, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod passed Resolution No. 059, Series of 2004, in
which it made a formal demand upon Jadewell to restore to
it possession of the Ganza Parking Area.61
With these developments, Jadewell filed directly with this
Court its first indirect contempt case against Bernardo M.
Vergara (then City Mayor of Baguio), its Vice-Mayor, and
the entire City Council for enacting Resolution Nos. 056 &
059, Series of 2004 pending resolution by this Court of G.R.
160025. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 163052.
On 23 June 2004, this Court through its First Division,
ordered G.R. No. 163052 consolidated with G.R. No.
160025.62
On 1 July 2004, then Baguio City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon
issued Executive Order No. 001-04,63 the decretal portion of
which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned City Mayor, pursuant
to his authority to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the City, and to issue executive orders
for the faithful and appropriate enforcement and execution
of such laws and ordinances (Sec. 455 (b) (2) and (iii), R.A.
7160) hereby affirms and gives protection to the right of the
citizenry, particularly affected motor vehicle owners,
operators, and drivers, to refuse to submit to the
enforcement of Ordinance 003-2000, by the Jadewell
Parking Systems Corporation, and further to refuse to pay
public revenue in the form of fees, charges, impositions,
fines, and penalties provided for in the said ordinance, to
the said entity, such acts being patently illegal and
prohibited by law; this Executive Order shall be in force and
effect until the City Council, as the legislative arm of the
City of Baguio, shall have adopted appropriate remedial or
corrective measures on the matters and concerns specified
hereinabove.
On 8 July 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued a Memorandum64 to
the City Director of the Baguio City Police Department,
directing the department to stop and prevent Jadewell from
clamping, towing, and impounding vehicles; to arrest and
file criminal charges against Jadewell personnel who would
execute the proscribed acts specified in the said
Memorandum; and to confiscate the equipment used by
Jadewell to clamp, tow, or impound vehicles under the
authority of the rescinded MOA.
On 12 July 2004, Jadewell filed its second Petition for
indirect contempt again with this Court, this time against
Mayor Yaranon for having issued the above-cited Order
also for the same reasons given in its first contempt petition
with this Court. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
164107.
Furthermore, on 15 July 2004, Jadewell filed an
administrative case against Mayor Yaranon before the
Office of the President (OP). Docketed as Case No. OP 04-
G-294, it sought the mayor’s suspension and removal from
office. The case against Mayor Yaranon was for his
issuance of the following: (1) Executive Order No. 001-04
dated 1 July 2004; (2) the Memorandum dated 7 July 2004
limiting the pay parking business of Jadewell to certain
parts of Baguio City;; and (3) Memorandum dated 8 July
2004 directing the Baguio City Police Department to
prevent Jadewell from apprehending, towing and
impounding vehicles. A supplemental petition filed by
Jadewell on 19 January 2005, complaining of Executive
Order No. 005-2004, which was issued on 15 October
2004, was also included in administrative case OP 04-G-
294.
On the following day, 16 July 2004, Jadewell filed a
Supplemental Petition with Motion for Leave of this
Court65 in the second contempt petition before this Court,
G.R. No. 164107, alleging as a supplemental fact, Mayor
Yaranon’s Memorandum of 08 July 2004.
On 15 October 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued Executive
Order No. 005-2004.66 This was a cease and desist order
against Jadewell to prevent it from performing the following
acts: (1) charging and collecting from motorists, parking
fees without their consent;67 (2) seizing and detaining
vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay parking fees to
Jadewell;68 and (3) using yellow-colored heavy wreckers or
tow trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".69
In addition to Executive Order No. 005-2004, Mayor
Yaranon issued Executive Order No. 005-2004-A, which is
essentially a rehash of Executive Order No. 005-2004.70
On 25 October 2004, Jadewell filed a third Petition with this
Court, praying that Mayor Yaranon be cited for contempt
and that Executive Order No. 005-2004 be nullified.71 This
case was docketed as G.R. No. 165564. On 16 November
2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental Petition to this Petition
alleging as a supplemental ground the issuance of
Executive Order No. 005-2004-A.72
On 20 December 2004, Mayor Yaranon issued
Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004, which
declared that Jadewell exceeded its area of operations for
the administration of on-street parking and was thus
required to show lawful cause why its business permit
should not be revoked. In response to this Order, Jadewell
filed a Second Supplemental Petition for contempt against
Mayor Yaranon in G.R. No. 165564 on 25 January 2005.
On 10 January 2005, this Court through a
Resolution73 ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 160025
with G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, and 165564.
On 17 January 2005, this Court denied Jadewell’s petition
in G.R. No. 166094 for failure to show any reversible error
on the part of the CA in dismissing its petition for contempt
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77341.74 Its Motion For Reconsideration
was likewise denied with finality.75
In the beginning of the year 2005, Jadewell attempted to
renew its business permit from the City of Baguio and
tendered the fees required. However, the Office of the City
Mayor refused to renew the business permit and returned
the amount tendered.76 Because of these actions of Mayor
Yaranon, Jadewell filed on 15 April 2005 its Third
Supplemental Petition in G.R. No. 164107, which had been
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, and 165564.
Aside from its main prayer to cite the mayor for contempt,
Jadewell also prayed that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be
disbarred.77 On 25 April 2005, this Court, through its Third
Division, admitted the Third Supplemental Petition of
Jadewell.78
On 9 February 2005, this Court, in G.R. No. 160025, issued
a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Mayor
Yaranon to immediately reopen the streets and premises
occupied and/or operated by Jadewell. The Court also
required Jadewell to post a cash or surety bond in the
amount of ₱100,000 within five days from receipt of the
order.79
The order, in part, reads:
Acting on the urgent motion dated January 26, 2005 of
respondent Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation for the
issuance of a temporary mandatory/preventive order and/or
for writ of preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction
pending appeal in G.R. No. 160025, alleging that the effects
of the acts of City Mayor Yaranon, unless stayed, would
also make effective what the petitioner Sangguniang
Panglungsod ng Baguio failed to obtain in the instant case,
the net effect of which would not only be grave damage and
injury to the respondent but also to the City of Baguio, the
Court further Resolved:
(a) to ISSUE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY INJUNCTION prayed for, effective
immediately, commanding City Mayor Yaranon to
immediately reopen the streets and/or premises
operated and/or occupied by the respondent and to
let them remain open, until further orders of this
Court; and
(b) to require petitioner to POST a CASH BOND or
a SURETY BOND from a reputable bonding
company of indubitable solvency in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱100,000.00), with terms and conditions to be
approved by the Court, within five (5) days from
notice, otherwise, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction herein issued shall AUTOMATICALLY
be lifted.
NOW THEREFORE, You, [City Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon],
your agents, representatives and/or any person or persons
acting upon your orders or in your place or stead, are
hereby DIRECTED to IMMEDIATELY REOPEN the streets
and/or premises operated and/or occupied by the
respondents and to let the said streets and premises
remain OPEN, until further orders from this Court.
On 8 April 2005, Mayor Yaranon issued a
Memorandum80 directing Col. Isagani Nerez, Director of the
Baguio City Police District, to create a special task force to
stop Jadewell from clamping, towing, and impounding
vehicles in violation of parking rules in Baguio City; to
impound the wrecker/tow trucks used by Jadewell.
On 20 April 2005, this Court promulgated a Resolution in
G.R. No. 160025, finding Mayor Yaranon guilty of direct and
indirect contempt. He was cited for direct contempt when it
was proven that he had submitted pleadings before this
Court containing falsehoods. Mayor Yaranon had stated in
his Compliance that the streets were opened for Jadewell to
resume operations, but upon inspection these were found
to be closed.81 He was also cited for indirect contempt, for
having continuously refused to carry out the writ issued by
this Court to reopen the streets so Jadewell could resume
operations.82 This Court likewise fined Mayor Yaranon the
amount of ₱10,000, which he paid. The Court further
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
immediately arrest and detain Mayor Yaranon pending his
compliance with the 9 February 2005 writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by this Court, which ordered
the reopening of some streets so Jadewell could continue
its operations.83
On 10 August 2005, Benedicto Balajadia, et al. filed Civil
Case No. 6089-R against Jadewell before the RTC–Baguio
City. The case was subsequently raffled to Branch 3 of the
RTC presided by Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan.84 Balajadia, et al. sought to nullify the MOA
between Jadewell and the City Government of Baguio and
its enabling ordinance, Ordinance No. 003-2000. The
complainants also prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against Jadewell.
On 19 April 2006, Judge Pamintuan issued an Order in Civil
Case No. 6089-R granting the prayer of complainants
Balajadia et al. for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction. The injunction was meant to restrain
Jadewell from proceeding with the supervision and
collection of parking, towing, and impounding fees on the
streets of Baguio City. Further, Judge Pamintuan ordered
the holding in abeyance of the implementation of City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the MOA.85
On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed with this Court a Rule 65
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus against
Judge Pamintuan86 for refusing to dismiss Civil Case No.
6089-R. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 172215. On
the same day, Jadewell filed a Petition asking this Court to
cite Judge Pamintuan for contempt. This fourth contempt
case, albeit primarily against a member of the judiciary, was
docketed as G.R. No. 172216.
On 19 June 2006, G.R. No. 172215 was ordered
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107, and
165564.87
On 23 June 2006, Mayor Yaranon wrote Jadewell a letter
demanding that it desist from operating the pay parking
system in Baguio City. Simultaneously, he wrote the
Sanggunian, requesting it to cancel Ordinance No. 003-
2000, the enabling ordinance for the MOA.
On 26 June 2006, Jadewell filed a Supplemental
Petition88 in G.R. No. 172215 complaining of Judge
Pamintuan’s issuance of the following Orders in Civil Case
No. 6089-R: (a) Order dated 24 April 200689 directing the
parties to file a pre-trial brief and setting the pre-trial of the
case; (b) Order dated 01 June 200690 informing Jadewell
that public respondent was not suspending the
proceedings, because he believed he was not covered by
the writ issued by this Court; (c) Order dated 14 June
200691 upholding the writ he issued in the civil case despite
his receipt of a copy of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court; and (d) Order dated 16 June
200692 directing Jadewell to comply with the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction under pain of direct
contempt.
On the same day, 26 June 2006, the Office of the President
(OP) rendered a Decision in OP 04-G-294, the
administrative case Jadewell had filed against Mayor
Yaranon, finding him guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and oppression. Mayor Yaranon was meted out a
penalty totalling 12 months suspension from office.93This
suspension was implemented by the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG). Aggrieved by his
suspension, Mayor Yaranon filed his Motion For
Reconsideration, which was denied on 22 August 2006 by
the OP.
On 29 June 2006, in response to Mayor Yaranon’s letters of
23 June 2006, Jadewell filed before this Court yet another
case for contempt – its fifth contempt case, and the third
one specifically against Mayor Yaranon. In addition to its
prayer to cite the mayor for contempt, Jadewell also prayed
that Mayor Yaranon, a lawyer, be disbarred.94 The case
was docketed as G.R. No. 173043.
On 31 July 2006, G.R. No. 173043 was ordered
consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052, 164107,
165564, and 172215.95 On 27 September 2006, G.R. No.
172216 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160025, 163052,
164107, 165564.96
On 23 August 2006, while the consolidated cases were
pending resolution before this Court, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006.
The Resolution directed the City Legal Officer to notify
Jadewell of the Baguio City Government’s intention to
rescind the MOA, and to inform Jadewell to stop its
operations under the MOA 60 days after receipt of the
Notice.97
On 28 August 2006, the legal counsel for Jadewell wrote to
Baguio City Vice-Mayor Bautista, Jr., informing him that the
OP had denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor
Yaranon assailing the OP resolution ordering the latter’s
suspension as City Mayor of Baguio City.98 The counsel for
Jadewell likewise stated in his letter that they were aware
that the Sanggunian was planning to issue a resolution to
repeal Ordinance No. 003-2000 and rescind the MOA. The
letter requested the Vice-Mayor to veto the measure in light
of the pending petitions with the Supreme Court.99 The said
counsel likewise sent a similar letter to the Sanggunian,
urging it to desist from implementing the repeal of
Ordinance No. 003-2000 and the rescission of the MOA
pending the resolution of the cases with the Supreme
Court.100
On 13 September 2006, Mayor Yaranon appealed to the
CA, in a case docketed as CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116,
praying for the lifting of the penalty of suspension meted
him in OP 04-G-294, but this appeal was denied. Mayor
Yaranon moved for reconsideration.101
On 22 September 2006, City Legal Officer Rabanes wrote a
letter to Jadewell, through its President, Mr. Rogelio Tan,
informing Jadewell of Resolution No. 204, Series of 2006,
which rescinded the MOA, and ordering it to stop
operations within 60 days from notice.102 This letter was
received on the same day it was issued;103 hence, the 60-
day period lapsed on 22 November 2006. This notice,
together with the resolution, constitute the second act of
rescission of the MOA by the city officials of Baguio.
On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed the sixth contempt case
with this Court against the acting City Mayor of Baguio,
Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the
Sanggunian, including City Legal Officer Melchor Carlos R.
Rabanes, for the second act of rescission of the
MOA.104 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174879.
On 9 October 2007, the CA dismissed Mayor Yaranon’s
Petition in CA G.R. CV SP No. 96116 on the ground that it
had become moot and academic due to Mayor Yaranon’s
failure to be re-elected in the 17 May 2007 elections. Mayor
Yaranon filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 07
November 2007, but this was also denied by the CA on 24
January 2008. Thus, on 17 March 2008, Mayor Yaranon
filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the CA Decision and Resolution. It was
docketed as G.R. No. 181488.
On 12 November 2008, G.R. No. 181488 was ordered
consolidated with the cases already mentioned.105
THE ISSUES
1. On G.R. No. 160025 and on the
claim in G.R. No. 174879 that the second
act of rescission was a valid act of
rescission.
Whilst the issues are spread out among the nine cases, we
have grouped these according to what are common to the
specific cases.
In our effort to simplify the issues and provide forms of relief
to the parties that are not purely academic, it is necessary
to examine the operative effects that may result from any
resolution of this Court. Such examination may also help
guide the parties in their future actions, and perhaps the
overly-litigated matters brought before us in the
consolidated petitions may finally be put to rest.
We note at the outset that on 22 November 2006, 60 days
had lapsed from receipt of the letter dated 22 September
2006, informing Jadewell of the decision of the City of
Baguio to rescind the MOA under Section 12 thereof. It may
be recalled that Section 12 requires that notice of the
intention to rescind be given 60 days prior to the effectivity
of the rescission. Jadewell has not questioned the legal
efficacy of this notice. It has brought this matter of a second
rescission to the Court’s attention only as a matter of
contumacious behavior on the part of the respondents in
G.R. No. 174879, in the same way that it brought various
actions of the public respondents before the Court in its
other contempt petitions. Since the legal efficacy of the
rescission in 2006 has not been contested by Jadewell in
any of the petitions before us, we thus consider this notice
of rescission to have taken legal effect and therefore, at the
latest, the MOA between the City of Baguio and Jadewell
has ceased to legally exist as of 22 November 2006.
Parenthetically, we note that while the validity of the second
act of rescission described in G.R. No. 174879 is not
principally determinative of the respondents’ liability for
indirect contempt therein, a conclusion that the second act
of rescission was undertaken competently and
appropriately will to a certain degree impact our
appreciation of such possible liability. We will discuss this
issue in our subsequent discussion on the charges of
contempt.
Inasmuch as there is no longer any existing MOA, no order
of this Court can have the effect of directing the City of
Baguio to enforce any of the terms of the MOA, which
brings us to the matter of G.R. No. 160025. In whatever
direction we rule on the question of the validity of the first
act of rescission, such ruling will only have the effect of
either providing Jadewell a basis to seek damages from the
City of Baguio for the wrongful termination of the MOA,
should we find wrongful termination to have taken place, or,
deny Jadewell that right. The possible susceptibility of the
City of Baguio and its officials to an action for damages on
a finding of wrongful termination is why we do not consider
G.R. No. 160025 as having been rendered moot by the
lawful rescission of the MOA on 22 November 2006. Thus,
we will proceed to rule on the issues in G.R. No. 160025.
The fallo of the RTC Decision upheld by the CA, which
affirmance is the lis mota in G.R. No. 160025, reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring both
Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 037, Series of
2002 and the April 17, 2002 Resolution overriding the
Mayor’s veto as NULL and VOID. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued by this Court is made
PERMANENT, with costs against respondents.106
The RTC did not order the respondents therein to comply
with the MOA. An order to perform a contract is not
necessarily subsumed in an order not to terminate the
same.
Contrast this legal point with the fact that the prayer of
Jadewell in its original petition asked the RTC, in relevant
part:
...that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent
and the writs applied for be issued against the respondents
nullifying and voiding Resolution No. 037, series of 2002
and the resolution over-riding the veto … and instead,
directing them to perform what the memorandum of
agreement requires them to do. (Emphasis supplied)107
This latter part, which is effectively a prayer for a permanent
mandatory injunction against respondents therein to
perform the terms of the MOA, are not in the fallo of the
RTC decision. We consider therefore that the RTC
deliberately withheld granting the specific prayer to order
Baguio City to perform the MOA. No motion to correct or
clarify the said fallo having been filed by Jadewell, the
prayer to order the city officials of Baguio to perform the
MOA is hereby deemed abandoned.
We further note three things:
1. Jadewell has not questioned - in its Petition,
Reply to Comment, and Memorandum before this
Court - the implication of the RTC and CA
Decisions to the effect that the Sanggunian had the
authority to perform acts of contractual rescission
on behalf of the City of Baguio when both these
courts ignored the issue raised by Jadewell in its
Petition before the RTC, and we therefore do not
consider this to be a genuine issue in this Petition
before us;
2. While the Sangguniang Panlungsod has
insinuated that there was fraud and excess of
authority on the part of the mayor in the
execution108 of the MOA - because the latter
provided for a smaller sharing of "20 % from the
gross profit of the operation or 50% of the net profit
whichever is higher" instead of the intended "20%
of gross receipts,"109- petitioners in G.R. No.
160025 conceded even at the RTC level that they
are not assailing the MOA for being defective but
for having been breached in the performance. We
thus disregard all arguments in G.R. No. 160025
regarding the validity of the execution of the MOA,
for being a non-issue in this case;110
3. We also immediately set aside claims of
Jadewell in its Petition before the RTC that an
alternative relief should be provided by the courts
in the form of compensation for terminated Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts under the BOT
Law (Republic Act No. 6957) as there is not the
slightest basis on record that the administration of
on-street parking can be classified as an
infrastructure contract, a basic element that must
be present for any contract to come within the
terms of the BOT Law.
Having preliminarily screened out the non-issues in this
case, we proceed to examine the rulings of the courts a quo
in G.R. 160025.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, along the
following points:
1. On the sole procedural issue. - The RTC was
correct in treating the Petition as one for
permanent injunction with a prayer for a preliminary
injunction, instead of treating it by its formal title:
"Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction." It
was correct in holding that if the Petition had been
treated by its formal denomination, then it would
have been dismissed for failing to satisfy the
requirement that the act sought to be nullified was
rendered in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity by
the respondents, but then this formal denomination
could be disregarded and the nature of the Petition
should be determined by its allegations and
prayers. Since there was a prayer to permanently
enjoin respondents from enforcing the questioned
resolutions, the RTC was correct in treating it as
one for permanent injunction.
2. On the substantive issues:
a. On the lack of due process afforded
Jadewell. – The RTC was correct in ruling
that Jadewell was denied the right to be
heard before the Sanggunian rescinded
the MOA. There is no evidence on record
that the Sanggunian afforded Jadewell an
opportunity to present its side or refute the
charges of the latter’s violation committed
under the MOA.111
b. On the authority of the RTC to consider
the effect of Section 9 of the MOA112 when
Jadewell never raised the matter of
Section 9 in any of its pleadings. – The
RTC correctly considered Jadewell’s letter
dated 24 November 2001, addressed to
the Sanggunian and offered during the
trial, which introduced the subject matter
of the five (5) year guarantee against
rescission provided in Section 9 of the
MOA. The CA regarded the RTC’s
consideration of said letter as judicious
and added that even without it, the MOA,
and its provisions, form part of the case
records.113
 c. On the failure to observe the 60-day
notice requirement. – The RTC correctly
found that the Sanggunian cannot validly
and unilaterally rescind the MOA without
observing the provisions in Section 12 of
the MOA requiring that a 60-day notice be
given before rescission can take place. To
allow the Sanggunian to unilaterally
rescind the MOA without giving Jadewell
an opportunity to present its side is to
render the right to rescission provided in
the MOA legally vulnerable.114
d. On the lack of substantiveness of the
alleged breach of performance of the MOA
by Jadewell. – The CA reviewed the
records of the case and upheld the
findings of the RTC that the violations of
Jadewell were not substantial to merit the
consequence of rescission under the
MOA.115
We elucidate on the arguments of the parties, the RTC, and
the CA.
In its Petition before the RTC, Jadewell argues that the
rescission of the MOA was not valid, on due process
grounds, and also because there was no substantial breach
on its part to justify a rescission of the MOA.116 It also
asserts that the Sanggunian had no authority to rescind the
MOA, because the latter was not a party thereto.117
Jadewell sought a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent
the implementation of the questioned Resolution, and
prayed that after hearing, the preliminary injunction be
made permanent. It further prayed for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari to nullify the assailed Resolution; and for a
mandatory injunction to compel the City Government to
perform the latter’s obligations under the MOA.118 Jadewell
alternatively invoked the provisions of Section 18 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the BOT
Law,119 in the event the RTC would uphold the validity of
the questioned Resolution.
The trial court ruled that the rescission violated the due
process clause of the Constitution and failed to meet the
requirements for rescission under the Civil Code and the
MOA itself. In the Sanggunian’s Memorandum, on appeal
before the CA, the Sanggunian assigned three errors to the
Decision of the trial court: (1) the RTC ignored the evidence
on record and the requirements of Rule 65 when it declared
the subject Resolution void; (2) Jadewell was not denied
due process when the MOA was rescinded; and (3) by
ruling that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had no right of
rescission for the first 5 years of the MOA – an issue not
raised in the pleadings – the trial court improperly took up
the cudgels for Jadewell in the case.120
As earlier stated, the CA upheld the RTC’s Decision in toto.
The Sanggunian filed its Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that the CA had erred as follows: (1) treating
Jadewell’s petition as an original action for injunction; 121 (2)
ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process122 when it
rescinded the MOA; and (3) finding that the MOA stipulated
for a five-year minimum guarantee against
rescission.123This was denied, and this denial and the CA
Decision are the subjects of G. R. 160025.
2. G.R. No. 172215 – Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, filed by
Jadewell against Judge Pamintuan
for not dismissing Civil Case No. 6089-R
Jadewell directly filed the instant Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari before this Court to nullify the denial by the trial
court of its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for
Reconsideration of the same order,124 and for ordering
Jadewell to cease collecting parking fees, and from towing
and impounding vehicles on the streets of Baguio City. It
also seeks to nullify the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6089-R, invoking both res judicata and litis pendentia.125 It
contends that, since the issue on the validity of the
questioned city ordinance and the MOA was favorably ruled
upon previously by RTC Branches 7 and 61 of Baguio City
in separate cases, Branch 3 of the same RTC presided by
Judge Pamintuan is bound by the rulings of the other
branches.126 Litis pendentia is being invoked in relation to
the petitions already before this Court.
Mayor Yaranon is impleaded in this case on the basis of the
order of Judge Pamintuan to the city mayor to perform his
duty to supervise the roads, streets and park of Baguio City,
in coordination with the police and the LTO during the
validity of the Writ of Injunction that Judge Pamintuan
issued.127
The main issue to be resolved in Jadewell’s Petition for
certiorari is whether Judge Pamintuan’s rulings in Civil
Case No. 6089-R violated the res judicata/litis pendentia
doctrines.
3. G.R. No. 181488 – The
Certiorari petition filed by Yaranon
seeking to reverse Resolutions dated
9 October 2008 and 24 January 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96116 which
upheld the validity of his suspension
as City Mayor of Baguio.
Mayor Yaranon’s instant Petition before this Court raises
the following issues: (1) that his failed re-election bid was
not a supervening event in the final determination by the CA
of whether he was guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and oppression; and (2) that the CA should rule
on the substantive validity of his suspension.
4. The Petitions for Contempt
a. G.R. No. 163052 – This is the first contempt petition filed
by Jadewell directly with this Court against City Mayor
Vergara, the Vice Mayor, and the entire Sanggunian, for
enacting Resolution Nos. 056 & 059, Series of 2004. To
recall, Resolution No. 056, Series of 2004 informs the
general public that Jadewell had neither the authority nor
the police power to clamp, tow or impound vehicles at any
place in the City of Baguio.128 In Resolution No. 059, Series
of 2004, the City of Baguio made a formal demand upon
Jadewell to surrender the Ganza and Burnham Park
Parking Areas within thirty days. In the same Resolution,
the City of Baguio also directed the City Legal Officer to file
the appropriate legal actions necessary to recover the said
parking areas and to ask for damages against Jadewell.129
The core issue to be resolved in this case is whether the
Sanggunian Panlungsod is guilty of indirect contempt for
enacting the above resolutions, pending resolution of G.R.
No. 160025.
b. G.R. No. 164107 – This contempt petition was filed
directly with this Court against then Baguio City Mayor
Braulio D. Yaranon after he issued Executive Order No.
001-04 announcing that, as City Mayor, he would give
protection to motor vehicle owners, operators, and drivers
who would refuse to submit to the enforcement of traffic
rules by Jadewell such as by refusing to pay the parking
fees or fines the latter imposes.
Yaranon also issued a Memorandum dated 8 July 2004,
ordering the arrest and filing of criminal charges against
Jadewell personnel who would clamp, tow, or impound
motor vehicles in defiance of Executive Order No. 001-04.
This was followed by a Memorandum on 8 April 2005
directing the Baguio City Police District to create a special
task force to prevent Jadewell from clamping, towing, and
impounding vehicles found to be in violation of the parking
rules in Baguio City.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether Mayor
Yaranon could be cited for contempt for the above, pending
resolution of the issue of the validity of the rescission of the
MOA in G.R. Nos. 160025 and 163052.
c. G.R. No. 165564 – Jadewell filed this third contempt
petition against Mayor Yaranon for issuing Executive Order
No. 005-2004 dated 15 October 2004. The order directs
Jadewell to cease and desist from: (a) charging and
collecting parking fees on the streets of Baguio City without
the consent of the City Government;130 (b) seizing and
detaining vehicles of motorists who refuse to pay the
parking fees to Jadewell131 and (c) using yellow-colored tow
trucks bearing the name "City of Baguio".132 Jadewell’s
petition also seeks to nullify Executive Order No. 005-2004.
On 16 November 2004, Jadewell filed a Supplemental
Petition. The act complained of this time was the issuance
of Executive Order No. 005-2004-A which is a mere rehash
of Executive Order No. 005-2004.133 On 25 January 2005,
Jadewell filed a Second Supplemental Petition in
connection with Mayor Yaranon’s issuance of
Administrative Order No. 622, Series of 2004. The said
administrative order declared that Jadewell exceeded its
area of operations for the administration of on-street
parking and it required to show lawful cause why its
business permit should not be revoked.
Like in the earlier contempt petitions, Jadewell alleges that
these issuances by Mayor Yaranon are contumacious
because they were made while the main petition, G.R. No.
160025 questioning the rescission of the MOA by the
Sanggunian, is still pending resolution with this Court.
d. G.R. No. 172216 – On 27 April 2006, Jadewell filed a
petition for contempt against Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan, Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3 of Baguio
City, in relation to Civil Case No. 6089-R pending before his
sala.134 In the said civil case, Judge Pamintuan issued an
Order directing Jadewell to desist from the collection of
parking fees, from towing and impounding vehicles on the
streets of Baguio City and to hold in abeyance the
implementation of City Ordinance 003-2000 and the MOA.
The validity of the Order of Judge Pamintuan is the subject
of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
instituted by Jadewell in G.R. No. 172215.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether Judge
Pamintuan should be cited for indirect contempt by this
Court for issuing the assailed Orders.
e. G.R. No. 173043 – On 29 June 2006, Jadewell filed yet
another contempt case against Mayor Yaranon. In addition
to its prayer to cite him for contempt, Jadewell also prays
that Mayor Yaranon, as a lawyer, be disbarred.135Jadewell
instituted this fifth contempt case after it received a letter
from Mayor Yaranon demanding that it stop its business
operations in Baguio City, at the same time directing the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to cancel Ordinance 003-2000.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Mayor
Yaranon was guilty of indirect contempt and professional
misconduct for the above acts pending resolution of G.R.
Nos. 160025, 163052,164107, 165564 and 172215.136
f. G.R. No. 174879 - On 19 October 2006, Jadewell filed a
contempt case against the acting City Mayor of Baguio,
Reinaldo A. Bautista, Jr., and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, including City Legal Officer
Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes, in connection with the second
act of rescission.137 Jadewell also asks that the respondents
who are lawyers, namely: Rocky Thomas A. Balisong,
Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J.
Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, and Jose M. Molintas,
be disbarred.
These acts, in Jadewell’s view, are contumacious in light of
the pending G.R. No. 160025 before this Court.
OUR RULINGS
1. On G.R. No. 160025
a. On the Treatment of
Jadewell’s Petition as one for
Permanent Injunction.
The CA sustained the position of the Sanggunian that
certiorari could not prosper because when the latter
enacted Resolution 37, the Sanggunian was exercising its
legislative function and not its judicial or quasi-judicial
function. The writ of certiorari under Rule 65 requires: (a)
that it is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) that such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.138
The CA nevertheless proceeded to treat the Petition as an
original action for injunction, ruling in this wise:
xxxx
Although in the trial court, Jadewell filed said petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65, it is
essentially one for Injunction under Rule 58. Said petition’s
form and substance satisfied all the requirements of a civil
action for Injunction, which is the proper remedy under the
attendant circumstances.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would
be defeated.
Considering the clear and patent denial of due process
committed by the Sanggunian in precipitately rescinding the
MOA and in the interest of substantial justice, WE deem it
more prudent to treat the petition filed below as an action
for Injunction under Rule 58, which is well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Consequently, the present
appeal shall be considered as an appeal from the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court, which is
properly appealable to this Court, as held in Casilan vs.
Ybaňez.139
xxxx
We sustain the ruling of the appellate court treating
Jadewell’s original action for certiorari as one for injunction
based on the allegations in the latter’s pleadings.
In Ramon Jimenez, Jr. v. Juan Jose Jordana,140 the issue to
be resolved was whether the nature of the action was one
for specific performance or for recovery of real property. In
determining that the case was one for the recovery of real
property, the Court characterized the suit on the basis of
the allegations in the Complaint. We restated the rule that
the nature of an action is determined by the material
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. In the recent case of Reyes v. Alsons Development
and Investment Corporation,141 we likewise ruled that the
nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the
pleadings.
In Lee, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,142 the controversy to be
resolved was whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was
one under Rule 65 or Rule 42. The determination of the
issue was crucial, because the appellate court had
dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, saying that the
wrong mode of appeal had been used. The CA had ruled
that petitioner should have filed a certiorari petition under
Rule 65 – instead of a petition under Rule 42 – to appeal
the assailed decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.
We held:
Our perusal of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
clearly shows that it is a petition for review under Rule 42,
and not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
We note that in the Court of Appeals’ petition, under the
heading "Nature of the Petition," petitioner stated that it was
a "petition for review on certiorari to set aside, invalidate
and reverse the Decision dated December 14, 2001 of
public respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr." Also, the
reversal sought was premised on the ground that the
decision was issued in gross error. The statement under the
heading "Nature of the Petition" that the trial courts’
decisions were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and even the caption
impleading the lower courts, would not automatically bring
the petition within the coverage of Rule 65. It is hornbook
doctrine that it is not the caption of the pleading but the
allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the original action filed by Jadewell before the RTC of
Baguio City, although the action was clearly denominated
as a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, the allegations
actually supported an action for injunction under Rule 58 of
the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. As can be gleaned
from its allegations and especially in its prayers, Jadewell
filed the case with the trial court with the ultimate end of
restraining the implementation of Resolution No. 037,
Series of 2002.
We agree with the CA when it ruled that Jadewell sought
permanent injunction aside from the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction, thus:
An action for injunction is a recognized remedy in this
jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from
committing or continuing to commit a specific act, or
compelling the defendant to continue performing a
particular act. It has an independent existence. The action
for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as
part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding.143 xxxx...
In Garcia v. Adeva,144 this Court had the opportunity to
clarify that while injunction can be a provisional remedy, it
can also be a main case. The Court had to make this
preliminary distinction in order to find out whether the SEC
had the jurisdiction to prevent, on a permanent basis, the
commission of certain acts by the respondents. Thus, the
necessity to make the distinction between injunction as a
provisional remedy and injunction as a main case. It found
guidance from Garayblas v. Atienza, Jr.,145 and quoting
from the latter:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby
a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It
may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
and as an incident in the main action. The Court has
distinguished the main action for injunction from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction,
thus:
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional
or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot
exist except only as part or an incident of an independent
action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the
law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment
embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists
until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
We, therefore, rule that the CA did not commit any error in
treating Jadewell’s Petition for Certiorari as an original
action for injunction.
b. On the denial of due process.
The second issue in this Petition is the correctness of the
CA’s ruling that Jadewell was deprived of due process
when the Sangguniang Panlungsod rescinded the MOA.
The findings of the CA are as follows:
In the instant case, evidence on record does not show that
before the Sanggunian passed the disputed Resolution it
gave Jadewell an opportunity to present its side. Neither did
the Sanggunian convene an investigatory body to inquire
into Jadewell’s alleged violations nor at least invite Jadewell
to a conference to discuss the alleged violations, if only to
give Jadewell the chance to refute any evidence gathered
by it against the latter. As it is, the Sanggunian arrogated
upon itself the role of a prosecutor, judge and executioner
in rescinding the MOA, all in clear violation of Jadewell’s
constitutionally embedded right to due process.146
x x x.
Both courts held that Jadewell was denied due process.
When the denial of due process argument is raised, it is
directed primarily against the exercise of governmental
authority that "deprives life, liberty and property" without
observance what is, in the circumstances, the applicable
standards of "due process." It is not an argument that is
relevant in situations of contractual breach between two
purely private entities, nor is it available against the
government when the latter is not discharging a
governmental function, but merely pursuing a purely
commercial activity in a proprietary capacity. In order to
consider the due process argument, this Court must first
determine whether the MOA was entered into by the City of
Baguio in a governmental capacity, or in a purely
proprietary capacity.
The regulation of on-street and off-street parking is a
governmental function that can be exercised by local
governments. It is important to understand the objective of
the Baguio City Government in: (1) privatizing the
administration of on-street and off-street parking; and (2) its
execution of a MOA with Jadewell. This can be gleaned
from the Explanatory Note and other provisions of the
agreement, to wit:
The City of Baguio has earned the reputation of the
CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY
for the previous years. This has become possible due to the
collective effort of both the Citizens of Baguio and the City
Government. However, the increase in population, volume
of vehicles and the absence of a regulatory measure to
address this concern gradually tainted what used to be a
reputation we were proud of.
The ever increasing problems, specifically those relevant to
the Traffic situation is at this point the biggest contributor to
environmental degradation. Other Salient points we must
consider relevant to this matter are the problems on
OBSTRUCTION AND DOUBLE PARKING which are very
rampant. We further add to these the problems on
DISORGANIZED PARKING, LACK OF DEPUTIZED
AGENTS to monitor, supervise and enforce traffic rules and
regulations.
At this point in time, we feel the immediate need of focusing
on these problems. There is an urgent need to adopt
measures that would alleviate these matters. This we
recommend that PARKING SPACES should be
REGULATED in such a manner that it would bring
advantage both to the City Government and the Citizens of
Baguio. We further propose the collection of
REGULATORY FEES that would be used in maintaining
our roads and to hire people that would de deputized to
help ease the problems as stated above.
Finally, we believe that our roads are beyond the
Commerce of Man. To convert our roads into PAY
PARKING SPACES, would be violative of this principle.
However to REGULATE its use and its eventual effect
would redound to the GENERAL WELFARE will be an
appreciated gesture to help preserve our image as the
CLEANEST AND GREENEST HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY.
xxxx
SECTION 4. Parking spaces. A parking place may be
divided into parking spaces and for the purposes of this
Ordinance, each space or for a number of spaces as
determined by the private parking operator in consultation
with the concerned Official of the City of Baguio.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Prohibitions against parking outside the
parking spaces. No spaces shall park any motor vehicle on
the sidewalk or cause or permit any motor vehicle to wait to
any road or length of road on which in any place in which or
adjacent to or in close proximity to which there is a parking
place.
xxxx
SECTION 7. Payment of Prescribed Charges. (1) No
person shall park any motor vehicle in a parking place or
parking space during the times specified in this Ordinance
without paying the prescribed charge for the required
parking period; (2) The prescribed charge payable in
respect to the parking of a motor vehicle in a parking space
shall be paid by the insertion into the parking meter
provided for that parking space a coin/coins of Philippine
Currency or by using cards in order to obtain the payment
ticket to evidence the payment of the prescribed charge; (3)
The payment ticket shall be displayed at a conspicuous part
of a motor vehicle in a parking place or parking space; (4)
The payment ticket shall be valid to be used on any parking
space within the authorized period indicated in the payment
ticket.
xxxx
SECTION 22. Rules. The Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to be entered into by the City Mayor shall be
governed by this Ordinance.
From the above, the following are clear: (1) that the City of
Baguio decided on the privatization of the administration of
parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons,
both of which are within its powers under Section
458(A)(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and
(2) that the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio
and Jadewell involve the delegation of governmental
functions in terms of regulating the designation and use of
parking spaces as well as the collection of fees for such
use. These are indicators that any privatization contract
pursuant to the above Resolution takes the essential
character of a franchise because what is being privatized is
a government-monopolized function.
It would thus be relevant to ask if there is a provision in the
applicable laws or the franchise (MOA) that grants the City
of Baguio the right to revoke the latter either at will, or upon
the satisfaction of certain conditions, such that ordinary due
process protection can be considered to have been waived
by the franchisee. We must caution that when we refer to
revocation at will here, we are referring to the revocation of
resolutory, not suspensive, obligations.147
We have looked closely at Resolution No. 003-2000 and
the MOA and have additionally reflected on the applicable
provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the
conclusion that:
(a) There is only one provision that allows for
unilateral revocation of the MOA, which can be
found in Section 9 thereof:
9. Minimum Guaranty – The FIRST PARTY
guaranties (sic) a minimum period of five (5) years
against rescission; provided that after such period,
the parties may agree to increase to a reasonable
rate the parking fees and the share of the city from
the parking fees collected as provided for in the
guidelines, (Annex "B");
(b) This Section 9 requires that five years must
have lapsed – presumably from the date of
execution of the MOA – before the unilateral right
to revoke the MOA can be exercised;
(c) Therefore, before the five year period has
lapsed, the right to revoke the MOA arises only
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and
the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even
after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there
be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of
third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance
with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid
revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse of the 5-year
period provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to
approach the problem from one or both of two perspectives:
one, negotiate the termination of the MOA with Jadewell, or
two, exercise its option under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The first option, a negotiated pretermination of the contract,
is an inherent right of every party in a contract. This can be
inferred from the freedom of the parties to contract and
modify their previous covenants provided it would not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.148 Despite the provision on the minimum
warranty against rescission stipulated in the MOA, the
parties were not constrained to mutually modify such
restriction. The Sanggunian could have proposed to
Jadewell the possibility of lifting the warranty against
rescission subject to the condition that the latter will comply
with its obligations under the MOA.
This scenario could have impressed upon Jadewell that its
contractual relations with the city government of Baguio
were less than ideal. The suggested approach for the
Sanggunian could have been legally sound and practical.
Obviously, this was not done in this case; thus, Jadewell’s
Complaint before the RTC of Baguio City.
The second option is the exercise of the unilateral right to
rescind a bilateral contract on the part of a party who
believes that it has been injured by a breach substantial
enough to warrant revocation. Where one party allegedly
failed to comply with his obligations under a contract, the
injured party may rescind the obligation if the other does not
perform or is not ready and willing to perform.149 We will
examine the acts of Baguio City in relation to what is
allowed under Article 1191.
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of
two modes: (1) through an extrajudicial declaration of
rescission; or (2) upon the grant of a judicial decree of
rescission.
Extrajudicial declaration of rescission is recognized as a
power which does not require judicial intervention.150 If the
rescission is not opposed, extrajudicial declaration of
rescission produces legal effect151 such that the injured
party is already relieved from performing the undertaking.152
However, the power of declaring extrajudicial rescission
conferred upon the injured party is regulated by the Civil
Code. If the extrajudicial rescission is impugned by the
other party, it shall be subject to a judicial
determination153where court action must be taken, and the
function of the court is to declare the rescission as having
been properly or improperly made, or to give a period within
which the debtor must perform the obligation alleged to be
breached.154 A unilateral cancellation of a contract may be
questioned in courts by the affected party to determine
whether or not cancellation is warranted.155 Thus, in an
extrajudicial decree of rescission, revocation cannot be
completely exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that
the other has committed a breach of the obligation156 but
always subject to the right of the other party to judicially
impugn such decision.
It is important to contextualize that the agreement entered
into by the City of Baguio with Jadewell is the embodiment
of a grant of franchise imbued with public interest and is not
merely an agreement between two private parties.
It is our view that the first act of rescission by the City of
Baguio may be valid even if there is a stipulation against it
within the first five years of the MOA’s existence. Article
1191 of the New Civil Code provides a party the right to
rescind the agreement and clearly overrides any stipulation
to the contrary. However, the grounds that would serve as
basis to the application of the said article must be clearly
established.
In the exercise of this option under Article 1191, was it
necessary for the City of Baguio to provide Jadewell an
opportunity to air its side on the matter before the former
implemented the rescission of the MOA? In the instant
case, was Jadewell deprived of procedural due process?
We answer in the negative. We disagree with the rulings of
the RTC and the CA that Jadewell was deprived of due
process. In Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. The
Board of Transportation,157 we confronted the issue of
whether the petitioners were denied procedural due
process when the respondent Board of Transportation
issued a circular ordering the phasing out of old vehicles to
be used as taxicabs. In the said case, the phase-out was
embodied in a circular that was promulgated without
holding a public hearing or at least requiring those affected
to submit their position papers on the policy to be
implemented. We held for the respondent Board, and ruled
in this wise:
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As
held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino,
44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process,
are constitutionally required for the protection of life or
vested property rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past
act or event which has to be established or ascertained. It is
not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons
or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian
Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA – be it first or second
act of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of its
legislative or administrative functions and was not an
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The
Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA lends
support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the
agreement was entered into by the parties was to provide
order, given Baguio City’s parking problems in identified
areas, as well as to generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as
its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no
longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly
an exercise of its legislative or administrative function.
However, it is another matter as to whether the City of
Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis
for the exercise of its right to rescind.
c. On the allegation of Jadewell’s
substantial breach of the MOA.
The Baguio City government has repeatedly mentioned that
Jadewell had so far installed only 14 parking meters, with
only 12 functioning. The COA-CAR Report dated 13 July
2003 enumerated 12 findings,158 a majority of which
indicates that Jadewell was remiss in the fulfilment of its
obligations under the MOA. While Finding Nos. (1), (2), (3),
(4), (5), (8) and (12) of the COA-CAR Report state that
Jadewell collected parking fees, Jadewell failed to properly
remit the same. Finding No. (11) of the COA-CAR Report
states that Jadewell failed to have its parking attendants
deputized,159 a condition under the MOA that is also
important to the overall objective of the endeavor.
The MOA does not specifically provide for the exact number
of parking meters to be installed by Jadewell pursuant to
the parties’ objective in regulating parking in the city.
Nevertheless, 100 parking spaces were allotted as
mentioned in Annex A of the MOA.160 The agreement also
obligates Jadewell to have its parking attendants deputized
by the DOTC-LTO so that they shall have the authority to
enforce traffic rules and regulations in the regulated
areas.161 To the Court’s mind, these are two of the most
important obligations that Jadewell had to comply with,
considering the nature and objective of the agreement it
had entered into.
Despite the enumeration of the above-mentioned faults of
Jadewell, we do not make a categorical finding that there
was substantial breach committed by Jadewell to justify a
unilateral rescission of the MOA. We find, however, that the
RTC had not properly received evidence that would allow it
to determine the extent of the claimed violations of the
MOA. Had these violations by Jadewell been proven in a
proper hearing, the finding of a substantial breach of the
MOA would have been a distinct probability.
Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA provided a clear
basis for their rulings on the extent of the breach of the
MOA by Jadewell. Save from reiterating the Sanggunian’s
litany of violations said to be committed by Jadewell, there
was no testimony on record to prove such facts and no
indication as to whether the RTC or CA dismissed them or
took them at face value.
Whatever the extent of breach of contract that Jadewell
may have committed – and the enumeration of Jadewell’s
alleged faults in Resolution 37 is quite extensive – the City
of Baguio was still duty-bound to establish the alleged
breach.
Matters became complicated when the RTC and the CA
lumped the issues on the due process violation of Baguio
City with Jadewell’s alleged substantial breaches under the
MOA, instead of making a clear finding on the existence
and extent of such breach. The facts and legal issues were
thus muddled.
We find fault in the lower and appellate court’s lapse in
examining the issue on Jadewell’s alleged substantial
breach. Evidence-taking had to be undertaken by these
courts before they could arrive at a judicial conclusion on
the presence of substantial breach.
We thus DENY the Petition of the Sanggunian Panlungsod
in G.R. No. 160025 and AFFIRM the questioned CA
Decision. However, we reject the ruling made by the
appellate court that the violations of Jadewell under the
MOA were not substantial. We hold that there is no
sufficient evidence on record to make such determination.
While Jadewell prays for damages against the public
respondent, and while ordinarily we could grant the same,
the context of this case prevents us from giving any form of
recompense to Jadewell even if the rescission of the MOA
did not follow the required legal procedure. This is because
it would be appalling to grant Jadewell any award of
damages, considering (1) it installed only 14 out of the
apparently 100 contemplated parking meters; (2) its
employees, private citizens who did not possess any
authority from the LTO, were manually collecting parking
fees from the public, and (3) it did not, apparently properly
remit any significant amount of money to the City of Baguio.
These three facts are uncontested, these omissions are
offensive to the concept of public service that the residents
of Baguio were promised through Jadewell. From its
ambiguous responses extant in the records, it is clear that
Jadewell does not appear to be an investor who has lost in
its investments in the Baguio City project. Thus, we do not
award any damages to Jadewell.
2. On G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107,
165564, 172216, 173043 and 174879
(The Contempt Petitions)
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure enumerates the acts constituting indirect
contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, or judgment of a court, including
the act of a person who, after being dispossessed
or ejected from any real property by the judgment
or process of any court of competent jurisdiction,
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with
the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this
Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings.
The rule alerts us to three possible situations, wherein, in
the context of the facts of these petitions, contumacious
behaviour could have been committed by public
respondents. First, disobedience or resistance to a lawful
order of this Court under paragraph (b). Second, unlawful
interference with the proceedings of this Court under
paragraph (c). Third, improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impeded, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court under paragraph (d).
Jadewell, in G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216,
173043, and 174879, bases its charges of indirect contempt
against public respondents on a claim that any action that
tends to stop the implementation of the MOA is
contumacious. Such actions include desistance orders to
desist against Jadewell itself, the second act of unilateral
rescission of the MOA; orders to other public officers to
prevent Jadewell from exercising its authority under the
MOA; and the official encouragement for motorists to resist
attempts of Jadewell to collect parking fees or clamp/tow
vehicles that do not observe the parking regulations.
We find scant jurisprudence to guide us on this matter. The
closest situation is that presented in Southern Broadcasting
Network v. Davao Light and Power,162 penned by Justice
Felix Makasiar. In that case, petitioner’s representative,
Carmen Pacquing, wrote a letter to President Marcos
asking for his intervention so that her Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) of the resolution of this Court
denying her Petition could be favorably granted.
Respondent Davao Light asked that petitioner Pacquing be
cited for contempt, arguing that her act in writing to the
President asking him to intervene in the case showed
disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court as
the final arbiter of all cases. We found petitioner Pacquing
guilty of contempt, thus:
x x x. WE hold that such actuation of herein petitioner’s
representative only bespeaks more of her contumacious
attempt to trifle with the orderly administration of justice
because if she know that this Court will ultimately decide
the case "regardless of the President’s intervention," then
she should have desisted from writing to the President.
In the light of the foregoing, there is no doubt that Mrs.
Pacquing committed an "improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice" (Section 3, par. [d] Rule 71, Rules
of Court) and impair the respect due to the courts of justice
in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular.
In the above case, respondent Carmen Pacquing was
clearly asking the President to commit an improper act – to
influence the Supreme Court – that obstructs the orderly
administration of justice, as the Court is constitutionally
required to act independently free from the promptings of
the President. Pacquing clearly violated both Sections (c)
and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.
No such similar situation occurred here. Public respondents
never asked anyone to employ pressure or influence on this
Court for the former’s benefit.
Instead, the acts that have been allegedly committed by
public respondents are acts done pursuant to their belief
that: (a) the MOA has been validly voided, and more
importantly, (b) that Jadewell’s personnel do not have the
legal authority to perform the governmental function of
administering the regulation of on-street and off-street
parking, of towing or clamping vehicles that violate such
regulation, and of collecting parking fees from motorists.
It is important to note that the Court never gave a
mandatory injunction that is couched in a way that requires
public respondents to fully comply with the terms of the
MOA. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI)
issued on 9 February 2005 is directed to Mayor Yaranon
only, and it directs him to perform only one specific act: to
reopen, and maintain open, the street and premises then
being occupied and operated by Jadewell.
Mayor Yaranon did not immediately comply with this WPMI.
Thus, this Court fined him ₱10,000 on 20 April 2005, and
ordered the NBI to arrest him if he further failed to comply
with the WPMI. Subsequently, Mayor Yaranon paid the fine,
and there is nothing on record to show that he has, since
April of 2005, further defied this Court on that score.
The Court did not issue a WPMI specifically ordering the
parties to observe the terms of the MOA. Thus, public
respondents were not expressly prohibited to act on their
beliefs regarding the validity or invalidity of the MOA, or, the
authority or lack of authority of Jadewell personnel to
perform governmental functions in the streets of Baguio.
This is an important result, because to hold otherwise is to
effectively grant one of the parties a mandatory injunction
even without an express resolution to this effect from the
Court. Without an express order, the pendency of a suit
before the Supreme Court is not a prima facie entitlement of
provisional relief to either party.
Public respondents therefore were, at liberty to question
and inform the public of their belief regarding the lack of
authority of Jadewell and its personnel to regulate public
parking in Baguio. They were certainly free to formally write
Jadewell on their beliefs and pass the corresponding
resolutions to this effect. The mayor was also not under
legal compulsion to renew Jadewell’s business permit in
view of his opinion that Jadewell was exceeding its
allowable area of operation, which Jadewell was not able to
fully disprove. This is especially true for two important
reasons: (1) there is an uncontested cease and desist order
that was issued by the DOTC-CAR on 13 March 2002
which Jadewell defied well into 2005, and (2) public
respondents are city officials of Baguio who have the legal
duty to ensure the laws are being followed, including laws
that define who may enforce regulations on public parking.
That Jadewell personnel do not have the legal authority to
enforce regulations on public parking is categorical from the
Letter dated 1 February 2001 by the Regional Director of
the DOTC-CAR denying the request of Jadewell for the
deputation of its personnel.163
We therefore do not find any of the public respondents who
were then officials of the City of Baguio, liable for indirect
contempt, and thereby dismiss G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107,
165564, 173043 and 174879. In G.R. 174879, we have
already pronounced that the Sanggunian was within its full
right to perform the second act of rescission, and thus, it is
even with more reason, that its members and the City Legal
Officer cannot be held in contempt therefor. We deny the
prayer in the petitions to disbar the respondents therein
who are lawyers.
We also do not find Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan liable
for contempt in G.R. No. 172216.
Jadewell wants this Court to cite Judge Pamintuan for
contempt for issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction ordering Jadewell to stop collecting parking fees;
to refrain from supervising the parking in Baguio City; as
well as to hold in abeyance the implementation of the MOA
and its enabling ordinance.164
It was only on 5 June 2006 that this Court, in G.R. No.
172215, issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)165directing the trial court to discontinue the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 6089-R. Upon receipt by
Judge Pamintuan of the TRO, he immediately ordered the
cancellation of the 29 June 2006 hearing.166
We do not consider the promulgation of the assailed writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction against Jadewell as a
defiance of our writ issued on 9 February 2005,
considering, it was directed against Mayor Yaranon only.
We have held in Leonidas v. Supnet that "a party cannot be
held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order which
is not addressed to him."167 We note that Judge Pamintuan
observed deference to the Orders of this Court when he
immediately suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No.
6089-R upon receipt of the TRO.
G.R. No. 172215
In this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Jadewell
assails the Orders of RTC-Branch 3 (Baguio City) denying
its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in Civil
Case No. 6089-R.
We deny the petition of Jadewell in this case.
In Manuel Camacho v. Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr.,168 we
described the nature of special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, as follows:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court’s power of
judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that
respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the
respondents may not be subjected to our review under Rule
65.
In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher
Education,169 this Court ruled thus:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and
so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it
is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or
a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court
within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary
acts -- acts which courts or judges have no power or
authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct
erroneous findings and conclusions made by the court.
In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, et
al.,170 we decreed:
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner
with the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to assail
the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The Order
of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor
finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.
It is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any
time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court’s
inherent power to control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. The only
limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of
discretion, or that no injustice results thereby.
East Asia Trader also reiterated our ruling in Indiana
Aerospace. Further, in Bonifacio Construction Management
Corporation v. Hon. Perlas Bernabe,171 we reiterated our
rulings in East Asia Traders and Indiana Aerospace. We
had ruled in these earlier cases that an order of the trial
court denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order,
and to use a writ of certiorari to assail it is improper.
The procedural policy in the cited cases was again referred
to in Bernas v. Sovereign Ventures, Inc.,172 highlighting the
following:
Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a
motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the remedy is
not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a
decision has been rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 181488
The question of law raised by petitioner Yaranon in this
Petition for Review on Certiorari is whether the CA correctly
dismissed his appeal questioning the validity of his
suspension from office as City Mayor, on the ground that
his suit had become moot and academic due to his non-re-
election to office. The CA cited Crespo v. Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija173 as basis for the dismissal.
For his part, Mayor Yaranon contends that the appellate
court should have ruled on the validity of his suspension
from office despite his failure to get re-elected as City
Mayor. He argues that he has the right to know whether his
suspension was valid or not and, in the event his
suspension is declared invalid, Mayor Yaranon believes he
is entitled to the salaries and benefits accruing during the
period he was suspended.
We deny the Petition of Mayor Yaranon.
The appeal of Mayor Yaranon has been rendered moot and
academic. We hold that the resolution of the issue raised
herein would serve no practical purpose.
In Miriam College v. Court of Appeals,174 we ruled that a
case becomes moot and academic when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties, or when no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Further,
courts will not determine a moot question in which no
practical relief can be granted.175
Mayor Yaranon has already served his suspension. We find
no practical value in remanding his case to the appellate
court for the determination of the factual basis and legal
issues of his appeal pertaining to the validity of his
suspension as then City Mayor of Baguio City.
We have held in Nicart, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division),176 that an issue becomes moot when a petitioner
is not entitled to substantial relief:
x x x [T]he propriety of the preventive suspension of
petitioner effected through the assailed Resolution of
February 15, 2001 has become a moot issue, it appearing
that he has already served his suspension. An issue
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would
be of no practical use and value. In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled
to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.
We cannot sustain Mayor Yaranon’s argument that his
appeal should not have been dismissed because, in the
event that the finding of the Office of the President to
suspend him is reversed, he is still entitled to the salaries
accruing during the period he was suspended. We take
note of the cases cited by Mayor Yaranon such as Crespo
v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,177 Baquerfo v.
Sanchez178 and Reyes v. Cristi,179 among others. These
cases involve substantial issues – such as denial of due
process and procedural irregularities – other than a mere
claim for entitlement to salaries. The factual background
and the legal issues for resolution in the cases mentioned
are not similar to the case at bar.
In Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees180 the
Court elucidated on the nature of the salary of a public
official:
Mechem states that "(l)ike the requirement of an oath, the
fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees may aid in
determining the nature of a position, but it is not conclusive,
for while a salary or fees are usually annexed to the office,
it is not necessarily so. As in the case of the oath, the salary
or fees are mere incidents and form no part of the office.
Where a salary or fees are annexed, the office is often said
to be ‘coupled with an interest’; where neither is provided
for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be
accepted merely for the public good." (Emphasis supplied)
Given the circumstances of this case, we find that Mayor
Yaranon’s claim for unpaid salaries, in case of exoneration,
does not constitute such substantial relief that would justify
the revival of his appeal. Even if we did sustain his Petition,
we nevertheless find that it has been mooted by our
resolution in the main petition.
WHEREFORE, we hereby rule as follows:
a.) In G.R. No. 160025, the Petition of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City is
DENIED. The CA Decision dated 7 July 2003 in CA
G.R. SP No. 74756 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. There is not enough evidence on
record to conclude that Jadewell’s violations were
sufficient to justify the unilateral cancellation of the
MOA by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio
City; at the same time, neither the RTC nor the CA
provided a clear finding whether the breach of the
 MOA by Jadewell was substantial. We affirm the
CA as to the rest of its dispositions in its assailed
Decision. Nevertheless, no award of damages is
hereby made in favour of Jadewell and neither is
there any pronouncement as to costs.

b.) G.R. Nos. 163052, 164107, 165564, 172216,

173043 and 174879, the Petitions of Jadewell to
cite Mayor Braulio D. Yaranon, Mayor Bernardo M.
Vergara, Acting City Mayor Reinaldo A. Bautista,
Vice Mayor Betty Lourdes F. Tabanda, the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Baguio City namely: Elmer O. Datuin, Antonio R.
Tabora, Edilberto B. Tenefrancia, Federico J.
Mandapat, Jr., Richard A. Carino, Faustino A.
Olowan, Rufino M. Panagan, Leonardo B. Yangot,
Jr., Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Galo P. Weygan,
Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M. Molintas, and
Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan for indirect
contempt and to disbar Sangguniang Panlungsod
members Rocky Thomas A. Balisong, Edilberto B.
Tenefrancia, Faustino A. Olowan, Federico J.
Mandapat, Perlita L. Chan-Rondez, Jose M.
Molintas, Melchor Carlos B. Rabanes and Mayor
Braulio D. Yaranon are all hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

c.) We DENY the Petition of Jadewell for lack of

merit in G.R. No. 172215. We likewise DENY its
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for being
moot and academic. No pronouncement as to
costs.

d.) We DENY the Petition of Mayor Braulio D.

Yaranon in G.R. No. 181488, for lack of merit and
AFFIRM the CA Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 96116.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.
Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.
REGALADO, J.:
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense
that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering
such services in the Philippines.
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an
Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
(hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs
the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged
by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by
fifteen percent (15%) with the reservation to make further
reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power
and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due
process of law.
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are
not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514,
PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such
places as the grantee may select, station or stations and
associated equipment and facilities for international satellite
communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise
granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals."
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it
undertook the following activities and established the
following installations:
1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its
provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A"
antenna (Pinugay I) was established.
Pinugay I provided direct satellite
communication links with the Pacific
Ocean Region (the United States,
Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea,
Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand
and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean
INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station
standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was
established. Pinugay II provided links with
the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in
Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other
Asia Pacific countries operating within the
region) thru the Indian Ocean INTELSAT
satellite.
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard
"B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established
to temporarily assume the functions of
Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they
were being refurbished. Pinugay III now
serves as spare or reserved antenna for
possible contingencies.
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and
installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark
Air Field, Pampanga as a television
receive-only earth station which provides
the U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour
television service.
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the
installation of a third standard "A" earth
station (Pinugay IV) to take over the links
in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the
petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the
Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the
Convention and the Operating Agreement of the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)
of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively
established by various states in line with the principles set
forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of
the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite
circuits to:
1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;
2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;
3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;
4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and
5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus
provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to
serve the public with indispensable communication
services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile,
telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American
or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and
services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said
Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to
apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders,
as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner
filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to
continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has
been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to
continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for
a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and
maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the
services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein
applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a
provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to
charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was
valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. 5 When
said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was
extended for another six (6) months, or up to September
16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the
provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed
the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a
reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized
rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on
the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of
present service rates takes note that after
an initial evaluation by the Rates
Regulation Division of the Common
Carriers Authorization Department of the
financial statements of applicant, there is
merit in a REDUCTION in some of
applicant's rates, subject to further
reductions, should the Commission finds
(sic) in its further evaluation that more
reduction should be effected either on the
basis of a provisional authorization or in
the final consideration of the case. 6
PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the
following reasons:
1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary standards
constitutionally required, hence there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory
powers of NTC;
2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was
properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was
exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra
vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural
due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a
violation of substantive due process.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of
Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of
respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of
Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the
jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that
respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise
of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in
its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of
legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of
certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect
questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos.
546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a
standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.
We hold otherwise.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard
for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making
the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of
the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory
and must have been established in the manner prescribed
by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is
that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as
to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the
power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner
required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196,
respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to
determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of
public service communications which necessarily include
the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection
therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No.
546, respondent NTC should be guided by the
requirements of public safety, public interest and
reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of
private entities in communications and broadcasting
facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides
for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over
respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of
the communications systems contemplated therein should
be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an
in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in
order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of
its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public
safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements
of a valid delegation of legislative power.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned
order violates procedural due process because it was
issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without
the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order
was based merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a
unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an
opportunity to present its side before the order in question
was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction
and the consequent deterioration of the public service could
have been shown and demonstrated to respondents.
Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate
fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-
judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of
due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the
fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice
and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to
a named person, as in the instant case, the function
involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that
under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be
preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant
to respondent NTC's legislative function but because the
assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in
the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a
certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not
the only primary source of data or information since
respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of
the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission,9 we made a categorical classification as to
when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-
judicial and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power
and even the power to fix rates- when
such rules and/or rates are meant to apply
to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of
a legislative character, such is not the
nature of the order complained of. Indeed,
the same applies exclusively to petitioner
herein. What is more, it is predicated upon
the finding of fact-based upon a report
submitted by the General Auditing Office-
that petitioner is making a profit of more
than 12% of its invested capital, which is
denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter
is entitled to cross-examine the maker of
said report, and to introduce evidence to
disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well
as to refute the conclusion drawn
therefrom by the respondent. In other
words, in making said finding of fact,
respondent performed a function partaking
of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous
notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case
of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et
al. 10 to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that
where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law (See
Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md.
L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If
the nature of the administrative agency is
essentially legislative, the requirements of
notice and hearing are not necessary. The
validity of a rule of future action which
affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not
determined according to the same rules
which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific
individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec.
130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from
statute, the necessity of notice and
hearing in an administrative proceeding
depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances
involved. In so far as generalization is
possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be
stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the
administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative
functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or
quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are
particular and immediate rather than
general and prospective, the person
whose rights or property may be affected
by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing. 11
The order in question which was issued by respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is
premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial,
that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's
financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit
of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the
attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%)
rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner
could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis
the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it
conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude.
We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of
its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector
who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its
questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made
by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft
of merit.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing,
as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming
that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the
same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing
such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce
entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory
procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other
order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the
applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which
provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the
Commission, upon notice and hearing the
Commission shall have power, upon
proper notice and hearing in accordance
with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the
contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint
rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed
and followed thereafter by any public
service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision
does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting,
excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent
has no authority to make such order without first giving
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such
a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of
September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating
its existing facilities, to render the services it presently
offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under
the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final
consideration of the merit of this application, the
Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing
respondents may have other sources of information or data,
still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should
act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which
is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner
was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made
effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative
act as to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case. 13An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a
temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even
confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low,
since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during
the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final
insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the
order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the
order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its
property, a declaration of its nullity becomes inductible,
which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is
confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result
in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of
business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since
petitioner is operating its communications satellite facilities
through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no
vested right therein. What it has is merely a privilege or
license which may be revoked at will by the State at any
time without necessarily violating any vested property right
of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of
respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such privilege
should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but
it must be fair and reasonable.
There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a
legislative franchise which is subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good
so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be
unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination
of the operation of said utility is required by the common
good.
The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the
conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the
consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the
utility, or clothed with the general power of management
incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to
such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the
regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to
destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due
regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then
of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore,
which operates as an effective confiscation of private
property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process
and equal protection of the laws. 15
Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its
authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public
utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the
rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission
has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to
regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not
be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. 16
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of
formula but of sound business judgment based upon the
evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and
independent judgment. 18 In determining whether a rate is
confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A
method often employed in determining reasonableness is
the fair return upon the value of the property to the public
utility. Competition is also a very important factor in
determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is
allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition. 19
A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate
reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial
evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner,
contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several
other sources of information without, however, divulging
such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an
attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed
rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the
financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction
without any elucidation on what implications and
conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said
statements. Nor did it deign to explain how the data
reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision
to impose a rate reduction.
On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe
drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public
service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be
unreasonable and improvident. The business in which
petitioner is engaged is unique in that its machinery and
equipment have always to be taken in relation to the
equipment on the other end of the transmission
arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or
refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily
entails a major adjustment or innovation on the business of
petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the
sending end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the receiving end in the
Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad
has to be matched with the corresponding change in the
sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of
petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be
technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of
the service of satellite communications.
At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed
at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery
and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing
charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a
competitive level with the technological advances abroad.
There projected undertakings were formulated on the
premise that rates are maintained at their present or at
reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may
practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we
concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate
and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be
equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates
assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and
the consumer.
Consequently, we hold that the challenged order,
particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being
violative of the due process clause is void and should be
nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should
heretofore have done, with the hearing and determination of
petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the
subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well
as other matter involved in said application, be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due
observance of our pronouncements herein.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the

order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC
Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining order issued under our resolution of September
13, 1988, as specifically directed against the aforesaid
order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986
DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and
ARIEL RAMACULA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in
his capacity as President of National
University, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and
Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University,
have come to this Court to seek relief from what they
describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal
to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary
legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:
1) that respondent University's avowed
reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in
their respective courses is "the latter's
participation in peaceful mass actions
within the premises of the University.
2) that this "attitude of the (University) is
simply a continuation of its cavalier if not
hostile attitude to the student's exercise of
their basic constitutional and human rights
already recorded in Rockie C. San Juan
vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No.
65443 (1983) and its utter contempt for
the principle of due process of law to the
prejudice of petitioners;" and
3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected
to the extreme penalty of expulsion
without cause or if there be any, without
being informed of such cause and without
being afforded the opportunity to defend
themselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime
Institute (117 SCRA 581 [1983]).
In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent
University and its President pursuant to this Court's
requirement therefor1 , respondents make the claim:
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of
the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not
because of their allegedexercise of their constitutional and
human rights;"
2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July
5, 1986 "when the enrollment period was already closed;"
3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic
showing" was "poor", "due to his activities in leading
boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of
this development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had
demanded that his son "reform or else we will recall him to
the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners in
G.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs.
National University, et al.," at the hearing of which on
November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the
students involved (to) take advantage and make the most of
the opportunity given to them to study;" that Guzman
"however continued to lead or actively participate in
activities within the university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is
facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446)
in connection with the destruction of properties of
respondent University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is
also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National University,
Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.' for damages arising from
destruction of university properties
4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he
continued to lead or actively participate, contrary to the
spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ...
Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the
petitioners) and to university rules and regulations, within
university premises but without permit from university
officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;"
and
5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are
not of good scholastic standing. "
Respondents close their comment with the following
assertions, to wit:
1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have
forfeited their privilege, if any, to seek enrollment in
respondent university. The rights of respondent university,
as an institution of higher learning, must also be respected.
It is also beyond comprehension why petitioners, who
continually despise and villify respondent university and its
officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking
enrollment in an institution that they hate.
2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal
technicalities, it is not to the best interest of all concerned
that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondent
university.
3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the
semestral basis, respondents cannot be compelled to enroll
them after the end of the semester.
On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading
as follows:
... Acting on the Comment submitted by
respondent, the Court Resolved to NOTE
the same and to require a REPLY to such
Comment. The Court further Resolved to
ISSUE a MANDATORY INJUNCTION,
enjoining respondent to allow the
enrolment of petitioners for the coming
semester without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceeding to which any or all
of them may be subjected with their right
to lawful defense recognized and
respected. As regards petitioner Diosdado
Guzman, even if it be a fact that there is a
pending criminal charge against him for
malicious mischief, the Court nonetheless
is of the opinion that, as above-noted,
without prejudice to the continuation of
any disciplinary proceeding against him,
that he be allowed to resume his studies in
the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of
the petition itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman,
father of said petitioner, is extending full
cooperation with petitioners to assure that
 whatever protest or grievance petitioner
Guzman may have would be ventilated in
a lawful and peaceful manner.
Petitioners' REPLY inter alia—
1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5,
1984 (when enrollment was already closed), it being
alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he also
attempted to do so several times before that date, all to no
avail, because respondents ... persistently refused to allow
him to do so" respondents' ostensible reason being that
Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the
school premises," although there were no existing
disciplinary charge against petitioner Urbiztondo" at the
time;
2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the
resolution 2 justifies the conclusion that "petitioners' right to
exercise their constitutional freedoms" had thereby been
restricted or limited; and
3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the
school premises without the permission of the school ... can
be explained by the fact that the respondents persistently
refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the
students. "
On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another
resolution, this time reading as follows:
... The Court, after considering the
pleadings filed and deliberating on the
issues raised in the petition for
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies
with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction as well as the respondents'
comment on the petition and the reply of
counsel for petitioners to the respondents'
comment, Resolved to (a) give DUE
COURSE to the petition; (b) consider the
respondents' comment as ANSWER to the
petition; and (c) require the parties to file
their respective MEMORANDA within
twenty (20) days from notice. ... .
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents'
comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never
conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or
not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in
activities within the university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or
disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of
"vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise
barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious
mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more,
furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment
from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of
respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of
theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-
enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as
students, have the right among others "to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in
case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations." 6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or
being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the
admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any
student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual
and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have
been conducted." 8 This Court is therefore constrained, as
in Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal
this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on students
without due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt
and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for ...
(its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the very object
of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful
management of the college." 10 The rules may include those
governing student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of
"good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on
"every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual
further provides that-
... The school rules governing discipline
and the corresponding sanctions therefor
must be clearly specified and defined in
writing and made known to the students
and/or their parents or guardians. Schools
shall have the authority and prerogative to
promulgate such rules and regulations as
they may deem necessary from time to
time effective as of the date of their
promulgation unless otherwise
specified. 12
But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not,
'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these
are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shag have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have
the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents
are directed to allow the petitioners to re-enroll or otherwise
continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to
any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them
may be subjected in accordance with the standards herein
set forth.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES,
RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO,
CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and
JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR,
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE
and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral
ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng
dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng
isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled
by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint
Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to
petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the
controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to
education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic
freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition
for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and private
respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996
denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated
January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
36 Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to
reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution
No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent
Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29,
1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March
29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner
alone in Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when
he overheard two men bad-mouthing and
apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his
boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his
two other brods while watching television. These
two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other
persons went back to Manang's and confronted the
two who were still in the restaurant. By admission
of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of
the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical
violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted
between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau
Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology.
"Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent
Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity
went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity
in the campus. Among them were respondents
Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were
looking for a person whose description matched
James Yap. According to them, this person
supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could
not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked "Paano ba
iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr.
James Yap went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft
Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue,
he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten
guys were running towards him. He panicked. He
did not know what to do. Then, respondent
Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles."
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind
Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and
Valdes who were in front of him, were also
punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted;
guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of
the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita
ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya."
What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also
running with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus.
At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the
Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap
to the university clinic; reported the incident to the
Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods
at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their
head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang
gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a
ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock
in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed
directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez,
they went towards the direction of Dagonoy Street
because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a
book for his friend from another friend who lives
somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before
they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate
Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside
the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just
keep on walking. However, the group got out of the
restaurant, among them respondents Reverente,
Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw
namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano
without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked
 Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr.
Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run
from the mauling and they were chased by
respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent
Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was
ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but
the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt
was torn and he was hit at the back of his head
with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was
chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr.
Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and
Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr.
Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he
identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of
the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr.
Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon
Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who
managed to run was stopped at the end of
Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes
shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent
Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time.
Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the
group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual
proceeded to a friend's house and waited for
almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening
before they returned to the campus to have their
wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars
roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The
victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual,
Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants,
private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung,
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
"Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a
complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging
private respondents with "direct assault." Similar
complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson
Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes
and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University
and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-
BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-
PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-
APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard
Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-
MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No.
9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate
notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and
Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints
and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed
their respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were
involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB
Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents.
Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent
notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12,
1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded
Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and
deliberate the charge against you for violation of
CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and
Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the
Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to
give testimony and present evidence in your
behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you
give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further
directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as
well as the sworn statement of their proposed
testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or
your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the
sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be
considered a waiver on your part to present
evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and
28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common
defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March
29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he
was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S.
Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung
goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular
date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad
asked his permission to use the car and thus, his
dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son.
Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but works from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports
Authority where the elder Bungubung is also
employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of
respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he
arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up
respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd.
route towards respondent's house in BF
Parañaque (on a Wednesday in Baclaran); and
arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent
Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and
taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at
the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports
Authority is located at the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with
his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m.
of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald
at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at the
university clinic for his throat irritation. He said that
he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to
McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the
girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette
Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the
Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of
March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the
responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some works
in the apartment of his parents. Although he had
classes in the evening, the workers according to
 him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m.
when he arrives from his classes. The workers get
paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit,
unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly
attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the
date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that
[he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a
meeting with some of the officers that we were
preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty.
They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic
expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The
dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the
Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-
BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-
PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and
RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837)
guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and
thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-
MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the
charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for
reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-
President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions
were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the
RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorariand
injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36.
The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995
Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the
June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior
Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued
a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents,
representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its
behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution
dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1,
1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment
of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex
parte motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in
paragraph 3.2125 of his original petition. Respondent Judge
amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in
the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with
copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
25121,28 in view of the authority granted to it under Section
77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
(MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and
Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-
intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent
Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining
orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to
dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On
June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an
Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to
dismiss and its supplement, and granted private
respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents,
representatives or any and all other persons acting
for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined
from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the
petitioners-in-intervention from the De La
Salle University and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995, affirming the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent De La Salle
University and to immediately allow them
to enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat in accordance with the standards
set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is
granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives,
or any and all persons acting for and its behalf are
hereby restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-
Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses
offered at respondent (De La Salle
University) and to forthwith allow all said
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to
enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation
thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect
upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
posting an injunctive bond in the amount
of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to
the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention will pay to respondent all damages that
the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if
the Court will finally decide that petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto
is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are
directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later
than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was
refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted
to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY
1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners
(respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also
prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU
in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated
September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent
Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant
portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of
the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that
until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE
University as well as your subordinates, agents,
representatives, employees and any other person
assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to
immediately desist from implementing the
Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the
intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution
dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said Resolution of
May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring
the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the
courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to
enroll and complete their degree courses until their
graduation from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995
Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for
preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned
Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the
penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for
Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private
respondents were to be excluded.38 The Resolution
states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE
LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE,
MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE
PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR.
ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND
RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY
IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE
COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT
OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE
PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG,
MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN
LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again
prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or
attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several
demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal
of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar,
CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to
petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent
Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes
pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco
refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order
dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr.
Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle
University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution
181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al.
v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar
and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there
being no other plain and speedy remedy available,
considering the set deadline for enrollment this
current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent
further prejudice to his rights as a student of the
institution, DLSU, through the proper school
authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin
Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for
Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through
petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private
respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent
Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner
DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar,
using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to
dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-
96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned
resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private
respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of
herein petition is hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as
follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-
96 is immediately executory in character, the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration
notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of
merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case
records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) from the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the
DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion
cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records
of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the
automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private
respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before
respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its
questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar's
urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The
pertinent portion of the order reads:
 In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent
motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby granted, and respondents' motion to
dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September
25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served
personally by the Court's sheriff upon the
respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to
conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the
continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction
dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil
Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the
urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4,
1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge from
implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122,
effective immediately and until further orders from this
Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his
manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his
course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his
enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as
indicated in his transcript of records52 issued by DLSU.
However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a
certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has
legal authority to review decisions of institutions of
higher learning that impose disciplinary action on
their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its
rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded
due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to
academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents
proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on
private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of
petitioners53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96
disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it
nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner
DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case,
petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having
two different directives from the CHED and the respondent
Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and
the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll
and complete their degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the
merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to
take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling
reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues
raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our
jurisdiction.54This is in consonance with our case law now
accorded near-religious reverence that rules of procedure
are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to
suspend their operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan
ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong
pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na
pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review
student expulsion cases, even those involving students in
secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in
the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite
Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
"Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not
transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving
institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg.
232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and
duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and
instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of
R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic,
i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and
development of academic plans, programs and standards
for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of
CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not
include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary
cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and
functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher
Education, which the CHED has replaced and whose
functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had
any authority over student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722,
otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on
Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for
other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the
creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher
Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned
policies, the Commission on Higher Education is
hereby created, hereinafter referred to as
Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and
separate from the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the
office of the President for administrative purposes
only. Its coverage shall be both public and private
 institutions of higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in all post secondary
educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. –
The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and
exercise such other powers and functions as may
be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose
and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be
necessary for its effective operations and for the
continued enhancement of growth or development
of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that
R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS'
power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving
institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They
make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as
institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show
that the authority and supervision over all public and private
institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting
programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to
decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary
level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED,
which is "both public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting programs in all post
secondary educational institutions, public and private." That
would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private
educational institution which offers tertiary degree
programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the
protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens
to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be
accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with
ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with
promoting its exercise and observance for the continued
intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning
and research, the development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and
cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A.
No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would continue to
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and
exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim
that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced,
never had authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact,
the responsibilities of other government entities having
functions similar to those of the CHED were transferred to
the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in
student discipline cases should therefore be read in
conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating
that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered
state-supported post-secondary degree-granting
vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred
to the Commission [On Higher Education]." This
provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation,
recommendation, setting and development of academic
plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the
only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of
jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the
transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS
might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any
other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of
law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang
proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings
of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our entire history.64 The
constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn
and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students
found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal
minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed
of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is
among the primary rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in
due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due
process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all
instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the
parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the
charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in
fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against them as they
attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover,
private respondents were given the right to adduce
evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it
by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline
Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied
due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine
the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this
Court held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x
an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher
learning, possesses academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas
na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko
na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint.74 According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in
teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically
stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have
a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free
choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung,
Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial
evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina
Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan
ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed
the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi
may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by
clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b)
the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be
successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has
been established by witnesses.79 Positive identification of
accused where categorical and consistent, without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying,
should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi,
being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to
the crime who can positively identify the accused. 82 Alibi is
an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with
caution because one can easily fabricate an
alibi.83Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is
inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive
declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the
crime and were the victim's assailants. As between
categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a
bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is
the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot
prevail over the positive identification of accused by the
witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in
student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable
doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial
evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private
respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and
Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly
that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29,
1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been
there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive
identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the
expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students
who have been investigated and found guilty by
the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner
university's disciplinary rules and standards will
certainly undermine the authority of the
administration of the school. This we would be
most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987
Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution
as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent
influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as
those who come after them.88 It must be borne in mind that
universities are established, not merely to develop the
intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or
flowering if you will, of the total man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined
to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in
Quezon City at the time of the incident in question on March Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few
29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury.
certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
Discipline Board, to wit: suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the
future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
CERTIFICATION mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases.
Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to
protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an
educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and
affirm by way of this Certification that
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not
sometime on March 29, 1995, at about
expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such,
and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we
pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU
were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at
may exclude or drop the names of the said private
Kiangan Hall, inside Camp Crame,
respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and
Quezon City, meeting in connection with transfer credentials immediately issued.
an affair of our class known as Class 7,
Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary
discussing on the proposed sponsorship WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and
affair. dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our
permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp
Crame, in his car with the driver. Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of
completion/graduation in favor of private respondent
Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. immediately issued.
Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro
D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 SO ORDERED.
Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City),
and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The
rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Quisumbing *, Chico-
amply corroborated by credible and disinterested Nazario, Velasco, Jr. ** , JJ., concur.
witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an
accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But
where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack
of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi
assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent
with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.92

Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times

when accused has no other possible defense for what could
really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time,
and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his
favor.93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on

private respondents is disproportionate to their
misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa

private respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang
pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in

their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and
that "the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline,
may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival."94 This power, however, does not give them the
untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not
commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of
arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process
question.95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the

circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by
private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997]
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as
Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON.
JESUS B. GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting
Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, and ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in
his capacity as General Manager of Philippine
Ports Authority, petitioners, vs. UNITED
HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO
No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots
to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents
right to exercise their profession and their right to due
process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975,
Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPAs
charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, [1] the PPA
promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 [2] on March 21, 1985, which
embodied the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage
Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in
Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that
aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses [3] and must
train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and
in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they
have achieved satisfactory performance [4] that they are
given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA
itself [5] to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age
of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. [6] Harbor
pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize
themselves into pilot associations which would make
available such equipment as may be required by the PPA
for effective pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot
associations invested in floating, communications, and
office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the
PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot
association and is required to pay a proportionate
equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume
his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned
of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A.
Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 [7] on July 15, 1992,
whose avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and
thereby afford better protection to the port users through the
improvement of pilotage services. This was implemented by
providing therein that all existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December
1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions
in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly
renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance.
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots
Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through
Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
before the Department of Transportation and
Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that the matter of reviewing,
recalling or annulling PPAs administrative issuances lies
exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body.
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued
Memorandum Order No. 08-92 [8] which laid down the
criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of
harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: [9] safety record
and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria
for Evaluation: [10] promptness in servicing vessels,
compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years
as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the
suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter
was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the
PPA. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the
President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order
directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of
PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that
said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots
under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P. D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines,
was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order
issued earlier. [11] He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92
applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes,
was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it to
control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of
pilots in any port district.
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-
AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and
circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of ones profession falls within the
constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. In the
limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected
thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than
to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to
harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or
cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees
performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the
exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPAs
jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged absence of ample prior
consultation before the issuance of the administrative order,
Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which
merely requires the PPA to consult with relevant
Government agencies. Since the PPA Board of Directors is
composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department
of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance,
and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National
Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private
sector representative who, due to his knowledge and
expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he
concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with
by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages,
before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September
6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: [12]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules
that:
1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and
arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and
Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing
Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from
implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of
Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as
a profession and, therefore, a property right
under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.[13] Thus,
abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be
exercised would be an interference with the property rights
of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or
alteration of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process
of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it
did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of
PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it
only after its publication in the newspapers. From this
decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court
on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating
on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents right against deprivation of property without
due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must
be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known
as the due process clause of the Constitution, viz.:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
x x x.
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation
and that such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process. When one speaks of due
process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced, while substantive due
process requires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just. [14] PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not
observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly
because no hearing was conducted whereby relevant
government agencies and the pilots themselves could
ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the
procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court
has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it
has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon.
Exevea, [15] where it declared that (a)s long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law,
for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO
No. 04-92 no less than four times [16] before the matter was
finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this
score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents
emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, which issues
the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots
examinations, was not consulted, [17] the facts show that the
MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the
Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board
of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued
that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the
issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast
Guard need not be consulted.[18]
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were
not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing,
as the fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules
and regulations, an administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing.[19]
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole
and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by
pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right
has become vested and can only be withdrawn or
shortened by observing the constitutional mandate of due
process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the
procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO
No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has
taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17,
1993, decision that (t)he exercise of ones profession falls
within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without
due process. [20] He merely expressed the opinion that (i)n
the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not
constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby,
and that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely
regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession. As will be presently demonstrated, such
supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate
an administrative order which is not only unreasonable but
also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced
only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is the granting
of license especially to practice a profession. It is also the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in
accordance with established standards. [21] A license is a
right or permission granted by some competent authority to
carry on a business or do an act which, without such
license, would be illegal. [22]
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their
profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial
eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations,
each followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the
court a quo observed:
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the
respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that here (sic)
in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he
must pass five (5) government professional examinations,
namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice on board a vessel for at least a year;
(2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train
and practice for at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after
which he must work, train and practice for at least a year;
(4) For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as
Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to qualify for an
examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given
for pilots.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment

which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at
the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of
PPA-AO No. 04-92, (a)ll existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December
1992 only, and (a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in
all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of
one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or
cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly
restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they
enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing
five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
training, they would have a license which they could use
until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for
mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they
have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license
which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and
neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that
period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a rigid
evaluation of performance which is conducted only after the
license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the
term renewal. It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which
primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO
No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85,
which is still operational. Respondents are correct in
pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a surplusage [23] and,
therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a
comprehensive order setting forth the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of
Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports. It
provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment,
performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor
pilots - matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92
and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds
nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
struck down.
Finally, respondents insinuation that then PPA
General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance
of the questioned administrative order may have some
factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in
his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial courts
finding of animosity between him and private respondents
might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of
cases filed in court between private respondents and
Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court,
cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the
issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in
accordance with law and the best of professional
motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always
subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a
quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.
Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial
court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described
in the information, without a permit from the municipal
treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of
Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant
contends that under such circumstances the provisions of
Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or
killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse
except upon permit secured from the municipal
treasure. Before issuing the permit for the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
the municipal treasurer shall require for branded
cattle the production of the original certificate of
ownership and certificates of transfer showing title
in the person applying for the permit, and for
unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy
said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals
for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been
carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for
agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no
event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food
any animal of any kind which is not fit for human
consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a
record of all permits for slaughter issued by him,
and such record shall show the name and
residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age,
brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as
remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of
identification of the animal for the slaughter of
which permit is issued and the date on which such
permit is issued. Names of owners shall be
alphabetically arranged in the record, together with
date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for
slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly
index the same under the name of the owner,
together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption or killing for
food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large
cattle except upon permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of
not less than ten nor more than five hundred
pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for
not less than one month nor more than six months,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
It is contended that the proper construction of the language
of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases
(1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a
municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle
for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that
the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a
municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the
penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle
without a permit in that municipality.
We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained
in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the
penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the
slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere,
without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a
municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of
those sections taken by itself and examined apart from the
context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the
phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the
words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words
"slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33;
and the other whereby the phrase "at the municipal
slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting
merely the words "killed for food" and "killing for food" as
used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole
Act, and keeping in mind the manifest and expressed
purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the
latter construction is that which should be adopted.
The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the
Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the
recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners
when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an
elaborate and compulsory system for the separate branding
and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the
Islands, whereby owners are enabled readily and easily to
establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers
of large cattle unaccompanied by certificates of transfer
issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the
contract of sale is made; and it provides also for the
disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession,
so as to protect the rights of the true owners. All this,
manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the
rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession
or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this
elaborate and compulsory system of identification, resting
as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on
each separate animal throughout the Islands, would be
largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals
were requiring proof of ownership and the production of
certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing
them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the animals
were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner
outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would
appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the
slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit
issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides
for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the
office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.
If, however, the construction be placed on these sections
which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily be
seen that all these carefully worked out provisions for the
registry and record of the brands and marks of identification
of all large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part
abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in
possession of such cattle, and naturally would, evade the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of
municipal slaughterhouses, and thus enjoy the fruits of their
wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of
detection incident to the bringing of the animals to the
public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other
identification marks might be scrutinized and proof of
ownership required.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
or more constructions, that construction should be adopted
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of
the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute
was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute
and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections
30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering
or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in
section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the
express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food
at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the
fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general
prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human
consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the
requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was
expressly and specifically mentioned out of
superabundance of precaution, and to avoid all possibility of
misunderstanding in the event that some of the
municipalities should be disposed to modify or vary the
general provisions of the law by the passage of local
ordinances or regulations for the control of municipal
slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of
section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One of
the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that
section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit
for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit
for human consumption. A construction which would limit
the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in the statute to
the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses,
leaving unprohibited and unpenalized their slaughter
outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to
defeat the purpose and object of the legislator, that unless
imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it
should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the
language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the
construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to
make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other
sections of the Act.
It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to
slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the
ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or
for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the
statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter
of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first
obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event
that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft
purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms
of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1,
1902), which provides that "no law shall be enacted which
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."
It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether
his contention is that this provision of the statute constitutes
a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right
of eminent domain without providing for the compensation
of the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may
be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion,
appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the
language of that great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the
case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the
question involved was the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by
any person, including the owner, of any stones, gravel, or
sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that
the law in question "is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to
regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as
would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the
public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit
condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and
interest of the community."
It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive
enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in these
Islands is to a greater or less degree interfered with by the
provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what
quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such
cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from
their right and authority, and in some degree interferes with
their exclusive possession and control of their property, so
that if the regulations in question were enacted for purely
private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations
are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied
that it is not such a taking, such an interference with the
right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise
by the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle
these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than
"a just restrain of an injurious private use of the property,
which the legislature had authority to impose."
In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the
doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was
reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote
the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right
of eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police
powers of the State, said:
We think it is settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered civil society, that every
holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights, are subject
to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as
shall prevent them from being injurious, and to
such reasonable restrain and regulations establish
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
This is very different from the right of eminent
domain, the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it; which
can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonable compensation therefor. The power we
allude to is rather the police power, the power
 vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and of the subjects of the same.
It is much easier to perceive and realize the
existence and sources of this power than to mark
its boundaries or prescribe limits to its exercise.
Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain
placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption
of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not
an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and
is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the
State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere
restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the
legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare.
And we think that an examination of the general provisions
of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks
to safeguard and the public necessities for which it
provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and
restraints imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership
by the particular provisions of the statute under
consideration were imposed not for private purposes but,
strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the
public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign police
power which every State possesses for the general public
welfare and which "reaches to every species of property
within the commonwealth."
For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a
virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the
total extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many
sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some
cases as much as ninety and even one hundred per cent of
these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of
the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost
exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes,
the ravages of the disease with which they were infected
struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the
country. large areas of productive land lay waste for years,
and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants
of the Islands, fell off to such an extent that the
impoverished people were compelled to spend many
millions of pesos in its importation, notwithstanding the fact
that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the
arable rice lands of the country could easily be made to
produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The
drain upon the resources of the Islands was such that
famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the
breast of the people, and in many provinces the energies of
the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the
apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they
were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were
expended by the Government in relieving the immediate
needs of the starving people, three millions of dollars were
voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or
famine fund, public works were undertaken to furnish
employment in the provinces where the need was most
pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the suffering
incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout
the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of animals fit
for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the
situation, because in an agricultural community material
progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped
for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a
community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the
fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to
market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government
to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but,
as appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for
the future depended largely on the conservation of those
animals which had been spared from the ravages of the
diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands
where the need for them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were employed,
with a view to the discovery and applications of preventive
and curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures
have proved in some degree successful in protecting the
present inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the
gradual increase and redistribution of these animals
throughout the Archipelago, in response to the operation of
the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in
practically relieving those sections which suffered most by
the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of
carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold or
more, and it may fairly be presumed that even if the
conservative measures now adopted prove entirely
successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these
animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have
more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this
sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing
became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands,
necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing with
the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other
personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed
from the legislative authority found that the general welfare
of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and
somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and
registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of
their slaughter for food. It will hardly be questioned that the
provisions of the statute touching the branding and
registration of such cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing
the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the
due and proper exercise of the police power of the State;
and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the
provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the
slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work
were in like manner enacted in the due and proper exercise
of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing
conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against
the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction
of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these
Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of
the administrative and legislative departments of the
Government, that not merely the material welfare and future
prosperity of this agricultural community were threatened by
the ravages of the disease which swept away the work
animals during the years prior to the enactment of the law
under consideration, but that the very life and existence of
the inhabitants of these Islands as a civilized people would
be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of
large cattle by disease or otherwise. Confronted by such
conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the
Legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the
preservation of work animals, even to the extent of
prohibiting and penalizing what would, under ordinary
conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of
rights of ownership and control of the private property of the
citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right
of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private property
by police regulation can be justified, we think that the
reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by
the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that
power.
As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case
of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):
 The extent and limits of what is known as the
police power have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every
State in the Union. It is universally conceded to
include everything essential to the public safely,
health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or
abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever
may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this
power it has been held that the State may order the
destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise
endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition
of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the
slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of
decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of
railways and other means of public conveyance,
and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction
of objectionable trades to certain localities; the
compulsary vaccination of children; the
confinement of the insane or those afficted with
contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants,
beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression
of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and
the prohibition of gambling houses and places
where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this,
however, the State may interfere wherever the
public interests demand it, and in this particular a
large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislature to determine, not only what the interests
of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27;
Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State
in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature
may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business,
or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon lawful occupations. In other words, its
determination as to what is a proper exercise of its
police powers is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the
enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;"
and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the
community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury
of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington
R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general
police power of the State, persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are
concerned."
And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p.
738) says:
It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the
instances in which the police power is or may be
exercised, because the various cases in which the
exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict
with a similar exercise by others, or may be
detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite
in number and in variety. And there are other cases
where it becomes necessary for the public
authorities to interfere with the control by
individuals of their property, and even to destroy it,
where the owners themselves have fully observed
all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but
where, nevertheless, some controlling public
necessity demands the interference or destruction.
A strong instance of this description is where it
becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the
private property of individuals to prevent the
spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the
advance of a hostile army, or any other great public
calamity. Here the individual is in no degree in
fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity"
which "knows no law." The establishment of limits
within the denser portions of cities and villages
within which buildings constructed of inflammable
materials shall not be erected or repaired may also,
in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of
private property; but regulations for this purpose
have been sustained notwithstanding this result.
Wharf lines may also be established for the general
good, even though they prevent the owners of
water-fronts from building out on soil which
constitutes private property. And, whenever the
legislature deem it necessary to the protection of a
harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or
sand from the beach, they may establish
regulations to that effect under penalties, and make
them applicable to the owners of the soil equally
with other persons. Such regulations are only "a
just restraint of an injurious use of property, which
the legislature have authority" to impose.
So a particular use of property may sometimes be
forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances,
and without the fault of the power, that which was
once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now
become a public nuisance, endangering the public
health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes
destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards
which prove, in the advance of urban population, to
be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of
becoming so, are liable to be closed against further
use for cemetery purposes.
These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-
book authorities in the United States clearly indicate the
wide scope and extent which has there been given to the
doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in
question being a proper exercise of that power is not in
violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law," a provision which itself is adopted from the
Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance
in the constitution of most if not all of the States of the
Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by
the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
SUPREME COURT of carabaos.
Manila
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall
EN BANC take effect immediately.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of
October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, hundred and eighty.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION (
COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, S
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL G
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION
D
IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
.
)
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

F
E
R
CRUZ, J.:
D
I
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry
of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It N
is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he A
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626- N
A. D

The said executive order reads in full as follows: E

.
WHEREAS, the President has given
orders prohibiting the interprovincial M
movement of carabaos and the
A
slaughtering of carabaos not complying
with the requirements of Executive Order R
No. 626 particularly with respect to age; C
O
WHEREAS, it has been observed that S
despite such orders the violators still
manage to circumvent the prohibition P
against inter-provincial movement of r
carabaos by transporting carabeef e
instead; and s
i
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the d
purposes and objectives of Executive
e
Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is n
necessary to strengthen the said t
Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef R
subject of the violation; e
p
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. u
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by b
virtue of the powers vested in me by the l
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the
i
following:
c
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is
hereby amended such that henceforth, no o
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical f
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to t
another. The carabao or carabeef h
transported in violation of this Executive e
Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable P
institutions and other similar institutions as h
the Chairman of the National Meat i
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in l
the case of carabeef, and to deserving i
farmers through dispersal as the Director p
 p other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially
i this Court.
n
e The challenged measure is denominated an executive
s order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of
a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of
the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he
has now come before us in this petition for review
on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation
of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case
of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then
on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however,
this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these
lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a
clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare
them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning.
Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law
when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing
another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or
excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is
demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear
of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was
issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking
care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the
exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No.
6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to
act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to
have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of
any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question
the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been
made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will
lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this
time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more
appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves
to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions
of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct
interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due
process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not
followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In
fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected
by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on
the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it
would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some
provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying
down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue
of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their
own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of
the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to
leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to
define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as
nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the
sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign
liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would
thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of
any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his
peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of
fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The
solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215
has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing
reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is
entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part
of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those
who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of
the question; the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow
the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination
of the problem not from one or the other perspective only
but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or
ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be
dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard
against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country
is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our
fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every person,
faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost
two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College
Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only
after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to
be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in
every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars
the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances
when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be
killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently
pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport
of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled
without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to
protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due
process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a
clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent
domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is
born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb
to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or
owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and
often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity
or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its
regulation under the police power is not only proper but
necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable
Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination
of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to
justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule
in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The original
measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of
its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the
carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We
affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face
of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v.
Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a
deprivation of property without due process of law. The
defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit,
and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was
affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure
to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were
then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken
many of these animals and the reduction of their number
had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which
in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore,
because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent
increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly,
necessitating more effective measures for the registration
and branding of these animals. The Court held that the
questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power
and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference;
and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is
clear that the enactment of the provisions
of the statute under consideration was
required by "the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class" and that the prohibition of
the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft
purposes was a "reasonably necessary"
limitation on private ownership, to protect
the community from the loss of the
services of such animals by their slaughter
by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food, even
when by so doing the productive power of
the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the
Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and
so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The
method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon
issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will
be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and
preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the
second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We
note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive
Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited,
it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their
transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with
the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by
the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the
penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the
accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported
is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by
the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive
order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair
play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions
when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to
correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order
should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with
the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held
in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is
penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice,
which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of
the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that
the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and
the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only
the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the
police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the
executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law
was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would
have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of
the President, to declare the executive order
unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse
to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of
Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to
assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case
would never have reached us and the taking of his property
under the challenged measure would have become
a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for
his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would
have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would
have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it
guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do
is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby

declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof
is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr.,

Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL,
NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL,
JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO,
JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR.,
ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R.
RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the
Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass
upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can
this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from
attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips,
or the like three (3) days before the date of the
examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court
by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other
dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled "
Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation
Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to
Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution
embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review
class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-
out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediately
proceeding every examination day
including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction
shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules
and Regulations of the Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of
the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a
prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing
the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In
an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that
it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10,
1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said
petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition
meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED
and the other dated October 21, 1986
issued by respondent court is declared
null and void. The respondent court is
further directed to dismiss with prejudice
Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
No cost in this instance.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and
to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated
as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation
Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal
bodies. Thus it held —
That the petitioner Professional
Regulatory Commission is at least a co-
equal body with the Regional Trial Court is
beyond question, and co-equal bodies
have no power to control each other or
interfere with each other's acts. 3
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied
heavily on National Electrification Administration vs.
Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine
Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a
Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being
co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this
case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is
glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that
the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the
orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was
that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs.
Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by
or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of
general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and
Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act
No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions
of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his
remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review.
Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it
was stressed that if an order of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate
remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to
the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No.
902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange
Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other
government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was
specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation
Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned,
with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that
need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling.
Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling
or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike
Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No.
902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223,
creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that
orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable
either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in
order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the
respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to
be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial
Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the
Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the
Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view
that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly
propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below
to review by certiorari decisions and/or
resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission and of the residential
Executive Asssistant is concerned, there
should be no question but that the power
of judicial review should be upheld. The
following rulings buttress this conclusion:
The objection to a judicial
review of a Presidential
act arises from a failure
to recognize the most
important principle in our
system of government,
i.e., the separation of
powers into three co-
equal departments, the
executives, the legislative
and the judicial, each
supreme within its own
assigned powers and
duties. When a amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
presidential act is
challenged before the
courts of justice, it is not
to be implied therefrom
that the Executive is
being made subject and
subordinate to the courts.
The legality of his acts
are under judicial review,
not because the
Executive is inferior to
the courts, but because
the law is above the
Chief Executive himself,
and the courts seek only
to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A
judicial review of the
President's decision on a
case of an employee
decided by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals
should be viewed in this
light and the bringing of
the case to the Courts
should be governed by
the same principles as
govern the jucucial
review of all
administrative acts of all
administrative officers. 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br.
II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"'
of the Department of Education and Culture issued
Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then
Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a
complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the
enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts
already entered into by public school teachers. It was the
contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First
Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify
what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the
memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which
has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We
held:
... We definitely state that respondent
Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil
Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff
therein asked the lower court for relief, in
the form of injunction, in defense of a legal
right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . .
.
Hence there is a clear infringement of
private respondent's constitutional right to
enter into agreements not contrary to law,
which might run the risk of being violated
by the threatened implementation of
Executive Office Memorandum Circular
No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which
prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers
and disbursing officers from honoring
special powers of attorney executed by
the payee employees. The respondent
Court is not only right but duty bound to
take cognizance of cases of this nature
wherein a constitutional and statutory right
is allegedly infringed by the administrative
action of a government office. Courts of
first Instance have original jurisdiction over
all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a
judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to
decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its
validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice
and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why
Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the
general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of
Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law
provides:
 SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate
Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3
of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which
resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body
involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's
Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to
the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers
or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action, and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation
. 14This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement
its purely administrative policies and functions like
Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent
PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure
examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue
presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance
had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the
Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private
party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said
issue came about because under the laws then in force,
final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the
Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari.
Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme
Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or
rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the
conduct of elections and the enforcement of election
laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that
an order of the COMELEC awarding a
contract to a private party, as a result of its
choice among various proposals
submitted in response to its invitation to
bid comes within the purview of a "final
order" which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari. What
is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before
the COMELEC and taken cognizance of
by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that
the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered
in a legal controversy before it wherein the
parties filed their respective pleadings and
presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this
order of the commission was issued
pursuant to its authority to enter into
contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC
resolution awarding the contract in favor of
Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of elections,
and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt
order may be imposed by the COMELEC
from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this
Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
arising from said order may be well taken
in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard
is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here,
petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued
that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders
of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also
postulate, for the very first time, that the
Monetary Board is among the "quasi-
judicial ... boards" whose judgments are
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to
the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts,"
that may review the Monetary Board's
resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the
following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit.
The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over
resolution or orders of the Monetary
Board. No law prescribes any mode of
appeal from the Monetary Board to the
IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950
and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its
resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction,
We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity
of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited
relief to those who are and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was
adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve
the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations."
However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen
that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot
even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, collge or university, or any review center
or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions . ... 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is
caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill
motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three
days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to
the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary,
it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They
cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed
to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They
should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful
knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As
defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized.
Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of
legitimate means of review or preparation on those last
three precious days-when they should be refreshing
themselves with all that they have learned in the review
classes and preparing their mental and psychological
make-up for the examination day itself-would be like
uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the
source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt
officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss,
then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.
Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set
up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of
the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of
the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for
the examinations should not be curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET
ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force
and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., took no part.

The term "liberty" means more than mere

freedom from physical restraint or the
bounds of a prison. It means freedom to
go where one may choose and to act in
such a manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others, as his judgment
may dictate for the promotion of his
happiness, to pursue such callings and
vocations as may be most suitable to
develop his capacities, and giv to them
their highest enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it

violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of
review that review schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before
becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the
means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding
academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or

college itself is possessed of such a right.
It decides for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly
extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is

not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-
appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the
lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged
it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For
reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was
filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president
and general manager of the second petitioner" against the
respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty
to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement
of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the
petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the
promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18)
members "operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and
city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and
giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million."1 (par.
2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of
the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in
any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section
1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or persons without
his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public
view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length
of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief
of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds,
not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes
and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class
motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section
2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than
18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels,
lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied
by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty
and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in
Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process
clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null
and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City
of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a
denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition
did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose,
which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of
the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of
the right to privacy and the guaranty against self
incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the
dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City
of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the
president and general manager of Hotel del Mar
Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
 resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to
sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected
and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage
in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of
the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor
(Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then
Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto
as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an
annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on
January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the
burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution
resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v.
Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities.
Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then
barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail
what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance
"null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent
the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members
of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the
case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the
decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional
grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the
alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate
motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made
permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court
against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted
standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that
the regulations are essential to the well being of the people
x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it
is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its
face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus:
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the resumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face
the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does
not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything
of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict
and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all
the great public needs."5 It would be, to paraphrase another
leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if
it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police
power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of
facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in
great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments
of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and
at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation
of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of
the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the
maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting
playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball
machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,
conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which
are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process
or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty
may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill
tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been
identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow
or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such
a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority.
It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted
here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of
deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance
No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in
certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000
annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has
been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2)
Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount
of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a
much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the
former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the
fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced
by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made
to implement the state's police power. Only the other day,
this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing
authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a
wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax
so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses
for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation
from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf
of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and
means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the
public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers
in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which
outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was
said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar
as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or
the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was
intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears
a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty
which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being.
No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of
the police power."28
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer
or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With
him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast
doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a
motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or
operators; another proviso which from their standpoint
would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means
a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do
these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its
face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the
question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before
us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove
illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all
due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
and determination, the attack against the validity of the
challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far
from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly
held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court
compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
business and occupations. Persons and property may be Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society will
fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying

legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of
the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on

another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in
the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the
alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,

EN BANC
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor
of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and
Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON.
ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES,
HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C.
OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO
U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE,
JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F.
CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON.
MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON.
BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON.
JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON.
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P.
MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON.
DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO,
JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON,
HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q.
BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R.
CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON.
BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M.
ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO
F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON.
JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of
the City of Manila,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding
Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel
good after and what is immoral is what you feel
bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any
dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who
would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is
secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It
is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the
conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will
not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the
words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional
guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in
zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test
of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule
42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower
court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila,
Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City
Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and
approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and
ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no
person, partnership, corporation or entity shall,
in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M.
Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the
East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas
Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage
in, any business providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of
the community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
 10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or
any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or
otherwise, or from granting licenses and
accepting payments for the operation of
business enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of
establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the
businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are
hereby given three (3) months from the date of
approval of this ordinance within which to wind
up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area, such as but
not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along
restaurants, with well-defined activities for
wholesome family entertainment that cater
to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition,
not only of motion pictures but also of
cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays,
art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law
and medium intensity districts as provided
for in the zoning ordinances for
Metropolitan Manila, except new
warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or
yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery,
or funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of
this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or
fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or
both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
that in case of juridical person, the President, the
General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation
shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER,
that in case of subsequent violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon
approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular
session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30,
1993. (Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that
the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns
such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were
not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and
they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor
did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and
neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community."11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City
Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as
Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it
is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which
specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a
commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3)
The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of
police power as the compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected; (4)
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by
punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a
legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5)
The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that:
(a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's
property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as
a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6)
The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection
under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting
the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and
for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area.14
In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of
Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the
power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as
provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local
Government Code,16 which reads, thus:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land,
buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose
shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities,
 including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same;
or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted
that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
provision included the power to control, to govern and to
restrain places of exhibition and amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was
enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its
police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of
Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of
Manila)20 which reads, thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal
Board shall have the following legislative powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which
shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six
months' imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the
presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the
burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency
between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the
Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial
zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed,
cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal
protection clause and cannot be denounced as class
legislation as there existed substantial and real differences
between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the
City of Manila.24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio,
Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining
order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on
16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered
the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of
said Decision reads:27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of
the City of Manila null and void, and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that
had been issued by this Court against the
defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on
12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the
case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of
law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition,
alleging that the following errors were committed by the
lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the
subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2)
It erred in holding that the
questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in
essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower
court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was
enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power
of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by
local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of
the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section
458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that
the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does
not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption
of validity.35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private
respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and
that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It
reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid
exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process,
confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with
its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection
clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any
officer unregulated discretion in the execution of
the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep
sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being
its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the
Court witnessed the area's many turn of events. It relished
its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the
Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila
and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that
the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The
Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra
vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities
that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress
the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution.
The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from
attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long
line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when
they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the
laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it
must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances
should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
precept that local government units are able to legislate
only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the
local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal
of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the
exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government
units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police
power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police
power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the
general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the
legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided
under the Code.42 The inquiry in this Petition is concerned
with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and
far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good.43 In the case at
bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.44
SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women
in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in
the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. . . ."48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice,49and as such it is a limitation upon
the exercise of the police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive
justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction
without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of
judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are
"persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their
property is concerned.52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate
limits on government, usually called "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic
procedural due process issues are concerned with what
kind of notice and what form of hearing the government
must provide when it takes a particular action.53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words,
substantive due process looks to whether there is a
sufficient justification for the government's action.54 Case
law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is
such a justification depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where
only rational basis review is applied, substantive due
process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where
strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental
rights, then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to
achieve a compelling government purpose.56
The police power granted to local government units must
always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly
those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty and property.59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60It
must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights62 a violation of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the
social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the
deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying
nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail
lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the
Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had
already taken judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila
traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide
a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence
and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes
and thrill-seekers."64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the
promotion and protection of the social and moral values of
the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the
objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City
of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community.
However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved
through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed"
under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the
prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
seprotect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems
with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like
which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless
and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted
definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments
are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual
affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of
no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual
immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the
most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to
be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual
act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we
would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering
the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house,
building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter
will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because
there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.
Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians
churches continually recall the presence and universality of
sin in man's history.66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the
establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be
injurious to the health or comfort of the community and
which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity
that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be
used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for
that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a
house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere
likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that
were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only
be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be
extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity,
reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be
laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to
address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because
immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in
the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate
human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but
not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are
covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly
objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly
punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome,"
"innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a
clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those
therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to put an
end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its
authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these
violations;67 and it may even impose increased license fees.
In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs,
day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance
halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section
3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up
business operations or to transfer to any place outside the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other
kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it
states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of
the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by
the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to
liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."68 In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.69
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of
Regents,70 sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized…as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can
be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be
broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by
the due process clause includes personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in
making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood where they
formed under compulsion of the State.71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the
enumerated establishments under Section 1 of
the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke
this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in
intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it
stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not
contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in
the Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge
such relationships with others in the confines of their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the
right to make this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the
due process clause gives them the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government, as
long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be
the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom
from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be
let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of
Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing
reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation,
are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental
that they are the basis on which his civic
obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the
will built out of that experience personal to himself.
If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders
himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he
ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer a master of himself is in any
real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion
on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise
restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it
should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not
to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in
criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not
diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their
right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for
their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of
the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive
as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial
use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof
forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business operations or to
transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into
allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently
restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9,
that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." The provision is the most
important protection of property rights in the Constitution.
This is a restriction on the general power of the government
to take property. The constitutional provision is about
ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about
loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's
property to benefit society, then society should pay. The
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.79
There are two different types of taking that can be
identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A
"regulatory" taking occurs when the government's
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property.80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it
was held that a taking also could be found if government
regulation of the use of property went "too far." When
regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions
of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a
question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." On many other occasions as well,
the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when
regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the
facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and
fairness require that the economic loss caused by public
action must be compensated by the government and thus
borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should
remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the
public action.83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings
is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner
that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.84 A
regulation that permanently denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's
point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
nuisance or property law that existed when the owner
acquired the land make the use prohibitable.85 When the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land will require compensation under the
takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on
land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial
use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending
on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations
and the character of government action. These inquiries are
informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to
prevent the government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a
"taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh
impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of
the owner.88
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the
"prohibited" establishments three (3) months from its
approval within which to "wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up
business operations" amounts to a closure of the
establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is
practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the
structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to
another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment
idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount
of money invested to build the edifices which the owner
reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It
is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found
in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking"
of private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their
property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate
area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just
compensation with an additional burden imposed on the
owner to build another establishment solely from his
coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
"problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical,
it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion
into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the
respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee
shop, art gallery or music lounge without essentially
destroying its property? This is a taking of private property
without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking
that should be compensated by the government. The
burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business,
otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent
violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits
them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as
a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome"
property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it
constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no
support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from
necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that the
property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed
because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose
while the property taken under the power of eminent
domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is
therefore "wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a
"wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a
particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the
cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of
private property for public use.90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide
or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or
guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no
definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to
set forth the conditions when the establishments come
within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon
the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make
possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the
touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could
be secured.91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of
property must, in order to be valid and constitutional,
specify the rules and conditions to be observed and
conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of
an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v.
Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by."
The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all
"because one may never know in advance what 'annoys
some people but does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to
ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community." The cited
case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the
enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that
is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City
Council and which amounts to an interference into personal
and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In
this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the
constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a
reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a
comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually oriented
businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades,
bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as
well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual
encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance
required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel
owners were among the three groups of businesses that
filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel
owners asserted that the city violated the due process
clause by failing to produce adequate support for its
supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours
resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects.
They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on
the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden
on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first
contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a
study which the city considered, was adequate to support
the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals
for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the
licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court
held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will
have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those
bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for
fewer than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely
regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs pointing
out, is also different from this case in that what was
involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode
in which motels may conduct business in order to put an
end to practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did
not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is
not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an
unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their
property is concerned.101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection
clause in this wise:
… What does it signify? To quote from J.M.
Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The
ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be
available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and
favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed
by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the idea of law." There is
recognition, however, in the opinion that what in
fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is
the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. The
constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact
exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under
such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental
act assailed, far from being inspired by the
 attainment of the common weal was prompted by
the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason."
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being
sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew
"that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall
be given to every person under circumstances
which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest.102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of
legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the people without
violating the equal protection clause.103 The classification
must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the
class.104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually
meals and other services for the public. No reason exists
for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar
subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area
but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does
not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for
entertainment" is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of
the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a
profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have
an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any
less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the
assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply
only when women are employed and be inapposite when
men are in harness? This discrimination based on gender
violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to
important government objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination
is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise
failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and
not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels,
hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section
458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land,
buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose
shall:
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation
and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land,
buildings and structures within the city in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose
shall:
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of any
entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same;
or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City
Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court
in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila106 that:
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l),
section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as
synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
Consequently, under the power to regulate
laundries, the municipal authorities could make
proper police regulations as to the mode in which
the employment or business shall be exercised.107
And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an
ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited
the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that
the municipality is empowered only to regulate the same
and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is
specifically given authority or power to regulate or
to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to
prohibit is impliedly withheld.109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners'
assertion110 that they were modified by the Code vesting
upon City Councils prohibitory powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over
public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4
(vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such
other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or
annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same
Section. The several powers of the City Council as
provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent
to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of
which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are
set forth are independent of each other albeit closely
related to justify being put together in a single enumeration
or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be
confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a
conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression
and prohibition.112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments
and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section
458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
included as among "other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend
to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or
"certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the
City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of
its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to
be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must
be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a
general rule in statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, or consequence is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the
rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes
as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact
the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the
Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling
of the Court in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held
that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in
the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the
Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not
covered by the other provisions of the same Code,
and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating
liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving
away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically
by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold
that, under the general power granted by section
2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance
in question, notwithstanding the provision of
section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter
superfluous and nugatory, because the power to
prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling,
giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a
later expression of the legislative will must necessarily
prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of
Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or
later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto.
As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are
irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later
prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
will.116 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between
two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable
method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a
subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to
those of an existing law but no provisions expressly
repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two
general classes: those which occur where an act is so
inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that
only one of the two can remain in force and those which
occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act
and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of
such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail.118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All
general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners'
interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers
the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the
Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the
Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting
the City Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover
under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It
can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent
and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another
section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod,
as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress
and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling
and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
devices and ways to obtain money or property,
drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug
pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such
other activities inimical to the welfare and morals
of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City
Council the power to prohibit the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so
declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the
matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the
City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach
its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these
establishments may only be regulated in their
establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from
the establishments themselves. That these establishments
are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from
another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on
Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned
proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish
and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as
among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h)
thereof. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a
"pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement
places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the
Code considers these establishments as legitimate
enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim
reddendo singula singulis which means that words in
different parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its
proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of
them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical
construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words
under consideration appear in different sections or are
widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle
applies.120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it
likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As
correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already
converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment
and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments
except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry
with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and
effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant
to the general law.121As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor
General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122
The requirement that the enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They
are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of
the Congress, the local government units cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactment
in question, which are merely local in origin cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the
presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has
already been held that although the presumption is always
in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance,
such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an
act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or
is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right.124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental
personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm.
The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory
and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the
City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with
the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for
the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins.
Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for
it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to
stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws
not even under the guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally
involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is
confronted anew with the incessant clash between
government power and individual liberty in tandem with the
archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the
nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of
motels and inns, among other establishments, within the
Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-
motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well
as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays.
Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our
sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and
equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the
present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals,
challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes
in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is
reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared
policy of the City Government to protect the best interest,
health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in
general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An
Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission
and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted
terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall
mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than
twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of
rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments
but would mean the same or would bear the same
meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who
shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon
conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand
(₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a]
juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons
in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same
offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City
ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure
or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect
immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session
today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9
impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila
(the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid
and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and
operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was
authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit
customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation
(WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-
intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-
hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns
and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to
intervene.10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of
the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to
withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion
to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993,
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22,
1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of
the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the
Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC
agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the
case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No.
7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded
by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well
as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from
the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to
the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,19 where the legitimate purpose of preventing
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be
effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of
carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994,
the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities, among other local government units, the
power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the
power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the
Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred
pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine
and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
and void since it violates the right to privacy and the
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it held
that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful object
obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of
the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being of its
constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate
Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty
is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for
review on certiorari.25 In their petition and Memorandum,
petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’
standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of
establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is
being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However,
petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of
their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of
the matter is whether or not these establishments have the
requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons'
equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to
demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm
from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of
standing is built on the principle of separation of
powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by
its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the
judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates
concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and
personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well
as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar
vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and
elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional
standing requirements of injury, causation, and
redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several
exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines,
the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States
Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have
suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."33 Herein, it
is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the
patronage of their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the
Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of
such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may
also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring
suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where
parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or
invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection
claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by
state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States
Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize
them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to
be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v.
Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the
equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18.
The United States High Court explained that the vendors
had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
parties who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a
relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the
rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into
play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when
a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that
the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert
the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will
recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but
our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila.40Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance
requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating
personal information such as name, gender, nationality,
age, address and occupation before they could be admitted
to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the
annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket
ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the
Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the
ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and
the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and
hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another
case about the extent to which the State can intrude into
and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a
room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through
such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people.43 Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance
halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The
awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by
the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a
rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the
framework for analysis of due process or equal protection
questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due
deference to the co-equal branches of government as they
exercise their political functions. But when we are
compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet
another form of caution emerges. If the Court were
animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent
emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial
integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary
is merely the third political branch of government. We
derive our respect and good standing in the annals of
history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule
of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through
the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal
standards through which the courts analyze the most
fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the
day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one
of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution. Due process evades a precise
definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals. The due process
guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation
or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted
as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive
due process." Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural
due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the
form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural
aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are
followed. Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most
other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive
legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome
as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level
of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of
constitutional due process has not been predicated on the
frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes
yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due
process clause has acquired potency because of the
sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine
the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on
substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene
Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case
acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a
"fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of
judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws
dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender53 and
54
legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so
in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been
articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United
States since been applied in all substantive due process
cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using
the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest
is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered.59 Applying strict
scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence
of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection.61 The United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to
protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial
access63and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is
the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury
that would warrant the application of the most deferential
standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we
recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of
these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of
political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does
not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively
exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the
degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as
integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the
Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style
enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but
rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not
feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact
with each other, their society and nature, in a manner
innately understood by them as inherent, without doing
harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental
rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of
Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution
for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments
"have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery
and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill-seekers.’"68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-
scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate
sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single
adults which is constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed
as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding
therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of
Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to
unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible;
indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on
which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking,
that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to
others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot
believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any
real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the
Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very
legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for
more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who
wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed
any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable
private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes
other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately
look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient
alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way
meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to
donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a
blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged
in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions.
Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit
activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of
section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification
of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to
illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and
tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime
home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our
capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day
Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still
steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old
Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big
cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega
cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem
confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world.
The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product.
Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for
new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism
of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and
drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on
the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can
easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The
State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality
without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality
among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights
this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the
promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as
old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a
school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of
morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a
society with relatively little shared morality among its
citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply
variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
accommodation of different interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that
"you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a
matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase
is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with
public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for
one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long
as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and
wrong, they will remain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen

not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but
also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more
extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty
to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by
the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves
are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the
embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression
of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and
because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the
law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an

indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative
is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to
the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to
avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more
judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9,
is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the
name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK,
FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and
style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S
BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, AVENUE
BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER
BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business
under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, RECORD
BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and
in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------------ x
G.R. No. 133661
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 139147
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the
name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA BLOOD BANK,
FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and
style, MOTHER SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S
BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, AVENUE
BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA, M.D., doing
business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER
BLOOD BANK, ALBERT L. LAPITAN, doing business
under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD
TRANSFUSION SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D.,
doing business under the name and style, RECORD
BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and
in behalf of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD
BANKS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the
constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the "National Blood Services Act of
1994," and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9,
series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719.
G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R.
No. 133661,2 entitled "Doctors Blood Bank Center vs.
Department of Health" are petitions for certiorari and
mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the
following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and, (2)
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both
petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from
implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory
injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of
Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’ license to
operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.3
G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing
business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima
Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the
other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent
Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of
this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640
and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly
registered non-stock and non-profit association composed
of free standing blood banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his
capacity as the public official directly involved and charged
with the enforcement and implementation of the law in
question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks
to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the
country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos
on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the
Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on
August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of
the Department of Health (DOH).6
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:
"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period
of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to
a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary."
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department
shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks
over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The
decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful
study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety."8
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country
have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers
run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC),
government-run blood services, private hospital blood
banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services
Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating
commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517,
entitled "An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation
of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories." The
law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of
blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau
of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958
and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in
1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure
Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to
enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as well
as clinical laboratories. Due to this development,
Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued.
The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter
enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was
characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate
suspension and communication of such suspensions to
hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent
communication with blood banks through monthly
information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial
difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of
its supervisory visits to the blood banks.9
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the
safety of blood and blood products intensified when the
dreaded disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the
International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT)
formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and
Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-
associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the
ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy
outlining certain principles that should be taken into
consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated
guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood
products for transfusion.10
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines
was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57,
Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary,
secondary and tertiary depending on the services they
provided. The standards were adjusted according to this
classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied
according to classification level. The new guidelines
likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the
blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.11
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A
institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program
(NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office
primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the
way for the creation of a committee that will implement the
policies of the program and the formation of the Regional
Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act
Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an
Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks
and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other
Purposes" was introduced in the Senate.12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills
No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to
address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank
system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were
referred to the appropriate committees and subsequently
consolidated.13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation,
with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on
the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to
Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking
System." It was revealed that of the blood units collected in
1992, 64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks,
14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based
blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood
banks. During the time the study was made, there were
only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or
commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these
numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial
blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red
Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run
blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the
Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood.
The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of
commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of
private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid
donors are those who receive remuneration for donating
their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run
hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary.14
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by
persons to blood commercial banks are three times more
likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria,
syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates
around ₱50 to ₱150, and because of this arrangement,
many of these donors are poor, and often they are
students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the
money, these donors are not usually honest about their
medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy,
voluntary donors who give their true medical and social
history are about three times much safer than blood from
paid donors.16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino
doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications
for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the
lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their
practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does
not matter to them where the blood comes from.17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act
providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took
effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series
of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the
DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and
Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should
have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners
were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to
open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses
granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity
of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran,
doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of
Fatima Blood Bank," docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or status quo ante order.18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely,
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following
grounds: 19
1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood
Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free
standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to
the purpose of the law;
2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services
Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue delegation
if not outright abdication of the police power of the state;
and,
3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services
Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted deprivation
of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar
petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction before this Court entitled "Doctors
Blood Center vs. Department of Health," docketed as G.R.
No. 133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No.
133640.21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and
regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to
operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998.
Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the
petition submitted the following questions22 for resolution:
1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it
a valid exercise of such power?
2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due
process?
3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and
with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and
services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing
respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the
same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from
implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further
orders from the Court.23
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a
Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with
opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining
order.24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of
Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is
unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police
power, can close down commercial blood banks to protect
the public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719,
and the sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood
banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No.
1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two
years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in
the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
"ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED
OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE
COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND
THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY
BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE
NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING
AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE
SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO
BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH."
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called
"Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood
Banking System." This has been taken note of. This is a
study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors
under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular
study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood
and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood.
This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks
to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject
of commerce of man.
…
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the
sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to
find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood
bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank
really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the
measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business
where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would
accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition
of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law,
exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of
blood or its components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
…
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written
by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary
of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on
Health.
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
"The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a
two-year period will give the Department of Health enough
time to build up government’s capability to provide an
adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the
use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a
sale of commodity."
Taking into consideration the experience of the National
Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the
hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood
donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does not
buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood
have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers
who would donate blood…
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those
commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it
will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the
people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we
should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that
we can go into a national voluntary blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not
safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood
will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any
risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which
increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of
intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited
value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests
are required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There
are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet
screen for and there could be others where there are no
tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling
blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he
tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or
test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests
altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these
have infections in them. Because there is no existing
system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner
can usually get away with many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of
this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold
was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks
in the testing process. They were protecting their profits.25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further
elucidated his stand on the issue:
…
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of
poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who,
unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the
next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend
their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie
about their age, their medical history. They will lie about
when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will
receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over
for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and
urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be
bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for
which it was sold. Between this buying and selling,
obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related
disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in for
minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with
hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he
leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes
in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their
blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood
transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act
of giving it…
For years, our people have been at the mercy of
commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among
medical technologists, hospital administrators and
sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for
collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult,
tedious and unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a
comprehensive national program for safe blood and for
voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public
health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial
blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more
convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that
if we are to close them down, there will be no blood supply.
This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure
that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial
interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should
be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work
because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary.
We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead
in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it,
and the Government must do it."26
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to
order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist
from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks,
compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that will
ultimately cause the shutdown of petitioners’ blood
banks."27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment
and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has
not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on
account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued
on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO,
DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory
leaflets, posters and flyers to the public which state that
"blood banks are closed or will be closed." According to
respondent Secretary, the same were printed and circulated
in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks
in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and
circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.28
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a
Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should
Not be Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No.
139147, citing public respondent’s willful disobedience of or
resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the
said case. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act
constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining order
and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly
administration of justice.29 Petitioners added that despite
the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the
existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated
misleading information under the guise of health advisories,
press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating,
among others, that "this year [1998] all commercial blood
banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will
have to rely on government blood banks."30 Petitioners
further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health
announced in a press conference during the Blood Donor’s
Week that commercial blood banks are "illegal and
dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected by a
restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest
is more important than the lives of the people." These were
all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places
in all government hospitals as well as other medical and
health centers.31
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show
Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained
that nothing was issued by the department ordering the
closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health
advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to
the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on
June 21, 1998.32
Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose
of the information campaign was "to promote the
importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to
educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood
supplies from commercial blood banks."33 In doing so, he
was merely performing his regular functions and duties as
the Secretary of Health to protect the health and welfare of
the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the
voluntary blood donation program espoused by Republic
Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides
that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human
blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through
public education, promotion in schools, professional
education, establishment of blood services network,
and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary
contends that he has the duty to promote the program of
voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging
the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the
people on the risks associated with blood coming from a
paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which
should be given more importance than the commercial
businesses of petitioners.34
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial
interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-
Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and
issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and
133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the
issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors
are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died
allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical
time.35
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.36
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without
giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court
granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the
above intervenors on August 9, 1999.
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent
Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary
to the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a
humanitarian act" and "blood transfusion is a professional
medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a]
and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood
or charging fees other than those allowed by law is even
penalized under Section 12."37
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass
upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary
to address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners
concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R.
No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:
I the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719
CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER;
II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
III
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND PROPERTY;
V
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER; and,
VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY
SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the
Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners
that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood
banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and
unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to
petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by
the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to
which the Secretary of Health must conform in the
performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that
the two-year extension period that may be granted by the
Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood
banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the
Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of
legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it
left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to
the judgment of the administrative body or any other
appointee or delegate of the Legislature.38 Except as to
matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature,
as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does
not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.39
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of
the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard
the health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase
out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of
the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is,
the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.
By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to
under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies.40 The Secretary of Health has been given, under
Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the
provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
"SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. – The implementation of
the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary,
within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof…"
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH,
by virtue of the administrative body’s authority and
expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order
No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order.
No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper
implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9
provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood
banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28,
1998 "based on the result of a careful study and review of
the blood supply and demand and public safety." This
power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions
upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension
for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true
distinction between the power to make laws and discretion
as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.41
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers
granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was
extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2
thereof:
"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy – In order to promote
public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state:
a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by
the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of the
principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood
for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of
commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable
distribution of blood supply and blood products;
d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood
donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial
sale of blood;
e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood
donation in the existing health subjects of the formal
education system in all public and private schools as well
as the non-formal system;
f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in
mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit collection of blood;
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and
organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in
order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate
and safe supply of blood;
h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions
promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit
blood services, either through a system of reimbursement
for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations
from governmental and non-governmental entities;
i) to require all blood collection units and blood
banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;
j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the
operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers
in the Philippines;
k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related
to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and,
l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include
preventive services and education to control spread of
blood transfusion transmissible diseases."
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing
rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly
discriminates against commercial or free standing blood
banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the
law.42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection
of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class
legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others
is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and
not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class.43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act
of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and
welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the
Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive
and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of
infectious diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and
syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The
situation becomes more distressing as the study showed
that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is
sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier
than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to
disclose their medical or social history during the blood
screening.44
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No.
7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and
benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and
proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the
Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial
blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking
system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe
blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the
voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu
of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood
centers, in strict adherence to professional and scientific
standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in
place.45
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for
the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate
its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit
blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for
the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former
operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the
former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the
latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the
law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of
safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves
the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact
that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source
their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine
blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application
of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended
to apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood
banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to
whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid
exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation
of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood
Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s
police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, requires the interference of the State;
and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.46
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the
avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health
by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country
through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective
requires the interference of the State given the disturbing
condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to
the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary
to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the
employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests
must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the
public.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a
valid exercise of the State’s police power. Therefore, the
Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of
action that is both necessary and reasonable for the
common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds
and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of
personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-
impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional
and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an
individual in connection to what he wants to do with his
blood which should be outside the domain of State
intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of
classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the
Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart,
the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man
but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because
the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid
classification. 48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the
commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them
as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with
hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of
the Act should be struck down because it violates the non-
impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general welfare of the State and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual
may be subordinated.49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,50 settled is the rule that the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right
granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the
Court understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the
law in question, the concern of the Government in this case,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business
firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that
suffer as a result of government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.51 This doctrine was reiterated in
the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian
Relations52 where the Court held that individual rights to
contract and to property have to give way to police power
exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of
commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as
proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the
Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws
cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers.53
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all
blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the
objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of
course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the
law may be or should be and not what the law is.
Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent
Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The
statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at
influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of
the constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the
statements and information contained in the health advisory
that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued
by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from
distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional
infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.56 Those who petition this Court
to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition
must fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the

constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether
the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues
being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders

judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS

THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June
2, 1998, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the

Secretary of Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack
of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates
for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and
third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent
Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the
parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant
company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first
shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00
A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM)
in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the
Company on March 3, 1969 at about
11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1)
Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr.,
(3) and all department and section heads.
For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano,
(2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna
and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union
panel to confirm or deny said projected
mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin
Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the
union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do
with the Company because the union has
no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de
Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration
is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of
the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly ,
the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall
fail to report for work the following morning
(March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3,
1969, another meeting was convoked
Company represented by Atty. C.S. de
Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed
of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod,
Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano.
In this afternoon meeting of March 3,
1969, Company reiterated and appealed
to the PBMEO representatives that while
all workers may join the Malacañang
demonstration, the workers for the first
and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration
and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in
order not to violate the provisions of the
CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who
will not follow this warning of the Company
shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall
be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel
countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held
the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston,
adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to
the Company which was received 9:50
A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of
which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'
(Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers
should not be required to participate in the demonstration
and that the workers in the second and third shifts should
be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the
mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent
Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation
of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well
as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp.
19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex
"B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint
was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor
Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan
(Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim
that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional
freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was
not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts
submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their
status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex
"F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September
23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969
fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of
said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it
is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten
(10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11,
1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein
petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order
dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that
under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969,
within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days
late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for
extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day
period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969
their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support
of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73,
rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the
reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October
28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9,
1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.),
appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations,
that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal
from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en
banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the
respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their
motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the president
of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said
president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief
from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners
filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a
notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and
principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of
the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central
core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization.
The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and
in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision
of those who have no patience with general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of
the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as
the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical
aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we
abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who
want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to
listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the
liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of
one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms
the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the
primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription;
but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights
is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of
officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a
law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence
of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial
to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining
that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike,
concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence
temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by
foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held
petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was
against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their
mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was
to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so
that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation
or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. Was it securing
peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its
own employees all the more weakened the position of its
laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly
employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression
well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them
by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their
basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would
not spell the difference between the life and death of the
firm or its owners or its management. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment
and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-
vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of
their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like
rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights —
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity
and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal
of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that
can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment
of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a
moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the
working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on
the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours."
The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations
that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind
and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on
such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on
March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any
court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the
freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes
that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a
strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that
loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration
especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of
the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately
action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised
against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by
one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of
their members will be regarded as a substantial indication
of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position
and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate,
the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have
made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever
losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its
workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will
join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the
Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company
at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the
mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of
human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm
in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work
for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the
mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of
the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor
practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1)
in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage
in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm
on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection
against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not
participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection
deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action
of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint
charging bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and
promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the
Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees
to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation
to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted
activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the
questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15,
1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized
that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who
belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly
the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's
brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the
employees from joining the mass demonstration. However,
the issues that the employees raised against the local
police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such
threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them
was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from
work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay
means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family
to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day
salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about
the desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to
petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it
necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of
the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it
thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should
properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities
having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company,"
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make
any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the
firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties
were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not
be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase
orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own
equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary,
the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric
consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might
have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for
only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of
the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV
of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees
in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial
Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to
effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise
by employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of
their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency
designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre —
as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
It has been likewise established that a violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no
rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain
the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-
two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and
private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities
of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such
rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the
aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the
municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights
of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted
itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in
the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of
such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including
the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations,
the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified
by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the
untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy
them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It
is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing
the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a
race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he
cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can
defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal,
bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay
for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion
for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five
(5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in
support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days
from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration
(Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure
were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29,
1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969
of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late.
Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September
28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was
filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the
inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail
over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to
the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over
basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute
or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence
to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority
of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be
affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore
is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet
the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15)
days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re
hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule
52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been
only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This
fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for
reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the
ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in
accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during
the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10)
days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15,
16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were
actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969
(Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period
required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted
from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed
beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion
to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in
suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day
reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial
Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-
a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in
all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression,
free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and
defenses presently available must be specifically raised in
the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or
defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time,
even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a
decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without
the resolution of which no final and complete determination
of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives
way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a
creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even
before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human
freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of
Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this
principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled
to cove with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do
justice, in any case, without further loss of
time, provided that the right of the parties
to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an
appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In
other words, when all the material facts
are spread in the records before Us, and
all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a
quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We
can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of
this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and
within the power of this Court to strike
down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with
grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be
beyond the admit of its authority, in
appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain
proceed in any error of judgment of a court
a quo which cannot be exactly categorized
as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any
doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether
or not the errors this Court has found in
the decision of the Court of Appeals are
short of being jurisdiction nullities or
excesses, this Court would still be on firm
legal grounds should it choose to reverse
said decision here and now even if such
errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in
the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
the unnecessary return of this case to the
lower court for the sole purpose of
pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
(Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court
industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would
an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which
denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human
freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according
supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially
when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has
be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property
rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it,
obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash
with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in
the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial
Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes
unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of
petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the
peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court
of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is
also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial
Relations to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which
was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the
Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton,
etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being
offered by the petitioners in the motion for
new trial is not "newly discovered," as
such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold
that such criterion is not binding upon the
Court of Industrial Relations. Under
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103,
'The Court of Industrial Relations shall
adopt its, rules or procedure and shall
have such other powers as generally
pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation
and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties
and power under this Act, the Court shall
act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind
in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial
court is disengaged from the rigidity of the
technicalities applicable to ordinary courts.
Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but
may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any
doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No.
 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading &
Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.)
For these reasons, We believe that this
provision is ample enough to have
enabled the respondent court to consider
whether or not its previous ruling that
petitioners constitute a minority was
founded on fact, without regard to the
technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil.
315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil.
578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations
rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert
competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law,
simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that
he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969,
instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is
only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was
a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure
technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice,
for the attainment of which such rules have been devised.
Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs.
Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice
Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil.
315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was
cited with approval in Register of Deeds v.
Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949];
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30,
1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back
as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its
proper-office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late
Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63
Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind.
For him the interpretation of procedural
rule should never "sacrifice the ends
justice." While "procedural laws are no
other than technicalities" view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends
themselves for the compliance with which
courts have organized and function, but as
means conducive to the realization the
administration of the law and of justice
(Ibid., p.,128). We have remained
steadfastly opposed, in the highly
rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in
altar of sophisticated technicalities with
impairment of the sacred principles of
justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals,
104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly
put by Justice Makalintal, they "should
give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968,
(Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27,
1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was
partial to an earlier formulation of Justice
Labrador that rules of procedure "are not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders
and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8)
leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from
work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of
such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union
and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the
Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its
thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against
them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes
"A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent
firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee
participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the
Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named
in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's
brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning
and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and
that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that
day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all
— should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss
the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel
penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on
their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow
to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes
frequently not from those who consciously
seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill —
good men who allow their proper concerns
to blind them to the fact that what they
propose to accomplish involves an
impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often
commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties
does not depend on motives. A
suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or
an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of
the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of
Rights is a never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the
liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe
unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger
to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is
important and respected, we must
recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code
of fair play for the less fortunate that we in
all honor and good conscience must be
observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding labor practice within the meaning and
of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial
subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33
expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than
to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and If free expression was accorded recognition and protection
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and
expediency resorted to by the respondent company integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It protection for free speech, free assembly and right to
was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed. petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings demonstration was not against the company nor any of its
Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed officers.
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a
patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in
the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice
Castro, We ruled: respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September
15 and October 9, 1969; and
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8)
admission of the respondents. Assuming
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
that the latter acted in their individual
separation from the service until re instated, minus one
capacities when they wrote the letter-
day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized
charge they were nonetheless protected
from other sources during their separation from the service.
for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming
activity for mutual aid and protection, Company, Inc.
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...)
This is the view of some members of this Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the
joining in protests or demands, even by a Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
small group of employees, if in furtherance
of their interests as such, is a concerted
activity protected by the Industrial Peace
Act. It is not necessary that union activity
be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank

should have allowed the respondents to
air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its

right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity
to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right
of self-organization of employees is not
unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs.
NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of
the employer to discharge for cause
(Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil.
Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace
Act does not touch the normal exercise of
the right of the employer to select his
employees or to discharge them. It is
directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing
right of self organization (Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court

is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as
a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential
issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37,
38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923,
935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772,
1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49,
72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248,
251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,
285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303,
309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386,
396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713,
726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-
940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60,
62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147,
1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547,
1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752,
1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814,
1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-
1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918,
1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966,
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414,
427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9,
10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-
81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348,
352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When
any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately
or at some other specified time, to do the
act required to be done to Protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as
the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively
to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope
Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor
General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the
weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper
party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to
apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the
rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead
to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for
applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case
are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is
not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the
people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private
citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time to
time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast
by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares
y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas
por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638
reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. justified.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6 Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially cannot be justified."
and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of
Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
and letters of instructions which all form Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
part of the law of the land, the requirement and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
of due process and the Rule of Law published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
demand that the Official Gazette as the these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
official government repository promulgate available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
and publish the texts of all such decrees, undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
orders and instructions so that the people been implemented or enforced by the government.
may know where to obtain their official and In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
specific contents. Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
general application, which have not been published, shall thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, recognized by respondent officials considering the
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
of those presidential decrees which were published only criminal laws until the same shall have been published in
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to effect immediately.
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The courts below have proceeded on the
theory that the Act of Congress, having SO ORDERED.
been found to be unconstitutional, was not
a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
Relova, J., concurs.
no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby Aquino, J., took no part.
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. &
L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must
be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner was charged with violation of certain
municipal ordinances of the municipal council of Pagbilao,
in Quezon province. By way of confession and avoidance,
the petitioner would admit having committed the acts
charged but would claim that the ordinances are
unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality, that
they do not apply to him in any event.
The facts are not disputed:
This defendant is charged of the crime of
Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an
information filed by the provincial Fiscal,
dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964,
1965 and 1966, in the
Municipality of Pagbilao,
Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
being then the owner and
operator of a fishpond
situated in the barrio of
Pinagbayanan, of said
municipality, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously refuse
and fail to pay the
municipal taxes in the
total amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO
PESOS AND SIXTY
TWO CENTAVOS
(P362.62), required of
him as fishpond operator
as provided for under
Ordinance No. 4, series
of 1955, as amended,
inspite of repeated
demands made upon him
by the Municipal
Treasurer of Pagbilao,
Quezon, to pay the
same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following
witnesses testified in substance as
follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age,
married, farmer and resident of Lopez,
Quezon —
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at
Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I know
the accused as I worked in his fishpond in
1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario is
at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I
worked in the clearing of the fishpond, the
construction of the dikes and the catching
of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness
declared:
I worked with the accused up to March
1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age,
married, copra maker and resident of
Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon —
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao,
Quezon since 1959 up to the present. I
know the accused since 1959 when he
opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the
fishpond up to the present and I know this
fact as I am the barrio captain of
Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness
declared:
I came to know the accused when he first
operated his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness
declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in
1967 and the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness
declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962
when the accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old,
municipal treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon,
married —
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of
tax collection. I know the accused even
before I was Municipal Treasurer of
Pagbilao. I have written the accused a
letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit
B). Said letter was received by the
accused as per registry return receipt,
Exhibit B-1. The letter demanded for
payment of P362.00, more or less, by way
of taxes which he did not pay up to the
present. The former Treasurer, Ceferino
Caparros, also wrote a letter of demand to
the accused (Exhibit C). On June 28,
1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery
Commission (Exhibit D), requesting
information if accused paid taxes with that
office. The Commission sent me a
certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The
accused had a fishpond lease agreement.
The taxes unpaid were for the years 1964,
1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness
declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10
hectares.
On question of the court, this witness
declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is
the fee on fishpond operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their
evidence Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C,
D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F, F-1 and the same
were admitted by the court, except
Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were
not admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO
NAZARIO, 48 years of age, married,
owner and general manager of the ZIP
Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of
4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
declared in substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since
1949. I buy my Residence Certificates at
Manila or at San Juan. In 1964, 1965 and
1966, I was living in Manila and my
business is in Manila and my family lives
at Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao,
Quezon. I do not own a house at Pagbilao.
I am a lessee of a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease
agreement to that effect with the Philippine
Fisheries Commission marked as Exhibit
1. In 1964, 1965 and 1966, the contract of
lease, Exhibit 1, was still existing and
enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15
and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966,
were translated into English by the
Institute of National Language to better
understand the ordinances. There were
exchange of letters between me and the
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding
the payment of the taxes on my leased
fishpond situated at Pagbilao. There was a
letter of demand for the payment of the
taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3) which I
received by mail at my residence at
Manila. I answered the letter of demand,
Exhibit 3, with Exhibit 3-A. I requested an
inspection of my fishpond to determine its
condition as it was not then in operation.
The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went
there once in 1967 and he found that it
was destroyed by the typhoon and there
were pictures taken marked as Exhibits 4,
4-A, 4-B and 4C. I received another letter
of demand, Exhibit 5, and I answered the
same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my reference
quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative
Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another
letter of demand from Tomas Ornedo,
Acting Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao,
dated February 16, 1966, Exhibit 7, and I
answered the same with the letter marked
as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I
received another letter of demand from
Treasurer Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8,
and I answered the same (Exhibit 8-A). In
1964, I went to Treasurer Caparros to ask
for an application for license tax and he
said none and he told me just to pay my
taxes. I did not pay because up to now I
do not know whether I am covered by the
Ordinance or not. The letters of demand
asked me to pay different amounts for
taxes for the fishpond. Because under
Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative
Code, municipal taxes lapse if not paid
and they are collecting on a lapsed
ordinance. Because under the Tax Code,
fishermen are exempted from percentage
tax and privilege tax. There is no law
empowering the municipality to pass
ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their
evidence Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B,
4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and
8-A and the same were admitted by the
court.
From their evidence the prosecution would
want to show to the court that the
accused, as lessee or operator of a
fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao,
refused, and still refuses, to pay the
municipal taxes for the years 1964, 1965
and 1966, in violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15,
series of 1965, and finally amended by
Municipal Ordinance No. 12, series of
1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his
evidence, tends to show to the court that
the taxes sought to be collected have
already lapsed and that there is no law
empowering municipalities to pass
ordinances taxing fishpond operators. The
defense, by their evidence, tried to show
further that, as lessee of a forest land to
be converted into a fishpond, he is not
covered by said municipal ordinances; and
finally that the accused should not be
taxed as fishpond operator because there
is no fishpond yet being operated by him,
considering that the supposed fishpond
was under construction during the period
covered by the taxes sought to be
collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the
ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is
outside of the power of the municipal
council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and
that the defendant claims that the
ordinance in question is ambiguous and
uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences
presented that the accused is a lessee of
a parcel of forest land, with an area of
27.1998 hectares, for fishpond purposes,
under Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
1066, entered into by the accused and the
government, through the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on
August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences
presented that the 27.1998 hectares of
land leased by the defendant from the
government for fishpond purposes was
actually converted into fishpond and used
as such, and therefore defendant is an
operator of a fishpond within the purview
of the ordinance in question. 1
The trial Court 2 returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as
follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series
of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965
and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966,
of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a
day, and to pay the costs of this proceeding.
SO ORDERED. 3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY
ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF 1965, AND AS
FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES
OF 1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO,
QUEZON, IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS
AND UNCERTAIN.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST FACTO.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION COVERS ONLY
OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC
LANDS.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE QUESTIONED ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID,
CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL
LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. 4
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of
1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No.
12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao.
Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions
thereof are hereinbelow quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial
limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a
municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per
hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those
who have or owners or managers of
fishponds within the territorial limits of this
municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin
after the lapse of three (3) years starting
from the date said fishpond is approved by
the Bureau of Fisheries. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial
limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax
in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any
fraction thereof per annum beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year
1964. 7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly
"ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that
being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered
since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He
likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they
reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4
provides that parties shall commence payment "after the
lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond
is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12
states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and taking
effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating
before the year 1964." 10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say,
it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 12 the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had
made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on
any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance
imposed no standard at all "because one may never know
in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy
others.' " 14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly
vague" 15 act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to
be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in
imprecise language — but which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it
may be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. In that event, such statutes may not be
challenged whenever directed against such activities.
In Parker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically,
"conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the
defendant, an army officer who had urged his men not to go
to Vietnam and called the Special Forces trained to fight
there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to invoke the
void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted
military interpretation and practice had provided enough
standards, and consequently, a fair notice that his conduct
was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 17 a divided Court sustained an act of Congress
(Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the too early nomination
of candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign period, and
prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of
vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had
included an "enumeration of the acts deemed included in
the terms 'election campaign' or 'partisan political
activity" 19 that would supply the standards. "As thus limited,
the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been
minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion,
however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct
sought to be prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As
worded in R.A 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the
entire spectrum of expression relating to candidates and
political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with the
"restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple
expressions of opinions and thoughts concerning the
election' and expression of 'views on current political
problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to
the nature of the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion
and thoughts') or the subject of the utterance ('current
political problems or issues')." 23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-
interests" test, 24 insofar as the statute's ban on early
nomination of candidates was concerned: "The rational
connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A and its
object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on
the rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing
public interest which Congress has found in the moderation
of partisan political activity, lead us to the conclusion that
the statute may stand consistently with and does not offend
the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the
balance achieved in favor of State authority at the
"expense" of individual liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's
separate opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin,
referred to as the "less restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine,
under which the court searches for alternatives available to
the Government outside of statutory limits, or for "less
drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would render the
statute unnecessary. In United States v.
Robel, 28 legislation was assailed, banning members of the
(American) Communist Party from working in any defense
facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute,
held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any
case, a screening process was available to the State that
would have enabled it to Identify dangerous elements
holding defense positions. 29 In that event, the balance
would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the
result is usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of
the courts is usually narrowed where the controversy
involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in the Levycase,
military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is
required and in which the competence of the legislature is
presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted
with the vice of vagueness. It is unmistakable from their
very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage.
As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the
term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish
fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to
maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National
Government which owns them, 32 the Government never
shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only
logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said
ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the
character of revenue measures 33 designed to assist the
coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it
cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability
should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that
the Government is immune from taxes and for another,
since it is not the Government that had been making money
from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds
in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by
the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal
taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair
notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of
payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition
of tax has to depend upon an uncertain date yet to be
determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond'
by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if
the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be
determined by an uncertain individual or
individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax payable
"after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is
unequivocal about the date of payment, and its amendment
by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder
"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does
not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of
payment have been definitely established. The fact that the
appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning
dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and
1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in
computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In
addition, the same would have been at most a difficult piece
of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but
hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1,
1964 for fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No.
12), and for new fishponds, three years after their approval
by the Bureau of Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so
since the amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely
granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It
did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With
respect to new operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still
prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough
standards that clarify imagined ambiguities. While such
standards are not apparent from the face thereof, they are
visible from the intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex
post facto measures. The appellant argues that they are:
"Amendment No. 12 passed on September 19, 1966,
clearly provides that the payment of the imposed tax shall
"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other
words, it penalizes acts or events occurring before its
passage, that is to say, 1964 and even prior thereto." 37
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor
General notes, "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on
May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it cannot be said that the
amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to
apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is
1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12
and 15 are in the nature of curative measures intended to
facilitate and enhance the collection of revenues the
originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had
prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the
tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot
be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive
penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant amnesty to
operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and
1964. It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a
retrospective one.
The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal
council of Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." 40 In Golden
Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. City of Butuan 41 we held that
local governments' taxing power does not extend to forest
products or concessions under Republic Act No. 2264, the
Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264
likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage
taxes on sales.)
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property,
although the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds
("P3.00 per hectare" 42). Secondly, fishponds are not forest
lands, although we have held them to the agricultural
lands. 43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land
covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a
large wood." 44 (Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes
were directed on the fishponds, they would not have been
taxes on forest products.)

They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business

of fishpond maintenance. They are not charged against
sales, which would have offended the doctrine enshrined
by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather on occupation,
which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are
what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is
obvious from the ordinances themselves.

There is, then, no merit in the last objection.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against

the appellant.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, and Regalado, J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO
ARCA, respondents.
Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose
Laureta for petitioner.
Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated
September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case
No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6
37 of the City of Manila null and void. The
preliminary injunction is made permanent.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge1
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed
by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila
on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL
FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN
ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO
BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE,
BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN
THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from
being employed or to engage or participate in any position
or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying
the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in
the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6)
months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than
P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon
conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as
Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a
judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and
void. 6
In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the
following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared
null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on
aliens employed in the City of Manila,
Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and
violative of the rule of the uniformity in
taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no
distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00
employment permit, which is out of
proportion to the cost of registration and
that it fails to prescribe any standard to
guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor,
thus, violating the fundamental principle
on illegal delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens
who are thus, deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore,
violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.7
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of
preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered
judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and
making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge,
then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on
March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following as errors
allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's
decision of September 17,1968: 9
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF
TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE
DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER.
III
 RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER
COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT
ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537
cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule
on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or
revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax
or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power
of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in
nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax
or revenue measure because its principal purpose is
regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the
first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of
discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and
therefore is regulatory in character the second part which
requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of
the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of
the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of
P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no
purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates
no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks
standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful. 10
In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price
Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government
agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour
among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the
interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the
administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised
without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be
measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority
and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes
conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter
of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion
to be exercised within the limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or
suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the
ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law
and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right
of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens. 13
The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in
the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the
accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain
Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court
of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal
of the Court of First Instance, the following information was
filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in
the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member
of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire,
and have in his possession and under his control
or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the
trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but
pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in
his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The
trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is
now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act
No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the
Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act
Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any
ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors
of any kind, other than the so-called native wines
and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act, except as provided in section
one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police
officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular
or any provincial, municipal or township
government to seize and forthwith destroy any
such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of
any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of
section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense
by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months,
in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on
the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection
of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the
state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for
the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less
civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of
their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with
discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate
or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the
constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for
purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to
examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the
policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes
adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times
to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but
always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed
an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants,
and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in
so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been
persistently attempted with the end in view of according
them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life.
Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by
the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience
and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living
"in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the
moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."
(Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan.
14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during
the American period. President McKinley in his instructions
to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands,
the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which
many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise
and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been
constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those
practicable means of bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.)
"Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or
guiding them in the path of civilization," the present
government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as
one more in accord with humanity and with the national
conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior,
quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.,
660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been
brought in contact with civilized communities through a
network of highways and communications; the benefits of
public education have to them been extended; and more
lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this
policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has
passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the
blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to
mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture.
It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood
and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk
Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz
., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The
classification rests on real and substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant
asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief,
but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly,
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The
exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at
present have reached a position of cultural equality with
their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of
the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be
doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the
passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure
peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It
has been the sad experience of the past, as the
observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of
highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their
standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not
predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to
any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the
class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair
in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by
reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against
the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law
empowering any police officer or other duly authorized
agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any
prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any
member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due
process of law provided in the Constitution. But this
provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to
constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not
always necessary. This rule is especially true where much
must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process
of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs.Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means
simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be
applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the
class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302:
54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be
seized by the government in payment of taxes without
judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be
confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the
property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case
(Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).
measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure
for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end
in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the
basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-
Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely
asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's
attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-
and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's
social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers,
doctors and other professionals educated in the best
institutions here and in America. Their active participation in
the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the
delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride
and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether
conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or
complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests
exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly
to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our
government, this court can go no farther than to inquire
whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If
the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of
the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing
conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are
matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And,
if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians
shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-
comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est
lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the
discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of
persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from
providing for its discontinuance by any incidental
inconvenience which some members of the class may
suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to
the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer
Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and
Conception, JJ., concur.

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power

of the state. It has been said that the police power is the
most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power co-
extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of
overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the
health, peace, morals, education and good order of the
people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise
of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or
capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an
individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote

peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove
all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and,
eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with
the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can
be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a
greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian

tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary,
all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public
policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent
right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now
enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no
true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in
education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C.
CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC
CITY, defendants-appellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and
Teehankee, Carreon & Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc
City passed 1 Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing
"on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the
United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for
P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of
P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a
copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the
City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of
uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution),
aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged
that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which
Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the
Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the
tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of
paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 because the
tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax
ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate
the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First
Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared
the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by
the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes,
licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Appellant alleges the same
statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing
ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be
paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as
a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not
taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant
Municipal Board to levy such an export tax, in view of
Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which
denies from municipal councils the power to impose an
export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall not be in the
power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form
whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose
an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an
unreasonable charge for wharfage use of bridges or
otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act
2264 effective June 19, 1959, gave chartered cities,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for
public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
Anent the inconsistency between Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, this Court, in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of
Roxas 4 held the former to have been repealed by the latter.
And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental
effects that municipal export or import taxes or licenses will
have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic
Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until
Congress acts to provide remedial measures to forestall
any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however,
whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation,
specifically the equal protection clause and rule of
uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, 5 We ruled that
the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also
to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class
as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the
refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time
of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby
ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid
under protest. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by
its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-
President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI,
Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila,
ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and
Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila,
respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO
QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G.
TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the
Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts
throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster
General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence
of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is
itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested
party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same
time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot
inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no
other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore
act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by
the above-named measures. The National Land
Registration Authority has taken common cause with them
insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite
notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On
its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on
the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not
pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in
mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of
statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first
been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly
shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its
validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt
is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec.
26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge
or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of
legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A.
No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3,
which provides:
The State shall pursue the following
objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy
transfer of mail and other postal matters,
from sender to addressee, with full
recognition of their privacy or
confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange,
cooperation and understanding through
the unhampered flow or exchange of
postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal
services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited
to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are
generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the
varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the
expansion and continuous upgrading of
service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the
petition, reads as follows:
 Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts,
decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law
are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No.
265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180,
1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under
Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977
and that of the Vice President, under such
arrangements and conditions as may
obviate abuse or unauthorized use
thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree
that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body
of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead
the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to
be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be
specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in
the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may
properly be included in the act. Thus, it is
proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the
way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary
that they should also have special mention
in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine,
170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which
Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute
on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in
the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is
silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous
legislations connected therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law,
such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute;
and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in
one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject,
we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act
which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned
in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither
within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal
service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a
repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec.
35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD
26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any
bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences
thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of
any disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to
this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal
generally with the subject matter or it may
be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even
where the conference committee is not by
rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with
which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even
where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed.,
p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee
Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon
C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the
Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals
of the Philippine legislature when they are,
as we have said, clear and explicit, would
be to violate both the, letter and spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the
petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the
government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is
based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because
while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary,
it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the
Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, the Commission on
Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National
Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the
filing of complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the
franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the
Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute
of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors;
the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the
Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino
Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of
the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor
to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant
the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these
same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in
the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections
or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because
of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt
that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon,
by the political departments before it was finally enacted.
There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care
or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in
the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification
was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments
the government. The same observations are made if the
importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used
for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed
by the National Census and Statistics Office and even
some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the
franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for
the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of
providing for a smoother flow of communication between
the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the
departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question
that if there is any major branch of the government that
needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the
respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis
precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary
the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available
data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails
amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails
from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions
include the service of judicial processes, such as the
intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails
coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount
of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that
because of this considerable volume of mail from the process they send in the discharge of their judicial
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it. functions.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in
effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended
only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the
widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it
badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a
person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not
really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which
the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does
not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary
for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal
of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly
treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the
franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any
justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee,
which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their
widows, does not send as much frank mail as the
Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation,
as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14Among the services
it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for
certain offices of the government that need the franking
privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the
contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory
provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly
situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its
subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the
criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of
similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of
judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the
political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges,
we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide
the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be
fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE
insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail
Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of
which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives
substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in
Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely
that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary
will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay
in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the
franking privilege can only further deepen this serious
problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the
respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of
the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating
with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process.
The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national
budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only
.84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should
not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our
courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC.,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order"
filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc.,
Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42,
dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation,
and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
of the Bureau of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI)
is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators,
who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to
operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other
place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners
Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are
two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and
grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation
(BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which
reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of
Old and Dilapidated Taxis
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the
government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public
conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly
in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the
continued operation of old and dilapidated
taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting
public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of
phasing out of old and dilapidated taxis
should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries
made by the Board of Transportation, the
latter believes that in six years of
operation, a taxi operator has not only
covered the cost of his taxis, but has
made reasonable profit for his
investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this
policy, the Board hereby declares that no
car beyond six years shall be operated as
taxi, and in implementation of the same
hereby promulgates the following rules
and regulations:
1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of
Model 1971 and earlier are ordered
withdrawn from public service and
thereafter may no longer be registered
and operated as taxis. In the registration
of cards for 1978, only taxis of Model 1972
and later shall be accepted for registration
and allowed for operation;
2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of
Model 1972 are ordered withdrawn from
public service and thereafter may no
longer be registered and operated as
taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979,
only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be
accepted for registration and allowed for
operation; and every year thereafter, there
shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:
1980 — Model 1974
1981 — Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those
provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the
last day of registration of each particular
year and their respective plates shall be
surrendered directly to the Board of
Transportation for subsequent turnover to
the Land Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this
Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro-
Manila. Its implementation outside Metro-
Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro-
Manila and only after the date has been
determined by the Board. 1
Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of
the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and
other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol
Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote
said Circular:
Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-
42, taxi units with year models over six (6)
years old are now banned from operating
as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such
the units involved should be considered as
automatically dropped as public utilities
and, therefore, do not require any further
dropping order from the BOT.
Henceforth, taxi units within the National
Capitol Region having year models over 6
years old shall be refused registration. The
following schedule of phase-out is
herewith prescribed for the guidance of all
concerned:
Year Model Automatic
Phase-Out
Year

1980
1974 1981
1975 1982
1976 1983
1977
etc. etc.
Strict compliance here is desired. 2
In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-
out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979;
those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in
1981.
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the
BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC
No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of
taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early
hearing of their petition. The case was heard on February
20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and
documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested
that they would submit additional documentary proofs. Said
proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to
petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of
Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for
Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same
Board a "Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or
Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them,
in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may
have under the law for the protection of their interests
before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1,
1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal
follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted
wherein the following queries were posed for consideration
by this Court:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the
questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by
Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional
right to procedural due process?
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents
did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential
Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed
memorandum circulars violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1)
Equal
protecti
on of
the law;
(2)
Substan
tive due
process;
and
(3)
Protecti
on
against
arbitrary
and
unreaso
nable
classific
ation
and
standar
d?
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of
Transportation the power
4. To fix just and reasonable standards,
classification, regulations, practices,
measurements, or service to be furnished,
imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for
said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the
exercise of the powers granted in the
preceding section, the Board shag
proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and
studies, the Board, in its discretion, may
require the cooperation and assistance of
the Bureau of Transportation, the
Philippine Constabulary, particularly the
Highway Patrol Group, the support
agencies within the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and
Communications, or any other government
office or agency that may be able to
furnish useful information or data in the
formulation of the Board of any policy,
plan or program in the implementation of
this Decree.
The Board may also can conferences,
require the submission of position papers
or other documents, information, or data
by operators or other persons that may be
affected by the implementation of this
Decree, or employ any other suitable
means of inquiry.
In support of their submission that they were denied
procedural due process, petitioners contend that they were
not caged upon to submit their position papers, nor were
they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the
leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice
in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or require
the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who may be affected, this being only
one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim,
therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due
process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry
prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public
conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data
and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process. As
held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and Banco Filipino,
44 SCRA 307 (1972):
Pevious notice and hearing as elements of
due process, are constitutionally required
for the protection of life or vested property
rights, as well as of liberty, when its
limitation or loss takes place in
consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a
past act or event which has to be
established or ascertained. It is not
essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future
conduct of a class or persons or
enterprises, unless the law provides
otherwise. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at
six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the
roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken
into consideration at the time of registration. As public
contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab
to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the
fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to
apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair
return on investment obtained. They are also generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable
service to the public specially considering that they are in
continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three
shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the
requirement of due process has been met.
On Equal Protection of the Law:
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates
their right to equal protection of the law because the same
is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely
towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed
out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also
envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat
the pertinent portion:
For an orderly implementation of this
Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be effective in Metro
Manila. Its implementation outside Metro
Manila shall be carried out only after the
project has been implemented in Metro
Manila and only after the date has been
determined by the Board. 4
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that
implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already
being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting
studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in
Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those
of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure
and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of
the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully
claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged
BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old
and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate
property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to
other transportation services is concerned, it need only be
recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that
the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies
to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It
permits of classification of the object or subject of the law
provided classification is reasonable or based on
substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and
that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause
is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded
the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the
liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars
do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a
law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right
must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this
Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B.
ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in their behalf and in
behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical
Colleges during the school year 1987-88 and future
years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ,
Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat
at Manila, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES
QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT
(CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by
the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent,
the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for
taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for
certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the
respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines
its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and
shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation
of medical education (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of the practice of medicine in
the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of
Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized
representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or
his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher
Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the
Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized
representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine
Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of
Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative
of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and
(h) a representative of the Association of Philippine Medical
Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of
Medical Education specified in Section 5 of the statute
include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for
admission into a recognized college of medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for
minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine,
to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and
supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes,
operating and delivery rooms, facilities for
outpatient services, and others, used for didactic
and practical instruction in accordance with modern
trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum
number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum
required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor
of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of
experimental medical curriculum in a medical
school that has exceptional faculty and
instrumental facilities. Such an experimental
curriculum may prescribe admission and
graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only
exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for
admission to a medical school and keep a register
of those issued said certificate; and to collect from
said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos
each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or
some departments of the hospitals for training
which comply with the minimum specific physical
facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof;
and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the
necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. — The medical college
may admit any student who has not been convicted
by any court of competent jurisdiction of any
offense involving moral turpitude and who
presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's
degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the
Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of
good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d)
birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be
construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines,
beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes
on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an
instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools
and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The
NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called
for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for
the issuance of the prescribed certificate of
elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.
 3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of
Medical Education, each medical college may give
other tests for applicants who have been issued a
corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other
aspects of the applicant's personality to
complement the information derived from the
NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite
Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any
medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-
87, without the required NMAT qualification as
called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private
respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In
December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges
during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the
enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. We regard this
issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs
documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary
injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or
administrative order has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind
of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality, aside from
showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the
1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by
the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the
vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give
priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress and to
promote total human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect
and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps
to make such education accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a
right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission
and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second
half certain "State policies" which the government is
enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have
not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or
in what manner the statute and the administrative order
they assail collide with the State policies embodied in
Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words,
discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This
burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision
invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That
burden of proof becomes of necessity heavier where the
constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second
portion of Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic
policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State
policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The
petitioners have not made their case, even a prima
facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to
imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution,
we note that once more petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in
fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may note-
in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and the
regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to
promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5
(3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the
latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in
a professional school but rather merely to make such
education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the
undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish
the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the
Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-
delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and
allocation of powers among the three great departments of
government,1 must be applied with circumspection in
respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal
with subjects as obviously complex and technical as
medical education and the practice of medicine in our
present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47
years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The
Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non
potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest
delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et
Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine,
Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but
which is also recognized in principle in the Roman
Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle
of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena
[68 Phil. 318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise
of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the
Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando
in Edu v. Ericta4 —
The standard may be either expressed or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit
upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are
set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute
itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation
principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable
and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of
due process. Again, petitioners have failed to specify just
what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and
"unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest
that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement
when added on top of the admission requirements set out in
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the
various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners
arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or
desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is
essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has
neither commission or competence to pass upon questions
of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation. Those questions must be address
to the political departments of the government not to the
courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments
must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police
power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and
non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote an the important interests and needs
— in a word, the public order — of the general
community.6 An important component of that public order is
the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is
whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community,
on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice
of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to
practice medicine first to take and pass medical board
examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements — i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school — for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.10 What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related: the
regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional
and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools,
by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and
medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our
social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of
medical education in the country." Given the widespread
use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical
schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in
other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure
or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful
to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease
or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that
that portion of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants,
based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11
Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert,
in other words, that students seeking admission during a
given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a
different cutoff score than that established for an, e.g.,
earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this
renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The
force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different
cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by
differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the
appropriate cutoff score for a given year may be a function
of such factors as the number of students who have
reached the cutoff score established the preceding year;
the number of places available in medical schools during
the current year; the average score attained during the
current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during
the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent
and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in
circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order
No. 52, far from being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the
Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility
needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and
the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition
for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE
HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao
City, respondents.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company
of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at
Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of
Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder1 and
attempted murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial
court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A.
6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending
Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one
(1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from
office until the case is terminated. Such
case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused
(Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the
order for his suspension,3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807
of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be
limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso
v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In his
order dated December 14, 19936 respondent judge denied
the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975,
the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial was, likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of
respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's
preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is
charged with murder and attempted murder under the
Revised Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA
6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In
dispute however, is whether the provision limits the period
of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first
sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is
charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is
six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from
office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of
the same section mandates that the case, which shall be
subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90
days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National
Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall
apply to all personnel of the Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42
of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension
Pending Administrative Investigation. —
When the administrative case against the
officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of
ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent
shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of
over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of
laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated" and the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall
be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused" are both
substantive and should be taken together to mean that if
the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of
preventive suspension must be lifted because of the
command that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A.
6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the
penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of
the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The
second deals with the time frame within which the trial
should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the
mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated
within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that
suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will
be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within
the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where
the facts so warrant, to criminal8 or civil liability.9 If the trial
is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such
that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case.
Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused
can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A
meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers
to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending
administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here.
What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A.
6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the
Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are
applicable to members of the Philippine National Police
insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree
which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days
cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of
R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years
shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is
misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in
violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive
suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any
public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been
filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an
information was filed against him for offenses under R.A.
3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had
been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a
motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his
indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal
protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal
mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term
of office does not expire until 1986. Were
it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have
been all this while in the full discharge of
his functions as such municipal mayor. He
was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that
the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability
must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due
process question. For even if thereafter he
were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right
to hold office had been nullified. Clearly,
there would be in such a case an injustice
suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim.
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the
people of Lianga. They were deprived of
the services of the man they had elected
to serve as mayor. In that sense, to
paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the
protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of
reason and resulted in sheer oppression.
A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order
of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural
due process that is apparent. There is
likewise an equal protection question. If
the case against petitioner Layno were
administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It
is therein clearly provided that while
preventive suspension is allowable for the
causes therein enumerated, there is this
emphatic limitation on the duration thereof:
"In all cases, preventive suspension shall
not extend beyond sixty days after the
start of said suspension." It may be
recalled that the principle against indefinite
suspension applies equally to national
government officials. So it was held in the
leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive
Secretary. According to the opinion of
Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of
respondents that an officer appointed by
the President, facing administrative
charges, can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension
can, in effect, be the penalty itself without
a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution and the Civil Service law."
Further: "In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be
shortened and he could in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation
of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy
of the law mandated by the Constitution
frowns at a suspension of indefinite
duration. In this particular case, the mere
fact that petitioner is facing a charge under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
does not justify a different rule of law. To
do so would be to negate the safeguard of
the equal protection guarantee. 11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective
official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also
under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with
similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling
in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process
and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon
which the preventive suspension of the accused
in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the
duration of the preventive suspension, such that the
suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and
unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder MACEDA). Grave
under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he felonies ito e. Six years
falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which and one day or more.
categorically states that his suspension shall last until the
case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung
section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial five years and litigation
which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from ng Supreme Court,
arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, ganoon ba and . . .?
nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-
day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be
lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else MACEDA). Hindi, dahil
should be read into the law. When the words and phrases iyong iba panay
disciplinary iyon e.
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12 SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong
page iyan, Rene?
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 MACEDA). Page 29 —
insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes Preventive Suspension.
all the more clear. We quote:
REP. GUTANG. Ang
So other than that in that complaint kasi ng mga
particular section, ano ba tao, pagka may pulis na
itong "Jurisdiction in may criminal case at may
Criminal Cases?" What is baril pa rin at nag-
this all about? uuniforme, hindi
magandang tingnan e.
So parang natatakot
REP. ZAMORA. In case
iyong mga witnesses.
they are charged with
crimes.
SEN. GONZALES.
Anyway, kung ma-
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
exempt na rito naman
MACEDA). Ah, the
siya e.
previous one is
administrative, no. Now,
if it is charged with a REP. GUTANG.
crime, regular courts. Mayroong entitlement to
reinstatement and pay. . .
.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano,
the courts mismo ang
magsasabing . . . xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa

MACEDA). No, the "Preventive Suspension
jurisdiction. Pending Criminal Case."
Okay ito but I think we
should also mandate the
REP. ZAMORA. The
early termination of the
jurisdiction if there is
robbery. case. Ibig sabihin, okay,
hindi ba "the suspension
of the accused from
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. office until the case is
MACEDA). Okay. terminated?" Alam
"Preventive Suspension naman natin ang takbo
Pending Criminal Case. ng mga kaso rito sa ating
Upon the filing of a bansa e.
complaint or informations
sufficient in form and
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty
substance against a
days, okay na.
member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi,
is six years and one day and ibig kong sabihin, let
or more, the court shall us just assume that a
immediately suspend the case can be, as Rene
accused from the office pointed out, can run to
until the case is six years bago
terminated." ma-terminate, sometimes
ten years pa nga e.
Okay, but maybe we
REP. ALBANO. Where
should mandate. . .
are we now Mr.
Chairman.
REP. ZAMORA.
Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not because this is a
only that, but the case preventive suspension.
must be terminated
within a period. SEN. PIMENTEL. No,
because you can
REP. ALBANO. Ninety legislate at least.
days na ho sa Supreme
Court the trial. SEN. SAGUISAG. But
then the case may be
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha? anti-graft ha. The case
filed against a policeman
REP. ALBANO. The trial may be anti-graft in
must be done within nature. . .
ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang Correct, correct, but is
ibig kong sabihin kung that a constitutional
maari sanang ilagay rito provision? Is it?
that the case shall also
be terminated in one year REP. ALBANO. No, but
from the time . . . aywan as a standard procedure.
ko kung kaya nating
gawin iyon. SEN. PIMENTEL. Then
you can legislate.
REP. ALBANO. One
solution, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
MACEDA). No, because
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. this particular provision is
MACEDA). Criminal for criminal cases. I know
case? Hindi ba that has anti-graft is a criminal
all been held as directory case but here we are
even if you put it in the talking, let's say, of
law? murder, rape, treason,
robbery. That's why it is
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, in that context that there
but, iyon na nga, we are is a difference between a
looking at some solution purely anti-graft case and
to a particular situation. a criminal case which
could be a serious
case since it is six years
SEN. ANGARA. Let's
and one day or more, so
have continuous hearing
it must be already a
and be terminated not grave felony.
later than ninety days.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ZAMORA. Ang
point ni Ernie, that's
really only the directory. REP. ALBANO. . . .
All of these, well, looks
exactly the same thing. What I mean to say is,
preventive suspension,
SEN. ANGARA. No, but we can use the
at least, we will shorten it Veloso case.
up in a case like this. We
are really keen on having THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.
it quick, swift. MACEDA). No, that's too
short, that's what I am
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift saying. The feeling here
justice. is, for policeman, we
have to be stricter
especially if it is a
REP. ALBANO. Mr. criminal case.
Chairman.
What Rene is just trying
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN.
to say is, he is agreeable
MACEDA). Yes.
that the suspension is
until the case is
REP. ALBANO. terminated, but he just
Following the Veloso wants some
case in Anti-graft cases administrative balancing
before the to expedite it. So let us
Sandiganbayan, the study what kind of
preventive suspension is language could be done
only ninety days. In no along that line. So just on
case shall it go beyond the National Police
ninety days which can Commission . . .
also be applicable here
 SEN. ANGARA. Can I Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
suggest a language that
may reflect. . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.

MACEDA). Okay, please.

SEN. ANGARA. "Such

case shall be subject to
continuous trial and be
terminated not later than
. . ." whatever we agree.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN.

MACEDA). Okay, so let's
study that.

So if there are any further

amendments to Chapter
2 on the National Police
Commission. . . . . . 13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to

place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP
charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by
law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which
suspension continues until the case against him is
terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently

from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious

offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously
exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence
by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days
under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor

or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence
of real differences among men, the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause
does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one
which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based
on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the
purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future
conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as
violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A
distinction based on real and reasonable considerations
related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which
exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor
unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid,
become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that
its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection
of the law? We hold that with the passage of the
subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act)
took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management
system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of
the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bangko Sentral's human
resource development program: Provided, That the
Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary
Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of
employees whose positions fall under salary
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with
the rates prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the
above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between
two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2)
the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-
exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a
classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but
solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner
also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of
which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of
arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows
that the questioned proviso does not appear in the
original and amended versions of House Bill No.
7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No.
1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-
and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the
SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law3 of
establishing professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP; 4(emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of
amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance
to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by
one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried
employees of the BSP;5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all
exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP
rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the
demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.8 Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause,
which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other
provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition,
as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have
been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law,
respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of
jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except
through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should
take cognizance of, considering the transcendental
importance of the legal issue involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause and
can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as
"fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance
with sound principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive
Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to
prevailing laws and policies of the national government.11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in
this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal
protection of the laws."12
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL
PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges
indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears
no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection"
clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is
that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane
to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications
for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as
enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on
scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical nicety.
Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they
may appear. (citations omitted)
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification.15 The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.17 The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations
that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the
SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers
and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against
the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a
disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-
and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination
or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably,
purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments
introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does
not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated
in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a
provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it
originated contained no such provision and was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute.21 An act of the legislature,
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations.22 To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT
LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within
the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees
of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the
challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance,
be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
and invalid in its application to another.24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another
time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute
in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory,
its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v.
City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of
New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning
ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a
residential district, although it was located in the center of a
business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then
prohibited the use of the property except for parking and
storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking
area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an
invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned
right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of
property in accordance with a well-considered and
comprehensive plan designed to promote public
health, safety and general welfare, such power is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it may
not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this
is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the
use of the property for any purpose for which it is
reasonably adapted. By the same token, an
ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless
be stricken down as invalid when, at a later
time, its operation under changed conditions
proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when
the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which
the courts will afford relief in an appropriate
case.28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued
enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a
consequence of significant changes in circumstances.
Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the
moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid
exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled
that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid
law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted
the subsequent changes in the country's business,
industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside
because its continued operation would be grossly
discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors.
The landmark ruling states:31
The question now to be determined is, is the period
of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342
grants to debtors of a monetary obligation
contracted before the last global war and who is a
war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the
Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable
under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only
extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who
filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that
said obligation shall not be due and demandable
for a period of eight (8) years from and after
settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said
Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to
prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves by giving them a reasonable time
within which to pay their prewar debts so as to
prevent them from being victimized by their
creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since
liberation conditions have gradually returned to
normal, this is not so with regard to those who
have suffered the ravages of war and so it was
therein declared as a policy that as to them the
debt moratorium should be continued in force
(Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these
obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25
and 32 and at present their enforcement is still
inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act
No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that
the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at
least twelve (12) years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as
1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is
plausible, and should be commended, the relief
accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their
hope to effect collection becomes extremely
remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And
the injustice is more patent when, under the law,
the debtor is not even required to pay interest
during the operation of the relief, unlike similar
statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and
consistent with what we believe to be as the only
course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us
under the present circumstances is to declare
that the continued operation and enforcement
of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is
unreasonable and oppressive, and should not
be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore,
the same should be declared null and void and
without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme
Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of
statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus
attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals
killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of
negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating
greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability
because they were not yet in existence when the statutes
were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became
invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view
of changed conditions since their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared
unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a
duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free
from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine
or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality
of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously
sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was
sustained because it applied to all similar
corporations and had for its object the safety of
persons on a train and the protection of property….
Of course, there were no automobiles in those
days. The subsequent inauguration and
development of transportation by motor vehicles on
the public highways by common carriers of freight
and passengers created even greater risks to the
safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger
of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under
the law the operators of that mode of competitive
transportation are not subject to the same
extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such
animals on the public roads as are railroad
companies for killing them on their private rights of
way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed.
949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may
become invalid by change in the conditions to
which it is applied. The police power is subject to
the constitutional limitation that it may not be
exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of
prior opinions of that court are cited in support of
the statement. The State of Florida for many years
had a statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq. imposing
extraordinary and special duties upon railroad
companies, among which was that a railroad
company was liable for double damages and an
attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without
the owner having to prove any act of negligence on
the part of the carrier in the operation of its train. In
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held
that the changed conditions brought about by
motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute
unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor
vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner
would have been required to prove negligence in
the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This
certainly is not equal protection of the
law."34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the
statute under challenge in determining whether that
statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute
nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which
denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibition….. In other
words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation…. If a law has
the effect of denying the equal protection of the law
it is unconstitutional. ….36 (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 +
8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of
challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal
protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters
of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but
the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the
coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-
file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also
discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP
charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the
amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System
(SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business
Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the
subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this
common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their
employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or
impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. -
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Bank's
Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans
in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic
review by the Board no more than once every two
(2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews
or increases based on productivity and
profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt
from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however
endeavor to make its system conform as closely as
possible with the principles under Republic Act No.
6758. (emphasis supplied)
 xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of
the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and
such other personnel as may [be] deemed
necessary; fix their reasonable compensation,
allowances and other benefits; prescribe their
duties and establish such methods and procedures
as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest
and economical administration of the provisions
and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That
the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice
President shall be appointed by the SSS
President: Provided, further, That the personnel
appointed by the SSS President, except those
below the rank of assistant manager, shall be
subject to the confirmation by the
Commission; Provided further, That the personnel
of the SSS shall be selected only from civil service
eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and
regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall
be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis
supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic
Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No.
10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of
Budget and Management, the Board of Directors
of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to
the employees and personnel thereof the
allowance and fringe benefits similar to those
extended to and currently enjoyed by the
employees and personnel of other government
financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of
Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and
General Manager, to approve the GSIS'
organizational and administrative structures and
staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise
and adjust the appropriate compensation package
for the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses,
privileges and other benefits as may be necessary
or proper for the effective management, operation
and administration of the GSIS, which shall be
exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law and
Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the
Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The
Board of Directors shall provide for an organization
and staff of officers and employees of the Bank
and upon recommendation of the President of the
Bank, fix their remunerations and other
emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be
governed by the compensation, position
classification system and qualification standards
approved by the Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation plans
in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic
review by the Board of Directors once every two (2)
years, without prejudice to yearly merit or
increases based on the Bank's productivity and
profitability. The Bank shall, therefore, be
exempt from existing laws, rules, and
regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. The
Bank shall however, endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the
principles under Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of
Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the
efficient management, operation and administration
of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in
the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be
governed by a compensation and position
classification system and qualifications standards
approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors
based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit
of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided,
further, That the compensation plan shall be
comparable with the prevailing compensation
plans in the private sector and which shall be
exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law, and
from other laws, rules and regulations on
salaries and compensations; and to establish a
Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's
and the employee's contributions to the Fund;
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as
amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
 3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Corporation's human resource
development program: Provided, That all positions
in the Corporation shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Board
based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit
of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans of other
government financial institutions and shall be
subject to review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly
merit reviews or increases based on productivity
and profitability. The Corporation shall therefore
be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It
shall however endeavor to make its system
conform as closely as possible with the principles
under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended.
(emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP
charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were
granted the exemption that was specifically denied to
the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to
petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket
exemption from the SSL in 2000! 39
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653
was confined to an evaluation of its classification
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the
BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial
distinctions that made real differences between the two
classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments,
however, constitute significant changes in
circumstancethat considerably alter the reasonability
of the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious
scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the
constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly
as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws -
between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven
other GFIs. The classification must not only be
reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members
of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without
differences.40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the
following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt
other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL,
can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP
stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that
Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of
the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled
as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply
because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through
a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through
seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a)
the right can only be invoked against a classification made
directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that
arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts;
and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the
validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance
(where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the
lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over
a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment
cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each
exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a
policy determination by the legislature." All legislative
enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination -
even those that have been declared to contravene the
Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and
equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is
nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination
made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot
and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support
the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and
the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who
are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at
issue in the second level of scrutiny is not
the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive
results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal
policytowards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the
seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational
discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of
equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be …
denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the
prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such
denial, it is unconstitutional.41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the
BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial
scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of
the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to
differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-
file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history
shows that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985
(1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay
for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in
pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities
in pay among similar or comparable positions which had
given rise to dissension among government
employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned
and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already
identified as a distinct class among government
employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat
notwithstanding a standardized salary system established
for all employees, additional financial incentives may be
established by government corporation and financial
institutions for their employees to be supported fully from
their corporate funds and for such technical positions as
may be approved by the President in critical government
agencies."42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the
GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of
the principles governing the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic
compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the
private sector doing comparable work, and must be in
accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under
the unified Compensation and Position Classification
System of the SSL,43 but rates of pay under the SSL were
determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates
in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to
be governed by the following principles: (a) just and
equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between
pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b)
basic compensation generally comparable with the private
sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum
wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management
was directed to use, as guide for preparing the Index of
Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule,
and the following factors:46
(1) the education and experience required to
perform the duties and responsibilities of the
positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be
performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the
completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external
relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and
reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and
equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in
the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position
titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs
were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to
compensation and position classification, in consonance
with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of
the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the
SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute
its own compensation and wage structure. However,
employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below
were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the
SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs
followed. Significantly, each government financial
institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to
determine and institute its own compensation and wage
structure, but also explicitly exempted - without
distinction as to salary grade or position - all
employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the
grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on
the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution
concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC
or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC
or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in
the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of
goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining
competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or
were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla
positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these
personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily
varies with the particular circumstances of each institution,
and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by
the employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is
the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the
government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the
sole power and authority to issue currency;50 provide policy
directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit; and
supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-
bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking
functions, including the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the
argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven
GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty
sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for
the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the
particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the
deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the
BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to
the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in
fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in
so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these
institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-
exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in
the amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and
over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each
GFI has a mandate different and distinct from that of
another, the deliberations show that the raison d'être of the
SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most
part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the
pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of
hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to
carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that
the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive,
and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering
further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL
exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other
GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-
and-file; it is patent that the classification made between
the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven
GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not
based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular
circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption
granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and
currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other
GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular class within
the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment
of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring
with each and every consequential grant of blanket
exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be
rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC -
which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a
compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other
[GFIs],"53then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL,
and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment
than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even
more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable
truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole
purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of
the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material
basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law.
"Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per
directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not
sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar
employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. The fact that certain persons have some
attributes in common does not automatically make them
members of the same class with respect to a legislative
classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v.
Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a
common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and
nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute
when other characteristics peculiar to only one group
rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two
groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US
Court sustained the validity of the classification as there
were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis
for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them
readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar
characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is
quantitatively greater than that caused by
alternative civilian service. A conscientious objector
performing alternative service is obligated to work
for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the
other hand, involves a six-year commitment…
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military
veterans and alternative service performers are
qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far
greater loss of personal freedom during their
service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the
military veteran becomes part of the military
establishment, subject to its discipline and
potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely
aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military
service, in consequence of which military
servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits…55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards
the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their
rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by
the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting
opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it -
whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is
reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A.
No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the
GFIs from other government agencies, not once but
eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653,
7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws
may have created a "preferred sub-class within government
employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the
wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum
involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of
which must be measured not only by looking at the specific
exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to
the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises
- albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable
change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation,
position classification and qualification standards of the
employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of
the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central
Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this
Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding
that claimant had manifested that she was no longer
interested in pursuing the case, and even when the
constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely
raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the
claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims
GSIS would also deny based on the challenged proviso.
The Court held that social justice and public interest
demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of
the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the
case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is
a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give
or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file
of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP
rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a
privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the
domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality
of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial
review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and
not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between those included and excluded, it
becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the
duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United
Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work
and Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer
benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where
favorable treatment already afforded to one group is
refused to another, even though the State is under no
obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and
the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears
the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one
can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of
the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld
from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion;
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is equally
binding on the rest.62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that
would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-
file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered
the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the
law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal
protection challenges in the main have followed
the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude
to legislative classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate
a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. 64
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond
the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther
highlights the development in equal protection
jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only
minimal judicial intervention in most contexts.
Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was
only that government must not impose differences
in treatment "except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation." The old variety of equal protection
scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the
legislature: it insisted merely that the classification
in the statute reasonably relates to the
legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due
process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically
concerned with identifying "fundamental values"
and restraining legislative ends. And usually
the rational classification requirement was
readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight
fit between classification and purpose; perfect
congruence between means and ends was not
required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting
edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection"
and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal
protection burgeoned into a major intervention
tool during the Warren era, especially in the
1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the
deferential ingredients of the old equal protection:
in most areas of economic and social legislation,
the demands imposed by equal protection
remained as minimal as ever…But the Court
launched an equal protection revolution by finding
large new areas for strict rather than deferential
scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier
approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to
the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal
protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose…. The
intensive review associated with the new equal
protection imposed two demands - a demand not
only as to means but also one as to ends.
Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a
far closer fit between classification and statutory
purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
traditionally tolerated by the old equal
protection: means had to be shown "necessary"
to achieve statutory ends, not merely
"reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal
protection became a source of ends scrutiny as
well: legislation in the areas of the new equal
protection had to be justified by "compelling" state
interests, not merely the wide spectrum of
"legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas
appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching
for two characteristics: the presence of a
"suspect" classification; or an impact on
"fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of
"suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major
contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in
the traditionally interventionist area of racial
classifications. But other cases also suggested that
there might be more other suspect categories as
well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was
the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new
equal protection that proved particularly dynamic,
open-ended, and amorphous….. [Other
fundamental interests included voting, criminal
appeals, and the right of interstate travel ….]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the
scope of the new equal protection, although its
best established ingredient retains
vitality. There was also mounting discontent with
the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's
equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use
the clause as an interventionist tool without
resorting to the strict language of the new equal
protection…. [Among the fundamental interests
identified during this time were voting and access
to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications
included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been
adhered to in form, there has also been an
increasingly noticeable resistance to the sharp
difference between deferential "old" and
interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of
justices sought formulations that would blur the
sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that
would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and
deferential review. The most elaborate attack came
from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated
position was developed most elaborately in his
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that]
equal protection cases fall into one of two neat
categories which dictate the appropriate standard
of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But
this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this
Court has done reveals that it has applied a
spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the equal protection clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in
the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize
particular classification, depending, I believe, on
the constitutional and societal importance of the
interests adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding
scale" approach describes many of the modern
decisions, although it is a formulation that the
majority refused to embrace. But the Burger
Court's results indicate at least two significant
changes in equal protection
law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection
formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren
Court, an extreme deference to legislative
classifications and a virtually automatic validation
of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases,
even while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-
off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed
to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in
some areas the modern Court has put forth
 standards for equal protection review that, while
clearly more intensive than the deference of the
"old" equal protection, are less demanding than the
strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex
discrimination is the best established example of
an "intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one
case, the Court said that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." That standard is
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and
means: where ends must be "compelling" to
survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate" under
the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required
here; and where means must be "necessary" under
the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally
related" under the "old" equal protection, they must
be "substantially related" to survive the
"intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the
European Community have also gone forward in
discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the
United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of
protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It
prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not
exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and
religion is regarded as grounds that require strict
scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of
discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under
the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while
allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in
times of national emergency, prohibits derogation by
measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race,
colour, language, religion or social origin."67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has
developed a test of justification which varies with the
ground of discrimination. In the Belgian
Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of
justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene
the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was
no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.69 But
over the years, the European Court has developed a
hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the
ECHR, a much higher level of justification being
required in respect of those regarded as "suspect"
(sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual
orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the
European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes
is today a major goal in the member States of the
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty
reasons would have to be advanced before a
difference of treatment on the ground of sex could
be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held
that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference of treatment
based exclusively on the ground of nationality as
compatible with the Convention."72 The European
Court will then permit States a very much narrower
margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on
grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the
Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn
by states between, for example, large and small land-
owners. 73
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under
international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination,
together with equality before the law and equal protection of
the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic
principles in the protection of human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights
instruments include some prohibition on discrimination
and/or provisions about equality.75 The general international
provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also
enshrined in regional instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights;78 the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on
Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and
revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union
Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European
states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has
adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994,
although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of
the League.81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not
merely function as traditional "first generation" rights,
commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining
rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the
ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of
the American and European Conventions oblige States
Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure
without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure
of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to
eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum
standards ensuring equality and prevention of
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR83 and in a very
large number of Conventions administered by the
International Labour Organisation, a United Nations
body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and
regional human rights instruments have specific provisions
relating to employment.85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also
gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition
against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88the issue before
the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in the
Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the
scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that
discrimination in social security benefit provision was not
within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in
the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article
26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to
other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the
field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not
extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained
in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its
view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant
including the rights in other international treaties such as
the right to social security found in ICESCR:
 Although Article 26 requires that legislation should
prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain
any obligation with respect to the matters that may
be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to
provide for social security. However, when such
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must
comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or
indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has
the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal
protection. International law recognizes that discrimination
may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights
Committee90 took into account the definitions of
discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring
that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should
be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all
rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of
the challenged provision, and its conclusion of
unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in
cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend
of other jurisdictions and in international law. There
should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause
as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable
irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social
justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the
special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this
approach.92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our
Constitution and international law, we held in International
School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, "in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation - all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its
Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part
of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between
capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is
entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but
include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote
"equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State
shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless
of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State,
in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its
eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and [favorable] conditions of work, which
ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all
workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any
kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not
inferior to those enjoyed by men,
with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
(citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when
they run afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter
judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive and have been used to support
many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as
indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our
own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must
decide our own problems in the light of our own interests
and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as
a people, and always with our own concept of law and
justice.96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with
the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of
other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they
must be construed to serve our own public interest which is
the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be
stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from
others.97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives,
this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and
authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling
within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have
been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs."98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can
trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of
development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls
for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold
attention and action in the Constitution. The
Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely
in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine
society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are
clear commands to the State to take affirmative
action in the direction of greater equality.… [T]here
is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of
doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort
towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing
vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of
society, including labor.101 Under the policy of social justice,
the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests
of the working class on the humane justification that those
with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the
obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only
on the legislative and executive branches but also on the
judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social
justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated.104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a
ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been
proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court,
but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any
inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the
SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the
denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for
the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down
any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it
enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of
the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly
those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof
are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and
balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor
the discretion to decline passing upon said
issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation -
made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the
highest Court of the land, to support and
defend the Constitution - to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that
courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to
determine whether another branch of the
government has "kept within constitutional limits."
Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went
farther and stressed that, if the Constitution
provides how it may be amended - as it is in our
1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is
followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In
fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice
Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine
Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly
respected and foremost leaders of the Convention
that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as
early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments" of the
government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is
akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit
specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the
BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL.
The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL
while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and
better education and opportunities for career advancement
- are given higher compensation packages to entice them to
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-
file employees consist of people whose status and rank
in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have
the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard
of living, and improve the quality of life for all."108 Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit

greater concern from this Court. They represent the
more impotent rank-and-file government employees who,
unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific
right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment,
nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor
practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but
their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No.
7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-
file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees
represent the politically powerless and they should not
be compelled to seek a political solution to their
unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have
waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot
be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be
given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause
of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty
to save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation

and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., see

dissenting.
Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 147387 December 10, 2003
RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS
G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF
AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The
Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)
which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387
was filed by Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis
G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of
the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority
bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as
respondents are: the Executive Secretary, then Speaker of
the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.,
the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of
the House of Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by
Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of
Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the
COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the
following bills originating from the House of Representatives
and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING
THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
‘OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE,’ AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES;"1
…
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE
THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST,
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH
FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."2
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight
members of the Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the
House of Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the
conflicting provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference
Committee submitted its Report,5 signed by its members,
recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives
on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an
amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen raised a point of order
commenting that the House could no longer submit an
amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon
moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment
thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the
proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of
the House approved the return of the report to the
Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of
Representatives elected anew its conferees7 to the
Bicameral Conference Committee.8 Then again, for unclear
reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the
House elected another set of conferees9 to the Bicameral
Conference Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the
House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the
House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No. 9000 and
SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had
been recommitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee.
The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report
was a new one, and was a result of the reconvening of a
new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen
then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred
the approval of the report until the other members were
given a copy thereof.11
After taking up other pending matters, the House
proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and
SB No. 1742. The House approved the report with 125
affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In
explaining their negative votes, Reps. Fariñas and Garcia
expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider.
Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative,
expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14.
Prior to casting his vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no
senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report and asked if this procedure was regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then
Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker
of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
and was duly certified by the Secretary of the Senate
Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the
consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No.
1742," and "finally passed by both Houses on February 7,
2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No.
9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main
that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have
only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep.
Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out
the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006,
on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other
than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in
the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No.
9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election
Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a
similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. –
Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even
as they campaign for reelection or election for another
elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and
void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be
declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval"
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not
have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the
Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:"14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary
General of the House of Representatives acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House
who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001
elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of
their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents’ Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions
contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the present suit. Except for the fact that
their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the
members of the House of Representatives, the petitioners
have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of
the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners
have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed statute
does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute
the petitioners’ allegations that "irregularities" attended the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House, appearing
on the bill and the certification signed by the respective
Secretaries of both houses of Congress, constitute proof
beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section
26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act
No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise, including the
filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the
general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its
title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the
term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate of
candidacy for an office other than the one which he is
permanently holding, such that he is no longer considered
ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the
"unfairness" of considering an elective official ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of
Section 67, all elective officials are now placed on equal
footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms
even if they run for any office, whether the presidency, vice-
presidency or other elective positions, other than the one
they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly stated in the
title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required
to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.
It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general subject which the
statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every
means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of
an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title.
Mere details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66
pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction
exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials
occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon
the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected
by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly
treated as the former. Equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act
No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of
the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property. Specifically, the
section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof
presume that the formalities of the law would be observed,
i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be
entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due
process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged
with violation of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents
Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
not excluding from the Rolls those members thereof who
ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections.
These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until
declared otherwise by the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall
first rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents,
i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus
standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities
as members of the House of Representatives, and as
taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a
party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to
allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy is "to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in
several cases involving issues of "overarching significance
to our society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing.
Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy,18 this Court brushed aside the procedural
requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then
Senator Francisco Tatad and several members of the
House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of
Rep. Act No. 8180 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by
then members of the House of Representatives which
impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of
Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly,
the Court took cognizance of the petition filed by then
members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which
challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded
Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were
likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of
acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government
agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,23Albano v. Reyes,24 and Bagatsing v. Committee
on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e.,
whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
this Court had declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its
existence from the constitutional provision on accountability
of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of "overarching significance"
that justifies this Court’s adoption of a liberal stance vis-à-
vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover, with the
national elections barely seven months away, it behooves
the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is
quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of
suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that [its]
constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be
added that the exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections
beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.30And
where the acts of the other branches of government run
afoul of the Constitution, it is the judiciary’s solemn and
sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now
resolve the substantial issues raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing
clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of
Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective.
All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or
amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the
law provides not only the declaration of principles but also
the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. – The State shall, during
the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including
access to media time and space, and the equitable right to
reply, for public information campaigns and fora among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of
Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist
that the title be a complete index of its content.36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which
deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one
title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee
on the particular matter are particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all we’re looking for now is an appropriate title to make it
broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that
correct? That’s all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result
in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think
that even with the term "fair election practice," it really
covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those
conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair and it is an
election practice and, therefore, I think, I’m very comfortable
with the title "Fair Election Practice" so that we can get over
with these things so that we don’t come back again until we
find the title. I mean, it’s one provision which I think is fair
for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this
limitation actually provides for fairness in election practices
as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, let’s get it
over with. To me, ha, it’s not a very touchy issue. For me,
it’s even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable
with it and it was voted in the Senate, at least, so I would
like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come
back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what you’re ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
It’s not the title per se, it’s the coverage. So if you will just
kindly bear with us. I’m happy that there is already one
comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also
comfortable with it. But it would be well that when we rise
from this Bicam that we’re all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, let’s listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation
that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with
the area of propaganda and political advertising, the
complete title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It
says "An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest
... elections through fair election practices." But as you said,
we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says
that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be O, Fair Election Act.
free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code
of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the
harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the
title to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest,
effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover this and it
should not be considered a rider. peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service
through fair election practices?
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
REP. PICHAY:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from
Fair election practices?
Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in the
Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And
therefore, I hope that the House contingent would agree to REP. MACARAMBON:
this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides
for fair election practices because ... Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service
through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not
disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more Wala nang practices nga.
generic so that then we have less of an objection on
constitutionality. I think that’s the theory. So, there is REP. PICHAY:
acceptance of this.
Wala nang practices.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials.
Maybe we should say the special provision on elected
officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ... THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

REP. MARCOS: It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.

I think we just change the Section 1, the short title. (Informal discussions)

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): REP. PICHAY:

Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ... Approve na iyan.

REP. MARCOS: THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."
be changed...
The rest wala nang problema ano?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
VOICES:
O, sige, fine, fine. Let’s a brainstorm. Equal...
Wala na.
REP. PADILLA:
REP. MACARAMBON:
Mr. Chairman, why don’t we use "An Act rationalizing the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible Wala na iyong practices?
elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa
known as the Omnibus Election Code?" THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO): Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.

Why don’t we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as O, wala na? We will clean up.
Election Practices Act?"
REP. MARCOS:
REP. PICHAY:
Title?
That’s not an election practice. That’s a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
REP. MARCOS:
You’re back to your No. 21 already.
The Fair Election.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding
..." That’s the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba?
Then the short title "This Act shall be known as the Fair
Election Act."38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive
department found cause with Congress when the President
of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure,
some sectors of society and in government may believe
that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not
the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government.39 It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom
or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve
the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in
a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not
suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.40 Congress is not precluded from repealing
Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a
laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective
of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of
truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional
directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature
and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the public.42 In this case, it
cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated
upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners,
as members of the House of Representatives, expressed
their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their
votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the
existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43
The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the
appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of
the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is
not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other.44 The Court has
explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in
this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of
officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292),
appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote.
Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to
the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the
Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all
the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14
of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire
law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities
attended the passage of the said law particularly in the
House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral
Conference Committee) members by the House
during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a
conference on the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
was presented for approval on the floor without
copies thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its
proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was
not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as
well as its senator-members at the time it was
 presented to and rammed for approval by the
House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the
2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was
instantly made and passed around for the
signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a
2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened on
November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB
No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill
submitted by the BCC that convened on November
20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with
the publication required by the Civil Code and
jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it
appears in § 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This
Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by
the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members
during its consideration on February 7, 2001, did
not have the same § 16 as it now appears in RA
No. 9006, but § 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000
and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection
thereto was made;
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.’ And it has been said that
‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.’
Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure.’"
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No.
9006 which provides that it "shall take effect immediately
upon its approval," is defective. However, the same does
not render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera,54 this
Court laid down the rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….55

i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine
on February 7, 2001, did not "contain a detailed, enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its
amendments to the subject measure;" and
publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano
amendment," which is Section 12 of the
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly
compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this
entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts
was the subject of the purported proposed
do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or
amendment to the compromise bill of Member
wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a
provision states, thusly:
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. – Any elected constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative
official who runs for president and vice-president shall be power.57No such transgression has been shown in this
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the case.
filing of the certificate of candidacy.50
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the pronouncement as to costs.
enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under
the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the SO ORDERED.
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
review of cases51 reveals the Court’s consistent adherence Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by concur.
the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there may be as to the
formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its
favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,53 viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of

expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its
Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things
that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the
freedom to choose is that others may make different
choices – choices we would not make for ourselves,
choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may
shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be
legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the
right to disagree and debate about important questions of
public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights.
Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep
disagreements about the definitions and demands of
morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox –
philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical
solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more
worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse
viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang
Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively,
the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for
registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with
the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s
evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds.
Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same
gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for
even their women did change the natural use into that
which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving
the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of
their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women
"ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds."
(7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of
brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its
Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality
as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit,
license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code
are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code
which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency
or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil
Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community,
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows’ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall
be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published
with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs,
cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or
shows, it being understood that the
obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live
or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1)
glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2)
serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence, lust or pornography;
(3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to
abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
and (5) are contrary to law, public
order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films,
prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only
for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we
will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a
famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one
article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the
youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the
State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three
commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed
Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene
V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC
Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in
his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution,
stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in
the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly
proven its under-representation and marginalization, it
cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations
per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the
purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies,
then all representative organizations would have found
themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the
intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is
not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the
nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to
the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will
remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine
pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize
lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a
"special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally
protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S.
Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or
promote the social or legal equality of homosexual
relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females,
and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad
Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on
Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public
morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society,
the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become
part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those
who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows."
"Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions.
This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having
Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
"nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x
which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x
x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying
that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte
of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would
begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC
not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of
filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010
to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a
Comment in support of petitioner’s application.13 Thus, in
order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its
position, we required it to file its own comment.14 The
COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment
on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we
issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and
desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlad’spetition on moral grounds violated the standards
and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010,
we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his
Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on
February 2, 2010.19
The Parties’ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar
as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal
protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued
that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application
for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have
their own special interests and concerns which should have
been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations
of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and
assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there
had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for
registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element
is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification
by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few
isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country."21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements
in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new
one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was
"not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to
the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in
the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious,
considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-
existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to
the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a
change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of
petitioner’s right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no
misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial
petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that
the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines
composed of the following LGBT networks:"
§ Abra Gay Association
§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan
§ Albay Gay Association
§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija
§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila
§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro
Manila
§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City
§ Circle of Friends
§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte
§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association
(GABAY)
§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender
Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila
§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro
Manila
§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) –
Lanao del Norte
§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City
§ Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur
§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
§ LUMINA – Baguio City
§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila
§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro
Manila
§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City
§ ONE BACARDI
§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila
§ PUP LAKAN
§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR
§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro
Manila
§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan
§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal
§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines
(STRAP) – Metro Manila
§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal
§ The Link – Davao City
§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon
§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila
§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga
City23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG
LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed,
petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of
non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent
ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s
Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality
in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the
Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether
the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects.
As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in
public debate may influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable
in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon
religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious
or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As
a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription
of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage,
must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on
religion might have a compelling influence on those
engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After
all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate
the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a
law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in
its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass
scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence
of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's
religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition
for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral
condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct
may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily
because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the
danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it
is recognized by the government, a sector which believes
that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will
bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our
civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts
is in danger of losing its own existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years,
homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It
is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure –
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit
to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific
overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or
are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the
same gender, of a different gender, or more than one
gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral
acts. There is a great divide between thought and action.
Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the
gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are
sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as
to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of
course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without
authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality,
and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government
will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest
of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of
morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported
violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition
of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are
a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise
to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our
Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the
same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.35 In
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral
ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the
standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x
have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine
population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No
law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed,
even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here –
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim
that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike
for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of
differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other
law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals
under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a
class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as
a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment.
We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and
it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today.
Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized
under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated,
and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It
is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and
moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens
are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration,
and every moral discernment has access to the public
square where people deliberate the order of their life
together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including
opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act
of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it
specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not
only for a minority, however small – not only for a majority,
however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes
upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do
what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the
dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom
applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction
imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose
its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC
is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that
homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows
that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and
the activity of forming a political association that supports
LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule
that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual
conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United
Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing
general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign
and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to
learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally
binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United
States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines
protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement
of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state
if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The
ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge
the existing order and whose realization is advocated by
peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association,
even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to
the authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political
group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to
publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only
if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies
that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the
protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe
that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On
the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent
to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold
and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or
moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the
community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a
golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and
the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a
clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims
and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior
restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored,
or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner
as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list
system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not
deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in
the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be
hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election,
petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition
has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not
outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and
equally participate in public life through engagement in the
party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is
not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact,
established its qualifications to participate in the party-list
system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner
has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with
other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that
there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s
fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve
geometrically in scope and promise, international human
rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order.
For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate
structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such
norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international
obligations to protect and promote human rights. In
particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of
the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.
In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires
that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be
construed to include "sexual orientation."48Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be
prohibited under various international agreements.49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the
scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No.
25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as
follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the
right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to
have access to public service. Whatever form of
constitution or government is in force, the Covenant
requires States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens
have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.
Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based
on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the
opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any
restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as
minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to
stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable
or discriminatory requirements such as education,
residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No
person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any
kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties
should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which
exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing

to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the
Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket
invocation of international law is not the panacea for all
social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International
Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that

these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not
find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true
status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or

a certain segment of society – wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human
intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will.
It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that
international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human
rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are
couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer
controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta

Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda
– and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or
opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social

issues presented by this case are emotionally charged,
societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s
role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior.
Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the
knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No.
09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for
party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice