G.R. No.

L-12541 March 30, 1960

ROSARIO U. YULO, assisted by her husband Jose C. Yulo, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
YANG CHIAO SENG, defendant-appellee.

Punzalan, Yabut and Eusebio for appellants.

A. Francisco and J. T. Ocampo for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

This concerns a "Petition to Reopen Case," dated December 14, 1959, presented by attorneys for plaintiffs-
appellants, alleging that the relationship between Rosario U. Yulo, plaintiff-appellant and Yang Chiao Seng,
defendant-appellee, as lessor and lessee, has already been definitely decided by the Court of Appeals in the
case of Sta. Marina, et al., and Rosario U. Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng, C. A. G. R. No. 8143-R. We have
gone out of our way to review our conclusion that no relation of partnership existed between said parties
because we had denied the motion for reconsideration of plaintiff-appellant questioning the conclusion of
this Court without explanation.

The claim of plaintiff-appellant Rosario U. Yulo is that the relationship between her and defendant-appellee
Yang Chiao Seng as partners had already been passed upon by the Court of Appeals in the above-indicated
decision. The portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals is contained on page 8 of the motion for
reconsideration in which it held that articles of partnership of Young & Co., Ltd. show that the parties to this
case are partners in the construction of the Astor Theatre. It is to be noted, however, that the decision of the
Court of Appeals was one in which Emilia and Maria Carrion Sta. Marina are plaintiffs and the defendants
are Rosario Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng; the action was one to eject the defendants from the land occupied by
them; the issue was the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the land. The Court of Appeals said
that the plaintiffs in that case had claimed that the reasonable value was P3,000, while the defendants
claimed that it was only P1,000, and the Court of Appeals held that in view of the partnership papers P3,000
represent the share of Rosario U. Yulo in the profits of the partnership and not the reasonable rent of the
property.

It is evident that no res judicata can be claimed for the previous judgment of the Court of Appeals. In the
first place, the parties in that case were Emilia and Maria Carrion Sta. Marina and the defendants, Rosaria U.
Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng; in the second place, the issue decided by the Court of Appeals was the rental
value of the property in question; that the cause of action was for ejectment of Rosario U. Yulo and Yang
Chiao Seng. In the case at bar, the action is between Rosario U. Yulo as plaintiff and Yang Chiao Seng as
defendant; the issue is whether or not the plaintiff is partner in the cinematograph business, as claimed by
plaintiff, or said plaintiff is merely a sublessee, as claimed by the defendant. There is, therefore, no identity
of parties nor identity of issue, nor identity of cause of action. We call attention to the very citation contained
in appellant's motion for reconsideration, which reads as follows:

Parties to a judgment are not bound by it, in a subsequent controversy between each other unless they
were adversary parties in the original action. There must have been an issue or controversy between
them. The reason for this rule obviously is the same as that which underlies the whole doctrine of res
judicata, namely, that a person should not be bound by a judgment except to the extent that he, or
someone representing him, had an adequate opportunity not only to litigate the matters adjudicated,
but to litigate them against the party (or his prodecessor in interest) who seeks to use the judgment
against him. (Sec. 422, 1 Freeman on Judgments, 5th ed., p. 918).

Without going further, we are fully satisfied of the correctness of our conclusion that the relationship
between plaintiff-appellant Rosario U. Yulo and Yang Chiao Seng is merely that of sublessor and sublessee,
and not that of partners. The motion to reopen the case is hereby denied and considering that judgment had
become final since October 29, 1959, order is hereby given to remand the record to the court below.