Jens Cavallin Content and Object

CONTENT AND OBJECf
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
SERIES FOUNDED BY HL. VAN BREDA AND PUBLISHED
UNDER TIlE AUSPICES OF TIlE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES
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JENS CAYALLIN
CONTENT AND OBJECT

HUSSERL, TWARDOWSKI AND PSYCHOLOGISM
Editorial Board:
Director: R. Bernet (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) Secretary: 1. Taminiaux (Centre d'
etudes phenomenologiques, Louvain-Ia-Neuve) Members: S. IJsseling (Husserl-
Archief, Leuven), H. Leonardy (Centre d' etudes phenomenologiques, Louvain-Ia-
Neuve), U. Melle (Husserl-Archief, Leuven), B. Stevens (Centre d' etudes pheno-
menologiques, Louvain-Ia-Neuve)
Advisory Board:
R. Bernasconi (Memphis State University), D. Carr (Emory University, Atlanta),
E.S. Casey (State University of New York at Stony Brook), R. Cobb-Stevens
(Boston College), J.F. Courtine (Archives-Husserl, Paris), F. Dastur (Universite de
Paris XII), K. DUsing (Husserl-Archiv, Koln), 1. Hart (Indiana University,
Bloomington), K. Held (Bergische Universitiit Wuppertal), D. lanicaud (Universite
de Nice), K.E. Kaehler (Husserl-Archiv, Koln), D. Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv, Koln),
W.R. McKenna (Miami University, Oxford, USA), J.N. Mohanty (Temple
University, Philadelphia), E.W. Orth (Universitiit Trier), B. Rang (Husserl-Archiv,
Freiburg i.Br.), P. Ricoeur (paris), K. Schuhmann (University of Utrecht), C. Sini
(UniversitA degli Studi di Milano), R. Sokolowski (Catholic University of America,
Washington D.C.), E. Straker (Universitiit Kaln), B. Waldenfels (Ruhr-Universitat,
Bochum)
JENS CAVALLIN
University of Stockholm, Sweden
CONTENT AND OBJECT

Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword vii
Chapter 1 / PROLOGUE: A remark on the study of the history of philosophy 1
Chapter 2 / THE BACKGROUND: The controversy on psychologism in

philosophy 7
Chapter 3 / HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI: A philosophical encounter 21

3.1 Husserl's early development: the environment 21
3.2 Husserl's abandonment ofpsychologism 27
3.3 Husserl and Twardowski 28
3.4 Kazimierz Twardowski -life and career 32
3.5 Twardowski and psychologism 34
Chapter 4 / THE RESURGENCE OF ONTOLOGY - OBJECTS OF

PRESENTATIONS 43
4.1 Psychology and ontology: the idea of a synthesis 43
4.2 The classification of psychic phenomena and the
"idiogenical" theory of judgement 47
4.3 Twardowski's theory of acts, contents and objects 51
4.4 Mereology 74
4.5 The content 84
4.6 Distinctio realis 96
Chapter 5 / THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTATIONS 113

5.1 The problem 113
5.2 Twardowski's solution 117
5.3 Husserl's criticism of Twardowski 146
5.4 Intentional objects and object-less presentations: Husserl's solution 199
Chapter 6 / EPILOGUE: The end of a conceptual history? 233
Annex 1: A note on the texts 239
Appendix I : References to Tardowski in Husserl's published works 241

Appendix II : Erdmann's Table of Objects 242
Appendix III: Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass 243
Bibliography 249
FOREWORD
This study is a revised version ofa book, published in February 1990

under the same title, as my Ph.D. thesis at the University of
Stockholm.
Revision of an earlier work poses specific problems, some of
which deserve mentioning. After the appearance of the first version
of this book new literature on related subjects and a new version of
the principal HusserI text involved in the discussion have appeared.
The newer literature contains both accounts of Twardowski's thought
and its relations to HusserI's philosophy, though without referring to
my study from 1990, largely because the texts concerned were con-
ceived parallell to it, though published later, or independently of it. It
would seem anachronistic, in this situation, to enter into new and ex-
tensive discussions with the authors of this literature. The choice
made here has been to update the original study, adding references to
texts published after my study, and to take account of points of views
expressed. I have retained the major part of the basic information giv-
en in the 1990 version, although some of it might now be more famil-
iar to interested students than it was in 1990.
Parts of the texts have been largely rewritten, in particular the first
four chapters. A somewhat different structure in these parts will, I
hope, clarify the problems better than in the first version. Typing as
well as other formal errors have been corrected. The substance of the
study remains unchanged, but it is inevitable that some of the new
formulations and deletions of earlier passages reflect changes in my
own positions.
The technical chapter on the HusserI texts has been moved to an
appendix in this version of my study.
In the revision of the work I have in particular benefitted from
comments and suggestions made by Professor Dick Haglund, Gote-
borg. I thank Professor Jan Woletiski of the Jagellonian University of
Cracow for encouraging me to proceed to a revision of the original
version of my study.
As for principles of quotation, I have upheld the choice made for
the first edition, keeping the original German but translating the Pol-
ish texts.
Vll
CHAPTER I
PROLOGUE: A REMARK ON THE STUDY OF

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
The history of philosophy is in a particular way tied to philosophy it-

self. In distinction to most other kinds of human research, philosophy
essentially involves itself, and in particular its own history in its own
process. This is commonly referred to as the reflective nature of phi-
losophy. Philosophy "bends back" in a process of recollection, or
even recreation, of its history. History should here be taken in the
sense of an effort to understand earlier thought, but also as a necessi-
ty to understand and interpret contemporary philosophical reflection
as a sediment of previous thought. This also includes the history of
the history of philosophy: radical tendencies to stand absolutely free
from prejudgements have alternated with a deep traditionalism - both
attitudes have influenced the degree to which previous thought has
been studied and taken into consideration.
Recent philosophical discussion has turned this reflective nature
of philosophy into a source of difficulty for someone who sets out to
study a philosopher living some time - albeit not too long - before.
The controversy stirred up by Richard Rorty, but also views put for-
ward by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault draw into doubt the
very possibility to present an "account" of views presented by writers
of earlier times. Already in philosophical traditions close to logical
positivism a generally restrictive - and often drastically
"reconstructive" attitude to history of philosophy prevailed I: the ad-
vent of "scientific" philosophy implies that we ought not to devote
too much attention to earlier theories. Still no doubt was, however,
entertained as to the very possibility of understanding, examining and
criticizing - that is: communicating with - earlier theories. A border-
line, however, was drawn between history of philosophy, as a purely
I A good example of this is Anders Wedberg's history of philosophy.
I
2 PROLOGUE
descriptive occupation, and philosophy in the "analytic" sense, which

does not pay attention to the context or expressions of earlier
thought, except to the extension that they are reconstructible within a
new conceptual apparatus.
Rorty's criticism, however, seemed to show that earlier optimism
as to the feasibility of a "rational reconstruction" of earlier theories,
in deliberately chosen new, and, from some point of view, more con-
sistently applied or clearer terms, was naive. An even harsher lot
would naturally befall.those theories in which rational reconstruction
did not seem even performable in the more liberal attitude adopted by
the logical positivists. What is the purpose of trying to understand a
theory which does not even in the first round appear consistent?
History of philosophy thus sometimes was relegated to an auxilia-
ry position subordinated to the "core" disciplines of philosophy. In
some places even a kind of expUlsion of the history of philosophy as
a philosophical enterprise took place: a demarcation line to the gener-
al history of ideas was drawn up.
On the other extreme, the "historicistic" relativistic approach
adopted by Foucault, or the "deconstructivism" developed by Derri-
da, seem to proscribe any kind of genuine dialogue with past theo-
ries, indeed even, if extrapolated in the extreme, understanding of
past thought. Although deconstruction might be interpreted as a kind
of reconstruction in the positivist tradition it is primarily interpreted
as a rejection of "rational" reconstruction.
The study presented here met, in its first edition in 1990, with a
kind of objections which seems to be based on a dichotomy between
an "analytical" - i.e. a genuinely "philosophical" approach to the
texts examined - and a historical description, which is then under-
stood as something not belonging to the core of philosophy.
As will emerge from the text below, a choice between these two
approaches has not been made, and deliberately so. My methodologi-
cal attitude is rather to insist that the cited dichotomy could not be
upheld, precisely due to the reflective nature of philosophy indicated
above. This nature means both that the possibility of interpreting, and
understanding, earlier thought is accepted, and that the project of
building up philosophy in a exclusively "synchronical" manner is not
realistic.
PROLOGUE 3
Applying this attitude to a particular philosopher or theory of the

past, a metaphor borrowed from photography might be helpful: in the
study of philosophy we are faced with a problem of selecting a
"lens,,2, in the following way.
A tele-Iens will permit the "photographer" or describer to look in
detail at some selected problems, whereas the wide-angle lens pres-
ents an overview, a "broader perspective", in a literal sense. Neither
of these approaches could be given absolute primacy. On one hand,
just studying details with your own personal, albeit ever so sophis-
ticated analytical instruments, will inevitably bring in some systemat-
ic distortion - yes, systematization in itself might be regarded as a
distortion, since understanding might also be to understand that a
particular theory under examination is not a closed system, or even
consistent. On the other hand, just using description and presenting
overviews will result in a lack of precision and clarity: the wide angle
lens normally presents rather uninteresting, and, at least from an
aesthetical point of view, unsatisfactory pictures.
History of philosophy, as a philosophical enterprise, it seems to
me, will necessarily be a compromise. It will neither satisfy those, for
whom philosophy is only about the development of new, formal or
less formal, analysis, nor those, for whom philosophy is more of an
impartial, or at least non-engaged, study of expressions of human so-
ciallife.
The particular role of the history of philosophy in philosophy is
thus part of the background to this study, although it is not its
subject.
***
Quine's famous lecture "Epistemology Naturalized" in 1971 initiated
a new debate on the relationship between empirical research, notably
psychology, and philosophy. It is remarkable that, in the course of
this debate for long rather little attention was given to the debates on
the philosophy of mind and in particular the relation of psychology to
2 The Swedish and German terms "objektiv" is much more attractive in this
context!
4 PROLOGUE
philosophy which took place in Gennan-speaking Europe just a cen-

tury ago. This situation is now rapidly changing. The barriers be-
tween "Continental" and "Anglo-Saxon" philosophy, (or
phenomenology and analytical philosophy) tend to be dismantled, al-
though occasionally one still finds aggression. To enhance this in my
view necessary and fruitful development history of philosophy has a
particular contribution to make. The study of the philosophy in Cen-
tral Europe in the time when both those tendencies or philosophical
styles were founded will, I believe, make it impossible to anathema-
tize, or ignore, each other as has been the case for decades.
The fall of the political barriers in Europe has, in particular, ex-
panded the opportunities for an exchange between philosophers of
Western Europe with those of Central Europe, thus giving new impe-
tus to the study of earlier contributions to philosophy from this part
of Europe. Incidentally, my own last checks of Twardowski's manu-
scripts, for the first edition of this study, were in fact perfonned
amidst the first close-to-democratic election campaign in Central and
Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. The centenary of
Twardowski's inauguration lecture in Lwow, November 15 1895,
celebrated in Lviv and Warsaw, may serve as an impulse to that new
effort.
The new situation has also brought with it new opportunities of
collecting new material for the understanding of the history of the
philosophical traditions rooted in late 19th century Gennan
philosophy.
The birth of phenomenology is tied to a number of tendencies in
psychology embodying a criticism of both earlier atomistic or asso-
ciationist psychology and "armchair psychology". Franz Brentano,
who simply tenned his principal philosophical work, "Psychology
from an empirical point of view", Carl Stumpf, a portal figure in the
history of experimental empirical psychology, Christian von Ehren-
leis, the father of the notion of Gestalt, and William James, with his
notion of "interest" as a detenninant in perception all laid the basis
for what later became phenomenological philosophy. Indeed, histori-
cally, also "deep" psychology in its insistence on pre-given underly-
ing ways of thinking and behaving, belong to this context. Freud in
fact took part in Brentano's seminars.
PROLOGUE 5
The same Central European academic environment which gave

birth to phenomenology also witnessed an attempt to rationalize the
totality of human thinking from quite another angle: the advanced
work of designing comprehensive formal systems for mathematics
and logic. Husserl was, just like Frege, Peano and Russell, deeply en-
gaged also in this undertaking, before and during his effort to shape a
newall-embracing ground for all future philosophy and even all sci-
ence.
Both these efforts to "rationalize" philosophy, as a
"Wissenschaft", may seem utterly different from those philosophies
which were more in fashion at the time - that is "life philosophy", in
particular the thinking of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But also here
care should be taken: there are links which could not be ignored, e.g.
between Schopenbauer and Husserl and between Schopenhauer and
Wittgenstein.
CHAPTER 2
THE BACKGROUND: THE CONTROVERSY ON

PSYCHOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGISM
Quine's challenge - despite his deep disagreement with some of the

basic tenets of phenomenology and any thought taking
"intentionality" as a central focus of attention - shares a basic atti-
tude with this strand of thought: philosophical reflection will neces-
sarily transcend the border of what is, today or at any other time,
considered to be philosophy.
Much of the discussion in the sequel of Quine's article, just as the
philosophical debates in Germany just a century ago, could be fo-
cussed on the particular term psychologism. This term has during the
last century been frequently used, sometimes more to brand what is
considered a philosophical mistake, sometimes to offer a more neu-
tral description of a philosophical standpoint. The notion of psychol-
ogism in philosophy plays a crucial role at least in the philosophy of
logic, philosophy of language and philosophy of knowledge. More
precise determinations of psychologism will, however, depend on the
particular field of philosophical problems examined, whether logic,
epistemology, philosophy of language or "practical" philosophy. The
notion might also be applied in disciplines outside philosophy, in the
social sciences (including economy) and the humanities. Martin
Kusch gives in a recent work3 an excellent survey of the role which
the notion of psychologism has played in philosophical debates from
the first occurrence of the notion till today, looking at the problem
from the point of view of "sociology of philosophical knowledge", or
what essentially amounts to a favourable judgement of the tendency
associated to the notion.
3 Kusch 1995.
7
8 CONTROVERSY ON PSYCHOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPY
Psychologism in philosophy might be considered from two differ-

ent aspects. One emphasizes the role of the subject matter of a par-
ticular discipline on the one hand, the other advances a
methodological psychologism on the other hand. 4 Already these very
sketchy distinctions show that a reasonably precise account of the is-
sue is better given in relation to a more restricted area of problems.
Nevertheless, some common attitudes could be found behind at
least those theories that have accepted the label of psychologism.
This would include a tendency to emphasize or ''upgrade'' psycholo-
gy (in whatever understanding of that tenn), in relation to philoso-
phy, or rather other philosophical disciplines, since psychology was
commonly accepted as a philosophical discipline among others. Only
later philosophy would - with Quine, and perhaps Kusch - argue that
philosophy as such would be dependent on the results of other parts
of knowledge and argue against any strict borderline between empiri-
cal science and philosophy.
One obvious difficulty - perhaps a pennanent one - has to do with
the issue of establishing what psychology is itself. The wealth of
opinions as to the legitimacy of different psychological methods calls
for great care in this task. Most tendencies and theories associated
with the tenn psychologism have taken for granted that psychology is
empirical, in some sense of this word. Psychologism therefore could
be classified as a fonn of empiricism. Since most methodological
battles fought in this context, concern which methods should be ac-
cepted as empirical, we do not, however, get much more clarity.
Notwithstanding all the problems of definition just hinted at, there
is however a remarkable affinity between on one hand those philoso-
phers who today, like Kusch, or in the wake of Quine (a representa-
tive example being Alvin Goldman) consider that the relevance of
empirical psychology in philosophy is beyond doubt, and a highly in-
fluential school of researchers in Gennany and Austria a hundred
years ago. Both tend to hold that problems traditionally treated in the
framework of what was called theory of knowledge could be treated,
4 The latter kind of distinction is made e.g. by Wolenski in regard to Twardowski,

See Wolenski 1989 p. 40; other distinctions are found, as regards more recent lit-
erature on the subject, in Notturno Cbs. 2-3, where Willard is also cited.
CONTROVERSY ON PSYCHOLOGISM IN PHILOSOPY 9
and solved, within the context of empirical research, even experimen-

tal and observational research.
Together with Frege, Husserl is perhaps the best known critic of
psychologism, and practically everything ofHusserl's work might be
related to various aspects of the relationship between philosophy and
psychology.s This is why a study of Husserl's philosophy in those
years when he first broke with what he, later, termed psychologism,6
is likely to be rewarding, not only to the understanding of Husserl' s
own development, but also to an assessment of recent suggestions
parallell to those dealt with by Husser!.
In Husserl's thinking on psychologism in philosophy, one might
discern at least three stages:
1. His criticism of psychologism in logic, including pure grammar
and meaning theory - from around 1894 (though with earlier
roots) till the publication of "Logische Untersuchungen" in
1900-01. This is the period dealt with in the present study.
2. A more general criticism of psychologism in the philosophy of
knowledge, or epistemology, which amounts to a criticism of natu-
ralism in philosophy. This period began around 1905, with the so-
called Seefeld manuscripts, and resulted in the divorce of Husser-
lian phenomenology from descriptive psychology of the Brenta-
nian mark. A programmatic expression of Husserl's position in
this period is presented in the essay "Philosophy as a Rigorous
Science" in 1911. The end of this period could be determined to
5 Reasons for regarding the issue of psychologism as the leitmotif in Husserl's
philosophy as a whole are developed by e.g. Suzanne Bachelard in her book on

Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic. In any case psychologism was the
main problem behind the revised version of phenomenology (i.e. the pure or tran-
scendental phenomenology)
6 I do not pretend to present a complete history of the term, which however seems
to have become common only at the end of the 1890s, although surely the authors
using this label were referring back to e.g. Fries and Beneke from the earlier part
of the century. Cf. Nicola Abbagnano's article on the issue in the Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Kusch (p. 101) attibutes the first use of the term to Johann Eduard
Erdmann in 1866, who should not be confused with Benno Erdmann mentioned
later in this study. J.E. Erdmann suggested the label of psychologism for Beneke's
views.
some time just before the publication of "Ideas", in 1913. In that

work the criticism of psychologism as a separate variant of natu-
ralism sinks somewhat into the background.
3. A period, beginning around the lectures on phenomenological
psychology in 1925, ends some time after the publication of the
Cartesian meditations. Here the issue of transcendental psychol-
ogism, i.e. the confusion of "phenomenological psychology" with
transcendental phenomenology, stands in focus. In this period the
basis (origin) of philosophy as a whole (not logic or theory of
knowledge) is reflected upon.
One might also consider Hussed's last philosophical period,

marked by the publication of "Krisis", as wholly devoted to the issue
of psychologism, thus also indicating a fourth stage. In a sense this
period also closes the circle. Despite some uncertainty in the textual
material available until now, there are reasons for considering the
question whether Hussed does not in this last period revert to the
psychologistic standpoints taken before the period which we are ex-
amining here.
An attempt to understand and assess the phases in Hussed's
"Auseinandersetzung" with the problem of psychologism requires a
study of the setting in which he worked. It seems safe to say that a re-
searcher is more likely to be formed by early influences than by later
ones. 7This is sufficient reason why an examination of Hussed' s first
encounter with the problem of psychologism deserves particular
attention. This encounter is what the present study attempts to ex-
amine, from a particular point of view, which transcends the borders
of the philosophy of mind.
The motives for psychologism
Just as Hussed and his disciples referred to phenomenology as a

"movement", 19th-century psychologism might be regarded as part
7 In Husserl's case there is, however, also a clear instance of influence in a late pe-
riod: though never admitted, the impact of Heidegger on Husserl's thought is too
obvious to be neglected.
of a broader movement. It had some of the missionary spirit and co-

herence associated with that term. In a movement, one might discern
factors (final causes or ends) which make it move: motives. Some
kind of general or collective motivation is sought in this context, not
necessarily grounds for action or thought on the individual level.
Nevertheless, like all generalizations on social action, such motives
are thought also to clarify individual actions (including thoughts).
The kind of description alluded to is an area, where history of phi-
losophy, general history of ideas and a sort of historical social
psychology are involved, philosophy being regarded as part of a
more general expression of ideas and thought. Kusch develops this
kind of research in his study on psychologism. Under this kind of un-
derstanding, it seems that one might discern two main motives for the
variety of psychologism discussed in this study.
1. The sceptical motive
Hussed frequently attacks the psychologistic philosophers for advo-

cating standpoints that ultimately lead to dogmatic scepticism (cf. be-
low). This means that scepticism is rather considered an undesired
result, not a motive.
Nevertheless, scepticism might also be seen it as a motive, more
precisely expressing a criticism towards a priori arguments in phi-
losophy, or, which is equivalent, a tendency to a general empiricism.
Scepticism towards other sources of knowledge, in philosophy and
elsewhere (mathematics traditionally being a case for hesitation),
than experience is characteristic. For e.g. Twardowski the alternative
to psychologism was "metaphysicism", a standpoint which Hussed,
too, faithful to their common Brentanian heritage, rejects, e.g. in the
lectures on logic and the theory of knowledge (Hua XXIV p. 177).
The psychologistic movement did not normally advance a thorough-
going scepticism like Hurne, nor of course the kind of scepticism im-
puted to it by Hussed in the argument in the Logical Investigations.
The scepticism of the psychologistic movement was directed to
aprioristic methods in psychology and therefore in philosophy. This
included rationalism before Kant ("rational psychology" and any talk
about innate ideas), as well as the transcendental philosophy of Kant
and German idealism. A consequence of this attitude was the rejec-

tion of a sharp border-line between necessary and contingent, i.e. fal-
lible, truths. The a priori, if any, is a matter of certain truths
becoming more integrated constituents or presuppositions of our
thinking than others, and usually it is possible to trace this develop-
ment in the history of thought. 8
A frequent corollary to the scepticism to the a priori was a rejec-
tion of metaphysics in the traditional aprioristic forms, as well as the
post-Kantian varieties. In particular, metaphysical discussions on the
soul, the ego, or the like were dismissed. Psychology was regarded as
the science of psychic phenomena - the slogan was "Psychology
without soul!" There were, however, exceptions to philosophers
drawing this kind of corollary, as we shall see, one of them being
Twardowski.
Psychologism mostly also implied a scepticism towards the exis-
tence (reality) of universals as a distinct ontological category. Nomi-
nalism or conceptualism (identifying universals with mental singular
objects) was a common denominator to most of the psychologistic
philosophers. Indeed it might be regarded as something of a
"leitmotiv" to it9 •
Inasfar as theory of knowledge was regarded as a discipline based
on non-empirical "speculation" (such as that of transcendental phi-
losophy), psychologistic philosophers nourished a wide-spread scep-
ticism against epistemology, just as against metaphysics. A discipline
which sought to explain the origin and nature ("Ursprung und We-
sen") of knowledge in any other way than by supplying some kind of
causal explanation was regarded with suspicion. The scepticism
against "speculation" (a notion which in earlier philosophy tended to
be used interchangeably with "theory"lO) also promoted reservations
towards philosophy as one unified undertaking I I • It was rather seen
x Heymans is as a typical example, expressing himself nearly as clearly as Quine

on this point.
9 The Polish historian of philosophy, Tatarkiewicz, cites Ockham himself as rep-
resenting a psychologistic outlook. (Tatarkiewicz 1993, vol I pp. 298-9).
10 Cf. Beck 1969 p. 413.

as a bundle of disciplines, related to each other by having "psychic

phenomena" as objects of study (i.e. the "ontological" psychologism
referred to by Wolenski). Logic, traditionally perceived as an a priori
discipline, was regarded either as a technical tool ("eine Kunstlehre")
dependent on psychology, or simply as a (perhaps normative), part of
psychology, albeit a rather autonomous part. Benno Erdmann, for ex-
ample, regarded logic as a normative application, but not a part of
psychology. (Erdmann p. l8)
2. The scientistic motive
"Scientism" might be described as an attitude which proclaims sci-

ence, understood in a sense which includes the natural sciences l2 plus
mathematics, as a model for all knowledge, and tends to exclude
knowledge which does not have this character from the field of
knowledge proper. In philosophy, scientism would aim specifically at
establishing commonly accepted methods of inquiry, conceptual ap-
paratus and basic doctrines and an accumulative growth of the body
of knowledge. By nature scientism is not primarily as a motive scep-
tical, and thus at first sight conflicts with motive 1. The conflict va-
nishes, however, if one remembers that the kind of scepticism
represented within the psychologistic movement only concerned a
certain type of knowledge, not all knowledge. Husserl, who shared
much of the scientistic attitude of the psychologistic movement,
however contends that the restricted form of scepticism, relating to
the a priori status of certain logical and "noetic" truths, inevitably
leads to general scepticism - and thus conflicts with a general trust in
science. 13
II Twardowski developed this theme in the article from 1897, WPF 111.
12 The notorious confusion in the English language concerning the use of the word
science pervades most disputes on qualifying philosophical tendencies and meth-

ods as "scientific". History, other humanities, the social sciences etc. always seem
to be regarded as "science" only in some secondary sense - not to speak about phi-
losophy, of course! We will revert to the issue of "Wissenschaft" versus science
later.
In the period studied here, traditional philosophy of mind or philo-

sophical psychology faced challenges from the emerging systematic
and experimental research in psychology and sensory physiology.
The inquiry into human understanding, or the conditions for human
knowledge, had suddenly become the object of systematic observa-
tion - entailing definition of laws - partially in mathematical terms.
Instead of previous speculation on the nature of the soul, there were
numerous systematic methods of investigating "psychic phenomena".
The new psychology "without SOUI,,14 gave birth to an overwhelming-
ly optimistic spirit regarding the discovery of empirically ascertained
knowledge, replacing what was largely branded as speculative theo-
ries. Just as natural philosophy had been replaced by experimental
and mathematical physics, psychology was felt to be on its way to
liberating itself from philosophy/speculation.
This situation was bound to pose grave problems for any philoso-
phy, based as mostly was the case after Descartes, on an inquiry into
the mind, or consciousness, or ego. The psychologistic school,
however, found new responses to these challenges. Introspection was
not only accepted as a valid form of scientific empirical method,
indeed sometimes identified as the empirical method yielding
important works by authorities like Mill and Bain. Thus it did not
present any difficulties to a scientistic outlook. 15 Although
13 This is not only the point made in the Logical Investigations, but, on a more
general level of the philosophy of science, also of the famous article from 1911 in
"Logos", "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science".
14 Brentano (Brentano 1924 p. 16) quotes with some approval A. Lange as to the
adoption of this slogan.
15 The parallel to more recent "objectivist" revolutions in the inquiry on the human
mind has been pointed out by e.g. Notturno in his polemics with one of the modem
"psychologistic" philosophers Elliot Sober (quoted in Notturno 1985 p. 78). This
kind of revolutions is exemplified by behaviorism, Freudianism and Gestalt
psychology (one might add functionalism in its various forms from the 1940s and
flourishing today in some of the speculation around artificial intelligence). Indeed,
Bertrand Russell's theory of mind in "The Analysis of Mind" could, just as today's
psychologistic tendencies based on theories of "mental states" etc. be seen as an at-
tempt to reconcile objective psychology with philosophy, analogous to the
introspection should not be identified with the Brentanian method of

"inner perception", insistence on the empirical character of descrip-
tive psychology was a cardinal thesis of the doctrine of Brentano.
***
The psychologistic philosophers generally expressed motive 2 in

their texts but more seldom defended the partial scepticism described
as a motive above. They certainly did not want to cast doubt on sci-
ence as a whole but to ascertain its truths or warrant its objectivity,
and to bequeath this status to philosophy. The fallibility of all science
was generally a subject of less concern, and in Brentano's school
handled, for philosophy, by the assertion of the certainty (Evidenz) of
"inner perception".
Although it would be tempting to interpret Husserl's polemics
against psychologism as a total rejection of it, it is important to un-
derline that in some essential respects Husserl shared the motives of
psychologism: Husserl was sceptical of the Kantian theory on the na-
ture of the a priori l6 and also advocated a "scientific" approach to
philosophyl7, and even, in a sense, might be taken to hold that
"experience" is the source of all knowledge, even knowledge a priori.
19th-century psycho10gism in Gennany, and certainly with an interesting link to

the general theory of object, represented by Meinong.
It is also precisely Sober's claim that it was the mistaken pretention of introspec-
tionism to be an "objective" method, which was vulnerable to Frege's anti-
psychologism, and that, consequently, psychologism could in some sense be saved
by the adoption of other, more "objective", methods, which is criticised by
Notturno.
16 Cf. a passage in the cited text from 1906-07 where HusserI accuses the Kantians
of being blind to phenomenology just as the empiricists are blind to epistemology

(Hua XXIV p. 202).
17 Cfhis Logos-article.
HUSSERL'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGISM
The best known explicit argument presented by HusserI against

psychologism concerns logic. The argument, however, also serves as
a model for the general arguments developed against any kind of
psychologism in philosophy and thus may help us better to under-
stand the sense of the controversy. The argument is found in chapters
3-8 in the first part ("Prolegomena zur reinen Logik") of the Logical
Investigations. It includes a rather detailed examination of the more
specified psychological interpretations of logical concepts made by
Mill and Spencer, as well as an examination of what HusserI consid-
ers to be the sceptical consequences of the doctrines of Sigwart and
Benno Erdmann, the authors of perhaps the most influential works on
logic at the end of the 19th century.
HusserI claims, in the first step of his argument, that a psychologi-
cal interpretation of the basic logical notions and "laws" - the most
important of them being the law of contradiction, although the law of
the excluded middle is also mentioned - results in empiricism in log-
ic. The logical laws are to be seen as empirical generalizations con-
cerning human thinking, i.e. the results of a continuous and never
failing series of observations of/acts. The mere fact that we do some-
times commit logical mistakes is to HusserI sufficient refutation of
this kind of empiricism: the generalization is simply not confirmed.
But HusserI also claims that there is absurdity in this position. Since
the logical laws are not empirical generalizations and not justified by
the simple perception of facts (immediate justification) they could
not be in any sense a posteriori. If they are true or valid, they must
thus be valid independently of empirical facts. This means that the
continued observation of instances of application of the law does not
incur upon its validity, nor is there any kind of gradually ascending
confirmation of the law, in some series of growing probability. But
we could not assume, at one and the same time, that something is jus-
tified as a result of several occasions of observation, and that it does
not depend of observation for its justification. (Hua XVIII pp. 73-4).
The view of the logical laws as norms - a rather frequent version
of the philosophy of logic attacked by HusserI, and advocated by
some of the Neo-Kantians, did not either satisfy HusserI. His
CONTROVERSY ON PSYCHOLOGISM IN PlllLOSOPY 17
principal argument is that any normative discipline must have a pure-

ly theoretical discipline as a "basis". There must always be some
kind of theoretical "nucleus" in all normative knowledge or theory.
Thus Husserl appears to amalgamate this kind of view with the more
clear-cut empiricist accoune s.
Husserl extends his argument against empiricism in regard of the
logical concepts and laws to any kind of theory of knowledge. All
empiricism must in his view lead to consequences which are just as
absurd, as being cases of "extreme scepticism" (ibid. p. 84). He
quotes the Neo-Kantian Windelband for support of his statement that
any attempt to found, by way of an empirical theory, what is in itself
a basis for any theory "as a theory" must be hopeless.
The heart of Husserl's standpoint could be stated as follows: Any
theory which bases the a priori on the a posteriori, for example laws
of logic on laws of fact, is absurd or self-contradictory. This position
might fit well as a representative example of a counter-point to
Quine'S plea for a naturalization of epistemology. Husserl did devel-
op his point of view in polemics with philosophers of his time - Hey-
mans might be chosen as a typical representative, but also Leonard
Nelson.
A parallell argument aims at establishing empiricism of any kind
as a sceptical theory. Husserl tries, in chapter 7 of the Prolegomena,
to develop a more precise notion of a sceptical theory in general. The
outcome of this effort is a contradictio in adiecto: any sceptical
theory is contradictory since it destroys some, or perhaps all, condi-
tions for any theory at all, in the more precise sense of the notion of
theory itself. Those conditions could be either logical or epistemic,
"noetic". Scepticism could never aspire at being a theory at all. Hus-
serl takes care to distinguish a sceptical theory from "metaphysical
scepticism" - such as the Kantian rejection of the possibility of
knowing anything about the thing-in-itself. Kant's attitude is not, ac-
cording to Husserl, contradictory, since it does not reject the validity
of the very foundations of a theory in general, viz. the unconditional
truth of logical laws and noetic principles.
18 Logische Untersuchungen Band 1, § 16, Hua XVIII p. 59 ff.

Now, psychologism, along with other brands of empiricism, Hus-

serl argues, is a variety of relativism, since it makes logical laws and
noetical principles relative to the human species. Husserl names this
kind of relativism specific relativism, in distinction to an individual
relativism which makes the laws and principles dependent on the in-
dividual person. Anthropologism is the general label given by Hus-
serl to any view which makes logical laws and noetical principles
dependent on the human species - viz. part of the "constitution" 190 f
that species.
Now, in Husserl's view the absurdity of the thesis that truth has its
"source" in the human constitution is patent: it would follow that
there would be no truth if there were no human species. But the the-
sis "there is no truth", i.e. the antecedent of the hypothesis is not only
false but absurd, since it is a contradiction. 20
Thus, parallell to the argument against empiricism Husserl rejects
relativism of all kinds, as being instances of a doctrine which derives
purely logical principles from facts. In short: psychologism of all
forms, be it "transcendental psychology" in a Kantian tradition or
empirical psychologil, is a form of relativism understood in this
sense, more precisely a form of specific relativism.
19 Hua XVIII p. 126. The notion of constitution is not used here in the later techni-
cal sense employed by Husserl, but rather as denoting a jact, and as a fact it is
time-bound. But a truth is not, according to Husserl, a fact - it is not individual, al-
though it might "pose" (setzen) a fact. This corresponds to distinction between the
content of the judgement "2 x 2 = 4" and the particular utterance of this
judgement.
20 Husserl does not in this context distinguish between a locution being a contra-
diction and not being a well-formed expression/statement of a language - which is
rather strange in view of his own strict distinction between meaning categories and
logical laws in the Logical Investigation No IV (Hua XIXII p. 326). Husserl even
explicitly identifies logical absurdity and contrariety to meaning categories (Hua
XVIII p. 130), although it should be clear that a logical absurdity presupposes the
meaningfulness of the contradictory components, whether it be a contradiction of
statements or ofterms.
21Brentano's claim for descriptive psychology's being empirical is not mentioned

here, only the more typical representatives of empiricist psychology such as Mill,
Bain and Wundt.
Therefore, HusserI contends that he has shown psychologism,

both understood as a relativism and as an empiricism, to be a scepti-
cal theory and thus that he has demonstrated its absurdity.22
22 The validity of this demonstration might be disputed. Sukale. (Sukale 1988),

brands HusserI's argument as circular and contends that HusserI only treats one
form of psychologism, viz. a subjectivistic kind of psychologism.
It hinges upon, among other factors,
I) The form of scepticism referred to by HusserI's determination of the notion of
a sceptical theory. Does anyone in the history of philosophy actually adhere to a
theory which says that any theory is in some sense irrational, self-contradictory or
at least circular in a vicious way? Is it not precisely the point of a sceptical
"theory" to reject the idea of such an all-embracing systematic and logically co-
herent body of knowledge (sentences, propositions, content of presentations) cov-
ering the idea of knowledge as such. The sceptic does not for that reason feel
compelled to deny the possibility of partial theories, meeting all the requirements
of a theory in HusserI's sense.
2) The theory of truth underIying the notion of theory which one employs will
also determine whether there is any edge at all against the polemics directed
against "anthropologism" and its sub-species psychologism. For if the notion of
truth is somehow subordinated to the, alas, human action of proving or demon-
strating then any theory will also, insofar as it is constituted by the idea of logical
consequence and thus truth, be subordinated to some kind of human action. In fact,
HusserI's own different versions of a theory of truth, far from being a correspon-
dence theory in the usual sense, rests - already at this time - on the conceptual
couple intention-fulfilment. "albeit" as its objective correlate. Basically it is also
this "albeit" which is the point of issue for HusserI's later more general anti-
psychologism, i.e. the strict distinction between the descriptive-psychological level
and the pure phenomenological or transcendental level of intentionality. Although
the concrete psychic experience of fulfilment may in some sense be primary to the
correlative or pure notion achieved by reductions, the only objective fundament for
knowledge lies in this correlative, reduced sphere, which is really the sphere of
meanings.
Also Kusch examines Husserl's arguments and gives a survey of the criticism
which HusserI's argument encountered in German philosophy of his own time - in-
dicating Kusch's own sympathy for this criticism.
CHAPTER 3
HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI:

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENCOUNTER
3.1 HUSSERL'S EARLY DEVELOPMENT - THE ENVIRONMENT
Brentano
The origin of Husserlian phenomenology is, primarily, tied to Franz

Brentano and the circle of philosophers - colleagues and disciples -
surrounding him23 •
Brentano's philosophy and influence has been described in several
works in later decades, and the interest in his work is still growing.
This is not the place for giving a detailed account of his thought.
However, some features should be highlighted in view of their funda-
mental impact on Husserl' s development.
I. Descriptive psychology was seen as the primary philosophical
method, in contradistinction to e.g. Kantian transcendental ideal-
ism, absolute idealism in a more metaphysical (e.g. Hegelian)
sense or rational "speculation" and logic in traditional
Scholasticism.
2. Introducing, or reviving, the notion of intentionality or "intentional
inexistence of the object" in consciousness or mind as the criterion
of the "psychic phenomenon" Brentano broke with a traditional as-
sociationist view on the mental functions. A teleological way of
describing higher mental functions was thus replacing a more
''passive'' view, anchored in British empiricism.
3. "Inner perception" was the primary method of descriptive
psychology whereby evident (i.e. certain) empirical knowledge
might be constructed.
23Recently a survey of Husserl's relations to and influences from the Brentano

School has been published. Cf. Rollinger 1996.
21
22 HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI
4. Brentano' s classification of psychic phenomena in presentations,

judgements and feelings was the basis of a theory sharply distin-
guishing the "basic" category of psychical phenomena, presenta-
tions (Vorstellungen) from the other two categories, namely
judgements and feelings/volitions. None of these categories could
be reduced to any of the others - this is what is labelled the
"idiogenical" nature of these categories. This kind of classification
was in practice dissolved in Husserlian phenomenology from its
outset: the "intentional act" is a broader concept, which in essential
aspects eliminated the borderlines between the three kinds.
Brentano's later development which focussed more on problems
of universals, emanating in a radical "reism" - a radical criticism of
any acceptance of the existence (reality) of general objects - was less
influential on Husserl's philosophy, indeed even counter to it.
The Brentanists
Among the more prominent members of Brentano's wide circle of

disciples were Carl Stumpf, Alexius Meinong and Anton Marty.
Another member of Brentano's circle of disciples was the Pole
Kazimierz Twardowski24 , whose philosophy and influence on Husserl
is the topic of this study.
They all shared Brentano's belief in the role of "descriptive"
psychology-as a central, yes even basic, part of philosophy.
Stumpf, Husserl's "habilitation father", friend and teacher, applied
Brentanian descriptive psychology both in concrete studies (first of
all on the psychology of audition, Tonpsychologie) and in exper-
imental work. He also developed theories of parts and wholes, in-
fluencing later studies in formal ontology, such as Husserl's ideas on
"dependence" as the basis for the notion of Wesen or essence. A tes-
timony of Stumpfs importance for Husserl is the fact that Husserl
dedicated the Logical Investigation to him.
Meinong had numerous contacts with Husserl, and also to some
extent competed with him for the "author's right" to the general
24 Twardowski's first name is often rendered in its German form Kasimir.

HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI 23
theory of objects - which, however, in the Brentanist group, perhaps

rather should belong to a third person, namely Twardowski. Meinong
is also a link to British philosophy of mind and philosophy of lan-
guage through Russell's and Stout's25 intermediation.
Marty was primary working on the philosophy of language - on
the basis of the Brentanian descriptive psychology, but also in con-
tact with the intense work in the comparative empirical theory of lan-
guage and grammar which was being developed in Germany at the
time. His theory of the functions of "names", ("autosemantica") and
"synsemantica" associated to both earlier theory of language and
general grammar and to Mill's theory of meaning. The function of
names was the basis for Twardowski's theory of content of object.
Marty's influence is cleady perceivable in Hussed's first and fourth
Logical Investigations but also determinant for the later versions of
phenomenology. 26
Balzano
Two features in the philosophical work of Bernard Bolzano had

decisive influence on Hussed's development.
1. Bolzano' s notions of "Vorstellungen-an-sich" and related con-
cepts gave a framework and new motivation to Hussed's insistence
on the "ideal" character of logical theories, objects and "laws". Bol-
zano, like Brentano, was trained in a Scholastic tradition of the
Catholic church. This tradition was gradually being revived in the
middle of the 19th century, i.a. by the work ofPrantf7 who made me-
dievallogic more known.
2. Bolzano's insistence on philosophy (logic) as a "Wissenschafts-
lehre", in a Leibnizian tradition as the "mathesis universalis" or a
25 Cf. v d Schaar 1991.
26 Cf. foot-notes 202 and 265 on Landgrebe's book on Marty, and the links to
Buhler and Wittgenstein and the speech act theory.
27 Prantl's magistral work on the history oflogic 1855 was widely used as a manu-
al in courses of philosophy.
"theory of theories" in Husserl's words in the Logical Investigations,

was clearly shared by Husserl in all his philosophical periods,
irrespective of what version of phenomenology he was developing.
Husserl and other students of Brentano were introduced to
Bolzano's "Paradoxien des Unendlichen", but Husserl does not seem
to have studied closely Bolzano's main work before 1894, when he
read Twardowski's work, which contains extensive polemics against
Bolzano. 28 Twardowski himself seems to have been introduced to the
Wissenschaftslehre by his teacher at the Vienna university Robert
Zimmermann, who was a disciple of Bolzano. Also Benno Kerry
gave much attention to Bolzano's views on "object-less
presentations" in a series of articles developing a doctrine on the
content and object of presentations, which greatly influenced
Twardowski. 29
28 This is a judgement which seems to be confmned by a glance at the frequency

of citation of Bolzano before and after 1894 in HusserI's manuscripts. Twardows-
ki's and HusserI's common disciple Leo Blaustein reports that Twardowski claims
that he directed HusserI's attention to Bolzano's "Wissenschaftslehre".
29 HusserI did not acquire a personal copy of Bolzano's "Wissenschaftslehre" until

some time in the beginning of the 1890s - probably after August 1, 1894, since he
was then awarded the title of professor and his copy carries the signature "Prof
HusserI". References to Bolzano before that time concern scarcely anything but the
theory of infinity.
Kerry's work itself deserves some attention, not least in connection with his
criticism of Frege.
Kerry criticized Frege for confusing content and object of presentations in his
Foundations of Arithmetic and Begriffsschrift. (This criticism may be found in a
series of articles in particular the fourth article in Vol XI p. 249-306, wholly de-
voted to this theme in "Vierteljahrsschrift fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, edited
by Avenarius and Wundt et al; in this regard cf. particularly the fourth article.)
Frege answers to Kerry's criticism may be found in some manuscripts, published
posthumously, but the main content is also included in the essay "Begriff und Ge-
genstand" from 1892 (Frege 1969). It may be not too hazardous an assumption to
regard Frege's adoption of a difference between sense and reference as a develop-
ment of the response to the criticism by Kerry for ignoring the distinction between
content and object.
Twardowski carefully studied and refers in several passages of "Zur Lehre" to
Kerry, though primarily to his second article in Vol X.
Lotze
Another well-known psychologist was Hermann Lotze, the author of

the theory of "local signs" (Lokalzeichen) in psychology, a
building-block for Gestalt theory, worked out by another Brentanist
Christian von Ehrenfels. Lotze separated two levels of description in
psychology, one strictly causal and physiological, dealing with the
functions of the senses, and another, teleological, for the "higher"
functions and meanings, of the mind or consciousness. Lotze was
also inspired by Leibniz and earlier German "mathematical"
psychology (Herbart). Lotze was Frege's teacher.
James
William James 's ,30 Principles of Psychology - read by Husserl in the

beginning of the 1890-ies with great enthusiasm (on the
The criticized standpoint in Frege (related to Bolzano's notion of

"Vorstellung-an-sich" etc.) is that "objective" presentations or "contents" (Inhalte)
- in contrast to subjective presentations - are subdivided into "concepts" (Begriffe)
and "objects" (Gegenstiinde), thus subordinating objects under contents.
Kerry holds the relation between object and content of concepts to be irreduc-
ible, but denies that the notions are dichotomic: i.e. a content of a concept might
well be the object of another content (p. 272), just like the relation of being the fa-
ther of does not exclude that if A is the father of B, B too might be the father of
someone e.g. C. This example might perhaps also explicate some of Twardowski's
intentions in talking about a real but relative difference between content and object
of presentations in general.
Kerry's general stand in the philosophy of mathematics is that mathematics
builds neither upon intuition (Anschauung), as claimed (according to Kerry) by
Kant and Beneke, Lange and other followers of the psychological interpretation of
Kant, nor upon purely logical judgements and concepts as Frege contended. Kerry
holds what he considers to be an intermediary position: mathematics is founded
upon "psychical work" (psychische Arbeit) which is a further operation on intu-
ition. Thus e.g. the judgement 7+5=12 is not to be regarded either as a synthetic
nor an analytic judgement but as a complex of judgements, some of which are syn-
thetic and some analytic (p. 305).
30
The relation between Husserl and James is treated by Richard Stevens, who
recommendation of HusserI's "habilitation father" Carl Stumpf)

made a great impression on Husseri. James' emphasis of the factor of
interest in psychology may be seen as one of the parallels to
intentionality - far into the very heart of rationality: the concept of
truth.
The Neo-Kantians
At least two philosophers from the Neo-Kantian movement should be

cited as significant for Husseri. One is his teacher in Berlin Friedrich
Paulsen, who is considered a proponent of a psychological
interpretation of Kant, the other is Husserl's friend and colleague
Paul Natorp, working on the lines of a "rational psychology",
HusserI's interest in Kant might also have been furthered by the
edition of Kant's work, under the direction of Renno Erdmann,
among others. Erdmann himself outlined a very "liberal" theory of
objects of presentation, which was well known to Twardowski (cf.
Appendix II).
Iso Kern has presented a most thorough examination of HusserI's
relations with Kant and Neo-Kantianism.
Other sources of inspiration

From an older generation first and foremost Leibni~l, should be
emphasized. Leibniz' thought was, from a psychological point of
gives a predominantly thematic and less historical comparison, mostly based on

rather late Husserl-material, such as Krisis or Erfahrung und Urteil, i.e. not from
the period when Husserl took decisive impressions from James directly. It is note-
worthy that Husserl shared Russel/'s appreciation of James in a number of aspects.
Husserl read Russell's chapter on James in "The Analysis of Mind", a copy of
which is preserved in Husserl's personal library kept in Leuven. The parallels be-
tween Husserl and Russell is treated in Jaako Hintikka's article in the Cambridge
Companion to Husserl.
31 Cf. Couturat's letter to Husserl inviting him to a congress in Paris, - Leibniz is

obviously a common source of inspiration to both Husserl and Russell, the idea of
a "mathesis universalis" as a system, mathematically constructed, covering and or-
view mediated to Husserl mainly by Herbart, who stressed the notion

of "force" as more fundamental than that of motion, (the idea of
intentionality is sometimes understood along the lines of a force).
Hurne, for whom Husserl demonstrates a sometimes surprising
veneration, in view of their generally divergent attitudes, remained
for many years a companion and a kind of test of the tenability of
Husserl's own ideas.
Schopenhauer's ''voluntaristic32 " account of the "Satz vom
Grunde" - Husserl's "primal" philosophical experience - could also
be said to be another way of expressing the "directedness" or
"vectoriality" of the mind as its cardinal "principle of rationality".
3.2 HUSSERL'S ABANDONMENT OF PSYCHOLOGISM
Husserl's criticism of psychologism in logic had a rather long period

of maturation before it was published. In this process he was
influenced by several other philosophers. The best known of these is,
thanks to the work of FellesdaP3, no doubt Frege, who criticized
Husserl's own "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891), in a review
published in 1894, for being precisely psychologistic (though Frege
did not employ the term).
Fellesdal's suggestion has later been challenged by, among others,
J.T. Mohanty, who has pointed to texts by Husserl, published before
Frege's review, which clearly display anti-psychologistic stand-
points. Texts published from Husserl's Nachlass after Fellesdal's dis-
sertation confirm this impression. Also Husserl's own statements on
philosophers, who he himself recognizes as sources of inspiration,
dering all human knowledge being a leading thought of both thinkers. Lambert,
who may have been one of the first to use the term phenomenology shares Leibniz
idea of ordering all knowledge into a system, a ''New Organon".
32 Schopenhauer or voluntarism reenters Husserl's philosophy at a very late stage:

in texts from the beginning of the 1930s Husserl sketches a project to reformulate
phenomenology along ''voluntaristic'' lines. F. Paulsen was the one who suggested
the term ''voluntarism''. Cf. Tatarkiewicz 1993 vol. III p. 180.
33 Fellesdall958.
28 HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKl
tend to reduce Frege's role: while Bolzano, Lotze, Brentano, Scho-

penhauer and James are all mentioned, Frege is not given any par-
ticular attention, although HusserI expresses great respect for him in
other contexts. From the correspondence between HusserI and
Frege34 we know that the contacts between the two thinkers were not
confined to the review, but extended, although sporadically, over a
period of 15 years (1891-1906). Thus, already in 1891, in a letter to
HusserI, Frege described the main features of his meaning theory,
and Frege's articles between 1891 and 1894 are likely to have been
read by HusserI, just as Frege had read other material by HusserI -
e.g. HusserI's review of Schroder's work in 1891 (See Frege 1976).
Without questioning the philosophers cited as sources of inspira-
tion for HusserI's early development, this study will focus on the role
of Twardowski in this development. This role may be characterized
as - choosing HusserI's own words rather than the word 'inspiration'
- giving rise to a reaction.
3.3 HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI
The attention to the relationship between HusserI and Twardowski is

mainly linked to the circumstance that HusserI's abandonment of
psychologism, in some crucial respects in the period before 1900,
represents a reaction to theories presented by Twardowski. Moreover,
HusserI's later, more general, argument against psychologism in
epistemology seems, in at least one important aspect, viz. the idea of
a general theory of objects, i.e. a formal ontology, to be dependent on
theories developed by Twardowski, HusserI's unwillingness to
acknowledge such indebtedness taken into account. The growth of
attention to Twardowski's role in contemporary studies of the origins
and content of HusserIian phenomenolo~5. confirms the
appropriateness of an examination of the relation between HusserI
and Twardowski focussed on the issue of psychologism in
34 Frege 1976 and -Husserl: Briefwechsel Vol VI pp. 107-118.
3S Schuhmann (Schuhmann 1993) may be cited as one who has contributed to this
aspect ofHusserl's development.
philosophy. Actually, Twardowski's work might even be described

as having a "triggering" effect, both for the development of Husserl's
first version of phenomenology, centered around the criticism of
psychologism in philosophy, and for the second stage of Husserl's
phenomenology, that is "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology.
Twardowski in his own right deserves attention for his role in the
Brentanist circle, but his reputation builds primarily upon his posi-
tion as the father of modem Polish philosophy.
The philosophical text material in which Husserl confronts Twar-
dowski is rather restricted. In the works published by Husserl during
his lifetime it consists of some remarks in the Logical Investigations,
and also in a passage in Ideen I (see Appendix I). A better view of
their philosophical encounter is, however, gained by looking at Hus-
serl's Nachlass, edited in the Husserliana series and in the letters. The
most important part of the relevant edited Nachlass is found in
Vol.XXII of the Husserliana series, edited and introduced by Bernard
Rang (Aufsatze und Rezensionen 1890-1910), where two texts di-
rectly relating to Husserl's reaction to Twardowski's work are pub-
lished. A more complete version of the same material has been
reedited by Karl Schuhmann in Brentano Studies Vol 3 (1990/91).
Cf. that edition and Annex I for a technical comment to the texts.
The principal text is given, by the editor of Husserliana XXII, the
title "Intentionale Gegenstiinde", though the entire manuscript is la-
belled "Vorstellung und Gegenstand" - it is referred to by Husserl
himself, in correspondence with the Neo-Kantian philosopher Paul
Natorp, as a reaction to Twardowski (as well as in a letter to Mei-
nong dated April 5, 1902).
The other text is a draft review of Twardowski's work "Zur Lehre
vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen" (1894), sent to Na-
torp for publication in the periodical "Archiv flir systematische Philo-
sophie", the editor of which was Natorp. The review was sent to
Natorp in 1897, but since Natorp himself had already prepared a
short review, he returned Husserl's text with the proposal to write a
more extensive critical "Abhandlung" instead. Both philosophers
were convinced that the book merited more detailed consideration.
Husserl replied that he was already preparing such a larger work - no
doubt he was referring to what was to become the Logical

Investigations.
Some consideration will be paid in this study to Husserl's review
of Twardowski, as well as the comments offered in the Logical In-
vestigations and Ideas I. However, the texts on "intentional objects"
contain the most complete discussion of Twardowski's views and
will therefore be in focus when the relations between the philoso-
phers are discussed. These texts indicate that an understanding of the
main parts of Twardowski's work turns out to be essential for the un-
derstanding of the construction of phenomenology, in particular the
phenomenological criticism of psychologism in its different phases.
This theme is the main topic of Husserl' s criticism of Twardowski.
Husserl declares Twardowski's lack of a clear distinction between
subjective (psychological) meaning and objective meaning to be
Twardowski's "principal mistake,,36.
In addition to its role in the history of phenomenology, the con-
frontation between Husserl and Twardowski over psychologism in
philosophy also contributes to a better understanding of some of the
roots common to phenomenology and what is today labelled analyti-
cal philosophy.37. An attention to Twardowski's work thus also
serves the function of bridging the gap between these two traditions.
Husserl's classification of his work on Twardowski's book as a
reaction, which means a largely critical attitude, should not conceal
some notable convergences of views, also in a perspective extending
beyond Husserl's first reading of and comments on "Zur Lehre". One
clear sign of this is Husserl's letter to Twardowski of December 5,
1905 - in the turmoil of the creative crisis which ended up in Hus-
serl's proposal for a new "pure" phenomenology - in which he ex-
presses a wish to know Twardowski better.
36 Hua XXII p. 349, foot-note.
37 This study may also contribute to the general promotion of knowledge of Aus-
trian philosophy, and thus be a response to the invitation extended by Rudolf Hal-
ler in his introduction to the new edition of Twardowski's "Zur Lehre". A study of
the origins of analytical philosophy which deliberately aims at looking into the
common background of problems of phenomenology and Frege's philosophy of
language is Michael Dummett's (Dummett 1993).
An examination of the relations of the two philosophers on the ba-

sis of the texts available shows that - as will be treated in some detail
below - Husser!' s reaction to Twardowski does not do full justice to,
or even correctly interpret, all Twardowski's views. This circum-
stance might have a parallell in the personal relations between Hus-
ser! and Twardowski. Though both being disciples of Brentano, they
only spent the study year 1885/86, when Twardowski was a beginner
in philosophy, together as students in Vienna. They did not know
each other well, as shown by the above-mentioned letter. Later Hus-
ser! seems to have developed a rather cold, if not even hostile, atti-
tude to Twardowski, as manifested in correspondence between
Husser! and Roman Ingarden. Ingarden fulfilled his doctoral studies
for Husser! in Gottingen, but submitted his "Habilitation" - at least
formally-for Twardowski in Lwow. 38
Also Kazimierz 4jdukiewicz, Twardowski's disciple, son-in-law
and successor in Lwow spent some time with Husser! at Gottingen,
but did not develop a sympathy for phenomenology as such. This
seems, however, to have been the case with Twardowski's younger
disciple Leo Blaustein, who, having spent one year with Husserl in
Freiburg, wrote a thesis on Husser!, relating to Twardowski's own
initial theory of act, content and object ofpresentations39 •
But let us now tum to Twardowski himself.
38 There is a series of letters from the summer 1928 when Ingarden tried to acquire
a post at the Lw6w university. HusserI, it seems with some reluctance, writes a let-
ter of recommendation to Twardowski, and in another letter from HusserI to Twar-
dowski - August 17, 1928 - he also dispatches the never published review of
Twardowski's habilitation work. In a letter to Ingarden from December 23 he com-
plains that he does not get the "manuscript" back and warns Ingarden to trust
Twardowski. Later he somewhat retires from this very critical position, but repeats
that he has the impression that Twardowski is hostile to phenomenology. Schuh-
mann has given this conflict some treatment.
39 Blaustein 1928.
3.4 KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI: LIFE AND CAREER
Kazimierz Twardowski was born 1866 in Vienna, the son of Polish

parents belonging to the nobility. He was educated in Vienna, at its
famous Gymnasium Theresianum and later passed over to the
University of Vienna. One of the philosophy teachers at Theresianum
(although Twardowski does not seem to have followed his courses,
see B. Smith 1988 p. 2) and a later friend was Alois Hofler, who
wrote a book on logic together with Meinong, but who was also one
of the editors of Bolzano's "Wissenschaftslehre".40 As already
mentioned, his teachers at the Vienna university were Franz Brentano
and Robert Zimmermann, among others. After studies at the
University of Vienna 1885-89 Twardowski was given the
opportunity to spend some time in Leipzig and Munich, studying
psychology at the laboratories of Wundt and Stumpf. Back in Vienna
he wrote a short doctoral dissertation under the title "Idee und
Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes"
(1891). He was awarded the degree of "Dozent" on the basis of the
"Habilitationsschrift" "Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der
Vorstellungen" in 1894. After a short period of work in an insurance
company he was in 1895 offered a professorship in Lw6w (in
German: Lemberg), then the administrative capital of the Austrian
part of (the still divided) Poland.
From his chair in Lw6w, Twardowski threw himself into a pains-
taking work of building up philosophical education and research in
Poland, in the Polish language. He exerted a dominating influence
also after the restoration of an independent Polish state. He is often
given the name "father of Polish philosophy" and is considered the
founder of the so-called Lw6w-Warsaw school of logic and
philosophy, members of which were i.a. Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski,
Ajdukiewicz, and also Tarski, to name but a few. 41
40 Volume I in 1914, when the edition was interrupted by Hofler's death and only
fInished 15 year later.
41A history of this school, though perhaps extended somewhat beyond what is
commonly regarded as its limits to include also philosophers who would not nor-
mally be regarded as "analytical" philosophers, is given in Wolenski 1989. See
Twardowski's philosophical publications after his transfer to

Lwow were scarce - most of them are contained in one volume,
edited at the centenary of his birth.42 Apart from the two dissertations
mentioned, there is one major publication and a smaller article from
the 1890s, as well as an essay from 1912. The major work is an essay
on "Images and Concepts" from 1898 (0 wyobrazeniach i poj~ciach,
summarized in German in a lecture given under the title "Uber be-
griffliche Vorstellungen" in Vienna in 1902) from 1898 and an ar-
ticle on the relations between psychology, physiology and
philosophy from 1897. Of his later publications, the essay "On
Functions and Products" (0 czynnos'ciach i wytworach - he also
gave a German title to the essay: Ober Funktionen und Gebilde) from
191243 is his most - and perhaps only - original philosophical work.
Twardowski taught in Lwow until 1930 and died there 1938, just
two months before Husserl. Twardowski left a rich philosophical
Nachlass, consisting mostly of lecture manuscripts, but also a great
number of letters etc. After the Second World War the principal part
of his manuscripts were brought from Lwow (then in the Soviet
Union) to Warsaw, where they are kept in the library of the philo-
sophical institute of the university. A minor part of the manuscripts
are still in the possession of the Library of the State University of
Lviv in the Ukraine. 44 A few of his lecture manuscripts were edited
later. Except for his first two works, his publications were written in
Polish. His lectures from 1894-5 in Vienna were held in German, but
also Coniglione 1993 for articles celebrating the revival of this school. A publica-
tion containing the contributions to the centenary of Twardowski's inauguration
lecture celebrated in Lviv and Warsaw in November 1995 is under preparation.
42Twardowski 1965, referred to as WPF. This volume also contains a meticulous

bibliography.
An abbreviated translation is available in the volume of texts from the Lw6w-

43
Warsaw school edited in Pelc.1979.
44 See Appendix III. The most interesting of the texts kept in Lviv seems to be the
installation lecture of Twardowski in November, 1895 on his arrival to take up his
chair in Lw6w. It is partly published in a Russian translation in Vemikov 1977.
The complete Polish text was published in Principia Tom VIII-IX.
as from the inauguration lecture in 1895 everything was held in Pol-

ish. A list of Twardowski's Nachlass is given in Appendix III to this
study. In addition to philosophical and other texts intended for publi-
cations Twardowski wrote, every day of his adult life, some lines in a
diary, a copy of which is available in the University Library in
Warsaw.
Twardowski's most original published work was undoubtedly the
"Habilitationsschrift", which is available both in an English transla-
tion (introduced and translated by Reinhardt Grossmann) and in a
German facsimile edition (introduced by Rudolf Haller).
Although Twardowski's habilitation thesis and main work was
greeted as highly clarifying and gave him a professorship in Lwow at
the age of 29, Twardowski did not count among the first rank phi-
losophers in the Brentano school. Gradually his relations with other
philosophers of this school weakened. Appreciation of his work has,
as indicated above, only much later been expressed outside Poland,
notably among those who take an interest in the early stages of phe-
nomenology and its precursors.45
3.5 TWARDOWSKI AND PSYCHOLOGISM
In order to sustain the claim that Twardowski had a triggering

influence on HusserI's rejection of psychologism, in the sense of
providing material for HusserI's reaction, one should be able to show
that Twardowski's main work, "Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und
Gegenstand der Vorstellungen" is representative of psychologism. As
will be clarified in later chapters this issue is considerably more
complicated than it might seem at first sight.
Complications already tum up if we relate to what has been said
about the motives for psychologism, since Twardowski, already be-
fore denouncing psychologism (e.g. in an article entitled "On the so-
45 Among those who may be mentioned are Smith-MacIntyre, Twardowski's trans-

lator into English Reinhardt Grossmann, Haller, Mohanty, Barry Smith, Kevin
Mulligan, U. Drummond and, more recently, Karl Schuhmann. cr. Bibliography.
called relative truths" in 1900), always fought against the relativity of

truth and scepticism in different forms.
The general impression of Twardowski's work is certainly a con-
structive and positive one.46 Generally speaking, - both Brentano and
Twardowski felt themselves to be truly Aristotelian.
As already noted, particular care should be taken if Husserl's texts
are used as a starting point for interpretation, rather than Twardows-
ki's own work47 • Also a part of his later production - bearing in
mind that Twardowski himself explicitly changed his view on
psychologism will have to be taken into account.
Three preliminary reasons for this caution could be given.
First, the term psychologism was not commonly used - although
it did exist - when HusserI read Twardowski, and still was not when
Frege, a few months later, published his review of HusserI's
"Philosophie der Arithmetik".
Second, Twardowski's position, criticized by HusserI in the un-
punblished review of Twardowski's book, is not in itself easy to
characterize in a simple way, as will emerge from this study. Basical-
ly Twardowski's psychologism should be understood only in close
connection with his general theory of objects, i.e. in an ontological
context, (though this should not necessarily be taken in the sense of
an "ontological psychologism" as suggested by Wolenski).
Third, although Twardowski, in the above-mentioned article from
1897, explicitly declares himself an adherent of psychologism (WFP
106), he contrasts this designation with "metaphysicism" - and
makes it rather a question of using psychology, taken in a very wide
sense, as the basic method of philosophy rather than a method based
on metaphysical doctrines of the kind supplied by German idealism.
It should be remembered that the term psychologism, before
46 Reminding one of the roots of the word "positivism" which, incidentally, is still
sometimes used by non-philosophers as designating a generally positive attitude to
life.
47In some texts dealing with the relationship between Husserl and Twardowski- it
seems that Husserl's interpretation of Twardowski is accepted somewhat
uncritically.
This applies for example to some of Schuhmann's texts.
HusserI's attack in the Logical Investigations, had rather descriptive

content and not, as may have been the case at the time after HusserI's
criticism, mostly devaluative connotations. This is illustrated in e.g.
HusserI's review ofa work by Theodor Elsenhans, who himself will-
ingly adopted this label for his views (Hua XXII p. 203).
Twardowski's psychologism, in the texts written before his
change of view in 190248 , is thus primarily a methodological thesis.
Philosophy should use, as its basic method, a specific kind of reflec-
tion on the human consciousness, termed in the Brentano tradition
"inner perception". This kind of special reflective perception was
only possible in regard to the psychic phenomena, towards which the
mind was directed, in other psychic acts. In the above-mentioned ar-
ticle from 1897, Twardowski is careful to distinguish psychology
both from traditional philosophical disciplines like epistemology and
metaphysics and from physiology. He claimed, with the other
Brentanists, that psychology, having inner perception as its basic
method, was a necessary and basic method in philosophy as a whole,
and as such should be regarded as a philosophical discipline. Further-
more, it is the fundamental one, since it offered the only philosoph-
ical method which was based on facts, or experience but still
produced results that were certain (evident). Now, the latter circum-
stance also means that this kind of psychology - though philosoph-
ical - was to be regarded as empirical, or dealing with "phenomena"
- in contradistinction to a "rational psychology", based on certain
metaphysical axioms (WPF 93).
The problem of psychologism, however, reappears also in this
form, at least if we accept HusserI's distinctions between different
understandings of the notions of consciousness and intentional acts.
The empirical character is not, to HusserI, eliminated by the claim
that the inner perception results in certainty.
Twardowski's interest, in "Zur Lehre" and other early works, was
primarily directed towards the particular category of psychic phe-
nomena regarded as basic to all other psychic phenomena, viz.
48 Twardowski's change of view is documented in his own texts; e.g. in a text from
1913 (WPF 271) but also earlier in a text from 1903, referred to in a foot-note by
the editor of his selected philosophical works (WPF 107).
presentations (Vorstellungen). The other kinds - according to the

classification proposed by Brentano - of psychic phenomena were
judgements and emotions. In its main features this classification is ac-
cepted by Twardowski,.
In the course of the examination of the specific theories suggested
by Twardowski on the nature of presentations the issue however
turns out to be more complicated. This is connected to, on the one
hand questions regarding the status and functions of presentations, or
components of presentations, and on the other the introduction of an
apparatus, in "Zur Lehre", closer to traditional metaphysics rather
than to empirical research into the human mind or behaviour.
Still, summing up, Twardowski could be said to represent
psychologism in the sense indicated by Husserl in the Logical Inves-
tigations, precisely because of his insistence on the empirical nature
of the investigations of psychic phenomena undertaken. Whether that
concept of empirical - which primarily included introspective meth-
ods and "inner perception" - would be accepted as such by psycholo-
gists today is another issue. It certainly was not so, even by all
psychologists of Twardowski's own days, as is clearly reflected in
Twardowski's own survey of current trends in psychology in 1897.
By and large it might be maintained that Twardowski introduces
his central distinction between act, content and object of presenta-
tions to avoid some of the pitfalls of psychologism.
After the publication of the Logical Investigations, and (according
to Ingarden) under the influence of it (although Twardowski's disci-
ple Lukasiewicz is likely also to have been instrumental in this re-
spect), Twardowski rejected psychologism, at least in logic, around
1902. Later he suggested a new theory aimed at replacing his earlier
psychologistic view, without accepting a Husserlian phenomenology
based on "ideal laws" and essences. The essay "On Functions and
Products" from 1912 represents an attempt to develop a more lin-
guistical and action-theoretical alternative to psychologism. Instead
of presentations Twardowski prefers to talk about psychic functions
or actions (activities), and instead of content he suggests a general
theory of products, including a specific theory of psychic products.
He specifies the mistake of psychologism as confusing properties of
psychic actions with properties of psychic products. 49
Twardowski was at least in two important respects a more faithful

disciple of Brentano than Husserl.
1. Brentano's "empiricism" and "anti-Platonism" found an advo-
cate in Twardowski but evidently not in Husserl. 50
2. Twardowski's later views, and more distinctly those of most of
his followers in the Lwow-Warsaw school, approached those of Ber-
trand Russell or the Vienna Circle. The school itself is, by its histo-
riographers Skolimowski and Wolenski, classified as "analytic".51
Twardowski himself, as is described by Elzbieta Paczkowska
Lagowska, did not, however, after his acceptance of "anti-psycholo-
gism", go as far as his more logically oriented disciples. Even after
his official rejection of ("ontological") psychologism in logic, he
maintained that the objects of logic, as well as those of the human
49 A treatment of Twardowski's later standpoint, particularly in relation to some

Husserlian meaning-theoretical themes has been given by Hanna Buczynska-Gare-
wicz (see Bibliography).
50 The issues ofBrentano's empiricism and anti-Platonism are extremely compli-

cated, and the Brentano-interpreters disagree.
The controversies are well illustrated in Oskar Kraus' edition of the
"Psychologie" from 1924. Kraus claims that it is evident that Brentano did not rep-
resent an empiricist standpoint, since much of the contents of descriptive psycholo-
gy is a priori -"non-inductive", and thus does not deal with facts. (p. LX).
Furthermore Kraus claims - supported by a long letter from Brentano himself,
quoted in the introduction - that Brentano did not until later develop an anti-
Platonism, which would imply that only objects that are "things" exist in some
sense. It is also clear that Brentano rejected both Husserl's and Meinong's theories
of general objects, although he at the same time claimed to have "copyright" to the
very idea of "ideal content" - or in Meinong's terminology "Objektive" (Ibid. p.
XLVI). What is clear is the fact that Brentano did develop an anti-Platonism of a
radical kind, considering all entia rationis as some kind ofjictions. As for Brenta-
no's empiricism, Husserl takes great pain to explain - as from the Seefeld lectures
in 1905 - why he could not accept the idea that Brentano's descriptive psychology
leaves room for a priori or apodictic certainty, thus making it a kind of empiricism.
51Cf. Wolenski 1989 pp. 313 and 317 and Skolimowski 1967 p. 55. Both authors
agree however that the label "analytic" does not fit Twardowski's own work. The
centenary of Twardowski's first lecture in Lw6w was, however, clearly marked by
an understanding of the Lw6w-Warsaw school as analytic.
sciences, were psychical as to their origin, or, as termed in the 1912

essay, products of the mind, i.e. not entirely "independent".
The notions ofpsychology, empirical psychology and philosophy
When Twardowski termed "Zur Lehre" a psychological investigation

he situated himself in the dominant tradition of philosophers of his
time, dealing with what would today be called philosophy of mind,
logic, epistemology, philosophy of language or philosophical
grammar or even philosophical psychology - but rarely just
"psychology". To regard psychology as part of philosophy was not as
such controversial- although there had been sharp controversies over
proposals (such as Fries' and Beneke's) to interpret e.g. Kant's
doctrine of categories as a doctrine concerning the processes of the
human mind. A distinction between rational and empirical
psychology was used by Husserl's friend and colleague the
Neo-Kantian Natorp, who wrote a magistral work on rational
psychology at about the same time as Husserl wrote his Ideas.
Twardowski, who termed his first dissertation on Descartes as
"epistemological", does not give any reasons for the choice of
terminology in the habilitation thesis.
Although the field denoted as psychology thus was much wider
than what is commonly accepted today, the group of philosophers re-
ferred to aspired to base philosophy on a kind of psychology which
they termed empirical psychology, in distinction to "rational"
psychology of the Neo-Kantian sort.
In his article on the relations between psychology, philosophy and
physiology mentioned above Twardowski refers to Beneke and Fries,
who saw themselves as the true followers of Kant, denouncing the
metaphysically oriented German idealists. An early representative of
a "rational" psychological tendency was Herbart with his
"mathematical" psychology.
John Stuart Mill's radical revival of empiricism inspired most of
what might be termed the psychologistic school of the 19th century.
Also Brentano, who, despite a very different background in the Scho-
lastic tradition, was deeply impressed by Mill - he considered
himself highly indebted to Mill, with whom he corresponded direct-

ly. Also another of the inspirers of Husserl, William James, exalted
Mill as a great inspirer of his own "radical empiricism" (cf. the de-
dication to Mill in James' "Pragmatism"). Twardowski's "Zur Lehre"
contains some rather important ideas taken over from Mill - in fact
theses that, paradoxically, add to the reservations towards classifying
Twardowski in a simple manner under the empiricist psychologistic
tradition.
The empiricist revival in John Stuart Mill had its source mainly in
the impressive development of sensory physiology and experimental
psychology, beginning early in the 19th century - Mill's father was
himself active in this field. This does not, with some exceptions
(notably Auguste Comte), imply that the experimental and/or physio-
logical point of view as a psychological method was the only one ac-
cepted. Neither John Stuart Mill, nor Brentano did themselves offer
any contributions to psychology in this sense. Their method must be,
from a contemporary point of view, regarded as highly
"armchair-oriented". Self-observation or self-perception was general-
ly accepted as a scientifically valid method of gathering empirical
facts. Indeed, as insisted by Twardowski, a sharp distinction was
upheld between empirical and experimental psychology. Experimen-
tal psychology was not to him the kind of psychology that was basic
to philosophy.
A number of important researchers made however contributions
both to experimental psychology and to philosophical disciplines,
such as logic and epistemology but also metaphysics. The most im-
portant of these is probably Wilhelm Wundt, whose magistral work
on logic exerted a major influence on Twardowski.. Stumpfhas also
been mentioned.
Another was Herman Lotze, whose already cited (p. 23) systematic
methodological pluralism could be seen as an extension and separa-
tion of the role of introspection or self-observation, thereby, howev-
er, also paving the way for a radically divergent view on the relation
between psychology and philosophy.
Historically, the controversy on psychologism was primarily re-
lated to logic, albeit logic in a fairly wide sense, often taken to in-
clude a "theory of theories" on the pattern of Bolzano's
Wissenschaftslehre - as in Husserl's Prolegomena. The works on

logic by Mill, Sigwart, Wundt, Benno Erdmann, to cite but a few of
the numerous writers52 included among the psychologistic logicians,
were prime targets of attack for both Husserl and Frege53
Twardowski's work however, and Husserl's reaction to it, widens
the scope of the debate to the general philosophy of mind, ontology
and meta-philosophy. This extension comes to the fore in Husserl's
successive broadening of his reflection on psychologism. Husserl, re-
suming the more formal discussion on parts and wholes of the third
Logical Investigation, goes into a general theory of objects in lectures
delivered between 1906 and 1908 (Hua Vols. II "Die Idee der Phano-
menologie", XXIV "Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"
and XXVI "Bedeutungslehre"). On the other hand, trying to find an
overview of recent production on the theme of psychologism (e.g.
with the help of the "Philosophers' Index") one generally finds that
the more narrow scope prevails, i.e. psychologism in relation to logic
- although often logic seen as the "theory of theories in general".
It is a well-known fact that, in first edition of the Logical Inves-
tigations, Husserl was not yet prepared to reject psychology, in the
"descriptive" shape it had been given by Brentano, as the true philo-
sophical method. He accepted descriptive psychology as equivalent
to phenomenology - obviously not considering that this kind of
psychology constituted any danger of the kind treated in the
"Prolegomena". This standpoint was also criticized by colleagues of
Husserl. 54 Only when Husserl came to the conclusion that descriptive
psychology in its Brentanian version (and that of Stumpf) had an em-
pirical character, did he abandon it as a philosophical method. De-
spite Husserl's great admiration for Brentano, he could not,
accordingly, avoid implicitly including him among those who, in a
52 See Kusch 1995 for a more complete reference.
53 Cf. e.g. "Prolegomena" chapters. 5 and 7, which are devoted to a critical ex-
amination of among others Mill, Sigwart and Erdmann.
54 See e.g. Wundt's polemics with Husserl in "Kleine Schriften". Also Husserl's
reply to critics in the second edition of the Logical Investigations - and e.g. also
the lectures from 1906-07 (Hua XXIV 201).
deeper sense, by their "psychologism" made philosophical reflection

an impossibility.
The difference between Brentano's descriptive psychology and
Husserl's version, in the first edition of the Logical Investigations,
hinges upon Husserl's emphasis of the "ideal unity of the species" (=
part of the title of the second Investigation). The rejection of nomi-
nalism on the one hand55 , and the study of the "ideal content", or of
the essence of acts, on the other hand, emerge as the heart of phe-
nomenological method. After the introduction of "pure" or transcen-
dental phenomenology Husserl did not consider the investigation into
the ideal contents of "presentations" as psychology at all, not even in
the descriptive sense, though it nevertheless should be seen as a de-
velopment of that kind of research. 56
The notion of "content", central to Husserl's rejection of psychol-
ogism, is however only one side of the coin. The other is the notion
of "object" - or rather the German equivalent "Gegenstand" (which
is commonly used synonymously with "Objekt"). These are precisely
the two notions which Twardowski undertakes to clarify. The general
theory of objects, suggested by Erdmann, Twardowski and Meinong
(who is the one usually given credit for creating the theory), is as
much part of the issue of psychologism as the problem of the status
of content (ideal and real). This complicates any use - such as in
Wole£ski - of the term "ontological psychologism". A general theory
of objects also plays a vital role for Husserl, both with respect to
some of the theses of the Logical Investigations on essence and ideal-
ity (the theory of parts and wholes in Investigation III), but more im-
portantly in the construction of the theory of "reduction" of real
objects (ultimately: the world), constituting transcendental phenome-
nology. Only if the notion of object is not tied exclusively to that of
reality is it possible to develop the kind of "formal ontology" on
which Husserl's idea ofa "pure" phenomenology rests.
SS A general tendency to link nominalism to psychologism is observed by Tatar-

kiewicz, from Ockham and onwards. Cf. Tatarkiewicz 1993 Vol.!. pp. 298-9.
S6 See the Introduction to the second edition of the Logical Investigations.

CHAPTER 4
THE RESURGENCE OF ONTOLOGY:

OBJECTS OF PRESENTATIONS
In this chapter Twardowski's doctrine on acts, objects and contents

of presentations will be introduced in the following three steps, pre-
paring for the discussion of the themes of the controversy between
HusserI and Twardowski.
I. The idea of a synthesis between the objects of psychology and a
theory of objects in general, a formal ontology.
2. The Brentanian classification of mental (psychical) phenomena
and the consequences drawn by Twardowski.
3. Twardowski's theory of acts, contents and objects of presen-
tations
This section will be subdivided into an introduction of the theory
of objects on one hand and the theory of contents on the other.
The final section of this chapter is an excursus into some of the
notions of the classification of the relationships between the notions
of existence and essence, two concepts involved in the medieval de-
bates on the status of universals. This section is included in view of
the role which the dispute on universals plays in psychologism and
the central function which notions like "ideality" and "essence"
(Wesen) play in HusserI's criticism of this tendency.
4.1 PSYCHOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY: THE IDEA OF A

SYNTHESIS
Content and object, the two concepts to which Twardowski devotes
his "Habilitationsschrift" also stand in the focus of an examination of
the confrontation between HusserI and Twardowski. Both those no-
tions are, in different ways, tied to the issue of psychologism,
Though the notion of content might occupy a more central position in
43
44 OBJECTS OF PRESENTATIONS
HusserI's reaction to Twardowski's main work, the theory of object

(Gegenstand) is the one to which Twardowski contributed more
constructively. In Twardowski's main proposal for a solution of the
problem he faced, however, both concepts play an equal role,
depending on each other.
Brentano's doctrine of the intentionality of psychic phenomena
states that all psychic phenomena are characterized by the
"intentional inexistence or the relation to something as an object".57
Brentano did not himself go into details on the explanation of the
meaning of the term "object". This notion, however, was, as
mentioned above, quite closely studied by Brentano's contemporary
the Neo-Kantian Benno Erdmann, who developed a rich theory of
objects in his Logik,58 Twardowski was impressed by Erdmann's
attempt and elaborated into a new theory of objects (of
presentations), by above all making two extensions to Erdmann's
theories:
1) He tried to link the general theory of objects with earlier
philosophy, first of all Aristotle's first philosophy or philosophy of
being in general, or metaphysics, but also medieval theories on being,
(ens, essentia and existentia) in above all Aquinas and Suarez as
well as the first systematic ontological constructions by Christian
Wolff. In many respects Twardowski is the first philosopher in the
post-Kantian era who tries systematically to develop an ontology. 59
57 E.g. as expressed in the Psychologie p. 136 :

" ... underscheidende Eigentiimlichkeit alier psychicher Phiinomene die intentio-
nale Inexistenz, die Beziehung auf etwas als Objekt" .
58 For an overview of the hierarchy of objects contained in this theory, see the ta-
ble reproduced as Appendix II.
59 According to Gilson, cf. Gilson 1962 p. 171, foot-note 1, the fIrst to use the
term ontology - which thus is a comparably modem term - was a Cartesian named
Clauberg (1622-1665) in a work from 1647. The term is also used in Leibniz'
"Opuscules" edited by Couturat in 1903. As mentioned Couturat's work on Leib-
niz was of crucial importance for Russell's work in developing a "characteristica
universalis" in the Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica. Wolffis
otherwise the philosopher who in the 18th century made the term universally
known, and even, after Kant, infamous. The relations between Twardowski's and
OBJECTS OF PRESENTATIONS 45
2) In this work he laid particular emphasis on a theory of wholes

and parts of objects (a mereology, to borrow a term from Twardows-
ki's disciple Lesniewski), which builds upon ideas from Brentano60,
Stumpf and Meinong, but also constitutes an original attempt to ap-
ply an ontological analysis for a solution of some fundamental prob-
lems relating to logic and the philosophy of mind.
Both these features are essential to Twardowski's solution of the
problem of "object-less presentations" - the main theme of the con-
troversy with Husserl- which also occupies a central place in his dis-
tinction between content and object as such. Twardowski elaborated
a theory of object prior to Meinong's better known
"Gegenstandstheorie" (though, as mentioned, inspired by Erdmann's
theory). Husserl claims that his own theory was prior to Meinong's
Meinongs theories of objects and Wolff's ontology has been treated by Roberto
Poli, who points out that already in 1910 Pichler demonstrated a relation between
W oltI and Meinong. Poli argues that there is a direct historical link also from
Wolff to Twardowski, which seems quite plausible.
Erdmann, Twardowski - and Meinong - might be said to represent most radi-
cally the standpoint described by Gilson as ''the liberation of pure ontology from
any commitment to the actually existing being". Gilson sees this as a consequence
of the "essentialisation of existence" performed by Suarez (Gilson 1962 p. 144).
Twardowski seems to be the one of the three who is most consciously associating
back to the Scholastics. Antonelli argues that most of Brentano's followers lacked
his familiarity with Aristotle and medieval philosophy.
As is clear from Zur Lehre - cf. below p. 64 - Twardowski did not himself
hesitate to use the notion of metaphysics and to consider metaphysics as a genuine
branch of philosophy. He did, however, not seem to use only one concept of meta-
physics. In lectures 1894-1895 he sketched a general discipline of "descriptive
metaphysics". This conception of metaphysics was roughly the same as Wundt's:
metaphysics is a comprehensive theory built on the total scientific knowledge, a
scientific outlook on the world "eine wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung" This
view seems to be supplemented by a theory that metaphysics deals with the rela-
tionships between physical and mental phenomena. Twardowski's introductory
lecture in Lwow 1895 is to a large part devoted to the subject of metaphysics as a
scientific discipline. His lecture on the immortality of the soul in 1895 provided a
good example of research within metaphysics thus conceived.
This kind of discipline is, however, rather different from the general theory of
objects presented in Zur Lehre, which Twardowski himself associates to medieval
philosophy.
theory. (Husser! refers to e.g. the mereology contained in Investiga-

tion No 111).61
This resurgence of ontology is linked both to Bolzano's logic and
theory of science and to the general revival of medieval philosophy,
systematically promoted within the Catholic church from the middle
of the 19th century. This revival is reflected in Brentano' s enthusias-
tic reading and lecturing on Aquinas62, an interest which, although it
dwindled considerably in Brentano himself, is still alive in Twar-
dowski's work.63
Quite generally, one might say that Twardowski proposes a recon-
ciliation between a Cartesian tradition, which takes its point of depar-
ture in the subject and its "presentations" or cogitationes, and
another tradition which focuses on "being as such", esse per se. This
reconciliation was performed by using Brentano's doctrine on the in-
tentional inexistence of objects as the characteristic feature of psy-
chic phenomena. The progress of scientific psychology and the view
60 Developed La. in lectures 1890/91, later published as the "Deskriptive

Psychologie" (Brentano 1982).
61 Note in Husserl's manuscript commenting on Meinong and Hofler, (K III 33).

See also footnote 3 in Ideen I (Hua III p. 28).
62 See Brentano's lectures on medieval philosophy (Brentano 1980), given the last
time in 1869. Brentano's reduced interest was due to his break with the Catholic
church after the proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope in 1870. Brentano's
break was concurrent with a remarkable rise of interest in the original texts of the
Scholastics - officially authorized and promoted by a papal encyclical on the sub-
ject ("Aeterni Patris" 1879). Husser/'s use of Scholastic notions is likely to have
more indirect sources - at least today there are no copies left of Scholastic texts in
his personal library in Leuven.
63 Twardowski entertained a rather independent relation to the Catholic church.
and did not practice. Twardowski had however religious interests, clearly ex-
pressed in various publications on Fechner's writings on the soul, and in his lec-
tures on medieval philosophy from 1906. Provided a demarcation is upheld
between religious belief and scientific knowledge there is no problem in religious
convictions. Twardowski's final judgement on medieval philosophy is somewhat
startling: he does not consider that medieval philosophy had anything really new to
offer in the history of philosophy!
of "empirical" psychology as a basic philosophical discipline rein-

forced the central position of inquiry into the mind as such in
philosophy.
4.2 THE CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA AND

THE "IDIOGENICAL" THEORY OF mDGEMENTS
Fundamental to Twardowski's theory of object and to his solution of

the problem of object-less presentations is the classification of
"psychic phenomena" suggested by Brentano (developed in the
"Psychology" chapters 5-9) in "presentations", 'judgements" and
"feelings/volitions". Brentano's classification has many predecessors
and parallels, one of which may be the ontological trinity of the
transcendentalia in many medieval doctrines of being: unum, ver-
urn, bonum. 64 Brentano examines a number of these classifications,
from Plato and onwards, discussing both the principles of distinction
and the distinctions themselves.
Whereas Kant's psychology was based on the triplet of feeling,
volition and knowing Brentano distinguishes between two different
classes of "knowing" (or "theory") and, instead, merges the two Kan-
tian classes of "conation" into the (Aristotelian) comprehensive class
of "orexis" in general. "Praxis" is not seen as a psychic phenomenon
at all. Twardowski, however, does not seem to accept the merger of
feeling and volition, at least in his lectures on psychology 1895-96. 65
Leaving feelings and volitions aside, and adopting a theoretical
point of view, the fundamental distinction for Brentano and his fol-
lowers was the one between presentation and judgement. Brentano
works out his distinction in polemics with most of his predecessors -
including Kant - and also makes the distinction the basis of a whole
new logic, which claims that all "categorical" judgements should be
seen as judgements of existence. This means that sentences contain-
ing verbs could be analyzed as existential judgements, where all the
64 A trinity not devoid of theological assets!
65 Manuscript P.12.l from 1895-6, p. 27.

"descriptive content" of the verb is drained to the adjective, leaving

the existence in its "pure" form. In other words, the only "genuine"
verb for Brentano is the verb "is".66
The use, which Twardowski makes of the Brentanian distinction,
is new. He combines the thesis of the irreducible ("idiogenic,,67) char-
acter of the psychical phenomenon of judgement - most importantly
to the class of presentations - on the one hand, and a theory of object
and content of presentations on the other. Twardowski did not sub-
scribe to the most radical version of Brentano's thesis, viz. that the
question of the existence of an object is always involved in judge-
ment. Instead he adhered to a modified version, in which the princi-
pal function of a judgement is the affirmation or negation of either
the existence of an object or the subsistence of a relation. Those
classes of judgement should accordingly be kept separate. 68
Brentano and Twardowski agree that this irreducibility of the class
of judgements to other kinds of psychical phenomena does not
66 For a treatment of this logical "reform", see (Ulfstedt 1984). Cf. p. 145.
Brentano's disciple Anton Marty objected to this theory. Marty's basic thesis is
the opposite one: the verb is the principal and fundamental ingredient of language,
and thus should not be "reduced" to some predicate. An argument in favour of this
was the frequency of sentences without any grammatical subjects in a number of
languages, such as the Slavonic languages and Latin. Brentano has a polemic with
the eminent Slavist Miklosich on this topic, included in Brentano 1925, as an ap-
pendix to the "Psychologie", though the text was written already in 1883. Twar-
dowski, who was Polish, and Miklosich, who was Slovenian, were aware of this
fact. Of course this dispute was one important piece of the background to the gen-
eral debate, in which Marty was involved, on the "inner form of language". Cf.
Section 5.3.
67 From the Greek "idios" (own) and "genos" (kind). Twardowski's own form "i-
diogenetical" is etymologically incorrect, since we do not have a reference to the
genesis but to the genus. This term was later changed by his disciples in Poland. I
use the corrected form in this study. Twardowski discusses the doctrine in several
of his writings, e.g. in a lecture and a written account of it in 1907 (WPF 198-99).
68 Cf e.g. Twardowski's lectures on logic in Vienna 1894-5, p. 118 in manuscript

P.6:
Wir miissen also daran festhalten, dass die Urteile fiber eine Beziehung eine be-
sondere Classe neben den Urteilen fiber Existenz sind.
depend on the object of the psychical phenomenon examined. A pre-

sentation and a judgement might have the same object but they differ
in their content. And the content of the judgement, Twardowski
agrees with Brentano, is the (affirmation or negation of) existence. 69
For Twardowski the crucial feature in this distinction between pre-
sentations and judgements was the "isolation" of the object of the
presentation from questions of existence. Issues concerning existence
are simply irrelevant for the investigation and description of presen-
tations, notably the objects of presentations.
Twardowski's theory might, however, also be related to Kant.
Whereas Brentano is predominantly critical of Kant, notably of his
classification of psychic phenomena. Twardowski finds no great dif-
ficulties in attaching his own notion of object of presentation with
Kant's notion of "phenomenon". Twardowski may even be said to
exploit the Brentanian idea of separating the class of judgements
from that of presentations for the purpose of establishing a kind of
doctrine with a "transcendental" character, insofar as the range of va-
lidity of his theses apply only to objects of presentation - a sphere
where we are not entitled to pose questions of existence at all, that is
exactly like the sphere of phenomena in the Kantian transcendental
idealism. The idea that the main subject of philosophical inquiry are
conditions which do not govern "things-in--themselves" - might be
compared with the idea of the subject matter of philosophy being first
and foremost the inquiry into objects of presentation. It is difficult to
see it only as mere coincidence that Erdmann, one of those who in-
spired Twardowski's general theory of objects, was also the editor of
Kant's collected works. 70
This - as indicated above - also brings Twardowski's theory close
to Hussed's proposal to found a "pure" or transcendental
69 ZL p. 9. Another related issue in this context, was, historically, the difference

of the objects of "conation" and that of ' 'theory". Brentano accounts for the hesita-
tion in this respect, from Aristotle onwards (Brentano 1925 p. 9).
70 Twardowski also had friendly relations with Hans Vaihinger. the editor of
Kant-Studien, to which he was also invited to contribute on a regular basis by Vai-

hinger. Twardowski did not however seem to entertain closer relations with other
more prominent members of the neo-Kantian school.
phenomenological philosophy, based on the "reduction" of existence,

or withdrawal from the "natural" attitude, which takes existence for
granted.
The idiogenical theory of judgements, moreover, also furnishes a
basis for Twardowski's proposal to construe a theory of objects of
presentation as an ontology, or a theory of being as being, understood
by Twardowski as a theory of the "highest kind", summum genus,
which is what is often called metaphysics71 This feature of the theory
of objects is what leads up to an examination of the theory of being
as a theory of relations between existence and essence, as brought up
in medieval disputes on the "rear' vs. "rational" distinction. between
existence and essence.
Twardowski does not in general, in "Zur Lehre", divide the cate-
gory of presentations into sub-categories - like Kant's distinctions72,
71
Cf. foot-note 59.
72 The Kantian notion of Vorstellung was conceived to replace earlier loose talk
about Ideas (cf. e.g. KRV B 376), and Vorstellung is indicated as a genus in a hier-
archical pattern, which might be depicted by the following scheme:
Vorstellung (repraesentatio)
Perzeption (V. mit Bewusstsein)
Subjektive: Objektive:
Empfindung (sensatio) Erkenntnis (cognitio)
Anschauung(intuitus) Begriff(conceptus)
empirischer reiner
sinnlicher Verstandes-
Bildes- notio
Idee
("ein Begriff aus
Notionen der die
Moglichkeit der
Erfahrung ubersteigt")
Liliana Albertazzi gives in an essay (Albertazzi 1992) an account of the rela-
tions between Twardowski's theory of objects and Kant's diversified notion. She
even proposes that Twardowski's ontology is "committed" to Kant's theory of
objects.
Husserl's early distinction between "intuitive" and non-intuitive acts

(Anschauung und RepIiisentation) etc., or Kerry's sharp distinction
between "Anschauung" and "psychische Verarbeitung". Twardows-
ki's theory is proposed to be valid for all presentations without ex-
ception. 73 However, in an essay, "Images and Concepts" from 1898,
he describes also the internal structure of presentations and at the
same time also distinguishes between different sorts of presentations.
Nothing in that essay contradicts explicitly the general theory in "Zur
Lehre", which also includes an important contribution to the theory
of "indirect" presentations. Still, the frequent use of "presented jud-
gements" for the theory of concepts presented in the essay is difficult
to reconcile with a sharp demarcation line between judgements and
presentations, i.e. the fundament to the doctrine of"Zur Lehre".74
4.3 TWARDOWSKI'S THEORY OF ACTS, CONTENTS AND

OBJECTS
The constitution of the theory

The Act
In describing the psychical phenomena Twardowski's fIrst distin-

guishes between the psychical act and ''what is presented, judged
etc." in or through this act. The act is the event consisting in the sin-
gular mental experience of an individual person. Twardowski gener-
ally builds his theory on examples from the class of presentations,
the basic psychical phenomenon, but emphasizes that the same kind
of distinction applies also to judgements.
73 Most of the preparatory work to "Zur Lehre" however circles around the prob-
lem of a theory of concept, which also entails a standpoint as to the distinction be-
tween concepts and images. Cf Manuscripts T.26.53 1-17.
74 Cf. below on Meinong 's theory of object and assumptions p. 145.

"What is presented": Content and object
The next step in Twardowski's project was to make clear that there
are two senses in which we could talk about "what is presented"
(''what is judged", etc.). In both senses the term "object" (German:
Objekt, or Gegenstand) occurred in the philosophical debates in
Twardowski's times. In one sense "what is presented" (das Vorges-
tellte) is usually associated to the character of the act itself, though
not being identical to the singular psychical event happening in one
person here and now. The other sense associates to that which the act
refers (intends, is directed) to, thus something not identical to the
psychical event itself. The latter is by Brentano termed the (primary)
"object" of the act. However, Brentano also used the term object in
another sense, i.e. "secondary" objects, those objects that are the ob-
jects of "inner perception". In view of the ambiguity of the German
term "Objekt" Twardowski prefers the term "Gegenstand", which,
only when there is no chance of ambiguity, is used interchangingly
with "Objekt". 75 A major point in Twardowski's distinction between
content and object is a development, or a criticism, of the Brentanian
notion of object.
Twardowski's double distinctions for the notion of presentation
introduced above, on the one hand the distinction between the act of
presentation and "what is presented" in it ("das Vorgestellte"), and
on the other hand, between the two senses of ' 'what is presented", i.e.
between content and object, is illustrated by the well-known example
of Mozart's native town. Thus we could say that a town in Austria is
''what is presented", when we talk about Mozart's birth-place. Clear-
ly "what is presented" in this case is identical with the town situated
at the place named Juvavum by the Romans. The object of the pre-
sentation is identical in the two presentations. What is presented "in
my mind" is however different in the two cases. What is different is,
in Twardowski's terminology, the content of the presentation.
7S Unfortunately it is not possible to transfer these shades of meaning into English

philosophical terminology, hence I have used the term "object" for the German
"Gegenstand" in this study, despite some unhappy historical connotations, which
tend to associate the term with an activity of ''throwing out" from a "subject".
Speaking, or having a presentation, of Salzburg, we could use both

these different "alternative presentations,,76.
Obviously Twardowski's distinction (for which he gives credit, in
the introduction of "Zur Lehre", to Hofler) is a kind of psychological
parallel to Frege's distinction, between the "Sinn" and "Bedeutung"
of expressions in language. As we have seen, it belongs to the same
debate, too, historically speaking.
Brentano' s77 use, on the linguistic level, of the "modifying" ca-
pacity of adjectives (a dead man is not a man, thus "dead" is a modi-
fier, not a descriptor in a common detenninating sense) is exploited
by Twardowski to work out his distinction. The role of this distinc-
tion in Twardowski and in HusserI' s polemics against him will be
studied in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Twardowski detennines, preliminarily, his notion of object in a
way which purports to make it independent of different epistemolog-
ical positions. In particular he wants to mark a distance to any kind of
confusion of the notion of object with a realist understanding of an
object as something "lying behind" our presentations (perceptions).
Danach ist der Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Urteile und Gefiihle, sowie
Wollungen. etwas vom Ding an sich verschiedenes, falls unter demselben
die unbekannte Ursache dessen verstanden wird, was unsere Sinne afficirt.
In dieser Hinsicht deckt sich die Bedeutung des Wortes Gegenstand mit jen-
er des Ausdrucks "Phaenomen" oder "Erscheinung", deren Ursache
entweder nach Berkeley Gott, oder nach den extremen Idealisten unser ei-
gener Geist, oder nach gemassigten "Real-Idealisten" die betreffenden
Dinge an sich sein mogen. Was bisher von den Gegenstanden der Vorstel-
lung gesagt worden ist und sich noch im Laufe der Untersuchung iiber die-
selben ergeben wird, beansprucht giltig zu sein, welchen Standpunkt man
immer unter den eben bezeichneten wahlen mag. Durch jede Vorstellung
wird etwas vorgestellt, mag es existieren oder nicht, mag es sich als
76 'Wechselvorstellungen' ZL p. 32, the example is Twardowski's own, though he

uses it as a demonstration rather than an introduction of the distinction between
content and object.
77 Brentano (Psychologie part II p. 62-63) was referring back to medieval and an-
cient distinctions. Cf. Klaus Hedwig (Hedwig 1991) p. 52 and foot-note 35, where
reference is made to Scotus' and Suarez' use of the existential modes. Cf. also Sec-
tions 5.2-3.
unabhangig von uns darstellen und sich unserer Wahrnehmung aufdriingen,

oder von uns selbst in der Phantasie gebildet sein; was immer es auch sei, es
ist, insofem wir es vorstellen, im Gegensatze zu uns und unserer vorstellen-
den Tiitigkeit der Gegenstand derselben. (ZL 35).78
I have quoted Twardowski at some length here, both because he

situates himself in relation to some traditional standpoints in epis-
temology, and because he demonstrates his intention to liberate him-
self from these standpoints. The passage just quoted, in addition to
giving a general idea of his notion of object of a presentation also
presents Twardowski's theory of act, content and object as an ex-
plication of the notion of phenomenon.
The ambiguity of Kant IS notion of "Erscheinung,,79 and also - as
Twardowski rightly observes - Brentano' s concept of phenomenon is
troublesome and to some extent dealt with by Twardowski's theort°
though the subject of inquiry in Twardowski's "Habilitationsschrift"
is not the notion of phenomenon as such, but only one subspecies of
the species of psychic phenomena, viz. presentations.
78 The link (perhaps unintentional) from "Gegensatz" to "Gegenstand" should be

noted - just as the English op-position and ob-ject. Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics X
1055a on "enantiosis" - opposition - related to numerous other passages in the
Metaphysics where Aristotle criticises earlier philosophers - including Plato and
his understanding of contradiction, contrariety and opposition.
79 Kant rarely seems to use the term "Erscheinung" in the "act"-sense. His distinc-
tion between the transcendental and "physical" senses of the term "appearance"
should rather be taken to apply to the more general level of "content" or "das Vor-
gestellte". He does not make a distinction of the content/object kind, hence his no-
tion could rather be taken to be the unspecified "content/object" criticised by
Twardowski. On Kant's conceptions of appearance/Erscheinung/phenomenon see
e.g. Allison 1983 p. 7 ff., referring to KRV A45-461B63-63.
80 Cf. "Psychologie" 13 - and also p. 45 in this inquiry. This means that Brentano
sometimes seems to cast some doubt over the notion of psychic phenomenon as
such - since it is primarily the category of physical phenomena that have the truly
phenomenal kind of existence.
Cf. Hussed's criticism of Brentano's use of the notion of phenomenon in the
Logical Investigations (Hua XIX/IT. p. 767) To Hussed it is essential that we can
perceive (wahrnehmen) physical phenomena in just as certain a manner as psychic
phenomena. This criticism is developed in a more general way by the central dis-
tinction between noesis and noema in the Ideas.
The interpretation of Twardowski's views on objects in general,

and accordingly his proposal to build up an ontology for the solution
of certain problems in the philosophy of mind bring in considerable
difficulties which are also of importance also to the interpretation of
Husserl (and, I would suggest, Frege). In the passage quoted Twar-
dowski says that it is possible to interpret his notion of object rough-
ly as Berkeley's notion of phenomenon.
He defines the object in relation to an undoubtedly mental activity:
our "presentational activity", a natural point of departure for a
"psychological investigation". At least in one sense of the word, this
is what one calls a phenomenological attitude: the objects which
Twardowski wants to investigate in a general manner are ''things as
they are", "at their face value", without regard to "what lies behind",
their "origin" or "causes".
Twardowski was not the first to introduce a distinction between
content and object of presentations; Bolzano, Zimmermann, Hofler
and Kerry had developed similar distinctions, Kerry in a polemic
with Frege's doctrines. What distinguishes Twardowski from some
or all of his predecessors are principally three factors:
1) His effort to combine this distinction with a ramified theory of
objects in general. This theory was inspired by Benno Erdmann's
theory, presented in his "Logik", two years before.
2) The introduction of the "idiogenic" theory of judgement as a
basis for a theory of objects of presentation.
3) A resolute rejection of the existence of ideal objects, such as
Bolzano's presentations-in-themselves or propositions-in-themselves,
although he does not hesitate to talk about the most varying kinds of
objects.
Theses on the object and content
For the clarification of the general thesis of the distinction between

content and object Twardowski requires a theory that both accounts
for the content and the object, as well as a theory which states the de-
pendence or relation between the content and object, if any. I shall
formulate Twardowski's views by suggesting some theses, the first
two of which may at first sight seem contradictory:
T I: The distinction between content and object of a presenta-

tion is real, not merely logical (ZL 29)
T 2: The distinction between content and object is relative, not

absolute (ZL 63)
T I says that the distinction is not merely a matter of point of

view, but that content and object are "toto genere" something differ-
ent. The simplest proof to Twardowski is the case of existing objects:
it is clear that, when we talk of the sun, we do not talk about a mental
content. Twardowski's thesis is, however, more radical: he claims
that also in all the other cases of presentations - i.e. when the objects
do not exist - contents and objects are different. In other words a
thought, imagined or fictional object is never identical to, nor part of,
the content of the presentation. The thesis might also be stated simply
as follows, in what might be taken as a reformulation of Brentano's
thesis of the intentionality:
T I': All presentations have objects
This thesis is in the focus of Husserl's discussion and criticism

and will be delt with in some detail under the heading of the problem
of object-less presentations.
T 2 is to be understood as saying that a content could well be the
object of another presentation - e.g. in all those cases when we think
or say something about our psychical life, presentations, judgements,
etc.
From Section 4.2 we know that Twardowski adhered to a sharp
distinction between presentations and other kinds of psychic phe-
nomena, in particular judgements. All psychic phenomena are based
on presentations, presentations being, as it were, the atoms of psychi-
cal phenomena. Twardowski expresses a general trust in the future of
a psychology constructed along the lines of the chemical system of
elements. This conception was perhaps most forcefully advanced by
Wundt with whom Twardowski, as noted, studied for some time.
Thus a philosophically relevant description of psychic phenomena

must start with presentations.
The general distinction between the act, content and object of psy-
chical phenomena rests upon the distinction within the sphere of pre-
sentations: Though Twardowski claims that parallellism is complete
between presentations and judgements in their general structure of
act, content and object, the issue of object-less presentations does not
give rise to an analogous problem as far as judgements are con-
cerned, An object ofajudgement, the existence of which is denied, is
obviously still an object of presentation (precisely, a non-existing
object).
Keeping in mind the distinctions introduced, to talk about a pre-
sentation, Twardowski holds, should thus generally be specified as
talk either about the act, or about the content or the object of it. An
attempt to spell out this view might be rendered as the following
thesis:
T 3 : All presentations should be specified, either as acts, or as

contents, or as objects.
Thus, there is not any general description applicable to presenta-

tions in general, in terms of "mental content" or the like. This holds,
even if presentations is one kind of psychic phenomena, along with
judgements, feelings and volitions.
The ambiguity of "what is presented" (das Vorgestellte) might
also, approaching the controversy between HusserI and Twardowski,
be termed as an issue regarding the notion of the intentional object.
In particular, it might be formulated as a dispute whether the inten-
tional object should be regarded as "immanent" or "transcendent". In
these terms, what Twardowski claims might also be spelled out as
follows:
T 3': The intentional object is to be specified as either content

or object (of a presentation/act).
Twardowski himself, however, wants to discard the term inten-

tional object in general, because of its unfortunate use as
58 OBJECTS OF PRESENTAnONS
synomymous to, or equivalent with "immanent". On the other hand,

this kind of alternative formula might be justified both by the role
which the Brentanian notion of intentionality plays in Twardowski's
argument for the distinction of content from object, for all presenta-
tions, and for its role in HusserI' s argument against Twardowski, as
being examined below.
A thesis on the objects o/presentations
Generally speaking, Twardowski combines an extreme "liberalism"

as to what is admitted as objects with a "conservatism" or reduction-
ism as regards what should be admitted as existing. Reality for Twar-
dowski is neither equivalent with existence nor being an object.
Twardowski feels rather free to combine all the three terms into dif-
ferent patterns. Twardowski is both a "monist" - viz. as regards rea-
lities, which seems to constitute a rather narrow category - and a
"pluralist", looking at the way he talks about the manifold categories
both of existence (e.g. irrealities like lacks, the medieval priva-
tiones) and of being an object (non-existing objects etc.). Describing
Twardowski as an ontological monist would thus depend on what
sense is given to the concept of being (reality, existence, being an ob-
ject etc.). Twardowski is well aware of these different possiblities,
and exploits them for the construction of his theory of objects of pre-
sentations. The theory of object discussed by Twardowski is thus
also a general theory of being - or ontology - provided that the no-
tion of existence is allowed to be submitted to various
"modifications"sl.
Twardowski also explicitly links his thinking to medieval patterns
of thought in developing this theory. It was, after all, one of the car-
dinal points of Scholasticism (in e.g. Aquinas' doctrines) to exploit
the notion of modes of being (e.g. esse intentionale and esse reale).
A description of Twardowski's theory of objects is preferably giv-
en in a rather indirect way. The notion of object as such is rather void
of meaning, hence its role might be clarified by answers given to
81Quite in conformity with the title of Brentano's "Habilitationsschrift" on the

manifold meanings of "existence" according to Aristotle.
various specific questions addressed to the theory. Twardowski him-

self rather quickly turns to specific problems in presenting the theory
- the principal problem being the issue of object-less presentations.
Before that, Twardowski gives much attention to a formal theory of
the constituents of objects, i.e. a general theory of wholes and parts (a
mereology in later terminology), which serves the purpose of elabo-
rating some of the details of a theory of objects.
Some major problems raised by Twardowski's theory of objects
are focussed on by examining an issue which has been given some
attention in a Polish debate on Twardowski's phenomenalism, de-
scribed below.
The relation between the notions of object and phenomenon
evoked by the passage quoted above (p. 51) is rather subtle in Twar-
dowski. On the one hand he equates the notions in general, on the
other hand, the object is defined in other passages as a "Moment" of
the presentation (or a judgement) (e.g. p. 10 of "Zur Lehre"), and pre-
sentations are but one species of the genus of psychical phenomena
Physical phenomena seem somehow to become subordinated to psy-
chical phenomena ...
A psychical phenomenon is accordingly an object which has the
peculiar property of being (intentionally) directed towards another
object. Physical phenomena (such as things or material bodies) do
not have this property, (although one might talk about a force as a
physical directed phenomenon. Intentionality is sometimes described
as being a "vectorial" magnitude, using a metaphor from physical
forces). 82
The (primary) object of a presentation is - in Brentanian theory -
never a psychical phenomenon, since in Brentano's theory the prima-
ry object is by definition something else than the psychic phenome-
non (= always an intentional act). Only in the case of inner
perception or reflection, where the mind bends towards itself and ex-
amines itself, is the psychical phenomenon immediately available, as
a secondary object. The only phenomena studied in reflection are
therefore the psychical phenomena.
82 This way of understanding psychology is quite dominant in Herbart's ''mathe-

matical psychology".
Twardowski differs from Brentano here: he includes also acts (that

is: psychical phenomena) among the objects of presentation. Since he
does not accept the division between primary and secondary objects
of Brentano, Brentano's original distinction between object and act
disappears or is radically changed.
Having followed Twardowski's thought so far - actually only
through the first introduction of "Zur Lehre" - one might be tempted
to draw the following, rash, conclusion: the object, just as the con-
tent, is part of the presentation. This kind of conclusion - which
would radically deviate from Brentano's insistence on objects being
different from the acts - has given rise to a discussion on Twardows-
ki's phenomenalism, which will be presented below.
In general the situation may be depicted as follows, leaving aside
the precise nature of the relations indicated by the lines in the figure:
Presentation
Act (Tatigkeit) "What is presented" (das Vorgestellte)
Content ("immanent object") Object (Gegenstand)
To understand this figure as representing parts of a presentation

however goes counter to the thesis of the "existential neutrality" of
the object, as stated in the passage quoted on p. 51 as well as to
Twardowski's explicit determination of the object as non-immanent
(ZL 4). Actually, it is quite justified to, preliminarily, include the fol-
lowing thesis as part of Twardowski's theory of object:
T 4: The object of presentation is never part of the presentation.
This thesis will, however, be submitted to several modifications,

as our examination proceeds. It will turn up to be virtually impossible
to provide a clear and definite answer as to its ultimate status in
Twardowski's theory.
But conversely, there is also textual evidence which supports a
quite opposite interpretation of the figure. The main passage is
Twardowski's classification of the object as one of the three

"Momente"S3 of the presentation, corresponding to the three func-
tions of "names" in the theory of language which Twardowski inher-
ited from Mill:
Aber nicht ein zweifaches sondem ein dreifaches Moment glaubten wir bei
jeder Vorstellung unterscheiden zu mussen: den Act, den Inhalt und den
Gegenstand. Und wenn der Name wirldich ein genaues sprachliches Bild
der ibm entsprechenden psychischen Verhiiltnisse bietet, so muss er auch
noch fUr den Vorstellungsact ein Correlat aufweisen. Thatsachlich ist das-
selbe vorhanden, und den drei Momenten der Vorstellung, dem Acte, Inhalt
und Gegenstand, entspricht eine dreifache Aufgabe, die jeder Name zu
erfiillen hat. (ZL 10)
To understand Twardowski's use of "object" we should therefore

investigate the implications of this psychological-linguistic analogy.
How could reference to the three ''tasks'' or "functions" of presenta-
tions (instead of names) not lead up to an interpretation, as in the rash
conclusion above, which essentially interprets Twardowski as a kind
of idealist? The objects would become parts of or identical with
presentations-ideas in at least the Lockean sense. This interpretation
underlies Ingarden's imputation of a "phenomenalist" conception of
object to Twardowski and possibly also Husserl's criticism of Twar-
dowski, accounted for in Section 5.3.
The linguistic origin of the triad of act, content and object of pre-
sentations, suggests that the notion of object of presentation should
be seen as a fUnction of the presentation than as a part of it - i.e. as
the function of referring to an object, rather than object per se. It
seems, however, that this interpretation would not lend itself as a ba-
sis for the construction of a theory of the ultimate constituents of the
world (summum genus), which was Twardowski's aspiration. The
essence of the object, after all, is to be non-immanent in Twardows-
ki's theory.
83 On the notion of "moment" cf. pp. 73 and 85, foot-note 123. It may tum out to
be a crucial term in more than one respect for the determination of the position of
Twardowski's theory of object in relation to traditional classifications of ideal-
ismIrealism (transcendentaVempirical).
As for the notion of function itself, Twardowski himself distin-

guishes in a later text between a mathematical and a more common-
sense interpretation. In this context he must be taken to hold that the
non-mathematical interpretation is applied.84 To apply this notion of
functionality to presentations and language respectively does not for
Twardowski imply a kind of complete language-mind dependence or
equivalence, which he in fact explicitly rejects in several passages in
"Zur Lehre".
Certain consequences of the linguistic origin of Twardowski's dis-
tinctions will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 5, in the context
of the dispute concerning object-less presentations. Twardowski's
general tendency to seek analogies and explanations in the linguistic
theory for applications in the field of psychology (however inter-
preted) might in itself be regarded as a deviation from a strictly
psychologistic line of thought.
This does not exclude that the formal notion of object of presenta-
tion, constitutes the principal building-block for a synthesis of
psychology and ontology, and therefore may be seen as founding the
most radical of all conceivable varieties of psychologism, since it
aims at explaining being "in terms of' the human mind.
Following the general outlook on the history of philosophy sug-
gested by Gilson 85 , this project may be taken to be one variety of
what was started by Descartes, viz. a replacement of Scholastic first
philosophy by a "pure" ontology, free from any commitment to the
actually existing being, but safely anchored in the cogito. This view
is confirmed by the evidence provided more recently for direct links
between pre-Kantian ontology in Wolff and Twardowski as well as
Meinong86 •
84 The distinction is presented in the framework of an account of the philosoph-

ical dispute on the brain-mind relationship in the essay on the relationship between
psychology, physiology and philosophy from 1897. He classifies the sense of the
notion of function when the psychic life is said to be a function of the brain, as the
mathematical one of dependence and co-variation.
85 (Gilson 1962) p. 144. Cf. p 43.
86 Cf. Polt quoted above foot-note 59, p. 43.

The controversy on Twardowski's phenomenalism
One way of trying to understand the status of objects of presentation

in Twardowski's theory is to examine an issue that was brought up
by Roman Ingarden already in 1935 and continued rather recently by
another Polish philosopher, viz. Twardowski's supposed pheno-
menalism.
The title of Twardowski's work itself, as is clarified when trans-
lating it into some other languages, is ambiguous 87 • The reference to
objects and contents of presentations might mean that presentations
consist of both contents and objects, as some kind of parts - in gram-
matical terms the use of the genitive case is "possessive". On the oth-
er hand the genitive case might also (in German as in English) mark
an "objective" relation rather than a possession, "the education of the
children" does not mark that education belongs to the children but
that it is an objective for the children to be educated.
If thesis T 4 is a correct interpretation of Twardowski, he did not
hold that the object is a part of the presentation, though some of his
formulations lend themselves to such an interpretation. His own
terms rather suggest that the term "presentation" could be understood
as either act, content or object, and that we have to choose one of
these interpretations. This, on the other hand, endows the idea that
objects are in some sense psychical with some legitimacy, since the
notion of presentation is invariably classified by Twardowski as de-
noting a psychic phenomenon. Had Twardowski consistently spoken
of the three different functions of presentations, one of these being
the function of objective reference rather than object, this discussion
might have taken place. To give Twardowski the benefit of doubt, or
following "the principle of charity", it seems also more reasonable to
accept that only a presentation, understood as an act or the content of
an act should be regarded as a psychical phenomenon, whereas the
object of the presentation might be both psychical and physical. The
86 Cf. Poli quoted above foot-note 59, p. 43.
87 For example the Swedish language. Cf. footnote 193 p. 123.

ultimate interpretation, however, does not - as noted below - come

out as safeguarded.
This is essentially the background of the discussion of Twardows-
ki's "phenomenalism,,88 raised by Ingarden in 1935 and continued by
Paczkowska-Lagowska in the essay included in her book on Twar-
dowski in 1980. The issue also touches other general theories of ob-
jects, such as Meinong's, those of other followers of Brentano
(including some philosophers today), Husserlian phenomenology, but
also Frege's theory (from "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung") of objects as
references89 (Bedeutungen) of names.
The problem as posed might prima facie appear strange: does not
the term "phenomenalism" denote a standpoint in theory of knowl-
edge rather than ontology? Phenomenalism is, in a customary under-
standing, taken to suggest that only "phenomena" are available to
knowledge or justify (ground) knowledge - in other words, only ob-
jects "directly perceived by our sensory apparatus" are knowable.
Whether there is anything "behind" or "causing" these objects is of
no concern or anyhow not knowable. The knowable objects are not
things, or facts, but "sensations" or "sense-data" etc. Ontological or
metaphysical qualifications, or descriptions of these objects, might
vary, by referring to categorizations like ''material'', ideal, spiritual,
mental, "neutral", etc.
The ontological statement: ''there is nothing except these objects",
is much stronger and is normally qualified as (material or empirical)
"idealism".
The issue of a phenomenalistic notion of object in "Zur Lehre"
was opened by Ingarden in a long essay "Vom formalen Autbau des
88 Cf. the discussion on Brentano 's "phenomenalism" referred to on p. 157 and
Oscar Kraus' protests against this interpretation - objections shared by the Polish
historian of philosophy, Twardowski's disciple Tatarkiewicz (Tatarkiewicz 1993
Vol 3 p. 157), who underlines Brentano's realism. Another view is represented by
Klaus Hedwig in Brentano Studien Vol ill, who underlines the difficulty of the no-
tion of object used by Brentano, and its dependence on medieval tradition, a tradi-
tion already largely ignored by Brentano's disciples.
89 Frege's 'Bedeutung' is ambiguous as between "referent" and "refer-

ence"{-function). Linguists today seem to prefer ''referent''.
individuellen Gegenstandes" from 1935.90 • Ingarden claims there that

Twardowski's notion of object is phenomenalistic, thus linking an
ontological concept to a specific epistemological standpoint. Ingar-
den's thesis patently contradicts Twardowski's own contention,
quoted above, viz. that his theory is valid under all different epis-
temological assumptions. Ingarden's linking the notion of object to
the Aristotelian concept of on is, however, sustained by Twardowski
(ZL 37).
Ingarden gives the following general description of a phenomenal-
istic conception of object:
Gegeostand ist alles und nur das, was irgendwie ''vorgestellt'' wird.
(Ingarden 1935 p. 33)
The fundamental feature of the phenomenalistic conception of the

notion of object is in Ingarden's view its dependence on the notion of
presentation. Twardowski's particular interpretation of the notion of
object is, according to Ingarden, the widest of four different conceiv-
able phenomenalistic interpretations. Everything that could be pres-
ented (i.e presented in a very wide sense, more or less equal to
"present in the mind in general") is an object (ibid p. 36). This inter-
pretation might be supported by the general "liberalism" as to objects
of presentation expressed in Zur Lehre, but the particular passage
from "Zur Lehre", quoted by Ingarden in support, does not give in it-
self an undisputable ground for this extension to the sphere of the
possible.91
90 The essay is largely accommodated into the grandiose ontological treatise ''The
Dispute on the Existence of the World" from 1946 (1962). There Ingarden does
not, however, repeat his suggestion regarding Twardowski's phenomenalistic no-
tion of object.
91 It is noteworthy that the Polish translation of "Zur Lehre" (WPF 33) changes
the original text in this, rather crucial respect of the theory, extending more than in
the original text the scope of the notion of object to what is potentially presented.
Whether this interpretative translation changes the problem is another issue. In the
earlier passage quoted on page 51 Twardowski expresses himself otherwise, giving
at least some ground for Ingarden's interpretation.
Ingarden argues, however, that not even the extension to the

sphere of the possible eliminates the basic dependence of the notion
of object on that of presentation - which constitutes its phenomenal-
istic character, according to Ingarden. The modal qualification must
in Ingarden's view pertain, not to the notion of "what is presented"
(i.e. content/object) but to the act of presentation (das Vorstellen).
More concretely, if we accept that Twardowski really claims that
everything that could be presented, and nothing else, is an object, this
excludes a realistic (or existential) interpretation of the notion of ob-
ject where an object is equal to an "external" thing, which sometimes
does and sometimes does not happen to be presented. This is so, sim-
ply due to the fact that Twardowski also allows non-existing and
even impossible objects, or, equivalently, asserts that every presenta-
tion has an object.
Ingarden claims that Twardowski's standpoint, thus interpreted, is
self-contradictory. Either one accepts that the notion of "being pres-
ented" refers to some relation between two objects, in which case
both or all objects must be said to exist in some sense, otherwise one
could not talk about a relation, i.e. say true things about it. Or, if one
takes "being presented" as a property of objects, it would be absurd
to talk about objects that do not (actually) exist, since anything which
has properties must be said to exist, in some sense. To link the notion
of object unexceptionally to the notion of being presented, makes be-
ing presented an essential (constitutive) property of objects. But this
notion of object, Ingarden claims, is an entirely different notion, a
"heteronomously existing" object, than the inherited notion of
"autonomous" being or OD. The notion of an "heteronomously exis-
ting" object is better represented by a work of art. It is not the
"autonomously existing" object primarily examined in ontology.
Just as the case of non-referring names is a test for the adequacy of
a theory of the meaning of language, the handling of cases of presen-
tations which do not seem to have objects is decisive for the theory of
presentations advocated by Twardowski. And we already know that
Twardowski's solution is built on the standpoint that there is an ob-
ject "of', or "corresponding to" every presentation - a denial that
there are presentations without objects. Its linguistic correlate would
be that there are no "names" or "categorematic terms" without
referents, a thesis which, by virtue of the very distinction between

"reference" and "referent" is plainly false.
Ingarden seems to impute to Twardowski the following thesis:
Only what could be presented could exist
Actually Twardowski does not say that much, but rather - in view
of his theory of the basic function of the psychical category of
presentation:
T 5 Everything that exists could be presented
Ingarden's criticism builds upon the circumstance that there is a

sense in which a view which regards objects as necessarily tied to
presentations also determines a standpoint on the notion of existence
and the ultimate categories of what there is.
As will emerge from the considerations in Section 4.6 below, the
term "essentialism" might, however, better describe Twardowski's
standpoint - and be more congruent with his own associations to me-
dieval philosophy. Ingarden also touches upon this matter, rejecting
the two understandings of "object", which he considers it possible to
extract from Twardowski's standpoint, as not fulfilling the require-
ments of the notion of an individually (autonomously) existing
object, but always only of a general or abstract entity.92 In this light,
in conclusion, Ingarden's description of Twardowski's standpoint as
phenomenalism becomes rather unnatural, since phenomenalism is
usually linked to the thesis that there are only individual objects. 93
92 The Husserlian notion of ''noema'' (derived from noein as a participle - though

present participle instead of perfect participle - as "das Vorgestellte" is derived
from ''vorstellen'') meets similar problems with regard to Ingarden's criticism. The
difference is that the noema is explicitly defined as a part (albeit, in Ideen I, as a
"correlative" and not real ("reell") part) of the lived experience (Erlebnis)
Husserl's dependence on Twardowski, or Twardowski's role as a precursor to
Husserl, is also in general terms recognized by Ingarden (Jngarden 1966).
93 This is valid for Berkeley and Hume - and is precisely the "distinction of rea-
son" advocated by Hume and combatted by Husserl (cf. Section 4.6). The form of
phenomenalism represented by Russell's neutral monism also rejects general ob-
Going back to Twardowski's own text however, before examining

Paczkowska-Lagowska's criticism of Ingarden, we also approach the
medieval background to Twardowski's ideas, and the notion of
"intentional object", the focus ofHusserl's critique of Twardowski.
Twardowski's standpoint on the general relation of psychology to
ontology is formulated as follows:
Da nun Alles, das vorstellende Subject nicht ausgenommen, Gegenstand,

Object einer Vorstellung sein kann, so erweist sich die Behauptungjener als
berechtigt, welche im Gegenstand das summum genus sehen. Alles was ist,
ist ein Gegenstand moglichen Vorstellens; alles was ist, ist etwas. Und so-
mit ist hier der Punkt, an dem die psychologische Erorterung fiber den Un-
terschied des Vorstellungsgegenstandes vom Vorstellungsinhalte in die
Metaphysik einmiindet.(ZL 37).
This might be formulated as the following thesis:
T 6: The category of object is identical to the category of be-

ing in the Aristotelian sense (ZL 37)
Twardowski's theory of objects is, as noted by Twardowski him-

self, not only the link between psychology and metaphysics, con-
ceived as a theory of being as being but he identifies - in Zur Lehre -
the theory of objects with metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense 94.
Wenn der Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, Urteile, und Gefiihle nichts an-
dreres ist, als das aristotelisch-scholastische Ens, so muss die Metaphysik
definiert werden konnen als die Wissenschaft von den Gegenstanden fiber-
haupt, das Wort im hier angegebenen Sinne genommen. (ZL 96)
Characterizing the object as the summum genus is in Twardows-

ki's view equivalent to:
jects or universals, except as an "inferred part of the structure of the world", i.e.
not "part of our data" (Russell 1961 p. 228). This is a standpoint which is practical-
ly identical to Twardowski's, who from this point of view perhaps could be asso-
ciated with phenomenalism.
94 Cf. footnote 59 on the terms metaphysics and ontology. Husserl resumes use of
the term ontology around 1910.
T 6: Everything that could be named is an object (ZL 12,23)
On the basis of these theses, is it true that Twardowski's ontology

is phenomenalistic? To settle that issue one would have to answer at
least the following questions:
1. Are there, in this theory, entities that are (or could never be)
never objects of presentations?
2. Which is the role of "Wechselvorstellungen" - i.e. what is
meant when we say that the same object is presented through two dif-
ferent presentations?
3. What is an object of a presentation of something that does not
exist? (Analogously, what is named by names that name things that
do not exist?)
Paczkowska-Lagowska argues against Ingarden's view ofTwar-
dowski's theory of object as phenomenalistic on the basis of two
assumptions:
1) Ingarden presupposes, counter to Twardowski, that there is no
such thing as existence-''just-like-that'' (schlechthin). All existence,
according to Ingarden, is qualified as to its mode of being (modus
essendi).95
2) Ingarden overlooks that Twardowski advocated a "real tran-
scendence" of the object in relation to the subject. (The term "real
transcendence" is taken from Hedwig Conrad-Martius). This kind of
transcendence implies that the relation between a presentation and
"its" object is not a real relation, like e.g. a causal relation. Nothing
in the presentation could, according to this understanding, change an
object or a property of an object96 •
Both these issues are also central in the discussion between Hus-
serl and Twardowski, though in a somewhat different form. 1) is dis-
cussed above all in connection with Twardowski's use of the term
95 This would be identical to Brentano's view.
96 Cf. Klaus Hedwig's description of Brentanian intentional correlation as

"assymmetric".
intentional existence as a "modified" meaning of existence, and 2) is

treated in the shape of the general controversy on the relation be-
tween the content and the object - whether that relation is a relation
of "correspondence" or any other kind of "having".
Apart from the difficulties in interpreting the notion of "real tran-
scendence", it is not clear that Twardowski's theory of objects repre-
sents the kind of theory suggested by Paczkowska-Lagowska: one
indication is his consistent avoidance of the term "transcendent" as a
qualification of "object", in spite of his replacement of the term
"immanent object" by his own "content", thus leaving the Brentanian
terminology. Furthermore, Paczkowska-Lagowska does not treat In-
garden's criticism against any kind of theory which includes relations
involving non-existents, i.e. against the very kind of relation repre-
sented by the notion of real transcendence. And finally she does not
pay attention to Ingarden's objection to the effect that all objects be-
come general in a peculiar way in a theory such as Twardowski's. In
particular, individual non-existing objects appear obscure, at least if
the Aristotelian criterion for individuation - "matter" - is upheld; the
assumption of non-existing material objects seems strange, though
not contradictory.
Twardowski himself associates his general theory of objects with
medieval metaphysics - mostly as represented by Aquinas. Thus,
"presentability" as the fundamental feature of the object is linked to
the Scholastic notion of unum 97 , one of the "transcendentalia" -
properties of a most general character, pertaining to all substances
(the others being "verum" - subject to true or false judgements and
"bonum" - subject to desires and evaluations)98, entirely in
accordance with the Brentanian tripartition of mental phenomena.
This suggestion may be related to the concept of the "Gestalt" quali-
ties, introduced into the psychological and philosophical debate by
Christian von Ehrenfels, two years before Twardowski's book.
"Gestalt" may be said to be a natural interpretation of the unity of an
97 ZL p. 39.
98 Cf. p. 45. A treatment of the transcendentalia and their "convertibility" is giv-

en by Heidegger in his "Habilitationsschrift" (Heidegger 1916).
object. If an object is divided into its parts, other objects will emerge,
and thus the original object loses its unity. This however does not
mean that a unity could not be analyzed: i.e. be complex.
Paczkowska-Lagowska also qualifies as another "Thomistic" fea-
ture in Twardowski's theory of object the understanding of existence
as something added to the object. This thesis might be seen as the on-
tological counterpart to the idiogenic theory of judgement: existence
is something quite different from (being an) object. The doctrine was
later known through Meinong's slogan: "Aussersein des Daseins
vom Sosein".
It should be observed, however, that this doctrine is not necessari-
ly Thomistic: in the form given to it by Twardowski and Meinong it
is closer to Scotus' teachings than Aquinas', (both claiming to be
heirs to Avicenna's doctrine). Also, Aquinas' doctrine of the
"analogy of being" rests upon a view of being, different from Twar-
dowski's view of existence, which is basically unqualified as to its
"modes".
On the whole, linking Twardowski's theory of objects to medieval
ontology, what Twardowski identifies with ens should be associated
merely with essentia, as Twardowski's own words on p. 37 in "Zur
Lehre", quoted below, also intimate. This holds, despite his sug-
gestion that the medieval concept of ens coincides with his own no-
tion of object - the constitutive feature of which is "the quality of
being presented":
1. Der Gegenstand ist etwas anderes als das Existierende; manchen Ge-
genstanden kommt neben ihrer Gegenstandlichkeit, neben der Beschaffen-
heit vorgestellt zu werden, (was der eigentliche Sinn des Wortes "essentia"
ist), auch noch die Existenz zu, anderen nicht. (My italics.)
In the Scholastic tradition however, the "transcendentalia" are

applied to (substantial) being, not to presented being, nor only to es-
sence. "Presentability" (the unum) could thus not be a
"transcendental" property of non-existents, neither would it be true to
say that the transcendentale "being true" (verum, "subject to judge-
ment" in Twardowski's view) is something linked to the concept of
existence as different from non-existence (or non-posited existence),
since the whole discussion only concerns existents (primarily sub-

stances). The very idea of the "convertibility" of transcendentalia
presupposes that every being have all the three transcendental prop-
erties, and thus every object have the property of being subject to
judgement and to presentation and "conation".99
Ingarden's most serious objection (probably inherited from
Lesniewski)IOO to Twardowski's theory of objects is that the unre-
stricted notion of object, in Twardowski's sense, leads to antinomies.
The only restriction suggested by Twardowski himself - the exclu-
sion of things-in-themselves (by definition non-presented entities)
from the sphere of objects - illustrates this circumstance. Obviously
we do talk of them - at least in philosophy - and thus in a sense have
a presentation of them. But still the thing-in-itself is by definition in-
accessible to presentations, and thus outside "psychology". An at-
tempt to escape by allowing the notion as being some kind of
abstract, philosophical object seems to be ad hoc: we are still faced
with the fact that "something" is excluded, and still we do say true
things about this something. Twardowski himself allows for impossi-
ble objects - so why not this one? But what is a presentation of a
non-presented/presentable object (a thing-in-itselt) like? Which ob-
ject does it have? Twardowski treats a similar case (cf Chapter 5 on
Nothing) by simply denying that there are such presentations. As
mentioned above (p. 48), he later develops a distinction between in-
tuitive and non-intuitive presentations (images and concepts). He still
is far, however, from using intuitiveness as a criterion for delimiting
the notion of object - this would deprive his theory of its generality.
99 As already mentioned it is part of the complicated history of the notion of ob-

ject that the objects of presentation, judgement and volition/feeling are sometimes
understood as different from each other - see e.g. a discussion in Aquinas on the
order of primacy between objects of reason and those of desire and will in Summa
Th. Q 82,3 where the object of reason is declared - in accordance with Aristotle
Met. 1027 b - to be in mente (and sometimes therefore lower as regards "relative"
- secundum quod - perfection) while the object of desire - and love - is outside
the mind.
100 Cf. (Woleilski p. 133, footnote) on LeSniewski's relation to Twardowski-

which puts into doubt the sense of calling Lesniewski a ''pupil'' of Twardowski.
Phenomenalism, as linked to Berkeley and Hume, is a theory fre-

quently tied to "sensualism", that is the view that all "ideas" are, or
are derived from, sensory experience. "Zur Lehre", while presenting
a rather comprehensive doctrine on "indirect" presentations does not
develop a theory of the origin of non-intuitive presentations. Twar-
dowski's views on this issue is, however, a main theme in the essay
from 1898 "On Images and Concepts"IOI, a work that diverges from
"Zur Lehre" precisely in distinguishing between several categories of
presentations. In that essay Twardowski distinguishes between three
kinds of "images" (intuitive presentations, as distinct from concepts):
perceptive, reflective and creative. All these are in some sense depen-
dent upon "impressions". But impressions are not only sensory -
they might also be non-sensory - e.g. of psychic objects (e.g. memo-
ries of earlier beliefs etc.). He describes the situation as follows:
" ... every reflective and creative image has its source in perceptive images;
reflective ones depend on simple recollection, creative ones on transforma-
tion and combination of perceptive images" (WPF 128, my translation: "re-
collection" corresponds to the Polish word ''uprzytomnienie'', which means
"becoming conscious of').
Perceptive images have earlier been described by Twardowski as

some kind of "synthesis" of impressions:
"Images are wholes, composed of elements, and those elements are impres-
sions. The image is thus related to the impression, as the whole to its
parts."(WPF 126)
On the other hand he is also prepared to characterize by the term

''process'' the transition from impression to a whole image - which
seems to contradict the idea that the impression is a
(contemporaneous) element in the image:
"When we perceive any object we receive a sum of impressions; perceiving

e.g. an orange we grasp certain visual impressions. But those impressions
do not exist loosely beside each other; they do not make up a sum in an
101 A work which however depended on earlier work, such as the preparation of
"Zur Lehre".
arithmetical sense, but are connected together in a whole, or, as the English
psychologists say, are subject to integration. This process [my emphasis]
usually passes so quickly. that it escapes our attention." (WPF 125)
Now, this view seems pretty much a "sensualism", provided one

accepts, with Twardowski, a kind of "inner" sense, by way of which
we get impressions of our own psychic life - i.e. introspection.
A further hint of some kind of "phenomenalism", in a
"sensualistic" vein, might also be Twardowski's use, in the cited
essay, of the term sensory object as equal to ''physical object".
Should we thus accept Ingarden's rather than Paczkowska-
Lagowska's interpretation of Twardowski's position? The answer
must be yes and no.
Yes: some of the consequences of Twardowski's theory of object,
together with some indisputably psychologistic ingredients in the ac-
count of the content of presentations, described below, seem to pre-
suppose a kind of essential relation of dependence between object
and the psychic phenomenon of presentation.
No, inasfar as Twardowski's own general intentions, attitudes and
later development are concerned: in particular his later theory on psy-
chic "actions and products" does not substantiate an interpretation
which says that the only kind of object that there is, is in some sense
essentially linked to presentations.
Interpreting Twardowski along a more "phenomenological" line -
i.e. roughly the path followed by Husserl after the adoption of the
phenomenological reduction is perhaps a more fitting understanding
of Twardowski's views, though not compatible neither with his basic
realism nor with his later development. It is difficult to avoid the im-
pression that Twardowski moved away from his first line of thought
in his later thinking; the notion of object becomes in fact rare, being
replaced by other notions such as ''thing''.
4.4 MEREOLOGY
A central role in Twardowski's introduction of the theory of objects

and contents, is occupied by the theory of parts and wholes; what
Twardowski's student Stanislaw Lesniewski named mereology102.

The role of mereology in Twardowski's work is to explicate some
relations between contents and objects as well as between objects of
different kinds. Mereology is a fundament to most of Twardowski's
theory of object and content of presentations, primarily because
descriptions of basic notions, besides the introductory definitions, are
presented in tenns of an account of components. He generally under-
stands the notion of description precisely as "giving a general ac-
count of components".
Lesniewski construed mereology as one of three fonnal theories in
the foundations of mathematics (the other two being "ontology" and
"protothetics"). In this study only an overview of the aspects touch-
ing upon the controversy between Hussed and Twardowski could be
provided.
Lesniewski was of course not the first philosopher or logician to
occupy himself with problems pertaining to the concepts of part and
whole, but he seems to have been the one who first attempted to sys-
tematize the problem in a fonnal and axiomatized theory. Hussed's
third Logical Investigation, a part of the work which Hussed felt was
undeservedly neglected. 103 contains a mereology, which largely in-
spired Lesniewski. Hussed's predecessorsin mereology were Brenta-
no, Meinong, Twardowski and, perhaps most importantly, Stumpf.
Twardowski, however, seems to be the one who first puts the notion
of part (or component, "Bestandteil" - which might be seen as
102 The term sometimes also expresses a standpoint in mereology. If one rather un-
derstands the term as denoting any theory which deals with the relation between
parts and wholes, both theories like HusserI's and later theories such as that of e.g.
Nelson Goodman are included.
Goodman however opposes a mereological theory - interpreted as a standpoint
designed to reduce certain non-nominalistic ideas of universals - to other theories
on universals, which might also include a specific theory of parts and wholes. In
this study I use mereology in the fIrst, uncommitted, sense.
103 Cf. Rua XVIII p. 14.

having a slightly more abstract connotation) at the centre of his con-

siderations on the theory of the object of presentations. 104
The interest in mereology should be seen in the context of the gen-
eral tendency towards "elementism", which was a predominant ingre-
dient in Wundtian psychology, to which Twardowski, as noted
above, in many respects owed allegiance. As such it is also part of
the general quest for a "scientific" philosophy, sketched above as one
of the motives of psychologism. The idea that philosophy should ap-
ply some kind of "analytical" or "chemical" method is common to
both thinkers of a psychologicizing tendency like Twardowski, and
to e.g. Frege, whose use notions like "unsaturated" (''ungesattigt'') in
the context of grammar and logic indicates a similar kind of
inspiration.
Mereological aspects also play a prominent role for the relations
between Husserl and Twardowski, since Husserl devotes consider-
able attention to this aspect in the manuscript on intentional objects,
104 The volume edited by Barry Smith on "Parts and Moments" might be consid-
ered a modem standard work in mereology - in a more general and perhaps philo-
sophical rather than logical vein. In the introductory essay by Smith and Kevin
Mulligan, the origins of mereology - within a more comprehensive formal ontolo-
gy - are traced to Aristotle - in particular in the Physics. Another inventory of re-
cent mereology is contained in the proceedings from a seminar held in Lund,
Sweden in June 1983. Cf. (Parts and Wholes) in the Bibliography.
Brentano's published works do not give a systematic account of his theories in
this field, but the collection of lectures published under the title of "Deskriptive
Psychologie" (Brentano 1982) contains a section (Part One, II) on the subject.
As usual, Brentano's inspiration from Aristotle is also mediated through
Aquinas.
Aquinas differentiates a number of kinds of parts - just to exemplify:
In Q 76,8 of the Summa Theologica he separated between three kinds: partes
quantitativas, such as the line or a body divided into several parts, partes rationis
et essentiae, such as the ingredients in a conceptually determined entity (sieut de-
finitum in partes definitionis) and finally partes virtutis i.e. those parts that
compose a "force" (potentiale).
In Q 85,3 ad 2 he treats the universal in relation to the notion of part and whole,
and in ad 3 he treats the relation, known from Brentano and Stumpf, of the non-
solvability of parts - or rather the various orders of knowing parts in relation to the
whole. Sometimes we perceive the parts per se first, sometimes the whole first.
notably in connection with an argument against Twardowski's solu-

tion of the problem of (so-called) object-less presentations.
One might even say that a demarcation line between Husserl and
Twardowski in this period is drawn by Husserl's reservations to-
wards a generalized use of formal ontology - in particular the notions
of part and whole - for the solution of what Husserl rather would de-
scribe as descriptive-psychological (later "phenomenological") prob-
lems. This does, however, not imply that Husserl has anything in
general against an extended use of the notions of part or component
and whole. He also explicitly writes so in the fragment K I 62.
Frege's logic and philosophical grammar as well as Meinong's
(and Twardowski's) formal ontology belong to the background of the
metaphysical doctrine worked out by Russell, under the name of
"logical atomism".lo5 Logical atomism suggests that description pri-
marily consists of analysis into unanalyzable parts 106 and an account
of the relations between these parts in terms of ordered
sets/extensions. The nature and categories of the "atoms" concerned
is related to a mereological system, of the kind suggested by
Twardowski or others.
The idea of a correspondence between language and the world,
part to part, may be seen as a metaphysical counterpart of the
"psychology" of description l07 , which plays a fundamental role in the
\05 Russell gave credit to Wittgenstein for this idea. The theory of logical atomism
is expounded in a series of works written by Russell from around 1914 to 1922. I

have examined some aspects of this subject in two manuscripts 1995 and 1968.
106 I have earlier mentioned the idea that these atoms should have some kind of
''neutral'' metaphysical status - an idea which could be said to be shared by James,
Husserl, Mach and Russell although with quite different metaphysical conse-
quences.
107 The adequacy of Russell's understanding of Wittgenstein's thought has been

subject to much debate - and seems to have been largely denied by Wittgenstein
himself. It is also somewhat misleading to talk of the correspondence between lan-
guage and world, since in Russell's terminology we are dealing with propositions,
which might well be identified with the Meinongian "Objektive", themselves to be
regarded as some kind of (non-language) objects. The Wittgensteinian "Satz" is
obviously not the same as the proposition, regarded as some kind of object -the
detennination of the relation between content and object in Twar-

dowski's theories.
The theory of parts and wholes is presented mainly in paragraphs
9-10 of "Zur Lehre". Twardowski presents the idea of a general
theory of parts and wholes and then briefly touches upon some of the
main categories of the theory:
Uns interessiert nor das allen Arten von Teilen und allen Formen der Zu-
sammensetzung aus Teilen Gemeinsame, der Typus, dem jede Synthese
folgt, und der den verschiedensten Weisen in denen ein Ganzes zusammen-
gesetzt sein kann, zu Grunde liegt. (ZL 48)
Twardowski presents a rather complicated hierarchical system of

parts to fit his descriptions. An important role is occupied by the no-
tion of "mark"lOs, being determined as a part of the object. Actually
this determination (treated in section 8 of "Zur Lehre") is a major
point in Twardowski's distinction between obj ect and content of pre-
sentations; he insists that the "mark" is a part of the object, and not
the content. Thus a description, i.e. the enumeration of "marks", be-
comes equivalent to enumerating (at least some) parts of an object.
Ontology, as built upon the notion of object of presentation, therefore
also requires as an integrated part a mereology.
Twardowski applies the notion of part primarily to what might be
called the "analytical" parts of an object; he does not seem explicitly
to acknowledge the existence of complex but unanalyzable Gestalt
qualities, like the "figurale Momente" of Ehrenfels' first theory in
1890. Although one species of the category of "fonnal" parts does
not seem very remote from this kind of concept it seems fair to say
Wittgensteinian idea of language as "showing" the world would not make much
sense in such and interpretation of the notion of "Satz".
The vacillation of the focus of interest between linguistic and non-linguistic en-
tities puts into doubt the idea (proposed in e.g.(Dummett 1993). that there is some-
thing to be termed a "linguistic turn" which characterizes analytic philosophy.
Russell's aim seems fIrst of all to have been through and through metaphysical: to
deliver a comprehensive and materially adequate explanation of the world.
lOS The German term is "Merkmal", the English translation of which is difficult-
"characteristic" or ''mark'' seem to be acceptable though not satisfying.

that, despite Twardowski's wide notion of object, and his acceptance

of two extensions of the notion of part, viz. fonnal 109 parts and meta-
physical llo parts (see below), his theory should still be considered as
a variety of "elementism", in the tradition of both Wundt lll and older
associationistic psychology within the British empiricist tradition.
Some mereological distinctions in Zur Lehre

Material- formal
Any complex object has both material and formal parts. Material
parts are parts in the "common sense" of the word "part" - although
not only what is sometimes called "extensive" parts, i.e. parts that
occupy a definite place in space, or the kind of parts which Husserl
in the Logical Investigations calls independent parts or "pieces"
(StUcke). Also abstract objects could have material parts. Twardows-
ki calls the totality of the material parts the matter (Stoft) of the
object.
The formal parts are the relations in which the material parts of an
object stand into each other. The totality of the formal parts is the
form of the object. This notion of form is thus a kind of complex
relation - neither an Aristotelian notion of form, nor a more intuitive
notion associating to (visual) "shape".
109 Whether this kind of part is to be labelled "extensional" seems doubtful- such
parts literally are not extended in space. Twardowski obviously does not regard
formal parts (relations) as a kind of ordered sets or extensions.
110 ZL p. 58. Twardowski himself does not refer to any particular source for this
concept but the notion was common in the tradition surrounding Twardowski - ac-
cording to Barry Smith 1982 anchored in Brentano's doctrine on ''metaphysical
connections" (metaphysische Verbindungen) deriving from ancient and medieval
ontology. The difference originates both in the traditional difference between sub-
stance and accident and in the various modes of "being in", discerned by Aristotle.
III As noted Twardowski visited Wundt's laboratory. He also promoted the estab-
lishment of psychological laboratories in Poland. Among the numerous psycholo-

gists who were Twardowski's disciples was W, adys, aw Witwicki, who also
studied with Wundt.
Order
Material parts differentiate as to their orders: those parts that are fur-
ther divisible and those which are not.
Material parts can also be differentiated according to their capacity
(or lack of it) for being parts of an object in different ways - red
could e.g. be part of a red ball, the spectrum or all the colours in
which it is an ingredient. Twardowski sees, remarkably enough, both
time, considered as the duration of an object, and spatial extension,
as material parts, subject to this kind of differentiation (ZL p. 51).
Primary - secondary
Formal parts can be primary or secondary: the primary parts are such
relations which obtain between the whole and its parts, the secondary
those that obtain between the parts.
Proper - improper
The proper primary formal parts are those that the whole "has" or
those parts which "form" ("bilden") the whole. There are also other
relations between the whole and its parts however - Twardowski
mentions (ZL p. 52) coexistence when the whole is a thing, or suc-
cession when the whole is e.g. a movement or a time-period. Those
parts are thus improper primary formal parts of an object.
Rank
Proper and improper secondary formal parts (ZL p. 62) may be dis-
tinguished according to theirranks, dependent on the order of the ma-
terial parts between which they obtain.
Metaphysical
The metaphysical part is, as mentioned, not a part on a par with the
other two main kinds: instead the metaphysical part is defmed as that
part which is one of the members of the particular relation obtaining
between the kind of parts and the whole in which the whole "has" the
part or, conversely, to which the part "belongs".112
To make only a few observations on this theory or apparatus of
description:
1. A property is defmed as a relation between parts and the whole.
2. Twardowski rejects the particular way of differentiation be-
tween parts which is fundamental for Hussed: the "existential" dif-
ferentiation (of material parts) which distinguishes between parts that
could exist without their wholes and those that could not (ZL p. 51).
This is a consequence of his theory of judgement, since we treat only
objects of presentation, and so existence should not be involved.
3. The totality ("die Gesammtheit") of all properties from which
all other properties could be derived, by way of causal dependence is
defined as the "essence" of an object (ZL p. 60). (This "essence" is
the "Wesen" - as distinct from the medieval notion of essentia
defined by Twardowski as the property of being presented, (cf. above
p. 67). Twardowski refers in this passage to Sigwart and Hofler for
such an understanding of the notion of essence. 113
112 The notion of metaphysical part is related to the Brentanian notion of "distinc-
tional" part. The latter distinction is related to Brentano's between "distinctional"
and non-distinctional parts (Brentano 1982 pp. 10-25), though Twardowski does
not give a reference when intoducing the term.
Twardowski gives, in an interesting and subtle argument on p. 57-58 in "Zur
Lehre", his reasons for terming the relation between the parts and its whole a
"property" and not one of the members of the relation - i.e. the member which is
"had" in distinction to the "having" member: for a red table it is the table which is
"having" and the redness which is "had".
Thus a property is a relation pertaining between any part of a whole such that
the whole "has" that part - not just between the kind of parts that are only abstrac-
tively detachable, like redness in the example above. An army could consequently
have the property of having n regiments, etc.
IIJ The reference to Sigwart is, however, at least doubtful, since Sigwart considers
the "ideal" nature of the particular interpretation of "concept" to be a ''metaphysi-
cal" interpretation, distinct both from an "empirical" (psychological) and a "logi-
cal" one. Sigwart does not refer to causes (Ursachen) in this context, but "Folgen":
in order to have a metaphysical concept of a thing it is necessary that one realize
"ihre einzelnen Bestimmungen als notwendige Folge ihres einheitlichen We-
Husserl's mereology, as presented in the third Logical Investiga-

tion, contains less distinctions, and may be regarded, from this point
of view, as less sophisticated than both Twardowski's and Brentano's
versions. Husserl distinguishes only between two categories of parts,
"pieces" and "moments". As far as a formal framework is concerned,
however, Husserl advances the theory further than Twardowski, since
he formulates a couple of theses or axioms on parts and wholes in
general.
Twardowski employs mereology for three specific purposes:
a) formal ontology in general, i.e. for the construction of the
general theory of objects,
b) meaning theory, in some intuitive sense related to linguistic
meaning, rather than meaning in all intentional acts. In
particular the meaning of complex expressions is relevant,
c) philosophical psychology, in a sense which focuses on the
relation between the content and the object of presentations as a
correspondence (between parts of contents and parts of
objects).
Twardowski's, albeit moderately, "elementistic" attitude to
mereology separates his approach from Husserl's phenomenology.
For it is precisely the notion of a complex and structured, but still in-
divisible, whole - or "figure" - which underlies the Husserlian idea
of "categorial" intuition as the basis of phenomenological reflection.
Whereas the Twardowskian notion of formal part concerns the rela-
tions between "material parts" of a whole, or between parts and the
whole, the idea of a figural moment as a part, a "quality of the
whole", presupposes that the whole as such is the basis, and that parts
of the whole are determined as functions of the whole.
sens in ihrem Zusammenbange" ... (Sigwart 1924, I p. 325).

Sigwart attributes some kind of non- or more-than-causal status to his funda-
mental principle of "adequacy" ("Ubereinstimmungsprinzip"), which seems to cor-
respond to the kind of necessity assumed between the "components" of essence.
This principle is both "natural" and "normative" - at least judging from the follow-
ing passage in Sigwart's "Logik":
... das Gesetz der Ubereinstimmung < .. >, das, < ... > seine Anwendung nicht
bloss als Naturgesetz, sondem auch als Normalgesetz unseres Denkens finden
kann, ...{lbid. p. 392)
The property of being a whole, or one (unum in the medieval trin-

ity of transcendentalia), however, also determines the possibility of
being one object (cf. the discussion on p. 67). Thus, Twardowski's
notion of object itself is kindred to though still different from the idea
of a "figural moment".
Before leaving the theory of objects for the present, one difficulty
briefly touched upon on page 67 merits being reminded upon, with-
out aspiring at giving a definite verdict on the theory of objects as
such. The interpretation of Twardowski's concf-pt of object of pre-
sentation, as the summum genus of entities, might lead to difficul-
ties related to those of the set-theoretical antinomies. Generally some
restrictions have to be imposed on the summum genus both as re-
gards sets, wholes and objects of the Twardowskian kind. Just as all
kinds of elements are not permissible as set-forming elements, all
kinds of parts cannot be permitted as whole-forming parts or as
combinable. Erdmann's (cf. Appendix II) and other theories of the
order of objects suggest some categories of objects i.e. a kind of or-
der in the combinability.
To Twardowski all presentations (or other psychical phenomena)
have objects. Hence he was unable to suggest some kind of restric-
tion or criterion on combinability. Existence was not applicable as a
criterion for judging whether a presentation could have one or the
other object - since objects of all kinds (possible and impossible)
were accepted. However, as noted earlier, there might be presenta-
tions of un-presentable objects, of non-presented presentations, of
presentations without objects, and so on, parallel to those "sets"
which form the basis for the formulation of the set-theoretical para-
doxes. After Russell the kind of remedy offered is - here as there - a
theory of types or categories of the subject matter studied (e.g. the
Aristotelian standpoint of the "pluralism" of the notion of being), re-
stricting sets or combinability of parts. HusserI formulates a theory of
types, or at least the idea of it, in the Logical Investigations - as a
theory of types of meanings - a theory of semantic categories

(Bedeutungskategorien).114
4.5 THE CONTENT

Twardowski devotes three chapters of "Zur Lehre" mainly to the de-
termination of notion of content of presentations. Due to the
"relativity" stated in T2 (p. 53) between content and object, an ac-
count of contents from the point of view of formal ontology could be
presented as of one species of (non-real) objects, viz. objects of pre-
sentations of presentations (Vorstellungsvorstellungen). This might
seem an innocuous modification, simply replacing a "direct" object
by an "indirect" one. On the other hand, the term 'content' is also in-
troduced by Twardowski precisely to replace Brentano's "secondary"
object of presentation, so as to arrive at a sharp distinction, for every
presentation, between object and content. The question, however,
must be: what kind of description of a presentation may be offered if
we do not involve the object of the (primary) presentation at all?
How do I, using an example frequent in Twardowski's work, de-
scribe a presentation A of a presentation B of a square circle, if I ex-
clude what B is a presentation of, i.e. to neither the squareness nor
circularity of this (impossible) object. The problem resembles the
problem of indirect discourse - the specific difference of which is -
114 Hua XIX p. 326. This kind of theory was regarded as an integral part of any
mereology in the conception of Lesniewski as developed in Lesniewski 1929, and

indeed Lesniewski considered it superior to the theory of types for extensional sets
for solving of the problems raised by the paradoxes. On this issue see also
Wolefzski's chapter on Lesniewski. The most interesting application of this idea is
probably in the formal linguistic field - where the idea of "syntactic connexity" de-
veloped by Ajdukiewicz on the basis of Husserl's and Lesniewski's theory of se-
mantic types has led to the development of categorial grammar and later also
Montague grammars.
These grammars represent a kind of linear or sequential alternative to the tree-
structures offered by the phrase-structure and transformational types of grammar.
The advantage of the categorial grammar is its clear demonstration of functional
dependencies (combinabiIity) - and as such it has also paved the way for the gram-
matical theory called GD-theory which is based on the notion of functional depen-
dence as the only basic notion required in grammatical theory.
he quotation mark. lIs Is the sole difference between the object and
content ofa presentation a kind of mental quotation mark? II 6
The theory of content is the less discussed part of Twardowski's
theory - at least in recent interpretations - but not less important,
considering Husserl's criticism of it as leading to psychologism.
In his unpublished review of "Zur Lehre"l17 Husserl reproaches
Twardowski for having misunderstood Bolzano's notion of
''presentation-in-itself' or objective presentation, identifying it with
the content of a presentation. This misunderstanding, according to
Husser!, is fatal for Twardowski's entire theory of meaning and also
for his philosophy of mind in general, since it is bound to, in Hus-
serl's view, include meaning among individual (private) psychologi-
cal objects.
Twardowski himself, however, considers his notion of content to
be the same as Bolzano's notion of presentation-in-itself, or objective
presentation, Bolzano's subjective presentation being the same as his
own "act".
Bolzano, a.a.O., §. 49. Bolzano gebraucht statt des Ausdruckes "Inhalt ein-
er Vorstellung" die Bezeichnung "objective" Vorstellung, "Vorstellung an
sich" und unterscheidet von ihr einerseits den Gegenstand, andererseits die
"gehabte" oder "subjective" Vorstellung, worunter er den psychischen Act
des Vorstellens versteht. (ZL 17, foot-note **)
This divergence as to the interpretation of Bolzano provides a

background to Husser!' s criticism of Twardowski's psychologism,
though Husserl seems to overstate his point, as described below.
The notion of content is only partly explicated in the
"Habilitationsschrift", It is on the other hand a main theme in
lIS Which could be oral, written or unspoken (situational) - in oral discourse often
tone, gestures or other devices serve this purpose.
116 The problem is treated in some detail by Husserl in K I 62 and also in the lec-
tures on the theory of meaning (Hua XXVI) when trying to state the difference be-
tween object and meaning: indirect discourse and suppositio materialis are cases
where Husserl admits that meaning and object could merge.
117 Hua XXII p. 353, foot-note.

Twardowski's essay from 1898, "On Images and Concepts", to

which we have referred earlier. The main distinction of that text, viz.
that between "anschauliche" and "nicht-anschauliche Vorstellung",
or "image" and "concept", occurs in "Zur Lehre", but does not playa
major role there.
The basic distinction of "Zur Lehre" between act, content and ob-
ject is taken for granted in the later text. "On Images and Concepts"
might actually be read as an explication of the notion of content1l8, as
first introduced in "Zur Lehre". The focus is of course shifted from
the formal-ontological and metaphysical analysis to a psychological
. . .
mqmry m a more proper sense.
An account of Twardowski's theory of content could thus be
based both on "Zur Lehre" (paragraphs II, 12 but also 14 and 15 on
"indirect" presentations, of which general presentations are but a
species), and the essay "On Images and Concepts".
As presented below, in the form of some theses drawn from Twar-
dowski's texts, Twardowski's theory of content does not, in the last
resort, come out as consistent. Though this may break a general rule
of applying a "principle of charity" in interpreting a philosophical
theory, this circumstance anticipates the conclusion that some credit
should be given to Husserl's criticism. The roots of this inconsisten-
cy are likely to be in Twardowski's acceptance of the thesis of the
"double function" of contents of presentation presented in TC 2
below.
TC 1 Contents are not private:
This is a consequence of Twardowski's primary distinction be-

tween acts of presentation and "what is presented". The act is defined
as the "subjective presentation" in Bolzano's sense. (ZL p. 17, foot-
note), the content as "objective". Furthermore, the identification of
contents with meaning (e.g. ZL p. 11), which is identical in both the
speaker and the listener, precludes a "privacy". Clearly this is a
118 Though, due to the relativity of the notion of object, it is of course also the con-
tent as object which we study here, when we submit the notion of content or the
phenomenon of a content of a presentation to examination.
fundamental non-psychologistic feature of Twardowski's theory of

content.
TC 2 Contents are "ideas".
This view is presented e.g. in the second footnote on p. 19 of ZL,

where Twardowski attributes two roles, or tasks ("die zweifache Auf-
gabe") to contents, citing with approval a theory of "ideas" by G.
Noel. 119 These roles are 1) to represent an object to the mind (to be its
"mental substitute") and 2) to constitute the meaning (signification)
of a name. The first of these functions, if kept separate from the se-
cond - is difficult to reconcile with the requirement of TC 1. Though
only explicitly presented in a foot-note the view that one and the
same content could have these two roles might be considered as evi-
dence that the theory is psychologistic in the sense criticized by
Husserl.
TC 3 Contents are "aroused".
This is a term used several times, e.g. in the very definition of con-
tents of presentations given on the basis of the analogy to names (in
language, ZL 12). This raises a question as to the '·pre-existence" of
contents in relation to the presentations in which they are first
aroused. Are we to understand the metaphor of "arousing" or waking
up, as if there are "sleeping" contents, or as if there is some
''procreation'' taking place? In both cases a psychical, singular event
seems to be the most natural interpretation. Understanding content as
meaning, we might on the other hand interpret this "arousing" as the
"giving" of meaning, whatever sense this notion is given (as some-
thing "passive" or "active", individual, social etc.), along the lines
suggested by Husser! in the Logical Investigation No 1.
119 The text referred to is Noel's essay on names and concepts (NoeI1891).
TC 4 Contents are not real.
Together with the act, the content constitutes a real, singular

whole. The content as such is however never real. The tenn "real" is
explained in ZL 36.
ZL 31: Wol bildet er mit diesem [i.e. the act] zusammen eine einzige psy-
chische Realitiit, aber wiihrend der Vorstellungsact etwas Reales ist, fehlt
dem Inhalt der Vorstellung die Realitat immer; dem Gegenstande kommt
bald Realitiit zu, bald nicht.
Now, a counterpart to "real" in traditional philosophical discourse,

and in particular in HusserI, is "ideal" - since the content however
always exists, one may be allowed to conclude that the content is
ideal (which might of course be taken just to repeat TC 2). This the-
sis, clearly, does not give evidence to HusserI's criticism.
TC 5 Contents are psychical.
The description of the content as a psychical object follows from

the classification of presentations as a psychical phenomenon, and
carries with it all the ambiguities of that tenn. As psychical objects
they are available to a specific kind of research in the Brentanian
tradition labelled "inner perception". The notion of "mental substi-
tute", mentioned above, provides further support for the clas-
sification. Both presentations and judgements are labelled the
"psychic correlates" to linguistic expressions (ZL 7), and it is diffi-
cult to assume that only the acts, as the real, singular mental events,
could be alluded to in this context. Whether "artifacts" (e.g. works of
art) - i.e. objects that are not presentations - might have psychic con-
tents in Twardowski's sense is a slightly less trivial issue.
TC 6 Contents are objective.
This may seem to repeat what is said in TC 1 already - except that

the opposition "private"-"public" is replaced here by
"subjective"-"objective". Twardowski obviously does not hold that
there is any contradiction between being objective and psychical in
the sense of the preceding paragraph. To say that contents are objec-
tive however has the corollary that - interpreting also the theory from
1898 in the same spirit - both "images" and "concepts" are objective.
This is less trivial, since to say that two persons could have an intu-
itive presentation ("anschauliche Vorstellung") with the same content
may remove a "picture theory", of the kind criticized by Husserl (cf.
Section 5.3) out of the "immanence sphere". The content is not seen
as a singular event, since it might be shared and therefore is not de-
termined as to space and time. Whether this view also shakes the
privileged (private, subjective) position of "images" or intuitive pre-
sentations, and possibly even the use of "inner perception", for epis-
temological purposes is another issue.
TC 7 The content of judgements is the existence of objects.
This somewhat enigmatic formula, encountered in ZL 9120, origi-

nates in Twardowski's analogy between presentations and judge-
ments, as far as a tri-partite structure (act, content, object) is
concerned. On the other hand, the existence of objects, as such, if not
interpreted as the assertion of existence, is far from something which
we naturally would classify as "psychic". Is the existence of e.g. a
material object anything different from the object, just as the asser-
tion of the existence of an object (i.e. the judgement) is different
from the mere presentation or contemplation of it? Twardowski, like
Meinong in the formula on "the externality of being-so from being-
there" (cf. section 4.6), would perhaps have affIrmed this. But could
the content of a judgement, i.e. existence or non-existence, together
120 Barry Smith claims (B. Smith 1988) p. 336-337, that Twardowski changes his
position in this respect after the criticism directed towards psychologism by Hus-
serlo In later periods the object of judgements, some kind of "state of affairs", dif-
ferent from the object of presentations, is negated or affIrmed. This suggestion is
however already there in 1895, in the lecture on logic, where Twardowski rejects
the full idiogenic theory of judgement and claims that statements on the subsis-
tence of relations could not be reduced to existential judgements. Cf. manuscript
P6 p. 42.
Smith's use of the term "immanent" for the content of judgements does howev-
er not seem to have any support in Twardowski's text.
with the act of judging, fonn a psychic reality just as the presentation
(act +content) does? The analogy seems to break down.
TC 8 The content has parts.
If we take contents simply to be a particular class of objects this

thesis may seem trivial. However, a closer look at the kinds of parts
attributed to contents modifies the appearance of triviality.
The content is by Twardowski in "Zur Lehre" (p. 30) identi-
fied with Kerry's notion of concept (Begriff), a notion which Kerry
claims to have taken from Bolzano. The notion is central to the dis-
cussion on concept and object between Kerry and Frege, referred to
above (p. 21). The discussion between these authors on the strict vs.
"relative" separation between concept and object makes it less trivial
to say that concepts (or Twardowskian contents) have parts. Consid-
ering the classification of properties as parts: is e.g. vagueness a part
of the presentation of "beautiful"? Twardowski's dictum of the dif-
ference between contents and objects as "relative" but still "real" (ZL
p. 63 and p. 29) follows Kerry 121), Contents could be treated as ob-
jects of presentations (viz. presentations of presentations,
"Vorstellungsvorstellungen").
The task to supply a theory of parts - i.e. a mereology -
covering both contents and objects seems to present considerable dif-
ficulties. Some of these will depend upon whether we consider our-
selves to be dealing with a content in both the sense of a psychical
image (mental representation) or a meaning, sense or objective pre-
sentation, i.e. whether we accept that the content has "two roles" as
assumed by Twardowski, following Noel, or not.
121 but opposes Frege's position. Cf. Kerry's detailed polemics with Frege's
"Grundlagen" Vierteljahrsschrift fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie 11 (1887) p.
272 ff. In Frege's reply in "Begriffund Gegenstand" he sees the root of the contro-
versy with Kerry as consisting in their different conceptions of the notion of con-
cept and in the fact that Kerry mixes a psychological component into the notion of
concept. (Frege 1969) p. 97.
TC 9 Contents could be independent or dependent.
The dependence or independence of objects in general is discussed

by Twardowski in terms of parts and wholes, Twardowski expresses
the different status with respect to dependence than other parts in
terms of a differentiation of parts in various categories, such as those
of material vs. formal, "real" (the term is not systematically applied
by Twardowski) and "metaphysical", etc .. I22 A metaphysical part is
in some sense more dependent on "its" whole than the real part. Hus-
sed's distinction in the Logical Investigations between "StUcke"
(pieces) and "Momente" (moments)123 corresponds roughly to Twar-
dowski's distinction between real and metaphysical parts, whereas
Twardowski's distinction between material and formal parts should
be understood as a distinction 124 between qualities and relational de-
terminations (or, if we may take him literally, even relations).
For contents of presentations, the property of being
"detachable" (ablosbar) constitutes the basic criterion of depen-
dence.12S Two contents are said to be undetachable, if they "could not
be presented" without each other. The example of this kind of
122 Cf. Section 4.4.
123 The notion of "moment" is unclear in Twardowski's text itself and in related
contexts. In Twardowski there is the already mentioned (p. 57) difficulty of inter-
preting "moment", when act, content and object are labelled "moments" of the pre-
sentations. Twardowski seems to have abandoned this term relatively soon after his
habilitation thesis. In "Zur Lehre" Twardowski features the concept, without how-
ever disputing its employment, as by Stockl (ZL 84), for the definition of the no-
tion of ''mark'' (Merkmal).
The classical use in German philosophy is otherwise by Hegel - who describes
thesis, antithesis and synthesis as ''moments'' of one and the same dialectical total-
ity. In this case obviously the logical-ontological dependence of the various mo-
ments on each other is the interesting feature.
124 Cf. Segelberg's distinction referred to in footnote 309.
125 Twardowski refers to Brentano, Hofler and Stumpf for the origin of this notion
(ZL 65, footnote) The translation into English follows usage by e.g. Liliana Alber-
tazz; in (Coniglione 1993).
dependence in Twardowski is the relation of the content of a colour

presentation to the content of a presentation of extension (this unde-
tachability is mutual, i.e. obtains both ways, in distinction to the cate-
gories of parts with only one-sided undetachability, as well as,
naturally, detachability).
Detachability is also a basic ingredient in Husserl's notion of es-
sence, as conceived in the Logical Investigations. Those parts that are
"necessary for the existence of their whole" are essential parts. The
relation of "foundation" (Fundierung) is crucial for the ontological
primacy of the whole, in relation to its "founded" or dependent part.
Husserl however does not have to restrict the criterion to only one
class of objects - because he does not in the Logical Investigations
(i.e. the first edition) accept the "principle of externality". In Hus-
serl's later, "pure", phenomenology the situation is however differ-
ent, since a related principle is involved in the phenomenological
reduction. There the relation of detachability is transferred from the
level of existence to the level of essence: Husserl reinterprets the ne-
cessity underlying the notion of undetachability in terms of "essential
laws" instead of "possibility of existence".
TC 10 Contents are directed.
This might be seen as a mere repetition of the principle of inten-

tionality, underlying Twardowski's whole effort - seeing the distinc-
tion of content and object as one manner of explicating intentionality
or directedness. The content is in Twardowski's terms related to an
object, or determines an object, or is a "link" (Bindeglied) between
an act and an object. It seems clear that these terms have different
connotations, some of which permit a picture theory, and some asso-
ciating rather to a theory of intentionality which does not presuppose
"representation". Twardowski's theory might be said to be an attempt
to amalgamate a theory of intentional directedness into a more gener-
al framework of relatedness or structural analogy of composition.
TC II Contents stand for (genuine) names
This thesis is important, both for the solution of part of the prob-
lem of object-less presentations (viz. the problem of "nothing"), and
for the general foundation of the theory of the tripartite structure of
presentations, indicated above. ''Names'' are in this context those
"categorematical" expressions, other than sentences, which have an
"independent" meaning. Some names, accordingly, only look like
names, they are "pseudo-names".
TC 12 All material parts of contents are contents
This does not imply that the contents must be independent (ZL
67), i.e. that they could appear as presentations "in their own right" -
cf. the issue of "nothing" (Section 5.2). Fonnal parts (cf. Section 4.4)
obviously do not constitute parts of the content (e.g. the relations ofa
content are not constituents of the content in the sense of being a con-
tent or a partial content).
TC 13 The correspondence between parts of contents and parts

of objects must pertain between parts of the same order.
This thesis, found on p. 71 in "Zur Lehre", says that there could

not be any correspondence between parts of different orders. There
must always be some kind of parallel order of partition between con-
tent and object: no part of a part of a content could correspond to part
of a part of a part of an object. The notion of correspondence between
parts of content and parts of objects is exemplified by a mathematical
series of integers. This shows that the difference between content and
object also prevails in cases of ideal objects: the content as such - an
ideal object if we adopt the interpretation in TC 4 - corresponds to
another object of an ideal nature.
TC 14 Some parts of the content could be implicit
(ZL 76) An example used pertains to the points on a continuous

line. Now, if the presentation is to be separated from the expression
or description of it (which Twardowski certainly thinks it should),
this idea is difficult to reconcile with a non-psychological interpreta-

tion of the notion of content: for how does one differentiate between
open and implicit parts of a presentation if not by some criterion of
"noticing"? I happen to notice some features of a presentation, but
not others. If we do not apply the notion of content to linguistic ex-
pressions here, it seems unavoidable to apply some kind of psycho-
logical criterion, in order to state that presentations of the points
(infinite in their number) constitute parts of the presentation of the
whole line. One other weakness is the possibility of talking about an
implicit correspondence between content and object, if we acknowl-
edge implicit parts of contents (as for objects this concession is not
controversial: it is clear that we do not in an ordinary sense notice ev-
erything in an object). This invalidates the prima facie uncontrover-
sial thesis of the "inadequacy"126 of presentations.
TC 15 The "arrangement" of the parts of the content is the

form of the content.
This may be taken as part of an atomistic credo on the part of

Twardowski (ZL p. 78). Material parts are "glued together" into
wholes by (primary) formal parts.
TC 16 Contents could be direct or indirect.
(ZL paragraph 14) This is one of the theses which is richest in

consequences: most of the theory presented in "On Images and Con-
cepts" hinges upon the idea of indirect presentations (i.e. contents of
indirect presentations). It is also closely related to the idea of an
"inner form" of language, a dominant theme in Anton Marty's work
(cf. Section 5.3). In fact the distinction between image and concept
and the determination of concepts is dependent on the possibility of
allowing for combinations of presentations (contents). The same ap-
plies to Twardowski's theory of generalities (abstraction). Several
contents may be combined to yield a complex content, which may
however correspond to a (relatively) simple object. An indirect
126 ZL 83
presentation is normally expressed in language as some kind of de-

scription - a "riddle", to borrow Marty's expression (ZL 98), where
the thing asked for is the object. (A clear analogy is Frege's category
of ''unsaturated'' expressions or sentential functions.)
The notion of indirect presentation is difficult as such, notably if
we want to keep the interpretation of contents of presentations as the
objective content. Conceived as images or pictures it might be rea-
sonable to say that the contents of a presentation of a landscape with-
out mountains and a plain respectively are the same, but if we do not
have images at hand, say in the case of abstract terms, this possibility
is closed. Twardowski does however present a solution to this prob-
lem as well (ZL p. 107), which he elaborates somewhat in "On
Images and Concepts". He suggests that all presentations either are,
or are built upon (or accompanied by), images - i.e. a sensualism or
at least empiricism in a rather rigid sense. On the other hand, he is
also very generous as to what ought to be considered an image. The
possibility of combination explains also why Twardowski finds it so
important to reject Kerry's thesis of the equivalence of the "concept
of the concept" and the "concept". 127
Returning to mathematical examples, the identity of two contents,
at least one of which being of a descriptive character or indirect, is
crucial for the theory adopted on the issue of the multiple reference
of contents. Twardowski holds that a content could never refer to
more than one object. On the other hand he holds that this one object
might very well be a second-order object such as a general object.
Twardowski is however far from being categorical on the classifi-
cation of contents as indirect or direct: he even (ZL 110) admits the
possibility of more perfect psychic "organizations" which might be
able to present general objects directly - i.e. Husserl' s "categorial in-
tuition" may be reserved for angels and perhaps God. In that case, the
ability to present generalities only indirectly is a contingent or factual
constraint on the human mind.
127 Kerry distinguishes, despite Frege's allegations to the contrary, between "con-
cept in a logical sense" and concepts "in the head" - although Frege might not ac-
cept Kerry's "concept in a logical sense" as a concept in a non-psychological
sense.{Kerry p. 458)
Concluding this summary of Twardowski's theory of content of

presentations, we might say that it contains a mixture of theses of a
Bolzanian origin (TC 1, 4, 6), and components (TC 3, 5, 9, 16) be-
longing rather within a "psychologistic" current, in as far as the con-
tent is treated as something reminiscent of a picture or an image.
Thus it truly reflects the thesis of the "two-fold tasks" of contents of
presentation.
4.6 DISTINCTIO REALIS
HusserI, nominalism and the distinctio realis
The problem of the ontological status of universals plays a funda-

mental role in Husserl's switch from "psychologism" over to a new
position emphasizing the fundamental importance of "ideal" entities,
or essences, in a phenomenological philosophy. Nominalism as such
often plays an important role for psychologism in philosophy: ifuni-
versals are identified with concrete (singular) entities like mental
phenomena (contents of presentations etc.) the adoption of a particu-
lar category of being of universals ("Platonic" ideas or "Aristotelian"
essences) is mostly assumed as being avoided. Also conversely: for a
number of philosophers - in the 19th and the 20th centuries alike -
who make nominalism a central motive in their theory, psychologism
is appealing (cf. p. 11).
Brentano's first positions 128 were not unequivocal on this issue,
though in his later philosophy nominalism, under the title of "reism"
became a main theme. One of the most consistent nominalists in the
first half of the 20th century is Twardowski's disciple Kotarbinski.
Nominalism was in the Middle Ages often discussed in terms of
the distinction between essence and existence rather than the rela-
tions between concepts (names) and language.
128 An excellent survey of Brentano's work on Aristotle's doctrine of the manifold

meaning of being as well as its relations to Scholastic philosophy is given by
Antonelli. in Brentano Studien III.
OBJECTS OF PRESENTAnONS 97
Two reasons might be given for examining this aspect of Twar-

dowski's and Hussed's relationship in association to the medieval
dispute over the distinction between existence and essence.
One is the role which this pair of concepts from Scholastic ontolo-
gy plays in Twardowski's construction of a general theory of objects.
Twardowski explicitly claims that his theory is a legitimate heir to
medieval and ancient (Aristotelian) thinking on the notions of being
(ens), existence and essence.
The other reason is the role which Hussed, in the framework of his
attack on nominalistic theories of abstraction to which the main part
of the second Logical Investigation is devoted, attributes to this dis-
pute l29 • He criticizes some views ascribed to some of his
"psychologistic" contemporaries, but which originate in Hume. Hus-
sed's reference to Twardowski in this context (Hua XIX/I p. 140 ff.),
though involving a certain misunderstanding, is central to the general
criticism launched against Twardowski.
Chapter 5 (sections 32-39) of the second Logical Investigation is
wholly devoted to a study of Hume's theory of abstraction. Section
36 has the title:
"Humes Lehre von der distinctio rationis in der gemassigten und radikalen
Interpretation."
This section and section 37 contains a criticism of Hume, or at

least a "radical" interpretation of Hume, for making (only) a distinc-
tion of reason, a distinctio rationis, between those objects, from
which abstract ideas are "won", and the ideas themselves, or between
129 Husserl's interest in these Scholastic-sounding issues seems rather cursory,
since he did not return to these matters except perhaps once though with a rather
verbal link to the earlier discussion. In the lectures published in Husserliana XIII,
dating from a period close to the conception of "Ideen", he discusses the notion of
"distinctio phenomenologica", clearly making a travesty of the notions involved
in the other discussion. In that text however he denounces the distinctio realis.
Actually the issue at stake is not the same: what Husserl rejects there is not the idea
of having essences or other idealities as objects or beings but rather the idea that
the phenomenological reduction should be a case of a "real doubt" concerning the
existence of the world (Hua XIII p. 142).
characteristic properties (Merkmale) and objects. Hume's VIew is

rendered as follows by Husserl:
"Merkmale, innere Beschaffenheiten, sind nichts den Gegensmnden, die sie

'haben', im wahren Sinne Einwohnendes." (Hua XIXlI p. 198)
Husserl's considerations in this section refer to a passage in

Hume's Treatise, where Hume criticizes "the schools" - which we
might take to be some standard version of surviving Scholastic phi-
losophyl30 - for making the distinction between an object and its
properties:
Before I leave this subject I shall employ the same principles to explain that
distinction of reason, which is so much talk'd of, and is so little under-
stood, in the schools. Of this kind is the distinction betwixt figure and the
body figur'd; motion and the body mov'd. The difficulty of explaining this
distinction arises from the principle above explain'd, that aU ideas, which
are different, are separable. For it follows from thence, that if the figure
be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distin-
guishable; if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor
distinguishable. What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it im-
plies neither a difference nor separation. (Hume p. 332.)
Husserl's reference to the medieval distinction between essence

and existence sets the general historical framework of his discussion
but he does not explicitly qualify his own position as one of distinc-
tio realis, though this is traditionally the counterposition to distinc-
tio rationis. This is a rather natural reading, just as a reading of
Twardowski's theory of general objects (as well as concepts and
images) as being close to Hume's understanding of the distinction of
reason. Husserl regards Hume's doctrines on abstraction as
130 It might be worth recalling the fact, pointed out by Gilson (Gilson 1962 p.
166), that the terms "schools" and "Scholastic" had more than a terminological sig-
nificance for Hume: Hume, like most of the portal figures to the "modern" era in
philosophy, were not teaching philosophy at the university or in "schools", but
were "private" in their ways of philosophizing and living. One might speculate
whether this is part of a predisposition for the priority of issues relating to the cer-
tainty of knowledge of the individual person!
psychologistic, and identifies the "substantial number of modern Hu-

means" to which he refers with a group of psychologistic philoso-
phers.\31
On closer scrutiny, however, Twardowski's position on abstrac-
tion and the "distinction of reason" turns out to be rather compli-
cated. This is both due to his general "liberalism" on objects of all
kinds, including general objects, and to his theory of wholes and
parts. The latter theory admits a wealth of different kinds of parts -
whereas HusserI claims that the distinctio rationis-position only al-
lows for one basic kind of part, namely the concrete part. Twardows-
ki could thus not simply be associated with nominalism, and neither
could Meinong, who devotes much of his argument to a criticism of
nominalism.132 Objects of presentation do not, in Twardowski's
theory presuppose existence, and so the question of their properties
being really or merely rationally distinct from the objects themselves
might seem vain. Nevertheless, we have already seen that, if one
raises the issue of the existence of e.g. general objects (and Twar-
dowski does so repeatedly), Twardowski sides with Hume rather than
with the "realists": general objects, such as properties etc., do not ex-
ist "in-themselves". Instead they are products of a process of abstrac-
tion, i.e. "higher-order objects", to use Erdmann's, and later
Meinong's terms. 133
HusserI's position in this context was qualified, by some of his
critics - notably Wundt - as imbued with "Scholasticism". This des-
ignation is, according to the interpretation of HusserI' s standpoint in
the period discussed given below, not without ground, if it is not un-
derstood as a kind of direct influence on HusserI by the Scholastic
13I As a distinct representative of a modem Humeanism in many respects, and no-
tably in respect of a distinctio rationis in a radical interpretation, HusserI in the

Logical Investigations points out Hans Cornelius. (Hua XIXII p. 211)
132 Twardowski argues in his lectures in favour of conceptualism. Meinong's posi-
tion is stated in "Uber Gegenstande hOherer Ordnung" and other essays. Peter Si-
mons has given an exposition of some views on nominalism in the Lwow-Warsaw
school, including Twardowski. Cf. Simons 1993.
133 ZL 106.
doctors. 134 Though Twardowski explicitly associates to medieval

thinking, HusserI, in the period before his turn to transcendental
idealism, seems to fit better into the "main stream" of Scholasticism,
viz. Thomism. The rejection of the distinctio rationis is an important
aspect of HusserI' s assertion of the "ideality" of fundamental logical
laws, and even more so of the use which HusserI makes the notion of
essence (Wesen, Essenz, Eidos etc.) in most of his philosophy, from
the Logical Investigations and onwards.l3S.
The medieval distinctions
A general historical vademecum to the notions of existence and es-

sence is found in Etienne Gilson's work (Gilson 1962). 136Gilson
traces the medieval distinction from Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines
on ideas and form/matter over a kind of distinction between existence
and essence ascribed to Boethius, developed by Alfarabi and explicit-
ly stated by Avicenna.137
The distinction between esse or existentia and essentia is not uni-
vocal, nor is there a very consistent use of language in medieval phi-
losophy. A number of more or less synonymous terms are used -
above all interchangingly with essentia138• The main idea behind this
kind of distinction might, very roughly, be that there are, two "sides"
134 What is preserved of HusserI's personal library in the HusserI Archives in Leu-
ven is, as noted above (p. 44), remarkably free of any medieval original texts.
I3S Cf the more penetrating consideration of these notions by HusserI's disciples
Jean Hering in (Hering 1921) and Stein in (Stein 1950).

Of course the common denominator to any interest in Scholastic philosophy
among all the Brentanists is Brentano himself.
136 For readers who know Polish, M. A. Krapiec' works are also rewarding to
study. See Bibliography.
137 (Gilson 1962) pp. 124 and 339.
138 Aquinas gives in his short first work "De ente et essentia" some examples of
these terms and tries to give an account of the relations between the notions
involved.
OBJECTS OF PRESENTAnONS 101
of being: that something exists and what it is: esse or existentia and
essentia. Aquinas, exploiting the Aristotelian act-potency distinction
to explain the difference, suggests that existentia represents the actu-
ality of an entity, whereas essentia is the possible specific wayan en-
tity develops, a "nucleus" of properties, persisting through change. 139
The distinction between existence and essence differs from other
related pairs of concepts (e.g. phenomenon-idea, matter-form,
individual-universal, bearer of properties-property etc.) in that it
places ''pure being" in the foreground, investigating not so much the
"composition" of ultimate parts of entities as the very circumstance
that something exists at all.
The dispute referred to in the passages quoted from Hume and
HusserI was formulated in terms of whether the two "sides" of being
are "really" different or (merely) "rationally" distinct.
Two principal versions of both the distinctio realis and rationis
positions were offered as solutions.
Distinctio realis
1. In the modified versions of the doctrine of the distinctio realis, es-

sence and existence were said to be "distinct but not separated".
There is no such thing as an independent essence, but on the other
hand essences are really there, in the things, and existence is not
something necessarily or at all linked to the essence - it is added to
essence.
2. The radical version would be some kind of "Platonism" (if ever
held by Plato), i.e. essence would have actual being, or essences
should be seen as (primary) substances in themselves. l40
139For an interesting analysis of Brentano 's ontology, focussed on the notions of

substance and accident, see B. Smith 1987.
140 The view imputed to Plato by Aristotle in e.g. Met. 1040 a.

Distinctio rationis
The essence of an entity is only distinguished from existence by way

of an operation of reason or mind. This can be seen in two ways (at
least):
1. Existence is included in essence (this seems to have been the
position of Avicenna). This would on at least some interpretation be
equivalent to saying that existence is a property, or a "real property",
to paraphrase Kant.
2. The opposite standpoint: essence is included in existence, which
means that the nature of things is not anything in itself, but depen-
dent on human reason. This might be taken to be Hume's view, and,
as Husserl suggests in the Logical Investigations, two different inter-
pretations of this standpoint are possible:
a) a "moderate" one, in which a "fundamentum in re" is ac-

cepted as a basis for a distinction, or for the discernment of quali-
ties in a thing,
b) a "radical" one, where the distinction is seen as a pure "habit"
of judgement.
The less radical version (2a) of the distinctio rationis seems to

approach the modified version of the distinctio realis, since to talk
of a rational distinction "with a fundament in the things" must be
close to being equivalent to speaking of a real distinction, which is
not a separation.
Apart from the cited, reasonably clear-cut, versions of the distinc-
tio, other interpretations were advocated, such as the so-called
"distinctio objectiva" or formalis, attributed to Duns Scotus and his
followers. This position is, on the surface, intermediate between the
distinctio rationis and realis. Effectively, however, it amounts to be-
ing equivalent to the distinctio rationis, since it gives absolute pri-
macy to one of the two "components" of being, viz. essence.
The last position seems to have been represented by some
members of the Scotistic tradition, also referring to Avicenna. Gil-
son l41 describes the Scotistic position as accepting a real distinction
between essence and existence, but also declaring existence to be a

modus intrinsecus of essence. This position differs from the Thom-
istic one, characterizing existence as the actus of essence. There es-
sence is regarded as something analogous to potency or possibility,
and only through existence is one allowed to speak of being. In the
Scotist position essence has an indubitable primacy over existence,
being only one of several possible "inner modes" of essence.
Gilson l42 argues that Thomism should be regarded as the true heir
of Avicenna. The doctrine of existence being "added", or even
"accidental", to essence does not, in itself, make a standpoint
"Thomistic".143 The decisive point is in what way it is "added". If as
some kind of "inner mode", one is close to the opposite standpoint -
the distinctio rationis-position. This kind of distinction is what Sco-
tus refers to as a "formal" or even "objective" distinction. The dis-
tinction between existence and essence was, in this version, regarded
as founded in the mode of "objective" or "intentional" being, i.e.
something constituted by human beings, though not as it were disap-
pearing at the whim of individual humans, but rather similar to the
more permanent being of works of art.
It cannot be overly emphasized however, that the distinctio
rationis-position is compatible both with some kind of "essentia-
lism" or idealism in a metaphysical sense, giving ontological primacy
to essences, and to some kind of "existentialism", reism, or even ma-
terialism, which gives primacy to existence, or does not recognize
anything as existing but concrete individuals. This belongs to an on-
tological explication of the, otherwise somewhat surprising, combi-
nations of views in e.g. Hume. Hume unites the absolute primacy of
the individual, as in the quoted passage rejecting the distinctio real-
is, with scepticism as regards the possibility of having knowledge of
anything but "ideas" and relations of ideas, i.e. phenomenalism or
(empirical) idealism.
141 (Gilson 1962) p. 130 and onwards.
142 Gilson is the main proponent of an "act-interpretation" of Aquinas' teachings.
143 As Paczkowska-Lagowska seems to hold.

Twardowski and the "externality of existence" in relation

to essence
Two issues relating to the discussion between HusserI and Twar-
dowski associate to the notion of essence within the framework of the
medieval distinctions indicated above.
The first is the kind of relation obtaining between different proper-
ties making up one essence. This is described by HusserI, in the se-
cond edition of the Logical Investigations l44 i.e. when HusserI has
introduced a more systematic use of the notion of "Wesen", as a
"Fundierungsverhliltnis", obtaining between essences or ideal kinds,
as between wholes and their parts. 145
The other issue concerns the status ofjudgements in relation to ex-
istence, as described in Section 4.2: the Brentanist doctrine of the
"idiogenical" status of judgements as being neither a pure synthesis
of presentations nor a subspecies of presentations.
The first issue contains a basic divergence between the Aristote-
lian (natural-kind-based) view on essences of HusserI and the Twar-
dowskian causal view on essences, referred to above (p. 75-6).
The second doctrine, central to Twardowski's whole theory of
content and object, is formulated in ontological terms by Meinong as
the thesis of the "externality" (Aussersein) of being (existence, Sein)
in relation to essence (Sosein)146 - or, on the logical level, the
idiogenical theory of judgement. This is understood by Twardowski
as a corollary to the Kantian rejection of "existence" as a real
predicate.
Twardowski's position with regard to this issue is ambivalent. On
the one hand he clearly advocates a distinction between existence and
essence on a psychological level: the generalized idea of objects of
144 Investigation III, paragraph 11, Hua XIXII p. 251 ff.
145 Cf. what was said about detachability of parts of contents on p. 73, in relation
to the Husserlian notion of essence/Wesen.
146Also discussed by Roberto Pol; in his article on Twardowski and Wolff (poli
1992).
presentation without commitment to existence presupposes that such

a distinction is possible. On the other hand, the idea of existence as
something "added to" objects of presentation, and asserted or rejected
in judgement, makes existence dependent on a psychic phenomenon
as well. In the last resort a distinction of reason emerges, in the shape
of a standpoint similar to that of Scotus, who (following Gilson)
should rather be sorted into that camp. The distinction between exis-
tence and essence, which was at the basis of the entire idea of the for-
mal notion of object of presentation would therefore pave the way for
a primacy of essence, as the summum genus of objects of
presentation.
Twardowski seems to hold three views in this context:
1. He is an adherent of a radical difference of existence and object-
ivity ("Gegenstandlichkeit", which is: "die Beschaffenheit vorgestellt
zu werden I47", ZL 37), which is precisely the Twardowskian explica-
tion of essence.
2. He subscribes to a Humean theory of abstraction - even more
clearly in his later work "Images and Concepts" than in "Zur Lehre".
3. He states that the notion of object of presentation is equivalent
to the medieval notion of ens, being.
This seems to imply that the doctrine of the "externality" of exis-
tence to essence identifies objects with essences. This might mean,
either that individual entities are sorted out from knowledge proper,
or that essences are identified with individuals, rejecting the thesis
that individual objects have properties that "exemplify" general es-
sences. As mentioned earlier, Ingarden also criticizes Twardowski's
position for eliminating individuals from ontological considerations.
147 Note the optionally dispositional accent of the verb ''werden'', "become". Nev-
ertheless this property of becoming presented is undoubtedly also a property. i.e.
something inherent in the object, i.e. one could well see this property as precisely
that "side" of being which, as it were, lends itself to the perception or apprehension
of cognizing beings. There might thus be other sides, theoretically speaking.
An object in Twardowski's sense would thus be some kind of unit

--essence - not a concrete individual but a "haecceity,,148.
Twardowski's position, in the principal aspect of the distinction
between essence and existence, might be described as follows:
Essence (i.e. the object of presentation) never includes existence.
Existence is always added to it, and is the content of the psychic phe-
nomenon of judgement. In this sense then, the idiogenical theory of
judgement and the neutrality of the object of presentation is but one
way of expressing a real distinction: it is possible to think of an ob-
ject (i.e. to have a presentation) without there existing any object.
Nor does the presentation have to be one of the object as existing. 149
On the other hand, essence-as-such or any general objects (as all
properties-as-such) are only available to the mind after a process of
abstraction, never directly. This means that the essence is not inde-
pendent of the objects in which it inheres. This view would have
come close to the Aristotelian criticism of Plato, had it not been for
the adoption of the "formal" or neutral kind of object involved,
which adopts a perspective from the point of view of - in Twardows-
ki's terms - psychology. The "formality" of the object of presenta-
tion takes Twardowski's theory away from the Scholastic heritage.
Then, however, it seems that this theory could not say anything
about being as such, or ontology. When Twardowski, and the other
advocates of the "externality of being-so from being-there", suggest
that there could be no exception to the fact that there is an object of
every presentation, they also seem to presuppose that some kind of
transcendental reduction or distinction is necessary. The kind of
148 The ontology of "quality moments" suggested by e.g. Ivar Segelberg, Gustav
Bergmann, Wilfrid Sellars and Nelson Goodman, might be regarded as one variety
of this view. In those theories the ultimate constituents of the world are considered
to be neither universal essences nor individual concrete objects but simple in-
stances ("moments") of qualities. This theory comes out as a radical variety of the
distinctio rationis, since one would not talk about something "having" a quality, if
it is by defmition a simple object (i.e. an object without constituents, consisting of
an instance of a quality). Relational properties are not recognized as parts of an ob-
ject in this theory-contrary to Twardowski's theory of parts and wholes.
149
In a "genuine" sense; cf. section 5.3 on intentional existence.
psychology undertaken is not usual psychology, dealing with an in-

vestigation of the facts of human behaviour and mental life, but an
inquiry into formal or "presuppositional" conditions of knowledge.
The formal theory of parts and wholes (mereology) suggested is less
a theory of the real parts and components of the world than an appa-
ratus of description for understanding phenomena, notably psychical
phenomena.
Since Twardowski agrees with Brentano and Kant that knowledge
is discursive I50, i.e. a matter of judgements, the kind of inquiry, in
which he is engaged, is not theory of knowledge but a more basic
theory in the general sphere of investigation of psychic phenomena
(the critique of reason).
Twardowski shares the Brentanian conviction that what is under
scrutiny are real psychical phenomena, primarily the psychical act of
presentation. There would hardly be any sense to in talking about his
investigation of acts and "their" contents and objects respectively, if
it were not a kind of investigation of something in the real world of
human beings, not the structure of a transcendental ego.
The difficulty in Twardowski's position, apart from the practically
unlimited (save for the case of "infinitation" , cf. section 5.3) freedom
to form objects, includes also the role played by existence in the
course of a "negative" definition of objects of presentation, as dis-
tinct from objects of judgement. 151 To deal with this difficulty recent
150 Kant, however, holds that judgements ultimately are combinations of, i.e. re-
ducible to, presentations; he does not represent an "idiogenical" theory of judge-

ments.
151 Barry Smith (B.Smith 1988) claims that Twardowski changes his position in
this respect, by adopting a kind of separate category of objects of judgements -

"Sachverhalte" - similar to Meinong's "Objektive". The role of relational judge-
ments, mentioned on p. 46, as well as the role played by "presented judgements"
for the determination of the notion of concept in the essay from 1898, manifest
some kind of hesitation, but it is difficult to find an explicit change of views. Gen-
erally speaking, Twardowski changed his position towards an adoption of the later
Brentanian doctrine of "reism" in his writing and teaching as from about 1910.
This is a position which is clearly close to a radical distinction of reason, since
only a very restricted category of objects (Le. "things") was admitted as
non-fictitious.
advocates of Meinong's "Gegenstandstheorie" have found it neces-

sary to rely on a "new" logic, the so-called "free logic", which ex-
plicitly counts existence as a property. 152
Husserl's position, at least in the period from the abandonment of
psychologism, via the adoption of ideal contents in the beginning of
the 1890s, till some time around the publication of "Ideen I", seems
to tend towards a more "Thomistic" standpoint of a real distinction,
compatible with epistemological realism. 153This is linked to the cen-
tral role of notions like "categorial intuition" and later
"Wesensschau", which presuppose that we are in some way able to
grasp directly not only individual objects but also generalities, ideas,
or essences.
After the publication of the first part of the "Ideas", Husserl tends,
however, to emphasize the derived nature of essences: they are often
described as the outcome of some process of abstraction or at least
constituted as some kind of common or resting element in a set of
changing individual objects. This view is already perceivable as early
as in "Die Idee der Phanomenologie" from 1907, but it is later devel-
oped in terms of a more explicit emphasis on the constitution as a
necessary ingredient for the understanding of the notion - in other
words a descriptive understanding more than an intuitive one. 154
According to Gilson, the modern era, ISS, ignored the Thomistic or
the other modified versions of the distinctio realis, or simply identi-
fied this view with a more radical ("Platonist") conception. As a
152Cf. Lambert and B. Miller 1986. The latter author argues that existence, but not
non-existence, is a property.
153 A position, close to the one advocated by Scotus, is taken by Hussed's faithful
but more Scholastically erudite disciple Edith Stein.(Stein 1950 p. 98).
154 Phanomenologische Psychologie (Hua IX p. 75). This view on essences ap-

proaches the view of abstraction - of course now transformed into constitution -
held by Hume and Twardowski.
ISS Beginning in this case with Suarez, not Descartes.. Suarez was the teacher of
Descartes' teachers in the Jesuit college of La Fleche. (Gilson 1962 p. 158). Cf.
also Stein 1950.
reaction to this version a kind of distinctio rationis was taken for

granted l56 Even philosophers, like Wolff, who deliberately associated
to Aquinas J57, seem to have accepted Suarez' rather misleading ac-
count of the Thomistic standpoint.
If Gilson is right, it seems fair to say that Husserl, by his refusal to
accept a Humean theory of abstraction based on a psychological in-
terpretation of "ideas", and a distinctio rationis-position, broke with
this tradition, introducing his theory of "categorial intuition", and
later "Wesensschau" ("ideation"): the idea that general objects are
given to intuition with the same right as that granted by perception to
individual objects. To Husserl, knowledge always, just as to the em-
piricists, had to be justified by its origin in pure intuition. If there
were not some kind of "real" distinction between the individual being
and its essence (viz. the "ideal"), it would be difficult to claim that
our perception of this nature is anything but a habit of thinking, i.e.
not founded in the "thing (Sache) itself', which is the radical inter-
pretation of the Humean doctrine criticized by Husserl.
Husserl's position in the Logical Investigations, laid down already
in his first confrontation with psychologism during the period inves-
tigated here, should be interpreted as a "moderate" position of dis-
tinctio realis,
Twardowski's views are, as mentioned, ambivalent. If his
"Humeanism" is taken as the basis of interpretation, he should no
doubt be situated in the opposite camp. Significant in this context are
not only his theory of abstraction and his explicit rejection of the ex-
istence of ideas or general objects (ZL 106), but also his view of the
notions of essence l58 and "Wesen".159 For "Wesen" Twardowski
claims some kind of causal cohesion to be central - all properties
156 Cf. Gilson 1962 Ch V.
157 Cf. Poli's proposals on the direct influence of Wolff on Twardowski and Mei-
nong, pp. 43 and 97.
158 Defmed as in the passage quoted on p. 67.
159Not treated as synonymous with essentia, which he relates directly to the views
of Avicenna, Suarez and Aquinas.
being in some sense causally "derivable" from the Wesen of an ob-

ject (ZL 60). This indicates a distinctio ration is position.
Twardowski's position contains elements from various theories:
actually the theory of objects might be understood as a method of
overcoming the opposition between the real vs. rational distinctions,
in the following way:
1. From the "psychological" point of view which Twardowski ap-
plies it is not possible to make any distinction between an object
and its properties, other than as one between a complex whole and
its parts. Such parts must be regarded as particulars and the gener-
al objects abstracted as fictional (higher-order-objects). Thus a
distinctio rationis.
2. From the point of view of the pure theory of objects of presen-
tation, there is an absolute and unbridgeable gap between object
and existence l6o : presentating an object does in no way commit
one to an assertion of its existence. The "existence" of objects of
presentation is only a modified existence - not existence properly
speaking. 161 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of speaking of objects
even allows for a whole science dealing with objects in general-
the science formerly named metaphysics, but in Twardowski's
(Erdmann's, Meinong's) terms - Gegenstandstheorie, which for
all essential purposes is equivalent to the Aristotelian science of
being as being. Thus a distinctio realis.
To Husserl causality is the very nucleus of factuality, and factual-
ity is, at least as from Husserl's more systematic development of the
notion of "Wesen" in Ideen I, the counterpoint to essentiality (the
Husserlian basis of the apriori in that work). Effectively, Husserl had,
at the stage of development examined here, before the Logical
Investigations, not developed any distinct notion of essence (Wesen)
at all. 162 This may explain why he does not object to Twardowski's
160 And the view of higher-order-objects as fictitious would seem to presuppose

that the only objects of which we could make true judgements of existence are the
first-order-objects.
161 Cf. Section 5.3 on intentional existence as modified existence. For a more re-
cent version of this thesis cf. Segelberg 1947 p. 47.

notion, despite his rather thorough-going scepticism regarding Twar-

dowski's project of explaining a number of philosophically central
notions in terms of ontological (mereological) concepts and their
relations.
The plausibility of Twardowski's view largely depends upon the
notion of a "modified existence" as well as examples and descrip-
tions of this kind of existence. Much of the theory loses its coherence
if one applies an interpretation of existence closer to substantial be-
ing. It is no coincidence that HusserI devotes so much effort to under-
standing in a new way (though largely guided by Brentano and
Stumpf) the ideas of independent being, independent object and inde-
pendent (categorematical) meaning - all notions essentially related to
the traditional notion of substance as that which "needs nothing else
in order to exist".163
Ingarden's main criticism of Twardowski's theory and similar pro-
posals is precisely that they do not leave room for an explanation or
understanding of the notion of "autonomous" individual being. Ingar-
den sees this as a kind of idealism - seen as a theory which explains
all objects as "functions" of acts of human beings. But this amounts
to, as far as essences are concerned, the thesis of a mere distinction of
reason: it is the human being who imposes the "divisions of the phe-
nomenal field" - not the phenomenal field which "forces" a certain
division on us.
162 It is doubtful whether he ever did, despite the central position of this concept in
his philosophy, as has been demonstrated by the criticism submitted by Hering, In-
garden and Stein.
163 One formula, quoted e.g. by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit (p. 92), is Descartes'
res••••, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum (the text is from Oeuvres. Ed.
Adam Tannery Vol Viii: Principia I n.S3, p. 2S)
CHAPTER 5
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS

PRESENTATIONS
5.1 THE PROBLEM

In previous sections we have endeavoured to draw up the main fea-
tures of the general theory of objects and contents of presentations
developed by Twardowski.
The basic thesis of Twardowski's theory of objects was formu-
lated as follows (p. 53):
T l' All presentations have objects.
An alternative formulation might be termed as follows:
T I" There are no object-less presentations.
Any proposal that there exist presentations without objects will be

irreconciliable with Twardowski's theory as such. Therefore the issue
of object-less presentations assumed a catalytic role for the devel-
opment of Twardowski's ontology. It will be necessary for
Twardowski to demonstrate that all examples of putative object-less
presentations could be dealt with in the framework of his theory.
Twardowski's proposals for dealing with the problems occurring in
this context are central to the criticism which HusserI directs towards
his theories.
The fundamental task of Twardowski's theory was to explain
Brentano's idea of "directedness" as mark of any psychic phenome-
non and to clear it from certain deficiencies.
The idea of directedness as a characteristic of psychical phenome-
na is ambiguous at least in the following basic respect: is direc-
tedness a relation or a quality of the act?
113
114 THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTATIONS
Brentano's doctrine of the immanence of the object of the "inner"

perception - i.e. the act itself or consciousness - is designed to take
care of this problem by simply declaring that the object of this inner
perception (the secondary object) is different from the "ordinary" or
''transcendent'' (the primary) object. l64 Whereas the relation to the
primary object undoubtedly is a genuine relation with two members,
the relation to the inner or secondary object is not a genuine relation
but some kind of pseudo-relation or "containment".
Twardowski explicitly relates his views to Brentano's in a foot-
note (ZL p. 18). Twardowski did not accept the theory of intentiona-
lity offered by Brentano - for the obvious reason that it contains two
objects. Twardowski is not prepared to call Brentano's secondary
object an object at all. Instead he suggests the notion of content, since
in some sense the secondary object is part (a component) of the
presentation.
For Twardowski, whenever we have a presentation of something
that does not exist, in the normal sense of the word thesis T 7 is chal-
lenged, due to the aspiration to uphold the Brentanian doctrine of in-
tentionality, consisting in being directed towards an object, as the
characteristic feature of psychic phenomena, and at the same time re-
fusing to accept the "secondary object" as object.
Brentano defends his general thesis of intentionality as the
directedness-to-an-object of all psychic phenomena by stating that
the secondary object is still there, even if there is no primary object.
Brentano's explanation in Twardowski's view must, however, be ad
hoc and in effect equivalent to older picture theories. Consequently it
fails to express the fundamental feature of directedness.
Twardowski's particular problem with object-less presentations is
thus linked to his general view that objects, in a ''primary'' sense, are
linked to all presentations. For him, unless he could explain the very
common situation of people having presentations without there being
anything there, he could not uphold the doctrine of intentionality,
164 Cf. e.g. Psychologie p. 106:

Wo immer ein psychischer Akt Gegenstand einer begleitenden inneren Er-
kenntnis ist, enthaIt er, ausser seiner Beziehung auf ein primares Objekt, sich
selbst seiner Totalitiit nach als vorgestellt und erkannt.
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTATIONS 115
understood as directedness towards an object, as a mark of psychic

phenomena. It is thus necessary to build up a theory which does not
allow for any exceptions to the rule that all presentations have
(primary) objects. In other words: all presentations - and therefore all
psychic phenomena-in some sense "have" objects. We have already
seen how this requirement led him to the suggest a general theory of
objects, and a notion of object also wide enough to cover objects
which do not exist, in the common sense of this word.
To understand not only Twardowski's, but all similar theories of
objects of presentations, we are forced to inquire in some more detail
into the arguments and background of his position - in addition to the
general argument from the "alternating presentations" (Wechsel-
vorstellungen) mentioned above (p. 50).
The importance of the issue of the object-less presentations thus
lies in the necessity of including considerations of objects, however
defined, in a description of presentations. If it is optional to include
an obj ect in the description of a presentation, just as in the case of
names common sense assumes that some names only pretend, but do
not in fact name, then it is clear that the issue of objects takes on a
much less significant role. The analogy to language suggests itself by
Twardowski's explicit inspiration from Mill's theory of names. What
is not a problem for Frege's theory of meaning of language - i.e. that
some names do not have reference but only sense - becomes a criti-
cal issue for Twardowski. For the analogy between the level of pre-
sentations and the level of names in language to hold, all genuine
names must (by definition) refer, or "have reference/referents". This
analogy is however fundamental to Twardowski's definition of the
notion of presentation as such, as the minimal unit of the sphere of
psychic phenomena.
The theory proposed by Twardowski might in one sense be said to
constitute a first break with psychologism, instead of being a
psychologistic theory: Twardowski, along with Brentano, assumes
that any satisfactory description of presentations must give regard to
what they are presentations of. The description must, in this sense, be
non-immanent or teleological (functional). In other words, there is no
adequate description of a presentation only as a psychic event taking
place in someone's mind or head, or as the content of this event
(what is "in the event").165 What is presented through the presentation

must be taken into account. Twardowski is one step further than
Brentano from psychologism, in the sense that Twardowski does not
see any kind of object as being "in" the presentation, despite the fact
that he refers to the object as an aspect or "moment" of the presenta-
tion. What is "in" the presentation is the content. This is why the dis-
tinction of content and object is crucial, even if we do talk about both
as being "what is presented" (das Vorgestellte).
If the object is never "in" the presentation, still two problems
remain:
1. The status and nature of objects, more specifically the possible
"dependence" of objects on presentations. 166
2. The nature of content; in particular its "subjectivity" or imma-
nence, as related to the function of meaning, as well as the Bolzanian
notion of presentation-in-itself. If all content is meaning and all
meaning is taken in the sense of objective content (ideal content) - is
there any controversial sense in which content is psychical?
165 Similarly, without pressing the analogy, there is no point (or at least it is rather
pointless) to describe the essential features of a chair, without mentioning that its
function or role is to let people sit on it (naturally talk about points or senses to a
certain extent prejudges the issue, due to the teleological character of these
expressions).
The expression "adequate description" or specification of the (content of) a
presentation to some extent only circumscribes the standpoint or the prejudgement
that there is something more to a description of a psychic event than an
"immanent" description - or that psychology must necessarily also concern itself
with what is not "in the psyche". This has also to do with the degree of liberalism
as to the use of the preposition "in": do we allow ourselves to use it in a non-
spatial sense or do we want to restrict its use to spatial internality in this context?
166 This is a problem which, speaking in Kantian terms, could in its tum be under-
stood in two senses: either as a "transcendental" problem, concerning the
"epistemic conditions" of objects, or as an empirical problem, concerning the in-
herence. Cf. Allison. As recalled, Benno Erdmann, one of Twardowski's inspirers,
was the editor of Kant's works, and the revival of transcendental philosophy was
just taking place. As mentioned (p. 47) Twardowski does not share the aversion to
Kant felt by some of his predecessors in the Bolzano-Brentano tradition.
Twardowski does not consider his view an uncontroversial thesis

- he introduces it in the course of a polemic with Bolzano, Kerry and
Hofler, who all explicitly hold that there are presentations without
objects. As mentioned, Frege 167 subscribes to an analogous view on
the linguistic level, for names. For Bolzano and Frege the explana-
tion rests upon the "senses-in-themselves" or "presentations-in-
themselves" (Vorstellungen-an-sich) - i.e. "objective content" as
reappearing in Husserl. l68 This position is commonly labelled
"realism" of universals, though it is certainly "modified" in the case
of Bolzano and Husserl, rather than "Platonism". Twardowski's lib-
eralism as regards the scope of the notion of object allows him to dis-
pose of these senses-in-themselves: he prefers to accept non-existent
objects as referents of presentations, thus preserving the reference
function for all presentations. Whether this is a satisfactory solution
is the main issue of the controversy between Husserl and Twar-
dowski in the texts examined below.
5.2 TWARDOWSKI'S SOLUTION

Twardowski's distinction between act, content and the object of a
presentation (and accordingly also other psychic phenomena) has
been introduced in Chapter 4. In this section the application of this
distinction to the solution of the problem of object-less presentations
will be presented. I will be necessary to introduce one of the lin-
guistic technical terms lying behind Twardowski's use of the notion
of intentional existence. The solution Twardowski offers to the
problem of object-less presentations will then be discussed mainly
167 See e.g. "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung", where Frege clearly refers to some names
having sense but not reference, which Frege at this time regards as equivalent with
having an object. He even suggests that the "Bedeutung" of the name is the object.
Frege's view on reference (not sense) is in this respect taken over by Wittgenstein
in ''Tractatus'', cf. 3.203.
168 At least in the early period, including the first edition of the Logical Investiga-
tions. The notion of ideal content becomes less important after the introduction of
the phenomenological reduction and transcendental thinking in general in Husserl.
around three groups of putative counter-examples offered by

Bolzano.
Bolzano suggests the following examples of kinds of presentations
which do not have objects (Twardowski quotes §67 of the
"Wissenschaftslehre"), namely presentations of I) Nothing, 2) a
round square, 3) a green virtue and a golden mountain. 169
Twardowski's own position on the issue of object-less presenta-
tions is presented in §5 of"Zur Lehre", as mentioned largely as a po-
lemic with Bolzano. Bolzano' s general influence on Twardowski as
regards the distinction between object and content as such, explains
why the issue also takes on a general significance for Twardowski's
entire outlook.
Modifiers and "The painted landscape"

As mentioned above (p. 50), Twardowski, in order to elaborate the
thesis that all presentations have objects, i.e. that a satisfactory theory
of intentionality is not dependent upon the assumption of some kind
of secondary objects of the Brentanian type, recurs to a linguistic J70
distinction between the modifying and determining uses of adjectives
in language (logical predicates).
Twardowski suggests that we contemplate the example of an artist
who has painted a landscape. When talking about a "painted land-
scape", we could have either of two things in mind: the landscape in
front of the artist, of which he makes a picture, and the picture itself-
or at least the motive of the picture (or the work, of course the painter
could in some sense have made pictures of the same scenery before).
It is clear that the first kind of object is something different from the
169 Actually, the incompatibility between the terms of the complex expressions
"green virtue" and "round square" is different in each case. The fact that colour de-
tenninations do not, in a "nonnal" use of language, apply to abstract objects ex-
cludes the first case, whereas the other case of incompatibility rests upon the
contradictio in adiecto of the expression "round square".
170 'Linguistic' means here: "relating to the theory of language", not relating to
language.
second: the grass, stones and water are not in any sense identical
with the canvas, oil and colour of the painting, that is a physical ob-
ject, and still less with the motive, work or figure, possibly "in the
mind" of the artist.
Now, using the same words - "painted landscape" - for both the
scenery in front of the artist and the thing he is producing on canvas,
one exploits the differences between the "modifying" and the
"determining" uses of predicates, as defined by Brentano. 171The
modifying use changes the meaning of the whole predicate. In this
context this is crucial, since the example involves both human inten-
tionality in general, including the production of "purely intentional
objects" (in medieval terminology, like works of art), and the idea of
representation or picture (someone must always be involved for
something to be a picture) as such irrespective of the production or
action of some kind.
The notion of a modifying use of adjectives/predicates concerns
the interior structure of predicates 172 - i.e. complex predicates, since
what is discussed is the role of one part of the complex predicate with
regard to the whole of it. This means that the syntactic category of
modifiers is different from other predicates.
The situation might be expressed as follows:
Assuming that the adjective "dead" is used as a modifier,
171 The distinction between modifier and determinator is closely related to the one
between proper and improper (eigentlich and uneigentlich), which will also playa
central role in Husserl's argument and proposed solution (based on assumptions).
The editor of the second edition of the "Psychologie", Oskar Kraus only refers to
Anton Marty for the further elaboration of this pair of notions.
172 The term "predicate" is taken in its logical sense, to be distinguished from its
grammatical sense. The term used by Twardowski is "adjective". In linguistic
analysis adjective is normally included among those parts of language which are
part of the "nominal phrase", which roughly corresponds to the older syntactical
category of "subject". To say that the adjective is part of the predicate rather than
the subject thus actually presupposes an transcription or analysis like the one un-
dertaken in standard predicate logic, where the "subject" of traditional grammar is
void of content. Brentano's idea of transforming all categorical statements into ex-
istential statements is one variant of a radical transfer of all descriptive content to
the logical predicate. Cf. Ulfstedt 1984.
from
"There is a dead man"
does not follow
"That object is both dead and a man",
since the modifying function of 'dead' does not allow dead men to be
men in a genuine or proper sense.
In the case of an "ordinary" or determining adjective (''white'',
"round", etc.) - or part of a predicate - the corresponding conse-
quence however pertains. Other examples of modifiers might be
"former", "imagined", "faked", "false", "putative" etc.
The word "painted", in the context just cited, belongs to a catego-
ry of terms which is ambiguous in an interesting way: they might or
might not be used as modifiers. 173 To this class of predicates belong a
number of expressions describing results of human actions and thus
fundamentally involving some kind of reference I 74 be it to an "origin"
or to something represented.
Another example might be given in. the context of a criminal court
trial. The expression "the described action" could be used, in the pre-
sentation of the prosecutor, for something which really took place
and then "happened" to be described by someone. On the other hand,
the same phrase might be used by the defence, for something quite
different, viz. an action assumed by the prosecutor to have taken
place but not really having taken place. The term "described" is then
173 There is a whole scale of possibilities - depending upon the tolerance within
the linguistic or cultural community concerned as to the use of both the adjectives
and the noun determined (modified) by it. One example is precisely 'dead' where
usage and custom varies from regarding dead persons as persons in a genuine
sense to being just corpses. Rituals surrounding dead bodies and the respect, often
also protected by law, payed to no longer living persons express the view applied
in the particular culture concerned.
One might accordingly distinguish between "pure" modifiers like "false",
"faked", "putative", "pretended" on one hand and "semi-modifiers" like the ones
we are interested in here: "presented", "imagined", "intended", "thought-of', etc.
174 "Reference" is not used in a technical semantic sense here - but rather in a
sense related to Heidegger's "Verweisung" i.e. a very ''primitive'' kind of
''pointing away".
used in a modifying sense by the defence, but in a determining sense

by the prosecutor. Only the judge will terminate this ambiguity, on
an official level. Had the defendant correctly declared himself not
guilty, the action had only existed "in the mind" of the prosecutor
(and perhaps indirectly in the minds of those of the other participants
in the trial, including the defendant, albeit then perhaps with the par-
ticular colouring like: "the absurd allegations of this vicious prosecu-
tor!"). It is clear that, although the two parties in the trial use the
same expressions, they do not understand it the same way: there is
ambiguity of a particularly tricky kind.
There are means of expressing the distinction, contextually or by
some device which does not belong to the part of discourse normally
reflected in writing, like tone or extra stress of pronunciation. The
object described either as a result of an action or rather a type of ac-
tion might be emphasized on the one hand, or the "content" of the ac-
tion, or the action itself on the other hand. One might stress the
object as something entirely independent but only accidentally
''touched'' by an action. 175
The issue is however not as straightforward that one can simply
decide (as in court) which of the uses of the expressions concerned
we are to apply though this solution seems in fact to be the one Twar-
dowski had in mind. Precisely the cases where we do not know
whether we have to do with something "real" or something "merely
imagined" - such as situations of questioning, or research - are mod-
el situations where we have to use the "semi-modifiers" dealt with
175 Examples of rites may illustrate: the notion of ''transsubstantiation'' in Scholas-

tic theology aims at explaining why bread and wine, after the consecration in the
eucharist, are not ''truly'' bread and wine, but the body and blood of Christ. They
do not represent the body and blood (in the way in which a sign represents) but are
body and blood, precisely because the consecration has transformed the substance
into another substance.
Similarly, the painter may be said to transform the substance of oil, colour and
canvas into a picture. More generally: every product of some action is a trans-
formation of a raw material in the sense that the essential, adequate or
''meaningful'' description could or should not omit to mention the function or role
the product plays for the user, the new "essence", while still not ignoring the
"origin" of the product.
here in their, as we might call it, "problematic,,176 function. Only af-

ter the problem has been solved, the question answered, and so on,
are we able to establish whether the expression was used in a modify-
ing or a determining sense.
In Twardowski's example the predicate 'painted' assumes in the
first sense a constitutive role: a picture could not be a landscape, un-
less in a "modified" sense (in this case being the object or motive
painted). In the second sense, 'painted' just adds a relational predi-
cate to the description of the natural landscape concerned. It is thus
not a constitutive, necessary or essential component in the land-
scape, and thus "detennining".
The predicate in focus here is the general predicate "presented" or
rather, using the substantivicized fonn, "the presented" or "what is
presented" (das Vorgestellte), as referred to in the previous chapter
(p.49).
Twardowski's point in illustrating the two different uses ofpredi-
cates by the "painted-landscape-parable" is to allow for a generaliza-
tion to all presentations: the painted landscape in the modified sense
is in fact not a landscape at all, just a picture of a landscape. "What is
presented", in the analogously modified sense, is not at all the same
as the object presented. Twardowski even uses the expression,
though within quotes, "a psychic picture" (ZL 9) for a provisional
designation of the content, and thus makes use of the obvious distinc-
tion between the picture and the object depicted in order to differenti-
ate between content and object of presentations. The content is an
object only in a modified sense - i.e. it is not an object at all, al-
though it is related in a special way to "its" object, just as a dead man
is related in a special way to a genuine man. After all a dead man
must have been a man in order to be a non-genuine (dead) man now.
176 Cf. Kant and Twardowski's reference to his deliberations on the "problematic"
use of the notion of object ZL 34 and KRV B 346 for the context of "notbing" and
B 310 for a definition of a ''problematic notion":
Ich nenne einen Begriff problematisch, der keinen Widerspruch enthiilt,. der
auch als eine Begrenzung gegebener Begriffe mit andem Erkenntnissen
zusammenhiingt, dessen objektive Realitiit aber aufkeine Weise erkannt wer-
denkann.
This peculiar relation could also be expressed as it were from the

object perspective: the object is presented through the content. The
nature of this "through" or "by means of' is often regarded as in
some sense, or in some cases, undefinable or primitive, which does
not prevent Twardowski from devoting a whole chapter to the theme
of the relations between the object and content (Ch. 12 of "Zur
Lehre"). We shall also see below that precisely the issue of the rela-
tion between the content and "its" object is central to HusserI's criti-
cism. Twardowski's reference to the notion of being presented
''through'' a content is related to the medieval distinction between id
quo and id quod (that by which and that which) as "objects" of
presentation. 177
A linguistic model
Psychologism in philosophy is, when criticized by HusserI, mostly
contrasted with a theory involving "ideal entities". Today most critics
of psychologism rather tend to contrast psychologism
("mentalism"178) with a priority given to considerations of language,
language use, rules for language "behaviour" or linguistic acts. Just
as in the case of psychology there is a dispute regarding the border-
line between a philosophical kind of psychology and a non-
philosophical or empirical psychology, there is disagreement as to
the possibility or necessity of undertaking a kind of philosophical in-
quiry into language without being particularly concerned with lin-
guistics or empirical theory of language. The role, functions and
methods of theory or philosophy of language were, as noted already,
177 Twardowski refers to Zimmermann for this terminology. ZL 18-20.
178 There is reason to observe the distinction between psychology and mind also in
this context: the 19th C advocates of psychologism did not necessarily advocate
mentalism in some (normally pejorative) sense attached to the term today. General-
ly, advocating research into the mind or psychical phenomena as a method for
solving philosophical problems does not necessarily imply that the subject matter
of science or common sense knowledge in general is in some sense mental or
psychical.
the subject of intense discussion among philosophers and linguists in

the years when Twardowski published his dissertation. 179
Twardowski's theory of mind is, as indicated in Chapter 4, in two
ways interconnected with theory of language:
1. Theory of language, in a shape inspired by John Stuart Mill,
furnishes the form of the theory of acts, contents and objects of
presentation, i.e it determines the central notion of presentation it-
self. Twardowski himself refers to Mill's theory of language -
more precisely that part of it which deals with the two-fold func-
tion of "names", viz. those expressions that have an independent
descriptive function (categorematic expressions, i.e. roughly
those that are in contemporary linguistic theory termed "noun
phrases"), as inspiring his own theory of the triple function of
names in relation to presentations.
Twardowski's contention is, that the three functions of a name are
"analogous" to the three "roles" (Momente) of presentations:
Die drei Funktionen des Namens sind demnach: Erstens die Kundgabe
eines Vorstellungsaktes, der sich im Redenden abspielt. Zweitens die Er-
weckung eines psychischen Inhaltes, der Bedeutung des Namens, im An-
gesprochenen. Drittens die Nennung eines Gegenstandes, der durch die
von dem Namen bedeutete Vorstellung vorgestellt wird. (ZL 12)
2. The role of theory of language for Twardowski's construal of

the functions of presentations also determines the position of
theory of language itself. In the passage quoted Twardowski de-
termines meaning (Bedeutung) by reference to the (in some sense)
psychological notion "content" of presentations and also sees an
analogy between the other functions of names and the other
"moments" of a presentation.
It is, however, more difficult to understand how the three func-
tions of a linguistic category of expressions could correspond to, or
be analogous to, the three "moments" of a presentation, and still less
179This debate is perhaps better reflected in standard handbooks on linguistic

theory than in philosophical text-books.
three interpretations of the tenn ''presentation''. In "Zur Lehre"

Twardowski does not talk about 'functions' of presentations, but ei-
ther about the meaning of the term presentation or about the three
different "moments" of a presentation. In both cases, however, we
seem to have three different objects or entities (constituents), not
three different sets of qualities or relational properties of one and the
same object.
"Nothing"
The first example among Bolzano's object-less presentations, that is
the presentation of nothing, is rather easily dealt with in Twardows-
ki's view, although Twardowski's solution is, as we shall see, par-
ticularly interesting. It rests on a linguistic argument, and
presupposes that there is no complete correspondence between lan-
guage and presentations.
What Twardowski claims is that this class of putative object-less
presentations is void, simply because there is no such thing as a
presentation of nothing. lso He argues as follows: The expression
180 It should perhaps be observed that quotes may also be used to mark names (in
the more current contemporary use, not Twardowski-Mill' s use!) of presentations.

n.b. contents of presentations (i.e. not only names of linguistic expressions).
"Nothing" may thus be taken to be the name of both the linguistic term and the
name of the presentation of nothing. Twardowski does not have to deny that there
is a name of a linguistic term, and can also claim that there is a name denoting the
non-existent presentation of nothing (this non-existent presentation is an object in
our ''psychological'' considerations). As long as we are aware of the possibility of
differentiating between terms and presentations, no particular harm is caused by
this ambiguity of the quotes.
Ifwe want to be more exact, other conventional marks might be applied to dist-
inguish between names of expressions and names of presentations, e.g. by writing
names of presentations Gust like any proper name) in capital initials. This conven-
tion might be more fitting, since what we do is not exactly to quote.
"The presentation Nothing exists" could thus be true to Twardowski, since we
are free to baptize any presentation of ours by any name, be it as bizarre as No-
thing Gust like Ulysses!): names do not have to say anything about the object they
name. "The presentation nothing does not exist" would be true for quite another
reason - since it denies that nothing (das Nichts) is a presentation, which it is ob-
"nothing" is not "categorematic" - which for Twardowski means to

signify181 a presentation. The function of the term is simply that of be-
ing a component of negative sentences, not that of a name. Only
names (albeit in the extended sense given to this term by Mill) have
the kind of correspondence to presentations referred to in and utilized
for Twardowski's theory of presentations. This means that there is
some kind of restriction or constraint on the possibility of generating
names from other names, or equivalently, presentations from other
presentations. Generations which infringe upon this constraint only
give quasi-names - such as "nothing,,182.
The constraint which Twardowski uses to prove his case is the
medieval notion of "infinitation": the use of negation for generating a
noun from a noun is allowed only if there is a superior or more com-
prehensive class of objects than the one negated. E.g. there has to be
a class containing both the Greeks and the non-Greeks in order for us
to speak meaningfully about a non-Greek.
The complex name "nothing" should however be analyzed 183 as
"not-anything". Considering that there could not be any higher or
more comprehensive class of objects (even in Twardowski's ex-
tremely liberal sense) than the class of - precisely - objects, the class
of aliquid, to employ the medieval notion chosen by Twardowski,
infinitation is not a permissible transformation for forming a name
from a name. Twardowski sees this as a consequence of the view that
everything we present to ourselves must be "something" - one corol-
lary of the "essentialism" of Twardowski referred to above (p. 98).
viously not. Twardowski would also agree that "The presentation of nothing ex-
ists" is not true, precisely because the theory of the syncategorematic nature of the
term "nothing" excludes this manner of expression.
181 The German term is "bezeichnen". The intimate connection between language
and mind finds expression in the traditional adoption of the definition of categore-
matic expressions as those expressions which denote or express (complete)
presentations.
182 Jan Wolenski discusses a possible generalization of Twardowski's analysis to
the notion of 'being' as such. Cf. Wolenski in PaSniczek 1992.
183 The expression "should be analyzed" will be analyzed later in this inquiry.
Thus to Twardowski no presentation at all signified by the term

''nothing''. The term simply has another function than that of signi-
fying a presentation, or being a name.
Or rather, it has only the function of signifying a presentation
together with other expressions, it is a "dependent" or syncategore-
matic part of the expression (ZL 23), more precisely an abbreviation
of an underlying expression which contains a negative operator. It
could however not be a (genuine) subject of the underlying phrase:
''Nothing is eternal" should be seen as the abbreviation of "There is
not anything (which is) eternal". In this case the negation determines
the complex noun "anything eternal" - a name or noun which clearly
could be infinitated. The quasi-name "nothing" has however been
eliminated, by dissolution into a logical particle and a categorematic
expression or name.
One weakness of Twardowski's argument against Bolzano on this
issue lies already in the patent fact that language is full of expres-
sions that do not have a "meaning of their own" (they are incomplete
or ''ungesattigt'', to use Frege's term). The border-line between syn-
categorematic and categorematic words is, moreover, far from clear;
one paradigmatic form of a ''word'' might thus be syncategorematic
while another form is categorematic. This is also the reason why this
distinction has been abandoned in later linguistic theory.
Relying upon some sense-preserving "analysis", transcription or
reformulation, one might even arrive at the following general, some-
what paradoxical position: the only semantical category of complete
or categorematic terms is the category of "empty" or even
"sense-less" terms - i.e. proper names l84, all other categories of lin-
guistic expressions (i.e. predicates in the Fregean sense of proposi-
tional functions) requiring some kind of supplementing expression.
How could we be so sure that e.g. the expression (name) "horse" is
not an abbreviation for "animal having four legs and used for riding
on, etc?" This would mean that the expression "horse" did not signify
one but several presentations. A similar observation may also be
made with regard to expressions on the "sentence" level, such as an-
swers to questions, references to previous sentences in narrative
184 Such as Russell's "logically proper names".

discourse, inference, polemics and so on. A sentence always has a

"context" or a "situation" on which it depends or with regard to
which it might be seen as an incomplete symbol or operator. 185
As noted before, Twardowski does not at this time in his career
make a distinction between different kinds of presentations - only
"complete" presentations are accepted as genuine presentations. His
later distinction between images and concepts introduces new com-
plications. In particular the derived character of concepts, as pro-
posed in his essay "On images and concepts", casts doubt on the
possibility of upholding independence as a criterion for something's
being a genuine presentation, and correspondingly, also a criterion
for demarcating the category of linguistic "categorematic" expres-
sions signifying those presentations.
The first case of putative object-less presentations, which Twar-
dowski thought represented a rather uninteresting class of cases, and
moreover one which could be easily eliminated, thus turns out to be a
highly interesting case, actually a particular case of a general solution
proposed by Russell to a similar problem, emanating both from
Frege's theory of sense and reference and Meinong's theory of ob-
jects. 186 For Russell the requirement that all propositions have truth-
values was absolute, and hence the theory inherited from Frege,
which permitted sentences with names lacking reference, i.e. object-
less names, was not tolerable. To Russell, all meaning is reference (to
an object) and hence all meaning which appears to involve non-
referring expressions must be analyzable (that is: "really mean") into
185 The extension of consideration beyond singular sentences also influences other
proposals, such as Frege's and Marty's, to treat sentences or propositions as the

only clear-cut case of categorematic or independent expressions.
186 Meinong's theory was basically identical with Twardowski's, although the dif-
ferent levels of objects, corresponding to different levels of linguistic expressions,

playa more important role.
Whether Meinong's "Objektiv" should be termed a special category of object
might be regarded as a matter of terminology - depending on whether the general
term "Gegenstand" is taken to include all objects of various orders or whether the
term "object" should be restricted to only individuals in some "ultimate" sense not
covering e.g. states of affairs or facts.
meaning containing referring expressions. Twardowski suggests that

expressions that do not prima facie have reference should be ana-
lysed as having reference - but his proposal is to declare them as not
signifying a presentation, which to him is equals not having a mean-
ing (a content) "of its own". During this period Russell seems how-
ever to share the ontological views of Frege and Husser! (Meinong)
in one respect, viz. in accepting certain non-concrete objects as exist-
ing. For Russell these objects were propositions (the Meinongian
"Annahmen"); Russell rejected the Fregean senses as
"third-realm-objects" having some kind of existence.
Twardowski's technique of relegating the issue from ontology to a
matter of the analysis of linguistic terms and/or their corresponding
presentations is basically identical to the one applied both by Husser!
and Russell. The consequences of this technique for the theory of ob-
ject as such will be discussed later in this study.
One might however wonder why Twardowski does not apply his
view of the presentation of nothing to all putative object-less presen-
tations. Why should we stop at this specific "quasi-name", which,
even in some of Twardowski's formulations, seems to be regarded as
"meaning-less", at least in isolation? How does he show that we do
have presentations of golden mountains but not of 'nothing'?
This discussion brings in the entire notion of the "inner form of
language", examined below in section 5.3, a notion related to what is
in more recent linguistic theory termed "deep" structure. Twardowski
seems to rely on an authoritative interpretation or absolute analysis
of a linguistic expression. This analysis reveals a quasi-name as a
non-genuine name - despite its obvious syntactical function as a
name/noun phrase. It is not easy to tell what criteria to apply for this
kind of revelation. Does it feel differently when we have a genuine
name, designating a genuine presentation? Since it is precisely the
naming function of the name which is analogous to the reference-to-
an-object function of a presentation (or ''what is presen-
ted"-as-object), this difficulty will be critical for Twardowski's
theory of objects.
Twardowski has an ambition to suggest an empirically or scientifi-

cally correct psychological analysis of the presentation concerned. ls7
Now, this feature of Twardowski's theory makes it psychologistic in
a sense in which Husserl' s corresponding theory is not. The result of
the enquiry is not for Twardowski some kind of grammatical knowl-
edge or a general a priori knowledge of presentations in general,. The
application of his solution only to the term "nothing" (and its puta-
tive corresponding presentation) might be explained by the fact that it
is more natural to apply some kind of pictorial understanding to the
other kinds of putative object-less presentations being examined.
Clearly no feature of a syntactical nature permits Twardowski to say
that "nothing" is not a genuine name - it functions adequately in a
normal grammatical sense. The surface structure does not contain any
rule which prohibits the use of "nothing" as a subject, in traditional
grammatical terminology, or as part of some other expressions in
which nouns could occur. So it is a semantical feature - a reference
to an underlying meaning - perhaps mediated by some kind of inter-
mediary "deep linguistic structure", more or less related to what Rus-
sell called "logical" structure.
Twardowski presents his result as some kind of discovery: it is a
fact of the world that there is no presentation corresponding to the
expression "nothing" although the argument for this finding is
logico-linguistic, resting on the impossibility of "infinitation" of the
summum genus. What is to be proved is that the rule of all presenta-
tions "having" objects has no exceptions, or, that reference to objects
is the exclusive criterion of presentations (ultimately all psychic phe-
nomena). Had there merely been a logical or grammatical rule ex-
cluding the expression "nothing", Twardowski would not have
achieved the desired effect, since he accepts logically impossible
(and perhaps grammatically impossible?) presentations and objects.
187 Later critics of Russell's theory of descriptions, for example Strawson, do not
generally aspire at this kind of empirical correctness, but rather point to Russell's
rather naive and simplistic conception of language as being subject to a, possibly
unique, correct analysis, ignoring all other layers of meaning and
"presuppositions".
But, if we keep the original criterion for being an object - that it

could be denoted or named by a name - then Twardowski's explana-
tion is circular. For it does not determine beforehand that the name
should be some kind of semantically defined name (the circle would
have been too obvious then). The point of departure must be on the
syntactical level, i.e. the "quasi-name"-level, where the term
"nothing" behaves just like any other name. It makes no difference
whether this name turns out, after analysis, to be non-genuine. Its
syntactic behaviour does not change. In fact this is a feature which is
systematically exploited in a variety of contexts, above all for reasons
of style, e.g. inpoetry and philosophy and perhaps also official and
legal style, all examples of styles that are (at least in several Western
languages) fond of nominalizations.
A slight difference of terms illustrates the difference between Bol-
zano's analysis of "kein", referred to by Twardowski in this context,
and Twardowski's analysis of"Nichts". Bolzano talks about concepts
(Begriffe), which immediately turns attention away from the syntac-
tic or surface level, to some underlying "logical" level, which of
course has different properties and rules of syntax or composition.
Twardowski however talks about presentations in an undifferentiated
sense here, but since both the interpretation of "act" and "object"
could be excluded, only the interpretation of "content" remains plau-
sible. lss These presentations do not have any underlying substructure,
but are directly correlated to linguistic expressions - in this case via a
rejection of a direct one-to-one correlation between presentation and
linguistic structure. The presentations are in fact several and of a dif-
ferent structure than the linguistic expressions.
Now, this reflects a general problem in the "act"-terminology,
which also reappears in Husserl's phenomenology. If we accept that
188 In examining Twardowski's theory of acts, contents and objects of presenta-
tions an index (presentation 1, presentation2, presentation3) might be used to re-

flect the different senses in which one is using the term. This is however not
always feasible, since the task is precisely to demonstrate why the unqualified or
unindexed term should be qualified. In fact, when Twardowski himself talks about
presentations, one could take him as not referring either to the act or the individual
event or to the object referred to, but to some kind of (real or ideal, this is the ques-
tion) content.
there is something like the content in some logical or conceptual

sense of an act of presentation, say of nothing (Nichts), and also ac-
cept that Twardowski is referring to this conceptual content when de-
nying that there is a presentation of Nichts, then the problem
reappears as a problem of acts. We will face a situation where one act
corresponds to several contents, or at least a complex of contents, and
moreover a complex of contents which is the same for a number of
acts, in fact rather independent of these acts, since the contents do not
have to be actualized by this or that specific act but could be actual-
ized in an infinite variety. In this situation the use of the notion of
presentation, unqualified or otherwise, becomes rather reprehensible
- and one understands why e.g. Kerry prefers the notion of
"concept"189, which Twardowski seems to identify with his own no-
tion of content, without however noting the problem of identification
or correlation to acts.
Thus, when Twardowski says that there is no presentation of
''Nichts'' he is patently wrong, if he means to say that there is not any
act of presentation, since in a trivial sense a linguistic expression,
whenever used, must be accompanied by some kind of presentation,
be it only a presentation of a meaning-less set of sounds or black
spots on paper. Even if we have to do here with an instance of an ex-
pression which could be analyzed into several expressions, belonging
to a different grammatical category than the original one, on the
"surface", this does not alter the basic situation.
In fact, the rule of infinitation which Twardowski appeals to, in
order to say that there is not any presentation ofNichts, is a rule of a
formal-ontological nature. This is the very rule which he attributes to
A vicenna, the advocate of the distinction between existence and es-
sence, as indicated in Section 4.8 of this enquiry: there is nothing
which exists without being anything (aliquid), and conversely: there
is nothing which has, as an ingredient of its nature, to exist. This in
its turn brings in the issue whether this distinction is real or only a
"distinction of reason", which Hume (cf. pp. 91-92) appeals to, and
which is criticized by Husser!. This distinction, real or rational, is
189 Which Frege reproacheS by for using in a psychological sense. Cf. Frege 1969
p.114.
also the presupposition on which HusserI' s entire idea of phenome-

nological or transcendental reduction rests: the idea that one could
treat objects regardless of their existence, or equivalently, existence
as one kind of property from which one could abstract, the object still
in some sense being the same.
Paradoxically, the principle which Meinong formulates as the
"exteriority of Sosein to Dasein" seems to tum into what looks like
its opposite, the inclusion of Dasein in Sosein, as some of the Scho-
lastic opponents of Thomism 190 would have it. Twardowski's require-
ment that there could be no higher genus than aliquid, and that there
is no possibility of talking or thinking or having a presentation of
anything which is not anything, amounts to a kind of treatment of ex-
istence as a property. Now, this is what some adherents of the
"modified" doctrine of distinctio realis (for example the Thomists)
claim: "essentialism" or idealism on one hand and nominalism, exis-
tentialism and even materialism (reism) on the other are two sides of
one coin, a refusal to accept that existence and being-so are really
different. 191
Green virtues, round squares and golden mountains

As for the other groups of object-less presentations exemplified by
Bolzano, Twardowski treats them as one. Actually three distinct
groups of descriptive expressions are involved:
190 Henry of Ghent is one example cited by Allers (Thomas von Aquin 1959)
p.lOl.
191 Cf. e.g. Rudolf Allers in the comment on Aquinas' De ente et essentia (Thomas
von Aquin 1959 p. 101, etc.)

A conclusion - with I believe some historical accuracy - to be drawn is that
Hussed's transition from realism to transcendental idealism would also imply a
transition to a new metaphysical position, which would thus unite both transcen-
dental idealism and empirical idealism or metaphysical idealism. Kant's dismissal
of "existence" as a real predicate, which partly is designed as a criticism of the on-
tological proof of God's existence, would still rest upon the same assumption as
that very proof: the idea that existence could be in some sense treated as something
from which we could abstract, on a par with other properties, and that the condi-
tions of experience do not apply to being-in-itself.
1. Complex "names" (noun-phrases) containing parts belonging to

syntactically compatible categories, such as the adjective green
and the noun virtue, but having constraints on a seman tical level-
like the prohibition for colour-predicates to apply to abstract
nouns.
2. Logically contradictory - though still syntactically permissible
- complex names, mostly cases of contradictio in adiecto.
3. "Epistemically" or empirically prohibited names - nothing in
the description itself, nor in its ''underlying'' signified presenta-
tion, proscribes e.g golden mountains.
Twardowski argues, against Bolzano, that these groups of presen-
tations "have" objects, but. objects that do not exist. This is the core
of Twardowski's solution to problem as far as the major categories of
object-less presentations are concerned. The idea rests upon the con-
ception of a formal ontology and the idiogenical theory of judgement,
introduced in Chapter 4. Conversely, this kind of theory may offer it-
self naturally, considering the problem of object-less presentations,
while maintaining the idea that the particular characteristic of psychic
phenomena is their being directed towards an object, or "having" an
object.
There is in Twardowski's view a radical difference between this
latter (three-fold) kind of putative object-less presentations and the
preceding one. Here there is no doubt that there is a presentation, nor
that the linguistic expression is a "name" in Mill's sense - a catego-
rematic expression. Thus, if I pronounce e.g. the expression
"obtuse-angled square", to choose Twardowski's own example, it is
clear that the utterance of the expression I) announces that I have a
presentation, 2) arouses another presentation in the hearer and 3)
names an object.
While the first two functions might be acceptable from a
"psychological" point of view, the third "function", epitomizes the
characteristic feature of Twardowski's ontology. Although the object
named or presented could not be said to exist in any proper sense of
the word, this function of the name, and analogously the presentation,
is best described by saying that there is an object, also in the case

where this object does not exist.
Just as it is clear that objects like square circles do not exist, it is
however clear that the presentation exists. And still it is obvious, ac-
cording to Twardowski, that the object could neither be identified
with the act of presentation, nor included in it as its content or
"immanent object", which always exists. We may also have several
presentations of the same object - "alternate" presentations
(yV echselvorstellungen, ZL 32). It is the idea of non-existing objects
which is given the key role of explaining generally the difference
between contents and objects and consequently also assumes the
main burden of explanation developed in the theory of objects. 192
192 It is tempting to be ironic about Twardowski's choice of terms: at least in En-

glish it seems more adequate to talk about a "theme" or a subject or topic of a pre-
sentation, instead of object, insofar as non-existing objects are concerned. This
irony rests upon the double function of the genitive case: the possessive function,
in which the "owner" of the presentation is a person, subject or ego, and on the
other hand the objective(f) function, which refers to a relation between two objects,
where no "ownership" is involved: - a ''true fear of God" is not a feeling of God's.
Also in the possessive function the genitive case is used for different kinds of rela-
tions, e.g. in the cases of "X's enemies" and "X's leg". In the second case, but not
in the first, is it natural to talk about the object owned or belonging to the person or
subject as a part of it.
The different uses of the genitive case are perceived when translating the title
of Twardowski's "Habilitationsschrift" into Swedish. Swedish does not use the
same preposition in a position before the two nouns "object" and "content". A
choice of some expression of a spatial connotation is necessary when rendering the
genitive case of the original German (der Vorstellungen). The preposition indi-
cates inclusion for content ("i", i.e. "in"), while the preposition used in connection
with object would mark juxtaposition ("for", i.e. "for" or "in front of'). One would
thus translate the title into Swedish as follows: "Till teorin om innehAll i och
fOrenuil for foresmllningar" (literally: "On the theory of contents in and objects for
presentations").
The English preposition "of' is used much more generally and could thus more
or less entirely render the original undifferentiated genitive case. Had Twardows-
ki's mother tongue been Swedish, instead of Polish (and German) with their possi-
bilities of an objective genitive case with inflexion, he might have had much
greater problems talking about non-existing objects: it is much less intuitive to talk
about someone standing in front of a non-existing object, than "having some non-
existing object in mind"! The use of an objective genitive case also for impersonal
Far from admitting that the role played by non-existing objects

blurs the distinction between existence and non-existence, Twar-
dowski claims that it sharpens it: it draws the attention to the differ-
ence between existence and being-presented. As we have seen in the
quotation (on p. 67) from "Zur Lehre" p. 37 this might be regarded as
an expression of the "Scotistic" variant of the distinctio reaUs be-
tween existence and essence, a variant which we however found hard
to distinguish from the distinctio rationis, due to the pre-eminence
given to the essence (interpreted in this case as "object" in Twar-
dowski's terms).
Some preliminary remarks on Twardowski's solution

Twardowski's notion of object, outlined in Sections 4.~.4, requires
more careful consideration, in particular Twardowski's claim to have
rebutted the reproach for blurring the border between existence and
non-existence, Twardowski claims to have done so primarily by
drawing a sharp border between being/existence and being presented,
by way of the "idiogenical theory of judgement", described in Chap-
ter4.
Twardowski exploits the notion of a modifying use of adjecti-
ves/predicates: the kind of existence which we refer to, whenever we
-like Twardowski - claim that there is an object for each presenta-
tion, is not a genuine existence but a modified one. This modified use
of existence terms, Twardowski suggests, underlies the exploitation
of the medieval terminology revived by Brentano, speaking of
"intentional" (in)existence.
Thus, according to the idiogenical theory of judgement, intentional
existence is not existence, which means that the kind of modification
performed by the qualification "intentional" is a radical modification,
since it eliminates the "original" sense of the term to which it is
nouns might be the linguistic presupposition for formal ontology.

The dispute about Twardowski's ''phenomenalism'' could thus be coined in
terms of the use of the genitive case (i.e. in German, or, in English the preposition
"of') in the expression ''the object of the presentation" - if it is possessive then
there is the label of phenomenalism is justified, if it is objective it is not.
applied. Accordingly, in this context modification is not an accep-

tance of different grades or modes of existence,193 as previously de-
scribed (p. 96), but as non-existence. Twardowski argues that the talk
of (proper) existence in the context of presentations is irrelevant.
Twardowski carefully avoids suggesting that "intentional" be syn-
onymous with "immanent" - as we shall see, this is one of the points
where Husserl's critique of him is somewhat misplaced. Twardowski
does not speak of intentional objects. Just like Husserl he rejects the
idea of an intentional object, if this idea is taken to involve some kind
of object different from the non-immanent object, i.e. a "mental" or
immanent object.
Twardowski holds that the Scholastic view of non-existing objects
was precisely that those objects had "merely intentional existence"
which is not a genuine existence. 194 Now, this is true, inasfar as some
of the medieval tradition also referred to this kind of existence - as
esse debile or ens diminutum. 195 But this way of looking at exist-
ence presupposes a scale or modes of existence - medieval philo-
sophy exploited the Aristotelian scheme of possibility-perfection! ac-
tuality to its very limits. 196
However, Twardowski's predilection for medieval analogies leads
somewhat astray - since he does not want to operate, as
Paczkowska-Lagowska points out (see, p. 65), with several modes of
existence, risking some kind of "Platonism", and besides being
193 The term mode being applied in another sense than in the case where we under-
stand existence itself as a modus intrinsecus in the Scotist fashion. Cf. p. 95.
194 ZL 25. Twardowski does not however tell us which medieval philosopher he is
referring to - which makes it difficult to verify his claim. Simonin however also
refers to authors, e.g. Aquinas, who distiguish those entities which are "in the
mind" from entities ·'proper". Aquinas uses the term proprie in making this dis-
tinction in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Cf. Simonin 1930 p. 449,
also quoted in Spiegelberg 1969.
195 See Spiegelberg 1969 footnote 1, p. 123.
196 Or far beyond them. The notion of analogy, building upon this idea, is central
to the whole project of a natural theology in Aquinas.
contrary to his absolute distinction between judgements and presenta-

tions. For at least Aquinas, the classification of some objects as
(purely) intentional seems mainly to serve the purpose of underlining
the (relative, secundum quid) superiority of the non-intellectual ca-
pacities of human beings (e.g. love), since the objects of those ca-
pacities have existence also outside the mind. 197
Still - as pointed out already in the description of the idiogenic
theory of judgement - a weak point in Twardowski's theory in gener-
al is that he constantly brings issues of existence into the fundamen-
tal distinction between content and object of presentations. The basic
argument for this distinction after all remains that nobody denies the
existence of the presentations at least as acts having contents
(although it is not clearly claimed by Twardowski that the content ex-
ists separately), but that there are often presentations of objects
which do not exist.
The ultimate motive for using psychology in philosophy is for
Twardowski Cartesian. In psychology a sphere of (scientific) knowl-
edge, which enjoys the privilege of being indubitable or self-evident,
is available, precisely because what we are examining is our own in-
ner experience (the contents of presentations and other psychical phe-
nomena). This is the ultimate reason why we are not entitled to pose
questions regarding the existence or non-existence of the objects
concerned.
Brentano's point in making "inner perception" the basic method of
philosophical inquiry, and hence the basis of his claim to build a
psychology and philosophy from an "empirical" standpoint, is his
thesis that the "intentional" or phenomenal and hence dubitable l98 ex-
istence of external or physical phenomena is different from the indu-
bitable reality and existence of psychical objects. Doubt is simply of
no relevance to descriptive psychology.
Twardowski's main amendment to this thesis is that it is necessary
to distinguish between the object of the inner experience as a real
psychic phenomenon, the intentional act of presentation, and its
197 Summa Th. Q. 82,3. (In Vol 6)
198 Or merely objective! Cf. the distinctio objectiva p.95. (Brentano 1874 p. 120).
content. In pursuing descriptive psychology both the content and the

object of the act should be catered for. The object must however not
be taken to exist, only the content, for any given presentation.
Far from asserting that the "intentional object", taken in the inher-
ited sense (replaced by Twardowski by the content of presentation),
has some kind of ''weaker'' existence, Twardowski, along with Bren-
tano, claims that it has a better established existence than anything
else. It is the subject matter of the central philosophical discipline of
descriptive psychology, or, using Brentano's alternative term,
"Psychognosie". Denying the existence of such matter would be like
denying the existence of "phenomena" altogether, or of"Erfahrung".
Twardowski's basic distinction implies that impossible properties
or contradictory descriptions such as those of the putative object-less
presentations given above, could never be predicated of real, existing
presentations. A real object, such as a presentation (as act), could
never have properties, described by mutually contradictory predi-
cates; nor could its (ideal?) content. Ifwe could talk about impossible
matters like round squares, it is precisely due to the fact that the con-
tradictory properties in question are not ascribed to the presentation,
but to the (non-existent) object.
Likewise, we can have absurd presentations as well as talk mea-
ningfully and truthfully about them. What we have is not something
contradictory, neither in the sense of our minds being endowed with
contradictory properties - nor in the sense of our acts being real enti-
ties having those properties, nor, to Twardowski, in the sense of acts
having contents of such a nature. The distinction between act and
content on the one hand and object on the other means that there is
nothing "in" the act which is contradictory, but that there is some-
thing different from the act, but still in a peculiar way linked to it, i.e.
the object, which "has" these properties. If this object is submitted to
judgement (in a different psychic act), then it must be described by
contradictory predicates - and consequently be considered as non-
existent. As long as we deal with an object of presentation, however,
this kind of problem does not arise, thanks to the "idiogenic theory of
judgement". This is no more nor less than the trivial distinction be-
tween properties of the presentation of a green chair and properties of
the green chair. The presentation, "itself' (what is "in" the act or "in
the mind") is obviously not green.
As remarked above, the kind of ontology, expressed by Twar-
dowski as a theory of the (pure) object of presentations, and by Mei-
nong as the theory of the "exteriority" of being-there from being-so,
may be labelled an "essentialistic"l99 variety of the distinctio realis
between essence and existence, as sketched by Scotus. Fine as the
distinction between the "secondary" object of Brentano and the
"content" of Twardowski may appear - it is marked as rather insig-
nificant by Twardowski - it constitutes a sharp border-line between
Brentano on the one side and Twardowski and Meinong on the other.
Brentano's later development towards "reism" marks this differ-
ence: 2OO the objects denoted by "terms" in his "existential" logic
could never be anything but "things", never "fictions", like higher-
order objects of a Meinongian type etc.
Functions and roles
Twardowski's notion of object of presentation has roots in three

different theories:
1. Psychology: The absolute distinction between judgements,
presentations and feelings/volitions as three distinct classes of
psychic phenomena.
2. Logic: The function of judgement is to affIrm or deny existence.
3. Linguistics: the role of "naming" (Nennung)201 is one among the
three different roles of names mentioned by Twardowski.
199 In talking about essences one should keep in mind the possibility of interpret-
ing essence both as something individual and as something universal - in accor-

dance with medieval tradition. This kind of duplicity in the use of the notion of
essence is also reflected in Husserl's introduction of the phenomenological notion
of "Wesen" in Ideen (Hua III p. 13).
200 Irrespective of the issue whether Twardowski also changes his views in a simi-
lar direction.
Concentrating on the linguistic context, it might be natural to in-

terpret the object rather as reference to the object, that is as a
"function" or "role" of the presentation, something which belongs to
it in virtue of its context. The distinction is not innocent, since it does
not presuppose that there is anything else than the presentation - ref-
erence represents the aim, purport or intention of the presentation.
This notion of function should not be taken in a mathematical or for-
mal sense, but more in a sense associated with biological or an-
thropological/sociological teleological explanations. It is not strange
to say that there is a function of reference to an object even if there
does not exist an object.
For linguistic entities, such as names in the sense used here, the
talk about "functions" causes no special trouble. The case may, how-
ever, be different for presentations, in any sense associated to the no-
tion of "psychic phenomenon" - due to the simple fact that linguistic
entities in all respects of interest to us here, are public or objective. 202
Presentations, in the philosophically interesting respect of the
201 The English rendering of this term is somewhat interesting in itself: "naming"
is less attractive than perhaps "calling" or "referring". The last term may however
to some extent be said to assimilate unduly the terms of the Twardowskian theory
of language to Fregean terminology. There is however also good reason to do so:
the debate on the "naming function" to an essential extent repeats or runs parallell
to the Frege-Husserl discussion on "Bedeutung" and "Gegenstand"/
"gegenstiindliche Beziehung".
For a treatment of naming and meaning, on the background of Marty's theories
see Landgrebe 1934.
202 I am using "linguistic entity" in the "formal" or "-emic" sense normally applied
in linguistic science (or anthropology in general), where a phoneme or another unit
of a language (or structural unit in general) is something different from the indi-
vidual sounds or graphs (individual persons) exemplifying it. Those sounds could
- like [r] and [I] in Japanese - be very different from the point of view of another
language, or by virtue of some physical phonetic description. There is in principle
no "similarity" of the sound stuff required to form the unit described. Thus it is
clear that any linguistic entity in this sense is defmed by the community of speak-
ers/users, or the system, and thus should be seen as non-private. Another question,
not entirely irrelevant here, is whether there are senses, in which a use of language
might be private, or, reversely, whether there is anything like thinking, or having
psychic experiences at all without language.
Cartesian tradition, viz. their role in establishing indubitability, are

essentially private or sUbjective.
The Twardowskian notion of content - at least in one interpreta-
tion, or one of its "roles" - breaks this tradition by introducing the
notion of "function" for presentations, in analogy to linguistic func-
tions, thereby distinguishing between different meanings of the term
"presentation". While the act remains strictly private in the sense of
being an individual real event, the content as a "function" of the pre-
sentation is the presentation defined as being related to other entities.
This function is for Twardowski both that of being a mental substi-
tute and a meaning of expressions. The content is also (at least poten-
tially), an object viz. an object of inner perception or descriptive
psychology.203
Still, this notion of psychic object, subject to research in the con-
text of descriptive psychology, seems to presuppose that privacy or
"innemess", is kept unbroken, indubitability being granted, in the
Cartesian tradition, by this seclusion from foreign inspection. Other-
wise the talk of "inner perception" would be rather pointless. Phi-
losophical reflection takes place, not by excursion into some
transcendent(al) realm of ideas, but by "incursion" into our own
minds. The seclusion from inspection is effectively equivalent to the
''neutrality'' or pureness of the object of presentation, as presumed in
the idiogenic theory of judgement - since it is the non-affirmation
(and non-negation) of existence which makes the kind of formal ob-
ject suggested in the Twardowskian theory possible.
Considering the notion of "roles" in some detail, a strangeness of
the analogy between naming names and referring to objects of pre-
sentations comes out. A linguistic unit is essentially repeatable, or
reusable. A presentation, in the secluded sense referred to, is not re-
peatable however - except possibly in the history of the individual,
though also there coloured by new shades like memory.
203Cf. Twardowski's dictum that the difference between content and object of a
presentation is "relative". (Thesis T 2). Also the object of a presentation is, as we
have seen, declared to be a function of the presentation, though we have inter-
preted this to mean that reference to an object is a function, not the object itself.
The circumstance that two presentations could have different con-

tents but the same object appears prima facie rather uncontroversial,
as illustrated by well-known examples - be they morning/evening
stars or Salzburg/the City at Juvavum/Mozart's birth-place. Also, two
different acts might have one and the same content: we could have
presentations of Mozart's birth-place twice. Conversely, it is not too
strange to say that the same content of presentation could refer to dif-
ferent objects (e.g. the presentation of my leg).
But difficulties arise: there may be one sense of privacy, in which
we only refer to the particular experience of one person - but allow
for repetition of the same experience several times. In a stricter sense,
however, it seems doubtful whether there could be two experiences
or presentations with identical content - notably if we include time
and space coordinates of the presentation itself (or the person having
the presentation) in the content.
Effectively, the identity of content required for presentations
seems dependent upon some kind of expressed or propositional- i.e.
linguistic - level of intentionality. But then the psychological level
disappears altogether! The only private residuum becomes the act
and we are not able to say more about it than the platitude that it ex-
emplifies this or that content. This exemplification has a certain es-
sential arbitrariness, as is shown by the linguistic example: any act
might "in principle" exemplify any content. It might be just the same
"feeling" to see a mouse as to see a cat. A "role" or "function" of
something essentially private is basically different from the role of a
linguistic unit. Roles in the latter sense are assigned by some commu-
nity - and thus are three-place relations.
Thus we leave the private sphere, and thereby the epistemological
privilege of being directly available to indubitable knowledge, since
nobody could claim to have the exclusive "right" over an object
which, by definition, could be identical with the object of the presen-
tations of others! But this only mirrors the situation described in the
discussion of Twardowski's "phenomenalistic" concept of object: if
the understanding of the object focusses on its being a "function" of
the presentation, then the object becomes a private institution as well.
Then, again by definition, no two persons ever "have" the same ob-
ject - or object is just the conventional name for a collection of
private experiences (or a "logical construction" of them). Now, this is

what is sometimes referred to as the "intentional" object or the
''phenomenal'' object.
So the analogy of the "role" ("Aufgabe" is Twardowski's tenn) of
the linguistic entity/type name and the psychic phenomenon presen-
tation breaks down, it seems, precisely because of the Cartesian role
awarded to presentations within the doctrine of "inner perception"
advocated in the Brentano tradition, viz. the role of safeguarding
against error.
A no less important question - a classical one in the theory of per-
ception - is the counterpoint to the epistemological ambition for cer-
tainty: how do we provide a satisfactory description of perceptual
mistakes? Imagine e.g. a situation where I believe a root in the forest
to be a huge and dangerous beast: is the object in the Twardowskian
conception the tree or the beast? For we do not have two objects, and
the object should not be identical to the content of my mind (which
in some rendering of common sense could be described as beastly, as
"of a beast", while the object would not). Is there any plausible way
of describing this situation without allowing for some kind of judge-
ment? But then, is there any kind of situation where the kind of pure
presentation, and thus pure "neutral" presentational object occurS?204
Following Twardowski's development, one also perceives the grow-
ing role attributed to all kinds of operations on presentations, which
means that the pure and direct presentation appears more and more as
a fme rarity. But this also means that the original classification,
which prescribed the strict borderline between presentation and
judgement, becomes blurred, and with it the idea of the neutrality of
the object.
204 Twardowski does not in other contexts regard perception of physical objects as
presentations . He classifies them as judgements on the cause of a psychic phe-
nomenon, the presentation.
Husserl's classification of this kind of presentation as "Neutralitiitsmodiftka-
tion" has some attraction: the ''neutral'' perceptual object would thus be rather a re-
sult of some kind of operation whereby the affirmative, negative or other kind of
standpoint (thetic component in Husserl's terminology) is removed. This is far
from the ''basic'' presentation of Twardowski's and Brentano's kind. Mistakes as
''noematic explosions" is another metaphor used by Husserl in Ideen.
Twardowski does not treat this question in any detail in "Zur

Lehre,,205 - nor later, it seems: perhaps the simple explanation is that
his theory deals with the ascertainment of truth and does not explain
or describe mistake. This may be regarded as a fatal shortcoming of
the theory - since any theory of knowledge should include some kind
of criterion for differentiating between truth and falsity or mistake. 206
The absence of any kind of similarity or correspondence between
"content" of mind and object in the case of mistakes - despite the
presence of reference also in the case of mistakes, must be a main
stumbling block to any theory of correspondence or similarity be-
tween object and content. (ef. section 5.3)
But talk of "roles" or tasks in the context of presentations gives
rise to difficulties for other reasons as well: a role is essentially
something which must "inhere" in an object (or rather we should say
subject, something which "lies under") and which, as noted, also re-
quires some kind of attributing author, i.e. somebody or some institu-
tion has to give the role, or to invent it. To say that one of the tasks of
a presentation is to refer to an object would thus in a sense prejudge
the matter: talking about tasks or roles presupposes some kind of in-
tentionality, and thus the very fact that presentations have roles might
be taken just as another expression for their having some kind of
reference.
These difficulties do not reduce the importance of the problem as
such: failure of the function of naming also led to the distinction be-
tween the notions of sense and reference in Frege's conception, and
led to Russell's theory of descriptions, just as the case of object-less
presentations brought up the need for a distinction of the "roles" of
presentations or different interpretations of "what is presented", as
content and object respectively.
205 His treatment in "Zur Lehre" is confmed to a short comment of the Cartesian
description of the difference between truth and mistake - as support from Des-
cartes for the distinction between content and object. Cf. ZL 26.
206Brentano's difficulties in coping with a theory of truth are described by

Ulfstedt.
5.3 HUSSERL'S CRITICISM OF TWARDOWSKI
Hussed's discussion of Twardowski's theory, in the manuscript on

intentional objects (Cf. Section 3.4) has two main constituents. One
more critical part expounds the arguments against Twardowski's
theory of contents and objects of presentations and especially his
suggested solution to the problem of object-less presentations.
The other part is Husserl's own theory, presented in a fragmentary
form. Seven years later the Logical Investigations presents a more
consolidated theory in some (far from all!) of the issues treated in the
controversy with Twardowski. Before going into the details of Hus-
serl's criticism I shall attempt to give a preliminary view of the main
lines of Husserl' s position.
In order to show that Twardowski's theory really had the role in
Hussed's development which we assigned to it in Section 3.2 - we
have to make clear two things:
1. The interpretation of meanin!f°7 as a "psychical content" is a
necessary ingredient in Twardowski's theory.
2. Hussed's own standpoint deviates in a significant way from this
interpretation.
On both these issues the outcome of this examination will contain
a number of reservations, partly because Husserl at some rather cru-
cial points did not interpret Twardowski with sufficient care. The
preceding account of Twardowski's notion of content of presenta-
tions should have made clear already that Twardowski's theory also
contains elements which can not be labelled psychologistic.
207 I take "meaning" in the unqualified sense used by Twardowski and also Hus-
serl, at least in his earlier writings. Although there is evidence in unpublished texts
probably written by Twardowski very close to the publication of "Zur Lehre" (as
has been brought to my attention by Dr A. Orlowski) that Twardowski had read
Frege, and probably also "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung", "Zur Lehre" does not show
signs of an adoption of the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, de-
spite the fact that Twardowski's distinction between content and object might be
construed as a "psychological" correlate to the Fregean (semantic or linguistic) dis-
tinction. Cf. p. 51.
In particular one aspect mentioned above is likely to have had a

significant impact on Husserl's tum away from psychologism. This is
the development of the idea of a formal ontology - primarily by
Twardowski - which laid the ground for Husserl's idea of the phe-
nomenological reductions. Since Husserl considered that only these
reductions were capable of overcoming psychologism in the more
general, epistemological, sense, the reading of Twardowski, though
initially leading to a basically critical reaction, as indicated also
might have influenced Husserl in the transition to the second stage of
a general rejection of psychologism, that is the transition to transcen-
dental, or pure, phenomenology.
If the term "psychologism" is defined principally against the back-
ground of Husserl 's criticism of psychologism in the Prolegomena to
the Logical Investigations, the scope of reservations must be ex-
tended even further. Twardowski's field of research is much broader
than the foundations of logic and formal science dealt with there -
actually it covers much of the field of "phenomenology and theory of
knowledge" treated in the main part of the Investigations.
Psychologism may - as described in Chapter 2 of this study - be
taken to suggest that mental phenomena are different from the
"outer" phenomena of the physical world but still something which
one could examine by empirical methods. The psychic "acts" as ob-
jects, and more precisely examinations of the contents of these acts,
must thus proceed from the same kind of sources as examinations of
any kind of event or process in the world. Though the content of an
act is essentially excluded from public inspection, i.e. is "subjective"
in the common sense of this term this does not exclude an empirical
and scientific method of research in this sphere
Despite the extreme "liberalism" of Twardowski's notion of ob-
ject, criticized by Husserl, the heart of Husserl's argument does not
seem to be the role which Twardowski allows objects to play, but
rather the character of contents and their role in other contexts. The
thesis of the "double function" of contents, which Twardowski brings
in, rather inadvertently but seemingly with approval is crucial in this
argument. The function of the "mental image" (as described by G.
Noel, cited above, p. 81) is decisive for the assessment of the extent
of psychologism in Twardowski. The thesis of the double function of
the content of the presentation both as a phantasma (or a mental sub-

stitute) and a meaning permits Twardowski to say that the content is
both (at least some "ideal" part) an objective or public entity, as well
as being confined to the private sphere, since it is always linked to a
real act of mind. The kind of existence attributed to this category of
mental objects is not easy to grasp, since Twardowski holds that uni-
versal ideas do not exist, being the objects of indirect presenta-
tions 208 • They would rather seem to be some abstract or ideal
particulars.
The gist ofHusserl's criticism lies in the observation that the func-
tion of representation, fulfilled by a mental image, is not compatible
with the function of meaning, fulfilled by an objective or public enti-
ty. Ultimately, to Husserl- as will be developed later - it is not pos-
sible to solve this issue if one restricts the kind of description of
"mental contents" to merely one. If we describe a round square, we
are certainly not describing a psychic act, but still less something in
the world. What we do is characterizing a psychic act but not de-
scribing it as an individual event. Husserl insists that one must distin-
guish between two different kinds of specification or identification of
the act. This is what Husserl later calls the noetic and the noematic
mode of description. Provided one does not understand the notion of
part in a spatial sense, it may be innocuous to term the objects
(thought-objects) parts of the presentation. 209
The last remark is anticipatory: Husserl does not suggest this dis-
tinction explicitly at the time of writing the text "Intentionale Ge-
genstiinde". Effectively, Husserl allows the distinction of "noetic"
and "noematic" to be important only during a rather short span of
time. He gradually increases the emphasis on the parallelism between
those two levels of description - up to the point of making it an
identification. 2lO
208 Peter Simons criticizes Twardowski's theory of general objects (Simons 1993).
209 Husserl's term is "correlative" part, in contradistinction to what he calls in Ger-

man "reell", a peculiar term which is perhaps best translated by "authentic" or
"genuine" rather than "real".
Meaning content and psychic content

The issue of the problem of object-less presentations is opened by
Husserl in the first remark of the preserved part of the manuscript on
intentional objects - a remark formulated as a conclusion drawn from
a (lost) introductory part of the text:
Durfen wir nach diesen Uberlegungen annehmen, dass jeder Vors-
tellung ein Bedeutungsgehalt zukomme, so bleibt nun die ungleich
schwierigere Frage zu erortem ubrig, ob sich auch eine jede auf Ge-
genstiinde beziehe. (Hua XXII p. 303)
The scope of this remark is wide: it entails that every presentation,
and not only every linguistic act, has meaning or a meaning
"content". This is one way of announcing, although it is expressed
more clearly in the footnote to Husserl's review of"Zur Lehre" some
years later, that there are two kinds of contents for each presentation,
one "psychic" content and one "meaning" content. It is also a way of
announcing as a separate issue the question of the objective refer-
ence of presentations. We shall see how Husserl in the course of his
considerations of issues regarding meaning (Bedeutung), oscillates
between the integration of issues regarding reference (objects) of
presentations and their sense or meaning - a hesitation which is
linked to his varying opinions on Frege's terminology of "Sinn" and
"Bedeutung". 2 I I
In saying that presentations have or should be ascribed212 meaning
content Husserl deliberately refers the issue of meanings to another
level than the psychological one, since, if we could distinguish some
210This might be seen, as has already been remarked in the introduction, as some
kind of resumption of "psychologistic" positions - "Krisis", generally speaking,
seems to close the circle of psychologism for Husserl.
211It is not possible to choose either of Frege's or the Fregean-inspired semantic

terms sense and reference/referent (whatever the English interpretation of this am-
biguous term may be) at this stage, since what is decisive for Husserl is precisely
whether it is possible to sort out two distinct aspects of meaning, or whether mean-
ing is all (objectual) reference. Then every shade of "sense" in Frege's sense
should be deferred either to the psychological or to the "noetic" level, in the later
terminology.
kind of meaning content of presentations, they could not be said to

be the meanings themselves. Also, this form of expression would
seem to exclude the idea that content is some kind of interpretation
of the word "presentation", unless we understand this notion as a
pars pro toto letting the content part standing for something which
could also be said to have other properties or parts than those which
might properly be called content (e.g. time and locality of the presen-
tation, intensity and other feelings, etc.) Thus Husserl could be un-
derstood as forestalling his later generally critical attitude to the
notion and language of the "content" of mind etc.
Twardowski had pointed to the content level as the level of the
meaning of linguistic expressions - Husserl as it were points out a
level (ideal) to which psychic phenomena in some sense refer. Al-
though he also determines this level as a level of "Gehalt", the choice
of term is noteworthy; he does not say that this "Gehalt" or posses-
sion is something "in" the presentation but that it "belongs" to it. At
least the "psychic" level - whatever it may be - could not in itself be
regarded as the level of meaning content, as Twardowski's formula-
tion indicates. It remains to be seen what could be left of the idea of
"psychology" in any sense, if one interprets Twardowski's notion of
content in the "objective" direction indicated by some of the theses
summarized in Section 4.3 of this study.
Husserl's arguments for the introduction of a level of meaning
content were contained in the missing part of the manuscript. These
arguments should sum up to an argument against psychologism in
meaning theory as such. Enough is left ofthe text, however, to allow
the reader to grasp Husserl's rejection of psychologism, at this stage
of his development. The developed argument is provided in the first
Logical Investigation (in particular chapters 3-4).
Husserl does not question the thesis that meaning is in some sense
contained in presentations, but rather the idea that, in studying mean-
ing contents, we undertake some kind of empirical psychology.
212 The Gennan "zukommen" has a peculiar shade of both a kind of "natural" be-
longing - hinting at some necessity in the possession - as well as "ascription"
which is rather to be interpreted as a more "social" or "conventional" sort of
association.
After all, Twardowski claims that one of the criteria for distinguish-
ing between content and object is that the content always exists
(albeit not as a real object) whereas the object does not have to exist.
This position does seem to give ground for saying that Twardows-
ki really holds that contents are contents in some spatial sense, "in,,213
the psychic phenomenon. On the other hand. one might, trivially, say
that any discussion of space and time is only pertinent to physical
phenomena. This may appear plausible for space, but certainly not
for time: the act as a psychic phenomenon is certainly temporal, an
event. But then, what would existence mean for contents, if they are
non-spatial, non-temporal and still necessarily tied to something at
least temporal (the act) "in" which they are? The closest answer
seems to be a position reminiscent of the one Aristotle took to (his
interpretation of) Plato's doctrine of ideas, a position quite natural to
ascribe to Twardowski as a follower of the Aristotelian Brentano.
The content would be necessarily linked to a real act, but in no way
identical to it, since it could be present both in other acts of the same
person and in acts of other persons.
This illustrates, again, the question whether there is any essential
element of psychologism in Twardowski's theory. Largely, the an-
swer to this question must depend on whether the kind of research on
contents undertaken is thought to be a process of empirical
(inductive) investigation, or of an a priori nature. As noted in
Section 3.5, a clear-cut affirmative answer could be given to the
question whether Twardowski was advocating psychologism, formu-
lated in this manner, on the basis of material which was not available
to Husserl, that is material from the later part of the 1890S 214 • It is
considerably more difficult to decide, whether the a priori research
undertaken in Husserlian phenomenology in its varying shapes
213 Obviously "content" in the sense used here is primarily used metaphorically -
sometimes however literal shades of meaning of this term, as Husser!' s dislike of
the term "Inhalt" and preference of "Gehalt" shows, are not unimportant ingredi-
ents in this and similar debates.
214In the article in an educational journal in 1897 Twardowski subscribes to

psychologism as a position replacing "metaphysic ism" in philosophy. WPF
106-107 referred to on p. 33.
differs fundamentally from the "psychological" reflection undertaken

in the Brentanist tradition. The solution of this task will however not
be attempted within the present examination.
HusserI rejects Twardowski's general thesis that all presentations
have objects, but this rejection does not primarily function as a criti-
cism of psychologism in Twardowski. HusserI's own solution in-
volves the suggestion that "subjective" research on presentations
must, in the description or characterization of the presentation, refer
to something which is not immanent to the presentation, namely the
object.
There is however a link between the "anti-Platonism" inherent in
Twardowski's view on contents as existing, always in some presenta-
tion, and the liberal attitude to the range of objects permitted. Let us
remember that it is the existence of contents, which to Twardowski
precludes the "ascription" of impossible properties or contradictions
to them. Only non-existent objects could "have" those properties.
The contradictory properties ascribed to square circles evidently do
not belong to any mental or psychic objects - neither the individual
experience-events, nor some kind of "content" or type of these
events. Saying that the presentation of a square circle is neither
square nor circular is thus not different from saying that a presenta-
tion of something green is not green. This part of what Twardowski
wants to say is not controversial. The real trouble arises when we try
to specify what a content is - disregarding the object. This is where
Twardowski's suggestion that his "content" is the same as Bolzano's
Vorstellung-an-sich or objective presentation becomes doubtful. In
what sense is the content objective - if we disregard the object? How
do I specify the content of a presentation of a square circle?
HusserI's rejection of Twardowski's theory goes hand in hand
with a general approval of Bolzano's doctrines, but also with a
gradually growing emphasis on reference to objects (gegensUindliche
Beziehung) as the sole meaning of "meaning". This may seem para-
doxical, in view of Twardowski's insistence that his own distinction
between content and object is taken from Bolzano21s , and furthermore
the historical fact that precisely Twardowski's discussion of Bolzano
21S
ZL p. 17 footnote.
inspired Husserl to more intense study of the "Wissenschaftslehre".

Bolzano, just like Twardowski, is also thoroughly critical towards a
"Platonistic" interpretation of presentations-in-themselves.
The explanation should be sought in Twardowski's proposal to de-
velop the notion of obj ect for the explanation the directedness of psy-
chic phenomena. This suggestion was absent in Bolzano, but closer
to other philosophers of a "rationalist" tendency like Herbart and
Lambert. Twardowski's generalized use of the notion of object deter-
mines his polemics against Bolzano on the subject of object-less pre-
sentations. It may be held - with Husserl and Ingarden - that
Twardowski's use of the notion of object is not consistent with his
own realist position in epistemology, shared by Bolzano, and by Hus-
serl in the period concerned.
If the short introductory remark just quoted from Husserl's text
may be interpreted as a demarcation line to Twardowski's psycholog-
ism as regards contents of presentations, it also marks a frontier to a
more extreme kind of anti-psychologism represented e.g. by Frege's
essay on sense and reference. Frege rejects the idea of at all discuss-
ing psychological notions such as presentations as having some kind
of ideal content - he is interested in the ideal contents of language.
This divergence has consequences for the respective views of Husserl
and Frege on the notion of object, as related to the notion of meaning
of names - Frege's identification of meaning/reference with object
(Gegenstand) evokes Husserl's lively objections, as seen in the corre-
spondence from 1891, in the text on intentional objects216 (discussed
later in this study), and also recorded in the Logical Investigations.217
Notably in the fragment K I 62 added to the Husserliana XXII text by Schuh-

216
mann's edition in Brentano Studien.
217 Hua XIXII p. 58. Husserl's later distinction between "Sinn" and "Bedeutung"
in a passage of Ideas I mentioned frequently in this study (Hua III p. 304) is quite
different from Frege's - in fact it should be seen as a token of his continued insis-
tence on two different levels of meaning, one for the more general meanings of all
presentations/lived experiences and another for the more narrow sphere of lin-
guistic acts.
The paradox
Husserl's examination of Twardowski's treatment of the theme of
object-less presentations in §5 of "Zur Lehre" aims at solving both
the more general issue of the relation between presentations and their
objects and the more special question of whether there are any
object-less presentations.
Husser!' s choice of terms should be noted: Husser! asks whether
every presentation relates to an object, not as Twardowski whether it
co"esponds to an object, or as Bolzano whether it has an object.218
The question whether this choice of terms prejudges the outcome of
the inquiry should be posed - but the answer must await the outcome
of other parts of this inquiry.
In "Intentionale Gegenstande" Husser! points at the possibility of
expressing the problem of object-less presentations as a paradox. He
suggests two mutually contradictory answers to the question as to
whether every presentation relates to an object:
1. Yes, every presentation is related to an object, since every pre-
sentation presents an object, or there corresponds an object to ev-
ery presentation.
2. No, it is obvious that there are no such objects as round squares,
and accordingly no objects corresponding to presentations of
round squares.
Husser! sees the proposed solutions of this paradox in the course
of the history of philosophy as falling under basically two different
categories:
I Picture-theories
II Theories involving a modification of existence
Twardowski's theory might prima facie be considered as a type-
example of category II. Much binges upon what is meant by a modi-
fication of existence - whether or not modified existence is consid-
ered as non-existence. This discussion might, as proposed here, be
illuminated by some of the medieval distinctions, such as the
218 cr. e.g. ZL p. 20 and Wissenschaftslehre § 67.

distinctio realis as well as different views on modification of exis-

tence, whether as modus essendi or involving some kind of modus
intrinsecus of essence, in the Scotistic fashion referred to above
(Section 4.9).
The picture-theory
The popular solution to the problem of object-less presentations is,

Husserl says, well-known: it is the picture-theory.219 The basic fea-
ture of this kind of theory is the thesis that to have a presentation of
an object is the same thing as to have a psychic picture of it. In par-
ticular, this kind of solution is preferred when we have to do with ob-
jects that do not exist, e.g. cases of mistakes and imaginations. What
is presented is then not something outside the mind but a "picture"
inside it, or a "representation". One might say in this case: object and
content are identical, since the object is in some sense entirely in the
mind. This kind of theory is well known from philosophical epis-
temological debates concerning e.g. the notion of "phantasma" dur-
ing the Middle Ages and before, and on primary and secondary
qualities, at least since the time of the British empiricists.
Twardowski, as we have seen above, also uses, though within
quotes, the term "psychic picture" for a preliminary designation of
what he, in his more considered articulation, calls content. However
he also explicitly rejects the picture-theory as being ''primitive
psychology" (ZL 67). Twardowski's epistemological view in "Zur
Lehre" could be described, taking all the complications indicated by
the discussion on his "phenomenalism" into account, as a kind of
"critical realism" or "real-idealism", to use the term from "Zur
Lehre".220 Although this kind of standpoint would imply that some
219The criticism of the picture-theory is included both in the text contained in

Husserliana XXII and in K I 62 - which in part is directly reprinted in the Logical
Investigations (Hua XIXII p. 436).
220 Cf. the passage quoted on p. 37 in this study. Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg 1969 p.
206) suggests as well the label of critical realism for Brentano's standpoint. At
least in the case of the "Psychologie" this label might seem debatable.
external object is the cause of physical phenomena, it is not similar

to the phenomena - i.e. no properties of physical phenomena are
identical to those of external objects. Twardowski expresses himself
clearly on that point in his lecture on logic. 221
Although in the end Hussed, from a methodological point of view,
associates Twardowski's theory with the picture-theory, Twardows-
ki's parable of the painted landscape played an important role for
Hussed's own arguments against the picture-theory in the text on in-
tentional objects. There Hussed argues that the position taken by
Twardowski represents the same kind of "duplication" as the picture-
theory. As predicted in the previous sections, we might expect that
the validity of Hussed's criticism will hinge upon the explanation
given to the notion of content by Twardowski - is his notion of con-
tent in essential respects still to be considered that of a "psychic
picture"?
Hussed advances the following general points against a picture-
theory .
1. It is evident in the case of many presentations e.g. abstract con-
cepts like "art", "science" or various mathematical notions, that
there are no pictures whatsoever "in the mind". No ad-hoc as-
sumption of ' 'unconscious images" improves this situation.
2. The picture theory does not explain anything. The paradox of
object-less presentations is about the same object which is said
both to exist and not to exist. The problem does not concern two
different things, one of which is something in the mind (a
''phantasma'') and the other "out there". Nobody suggests that the
''phantasma'' is identical with the depicted object.
3. The picture referred to is not even always a genuine picture at
all, since to be a picture presupposes precisely that there is
something of which the picture is a picture. Thus the problem
reappears, as a problem of the relations between pictures and their
objects.222
221 Manuscript P 6 p. 237.
222 We may leave aside for the present the case of purely imaginary pictures, ab-
Modified existence - intentional existence
Having dealt with, and dismissed, these rather simplistic explanations

in the first round, HusserI is ready to turn to the second category of
theories designed to dissolve the paradox. This is where he finds the
characteristic elements of Twardowski's theory.
The central concept is the "intentional" mode of existence, as one
application of the opposition between proper or genuine and modify-
ing uses of predicates/adjectives. Since this is also one of the first oc-
casions on which HusserI discusses problems associated to the
terminology of intentionality in some detail, it assumes a certain his-
torical importance. For ifit is Twardowski's, albeit in Husserl's view
mistaken, application of Brentano's resumption of this medieval ter-
minology which directs Husserl's attention to the possible force of
this concept, then Twardowski's role in HusserI's development and
the development of phenomenology as a whole is decisive. 223
Far from recognizing that Twardowski's application of the medi-
eval notion offers in a plausible solution to the problem of object-less
stract art, etc. which by definition are not pictures of anything. As has been
touched upon already in the foregoing these cases might turn out to be among the
most interesting examples of what was known as the intentional or purely inten-
tional mode of existence.
This problem is adjacent to the more general problem of the meaning of
"representation", and the "reality" of representations e.g. in theoretical linguistics,
artificial intelligence and related cognitive disciplines. This in turn is an aspect of
the more traditional problem of idealism and realism in theory of knowledge
(realism/instrumentalism in philosophy of science) and related logical problems.
Cf. below p. 170.
223Cf. the introduction to Husserliana Vol. XXII, where the editor gives a survey
of Husserl's first treatments of the notion of intentionality (p. XXVIII and fT.).
Twardowski's book certainly does not introduce the concept to Husserl, nor did it
provoke his first written reflections on the subject, but it may well have contrib-
uted substantially to having turned Husserl's attention away from the more psycho-
logical track (intention as interest. etc.) perhaps inspired by his reading of James.
Twardowski does not whole-heartedly embrace Brentano's terminology from
1874, as far as intentionality is concerned. In the above-mentioned text on logic
from 1894-5 he strikes out intentional existence from the characteristics of psychic
phenomena (P VI p. 21)
presentations, Husserl contends that the solution is merely tennino-

logical, and ultimately results in a duplication of the object which it
shares with to the picture-theory. He asserts that the claim that the
object of the putative object-less presentation has (merely) intention-
al (=non-genuine) existence (cf. Hua XXII p. 314-15) in effect leaves
us with two objects (ibid. p. 308), one intentional and another "out
there", in those cases when the object does exist. It is, accordingly,
not the word "intentional" but the addition of "merely" that modifies
existence into non-existence. "Intentional" per se includes both real,
true or existing and non-existing objects. Thus it is not possible to
generalize the explanation of the case where the object does not exist
to all presentations, and accordingly it is not valid as a description of
the act of presentation or any other psychic phenomenon. When we
perceive a chair, in Husserl's view at the time, we have one and only
one "intentional" object, the thing which is there, which exists, in the
outside world. 224
Husserl has however misread Twardowski at this point. As already
remarked, Twardowski does not nonnally talk about intentional ob-
jects at all, although he employs the tenn on some rare occasions as
synonymous to "content", (e.g. ZL 40). Instead he refers to objects of
presentation that do not have true but only intentional existence:
Die Scholastik hatte die Eigenmmlichkeit der Gegenstande die
vorgestellt werden, aber nicht existieren, gar wohl erkannt, und von
ihr stammt der Ausdruck, diese Gegenstande batten nur objektive, in-
tentionale Existenz, wobei man sich wohl bewusst war, mit diesem
Ausdrucke keine wahrhafte Existenz zu bezeichnen. (ZL 25)
224 As pointed out by Bernard Rang in his introduction to Husserliana XXII, Hus-
sed does not at this time include perception among intentional experiences, since
perception enjoys a directness which precisely all intentional acts lack, since they
involve some kind of active participation or interest on the part of the agent.
Twardowski however intends his theory to fit all kinds of presentations. He
does not recognize "external perception" (iiussere Wahrnehmung) as a presenta-
tion, but considers it to be a judgement. In addition to the text cited above the fol-
lowing passage purveys his view in a nutshell:
Die aussere Wahrnebmung ist ein Existential-Urteil, und zwar ein affmna-
tives, tiber ein physisches Phiinomen. (P.VI p. 235)
This should be read in the light of the idiogenical theory of judge-

ments, which states that presentations as such should not be thought
of as involving considerations of existence at all.
Husserl imputes a doctrine of intentional or immanent objects to
Twardowski - a two-object theory, similar to Brentano's distinction
between primary and secondary objects. Twardowski however does
not propose to exploit the notion of intentional to qualify the
"immanent" object - thus there are not two kinds of object relative to
one presentation. The content of one presentation could however, in
psychological reflection, be the object of a presentation. This is the
main reason why Twardowski prefers to use the term content.
Twardowski's point in speaking of the intentional existence of ob-
jects of presentation is not that this existence is (merely) immanent,
i.e. a real existence inside (rather than outside of) the mind. It is rath-
er that, when using the term existence for objects of presentation, i.e.
for objects which are not the subject of judgement, we apply the
word existence in a "modified" manner, i.e. a metaphorical or non-
genuine way. Twardowski clearly agrees with Husserl in granting
existence to the content of presentations. Intentionality for Twar-
dowski does not consist in some kind of immanence accorded to one
category of objects which should thus lead to terming these objects
"intentional objects". Intentionality means that all presentations have
objects, regardless of whether we may truthfully judge that an par-
ticular object exists or not. Talk about content for Twardowski would
not in itself bring in the vocabulary of intentionality.
Twardowski's employment of "intentional" is thus quite different
from Husserl's in the period under examination: he uses the term as a
modifier of "existence" for expressing the fundamental separation
between existing and being-presented. This separation or "real dis-
tinction" could be alternatively described as the "externality" of es-
sence to existence or object to existence, or, in more
psychologicalllogical terms, the requirement of the "idiogenic theory
of judgement" to reserve existence as the exclusive and characteristic
mark of judgements.
Husserl however argues (Hua XXII p. 309) that the mere
distinction, by means of the modifier "intentional", between true and
non-genuine225 existence commits its advocates to the adoption of
some theory of the immanence of objects: how could the activities of

presentation and judgement of non-existent objects relate to objects,
if there are not "secondary" or immanent objects which inhere in the
activities themselves? This criticism presupposes that the relata of a
relation must all exist, and furthermore that the intentional or psychic
acts of presentation and judgement are to be seen as relations in an
ordinary sense. This is however not assumed by Brentano, nor prob-
ably by Twardowski.
On the other hand, the more intricate issue of the status of the ob-
ject in Twardowski's theory as a whole gives some support to
HusserI's criticism - but then interpreted to hold for all objects, in-
tentional or non-intentional (assuming that the attribute "intentional"
is not merely pleonastic, and that objects might be non-intentional).
This is what has been discussed at some length in the consideration
of Twardowski's "phenomenalism" above.
Still we should not forget that Twardowski also could be taken to
reject altogether the distinction between immanent and transcendent,
and to design his theory of objects of presentations precisely to avoid
this dichotomy. This interpretation would, as already discussed,
locate Twardowski closer to the Neo-Kantians, as HusserI's use of
the same idea of the existence-neutral (formal) object for his own
transcendental version of phenomenology might already suggest. 226
225 The Gennan tenn is "eigentlich" - a tenn carrying heavy load, at least since
Heidegger, but also previously in Brentano, marking the border between detennin-
ing and modifying uses of predicates. It is difficult to find a word in English that
corresponds to the negative counterpart "uneigentlich" (inauthentic, inappropriate
seem rather unfitting), whereas "proper" seems to be quite exact for "eigentlich".
226 One passage in "Zur Lehre" where Twardowski seems to pay homage to the
traditional view of objects as in some sense transcendent is on p. 9, where he
speaks of the analogy between objects of judgement and presentations:
"Dieses wie jenes bezieht sich auf einen als unabhangig angenommenen Gegenstand"
In the original version of the work this passage contains a somewhat enigmatic
sign or misprint - one half of a quotation mark before "als" - as if Twardowski
had intended to put the remark of the independence within quotation marks. Since
this passage seems to contradict the "phenomenalistic" character of Twardowski's
notion of object, a quotation mark would confer quite a different meaning.
One should however observe, as Brentano's argument against Meinong's
Let us recall that Twardowski's insistence on reserving

"existence" for the level of judgements should be interpreted
primarily as one way of expressing the general Brentanist standpoint
that existence is not a "real predicate", in the terminology used by,
among others, Kant. 227 Existence thus does not apply to objects of
presentations but only as an essential predicate on a "higher" level of
psychic phenomena, if that qualification of the level of judgement be
permitted. Brentano's "existential logic", viz. the thesis that all
propositions expressing a judgement could be written out in a more
exact logical form, which always included existence was a logical
counterpart to the idiogenic theory of judgement (understood as a
"psychological" theory).228
Husser! rejects this foundation to Twardowski's position. He
challenges the theory of the "idiogenic" status of judgements and
theory of "Annahmen" shows, that "angenommen" is ambiguous. One might un-

derstand it as "presumed and afftrmed" or as "presumed as merely posed". This
means that the independence of the object might be affirmed or merely posed,
which implies that the issue is only pushed one step backwards and not solved.
m Brentano (Psychologie II) p. 53, relating to Kant, also develops a theory of

classification of predicates.
Brentano's rejection of the ontological argument for God's existence is also in-
spired by Aquinas, a constant source of inspiration to Brentano in his early period.
228 Cf. p. 46. See Psychologie Vol II p. 60.

Ulfstedt 1984 treats Brentano's existential logic and its relations to the theories
of intentionality and formal ontology see (in Swedish, with a summary in French).
Brentano's theory is criticized in the work "Versuch einer Theorie der Existen-
tialurteile" by the "psychologistic" philosopher Hans Cornelius. Husser! sent a re-
view of Cornelius's work to (it was, contrary to the review of Twardowski, also
accepted) the "Archiv fur systematische Philosophie" in 1897 (Hua XXII pp.
136-142). The letter containing the review was sent five days before the letter con-
taining Husserl' s review of "Zur Lehre" to Natorp (Husserl-Chronik p. 48). A larg-
er text, written - according to the editor of Husserliana XXII (cf. p. 465) -
immediately before the review in 1896-1897, is also included in Husserliana XXII
(pp. 356-380). Cornelius's book appeared in 1894, i.e. the same year as Twar-
dowski's "Zur Lehre".
Husser! seems in his review rather to defend Brentano, though not subscribing
to his sharp division between judgement and presentation. In this matter Husserl
seems closer to Cornelius, though he does not approve of his psychologism.
instead emphasizes the similarity between presentations in a narrow

sense (excluding feelings/volitions and judgements) on the one hand
and that of judgements on the other. HusserI includes among presen-
tations also so-called "propositional presentations":
1m ubrigen sei hier gleich bemerkt, dass unsere Untersuchung
nach Methode und Ergebnissen auf Vorstellungen aller Arten uber-
tragbar ist, also auch auf die propositionalen Vorstellungen (originale
Sachverhaltsvorstellungen), obschon mit gewissen Modifikationen,
damit zusammenhiingend, dass <das>, was als "Beziehung auf den
Gegenstand" verstanden wird, sehr wesentliche Artungen aufweist,
die eben die Vorstellungsarten bestimmen. (Hua XXII p.312)
This position is retained in the Logical Investigations as well as in
the Ideas I - in the Logical Investigations there is the theory of the
distinction between the matter and the quality of the act and in the
Ideas this distinction is replaced by the notions of the "thetic compo-
nent", vs. "noematic nucleus". The idea of existence as the differen-
tia specifica of the phenomenon of judgement is replaced by a theory
which allows a "position" of existence in all acts. This theory is also
an essential element in HusserI's own (temporary) solution to the
problem of object-less presentations - couched in terms of
"assumption" (cf. Section 4.4).
Though the analogy between judgements and presentations is also
emphasized by Twardowski, his views diverge considerably from
those of Husserl. HusserI thus does not talk about presentations of
judgements when stating his thesis of the transferability of methods
and results, but of presentations of states of affairs. This category of
presentations should be distinguished from presentations of judge-
ments, which play an essential role in Twardowski's theory of indi-
rect presentations and in his later theory of images and concepts. A
presentation of a judgement is a presentation about something psy-
chic, or a second-order psychic phenomenon, while a presentation of
a state of affairs might have any kind of state (real or unreal) as its
object. It is thus a first-order psychic phenomenon.
Although Twardowski includes quite a rich variety of objects in
his ontology, and among those what would normally be called facts
and non-facts (lacks, absences, etc.), he does not seem to consider the
presentation of a state of affairs as a "direct" presentation. He seems
to consider two different views: Either, as in "Zur Lehre", one could

only indirectly have such presentations, namely as presentations of
judgements or presented judgements (ZL 6, associating to Erdmann).
Or, as in the lecture on logic 1894-5, all judgements could not be un-
derstood as existential judgements; he openly criticizes Brentano in
this respect. 229 He holds that judgements on relations should be seen
as a separate class of judgements. This standpoint of course does not
agree with a standpoint on existence as the differentia specifica of
the class of judgements within the genus of psychic phenomena. But
it also leaves in doubt the existential status of the objects involved in
such judgements: is existence involved or do we have only objects of
presentation, existence being merely intentional or formal? No doubt
this exception breaks up the unity of the theory - Meinong seeks the
same way out as Twardowski does in the lecture on logic, i.e. in the
notion of the "subsistence" (Bestehen) of states of affairs. 230
Twardowski seems to regard objects of judgements and objects of
presentations as identical - i.e. the same object is an object of
presentations and of judgements (volitions/feelings, etc.) (cf. ZL 8,
where Twardowski also rejects any kind of "intermediary class" of
psychic phenomena between judgements and presentations). 231
HusserI is in general sceptical of the kind of distinction applied by
Twardowski, and records his dissatisfaction with the notion of
229 Der Begriinder der idiogen.<etischen> Urteilslehre vertritt die Ansicht dass aIle
Urteile nur solche tiber Existenz seien; diese Ansicht ist unhaltbar....Wir mtissen
also daran festhalten, dass die Urteile tiber eine Beziehung eine besondere Classe
neben den Urteilen tiber Existenz sind. Man driickt diese Lehre auch so aus, dass
man sagte das H<andlungs>-wort "Sein" ist zweideutig. P VI p. 118
230 A notion misunderstood by Russell in his review of Meinong in "Mind".
231 This is a crucial point of divergence between Twardowski's and Meinong's for-
mal ontologies: Meinong's theory is built upon the existence of the "assumption"
("Annahme") as precisely the intermediary between judgement and presentation,
the "assumption" having the "objective" (das Objektiv) as its special kind of ob-
ject. The "objective" is, as is well-known, the ancestor or close relative of Bertrand
Russell's notion of proposition.
presentation as used by Twardowski and others.

Twardowski however, though subscribing to the view that the
treatment of judgements and presentations should be perfectly analo-
gous, passes rather quickly over the case of judgements. Neverthe-
less, his brief account of the content of judgements is perhaps the
most surprising and difficult ingredient in the whole book: he sug-
gests that the counterpart to the content of presentations
(provisionally designated as a "psychic picture") in judgements is the
existence of the object of judgement. The analogy which he thus tries
to draw between the (genuine) object ofa presentation and the object
of the judgement on the one hand, and the content of a presentation
and the existence of a judgement on the other appears strained, to say
the least (ZL 9). One would perhaps have expected some kind of
"mental substitute" and "meaning" (the double function thesis, con-
verted for judgements) interpretation for judgement contents. But
precisely because of the strict distinction between judgements and
presentations this is difficult, since a kind of mental picture of a state
of affairs, i.e. a kind of judgement-meaning, would obviously be very
difficult to separate from the mental substitute or meaning function
of a mere presentation. And if existence is stated as a necessary in-
gredient in this content, it would be quite impossible to maintain the
thesis that existence is not a predicate, since the content of judgement
would consist of some kind of presentation of a state of affairs plus
existence. Perhaps Twardowski's criticism of existence as the sole
criterion of judgements in the lecture on logic should be interpreted
as a solution to this difficulty.
In the light of this problem, how should one interpret Twardows-
ki's use of the notion of "intentional" as a modifier of "existence"?
Even if HusserI's proposal to include Twardowski among the
"immanentists" can not be sustained, his more general criticism that
"intentional" in no way annulls existence, or at all could be regarded
as a modifier, should still be examined.
232 This divergence of views is the theme of a text written shortly before
"Intentionale Gegenstiinde". There Husserl makes a sharp distinction between intu-
ition and representation. (Hua XXII pp. 269-302, "Anschauung und Repriisenta-
tion") as two different kind of "presentations".
As we have seen, Husserl observes that the modifier in effect is

not at all the term "intentional" but the adverbial only, which Twar-
dowski, according to Husserl, slips in inadvertently. Objects could be
thought of and exist, just as they could be thought of and not exist.
But this does not tell us much about what these objects are - nor ex-
plain the difference between presentations of existing objects and
presentations of non-existents, one of the principal purposes of Twar-
dowski's theory of content and objects.
Actually, developing Husserl's criticism somewhat further, one
might say that Twardowski's use of the notion of intentional as a
modifier also serves the more general purpose of fortifying the strict
border between presentations and judgements. He says in ZL 24-25
that talk in general of existence as related to objects of presentations
is modifying - in other words, the existence of objects as objects of
presentations is intentional, i.e. non-genuine existence.
...wenn etwas als VorgesteHtes im Sinne des VorsteHungsgegenstandes

"existiert", diese seine Existenz keine eigentliche Existenz ist. Durch den
Zusatz: als VorsteHungsgegenstand, wird die Bedeutung des Ausdruckes
Existenz modificiert; etwas als Vorstellungsgegenstand Existierendes ex-
istiert in Wahrheit gar nicht, sondem wird nur vorgestellt. Der wirklichen
Existenz eines Gegenstandes wie sie den Inhalt eines anerkennendens Ur-
teils bildet, steht die phaenomenale, intentionale Existenz dieses Gegens-
tandes gegenubec*); sie besteht einzig und aHein in dem
Vorgestelltwerden. (The foot-note* refers to Brentano's "Psychologie"
Book II ch.l §7.)
Twardowski's reference to Brentano in the above passage compli-

cates rather than clarifies the situation: Brentano does not at that
point refer to any kind of modification of existence in the sense
employed by Twardowski. What Brentano discusses is the difference
between psychic phenomena - i.e. those phenomena that are in his
view characterized by their being directed towards an object, i.e. the
intentional inexistence of the objecr33 - and physical phenomena.
233 Brentano warns explicitly against the confusion of intentional inexistence of

the object and real existence as is evident in Platonistic tendencies, such as the
views of Philo of Alexandria and Anselm of Canterbury. (Psychologie p. 125).
What is peculiar about psychic phenomena in Brentano's doctrine is

also that they are subject to the specific kind of perception called
"inner perception", which is unique in its having its object "inside"
the mind. Thus the existence of psychic phenomena in the mind is
not only "intentional", but also real: the object is really there, im-
mediately available. This is why Brentano accepts the - somewhat
bewildering - formula that only psychic phenomena have both inten-
tional and real existence, 234
This might truly be termed "immanentism": the grasp and certain-
ty of the reality of psychical phenomena is quite clearly due to their
being "inside" the consciousness. Brentano would however also say
that psychical objects of presentation have real existence and not
only existence in a modified sense.
234Brentano supplies the following summary of the doctrine of the intentional in-
existence of objects :
Wir sprachen daraufvon dem Merkmale der Au s d e h nun g, welches von
Psychologen als Eigentiimlichkeit aller physischen Phlinomene geltend ge-
macht wurde; allen psychischen sollte es mangeln. Die Behauptung war aber
nicht ohne Widerspruch geblieben, und erst spatere Untersuchungen konnen
tiber sie entscheiden; nur dass die psychischen Phlinomene wirklich samtlich
ausdehnungslos erscheinen, konnte schon jetzt festgestellt werden. Wir fan-
den demnachst als unterscheidende Eigentiimlichkeit aller psychischen
Phanomene die in ten t ion a I e In e xis ten z, die Beziehung auf et-
was als Objekt; keine von den physischen Erscheinungen zeigt etwas
ahnliches. Weiter bestimmten wir die psychischen Phlinomene als den
ausschliesslichen G e g ens tan d d e r inn ere n Wah r n e h m u n g ;
sie allein werden darum mit unmittelbarer Evidenz wahrgenommen; ja sie al-
lein werden wahrgenommen im strengen Sinne des Wortes. Und hieran
kntipfte sich die weitere Bestimmung, dass sie aHein Phanomene seien, de-
nen ausser der intentionalen auch w irk -1 i c h e E xis ten z zukomme.
(Psychologie p. 136-137)
This passage has given rise to a debate on Brentano's phenomenalism. Brenta-
no's editor Oscar Kraus vehemently protests against any kind of interpretation in
this direction. Although Brentano rejects the thesis that there is a contradiction in
assuming both the phenomenal (intentional) and "external" and "real" existence of
physical phenomena, he finds other evidence to hold that only mental (psychical)
phenomena could have real existence. Physical phenomena are to Brentano e.g.
sensory phenomena lika colour-spots etc., not things or events.
So after all, some credit might be given to Hussed's criticism of

the use of the notion of "intentional" made by Twardowski. This use
is in fact linked to a kind of immanentism, in the sense that the use of
"intentional" as a modifier to "existence", for objects of presentation
presupposes that these objects are a special selection of objects for
which we have epistemological certainty or justification, since they
are within the purview of "inner perception". They are a special
selection - in fact not the widest possible class, summum genus, be-
cause in any case when we say a true thing about them as objects of
presentations, i.e. whenever we do descriptive psychology, we are
engaged in a kind of research which could never go beyond the bor-
der of mind or consciousness.
Twardowski's project to get out of the immanence circle by the
distinction between object and content of presentations, however,
fails, if one does not assume that the category of objects of presenta-
tion is the largest category of entities (summum genus) - but then
the problem of non-presentable objects etc. reenters (cf. p. 77).
If it is difficult to talk about objects of presentation as existing in
any sense, one is rather lost, if one does not retire to a rather tradi-
tional ontology which sets certain, maybe seemingly arbitrary, limits
as to what is to be accepted as object - essentially the Suarezian posi-
tion rejected by Twardowski. But then also the proposed solution to
the problem of object-less presentations fails.
HusserI's later transcendental phenomenological reduction implies
a withdrawal of this criticism of Twardowski. What seems
impossible to uphold, however, is the critical realism advocated by
both Twardowski and HusserI at the time and the wide notion of
"object" applied.
The object would have to be something other than, or something
which stands away from, the content or the presentation - something
"transcendent" - whatever that might mean.235
235The existence-neutral object in Twardowski and other object-theoreticians like

Meinong, seems to have been one of the factors determining Bertrand Russell's
theory of description in 1905. Russell's later work "The Analysis of Mind", how-
ever, though in its terms highly critical of Meinong, adopts a rather similar onto-
logical position. The ultimate constituents of the world, "sensibilia" or
Formal ontology: "having" and the complication of being

Mereology has already (p. 76) been indicated as having at least three
different fields of applicationin Twardowski's early philosophy. The
first of those is no doubt the most general - and properly speaking
one should not talk about the role of mereology for this field, since
mereology is itself to be regarded as included in what has commonly
been labelled, at least after Hussed's "Jdeen", "formal ontology", or,
in the terms of the cover-note of the manuscript K I 62 (quoted below
on p. 154), "a priori theory of object".
To define or describe formal ontology is not uncontroversial, since
it presupposes the legitimacy of talking about a "science about being
as such" in general and also about a specific border between formal
and "material" or "real" ontology. The discussions over object-less
presentations however demonstrate the crucial role of such notions as
"being", "entity" , "part", "property", "object", etc. in a variety of
philosophical problems, studied within what is labelled
epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind or
philosophical psychology.
Twardowski, following Erdmann and Brentano, uses the notions
of object (Gegenstand) and of whole and part, for the purpose of
determining such central ontological terms as ''unity'' and "property".
We have also seen (p. 77) that he avoids a notion of "Gestalt",
"figurales Moment", etc., or for that matter essence, in a sense which
does not fit in with a rather "elementistic" view on parts and
wholes. 236
"sensations", are an explicitly phenomenalistic and atomistic variant on the theme

of the "neutra1" object suggested by Twardowski. Meinong in correspondence with
Russell also acknowledges the close convergence of their views. Variants of "the
neutral monism" are today advocated in the philosophy of Hector-Neri Castai'ieda
and some of his pupils.
Husserl read with attention at least some of Russell's work - as seen from the
annotations in e.g. the chapter on introspection in his personal copy of the
"Analysis of Mind", a chapter where Russell comments on James.
236 As far as "Zur Lehre" is concerned, nothing shows that Twardowski was famil-
iar with works like Bergson's "Les donnes immediates de la conscience" (which
appeared in 1889), James's "Principles of Psychology" (1890) and Ehrenfels' fun-
Twardowski's mereological standpoints are commented on by

HusserI in the text on intentional objects (in fragment K I 62) on two
points:
I) The infinite complication ("Ineinanderschachtelung") of prima-
ry formal parts in each other, as the solution to problem of describing
the nature of the relation which "holds the parts together in the
whole" (ZL 59)
2) The generality in the application of the notion of part as proper-
ty - extending even to identity, or other all-embracing "properties".
HusserI says:
In der Meinung, damit Einblick in die Tiefen des Gegenstandsbegriffs ge-
winnen zu konnen, ist Twardowski unermudlich den Verwickelungen
ubereinander gebauter Teilverhaltnisse nachgegangen 1= 1)/, wie er auch
in anderer Richtung davor nicht zurUckschreckt, aIle ausseren Bestim-
mungen der Gegenstande, ihre relativen Attribute so wie rein formale, wie
Identitat und Einheit, auf vermeintliche Teile derselben zu beziehen 1=
2)/. 237
In more traditional (Aristotelian) language one would perhaps

have said that Twardowski tries to explain mereologically the notions
of substance and accident: that which "has" and that which is "had",
or, which is equivalent, the problem of persistence of being through
change. 238
damental article on Gestalt qualities (1890), in the years when Twardowski was
preparing his doctoral and habilitation works. There is however a bibliographic
reference to James in Twardowski's first lectures in psychology in Lwow in 1896.
Twardowski does not mention these authors either in the article from 1897 on
the relation between psychology and philosophy - despite the ambition of this ar-
ticle to give a very general overview over the problem and the recent development
in psychology and philosophy of mind.
The same situation prevails in later works, e.g. as late as in an article on the
general state of psychology written for a pedagogical encyclopedia in Polish in
1913, when both James and Bergson were well known and much-discussed
thinkers.
As to the contacts between James and Bergson see e.g. Stevens 1974 p. 21.
237 K 16217, IG p. 169, insertions within bars mine.
Cf. an exposition of this subject in Brentano's ontology by Barry Smith (B.

238
Smith 1987).
170 THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTAnONS
As for the first point, let us look at Twardowski's own text in the
passage referred to by HusserI:
Wenn aber die Relationen des "Habens", welche zwischen einem Genzen
un seinen Teilen stattfinden, wieder Teile des Ganzen sind - und dass sie
es sind, kann nicht geleugnet werden und berechtigt UTIS, sie als formale
Bestandteile des Gegenstandes zu bezeichnen - so werden diese Relatio-
nen nicht minder wie die materialen Bestandteile vom Gegenstand gehabt.
Dann ergibt sich aber eine unendliche Complication, indem diese zweiten
primaren formalen Bestandteile ebenfalls vom Ganzen gehabt werden.
Vielleicht liegt aber gerade in dieser ins Unendliche gehenden Ineinan-
derschachtelung primarer formaler Bestandteile der Schliissel zur Losung
der Frage nach der Natur der Beziehung, welche die Teile im Ganzen zu-
sammenhalt. (ZL 59)
HusserI's basic objection is that this reduction of the relation of

"having" leads to absurdities, due to the over-exploitation of the no-
tion of part (a special case of the absurdities or paradoxes arising
from the unimpeded use of the notion of object). Thus the view of
even such "transcendental" properties as "unity" as a part (had by ev-
ery object) certainly leads to difficulties. It is tempting to say that this
use of the notion of part - and the "infinite complication" of
"having" resulting from this use - is designed to escape, or at any
rate fills the function of avoiding, an acceptance of a fully-fledged
conception of unity or wholeness. 239
Twardowski touches this problem also elsewhere in "Zur Lehre",
in a reference to the idea of unity (unum) in medieval philosophi40
on p. 39. There too Twardowski suggests that the key to the under-
standing of the unity of the object in general is precisely the infinite
complications of havings and havings of havings, etc. pertaining
239 Cf. Brentano's doctrine on the distinction between the notions of unity and sim-
plicity (Einheit - Einfachheit), as exemplified in consciousness (Deskriptive

Psychologie pp. 10-12).
240 Medieval philosophy, in this, as in most cases, derives much of its inspiration
from Aristotle - cf. e.g. the text on unity in the Metaphysics (1015 b). Cf. the gen-
eral consideration of the transcendentalia in some medieval traditions, undertaken
e.g. by Heidegger as noted on p. 66.
between wholes and parts. He does not reject this understanding as

an unacceptable infinite regress penetrating into the very heart of the
notion of object. It is also possible to see why he does so: by regard-
ing all features of an object as components of it, he paves the way for
the general view of part-to-part correspondence as a fundamental
relation between the content and object of presentations (cf. below).
Husserl objects to this extension of the notion of having as a part.
Apart from the rather awkward necessity of adopting a number of
things that are parts of everythini41, and the infmite regress (which is
at least descriptively ad hoc), there are, he holds, simpler and more
intuitively satisfactory ways of expressing the situation. And this is
where the relevance of the problem-sphere of wholes and parts also
for the problem of object-less presentations is situated: Husserl wants
to transfer the attention to the way of "seeing" or the point ofview/42
or the logical function of the presentation - from the object "itself'. It
is clear that this suggestion depends - as we have seen before - on
the understanding of the object as something different from the pre-
sentation (i.e. the object is never identical to the content), i.e. some
kind of realism, which, as we have seen, it is not certain that Twar-
dowski shares in "Zur Lehre".
At any rate, Twardowski's standpoint as regards the deeper im-
plications of the notion of the unity of the object seems rather para-
doxical, since the unity of the object was seen both as its "essence" -
the very factor that defines the presentability of the object of presen-
tation - and as the infinite complication of parts in parts. This infinite
241 Such as unity, etc. This seems to be inevitable in any theory of quality-
moments, provided certain limits to what is allowed as qualities are not given, or
unless one is able to reduce all too frequently occurring qualities (such as those
termed transcendental qualities here) to non-qualities - commonly relations or
relational properties. The doctrine of quality-moments presupposes a sharp distinc-
tion between those properties that are qualities and those that are relational proper-
ties. Twardowski assumes however that even relational properties should be
treated as parts, which makes these routes of escape impossible for him.
242Hussed does not employ the term "Auffassungsweise" in this passage of the
manuscript (K I 6217, IG p. 169), but equivalent terms, such as "Gesichtspunkte
denselben Gegenstand oder Sachverhalt vorstellend und erkennend aufzufassen".
complication is not a phenomenal complication; by definition, in vir-

tue of the attribute of infinity it is unpresentable. But then - by Twar-
dowski's way of looking at his own work as psychology, one must
have entered a field where only speculation could prevail, the field of
things-in-themselves. This state of affairs also, as a matter of fact,
undermines his own suggestions in the field of formal ontology: what
Twardowski has to say about the formal structure of being is not built
on "experience" but is an apparatus necessary for the understanding
of experience - i.e. a theory of a rather "transcendental" character.
Whatever Twardowski's programmatic stand to empirical psycholo-
gy (in some sense) as the only valid source of philosophical inquiry
may have been at this stage of his career, his own findings, and per-
haps most valuable insights, go beyond his own restrictions, the most
obvious example being the formal ontology suggested.
Twardowski's theory of "being in": the infinite com-plication or
Chinese-box-principle - may be seen as an extreme representative of
philosophical atomism. This view in turn may be seen as one neces-
sary condition for the emergence of a radically different approach to
the study of mind, nearly at the same point of time, namely Ehren-
leis' idea of Gestalt qualities and James' idea of the "stream of
thought" (related to Bergson's ideas) referred to above, all affecting
Husserl's thinking.
Following our previous considerations on Twardowski's views on
existence, one might say that Twardowski pursues a certain monistic
line of thought, trying to reduce a number of ontological categories to
cases of relations between parts and wholes of "first-order objects"
(i.e. particulars or individual objects). Husserl and Frege object to the
idea of just working with one basic ontological category - that of ob-
jects. Frege emphatically objects to Kerry's relativization of the dis-
tinction between object and concept, and Husserl builds his solution
to the problem of object-less presentations on the transfer to the level
of the "logical function" of presentations.
Complex presentations and complex objects

Husserl's criticism of Twardowski's work in the manuscript on inten-
tional objects focuses partly on ontological theories, partly on the
theory of language, or more specifically meaning of language. These
two fields of philosophical inquiry are also in focus of the criticism
which Husserl presents on several occasions, directly or indirectly,
against Frege's use of the term "Bedeutung" as synonymous with
"Gegenstand" or object. This criticism does not only have termino-
logical import but is central to Husserl's theory of meaning as a
whole, although it is expressed mainly as a terminological difference.
It reflects Husserl's general standpoint in the period concerned, i.e.
that issues concerning linguistic meaning should focus on the func-
tion of ' 'presentations themselves" not on objects.
Husserl's own description of a theory of object as related to theory
of meaning is found i.a. in the cover-note of the whole file K I 62.243 I
quote it in its entirety:
Verschiedene Weisen der Beziehungen auf Gegenstiinde als Weisen in der

Funktion von Bedeutungen in der Zusammensetzung. Ob verschiedenen
Teilen einer Bedeutung ein verschiedener Gegenstand entspricht. Vgl.
auch zusammengesetzte und einfache Vorstellungen.
N.B. gut
Zur apriorischen Gegenstandslehre244
Accordingly, what we have to do with, is syntax, in the sense of (a

theory of) the way of producing complex meanings (linguistic or
non-linguistic) out of simple ones. The principal question of the text
is whether there is correspondence between meaning and object, or
more specifically between parts of meanings and parts of objects.
The general solution indicated is: the syntactical function of
243 A note possibly designed for his own memory, perhaps in the context of his re-
flection about sending the whole text to Meinong. Cf. Schuhmanns introduction to
the reedited complete version of the text on intentional objects (JG).
244 Cf. Annex 1

meanings determines the difference of objective reference. Despite

Husserl's generally critical attitude towards the notion of correspon-
dence as developed by Twardowski one could perhaps also say that
correspondence could serve as the pivotal notion of semantics or
theory of meaning in general - the idea of standing for or referring
to.
Since the choice of terms for the relation between content and ob-
ject to a certain extent prejudges the solution to the problem of
object-less presentations a note on terminology is appropriate:
correspondence tends to presuppose a parallel structure between
presentation (content) and object,
the notion of having links the object by some form of dependence
to the content of the "presentation itself',
the notion of relations could rather be said to emphasize a certain
independence - normally a relation pertainins between two objects
or things.
When Husserl chooses to discuss correspondence, he thus also
presupposes that the most interesting case of scrutiny is that of com-
plex presentations - only complexes could be said to have a structure.
One might read Twardowski as saying that, strictly speaking
(whatever that means in the world of phenomena!), there are no sim-
ple objects at all, despite the fact that we no doubt experience some
objects as simple. The trivial fact that all objects have some relations
to other objects, combined with the theory that relations are also
counted as (formal) parts of objects, should exclude all simple
objects. Moreover, in principle every object is even (by virtue of the
"Ineinanderschachtelung"! cf. p. 154) infinitely complicated.
Twardowski, however, satisfies himself by admitting that there are
objects which no doubt appear (erscheinen) as simple (ZL 68-69) -
this is one of the reasons why he rejects the theory of the relation
between content and object of Zimmermann, his teacher and
Bolzano's disciple. Zimmermann meant that the relation between
content and object is primitive and unanalyzable - Twardowski holds
this to be true only of simple (if any) objects. For other objects the
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTAnONS 175
relation245 can be characterized in tenns such as correspondence or

analogy of composition:
Die Frage, ob es ausser "dem Vorgestelltwerden durch den Inhalt" noch

andere Beziehungen zwischen dem Vorstellungsgegenstande und dem
ihm zugehOrigen Inhalte gebe, scheint nun im einem FaIle zu bejahen, in
einem anderen FaIle zu vemeinen. Und zwar dlirfte das erstere der Fall
sein bei Inhalten, durch die einfache Gegenstiinde, oder wenigstens Ge-
genstande a I s einfache vorgestellt werden; das letztere dlirfte der Fall
sein, wenn zusammengesetzte Gegenstiinde oder Gegenstiinde als zusam-
mengesetzt vorgestellt werden.
Dass viele Gegenstande als einfache vorgestellt werden, wenn sie auch
nicht in Wahrheit einfach sind, scheint unzweifelhaft, und ist dann der
Fall, wenn an einem Gegenstand keine Teile unterschieden werden und
derselbe als einfacher erscheint. (ZL 68)
The distinction between objects as presented and objects as they

truly are is inadvertent in this passage - still the question whether the
object, presented as simple, is identical to the object presented in
reflection, as it truly is, i.e. as complex, must be decisive for the no-
tion of object itself.
The relation between content and object of one and the same com-
plex presentation is an "analogy of composition" ("eine Analogie der
Zusammensetzung"). "Analogy" means that some kind of similarity
is at hand but that the similarity is not perfect - Twardowski cites
with approval Bolzano's view as to the "inadequacy" of the corre-
spondence: there is thus not a part of the content for each part of the
object.
245 In the title of § 12 Twardowski uses the term "Verhiiltnis" between content and
object, in other context he employs the term "Beziehung" - I have failed to fmd
English equivalents which make any difference in the shade of meaning clear.
However, there seems to be at least a potential difference (not used by Twardows-
ki): "Verhiiltnis" associates to the historically important notion of habitus, al-
though the exact German equivalent may be "Verhalten" or "Haltung" (English:
attitude). The Humean central notion of "habit" (cf. the discussion of the distinctio
realis) underlines the subjective character of this term: it marks a "stand" of the
mind or person, whereas "relation" is more neutral and presupposes the existence
or at least some kind of comparability of two relata.
Another constraint considerably limits the scope of Twardowski's

theory of correspondence or analogy, in a somewhat puzzling way. In
the survey over the possible kinds of relations which might obtain
between contents and objects of presentations Twardowski restricts
his considerations to intuitive presentations (anschauliche Vorstellun-
gen) (ZL 81). Since there has not been any previous discussion of a
border-line between intuitive and other presentations (on the con-
trary, as we have seen, Twardowski has spoken with very wide
claims for generality), this constraint is surprising. 246 The example il-
lustrating the correspondence adds to this surprise - it is a series of
numbers!
This constraint and the example chosen complicates the compari-
son with HusserI, since HusserI for his part, in this period of develop-
ment, on the one hand did not count direct presentations or intuitive
presentations as intentional, but on the other hand had a primary in-
terest precisely in intentional (exemplarily linguistic) presentations.
Moreover HusserI did not consider direct presentations to be the
same as simple presentations - the notion of Gestalt quality warrants
the distinction between simplicity and directness of presentations.
This means that for Husserl Twardowski's distinction between those
presentations which have a primitive relation to their objects (i.e.
simple presentations) and those that have a relation of
"analogy-of-composition" (complex presentations) does not hold.
Neither is it likely that HusserI shared Twardowski's hope of finding
ultimate elements of presentations. 247
246 Twardowski is however by no means unaware of such a distinction: as men-

tioned his preparatory work for "Zur Lehre" consisted in investigations on the no-
tion of concept, and its difference from intuitive presentations.
247 Cf. ZL p. 71:

... in der schon oft beklagten Tatsache, das die letzten, einfachen Bestandteile
der Vorstellungen, ihre Elemente im wahren Sinne dieses Wortes, noch [!]
nicht gefunden sind. (My insertion)
This hope reflects Twardowski's already mentioned attraction to the Wundtian
school of psychology - one seems to envisage some kind of table of psychic ele-
ments analogous to the table of chemical elements.
One might see some relationship between the Wundtian elementism and the in-
terest in mereology as such.
One reason for Twardowski's restriction to "intuitive" presenta-

tions might be the obvious lack of correspondence (the
"arbitrariness") between linguistic (and other) signs and the objects
referred to. This is demonstrated in his argument from the syncatego-
rematic meaning of "nothing" (cf. section 5.2).
Seeing the matter from a later Husserlian perspective, it is precise-
ly this arbitrariness of the intentional experience (including, then,
perception) which marks the borderline to a representational theory
(or a correspondence theory). At the same time it is its basic inherent
difficulty: if e.g. perception is independent of external stimuli as to
its "content" (a consequence of an extreme Gestalt view, since we are
predisposed to perceive a specific set of "good forms"), the border-
line between imagination and perception becomes blurred. For Hus-
serl, at least during part of his career, the solution lay in a notion of
"Wesen" or essence. 248
In "Intentionale Gegenstiinde" Husserl spells out his reading of
Twardowski249 as a consideration of the relation of the -
248 Although the notion of "Wesen" or essence as a technical term in Husserl's

philosophy falls somewhat outside the period of Husserl' s development which we
follow here, there is reason to point at the shifting use of this notion in different pe-
riods of Husserl's philosophy.
Essence is in the first period after Husserl's adoption of the phenomenological
reduction rather seen as a form of the lived experience, in the sense in which the
Gestalt theoreticians saw form as a property of the whole, perceived as a form as it
were directly and immediately. At a later stage Husserl tends rather to emphasize
the residual character of the essence: that which is left, after a kind of (at least
theoretical) scanning operation has been made of a number of exemplifications of
the essence, leaving the non-essential properties aside. The residual theory is grow-
ing more important as the idea of constitution emphasizes the layer-wise build-up
of essence: every essence should in theory be analyzed or deconstructed into a se-
ries of operations on particulars. From a phenomenological point of view the two
conceptions are rather different: the first emphasizes the immediate character, the
second rather a derived character of the essence.
There is also a difference, just as in Scholastic theory, between essence con-
ceived as the totality of the properties of one particular entity and essence con-
ceived as the abstract or ideal universal which is exemplified in the particulars.
249 From p. K 162/3 (p. 167 in IG).

psychological - mode of presentation to the form of presentation.

This is fundamentally the deliberation underlying Husserl's recom-
mendation to tum to the "logical function" of presentations instead of
objects of presentations (cf. 5.4).
Husserl expresses his general doubt about the idea of a
"syntactical correspondence" as the unified model of description of
the relation between complex contents and complex objects:
Insbesondere driingt sich bei den zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen und

Zusammensetzungen von Vorstellungen mancherlei Unterschied in der
gegenstiindlichen Beziehung auf, aber auch mancher Zweifel: ob denn je-
dem Teil der Vorstellung ein Teil oder Moment am Gegenstand ents-
preche, als das ihm zugehOrige Vorgestellte, ja ob denn bei allen
unterscheidbaren Vorstellungsteilen uberhaupt und in einem Sinn von ge-
genstiindlicher Beziehung die Rede sein konne, ob also es angemessen
sei, sie aile gleichmiissig als "Vorstellungen" gel ten zu lassen.
This passage also reflects HusserI' s opposition to Twardowski's

idea, contained in the passage quoted below, that all parts of presen-
tations are presentations themselves.
HusserI's view is closer to the one represented by Zimmermann
and Bolzano: the "relation" between (objective!) content and object
is not further '!Ilalyzable - it is the "of'.
For Twardowski all parts of presentations are also presentations:
this is valid both for contents and objects:
Wie durch eine Vorstellung des ganze Gegenstand vorgestellt wird, so

werden die einzelnen Teile des Gegenstandes durch entsprechende Vors-
tellungsteile vorgestellt. Nun sind die Teile eines Vorstellungsgegens-
tandes wieder Gegenstiinde von Vorstellungen, welche ihrerseits Teile der
ganzen Vorstellung sind. Die Teile des Vorstellungsinhaltes sind Vorstel-
lungsinhalte, sowie die Teile des Gegenstandes Gegenstiinde sind. In
analoger Weise bilden die Inhaltsteile den Gesamt-Vorstellungsinhalt, in
welcher die Gegenstandsteile den ganzen einheitlichen Gegenstand bil-
den. (ZL 42)
Now, the relation between content and object is precisely this

correspondence of parts - a partial correspondence because of the
"inadequacy" already mentioned. 250 Those parts of the object which
are selected for the correspondence Twardowski, in accordance with
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENT AnONS 179
a use of language frequent among his contemporaries, calls "marks"

(Merkmale). Many parts of the object are not marks - e.g. the rela-
tions of the object (in accordance with Twardowski's classification of
relations as parts of the object). The mark is thus the kind of parts of
the object which is represented in the content, which we "notice".
The mark is always in Twardowski's theory represented by a materi-
al part (a part in the ordinary, concrete sense) of the content.25I In
fact, the essential characteristic of a mark is to be noticed or
represented. 252
Now, the main argument against any theory of correspondence be-
tween content and object, a correspondence built upon the idea of
some kind of syntactical analogy, i.e. a species of similarity, must be
the role of language. Anyone, who tries to suggest a similarity be-
tween words and what those words stand for, faces a difficult task -
in fact the task of explaining away the phenomenon of sign itself.253
This is also where the picture theory of content of presentations in
general fails - and the theory of correspondence is in Husserl' s view
but a variant of the picture theory: not even a total similarity of two
different objects makes one the picture of the other. For anything to
be a picture one has to insert someone who makes one thing the pic-
ture of the other:
Die AhnIichkeit zwischen zwei Gegenstiinden, und sei sie noch so gross,
macht den einen noch nicht zum Bild des anderen. Erst durch die Fiihig-
keit eines vorstellenden Wesens, sich des Ahnlichen als Reprasentanten
fur ein ihm Ahnliches zu bedienen, bloss das eine bewusst gegenwiirtig zu
haben und statt seiner doch das andere zu meinen - mit einem Wort,
durch die Fiihigkeit des Vorstellens -, wird das Bild zum Bild. Vnd die
250This inadequacy may be seen as one expression of the frontier between "naive"
and "critical" realism.
251 Cf. section 4.5.
252Twardowski develops his theory of marks - which we only sketch here - in §§

8 and 13 of ZL.
253This task may be seen to be assumed by a "causal theory of meaning", explain-

ing "arbitrary" signs by way of "natural" signs (like smoke from fIre).
Sache wird nicht mehr verstandlich, wenn man die Bildahnlichkeit belie-
big steigert, und nicht weniger, wenn man sie beliebig mindert und
schliesslich aufhebt. (K I 62/8)254
A theory which does not accept a relation of correspondence as the

basic meaning relation does not need an elaborate theory of parts and
wholes of Twardowski's kind either. Hussed does not see difficulties
in accepting as parts some objects which are not called parts in daily
conversation (such as abstract parts or "moments"), but, as noted, he
has serious objections to the wide notion of part employed but Twar-
dowski. Hussed gives a criterion for what he is prepared to label a
part of an object:
Teil des Gegenstands is ist alles, was ibn reell konstituiert, was also, wenn
er realer Gegenstand ist, selbst wieder als real gelten kann, somit seine
Stiicke sowie seine positiven Merkmale und allenfalls die realen Verbin-
dungeD, welche Einheit geben. (K 162/10, IG 172)
Effectively, the talk about alternating presentations ("Wechsel-

vorstellungen"), combined with the idea of a correspondence be-
tween (complex) contents and objects seems to demonstrate the diffi-
culties of Twardowski's theory. It becomes difficult to understand,
how e.g. the city situated at the place of the Roman Juvavum could
be identical to Mozart's birth-place, if what corresponds to one pre-
sentation (one content) is not identical to what corresponds to the
other. And this does not seem to be the case, since all the "parts"
(marks) of the object corresponding to the fIrst content are different
from the parts of the other. The doctrine of correspondence in fact
eliminates the intentional character of presentations, since they in-
volve an idea of image, which presupposes some kind of intentionali-
ty and thus does not explain it. Intentionality normally requires that
the object is thought of as by defInition having properties - other
than the marks "corresponding" to the content, i.e. as being a unity
having these properties. In fact, what is characteristic of e.g. the per-
ception of an object is not the correspondence, but precisely the "spill
254This text is in part reproduced verbatim in Hua XIXII p. 436. The text is on p.
170 in IG.
over" - what we perceive is not a set of parts of an object, but an ob-

ject with those parts (rear-sides, etc.).
The identification of a non-existent object is even more dubious.
How do we realize that the god named Jupiter by the Romans is iden-
tical to (if he is) the Zeus of the Greeks? (Remember that Twardows-
ki does not admit any kind of "modified" existence, in the medieval
sense, but understands intentional or modified existence to be non-
existence.) Does it make any sense to say e.g. that their parts are
identical? It does not seem so - compare the sense of statements
concerning the present king of France!
The Inner Form and complex meaning

Section 5.2.2 briefly indicated the role played by reflection on lan-
guage in Twardowski's doctrine on the distinction between content
and object. A central and historically important place in Twardows-
ki's reflection on language is occupied by the notion of "inner form
of language" - in German "innere Sprachform". This notion is im-
portant for the understanding of Twardowski's concept of content as
well as of his construal of meaning.
On page 97 of "Zur Lehre" Twardowski presents a polemical ar-
gument against Bolzano's claim that there are presentations - as il-
lustrated by the expression "land without mountains" - where the
parts (material parts) of the content of the presentation do not corre-
spond to parts of the object of the presentation. This might constitute
a counter-argument to the general thesis of correspondence as the ba-
sic kind of relation between content and object of presentations (cf.
the preceding section). In the object presented there are obviously no
mountains, but in the presentation, so Bolzano' s argument runs, there
are at least the parts "land" and "mountains". So no correspondence
prevails.
Twardowski's principal objection is that Bolzano confuses the
content of the presentation, i.e. the meaning of the name signifying
this presentation, with the "inner linguistic form", i.e. the contents of
so-called auxiliary presentations.
The notion of "inner fonn of language", was developed by Marty

in e.g. in an article from 1893 on the relationship between logic and
grammar (Marty 1893). The concept is also a focus of Marty's gran-
diose general grammar in 1908, a work which has been mentioned
several times as being highly influential also on Husser!. 255
This notion - related to and illustrated by, but far from identical to
the concept of "Etymon" or "original meaning" of expressions in old-
er theory of language - has interesting relations to the notion of deep
structure in recent linguistic theory.256 Both notions aim at indicating
some layer of language both different from meaning and the surface
level (sound or text). It is a layer of language where "factors" or
"features" of the sound pattern of words, or uttered sentences and
other expressions, constitute an underlying syntactic structure, which
might be displayed after analysis built upon empirical examinations
of language use. This underlying syntactic fonn, though related by a
number of fonnalizable transfonnations to the surface structure is
different from the surface structure, and also commonly assumed to
be different from the meaning structure (though this is disputed by
some theoreticians).
In Twardowski's and Marty's version, the inner form oflanguage
is associated to definitions. The difference is however that ordinary
defmitions in customary grammatical and logical theory are taken to
express ingredients of the meaning of an expression, while displays
255 And also indirectly influential on more recent theory of language, both empiri-
cal and philosophical, mainly mediated through Karl Buhler who was Hussed's
disciple and later professor of philosophy and psychology in Vienna and the
United States. BUhler's theory of the three-fold functions of language is also likely
to have significantly determined Wittgenstein 's philosophy of language from the
1930-ies, cf. Gier 1981 pp. 99, III and 239, where also other references are given,
e.g. to Kaplan 1971 p. 82.
The idea of language as form - albeit not necessarily "inner" or psychic form-
also pervades all structural theory of language from Roman Jakobson, Saussure
and Hjelmslev to present-day reflection be it in Chomsky or Derrida.
256 See e.g. Chomsky's "Language and Mind" (Chomsky 1969), where he deliber-
ately associates to older linguistics and philosophical grammar, such as the Span-
iard Sanctius (16 C), Descartes and his followers in the Port Royal School, and
Wilhelm von Humboldt.
of the inner form of language are not. The point of assuming an inner
form of language is better described by the help of "circumscribing
definitions", the purpose of which is to single out elements of the
structure which do not form part of the meaning, although they
"circumscribe" it. The example of "land without mountains" should
make this clear: in the meaning of the presentation of a plain the pre-
sentation of mountains is not an ingredient. This is due to the fact
that we could imagine the plain in a number of ways, using several
different definitions and several different attributes. The role of the
inner form of language is to evoke the content of a presentation of a
plain or the meaning of the word "plain", it is not this content itself,
and consequently not the meaning. It has merely an "auxiliary" role,
not the role of an ingredient of the meaning.
Just like Georges Noel, Twardowski builds his determination of
the idea of concept - as differentiated from image2S7 - on the idea of
auxiliary presentations, explained by analogy to the inner form of
language. The same goes for his theory of abstraction and theory of
general objects in "Zur Lehre". The auxiliary presentations do not be-
long to the content of presentations, since we do not have a presenta-
tion of a mountain when thinking of a plain. Still they do belong to
the inner form of the presentation in some sense, i.e. there is some
kind of description of a presentation which should include the moun-
tain in the presentation of the plain.
This way of regarding presentations introduces an intermediate
layer between the presentation (as act) and the content (or possibly
several layers, since auxiliary presentations might come in and fulfil
some kind of operation or transformation and then be "absorbed",
like a branch in a tree-structure in linguistic transformational theory).
Furthermore, some kind of psychologistic realism seems to be pre-
supposed, in analogy with the traditional theory of (real) definitions:
the auxiliary presentations are not chosen at random or arbitrarily by
the analyst, but are really part of the structure of the presentation,
forming some kind of transformational link between the act and the
content. Thus this notion is fundamental to his theory of complex
contents as such, since it helps to remove a number of elements in the
257 In the essay on images an concepts from 1898.

structure of meaning from meaning proper or contents of presenta-

tions, and to place them in another structure. 258
It is in this light that we should understand Twardowski's criti-
cism of Bolzano for confusing meaning (content) and structure of
presentations (as acts).
A well-known category of illustrative examples of the inner fonn
of language is offered by etymology. We all know that a sense of a
word is sometimes gradually abandoned and forgotten, and how a
new sense - often more abstract or metaphorical - replaces the old
sense. Most technical tenns have this character: just take "telephone"
- who remembers today that there is a root of something distant and a
sound in this word - even if a speaker of German (Femsprecher)
might be closer to this memory than speakers of English. The same
goes for metaphors and metonyms; the "original" meaning is sinking
into the background, and may in the course of time be more or less
forgotten by a linguistic community, which means that also the meta-
phorical function disappears. Nonnally we would not award the sta-
tus of component of the meaning of the new notion to any of the
components of an etymological or "original" sense.259 Still a speaker
of the language could sometimes, when asked, account for the roots
or the etymology of a current expression.
Also the notions of "style" and ''value'', in order to have any
sense, must be distinguished from the notion of meaning, in a
"genuine" sense (whether we talk about meaning as such or only
about synonymy and related concepts like homonymy and polysemy,
etc.).
Marty emphasized that the difficulty in translating poetry does not
lie in the different meanings that we attach to words, but in the differ-
ent inner fonns lying under the use of language: backgrounds,
2S8 Chomsky also advocated an explicit realism or psychologism for at least the
fIrst versions of his transformational grammar.
159 By any theory of meaning it would seem - if the notion of ''use'' as meaning is
not extended to cover all previous uses and the whole history of an expression -
including all shifts of use and transfers in various ways and by all users of a lan-
guage - where it becomes, of course, nonsensical to use ''use'', since it is unknown
and unknowable.
presuppositions, styles, etymology, culture, etc. Note that all these

factors might also detennine a difference of meaning, but should
nevertheless be distinguished and isolated from meaning proper.
Twardowski and Husser! take somewhat different positions on
Marty's views on the inner form oflanguage.
While Twardowski accepts the very notion of inner form of lan-
guage, as separate from meaning proper, Husser! does not.
Husser!' s views on this concept, however, undergoe substantial
changes between the two versions of the Logical Investigations - as
demonstrated by the relevant passages in Investigation No IV (Hua
XIXlI p. 306 and onwards). Although Husser! does not (as usual) ad-
mit a change of opinion, his a new position actually approaches
views expressed by Twardowski, and perhaps also Meinong.
For Husser! a crucial role in this context is played by the notion of
"implicating" (implizierende2~ meaning. Husser! denies the differ-
ence per se between what Twardowski would call the inner form of
language and meaning, and he criticises Twardowski for psycholog-
istic conflation of the "auxiliary" images and presentations with
meaning.
The notion implicating meaning is built upon a distinction be-
tween two interpretations of the idea of complex meaning:
I. A complex meaning could be a meaning which consists of other
meanmgs.
2. A complex meaning could be a meaning which does not have
other meanings as parts but which, when articulated or explicated
in a new act, is interpreted or rendered by a complex meaning.
Husser! does not permit the "intermediary" level exploited by
Twardowski for the defence of his theory of correspondence between
the (material) parts of object and the parts of content. Since
Twardowski claims that the auxiliary presentations correspond to the
inner form of language and thus do not belong to meaning proper, he
is able to uphold the correspondence.261
260
First edition: "implizierte".
261
A similar discussion took place between the different schools of transforma-
Though Twardowski attributes a psychological function to the in-

ner form of language he does not suggest, however, as Husser! seems
to intimate, that the inner form, in the shape of auxiliary presenta-
tions, should be taken as a proof of the complexity of the content of
the presentation. On the contrary, he insists that auxiliary presenta-
tions are not part of the content of the presentation itself under ex-
amination. This is quite consonant with Marty's view.
Twardowski's rejection of the picture theory has two stages: the
first is the separation of image and idea in accordance with Noel's
suggestion, the second is (equally following Noel's views, cf. ZL 19,
footnote) the distinction of the double functions of the idea (= con-
tent), as the "mental substitute" and as the meaning. The mental sub-
stitute function might be identified, it seems, as the psychic
counterpart to the inner form of language. What is important here is
that the mental substitute function is not identical with the image,
picture, or even perhaps "phantasma,,262 function. Thus on the one
hand one should distinguish between as it were the "inner form of
presentations", of which - in our example - presentations of moun-
tains are components, and the meaning or content proper, of which
presentations of mountains are not components. On the other hand
one should also distinguish between this objective inner form and the
picture, which is a subjective and personal accidental accompanying
act.
Husser! himself recognizes that he does not overcome the difficul-
ties regarding the parallelism or correspondence between language
and intentionality, including the status of the inner form of language.
This is seen by the note added to § 3 in the second edition of Inves-
tigation No IV and also in Ideas I (p. 307).
tional grammarians during the 1970s, where Chomsky's original view on the "deep
structure" as being different from both the "surface structure" and the meaning or
"semantic representation", was challenged by the school of generative semantics.
Marty emphasizes the difference between the inner forms of different lan-
guages - this is the point of the difficulty of translating poetry: it is possible to
transfer meaning, but the inner fonn of language is much more difficult to transfer.
262 Hussed's association of Twardowski to these kinds of theories seems rash, per-
haps due to Hussed's rather limited acquaintance with the theory of language in
the period concerned.
The notion of the inner form of language, however, bears a wider

interest in the context of the controversy between Husserl and Twar-
dowski than what is perceived from the texts from the 1890s. One
might even say that Husserl's neglect of the notion of inner form in
the earlier texts and his misunderstanding of Twardowski as identify-
ing inner form with linguistic meaning paves the way for his own
theory of constitution, which became the dominating idea in all his
later thinking. For, what is constitution, if not a theory of inner form
of presentations/intentional actslErlebnisse? The character of the
"implied complexity", layer-by-layer, is the nucleus of the Husserlian
theory of constitution, and also determines the idea of inner form, in
the original linguistic conception in Marty. Marty does himself term
a description of this inner form a "logical" one, in contradistinction
to a "psychological" (i.e. a genetical-historical) description (Marty
1983 p. 125). It is also noteworthy that this circumstance is expressed
in the second, revised, version of the text in Investigation IV (Hua
XIX p. 310), where the apparatus of constitution is used to explain
why a unified experience could still have a complex ''underlying''
structure. The theory of constitution is a theory of "subconscious",
retrievable, structure of "Erlebnisse".
Husserl and Twardowski seem to agree that the inner form or deep
structure does not belong to the meaning in an ordinary (explicit)
sense of that expression, that is neither the linguistic meaning nor the
meaning of the intentional Erlebnis/act. They differ in as far as Hus-
serl sees something reminiscent of the inner form as an indirect or
"implicit" part of the complex meaning - a meaning which does not
consist of (explicit, partial) meanings. Twardowski, in "Zur Lehre",
regards the inner form of language as analogous to auxiliary presen-
tations. They do not form part of the content of presentations, and
thus not a part of the meaning either.
Twardowski revises his position in the essay "Images and Con-
cepts" - where the concept, now defmed as one species of the genus
"presentation", which also embraces images263 , is clearly seen as a
complex presentation. This complex presentation has a particular
263 This in tum appears to be a rather radical revision in relation to the view of
Noel, approved in "Zur Lehre".
syntax. where the auxiliary presentations play a crucial role. The

foundation of this complex presentation is an image, upon which in
some sense an auxiliary presentation of a judgement "operates". A
"land without mountains" is thus a presentation which consists of an
image of a land, upon which the presentation of the judgement "there
is no mountain in this land" operates. The presentation of the judge-
ment functions in the same way as "embedded clauses" in the under-
lying structure of generative grammar. The difference, in relation to
"Zur Lehre", is however that Twardowski now awards an active role
within the meaning ("semantic representation" in the terminology
employed in generative grammar) to this presentation of a judge-
ment. This is also the standpoint of Hussed in the Logical
Investigations.
Chomsky 264 draws up an interesting historical picture of the issue
of deep structure in the theory of language, tracing a fundamental dif-
ference of views between two standpoints, which both accept that the
"surface level" of language does not tell the whole truth about the
structure of an expression. An older tradition (Sanctius) holds that
language is full of abbreviations or "elliptic" expressions, which
could be made explicit in a number of new expressions - none of
which could claim absolute right over the other. A newer tradition,
from Descartes, the Port Royal school and Du Marsais, claims that
the elliptic expressions should be understood as being underpinned
by a psychic structure, which in some sense is "real", and could be
explored by empirical means.
The "idealistic" tradition of Sanctius is continued by later 20th
Century philosophical grammarians such as Croce and Vossler, and
also by the young Hussed, while a realistic tradition might be repre-
sented by Twardowski, who precisely in this respect, e.g. by his use
of the notion of "auxiliary presentations", shares a psychologistic
tendency with some later theories of language, as e.g. that of Chom-
sky himself (at least temporarily). Marty's position is more difficult
to classify in this respect: his subject matter is undoubtedly psycholo-
gy, albeit seen as a basic philosophical discipline; but on the other
hand he is careful to distinguish his own research, as being "logical"
2M Chomsky 1969.
emphasizing the links between logic and grammar, from a

psychological-genetical type of investigation. Furthennore he clearly
rejects positions which give the psychological study of language an
absolute priority in philosophy (positions occupied by Max Maller
and, it seems, also by Wundt and Steinthal (cf. Marty 1893 p. 119).
Marty's objections to Humboldt (whom Chomsky regards as a
"realist" in this sense) for identifying inner fonn of language with
meaning, might be significant in this respect. Marty's own position in
this dispute is perhaps better described by his emphasis on the notion
of the functionality of meaning: meaning is not for Marty an object at
all but a function of linguistic expressions: i.e. the function of arous-
ing certain presentations. Meaning is not a psychic phenomenon -
nor is it, as in Twardowski, the content of a presentation.
Disregarding the dispute between realism and idealism in this lin-
guistic understanding, a very Humboldtian view of the role of deep
structure or inner fonn in general is however expressed in the follow-
ing statement by Marty (it might also serve as an expression of the
fundamental credo of generative grammar). Its role is to make the
creation of an infinite number of expressions from a finite number of
linguistic elements:
Dies ist der ursprungliche Anlass und der Hauptzweck der inneren
Sprachform: als Band der Assoziation zu dienen zwischen Laut und Be-
deutung, und dem SprachschOpfer zu ermoglichen, durch eine relativ
beschrankte Zahl durch sich verstiindlicher oder durch ungesuchte Ge-
wohnheit verstiindlich gewordene Zeichen eine weit grossere Hille von
Inhalten zu umspannen. (Marty 1893 p. 107.)
The "realistic" view of inner fonn, and perhaps meaning, is in this
sense (though without its psychological underpinning) shared by
Russell and perhaps also the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. The de-
velopment of Husserl's views on meaning from "idealism" to
"realism" might actually be regarded as a counterpoint to Husserl's
development in epistemology, which goes from realism to idealism.
The phenomenological method of investigation into the constitution
of meanings is fundamentally, not a method of construction. Mean-
ing is found, and so we cannot choose interpretations that are "fUr ge-
wisse logische Zwecke vorteilhafter", as Husserl's theory of
explication seems to suggest in 1894.
Hussed's view on the complexity of meaning in the Logical Inves-

tigation No IV detennines his sketch of a general theory of meaning
(i.e. semantical) categories. The rejection of Twardowski's doctrine
that all parts of contents are contents, is the basis for a theory of the
syntax of meaning, in which a composite meaning does not itself
have to be composed of meanings Gust as a noun is not necessarily
composed of nouns). We have already pointed at this theory as the
historical basis of later categorial grammars and their derivates (p. 78
footnote 114).
Hussed is hardly right in saying that Twardowski identifies image
or direct presentation with meaning: on the contrary, Twardowski in-
sists that the external form of language have a correspondent struc-
ture on the inner level of meaning. The notion of inner form is
designed precisely to explain how meaning is related to the outer
form of language i.e. sound or writing patterns. It might seem some-
what strained to deny that ''without mountains" does not have a cor-
respondent component of the meaning of the entire expression "land
without mountains". In Marty's view this is however not more re-
markable than the fact that there are several functions of linguistic
expressions, of which only one plays the role of arousing presenta-
tions, viz. the meaning function.
According to Twardowski, this appearance of strangeness is due to
the assumption of a simplistic parallelism between language and
thought. Only after we have examined the inner form of language are
we ready to proceed to the analysis of the meaning of an expression.
Meaning is - in Twardowski's theory - the nucleus of the intentional
act or the presentation, that nucleus which is precisely determined by
its exact correlation to the object. Meaning is simply defined as those
components of the presentation which have objective correlates.
Meaning is all objective, and whatever components there may be in
the external form of an expression, if they cannot not be traced to this
objective correlation they belong to the inner form of language and
not to its meaning, which is the content of presentations.
The situation becomes more complicated if we do not restrict our-
selves to the consideration of "names" and their meaning. Marty pur-
sued his considerations further after his discovery of the systematic
lack of correspondence between the traditional categories of "words"
and the semantically defined syntactic categories. Thus in his later

writings (such as the "Investigations" (Marty 1908), the fundamental
distinction between semantical categories is not between "names"
and "predicates", categorematic and syncategorematic expressions or
the like, but between "autosemantic" and "synsemantic" expressions,
i.e. expressions having independent or just dependent (or contextual)
meaning. He accepts e.g. only the nominative case of nouns as
"autosemantic", while the other cases are clearly "synsemantic". Also
sentences are to be considered as autosemantic, indeed as the main
class of expressions falling under this category.265
Husserl's idea of "implicit" (first edition of the Investigations) or
"implicating" (second edition) meaning, however, presupposes that
all parts of the external form of an expression should be accounted
for in terms of meaning (proper). Only those parts of a meaning
which are not explicit and manifest through the external form of lan-
guage can be made manifest by the deployment of the implicit
meaning ("explication"). The external form thus provides one possi-
ble explication of a meaning, and other possible explications might
be concealed or implicit and brought out after analysis. To a certain
degree this theory deprives meaning of its fixed structure: Husserl is
prepared to say that there are several explications of one meaning.
Thus there is no definite expression of a "semantic representation",
or the intentional essence (Wesen) of a linguistic act.
Correspondence and the notion of truth

Although it might be natural to link considerations on the "adequacy"
of contents to objects to an account of truth, only some scattered
notes on the notion of truth are to be found in "Zur Lehre", (e.g. pp.
265 Cf. Marty 1908 and for a critical examination which also pays regard to Huss-
ed's and BUhler's criticisms, Landgrebe 1934. Landgrebe emphatically rejects
Hussed's classification of Marty's position as psychologistic (p. 27, footnote), pre-
cisely because Marty considered meaning to be afunetion. not a psychic phenome-
non (i.e. an object). This also fits well with Marty's general emphasis on verbs in
language, as different from traditional concentration on ''names''.
"Sentence" is also Frege's basic semantic category.
26 and 38). Twardowski does not give much attention to this issue
until in a pUblication which might in fact be said to end the period
which is, at least in a terminological sense, psychologistic. I refer to
his - relatively polemic - essay "On so-called relative truths". 266
That essay seems to endorse Spencer's theory of truth as a
"parallelism between relations within the mind and relations of the
world" - a theory which seems to fit in well with Twardowski's gen-
eral mereological views, understanding "parallelism" as some kind of
structural correspondence or "analogy of composition".267
Husserl includes in the file of manuscripts containing his reactions
to Twardowski's book also a reflection on the notion of truth - in fact
a rather early (if not the earliest) clear statement of a view of truth,
which he came to retain all his career. This reflection is included in
the last part (dating from 1898) of the text "Intentionale Ge-
genstiinde", which means that it was conceived slightly later than
Husserl's review of Twardowski and in immediate connection with
the preparation of the Logical Investigations.
The connection with Twardowski is however also immediate: one
of the points of the theory presented by Husserl is that the notion of
truth should be seen as based on (the ideal correlate of) the
266 Written originally in Polish in 1900, but translated into German and published
in 1902 in Archiv fUr systematische Philosophie (Bd VIII, Heft 4). The translator
(M. Wartenberg) has however ignored Twardowski's own distinction between in-
tuition and presentation in general from 1898, translating ''wyobratenie'' (image)
by "Vorstellung" (cf. WPF p. 331).
267 Twardowski quotes without objection Spencer's view of the "act of knowing"
as "the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the envi-
ronment" - from Spencer's "First Principles" § 25 - WPF 334. Twardowski also
defends Spencer against reproaches for relativism. since the Spencerian relativism,
in his view, is nothing but a theory of the relationality of truth, as emerges from
the quoted phrase. In Polish this distinction is clear due to the use of two different
terms - "wzgl~dnosc" for relativity and "relatywnosc'" for relationality. The Ger-
man translation does do justice or this distinction.
It might be worth recalling that Spencer is, together with Nietzsche, among the
rather rare philosophers whom Husserl treats with irony and even contempt (cf.
Hua XXIV p. 205-6, part of his lectures in 1906-7, which are, as already stated, to
be read in close connection with the controversy with Twardowski).
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTAnONS 193
intentional experience of evidence, which is the complex experience

of intended meaning, judgement and filled meaning (intuition). And,
the point of talking about the truth of an intentional experience or act
presupposes that not all presentations have objects (in a genuine
sense), since, if one could state that the presentation (the intentional
act) already had an object from the outset, the point of seeing some
acts as truthful and some as mistaken would vanish. Effectively, the
whole talk about truth as adequation or conformity between the mind
and the world falls, if every presentation, i.e. also complex presenta-
tions, is a presentation of an object. A crucial case is the case of pre-
sentations of relations, since a presentation of a relation also must be
said to have an object. It is however difficult to avoid the conclusion
that there must be some kind of correspondence or adequacy between
this object and the content of that presentation. It might be possible
to avoid this conclusion by saying that there could simply not be pre-
sentations of relations, only of singular objects, such as facts, consist-
ing of relations and other parts. As soon as we have a psychic
phenomenon directed towards a relation we would have a judgement,
not a presentation. We have seen how Twardowski tries to avoid
these complications of the idiogenical theory of judgement by his
suggestion to distinguish between existence of objects and subsis-
tence (Bestehen) of relations.
The idea of correspondence as a relation between the content and
the object of the presentation - and a relation which pertains between
all presentations and their objects - would thus preclude that there
could be contents (presentations) which are not in some sense true, in
the way Husserl interprets the notion of truth. It is however notewor-
thy that already in the review (from 1896-7) Husserl has somewhat
altered his original position as regards the existence of the object (in
the genuine sense of existence). The object is there qualified as an
"aspect" of the ideal content of the presentation ("presentation" being
a term which Husserl is ready to discard at this time), along with the
content, taken as an ideal content. Husserl there clearly reflects an at-
titude that comes near to the Fregean distinction between sense and
reference.
The outcome may appear somewhat paradoxical: in order to safe-
guard a theory of truth based on correspondence, adequacy or
confonnity Hussed is obliged to reject a theory of presentation

which includes some kind of correspondence between content and
object of presentations. And furthennore, since we may take it that
Twardowski did not change his view on the theory of truth between
"Zur Lehre" and "On So-called Relative Truths", Twardowski does
not seem to have any doubts about the possibility of accepting corre-
spondence between content and object for all presentations.
For Hussed, although truth is to be seen as a complex state of af-
fairs, the most basic part of this state of affairs may be said to be the
third component (of the three: intention, judgement and filling), since
the entire possibility of truth rests upon our ability to have a direct
"lived experience" (Edebnis) of the "Sache selbst", a lived experi-
ence which is contrasted with indirect or representational experiences
(or, in this early stage, even: intentional experiences). Only in those
direct experiences do we have access to the object itself - in the case
of mistakes we have experiences without this access. The last case
could not be shown until, naturally, reflection has demonstrated the
mistake. As in Hussed's entire theory of truth, the role of direct in-
sight, filling, or evidence is not to be interpreted as a guarantee of
truth, by some special faculty of mind. Rather it is the interpretation
of the notion of truth as something ultimately founded on, i.e. presup-
posing, the possibility of establishing this direct access.
Hussed asserts that whereas the meaning content alone constitutes
the ideal content or inner content of the presentation, the objective
reference or the extension of presented objects should be seen as a
"secondary", possibly "external", component - in truth contexts only
(Hua XXII p. 338). This standpoint expresses the necessity of avoid-
ing any talk of correspondence in the context of the relation between
content and object of presentations only. Truth and object are differ-
ent "objectivities", as he says in the part of the manuscript which
dates from 1898 (Hua XXII p. 340).268
268 In the same passage HusserI emphasizes the difference of act, content and ob-
ject of presentations - an influence from Twardowski? - but also the possible iden-
tity of content and object (the cases of suppositio materialis, etc. might be
referred to, as noted in the manuscript K I 62).
A root of Husserl's and Twardowski's divergent attitudes un-

doubtedly lies in the theory of judgement. Husserl certainly recog-
nizes some kind of difference between judgement and presentation
(taken in a very imprecise sense) - but he firmly asserts the legitima-
cy of talking about truth also in the context of presentations as such.
Husserl strictly distinguishes judgement of perception from predica-
tive judgements: judgements of perception also according to Husserl
do not have to include "naming". Nor does he recognize the possibil-
ity of rewriting or interpreting "one-part" (i.e. perceptual) judgements
as existential judgements: they are not anything but predicative
judgements about something being an object (Hua XXII p. 347).
Thus it is not possible to uphold the Brentanian doctrine about exis-
tence as the sole content of all affirmative judgement. Although we
have seen that Twardowski too has doubts about this doctrine, it
might be asked whether it is not the necessary basis for the particular
interpretation of object of presentation in Twardowski's theory.
Husserl's standpoint is linked to some kind of realist epistemolo-
gy: only if the object is interpreted as something not constituted
(instituted) by the different acts of perception, judgements, etc. could
one uphold the directness and non-predicatedness as a criterion for
distinguishing between judgements of perception and judgements of
predication (and existence).
On the aetiology of intentionality

The philosophical encounter and disagreement between Husserl and
Twardowski has been focusing on the notions of intention and inten-
tionality. Their confrontation over the interpretation of the notion of
intention has a historical interest, since Husserl's reading of Twar-
dowski took place relatively soon after Brentano's revival of this no-
tion, and in the course of a new interpretation of the concept.
Although it may appear as surprising, in view of Husserl's criti-
cism of psychologism, Twardowski makes a more logical-semantical
use of the notion,269 while Husserl focusses on a more psychological
269 Emphasized by the editor of Husserliana XXII.

aspect: Twardowski's interest lies in the "modifying" (semantical)

function of the predicate "intentional", not in a use which empha-
sized the "innemess" of intentional objects.
Husserl on the other hand - influenced by his reading of psycholo-
gists such as Ehrenfels and James - advances an interpretation, closer
to the ordinary English understanding of the word "intention", viz. as
a conscious and purposeful ingredient in human behaviour. This in-
terpretation is not modifying but determining, since a phenomenon
like human behaviour is not turned into non-behaviour by qualifying
it as "intentional", but rather described as having a certain character-
istic.270 James and Ehrenfels both focus on interest - i.e. the active
role of the human person/mind - in the cognitive process. This focus
on "action" is not alien to the medieval tradition being represented
e.g. by Aquinas, although we might usually associate this tradition
more with ontological reflection on the esse intentionalis, as one of
the several modes of being, in the ladder going from less perfect to
the ultimately perfect being, rather than with theory of perception. At
least in some texts in Aquinas, the focal point is undoubtedly
"practical" - e.g. reflection over the notion of rational and
premeditated action, as linked to the notion of responsibility (and
accordingly sin).271
270 Though intention is often seen as the demarcation line between behaviour and
action.
271 De Veritate q.22 a.13,c and Summa Th. Ia I1ae q.12, a.1. References indicated
by Simonin.
Simonin also indicates another passage (Simonin p. 450), from De Potentia q.3
a.7, ad 7, where a more ontological use is made of the notion of intention: Aquinas
distinguishes between "esse co",pletu", in natura" on the one hand and "<esse>
per modum intentionis, sicut virtus artis est in instrumento artificis". The latter
mode of being is the being of the artefact, which exists only in virtue of the art (the
artist).
A central theme in that context was to Aquinas the explanation of the particular
being and force of the sacraments: their natural being (e.g. being bread and wine)
must be distinguished from their intentional being, the instrumental being due to
the divine "artist" behind the sacraments. It would have been quite pointless to say
that this intentional being was no true being - as is well known from the doctrine
of ''transsubstantiation'' - the second kind of being is true to the extent that even
Only after Husser! undertook his "phenomenological surgery", the

transcendental reduction, was he ready to exploit the modifying po-
tential of "intentional" - not for making a kind of distinction between
existence and non-existence or modes of existence as such, but for
contemplating the entire world in the mode of intentionality and
nothing else: the phenomenological bracketing could be seen as a
"total modification". 272
As for Brentano, his use of the apparatus of intentionality - a rath-
er rare use, as has been noted in recent debates - appears confused.273
The preceding discussion of Husserl' s criticism of Twardowski may
have dissolved some of that confusion: immanence in no way ex-
cludes reality. On the contrary, in Brentano's view the intentional ex-
istence of the object, the characteristic of psychic phenomena,
safeguards the direct access of the mind to reality, since the object is
both phenomenal/intentional and real/immanent (cf. p. 150). For
physical phenomena the situation is different: there we have the split
between the "external" cause of the phenomenon and the phenome-
non itself, avoided in the case of psychic phenomena, the noumenon
of which is, as it were, included in the phainomenon.
Seeing Twardowski as a disciple of Brentano becomes somewhat
complicated in this light: effectively, the use of the ontological inter-
pretation of the notion of intentionality seems to exclude the epis-
temological one, which is central to the critical realism of Brentano.
For if one does not accept the "immanent" object as an object at all,
and rebaptizes it as content, one loses the advantage of the direct ac-
cess to at least some kind of objects, as in Brentano's theory. We are
only left with a kind of object of which we never know for sure
whether they exist or not, existence being by definition separated
from their "objectivity". Quite in agreement with this, Twardowski
the substance is of the second kind, whereas the natural being only concerns the
accidents.
272It is the possibility of this total modification which is disputed by most disci-
ples of Husserl within the phenomenological movement. How could one modify
everything if the non-modified "origin" of modification is not kept within the
theoretical framework?
273 As noted by Spiegelberg (Spiegelberg 1969, pp. 208-9) and Ulfstedt.

also precludes that objects in his understanding could have anything

in common with the noumena in a Kantian sense.274
One might discern a strange circle in a development going from
Descartes to Twardowski: Descartes, in striving to make the justifica-
tion of knowledge the focus of philosophy, to the detriment of ontolo-
gy, appealed to what was perceived as the absolute security
safeguarded by the cogito, i.e. the "inner" or psychic sphere. Twar-
dowski on the other hand, exploiting to the full the potentiality of the
"inner" sphere for the build-up of a new ontology of objects of pre-
sentation, seems to lose the very force of justification searched for by
Descartes. One might, of course, see this as a sign of an irreducible
gap between two kinds of focus chosen for philosophy: knowledge
or being.275 Or alternatively, one might also take Twardowski's resig-
nation from the existence-guaranteeing function of the inner sphere
(in its pregnant sense, viz. the sphere of presentations), as an implicit
recognition that "psychology" in his sense of the tenn is not a science
which has the pretention of being "empirical" in the sense of talking
about the world of things as they are, but rather that of settling cer-
tain issues which detennine the further development of empirical
274 Cf. the discussion on p. 51 relating to ZL p. 35.
275 A perhaps somewhat anecdotical but still illuminating illustration of this gap,
including its medieval roots, might be certain discussions of the famous Aristote-
lian dictum as may be found e.g. in "De Anima" I1I.8 p. 453 in the Moerbeke edi-
tion (Aristoteles 1951), where it is stated that the soul is "in some way" 0 the
principle of everything.
This passage is commented on by Aquinas, which supplies interesting informa-
tion concerning his notion of object. It is also the focus of a tacit exchange of opin-
ions between Husserl and Heidegger. The latter uses Aquinas explication of
Aristotle for the purpose of introducing his own notion of "Zuhandenheit" (his clue
to the bridging of the epistemological rift between subject and object). Husserl
ironically notes at this passage in his copy of "Sein und Zeit" (p. 14) that Heideg-
ger still has got some Thomism left - a reference to the time when Husserl, like
many others, regarded Heidegger as a Catholic philosopher.
This is but one illustration of the role issues related to psychologism assume in
the confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl as seen from "Sein und Zeit", p.
217. where Heidegger recognizes the justification of psychologism in rejecting the
separation between the real and the ideal. (Cf. Cavallin 1987 p. 46 and 180)
science. Now, this last way of looking at things comes near to tran-
scendental idealism, which was rather close at hand, considering the
rise ofNeo-Kantianism in these years.
The last words may give a natural cause to revert to the two issues
judged as the two main problems of psychologism in a general sense
(p. 106), reformulating them as follows:
1. Is the understanding of the meaning/content as a real psychic
event a necessary ingredient in the interpretation of Twardowski's
theory of content and object of presentations?
2. Does a theory of objects, a formal ontology, such as that de-
signed by Twardowski, require this interpretation of content?
It seems likely that Husserl's answerS would have been affirma-
tive in the period concerned. To the fIrst question his answer is likely
to have been rather unequivocal, but to the second question more
hesitating, since he certainly acknowledges the basic legitimacy of
formal ontology, as well as of an extended notion of part and whole.
His criticism is more directed to Twardowski's special variety of the
theory than towards the idea as such.
After Husserl's acceptance of a generalized formal ontology for
pure phenomenology, an evaluaion of issues concerning existence
will necessarily look different.
5.4 INTENTIONAL OBJECTS AND OBJECT-LESS

PRESENTATIONS: HUSSERL'S SOLUTION
The examination of the main features of Husserl's own solution to
the problem of object-less presentations will be thematized under the
following headings, without pretending that there is any clear border
between the themes concerned:
1. The shift of attention from the objects of presentation to con-
tents of presentations, or rather to what is termed the logical func-
tion ofpresentations. 276
276This feature of HusserI's criticism of Twardowski is also noted by

Smith&McIntyre - who, however, do not seem to notice that HusserI wrote his text
before the publication ofFrege's critical review of "Philosophie der Arithmetik".
2. The notion of objective content.

3. The role of hypotheses or assumptions.
HusserI's solutions to the problems treated in the manuscript
"Intentionale Gegenst:ande" undergoe changes both in the Logical In-
vestigations and, more significantly, after his adoption of the "pure"
phenomenology. As remarked repeatedly, HusserI's development in
both phases of his phenomenology is related to reflections on Twar-
dowski's "Zur Lehre". The text being primarily examined here is,
however, the manuscript on intentional objects, which necessarily
limits the scope of the considerations.
The logical function of presentations

It has already been pointed out that a basic ingredient in HusserI's
criticism of Twardowski's solution of the problem of object-less pre-
sentations is the suggestion that the correct solution does not lie in a
theory of object, but in the theory of presentation "itself'. The expla-
nation should focus at the functions of the presentation, in particular
at what HusserI labels the logical function of presentation. HusserI
claims thereby to eliminate the role of Twardowski's general theory
of the existence-neutral object of presentation in explaining why
there is, for all presentations, both a content and an object - despite
the obvious and commonly accepted fact that some presentations do
not refer to any existing "external" thing, just as some names do not
in fact name existing things.
The notion of function itself is, as noted above (e.g. p. 128) am-
biguous. A strict mathematical interpretation of the term could not be
intended. "Function" must be taken in a more intuitive or looser
sense, viz. to indicate the "behaviour", role or set of relations of an
entity within some totality to which it belongs. The totality assumes a
primary explanatory role. A logical function of an entity would thus
mean the role of this entity for the drawing of conclusions, consisten-
cy and the possible truth/falsity of judgements or sentences.
HusserI's basic argument against Twardowski's solution of the
problem of object-less presentations is the simple one that the
attribution of the unacceptable qualities - e.g. round-squareness - to

objects instead of to the functions of presentations "themselves", is
quite misdirected. If the object of a presentation is anything else than
a function of the presentation - i.e. a set of properties of the presenta-
tion, described in terms of the purposes which the presentation ful-
fils 277 - then talk about objects does not explain the circumstance
that we sometimes make mistakes or that some presentations are
about matters which do not exist, are impossible, or contradictory,
etc.
In order for this objection to have any kind of relevance, one must
presuppose that objects are not parts of the presentation - otherwise
there would not be any point in suggesting a shift of perspective from
objects to contents of the presentation.
So, in Husserl's view, a genuine solution to the problem must be
designed to describe what Husserl calls the logical function of the
presentation, instead of the possible status of objects of presentation
with regard to existence, modified existence etc. Husserl defines
"logical function" in the following way (I quote at some length, in
order also to include Husserl's statement of his thesis):
... die Rede vom Einwohnen und der ganze Unterschied zwischen ''wahr''
und "intentional" sich reduziert auf gewisse Eigentiim1ichkeiten und Un-
terschiede der logischen Funktion der Vorstellungen, d.h. der Formen
moglicher giiltiger Zusammenhange, in welche die Vorstellungen, aussch-
liesslich nach ihrem objektiven Gehalt betrachtet, eintreten konnen. (My
emphasis.)
The last passage, taken as a definition of the notion of logical
function, relates directly to the concept of objective content, i.e. of
the second item on our list of factors deciding the Husserlian solution
to the entire problem. The notion of logical function however does
not exhaust the notion of objective content - i.e. there are other
277 And to characterize the object as a function seems to be a simple category mis-
take, although a function could naturally be an object in a secondary examination
or other kind of operation or act. Cf. the related dispute between Kerry and Frege
and others on the relativity of the distinction between object and concept. Logical,
grammatical and ontological issues are involved in this seemingly merely termino-
logical dispute.
features of an objective content than the forms of the possible valid

context in which it could appear.
As we have seen, there are several possible interpretations of
Twardowski's ultimate standpoint in this matter - although the thesis
contained in Tl (cf. p. 53) does not seem to leave room for an inter-
pretation different from Husserl's. In fact the situation is, as has been
suggested earlier in this study, considerably more complicated. Twar-
dowski's notion of object might even be regarded as a precursor to
the later Husserlian notion of noema, as some "correlative part" of
the lived experience, fulfilling a number of functions associated with
this notion but also sharing some of its difficulties. 278
The logical rather than the ontological nature of this problem is
demonstrated, in Husserl's view, by the futility in the "quasi-division
of objects into genuine and intentional ones,,279, which he regards as
just as inaccurate as a division of objects into e.g. determinate and
indeterminate (cf. the quoted passage in footnote 2). This is a
fundamental error in Twardowski's book, according to Husser1. 280 It
278One should not confuse the essence of an object with noema, according to Hus-
serl's own statement in Ideen III (Hua V p. 85). Nor should one overlook the links
between the noema and the essence of the act or intentional lived experience, as
suggested by Husserl himself in his own comparison of terminology between the
Ideas I and the Logical Investigations (e.g. in Ideen I, Hua III p. 234).
279 Der Quasi-Einteilung der Gegenstiinde in wahre und intentionale ist analog
diejenige der Gegenstande in bestimmte und unbestimmte. (Hua XXII p.
313)
280 That it is a considered view is demonstrated by the fact that this is basically the
objection directed also against Frege 's theory of meaning. See both the correspon-
dence with Frege from 1891 and the remarks in the Logical Investigations (Hua
XIXII p. 58). Furthermore, much of the manuscript K 162 develops the same posi-
tion:
Sagt jemand "eine weisse Flache", "ein rotes Viereck", so konnen wir derg-
leichen anschauen; aber nicht die Bedeutung, sondem ihren Gegenstand
(genauer: einen Gegenstand, dem die Attribute zukommen) habe wir damit
angeschaut, und zwischen beidem gahnt eine uniiberbruckbare Kluft. (lG p.
168)
As noted before, Husserl rejects Frege's inclusion of objects in his account of
is linked to Twardowski's interpretation of "intentional" as a modifi-

er (cf. Section 5.3.5). We have already noted the inaccuracy in Hus-
serI's reading of Twardowski at this point.
To show the implausibility of talk about objects in this connection,
HusserI draws a number of parallels: the division of e.g. lions into
African and Asian lions is a proper division of the class of lions,
whereas a division of lions in determinate and indeterminate has
nothing to do with their qualities or proper relations. Neither determi-
nate nor indeterminate lions run around in the world, just as possible
or impossible lions do not. The difference between determinacy and
indeterminacy does not lie "outside" the presentations, but in the pre-
sentations themselves.
Husserl's proposal to relegate the solution of this issue to the
"forms of possible valid contexts of (the objective content of) presen-
tations" reflects the duplicity inherent in the notion of object,
employed by Twardowski and other "Gegenstandstheoretiker".
Twardowski expresses this duplicity unvoluntarily, by calling the ob-
ject sometimes a "Moment" of the presentation, while on the other
hand rejecting the "immanence" of the object (cf. the discussion
above on the theses T 1-T6).
In HusserI's view the objective reference or relation of presenta-
tions, i.e. a function or role of presentations (die gegenstandliche Be-
ziehung, e.g. Hua XXII p. 313) is the theme of the discussion, not
divisions within some general, all-embracing, class of objects. The
distinction between existing and non-existing does not mark some
kind of division within a general class of objects of presentation. Ac-
tually the argument is related to Twardowski's own argument from
"infinitation" (cf. p. 114) - there is no class of objects of presentation
more embracing than the class of beings in general, quite regardless
of the inclusion or non-inclusion of possible objects of presentation
in the class of aliquid.
Roughly speaking, one might separate at least three understand-
ings of the term object in philosophical tradition:
the meanings (Bedeutungen) of names. Just as an account of the roles of presenta-
tions should not take refuge in objects "external" to presentations (or at least non-
immanent objects), an account of the roles of names could not rest upon external
objects.
1. An object is something which is there before (and independent-

ly of whether) it happens to enter into a relation to a human mind.
2. An object is something created or invented by the human mind
(individually or collectively), and subsists in the same way as any
product of the human mind, be it physical, as shoes or chairs, or
immaterial like symphonies or mathematical theorems.
3. An object is a mere product of the imagination, and does not en-
dure beyond it. Neither is it identical with any particular act of
imagination, since it could be common to several such acts (such
as dreams, thoughts, ideas), which means that it could be causally
inseparable and dependent on, but not numerically identical with
the act "itself'.281
As a matter of fact, the last kind of interpretation was suggested in
Twardowski's later essay on "Actions/functions and products",
which eliminates most considerations of objects altogether. Twar-
dowski, ostensibly influenced by the anti-psychologistic criticism of
the Logical Investigations, thus approaches the realist position taken
by HusserI in 1894, a position which HusserI, influenced by the idea
of a formal ontology, for which Twardowski should be given credit,
had at that time abandoned!282
Some of these different kinds of understanding of the notion of
object are seen e.g. in Kant's distinction between objects as made
possible (in a transcendental, not empirical-causal sense) by the pre-
sentation on the one hand and objects as those things that make
281 See the article on "Objekt" in Ritter for a rather exhaustive historical survey of
the history of the notion. The article on "Gegenstand" contains considerably less
material.
Both together give however a nearly crushing impression of the variety of
philosophical ideas lying in this concept - one is rather surprised that anyone dares
to make use of it!
282The issue of Husserl's relation to terms like "realism" or "idealism" is im-

mensely more complicated than this historical sketch could show - cf. the well-
known letter to Abbe Baudin in 1934, where Husserl declares himself to be as
much a realist as an idealist.
phenomena possible, in the empirical sense of being the causes of

sensations (Empfmdungen)283 on the other.
If one agrees in essential respects with Husserl' s standpoint during
this period, only the different employments of the notion of object
give Twardowski's theory some plausibility in the issue concerning
the object-less presentations. Although Husserl does not entirely dis-
agree with the idea that one could refer to objects without being com-
mitted to their existence (Hua xxn 315), he could not accept that
properties or functions of (contents of) presentations were treated as
if they were valid bases for the division of classes of objects.
Now, the next question to decide upon is: what does the notion of
"form of possible valid contexts,,284 imply? What is a
"Zusammenhang" - a complex whole, in which the presentation (its
objective content) is inserted (of which it is a part)? The predicate
''valid'' says that we have to do with a complex whole, which could
be inserted into consequence relations. Thus, Husserl's formula
would say that the presentation is one part of the context and other
presentations are other parts of the same context. Whether the con-
text, or complex whole, could also include non-presentations (such as
facts of the world) does not emerge from the formula chosen. One
gets the impression however, from the passage quoted above, that for
Husserl a logical function is a question of "syntax" (i.e. the syntax of
presentations, not linguistic units), not "semantics".
Objective contents
Talk about the presentations "themselves", and their logical function,
is ambiguous, even if we only examine the "themselves" as denoting
283 KantB 124-125.
284 The English tenn "context" is often used metaphorically, without directly refer-
ring to texts. A context obviously often consists of facts. situations or states of af-
fairs "surrounding" or "occurring together with" a certain specified thing, event or
situation, etc. In the latter sense the notion of context is close to being equivalent
with the Husserlian notion of horizon. In Gennan (and Swedish) there is a more
general tenn covering both senses: Zusammenhang (sammanhang).
what might be called the content of presentations, having made a pre-

vious distinction between the act and the content of a presentation.
We might on the one hand refer to contents in the Twardowskian
sense, in which a content is always ascribed existence (albeit not real-
ity) in an individual psychic phenomenon, an act. Twardowski does
not assume that the content exists independently of the act, although
the content could certainly, in inner perception, or descriptive
psychology, be studied as a distinct object, regardless of the individu-
al act in which it inheres. Despite Twardowski's identification of the
notion of the content of a presentation with Bolzano' s presentation-
in-itself, or "objective presentation" he considers the content to be
something "subjective", "immanent" or "in the subject", as emerges
from his quotation of Hofler in "Zur Lehre" p. 4. But, on the other
hand, we might instead operate with some other notion of content,
which Husserl wishes to contrast with Twardowski's concept. This
notion is often referred to in later Husserlian terminology as the
"intentional" content. At this stage of Husserl's development,
"objective", "ideal" or meaning content might be more accurate des-
ignations. There is thus at least a partial coincidence of terms. The
convergence between Husserl' s and Twardowski's views is con-
cealed by Husserl's continuous tendency to emphasize the differ-
ences, but obviously the convergence is not complete, as
demonstrated by the different solutions of the problem of object-less
presentations. Twardowski, generally speaking, does not allow con-
tents to playa major role in the solution of the paradox - the burden
of explanation lies with the theory of object. The trivial observation
that a presentation of a green chair is not in any way "itself' green285
illustrates this difference. What is it that "has" this property of being
green, in the crucial cases, where we are either mistaken or just imag-
ine the chair?
285 In order to distinguish between the (at least) two different ways of understand-
ing most predicates pertaining to material objects, Ivar Segelberg underlines the
distinction between - in this case - physically (in German/Swedish "physikalisch"l
"fysikalisk", not "physisch"I"fysisk", cf. p. 195, footnote 308) and phenomenally
green. What is meant here is phenomenally green, the green which we perceive in
the object, not any kind of physical properties like the capacity of reflecting radi-
ation of a certain wave-length, etc.
Twardowski says that it is the (non-existent) object which has this

property. A more common-sense explanation might be that nothing
has this property, but that an adequate description of the presentation,
should take into account those features of the presentation which
make it possible to distinguish between the presentation of a green
chair and one of a red chair.
Husserl's answer in 1894 does not involve any object whatsoever
in this description. When examining the function of presentations we
must instead distinguish between two different kinds of "content":
the real or psychological content and the ideal or objective content.
The objective features of the presentation are not features of some-
thing different from the content of the presentation, like the Twar-
dowskian object. To Hussed this also invalidates the point in the
efforts to find any correspondence between content and object, like
the part-to-part structural analogy sought by Twardowski.
One rather simple argument for the introduction of the distinction
between content and object in Twardowski's theory was the impossi-
bility of accepting that there could be a presentation, the content of
which is both round and square. Twardowski's conclusion was that,
since neither the presentation itself nor its content could be both
square and round, something else must be. Husserl's choice is anoth-
er, eventually breaking down the distinction between object and con-
tent, as drawn up by Twardowski.
The passage from "Intentionale Gegenstande" quoted on p. 135
contains in a nutshell not only Husserl's approval of a Bolzanian
theory of "ideal" or objective contents, viz. his anti-psychologism, as
far as meaning in general is concerned, but also an indication of the
limits to his anti-psychologism.
These limits appear also in relation to Frege - whose anti-
psychologism ought not to be identified with Husserl's. Husserl un-
derlines that there is a meaning content in all presentations. Thus he
does thus not restrict his considerations to meanings of linguistic ex-
pressions, as Frege mainly does. Hussed remains within the
''psychologistic'' framework inasfar as he regards presentations, con-
sciousness, contents of mind, or whatever other "psychic phenome-
na" one might have (though precisely because of his anti-
psychologism he does not use this term), as constituting a distinct
sphere of meaning considerations. Although Husserl's interest in this

period of development is tied to logic, including philosophy of lan-
guage and general grammai86, he never, during his whole career, re-
stricts his philosophical interests to the study of language as a
phenomenon considered in isolation from the lived experience (the
intentional act or the "Erlebnis") of individuals, i.e. from "psych-
ology" in this sense. 287
Husserl's sketch, in "Ideen" (Hua III p. 305), of his own position
on the relation between "thought and language" as a relation of
"reflection", language-intentions having the peculiar property of be-
ing able to reflect or mirror all other kinds of intentional experi-
ences288, implies that there are (at least) two levels of meaning, each
given in "Ideen" a separate designation. Undoubtedly Husserl gives
the non-linguistic level of intentionality some primacy, extending the
notion of 'meaning', from language to intentional acts in general. In
the texts from the period examined here, there is, however, no such
distinction of two levels of meaning - Husserl rather seems to
identify the meaning of linguistic expressions with that of
presentations. 289
286 We should not forget that Husserl's fIrst works were devoted to the subject of
developing a (Philosophical) psychology of mathematics, and despite his rejection
of psychologism in logic he never accepted the idea of reducing mathematics to
logic, conceived as something having to do only with thinking as tied to language,
isolated from intentional experience as such.
287 Despite its privileged position as the "fmite means to express infInitely many
things", to quote the Humboldtian credo - language is thus never to be seen in
isolation from other forms of "expression". Thus the attempts to build up a general
theory of expression suggested by a number of philosophers, psychologists and an-
thropologists do not come far from Husserl's original intentions. A summary of
these attempts is given in Buhler's book "Ausdruckstheorie".
288 Ein eigentiimliches intentionales Medium Iiegt vor, das seinem Wesen nach die
Auszeichnung hat, jede andere Intentionalitiit nach Form und Inhalt sozusagen
widerzuspiegeln, ...
This medium is language, or as Husserl says at this time, "expression" - on p.
304 he seems to identify the "sprachliche Sphiire" and the sphere " des
Ausdriickens". The thesis seems to reiterate Humboldts view on language. Cf. p.
190 foot-note 304.
Hussed, as we have seen in the preceding section, strongly criti-

cizes Twardowski's particular use of the notion of modification in
relation to existence, for the establishment of a distinction between
object and content of a presentation, but he does not denounce the
notion of content as such. He establishes two different senses of the
notion of content, viz. ideal and psychic/psychological content re-
spectively. Hussed explains the difference as follows (note his use of
the word "Gehalt" instead of"Inhalt" in this context):
... die Unterscheidung des idealen von dem psychologischen Gehalt der
Vorstellungsakte. Der erstere weist ja hin auf gewisse Identifizierungszu-
sammenhiinge, in denen wir die Identitat der Intention erfassen (eventuell
mit Evidenz erfassen) wahrend die einzelnen Vorstellungen doch nicht ir-
gendein psychologisch-identisches Bestandstiick gemein hatten. Wir rech-
neten von vornherein die gegenstiindliche Beziehung der Vorstellungen
zu ihrem idealen Gehalt, Vorstellungen identisch derselben Bedeutung
konnten noch objektive Verschiedenheit, Vorstellungen verschiedener
Bedeutung noch Identitiit aufweisen. (Hua XXII pp. 311-312)
Two features deserve particular attention in this description:
1. It seems to determine the notion of ideality in a "constitutive"
way, i.e. the ideality is seen as some kind of "sediment" of a con-
stitutive process of identification or even "achievement", to use
Hussed's later terminology.290
2. Also the objectual reference291 (gegenstlindliche Beziehung) is,
together with the meaning, included in the ideal content of the
presentation.
Although there remains a distinct borderline to Frege's kind of
anti-psychologism, this ingredient of Husserl's solution to the prob-
lem of object-less presentations represents a clearly anti-psych-
289 Twardowski, like Marty, regards meaning as the presentation (viz. the content
of the presentation) which is aroused in the hearer and somehow identical to the
content of the speaker. Thus it would be strange to talk about presentations having
meaning - they are meanings.
290Husserl's notion of "Wesen" is sometimes explained in a similar way. Cf. p.

148 footnote.
291 This translation is suggested by Dummett.

ologistic aspect. An "ideal" element of the presentation is identified,

which means that this kind of content of a presentation is not an indi-
vidual (real) object. 292 It is, therefore, not SUbjective in the way indi-
cated above, as being "in" one and only one subject, but it is a
general object, capable of being present in several individual events
or objects, while retaining its identity. As noted earlier, while Twar-
dowski does not allow general objects of this kind as existing (ZL
106), he asserts the existence of contents, albeit in conjunction with
an act of presentation. Thus, at least in some of the interpretations
presented in the theses TC 1-16 (Cf. section 4.7) Twardowski's
notion of content does not diverge much from HusserI's, though he
does not exploit the notion of content in the same way as HusserI. 293
Other features, however, seem to warrant HusserI's criticism for
psychologism - such as the thesis that contents are both some objects
"aroused" and constituting meanings of names, etc.
The notion of analysis
The idea of objective contents is related to the notion of philosoph-

ical or logical analysis. Analysis means dissolution (into parts):
"psychological" analysis of a presentation, considered as a singular,
unique event "in" or "of' somebody's mind, normally yields parts
that are of the same singular, non-repeatable kind. 294 Or else, if the
292 "Particular" in Goodman's sense cf. Goodman 1966 p. 250.
293 One might attempt an interpretation of the Twardowskian content as some kind
of "abstract particular", in Goodman's sense, i.e. an entity or object which is not
repeatable nor real (=concrete) or universal - i.e. existing in the sense Platonic
ideas do not exist for Twardowski. Still, it seems to be a feature of contents
(precisely the sense of the "objective" presentation) to be repeatable, in one mind
or in several minds.
294Analysis in this sense is metaphorical, of course. Intellectual analysis is con-

templation or observation of parts, which still "cling together", i.e it is not literally
dissolution, like chemical analysis. Analysis of the intellectual kind thus never
changes the object analyzed, but only allows a better view of it. This traditional
view of intellectual analysis is challenged by recent thinking on "deconstruction" -
parts thus emerging from analysis are not of this singular, non-
repeatable kind (particulars), they are mostly regarded as instances,
tokens or examples of types (universals), i.e. general entities or ob-
jects. Some kind of identity of the entity analyzed is presupposed if
the use of two different linguistic expressions for one and the "same"
presentation should be justified. But this is not sufficient, since we
might say that a presentation of e.g. a national symbol like a flag is
the same as another presentation of a different national symbol, with-
out saying that the analyzed "content", is the same, for example by
emphasizing the same inner feeling of pride etc. Something more is
required. "Private components" must be ignored. Obviously this is
what Twardowski wants to say, in talking about the content as an
"objective" presentation. The analysis opened for in this case, is·
featured as an analysis of "psychic phenomena", by Twardowski and
Brentano, or an analysis of intentions by Husser!. 295 Husser! looks for
a more idealist view of the notion of object is presupposed: the object is something
which is dependent on the observer or analyst; it is not a "substance".
If one regards analysis in the way Nelson Goodman does, applying a mereolog-
ical point of view, it is possible to argue that there is one object which has parts in
all objects commonly said to have this or that property. Thus it is possible to say
that the object commonly classified as general is not at all general but is in fact a
kind of "split" individual, just as an archipelago is a split individual. But still, all
the parts of this huge split individual would be different! And so, even if the part
(=property) of a green chair, denoted as green, is part of the huge individual, split
on all green things in the world, and thus is in some sense the same as all other
green things in the world - it is not identical with these other parts in a strictly nu-
merical sense.
And, lastly, the usual objection to nominalism is: why on earth do we have to
say that this split object green is one object? Why is not green and grass the object
in question? In other words, there has to be some criterion of identification also for
the parts of a split individual (a relation of similarity for example).
29S This analysis is obviously something else than psychoanalysis in the better
known sense. It is, however, noteworthy that Freud's idea of psychoanalysis as a

revelation of "hidden" components of consciousness, was conceived more or less
at the same time as the confrontation between Husserl and Twardowski, and in the
same environment. Freud also took part in Brentano's seminars, although earlier
than Husserl and Twardowski. According to information which I have not been
able to verify, and which is not given in the "Husserl-Chronik" (Guttorm FlflJistad
in a lecture in Stockholm, February 4 1988) Husserl also had direct contact with
Freud.
ways of "articulating" parts of an "ideal" content which is there in

several individual (acts of) presentations. 296
The objectivity of the content means first of all that it is intersub-
jective.297 Hussed does not,298 however, commit himself to the aim of
fmding an ultimate, and definitely correct analysis of a particular
content. In the text on intentional objects he rather exploits a notion
of "explication" of contents which has a less absolutistic ring than
e.g. Russell's corresponding claims for a logically fully analyzed
expression.
Indem wir "den Inhalt der Vorstellung explizieren", erzeugen wir
also eine neue Vorstellung , die der urspIiinglichen unmittelbar aqui-
valenf99 und fUr gewisse logische Zwecke inhaltlich vorteilhafter
konstituiert ist. (Hua XXII p. 331)
Despite some deep "ideological" differences, it would certainly be wrong to re-

ject all affinity between the two kinds of analysis: this is demonstrated through the
subsequent development and interrelationship between psychoanalysis and
phenomenology.
296 The possibility - and indeed the requirement - that the result of analysis should
give a better overview of the "originally given" or "surface" mental content, unites
the two otherwise completely different attitudes to the "analysis of mind", and, of
course, that conceived by Bertrand Russell.
297 At least three degrees of inter-subjectivity could be discerned:

1. Common to several acts of one person
2. Common to acts of several persons
3. Publicly available, i.e. observable to several persons at the same time.
298 Bertrand Russell took a different position in making the idea of analysis into ul-
timate parts (logical atoms or elements), and the "logical construction" as its con-
structive counterpart, the basis of his philosophy.
299 Cf. p. 167. This notion of equivalence must be non-quantitative, and its sense
will determine the deeper import of the concept of ideal content. Generally speak-
ing, how does one determine the value of a presentation or a meaning, if it is not
some kind of truth-functional value? But to determine meaning equivalence by
way of equivalence of truth value would seem to make meaning dependent on
truth, whereas the normal way of seeing it is that meaning determines truth: only
an interpreted statement has a truth value.
One more distinction complicates the understanding of HusserI' s

notion of objective content in "Intentionale Gegenstiinde". HusserI
emphasizes that the object is not part of the presentation3°O, and
agrees that the "intentional inexistence of the objeceO h ' is an essential
feature of "psychic phenomena", such as presentations. He still
wishes to say that two different presentations, with two different
"meanings" (Bedeutungsgehalt) (such as "the birth-place of Mozart"
and "the place situated at the Roman Juvavum") have the same ob-
jective reference (gegenstiindliche Beziehung), or refer to the same
object. This seems to lie behind a distinction between two "sides" of
the objective content, a distinction - just as Twardowski's distinction
between content and object - related to Frege's distinction between
sense and reference.
A distinction of this sort appears at least in some texts, although
HusserI seems to be reluctant in making it and rather inconsistent in
his terminology. For example, in the review of "Zur Lehre" HusserI
explicitly speaks about two "logical sides" of the presentation, the
objective and the conceptual. In that text he is also prepared to say
that "Gegenstand" is something "at" the ideal content - thus
seemingly accepting the formula strongly criticized elsewhere! (Hua
XXII p. 350, footnote).302 In the text "Intentionale Gegenstiinde" he
300 Although in the review of Twardowski he appears to consider that the object is
one part of the ideal or logical content of the presentation - this belonging-as-a-
part or inherence is however "functional", not real (Hua XXII p. 350, footnote).
This notion of functional inherence might be understood as a partial translation of
the traditional talk about intentional inexistence - partial, because meaning, too, is
recorded as functionally inhering in the presentation.
301 Although his scepticism towards talk of the "directedness" of presentations to-
wards objects should be noted, this is only applicable inasfar as we have to do with
intuitively (anschaulich) present or given objects - i.e. not for objects which are at
this time of Hussed's development classified as "intentionally" given, i.e. predica-
tively or indirectly.
302 One such text is Hua XIXlI p. 55, where Hussed rejects any talk of "sides" of
the meaning - he strongly emphasizes that the essence oflinguistic expressions lies
exclusively in their meaning.
A text where Hussed already seems on his way to a less realistic notion of ob-
emphasizes the functional role which the objective reference fulfils:

it is something at the meaning, not something beside or independent
of it. 303 The object as such is not part of the meaning or the objective
content, though.
Actually much of the entire work of the Logical Investigations
might be considered as a development or an articulation of the funda-
mental distinction made earlier between the objective or ideal content
of acts and the psychic or real content. The first four Logical Inves-
tigations elaborate the notion of ideal content, ascending from a fun-
damental meditation on the notion of ideal meaning (I), over the
establishment of the ideal unity of the species and a general anti-
nominalism (II), into an elaboration of some basic concepts of formal
ontology and mereology (III), and then back again to the notion of
ideal meaning in Investigation IV. 304
This amounts also an articulation of the refutation of psycholog-
ism, as introduced in the Prolegomena to the Investigations. In addi-
tion to the notion of objective content a major role in this refutation
is played by the notion of "Wesen" - commonly translated by
"essence,,305, sometimes "ideal" essence, intentional essence (Hua
XIX/I p. 57), etc.
ject is the passage in the later conceived (1898) part of the text "Intentionale Ge-
genstiinde", where he emphasizes the ideal nature of the unity of the object. Hua
XXII p. 341.
303 ...der gegenstiindliche Gehalt der Vorstellung auf gewisse Beschaffenheiten

ihrer Bedeutung hindeutet, auf gewisse objektiv geltende Zusammenhiinge,
in die sich die beziigliche Bedeutung eingliedert. Hua XXII p. 338.
304 Cf. p. 185 foot-note 288. Far from considering that he had given a fmal clarifi-
cation of the relations between (linguistic) meaning and intentionality in general,
Hussed devoted intense efforts to this subject in lectures and manuscripts , e.g.
those published in Hua XXVI. These texts display signs of a renewed reading of
the manuscripts studied in this work. This is also noted in Schumann's "Chronik".
The previously cited passage from "Ideen" I (cf. p. 139, foot-note 218) shows that
Hussed did not regard the issue as definitely solved.
305 This translation, though traditional, is not very satisfactory, since the German
term "Wesen" might as well be translated by "being". If someone talks about
"lebendiges Wesen" in German, cannot be rendered by "essence" - the nearest
translation into English would probably be "creature".
THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT·LESS PRESENTATIONS 215
As noted, Husserl, in the text from 1894 - although not strictly

upheld in the formulations of the review from 1897 - claimed that
the object is not part of the presentation. Accordingly the object is
not part of the meaning either, since the meaning is a part, albeit an
ideal one, of the content of the presentation. Now, Husserl, already in
the texts preserved from 1894, sees complications in this position -
as testified by numerous deletions and amendments in the manuscript
K I 62 on this point. In fact there are at least three cases where, in the
field of linguistic meaning, the object is in some way directly part of
the meaning, or where the relation is, in the exact sense of the word,
complicated.
These cases are also classical centres of debates in later analyses
of language - both philosophical and linguistic.
The first case is indirect discourse, oratio obliqua, the second
mention of expressions instead of use, a special case of which is the
suppositio materialis, and the third the deictic function of expres-
sions, "indexicality".
The first two cases were not unknown in the discussions in the
intellectual environment of Twardowski and Brentano - they were
often treated under the psychological label of "Vorstellungsvorstel-
lungen", as referred to above (p. 84). The third case is considered at
some length in Husserl's text on intentional objects examined here,
as considerations on the case of "direct" - non-attributive - presenta-
tions. Husserl is careful to distinguish between these presentations
and presentations that do have an attributive component, though still
refer only to a singular object - i.e. what is commonly designated on
the linguistic level as definite descriptions.
It is fairly uncontroversial to include considerations of cases of
oratio obliqua and suppositio materialis, as not being particularly
disturbing exceptions to a theory of meaning which separates sharply
between the meaning and the object of a presentation. , Indexical ex-
pressions, however, and analogously "direct presentations", do pres-
ent more serious problems. In the Logical Investigations Husserl
devotes considerable attention to expressions with shifting meanings,
such as "wesentlich okkasionelle AusdrUcke" (§26 of Investi-
gation I). His position there is that - "ideally speaking" (Hua XIXII
p. 95) it is possible to eliminate all such expressions - though "in
practice" it may be unfeasible. Thus they do not shatter his faith in a

theory of the presence of objective content in all intentional acts. 306
The changing meaning of indexical expressions is not, in Hussed' s
view in the Logical Investigations, a proper change of meaning, the
ideal content, but a change of the act of meaning- the "Bedeuten",
not the "Bedeutung". Since the objective reference of the indexical
expressions varies, the ideal content could not be the same.
One would thus have to regard different tokens of indexical ex-
pressions as homonyms, although not entirely semantically unrelated,
since they obviously have some features (functions) in common. This
would however not necessarily be more remarkable than e.g. the
common function of a name used for several persons - viz. the func-
tion of naming them, or a determinate form of a noun, which is only
determinate in relation to a certain context. "The house", or "the
president" might in some sense also be regarded as homonyms, since
they might refer to quite different entities, depending on circum-
stances of utterance.
Strictly speaking, the meaning of linguistic expressions is in Hus-
sed's view derivative from the meaning of acts of mind - although,
as we have seen, he becomes gradually more conscious of the com-
plicated relationship between the two levels of intentionality. This re-
flects the complicated relationship between the intentional act, as an
306 Husserl did revert to problems raised in the text on intentional objects here in
particular detail in the lectures on meaning theory held in 1908 mentioned before,
edited in the Husserliana vol. XXVI. These lectures testify to the fact that Husserl
reread his notes from 1894 again - and even repeat some formulations from those
materials. There is also a part explicitly devoted to the problem of object-less pre-
sentations, though Husserl has less confidence in a quick and ready-made solution.
He says
Letzte AuflOsung und Kliirung dieser wie iihnlicher Paradoxen fiihrt sehr tief in die
Urteilsanalysen hinein. (Hua XXVI p. 40)
The paradox he refers to is exactly the one referred to in the text on intentional
objects examined here. The rather modest attitude still prevails in the "Ideen" I.
Both Marty and Frege are obviously among Husserl's chief interlocutors at this
point in his career.
occurrence in the individual person and intentionality, understood as

a some kind of social will or public direction of mind/opinion. 307
While at this time Husserl does not subscribe to the thesis that the
objective intention is some kind of social object, like a custom or a
habit - this is branded as "anthropologism" in his early writings - the
distinction between the psychologicae08 and the objective content re-
mains fundamental. The absence of this distinction is Husserl's ex-
planation of the root of the failures of Twardowski's solution to the
problem of object-less presentations. The mere distinction between
307 As in many contexts relating to terms with a medieval philosophical footing,

religious examples - often in connection with rites or regulated conduct in general
- are illustrative. Whereas intention is something essentially private or personal in
ethical applications, standing in the foreground in much of e.g. Aquinas' thinking,
dealing with the notion of guilt as essentially linked to the notion of deliberation or
intention, more collective uses are also relevant.
308 One might perhaps better say psychical content, and not psychological, here.
Strictly speaking the psychological content is something quite different from the
psychic content, viz. something discerned by systematic psychological analysis.
The same kind of ambiguity pertains in much discourse in English, e.g. as regards
the term ''physical'' - which might mean both roughly "natural" or ''material'' and
"as established by the science of physics".
In German and Swedish there is a difference in words ("physisch"I"fysisk" and
''physikalisch/fysikalisk'').
This ambiguity seems to apply to many scientific disciplines (cf. historical,
chemical, linguistic, etc.). It contributes to concealing what Husserl in his later phi-
losophy called an order of constitution between the life world and science: one
could in the contexts mentioned choose to apply either a life-world-meaning or a
constituted meaning to ''physical'', "historical", etc. "Psychic" and "psychological"
constitute - in English - a pair which is from this point of view unusually clear, in
comparison with the others: at least theoretically one could reserve the term
''psychic'' for the life-world meaning.
The expression "linguistic analysis" thus has, at least, three different meanings:
1) analysis by way of language (i.e. not chemical dissolution), 2) analysis of lan-
guage, 3) analysis by way of linguistics. The same thing could be said of the term
"linguistic tum" used by Dummett to characterize the birth of analytical
philosophy.
Here the term psychological may be preferable, since we are in the process of
discussing psychology as a philosophical discipline. The content described might
be understood as "constituted" by psychology.
the act and the content of presentations is not sufficient, and the gen-
eral theory of object does not help, precisely because of the unclarity
of its notion of object, which permits a double application both of
something essentially belonging to the "meaning" of the act and
something essentially independent of this meaning.
This unclarity is however also the basis of the idea of a "functional
part", which Husserl opposes to the notion of "real" ("reell") part, al-
ready in the review of Twardowski. The notion of functional part is
the one which permits Husserl also to talk of "correlative parts" in
the transcendental version of his phenomenology. The object is -
seen from the point of view of pure phenomenology, where the real
world has been "bracketed" - a kind of part of the residual product,
consisting of a transcendental ego and its noemata. The object is
there precisely the kind of empty but necessary end-point of the in-
tentional lived experience, "the determinable X". It is purely func-
tional, since all we can say of it is that it is there, as some kind of
"bearer" of attributes, all of which are given in the intentional experi-
ence to the object. Now, this notion of functional part is - as we have
seen from the account of Twardowski's mereology - a species of the
genus of formal parts - a genus to which HusserI is not willing, in
1894, to acknowledge the status of part at all. 309
As suggested above, this distinction implies that the kind of analy-
sis undertaken is quite different in the cases of the two different con-
tents examined: the parts discerned and the structure inherent in a
psychic content is something different from the parts of the objective
or ideal content. In the section on Twardowski's mereology a number
of distinctions between parts of different kinds and orders were giv-
en. In the foregoing (pp. 85-6) we have also underlined the funda-
mental role of the relation of "detachability" governing contents of
presentations in general, and also its relationship with Husserl' slater
notion of essence.
309 This dispute on the status of relations versus qualities is also treated by Segel-
berg, who retains Husserl's early view implying that qualities could be regarded as
parts of the object, whereas relational properties (i.e. fonnal parts in Twardowski's
tenninology) could not. (Segelberg 1947 p. 10.)
The tum away from the object, and at the same time the accep-
tance of an ideal or objective content of presentations as distinct from
their "psychic" content are thus in Husserl's view in 1894 prerequi-
sites of a sustainable solution to the problem of object-less presenta-
tions. This seems to presuppose a non-monistic ontology, associating
to the doctrine of a real distinction between essence and existence:
the essence is as it were (at least a central part of) the ideal content of
the individual thing, or another kind of existent being.
The purpose of Twardowskian object theory of explaining the
common and simple experiences of our having several different pre-
sentations of the same thing, presentations of things that do not exist,
and so on should be seen in the light of his approval of the "double
function" of contents of presentations.
Doubtlessly, Twardowski also claims that the contents of presen-
tations are meanings of names. This position, taken together with the
thesis (TC 6) that contents are objective, might be taken as tokens of
an identity of his theory with Hussed's. This is however a rash con-
clusion. Twardowski does not distinguish an objective content as
such from the psychic content: instead he generally retains the psy-
chic status of meanings.
Marty, with whom Twardowski basically aligns himself, as far as
theories of grammar and language are concerned, advocates a similar
standpoint. As noted on p. 170, Marty however emphasizes the
"functional" role of meaning more than Twardowski. Twardowski
says little on the subject of functions or teleology in "Zur Lehre", al-
though, as we have seen, he makes an explicit distinction between
two senses of "function" later. Hussed's emphasis on the functional
containment as the characteristic notion in this context is a feature
which he holds to be as fundamental to the idea of intentionality as
such. He sees it as a fulfilment of Lotze's idea that a description of
the "higher" or "intellectual" level of human psychic life is not possi-
ble without teleological concepts.
Assumption and hypothesis
The third step in Hussed's own solution of the problem of object-less

presentations points, more than the other steps, distinctively towards
HusserI's later thinking. The central idea of this step is kindred to the
one advocated by Twardowski: talk about objects of presentation
does not enforce the acceptance of all objects as existing. When we
do refer to objects which we know do not exist, this should be inter-
preted as a particular kind of psychic act described as an assumption
or hypothesis. This act is neither a presentation nor a judgement.
Some features of this third step point to solutions of not only the
paradox of object-less presentations but also to related problems of
philosophy of language of other philosophers. One purpose of Rus-
sel/'s theory of definite descriptions was to avoid the adoption of a
theory of objects, like those of Erdmann, Twardowski and Meinong,
in the explanation of the role of expressions referring to non-existing
entities. Russell's theory shares with HusserI's solution of the prob-
lem of object-less presentations the ambition of providing a restricted
ontology. Russell's solution to the problem of definite descriptions is
however confined to an "explicit" linguistic level, despite the diffi-
cult question of the status of "propositions", which are the subject of
Russell's analyses. 3lO In some sense propositions appear as indepen-
dent of psychic experiences or mental life. HusserI on his side, thanks
to the notion of objective content, felt unhampered when it came to
including considerations of psychic acts, features which were con-
demned as psychologistic by his critics.
Meinoni ll criticizing Brentano's dichotomy between presentation
and judgement, introduced the notion of "Annahme" as a third cate-
gory of psychic phenomena with a specific kind of object, viz. the
"Objektiv", the predecessor of the Russellian propositions. 312 HusserI
employs the notion of "Assumption" already in the text "Intentionale
Gegenstande" from 1894 - in the framework of a refutation of a kind
of general theory of object suggested by Twardowski and Meinong.
This does not prevent him from developing a formal ontology
310 Cf. pp. 118-9.
311 Meinong's theory of assumptions is well known from his work "Ober Annah-
men" from 1902, reviewed by Russell in Mind (Russell 1904).
312 At least as conceived in Russell's review; cf. e.g. Russell 1904 p. 206.
developed in the Logical Investigations (the mereology in Investiga-

tion lIn and later, which is clearly related to Meinong's general
theory of object.3\3
Husserl, when he comes to the point of the full exploitation of the
notion of assumption, i.e. in the phenomenological reduction, feels
no need to defend this notion against charges of psychologism. Rath-
er he sees this as a central idea for avoiding psychologism, in an
more general epistemological sense, as e.g. developed in the lectures
from 1906-07 on logic and theory of knowledge. The change of ter-
minology from "assumption" to "reduction" marks a change of meth-
od of reflection, from descriptive psychology to transcendental
phenomenology.
At first sight, the idea of assumption appears to contradict the
criticism directed towards Twardowski for muddling the notion of
existence referring to "modified" or intentional existence. The differ-
ence is however connected with the two previous points: Husserl has
no claim to present a theory of objects, only a theory of the logical
function of the objective contents of presentations. As soon as we
confine ourselves to the sphere of assumptions of phenomena we are,
however, allowed to develop general theories of objects. To Husserl
this equals a specific way of "reserving our judgement" - expressing
not a judgement but another attitude of mind. In this early period
Husserl combines this kind of explanation with a realistic position as
to objects: assumption pertains only to our own structure of con-
sciousness - it does not commit us to a standpoint on the fundamen-
tal ingredients of being.
Husserl accepts thus that, in a number of cases, when we make
statements concerning objects, we do not want to assert their exis-
tence. But we still have a number of options if we want to talk about
these objects. The exemplary case is that we present such objects to
ourselves, assuming that they exist - we talk of them or present them
in various manners, in this case under hypothesis.
Since this is not said in sentences about objects which are impos-
sible or simply do not exist, it is only possible to make this claim, if
313 Husserl competes with Meinong over the copyright to the theory. This is seen
in the manuscript on Meinong (K III 33).

there is an objective content which is different from the content di-

rectly presented or, more clearly in the case of expressed contents, a
content underlying the formulated sentence. Husserl thus does not
claim that the assumption is explicit, "on the face" of the presentation
- on the contrary, one has to "pick it up from beneath" as it were, by
way of studying the objective content of presentations. As for ex-
pressed presentations, the case is more familiar: we simply make a
kind of (logical) analysis of the statement (an ex-plication) and find
in the resulting expression the underlying assumption - expressed in
the form of e.g. hypothetical statement. As for unexpressed presenta-
tions, some kind of analysis of intentions or objective content must
be undertaken, followed by a description in language.
The simplest way of expressing such an assumption of existence
may be to insert the words "if any", e.g. in the case of rather simple
descriptions or names. The most common case of assumption is in
Husserl's view however not assumption of existence as such, but
identification of one and the same object, regardless of its existence,
under two different descriptions:
Fragt man nun, was es in dem hier fraglichen Sinne heisst, zwei iden-
tische Vorstellungen stellten - von Existenz und Nichtexistenz abgesehen
- denselben Gegenstand vor, so sieht man sofort, dass hier nur Identitat
gemeint sein kann unter eine Hypothese, <d.h.> unter einer, sei es auch
unausgesprochener Assumption oder etwas damit Aquivalentes. (Hua
XXII 316)
Talking about hypothetical existence, instead of assumption of

identity, the logical connotation of the notion of hypothesis should
be observed. Could one thus talk about a hypothetical presentation,
in a sense different from a presentation in general? In the theory of
judgement (versus presentation) advocated by Twardowski, the non-
positing character of presentation is its hall-mark - thus all presenta-
tions might be said to be hypothetical in a sense. Hypothesis in a
stricter sense seems to belong to the sphere of linguistically formu-
lated or expressed intentionality, more than to that of the notion of
assumption - or to borrow a more fashionable concept, of
presupposition.
Precisely this less explicit-linguistically oriented character is the

nucleus of the more recent notion of presupposition: it is the idea of
the speech ace l4 which also determines the necessity of paying con-
sideration to the "inner form" of language, be it interpreted as some
form of auxiliary presentations or some ideal patterns underlying the
surface pattern of expression.
Without pressing the similarities beyond the degree to which their
common relationship to Meinong may inspire, Husserl' s suggestion
shows some kinship to at least one element in Russell's theory of de-
scriptions as presented in "On Denoting" in 1905. Russell analyses
"Scott was the author of Waverley" as having the following
... wholly explicit fonn: 'It is not always false ofx that x wrote Waverley,
that it is always true of y that ify wrote Waverley y is identical with x,
and that Scott is identical with x'. (Russell 1966 p. 51) (My emphasis)
The hypothesis involved in the description, viz. the underlined

identification, serves the purpose of safeguarding against the possi-
bility that two persons wrote Waverley.315 This is something different
from Husserl' s use of hypothesis, which mainly serves to state the
truth of an identification, independently of any claim of existence of
the objects identified.
Husserl's tacit or underlying assumption of existence and Rus-
sell's hypothetical identity phrase thus do not play the same role. The
main difference - and the main resemblance between Husserl's,
Twardowski's and Meinong's theories - lies, however, in the role
played by non-explicit components of presentations, as expressed in
314 The notion of speech act is used frequently by Buhler, who saw this notion
(Sprechhandlung) as the main focus of the "Darstellungsfunktion" of language,

considered in the framework of a general theory of expression. Both these tenns
are central to Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language - they do in fact fonn a
link between Husserl's and Marty's theories oflanguage and speech act theory re-
ferred to above in foot-note 255.
315 Incidentally it is remarkable that Russell allows himself to use different, albeit
synonymous, words in the different contexts, as if it were unobjectionable to say
"x wrote Waverley" instead of "x is the author of Waverley" - what if someone
dictated Waverley?
language. Russell claims that we do assert - although this does not

come to the fore, until we unfold the expression into its "wholly ex-
plicit form" - that 1) there is something like an author of Waverley,
2) it was written by that only one person. The first assertion is what
makes any statement of the present king of France false. Husserl
claimed that this kind of statement contains an assumption, but not an
assertion. The assumption does not make the statement false; only an
asserted statement of existence or an underlying assertion being part
of the objective content of the presentation would fill that function.
The assumption plays the role of a "presupposition", in the ter-
minology of later speech act theo~16 - i.e. of one of the kind of in-
gredients which render the linguistic expression homonymous or
ambiguous, as indicated above (pp. 166, 194). In Husserl's view, just
as explicit indications of time and place could replace the ambiguous
indexical or occasional expressions, it is possible to express in lin-
guistic terms the unspoken assumptions, viz. under the form of
conditional clauses: "If there is a king of France now, then he is
bald."
It is rather clear from Husserl's text that he is referring to the way
of presenting (die Vorstellungsweise) that is the logical function of
the presentation, rather than the logical form of the explicit linguistic
formulation of a hypothesis. They might, under some notation of log-
ical function/form, be identical.
316 Husserl's solution is thus in this respect practically identical to the one sug-
gested by Strawson in "On referring". Assumption and assertion are simply not the
same kind of acts - later Husserl uses the technical term of ''thetic component" to
express the parameter in regard of which these modes of expression differ.
Twardowski was also aware of the difference between presuppose and assert,
although he does not present a theory on the subject in "Zur Lehre". In his already
cited lecture on Logic from 1894-95, however, he treats at length the so-called
double judgements and emphasizes the difference between presupposition and
assertion:
Aber hier scheint eine Verwechslung vorzuliegen zwischen dem was beim Urteilen
vorausgesetzt wird, und dem was in ihm behauptet wird. Nur was in der Aussage be-
hauptet wird bildet das derselben zugrundeJiegende Urteil; alles andere ist ein in die
Bedeutung der Aussage hineingetragenes. (P 6 p. 198)
Hussed's deliberations on the notion of assumption, unlike the

other two themes treated above in the text under examination here,
do not appear immediately linked to the main themes of (the first edi-
tion of) the Logical Investigations. They rather connect to the follow-
ing period, where the radical attack on psychologism in a more
general (or epistemological) sense leads to what amounts to a trans-
formation of the theme of assumptions into a main method of re-
search, the epoche.
Hussed does not in the text on intentional objects distinguish
clearly between the content of linguistic expressions and that of pre-
sentations considered as psychic acts. Thus when he refers to the
"unspoken" character of the assumption of existence he does not nec-
essarily have to imply that presentations, in order to have some con-
tent must be linguistically formulated or expressed. The assumption
is naturally part of the objective content, and could be explicitly laid
out, formulated as an antecedent in a hypothetical sentence concern-
ing the existence of the object in question - but on the other hand
there is nothing which says that it must be.
"If there is a present king of France, then he is bald.", is indeed a
strange thing to say, in a normal understanding of the point in utter-
ing hypothetical statements - as if there should be some kind of nec-
essary connection between being bald and being king of France. But
this strangeness depends on the context: one might e.g. have ana-
lyzed the situation of kings of France during history and found that
all kings of France have been bald (e.g. due to some inherent bald-
making force of the office itself), and that thus the baldness of any
king of France is necessary or at least highly likely.
Now, choosing Hussed's and not Russell's way of analyzing the
statement "The present king of France is bald" does indeed yield a
more natural way of looking at the statement - it becomes strange,
not false, and the strangeness lies precisely in the pretense or presup-
position that there is some kind of necessary link between the role of
being king of France and being bald, not in the false assertion that
there is a king of France today. This strangeness is due to the unlike-
liness, or empirical implausibility, of there being such a necessary
link.
The Russellian example is strange in relation to what we expect:

when we expect a piece of infonnation on a person living today, we
normally assume that the speaker is sufficiently informed to be justi-
fied to assert his existence.3\7
Husserl has, as we have seen, already at this time some kind of
theory of the various layers of intentional experience. This theory is
the central feature of his later notion of the constitution of intention-
ality: in making some kind of excavation into the deeper layers of
lived experiences we are able to reveal the structure of the experi-
ence, not as a kind of chain of sentences linked together in some syn-
tactical pattern, but as a structure with both "depth" and "width".
This structure is better visualized by tree-structures, such as those
used by e.g. generative linguistics, than by a linear sequential sen-
tence. The complicated structure of assumptions could be regarded as
the general theme of Husserl' s third, genetical, period of phenomeno-
logy, which in tum might be said to be articulation of the idea of a
"layer" theory of intentionality - expressed or non-expressed.
The idea of assumptions thus points further in the direction of
speech act theory - as the name itself says a theory not only about the
"content" of language, in some more or less abstract sense, or about
the "competence" or "langue", to choose terminology from linguistic
theory, but about the "act" or "performance/parole" itself. This
means that the presuppositions of the singular utterance or any other
language-event or situation are also considered. An assumption is
something that belongs to the sense of an utterance, without however
belonging to its manifest structure, if you consider the utterance as an
isolated event. 318
317 Had we expected some kind ofinfonnation about the hairyness of French poli-
ticians, and been ignorant about the present constitution of France, or reluctant to
acknowledge any significant difference between a king and a president, the situa-
tion would have been different also for the Russellian example.
318 As recalled above the principal link between speech act theory and phenome-
nology is Husserl's disciple, the philosopher, psychologist and psycho-linguist
Karl Buhler, who worked together with Husserl to prepare a review of Anton Mar-
ty's monumental 1908 work on general grammar and philosophy of language.
Buhler's influential work on the theory of language, built upon the idea of lan-
Before discussing two examples of Husserl's applications of the

idea of assumptions to the general theory of presentations and other
psychic phenomena, in the context of their expressions in language,
let us just summarize the role this idea plays in the more narrow con-
text of the problem of object-less presentations, as laid out in the
paradox presented by Husserl.
The idea of assumptions serves the basic purpose of eliminating
the need to employ the kind of "modification" of the notion of exis-
tence suggested by Twardowski in order to safeguard the general dis-
tinction between object and content of presentations. For, as we have
seen, the distinction of different kinds of existence as regards objects
of presentations, or at least the need to be able to talk about objects
having some kind of non-genuine, "merely intentional" existence was
a fundamental ingredient in Twardowski's theory. The introduction
of the assumption as an essential element of the theory - as an ingre-
dient of the presentation, although not an ingredient that explicitly
asserts or denies existence - disperses the ontological trouble. In
principle this is the same kind of solution as the one developed by
Twardowski himself for the case of "Nothing" (cf. 5.2), since what is
claimed there is also that the "infinitation" refers to some kind of
''underlying'' assumption or hypothesis for the regular use of nega-
tion, and also for "nothing". This is to say that "nothing" is some
kind of "functional" expression, or in traditional grammatical terms a
"syncategorematic" expression.
Russell's treatment of descriptive expressions in general also im-
plies regarding them as syncategorematic, since they are not consid-
ered as having a "meaning of their own", but should be submitted to
analysis in order to be completely understood. Russell expressed
himself quite clearly on this point:
guage as an "organic" unity of "signal-symbol-appeal" appeared in 1934. See his

"Sprachtheorie", p. 28 for a graphic exposition of this theory. Cf. foot-notes 255
and 314.
Biihler also refers to Twardowski - p. 242 - though with the same kind of mis-
understandings as Husserl' s. Ideas related to Biihler's were presented earlier in
works by Hans Lipps and Adolf Reinach. two other pupils of Husser1.
" ... a denoting phrase does not have any significance on its own account."
(Russell 1966 p. 51)
As for Husserl, he does not say that the descriptive expressions

lack independent significance or meaning, only that the meaning, or
objective content, is more complicated than what is shown on the
surface of the expression, and thus has to be retrieved 319 The func-
tionality is thus not context-related in his case, but related rather to
what might be termed deeper layers of content - layers where as-
sumptions or hypotheses are essential ingredients. At this point in his
development Husserl does not go beyond the fairly vague notion of
objective content, a notion which is undetermined as to levels or lay-
ers. Obviously he must however believe that he proposes better de-
scriptions of this content than the original expressions submitted to
analysis.
In Husserl's 1894 view, the theory of assumptions or hypotheses,
as applied to the dispute over object-less presentations, is capable of
giving a general solution, covering both different kinds of presenta-
tions (e.g. both singular and general presentations,
"Einzelvorstellungen" and "Gemeinvorstellungeh") and different
species, levels and orders of objects. 32o The latter property of the
theory allows it to apply to all kinds of "extensions" - the problem of
319 This seemingly innocent view of meaning conceals many - complications. In

fact "com-plication" is something of a key-word: to say that the meaning of an ex-
pression is complicated is not only to say that it is difficult to understand, but also,
as the ethymology tells us, to say that some-thing is involved and could be un-
folded by a process or action - as the leaves of a plant are in some way involved in
the bud and could "develop".
"The metaphor of the bud" is central to much thinking, in particularly during
the last 150 years, on evolution, development, etc. Cf. also the quotation from Rus-
sell on p. 200 and the idea of a wholly explicit form of an expression. Cf. Deleuze
1988 for an exposition of the parallel, some times equivalent, metaphor of the
"ply".
The notion of explication treated above should naturally also be contemplated
in the context of these metaphors.
320 Cf. Erdmann's table of objects in Appendix II for an overview of what might
be considered as objects in a theory of the Twardowskian kind.
object-less presentations could be reformulated as a problem of

extension-less presentations/expressions. 321 Since the solution is in
Husser!' s view so universal, there is not any particular harm in con-
tinuing traditional talk about existence, provided one is aware of the
abbreviative nature of this talk.
What may be more remarkable about the 1894 solution is that it
also liberates Husser! from the need to use a formal ontology for the
explanation of object-less presentations. Thus it would not, funda-
mentally, make some kind of phenomenological or transcendental re-
duction necessary. On the other hand this way was not chosen by
Husser! in 1905-6 exactly because of the "psychologistic" connota-
tions of the idea of assumptions. Had Husser! been concerned with
finding some kind of generalized presuppositions, or conditions of
cognition, or conditions of intentionality, to use a more transcenden-
tal language, already in 1894, he would perhaps not have been so
willing to oppose the idea of assumptions to the idea of non-
committing-to-existence-type of objects. Instead, the assumptions of
1894 still seem to be of some psychic kind, like a peculiar character
of the acts occurring in various contexts, e.g. mathematics. Still, this
character does not preclude that the assumptions are also considered
as some variety of the idea of modification which Twardowski had
used several times. This idea, on the other hand, is primarily pres-
ented as something having to do with grammar rather than psycholo-
gy - which does not necessarily imply a difficulty, since the
prevailing theory of language in Twardowski's time tended to em-
phasize the psychological foundations of grammar.
Application 1: Mathematics
The first application of the theory thus proposed by Husser! in the
text on intentional objects is mathematical- a natural case in view of
Hussed's then still ongoing project to present a second volume of the
321 Husserl thus relates back to his own discussions of the notions of content and
extension some years earlier with Schroder, where Husserl pleaded for the primacy
of the content-logic (one might in that context perhaps translate "Inhaltslogik" by
"intensional logic") over extensional logic (''Umfangslogik'').
Philosophy of Arithmetic and a treatise on the origins of geometry.322

He suggests that the totality of mathematical theory should be taken
as based upon a "Generalassumption" which might be understood as
the conjunction of all unspoken assumptions which govern mathe-
matical thinking - and this conjunction of assumptions should be re-
garded as an antecedent to mathematical theory in general.
Conclusions drawn from any mathematical proposition could be re-
garded as conclusions drawn from this proposition as itself standing
under the assumptions as antecedents in a hypothesis. This means
that the rules applied in mathematical reasoning are identical to those
applied in any formal reasoning.
The most important consequence of this view is at this point its
application to existential statements in formal science: we do not
need to invoke any kind of modified existence for any mathematical
object, since we trust that an unexpressed assumption is contained in
the antecedent of the existential proposition about these objects. Let
us quote Husserl himself at this important juncture:
... die formalen Gesetze, welche das Denken unter einer festen Assump-
tion regeln, identisch dieselben sind, als welche fUr ein sozusagen freies,
d.h. durch keine Bedingungen eingeschriinktes <Denken> gilltig sind.
Psychologisch betrachtet, konnen wir eine Assumption, die wir "ein fUr
allemal" fixiert haben oder die unseren weiteren Gedankenbewegungen
"selbstverstiindlich", aber ohne ausdrUck1iche Fixierung zugrunde liegt
(dies weist auf Dispositionen zu gewissen nachttiiglichen Erwiigungen
und Einscbriinkungen bin), wiihrend dieser Bewegungen oft ganz igno-
rieren, und wir konnen es ohne Verletzung der Wahrheit auch wirklich.
(Hua XXII p. 323)
Thus, Husserl's conclusion is that it is quite admissible, in fact

even necessary, to use "non-genuine" talk about existence - provided
one keeps in mind the assumptions lying behind such talk. This is
e.g. the way one could talk about proofs of the existence of
322 The treatise on the origins of geometry was the project which led him to the
study of the general notion of "Gestalt" and the related problems of the "law of in-
terest" etc. in the psychologies of Ehrenfels and James. Husserl in fact completed
the project 40 years later, as one of his last philosophical pieces of work.
geometrical objects, viz. through the assumptions contained in the

axiomatic foundations, together with deductions from them.
Application 2: Modes of existence

The rejection of modes of existence, just as for Twardowski, does not
mean that Husserl only permits one kind of object as existing, be it
"real" objects or some other subclass. The objects admitted by the
two authors are however different: Whereas Twardowski does not al-
low the existence of general objects such as "Platonic ideas" (ZL p.
106), he does permit such things as deficiencies (the medieval priva-
tiones, cf. ZL p. 36) as non-real323 existing objects, not to mention
the entire class of contents of presentations. Husserl, who no doubt
permits ideal objects such as truths, propositions (Satze) and con-
cepts as existing, seems doubtful whether to include such things as
privationes. As discussed in the manuscript K I 62 (cf. p. 161), only
parts having "positive characteristics" are entitled to the status of part
at all. A passage in "Intentionale Gegenstiinde" gives a general ac-
count ofHusserl's standpoint:
Wahrheiten, Satze, Begriffe sind auch Gegenstiinde, auch bei ih-
nen ist im vollen und eigentlichen Sinne von Existenz die Rede, aber
sie sind nichts was in der real en Wirklichkeit anzutreffen ware. (Hua
XXIIp.326)
The distinction between non-existent ideal objects, such as Platon-
ic ideas for Twardowski and existent, though non-real, ideal objects
might seem hair-splitting: still it seems to be this distinction which
underlies a number of rather fundamental philosophical controver-
sies, of an ontological, semantical and/or epistemological nature. To
pick just the epistemological aspect: it is rather decisive to the justi-
fying power of a statement whether or not we attribute existence to
the objects that considered as given to perception and thus have a
truth-granting status. Only those that are given could have this status.
323 This use is a sign of warning against identifying non-real with ideal in Twar-
dowski - i.e. a reservation also in respect of the theory of content treated in section
4.5.
If they are regarded as constructs, a truth-making function is com-

monly considered absent. This distinction between givenness and
constructedness is in fact a border-line between a phenomenalistic
and a phenomenological theory of knowledge. Or if one prefers, be-
tween a theory of "logical construction" and a theory of
"constitution". 324
A further corollary to Husserl's standpoint on the role of assump-
tions and the notions of object and modes of existence consists in his
reservation regarding the talk of different ''worlds'' as being in some
way comparable to the actual world, as in the Leibnizian tradition.
Es gibt nur e in e Wahrheit und e i n e Welt. aber vielfache Vorstellun-
gen, religiose oder mythische Uberzeugungen, Hypothesen, Fiktionen, ....
(Hua XXII 329)
The notion of "world" at this time in Husserl' s development is
equivalent with "the aggregate of all objects", rather than with the to-
tal conjunction of all assumptions or backgrounds, as in much of his
later thinking. Otherwise this passage would be difficult to under-
stand. This does not however mean that Husserl changes his view in
this respect. Even after introducing a new concept of the world in the
form of the notion of "life-world" Husserl restricts the use of possi-
bility to "motivated" possibility and does not approve of the talk of
several worlds. 325 A position close to the one criticised by Husserl is
the "fictionalism" represented by Vaihinger, but perhaps also the re-
ism advocated by both Brentano and Twardowski in their later
periods. 326
324 Russell's and Carnap's metaphysical doctrines could be seen as exemplary
cases of theories of logical construction. Carnap however labelled his work "theory
of constitution" in an intitial phase (information submitted by Mme Joeille Proust
in a lecture given in Stockholm). Carnap participated in Husserl's seminar in Frei-
burg 1924-1925 (Husserl-Chronik p. 281).
A Husserlian theory of modality in a formal guise is suggested by Hermann

325
Weyl in the article ''The Ghost of Modality" in Farber 1940.
326 Twardowski often acknowledges proximity to the positions taken by Vaihinger
- cf. Paczkowska-Lagowska p. 185 and WPF 265. Brentano's theory of fictions is

discussed in Kraus's introduction to the second edition of the "Psychologie".
CHAPTER 6
EPILOGUE: THE END OF A

CONCEPTUAL HISTORY?
This study started out from the issue of "psychologism" in philoso-

phy. That issue may at first hand look like a problem concerning the
content of presentations or other mental phenomena. Nevertheless,
the concept in focus soon turned out rather to be ''what is presented"
in another sense, or more generally the object of "intentional acts",
frequently referred to simply as the "intentional object". Twardowski
made an effort to dispose entirely of that notion, together with the no-
tion of immanent object, by way of his strict distinction between con-
tent and object of presentations and his classification of the notion of
"intentional" as a modifier. The concept of object was to a certain ex-
tent found to be only indirectly connected with the discussion on
psychologism, and rather touched another topic, namely the discus-
sion on Twardowski's "phenomenalism", raised by Ingarden. Never-
theless tendencies towards psychologism could be found in
Twardowski at some interpretations and uses of the notion of content,
specifically when the "double function" of content of presentations
was including the meaning of names.
Husserl criticised Twardowski from two different angles. First, he
did not accept that the adjective "intentional" could be seen as a mo-
difying term in order to explain the "existential neutrality" of the ob-
ject of presentation. Second, he did not accept that the content of
presentations should be regarded as a singular object of the same
kind as other particulars. An objective content should be looked for.
However, despite Husserl's criticism in 1894 and 1898, the theory
of object of presentation played a crucial role for Husserl's later ver-
sions of phenomenology, built on the idea of "reducing" questions of
existence as regards the intentional object.
In this study, no definition of the notion of intentional object, nor
any arbitration among divergent suggestions presented, has been at-
tempted. Nevertheless, most of the factors which determined Hus-
serl's first criticism of psychologism could be centered around this
233
234 PROLOGUE: THE END OF A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY?
notion. The notion of an intentional object in fact epitomizes most of

both the conflicts and the kinship that could be found between Hus-
serl and Twardowski.
The examination of Husserl's and Twardowski's respective posi-
tions to the problem posed by mental acts or presentations without
any external existing objects - the problem of object-less presenta-
tions - occupied the major part of this study. HusserI's criticism of
psychologism is intimately tied to his attitude to the solution of this
problem.
Two classes of solutions employ the notion of "intentional". One
regards reference to "intentional objects" as necessary ingredients of
any account of acts of consciousness or mental acts. These solutions
emphasize that the mere presentation of an object does not involve a
commitment to its existence. Any reference of existence in the con-
text of presentations is merely "modified" talk - the existence re-
ferred to is not genuine existence but pseudo-existence (the
expression is Russell's, in the review of Meinong). Therefore, instead
of talking about intentional objects as such, we should rather talk
about objects of presentation having intentional (i.e. not genuine) ex-
istence. Twardowski's theory represents this sort of solution.
The other group of solutions does not accept that "intentional" has
this modifying function: in these theories the predicate "intentional"
only marks that some entity is the object of an act of presentation or
some other psychic act. The object does not "lose" its existence be-
cause of being intentional. Husserl advocated this solution when he
formulated his first objections to psychologism. Later he withdrew
from this position, albeit not to say that the intentional object ex-
cluded existence, but to precisely define the intentional object by the
"bracketing" operation undertaken in transcendental phenomenology.
Objects of hallucination, imagination or illusion are thus as much in-
tentional objects of lived experiences or acts as are real objects of
perception.
Some notion of intentional object determines the possibility of a
phenomenological philosophy as such, whether transcendental
(-idealistic) or realistic, mainly because such a philosophy assumes
that a description of mental acts can not be performed without a de-
scription of objects to which these acts are directed or refer.
PROLOGUE: THE END OF A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY? 235
An attempt to pronounce a verdict between on theories of the no-

tion of intentional object. has been outlined in an overview of the is-
sue of object-less presentations by Guido Kiinll27. He suggests a
classificatory scheme to deal with the comparison of perceptions of
real external objects with such hallucinations, where "what is presen-
ted" in, or the object of, the hallucination does not exist. Kling argues
that the kind of solution suggested by Meinong (and in some essen-
tial respects shared by Hussed) represents a fourth possible way out
of the difficulties which three "classical" theories do not master. Mei-
nong's theory would have to be modified in some respects in order to
fulfil this purpose. Since Meinong's theory could be regarded as a
development from, or even partly as identical with Twardowski's
theory of object, Kling's suggestion implies that Twardowski's
theory, too, would be relevant for a solution today328.
Kling's scheme is the following:
Kind of theory Perception Hallucination
1 Transcendence-theories one object, no object

a real thing in the external world
2 Immanence-theories one immanent object one object, the Noema

the Noema of a of a non-existing thing
real external thing
3 Two-object theories two objects: one object, the

one immanent immanent object
and one external
4 Meinong's theory one object: and one object, the

immanent object immanent object
object identical to the
transcendent object
327 Kling 1985
328 Unfortunately Kling does not seem to have read Twardowski before writing his
article, only Husserl' s review of "Zur Lehre". This means that some of the distinc-
tions of Twardowski's theory - as well as some of his presuppositions - are lost.
236 PROLOGUE: THE END OF A CONCEPTUAL mSTORY?
Before looking at Kung's suggested modifications of Meinong's

theories, one main difference between Meinong and Twardowski
should be pointed out. As emerges from the above scheme Twar-
dowski's main distinction between content and object does not fit
into the classification. The very point of Twardowski's theory of con-
tent and object is, as we have seen, to get rid of the ambiguity lying
under the undifferentiated use of the notion of object in both senses329
of the notion of ''what is presented". The use of the notion of object
as that "medium quo" something is presented (i.e. the so-called im-
manent object) is rejected by this theory. Twardowski reaches this
standpoint by first of all introducing a dichotomy between content
and object: thus the "immanent" medium quo, or content, is never
identical with the object. Thus Twardowski's theory is not a Meinon-
gian theory of the fourth kind in Kiing's table. This should also have
been amply documented by this study. Twardowski does not have to
make any effort to explain why there should be an immanent object
which sometimes is alone, sometimes duplicated by (or identical
with) the (transcendent) object.
In Twardowski's theory of object, the attribute of "intentional" ap-
plied to objects of presentation could be regarded as more or less
pleonastic. To be intentional means simply to have an object.
"Intentional" however acquires an additional descriptive content if
used as a modifier to the notion of existence. Existence is "excised"
already on the level of classification of psychic phenomena. The di-
chotomy thus established between presentation and judgement leads
to the formal theory of objects of presentation. Neither Husser! nor
Meinong (nor later Twardowski himself) retained this dichotomy
however: Husser! introduced a new and much more varied scheme
for classifying "acts" and Meinong allows the notion of "Annahme"
to playa crucial role in his theory of object.
As noted, Kling's solution is based on the fourth, "Meinongian",
line of thought. The modifications proposed either involve two dif-
ferent notions of "is", or two different notions of property.
The first ingredient comes rather close to the one advocated by
Twardowski: it involves a kind of "modified" existence. "Existence
329 Quod cognoscitur and medium quo to use Kling's scholastic-sounding terms.
PROLOGUE: THE END OF A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY? 237
as presented", including the being of non-existent objects, emerges as

something quite different from the existence of a real external object.
The category of properties attributed to the objects having this first
kind of being is simply defined as such properties that correspond to
properties of the intentional act. This kind of property is called
"converse-intentional" properties. An example of such properties
would be "meant as a round square".
The solution seems, however, to involve a rather risky use of the
notion of "property". First, it does not take into account the distinc-
tion between quality and relational property, but lumps together all
predicates into one category. 330 But when we speak of properties in
the sense of a quality of an object we do not normally refer to a fea-
ture which by definition involves a relation of this object to some-
thing else, e.g. an intentional act. Effectively, such a distinction has
the same weaknesses of the classical empiricist distinction between
primary and secondary properties.
Secondly, the proposed distinction also neglects the distinction,
drawn e.g. by Twardowski, between a ''property relation" and
property-in-itself (i.e. the "metaphysical" part spoken of earlier), or
between what is had and the relation of having. Twardowski (ZL p.
57) draws the analogy to the notion of possession. My possession is
1) the object possessed and 2) the relation obtaining between me and
the object possessed. The so-called converse-intentional properties
are thus neither qualities of the object nor relations obtaining be-
tween the object and metaphysical parts of it (i.e. its qualities) but
rather relations between the object and the act or subject.
By and large Kling's proposal therefore only seems to push the
choice of a solution one step further, i.e. to the distinction between
various kinds of properties instead of between different objects or
modes of existence, or, for that matter, the medieval distinction be-
tween being and essence/existence, as aspects of being. The last dis-
tinction, as noted, stands model to Meinong's distinction between
"Dasein" and "Sosein" but is not identical to it.
330 This view on properties is strongly objected to by e.g. Segelberg.

238 PROLOGUE: THE END OF A CONCEPTUAL mSTORY?
Whether or not Kung's solution of the problem could be backed

up by formal theories explicating the notions of e.g. converse-
intentional properties, etc.,m it seems unlikely that his approach
would fundamentally change the situation.
It is likely that this situation is connected with a more general dif-
ficulty facing theories which are linked to the adoption of an
"existence-neutral" object of intentional acts. The notion of object
seems impossible to define in a way that avoids the choice between
idealism and realism - which is often understood as the principal as-
piration of transcendental philosophy as such. If such a philosophy
does not, however, draw its motivation from reserving an ingredient
of idealism for a sphere, where one does not ask about the existence
or non-existence of things as such, but from the necessity of placing
conditions of knowledge before such considerations the conflict
might be superable.
A historical inquiry into a philosophical discussion and a pattern
of thinking does not primarily aim at providing the definitively cor-
rect theory, the satisfactory definition or the final clarification of a
notion or an expression. The principal aim of such a study is rather to
show the links between various parts of a doctrine and examine their
background and possible influences. This will, if successful, bring
about a better understanding both of the particular theories them-
selves and of traditions stemming from them. As in all historical
work, an effect may also be to present a clearer background and a
more stable starting point for later thinking. But we may also face a
situation, where the efforts to exploit a particular notion pose unsolv-
able problems to a theory based upon this notion . Becoming aware
of these difficulties inspires to a certain caution in the continued use
of the notion under scrutiny, rather than to a courageous and innova-
tive work aiming at a greater refinement and elaboration of its use. In
certain respects the philosophical use of both the notions of object
and content may have reached this stage.
331
KOng refers to Zalta 1983 and Parsons 1980 for such proposals.
ANNEXl
A note on the texts

Husserl's text on intentional objects was partially edited in Husserlia-
na Vol XXII by Bernard Rang. The editor of Vol XXII notes the in-
completeness of "Intentionale Gegenstande" as published, but he
does not refer to Schuhmann's note in the "Husserl-Chronik" on the
other text supplementing the text edited in Husserliana. Karl Schuh-
mann's reedition in Brentano Studien Vol 3 (1990/91) fills that gap. I
had, however, the opportunity to study the text not supplied in the
Husserliana edition in a transcription, put at my disposal by the Hus-
serl Archives in Leuven in 1986. The first edition of this study there-
fore made use of both the fragments (K. I 56 and K I 62) which are
joined by Schuhmann into the new version.
The order of the different texts (lost, published and un-published)
involved in Husserl's reaction to Twardowski is rather complicated.
The reading of the manuscript should start at page K I 62/3. The
text of the manuscript of the file is the continuation of the deleted
page 66/67 (in Husserl's own pagination) of the major text contained
in file K I 56, which is the basis of the text published in Husserliana
XXII as "Intentionale Gegenstande". This crossed-out page is re-
printed in the text-critical annex of Hua XXII on p.461. In the main
text a revised text from 1895 replaces the deleted page.
K I 62 should be regarded as the continuation of the text from
1894 (Hua XXII pp.304-338) and it was probably written earlier than
the texts reprinted in that volume (mostly dating from 1895 and
1898). The context and the mentioning of Twardowski's name sup-
ports the conclusion that the text belongs to the original period of
conception, viz. 1894.
The texts were written during two or three different periods; the
first part was written in 1894 and the second in 1898, with some
work also being done in 1895. It is considered part of a larger manu-
script under the title "Vorstellung und Gegenstand", the first part of
which has been lost.
As the cover-note of manuscript K I 62 in the Husserl Archives of
Leuven shows the content of that text is not really the relation
239
240 ANNEX!
between objective and subjective content of presentations as such,

but rather the issue of correspondence between parts of meanings
(contents) to parts of objects - i.e. an issue to which Twardowski de-
voting considerable attention.
The more general issue on the relationship between subjective and
objective presentations - the core issue of the dispute on psycholog-
ism - is likely to have been the subject of the fragment preceding the
present part of the text published in Husserliana XXII under the title
of Intentionale Gegenstande. The very fIrst words of that text suggest
that the subject of the fIrst part of the text has been the attribution of
meaning content to all presentations.
The relation between subjective (psychological) and objective
meaning might in one sense be said to be the topic ofHusserl's entire
criticism of Twardowski, i.e. in all texts dealing with Twardowski's
main work - it is formulated in the review of Twardowski's book and
labelled Twardowski's principal mistake (Hua XXII p. 349
foot-note).
Apart from the texts referred to so far, there is also a draft of a let-
ter from July 7 1901 to Anton Marty. This letter is also included in
Hua XXII, Annex pp. 419-426. It treats the same subject as the earli-
er mentioned texts: matters regarding the "object-less presentations"
and the distinction between intentional (sometimes "immanent") and
real (wirkliche) objects. The letter is partly a response to critical
viewpoints by Marty on Logische Untersuchungen (Husserl wrote a
critical review of a work edited earlier by Marty). This draft is part of
the evidence that the subject of "intentional objects" continued to in-
trigue Husserl after the publication of the Logical Investigations. As
mentioned above (cf. Schuhmann's "Husserl-Chronik") Husserl from
time to time returned to the manuscript at least in 1907 and 1908,
perhaps even as late as in the 1920s. Similar themes are also present
in the last preserved correspondence between Frege and Husserl,
from 1906.
APPENDIX I
References to Twardowski in Hussed' s

published works
Logical Investigations (Hua XIXII) Passage in

ZurLehre
Page Subject Page
55 "double directions of presentations" 14
140-141 abstraction 109
141 existence
220 (refers to p.140-141 above)
276 indirect parts 49
304-5 complex meanings 92,94,98
527 content-object in general
Ideen (Hua III)
316 acts, contents and objects in general
241
Appendix II
Erdmann's table of objects (from Erdmann p. 117).
Gegenstfulde erster Ordnung

Ursprung Beschaffenhelt Bestand Wirtdlchlcelt Umfang
l)~d'J'Sinro;w.hntmlJlg Wrre Sa.:tm ~ Geg tt*Cle9mt fil~
~d.rSchlwmuumng ~
Nrmila gllI1IIIII. m;qiI eiIlilre~ WIk:~ ~
2)~ vcrtB~. ~ ~'{I". ~ lU'lUildl AIIplIm
~ Pol1ikd ~ IdenIIll ilhaMi;h~
eIinrt! UIllTildD'~~\OO d~ IrirsIinnt
~ wjjlllJ!lnlnlflU~ erweim AI-
urdkl! Mdv~~ typisdl ~
lWlI. - srr.ull. ~Wlhn:fvnlIlg aIliIrdkl
ndlAnatlgi!m!gI. Wlhn ?;
N iii; 1hman1nl: '"d
~
N ~
Gegemtiinde zweiter Ordnwng
Inbegriffe oder Mannigfaltigkeiten
~
Zeitbeziehungen der G1ieder Verkniipf'Wlg der Glieder
Ge:m1lri1fn Reihen in weila'em Snn ~W~~ ~~~
=
~ Rdmi1~Sinn ~ ~
S)'StIn: KinYI ~ 14
~ Rlun
~ Va1iWtrlg
It.mIi.:IE
2liIIiJl:
sutm1id:
IcIIse
~
APPENDIX III
Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass
1. Manuscripts kept in the Library of the Institute for

Philosophy of the University of Warsaw
Abbreviated translation of "Spis inwentaryzacyjny r~kopis6w i ko-

respondencji profesora Kazimierza Twardowskiego" March 12 1959.
A revised and more complete list is under preparation (1995).
P =box containing mostly manuscripts to lectures

T = smaller files
K =correspondence
"h" after the text reference indicates that the piece is handwritten.
Otherwise the work has been typed by Twardowski himself.
"Goo marks that the text is written in German - otherwise in Polish.
No Content Year No of pages
P.
1,1 History of philosophy till the 18th C sum 1896 203 h
1,2 Philosophy of the 19th C 56 h
1,3 Development of philosophy in 19th C 1903-4 45
1,4 French philosophy in the 19th C 1903-4 39
2,1 History of Greek phil I 1898 112h
2,2 D:o II Sophists-Plato 1899 100
2,3 D:o Aristotle-Church Fathers 1900 154
2,4 History of Medieval phil Philo-9th C 1900-1 151
2,5 History of Scholastic phil 1900-1 61
3,1 Development of modem phil 1922-3 128
3,2 Development of Greek phil 1924-5 105
3,3 Syllogistics 1912-20 47
3,4 D:o 1925-6 65
3,5 Theory of knowledge 1925-5 65
3,6 Varia on history of phil 51
3,7 Fragment of essay on concepts -1894? 14hG
3,8 Ethics and life harmony 6h
243
244 APPENDIX III
4,1 History of phil 1930-1 34

4,2 History of phil (Greek and French 18C) 41
4,3 Franz Brentano and Varia 24
4,4 Logic for Physicians 1921-62 16
4,5 The Immortality Issue 1895 263hG
4,6 Main principles of phil sciences 1926-7 161
4,7 D.o 1928-9 I
5,1 Logic 1895-6 252h
5,2 Theory of inductive research 1896 141 h
5,3 Soul and body 87
6 Logic 1894-5 288hG
7,1 Theory of the method of scientific research 1898-9 67
7,2 Principal problems of theory of know-
ledge and metaphysics 1899-00 249
7,3 On mistakes in thinking 1900 91
7,4 On the method of scientific research 1902-7 60
9,1 On psychology 1925-6 180
9,2 Public university lectures:
soul and body 1903 119
9,3 Obituary on KT Rev.sc. phil.theol. 1939
9,4 D:o Express Wieczomy 1938
9,5 D:o Wiek Nowy
9,6 On psychology 1925-6 70
9,7 Introduction to the psychology of concepts
images and judgements 6h
10,1 Psychology I 1907-8 201
10,2 II (attention) 1907-8 94
10,3 of thinking I 1908-9 250
10,4 II 1908-9 97
11,1 History of philosophy India, Greece 1912-13 230
11,2 " Socrates, Plato 1912-13 230?
11,3 Psychology 1900-01 206
11,4 Psychology of smell and taste 1911-12 94
12,1 Psychology 1896 233
12,2 Psychology of feelings 1897 160h
12,3 Psychology of desire and will 1903-4 61
12,4 Psychology of feelings 1903-4 175
13,1 Hegel's philosophy 1904-5 167
13,2 Introduction to expo psychology 1904-5 273
13,3 Ethics, penal law and free will 1904-5 73
14,1 Ethics 243 h
14,2 Contemporary trends in scientific ethics 1901-2
15,1 The phil of Plato and Aristotle 1906-7 151
APPENDIX ill 245
15,2,1
15,2,2 ..
Hist. phil. from Aristotle
II
1907-8 17
50
15,3 Phil. of Renaissance 1908-9 38
15,4 Modem phil.to Kant 1909-10 88
15,5 0:0 II " 46
15,6 The beginning of modem phil 1917-8 31
15,7 Ethical scepticism 1905-6 30
15,8
15,9 .." 1914
1919
30
10
15,10 " 1923-4 25
15,11 " , Argumentum 1927-8 8
16 Historical-critical survey of main
trends of scientific ethics 1901-2 304
17,1 Basic concepts of psychophysics 1898 43 h
17,2 Visual illusions 1898-9 54
17,3 Psychology of supposition 1906 22
17,4 Main trends of scientific ethics 1905-6 22
17,5 " 1909-10 106
17,6 " 1909-10 55
17,7 " 1913-14 8
17,8 " 1919-20 11
17,9 " 1923-4 6
17,10 " 1927-8 10
17,12 General didactics 1902-3 139
17,13 From the history of universities 1919-20 98
T. 1,1 Roger Bacon 11 Juni 1294-1894 1894 llGh

2,2 On the epistemic value of natural science 1921 3
2,3 Thoughts 12
3,5 On the concept of education 1914 16
4,6 Lecture on scientific prejudgements 1894 10
4,7 On prejudgements 1906 15
5,8 On punishment responsibility 10
6,9 The concept and division of philosophy 7
6,10 Induction in metaphysics 1897 17
6,11 On memory 1905 II
7,12 The historical notion of philosophy 1911 27
8,13 Humanities and psychology 17
8,14 Why knowledge is power 1912 25
9,17 Speech to teachers 1922 II
10,19 Reputation and influence 7
10,18 Dilettantism 5
246 APPENDIX III
11,20 Classification of views on the

mind-body relations 1908 23
12,21 What is phil and why do we learn it? 1903 7
13,25,1-20,38 (not in series): minor pieces
21,42 Symbolomanie und pragmatophobie (French & Polish text)

21,43 Logical symbolism and thinking 20h
21,28 On presentations and judgements 28
21,30 Uber Funktionen und Gebilde 64
French text of the same 22
22,45-24,4Ia (not in series) minor pieces
25,49 Notes on the recognition of sex from style 167h
26,52 Idee und Perception (dissertation) 35hG
26,53 Preparations for "Zur Lehre": AllGh
I.Begriffseigenschaften 30
2.No title 120
3. (bibliography) 2
4.Begriffsumfang 27
5.notes 25
6.Anschauung 17
7.Zeugnisse 5
8.Varia 32
9.Vorstellungswesens des Begriffs 5
to. Wesen 21
11.Historisches 5
12.Begriffund allg Vorst 6
13.Begriff, seine Defmitionen 33
14.Merkmal 48
15.Begriffs-Inhalt und Begriffs-Gegenstand 25
16.Bolzanos und Ulricis Def. 15
17.Begriff - Definition 19
18.Begriffs Eigenschaften 39
19.=26,52
K.I-K.22 Correspondence 1896-1936
A copy of Twardowski's diary, containing brief notes for practi-

cally all days of his life is also kept in the Library. The original is in
the possession of his grandson prof. Tomczak Torun. An edition is
being prepared.
APPENDIX ill 247
2. Manuscripts listed in [Vemikov 1977 p.1 07], kept in the

Department of Manuscripts, "Fond Tvardovskogo", Lvov
State University Library, USSR. (Incomplete list, accord-
ing to Vemikov.)
1. Introductory lecture given in Lvov Nov 1895

2. Logic: Lectures given 1898-1907
3. Theoretico-practicallogic 1915/16
4. Traditional logic 1917/18
5. Three lectures devoted to the new interpretation of formal logic.
3. Other manuscripts kept in the Lviv State University Li-

brary Ukraine, as of Nov 1995. Preliminary list. A com-
plete inventory is under preparation.
6. Materialien zu einer Relationstheorie 1893 20 p.

(ppI67-176)(G)
7. Introduction to philsophy. Society of academic courses for
workers. 22/1-12/3 1897 h 35 P
8. Fragment of curriculum vitae + draft bibliography of works (by
Gromska?) 1917. 11 p.
9.1. Philosophy in the papal encyclical "Pascendi dominici gregis".
Speech in the Polish Phil. Society 12/2 1909.
9.2. The independence of thought 4 XI 1906.20 p.
9.3. On philosophical propaedeutics. Classes for teachers. 1897. 18p.
10. Letter from K. Witwicki 18.2.1927.
11. Kotarbmski's funeral speech over Twardowski. 14/2 1938.
12. The concept of pedagogics. 32 p. Year?
13. Practical ethics 26 p. Year?
14. On the relation ofphilosophy... Lecture in the Pol. phil. society
1114 1896 (fragment)
15. Was heiBt normal? 9 p. G.
16. Socrates. Popular lecture. 11 p. Early.
248 APPENDIX ill
Lectures copied and bound kept in the Jewish student circle library of
Lvov.
17. Main principles of the philosophical sciences 1925-26.53 p.
18. 1926-27. 148 p.
19. The theory of judgements. 28 p.MSS for publication.

20. Speech on the question of establishing a Ruthenian university.
1921?
BffiLIOGRAPHY
WORKS BY HUSSERL
Husserl, Edmund, Gesammelte Werke.(Husserliana). Vols.l-XXVI. Referred to as
HuaI-XXVI.
- , Husserls Abhandlung "Intentionale Gegenstiinde ". Edition der urspriinglichen
Druckfassung. Ed. by Karl Schuhmann. In Brentano Studien 1990/91 pp.
137-176. Referred to as "IG".
- , Erfahrung und Urteil. Hamburg 1948.
- , Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Den Haag 1968.
- , Briefwechsel. Vol 1-10. Ed by Karl and Elisabeth Schuhmann. Dordrecht
1994.
- , Unpublished manuscripts in transcription, (K I 62), K I 63, K 11133
(Meinongiana), B III 12 (BUndellV), Correspondence, Notes in personal co-
pies of books contained in Husserl's library.
WORKSBYTWARDOWS~
Twardowski, Kasimir, Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersu-

chung aus Descartes. Wien 1891.
- , Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Lehre der Vorstellungen.Eine psychologische Un-
tersuchung. Wien 1894. Also in facsimile edition with introduction by Rudolf
Haller. MUnchen 1982. English translation and introduction by Reinhardt
Grossman. The Hague 1977. Referred to as ZL or Zur Lehre.
- , 0 jilozojii sredniowiecznej. Wyklad6w szesc. Lw6w 1910. (Lectures from
1906)
- , Rozprawy i artykuly jilozojiczne. Lw6w 1927. (partly but not wholly covered
by WPF below.)
- , Wybrane Pisma Filozojiczne. Warszawa 1965. (Referred to as WPF, contains
a full bibliography of Twardowski's works)
- , Teoria poznania. In Archiwum historii fIlozofii i mySli spolecznej Warszawa
1975. <Lectures on theory of knowledge, from Twardowski's Nachlass, edited
by I. D~bska and introduced by T. Czezowski.>
- , Introductory lecture at the University of Lw6w 15 Nov 1895. In Principia
Tom VIII-IX 1994.
- , Unpublished material from the Nachlass. See Appendix III.
249
250 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Phaenomenologica
23. K. Held: Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen
Ich bei Edumund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. 1966
ISBN 90-247-0254-2
24. O. Laffoucriere: Le destin de fa pensee et 'LIJ Mort de Dieu' selon Heidegger. 1968
ISBN 90-247-0255-0
25. E. Husserl: Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit ErIAuterungen und Erinnerungen an
Husserl. Hrsg. von R. Ingarden. 1968 ISBN Hb: 90-247-0257-7; Pb: 90-247-0256-9
26. R. Boehm: Yom Gesichtsprmlct der Phiinomenologie (I). Husserl-Studien. 1968
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0259-3; Pb: 90-247-0258-5
For Band II see below under Volume 83
27. T. Conrad: Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens WId Erlebens. Mit einem
Geleitwort von H.L. van Breda. 1968 ISBN 90-247-0260-7
28. W. Biemel: Philosophische Analysen ZUT Kunst der Gegenwart. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0263-1; Pb: 90-247-0262-3
29. G. Thines: LIJ problhnatique de fa psychologie. 1968
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0265-8; Pb: 9O-247-0264-X
30. D. Sinha: Studies in Phenomenology. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0267-4; Pb: 90-247-0266-6
31. L. Eley: Metakritik der formalen Logilc. Sinnliche Gewissheit als Horizont der
Aussagenlogik und elementaren Pridikatenlogik. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0269-0; Pb: 90-247-0268-2
32. M.S. Frings: Person WId Dasein. Zur Frage der Ontologie des Wertseins. 1969
ISBN Hb: 90-247-0271-2; Pb: 90-247-0270-4
33. A. Rosales: Transzendenz und Differenz. Bin Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen
Differenz beim frilhen Heidegger. 1970 ISBN 90-247-0272-0
34. M.M. Saraiva: L'imaginationselon Husserl. 1970 ISBN 90-247-0273-9
35. P. Janssen: Geschichte WId Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls
Spitwerk.1970 ISBN 90-247-0274-7
36. W. Marx: Vemunft WId Welt. Zwischen Tradition und anderem Anfang. 1970
ISBN 90-247-5042-3
37. J.N. MOhanty: Phenomenology and Ontology. 1970 ISBN 90-247-5053-9
38. A. Aguirre: Genetische Phiinomenologie WId Redulction. Zur Letztbegrilndung der
Wissenschaft aus der radikalen Skepsis im Denken E. Husserls. 1970
ISBN 90-247-5025-3
39. T.F. Geraets: Vers Nne nouvelle philosophie transcendenlllie. La genese de la
pbilosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu'i\ la 'PhCnomenologie de la perception.'
Preface par E. Levinas. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5024-5
40. H. Decleve: Heidegger et Kant. 1970 ISBN 90-247-5016-4
41. B. Waldenfels: Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialpbilosophische Untersuchun-
gen in Anschluss an Edmund Husserl. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5072-5
42. K. Schuhmann: Die FwulJunenllllbetrachtung der Phiinomenologie. Zum
Weltproblem in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls. 1971 ISBN 90-247-5121-7
43. K. Goldstein: Selected PaperslAusgewiihlte Schriften. Edited by A. Gurwitsch, E.M.
Goldstein Haudek and W.E. Haudek. Introduction by A. Gurwitsch. 1971
ISBN 90-247-5047-4
Phaenomenologica
44. E. Holenstein: Phiinomenologie der Assoziatioll. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines
Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. HusserI. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1175-4
45. F. Hammer: Theonome Anthropologie? Max Schelers Menschenbild und seine
Grenzen.1972 ISBN 9O-247-1186-X
46. A. Paianin: WissensclrD/t und Geschichte in der Phiinomenologie Edmund Husserls.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1194-0
47. G.A. de Almeida: Sinn und InlrDlt in der genetischen Phiinomenologie E. Husserls.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1318-8
48. J. Rolland de Reneville: Aventure de I' absolu. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1319-6
49. U. Claesges und K. Held (eds.): Perspektiven transzendentill-phiinomenologischer
Forschung. FUr Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seiner KOlner SchOlem.
1972 ISBN 90-247-1313-7
50. F. Kersten and R. Zaner (eds.): Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism. Essays
in Memory of Dorion Cairns. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1302-1
51. W. Biemel (ed.): Phiinomenologie Heute. Festschrift fUr Ludwig Landgrebe. 1972
ISBN 90-247-1336-6
52. D. Souche-Dagues: Le diveloppement de I'intentionnalite dans la phenomenologie
husserlienne. 1972 ISBN 90-247-1354-4
53. B. Rang: Kausalitiit und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhiltnis von Perspek-
tivitlil und Objektivitlil in der Phanomenologie Edmund Husserls. 1973
ISBN 90-247-1353-6
54. E. Levinas: Autrement qu' etre ou au-deld de I' essence. 2nd. ed.: 1978
ISBN 90-247-2030-3
55. D. cairns: Guidefor Translating Husserl. 1973 ISBN (Pb) 90-247-1452-4
56. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phiinomenologie, I. Husserl aber Pfander. 1973
ISBN 90-247-1316-1
57. K. Schuhmann: Die Dialektik der Phiinomenologie, II. Reine Phinomenologie und
phlinomenologische Philosophie. Historisch-analytische Monographie aber Husserls
'IdeenI'.1973 ISBN 90-247-1307-2
58. R. Williame: Les fondements phenomenologiques de la sociologie comprehensive:
Alfred Schutz et Max Weber. 1973 ISBN 90-247-1531-8
59. E. Marbach: Dos Problem des Ich in der Phiinomenologie Husserls. 1974
ISBN 90-247-1587-3
60. R. Stevens: James and Husserl: The Foundations ofMeaning. 1974
ISBN 90-247-1631-4
61. H.L. van Breda (ed.): verite et verification I Wahrheit und VerifiiaJtion. Actes du
quatrieme Colloque International de Phenomenologie I Akten des vierten Inter-
nationalen Kolloquiums fUr Phinomenologie (Schwabisch Hall, Baden-Wdrttemberg,
8.-11. September 1969). 1974 ISBN 90-247-1702-7
62. PhJ. Bossert (ed.): Phenomenological Perspectives. Historical and Systematic Essays
in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg. 1975. ISBN 90-247-1701-9
63. H. Spiegelberg: Doing Phenomenology. Essays on and in Phenomenology. 1975
ISBN 90-247-1725-6
64. R. Ingarden: On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendentlllidealism. 1975
ISBN 90-247-1751-5
65. H. Kuhn, E. Ave-LaIlemanl and R. Gladiator (eds.): Die Miinchener Phiinomenologie.
Vortrige des Intemationalen Kongresses in MUnchen (13.-18. AprlI197l). 1975
ISBN 9O-247-1740-X
Phaenomenologica
66. D. Cairns: Conversations with Husserl and Fink. Edited by the Hussed-Archives in
Louvain. With a foreword by R.M. Zaner. 1975 ISBN 90-247-1793-0
67. G. Hoyos Vasquez: Intentionalitiit aJs Verantwortung. Geschichtsteleologie und
Teleologie der Intentionalitllt bei Hussed. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1794-9
68. J. Patoeka: Le Monde naturel comme problbne philosophique. 1976
ISBN 90-247-1795-7
69. W.W. Fuchs: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence. An Essay in the
Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1822-8
70. S. Cunningham: Language and the Phenomenological Reductions ofEdmund Husserl.
1976 ISBN 90-247-1823-6
71. G.C. Moneta: On Identity. A Study in Genetic Phenomenology. 1976
ISBN 90-247-1860-0
72. W. Biemel und das Hussed-Archiv zu LOwen (cds.): Die Welt des Menschen - Die
Welt der Philosophie. Festschrift fOr Jan Patoeka. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1899-6
73. M. Richir: Au-deld du renversement copemicien. La question de la phCnomenologie
et son fondement. 1976 ISBN 90-247-1903-8
74. H. Mongis: Heidegger et Ia critique de Ia notion de valeur. La destruction de la
fondation metaphysique. Lettre-preface de Martin Heidegger. 1976
ISBN 90-247-1904-6
75. J. Taminiaux: Le regard et I' excedent. 1977 ISBN 90-247-2028-1
76. Th. de Boer: The Development ofHusserl' s Thought. 1978
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2039-7; Ph: 90-247-2124-5
77. R.R. Cox: Schutz's Theory ofRelevance. A Phenomenological Critique. 1978
ISBN 90-247-2041-9
78. S. Strasser: Jenseits von Sein und Zeit. Eine EinfOhrung in Emmanuel Levinas'
Philosophie. 1978 ISBN 90-247-2068-0
79. R.T. Murphy: Hurne and Husserl. Towards Radical Subjectivism. 1980
ISBN 90-247-2172-5
80. H. Spiegelberg: The Context ofthe Phenomenological Movement. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2392-2
81. J.R. Mensch: The Question ofBeing in Husserl's Logical Investigations. 1981
ISBN 90-247-2413-9
82. J. Loscerbo: Being and Technology. A Study in the Pbilsophy of Martin Heidegger.
1981 ISBN 90-247-2411-2
83. R. Boehm: Yom Gesichtspunlct der Phiinomenologie II. Studien zur PhAnomenologie
der Epoche. 1981 ISBN 90-247-2415-5
84. H. Spiegelberg and E. Ave-Lallemant (cds.): Pfdnder-Studien. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2490-2
85. S. Valdinoci: Lesfondements de Ia phenomenologie husserlienne. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2504-6
86. I. Yamaguchi: Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivitiit bei Edmund Husserl. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2505-4
87. J. Libertson: Proximity. Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication. 1982
ISBN 90-247-2506-2
Phaenomenologica
88. D. Welton: The Origins 0/ Meaning. A Critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian
Phenomenology. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2618-2
89. W.R. McKenna: Husserl's 'Introductions to Phenomenology'. Interpretation and
Critique. 1982 ISBN 90-247-2665-4
90. J.P. Miller: Numbers in Presence and Absence. A Study of Husserl's Philosophy of
Mathematics. 1982 ISBN 9O-247-2709-X
91. U. Melle: Das Wahrnelunungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phiinomeno-
logischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phanomenologischen Wahrneh-
mungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. 1983
ISBN 90-247-2761-8
92. W.S. Hamrick (ed.): Phenomenology in Practice and Theory. Essays for Herbert
Spiegelberg. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2926-2
93. H. Reiner: Duty and Inclination. The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and
Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. 1983 ISBN 90-247-2818-6
94. M. J. Harney: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. 1984 ISBN 90-247-2891-6
95. Kah Kyung Cho (ed.): Philosophy and Science in Phenamenological Perspective.
1984 ISBN 9O-247-2922-X
96. A. Lingis: Phenamenological Explanations. 1986
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3332-4; Pb: 90-247-3333-2
97. N. Rotenstreich: Reflection and Action. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2969-6; Pb: 90-247-3128-3
98. J.N. Mohanty: The Possibility o/Transcendental Philosophy. 1985
ISBN Hb: 90-247-2991-2; Pb: 90-247-3146-1
99. JJ. Kockelmans: Heidegger on Art and Art Works. 1985 ISBN 9O-247-3102-X
100. E. Uvinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. 1987
ISBN Hb: 90-247-3272-7; Pb: 90-247-3395-2
101. R. Regvald: Heidegger et Ie Probleme du Neant. 1986 ISBN 9O-247-3388-X
102. J.A. Barash: Martin Heidegger and the Problem o/Historical Meaning. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3493-2
103 JJ. Kockelmans (ed.): Phenomenological Psychology. The Dutch School. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3501-7
104. W.S. Hamrick: An Existential Phenomenology o/Law: Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1987
ISBN 90-247-3520-3
105. J.C. Sallis, G. Moneta and J. Taminiaux (eds.): The Collegium Phaenomenologium.
The First Ten Years. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3709-5
106. D. Carr: Interpreting Husserl. Critical and Comparative Studies. 1987.
ISBN 9O-247-3505-X
107. G. Heffernan: Isagoge in die phiinomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einftlhrung in die
phanomenologische Urteilslogik durch die Auslegung des Textes der Formalen und
transzendenten Logik von Edmund Husserl. 1989 ISBN 90-247-3710-9
108. F. Volpi, J.-F. Mattei, Th. Sheenan, J.-F. Courtine, J. Taminiaux, J. Sallis, D.
Janicaud, A.L. Kelkel, R. Bernet, R. Brisart, K. Held, M. Haar et S. Usseling:
Heidegger et I'ldee de la Phenomenologie. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3586-6
109. C. Singevin: Dramaturgie de l'Esprit. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3557-2
Phaenomenologica
110. 1. PatoCka: Le morule naturel et Ie mouvement de I' existence humaine. 1988
ISBN 90-247-3577-7
111. K.-H. Lembeck: Gegenstand Geschichte. Gescbichtswissenschaft in Husserls
Phanomenologie. 1988 ISBN 90-247-3635-8
112. I.K. Cooper-Wiele: The Totalizing Act. Key to Husserl's Early Philosophy. 1989
ISBN 0-7923-r077-7
113. S. Valdinoci: Le principe d'existence. Un devenir psycbiatrique de la ph6no-
m6nologie. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0125-0
114. D. Lohmar: PhiinomellOlogie der Mathematilc. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0187-0
115. S. Usseling (Hrsgb.): Husserl-Ausgabe undHusserl-Forschung. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0372-5
116. R. Cobb-Stevens: Husserl and Analytic Philosophy. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0467-5
117. R. Klockenbusch: Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in
Phanomenologie und Dialektik. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0515-9
118. S. Vaitkus: How is Society Possible? Intersubjectivity and the Fiduciary Attitude as
Problems of the Social Group in Mead, Gurwitsch, and Schutz. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-0820-4
119. C. Macann: Presence and Coincidence. The Transformation of Transcendental into
Ontological Phenomenology. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0923-5
120. G. Shpet: Appearance and Sense. Phenomenology as the Fundamental Science and Its
Problems. Translated from Russian by Th. Nemeth. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1098-5
121. B. Stevens: L'Apprentissage des Signes. Lecture de Paul Ricreur. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1244-9
122. G. Soffer: Husserl and the Question ofRelativism. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1291-0
123. G. R6mpp: Husserls PhiinomellOlogie der Intersubjelctivitiit. Und Ihre Bedeutung fOr
eine Theorie intersubjektiver Objektivitlit und die Konzeption einer phiinomeno-
logischen.I991 ISBN 0-7923-1361-5
124. S. Strasser: Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phlinomenologie als ethischer
Fundamentalpbilosopbie.I991 ISBN Hb: 0-7923-1404-2; Ph: 0-7923-1551-0
125. R. P. Buckley: Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility.
1992 ISBN 0-7923-1633-9
126. 1. G. Hart: The Person and the Common Life. Studies in a Husserlian Social Ethics.
1992 ISBN 0-7923-172+6
127. P. van Tongeren, P. Sars, C. Bremmers and K. Boey (eds.): Eros and Em. Contribu-
tions to a Hermeneutical Phenomenology. Liber Amicorum for Adriaan Peperzak.
1992 ISBN 0-7923-1917-6
128. Nam-In Lee: Edmund Husserls PhiinomellOlogie der Instinlcte. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2041-7
129. P. Burke and 1. Van der Veken (eds.): Merleau-Ponty in Contemporary Perspective.
1993 ISBN 0-7923-2142-1
130. G. Haefliger: Uber Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2227-4
131. 1. Lampert: Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl's Logical Investigations.
1995 ISBN 0-7923-3105-2
132. I.M. DuBois: Judgment and Sachverhalt. An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenom-
enological Realism. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3519-8
Phaenomenologica
133. B.E. Babich (ed.): From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire. Essays in
Honor of William J. Richardson, SJ. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3567-8
134. M. Dupuis: Pronoms et visages. Lecture D'EmmJJnuel LeviTUlS. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-3655-0; Pb 0-7923-3994-0
135. D. Zahavi: Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjelctivitiit. Eine Antwort auf die
sprachpragmatische Kritik. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3713-1
136. A. Schutz: Collected Papers, W. Edited with preface and notes by H. Wagner and
G. Psathas, in collaboration with F. Kersten. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3760-3
137. P. Kontos: D' une phinominologie de III perception chez Heidegger. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-3776-X
138. F. Kuster: Wege der Verantwortung. Husserls PhAnomenologie als Gang durch die
Faktizitat. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3916-9
139. C. Beyer: Von Bolzano zu Husserl. Eine Untersuchung ilber den Ursprung der
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140. J. Dodd: Idealism and Corporeity. An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's
Phenomenology. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4400-6
141. E. Kelly: Structure and Diversity. Studies in the Phenomenological Philosophy of
Max Scheler. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4492-8
142. J. Cavallin: Content and Object. Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism. 1997
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CONTENT AND OBJECf

CONTENT AND OBJECT

CONTENT AND OBJECT

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

ISBN 978-90-481-4905-6 ISBN 978-94-017-1160-9 (eBook)

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Chapter 1 / PROLOGUE: A remark on the study of the history of philosophy 1

Chapter 2 / THE BACKGROUND: The controversy on psychologism in

Chapter 3 / HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI: A philosophical encounter 21

Chapter 4 / THE RESURGENCE OF ONTOLOGY - OBJECTS OF

Chapter 5 / THE DISPUTE OVER OBJECT-LESS PRESENTATIONS 113

Chapter 6 / EPILOGUE: The end of a conceptual history? 233

Annex 1: A note on the texts 239

Appendix I : References to Tardowski in Husserl's published works 241

This study is a revised version ofa book, published in February 1990

PROLOGUE: A REMARK ON THE STUDY OF

The history of philosophy is in a particular way tied to philosophy it-

I A good example of this is Anders Wedberg's history of philosophy.

descriptive occupation, and philosophy in the "analytic" sense, which

Applying this attitude to a particular philosopher or theory of the

philosophy which took place in Gennan-speaking Europe just a cen-

The same Central European academic environment which gave

THE BACKGROUND: THE CONTROVERSY ON

Quine's challenge - despite his deep disagreement with some of the

Psychologism in philosophy might be considered from two differ-

4 The latter kind of distinction is made e.g. by Wolenski in regard to Twardowski,

and solved, within the context of empirical research, even experimen-

5 Reasons for regarding the issue of psychologism as the leitmotif in Husserl's

philosophy as a whole are developed by e.g. Suzanne Bachelard in her book on

some time just before the publication of "Ideas", in 1913. In that

One might also consider Hussed's last philosophical period,

The motives for psychologism

Just as Hussed and his disciples referred to phenomenology as a

of a broader movement. It had some of the missionary spirit and co-

1. The sceptical motive

Hussed frequently attacks the psychologistic philosophers for advo-

and German idealism. A consequence of this attitude was the rejec-

x Heymans is as a typical example, expressing himself nearly as clearly as Quine

9 The Polish historian of philosophy, Tatarkiewicz, cites Ockham himself as rep-

resenting a psychologistic outlook. (Tatarkiewicz 1993, vol I pp. 298-9).

10 Cf. Beck 1969 p. 413.

as a bundle of disciplines, related to each other by having "psychic

2. The scientistic motive

"Scientism" might be described as an attitude which proclaims sci-

science pervades most disputes on qualifying philosophical tendencies and meth-

In the period studied here, traditional philosophy of mind or philo-

adoption of this slogan.

introspection should not be identified with the Brentanian method of

The psychologistic philosophers generally expressed motive 2 in

19th-century psycho10gism in Gennany, and certainly with an interesting link to

of being blind to phenomenology just as the empiricists are blind to epistemology

HUSSERL'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST PSYCHOLOGISM

The best known explicit argument presented by HusserI against

principal argument is that any normative discipline must have a pure-

18 Logische Untersuchungen Band 1, § 16, Hua XVIII p. 59 ff.

Now, psychologism, along with other brands of empiricism, Hus-

21Brentano's claim for descriptive psychology's being empirical is not mentioned

Therefore, HusserI contends that he has shown psychologism,

22 The validity of this demonstration might be disputed. Sukale. (Sukale 1988),

HUSSERL AND TWARDOWSKI:

3.1 HUSSERL'S EARLY DEVELOPMENT - THE ENVIRONMENT

The origin of Husserlian phenomenology is, primarily, tied to Franz

23Recently a survey of Husserl's relations to and influences from the Brentano