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Innovation is a rallying cry for most of today’s organizations. Yet encouraging innovation
and superb execution of routine work at the same time runs the risk of sending a mixed
message that can end up accomplishing neither.
For example, in 2000, Bank of America sought to become an industry leader in
innovation and established a program to promote experimentation in two-dozen real-life
‘laboratories’ – fully-operating retail bank branches in which employees were to experi-
ment with new product and service concepts, such as virtual tellers. Successful experiments
Amy Edmondson – determined on the basis of consumer satisfaction or revenue growth – would then be
recommended for a national rollout.
Bank senior management voiced strong support for innovation, and explicitly recog-
nized and communicated that experimentation with new ideas necessarily produced failures
along the way. Indeed, a failure rate of 30 per cent was targeted as indicative of ‘sufficient’
risk-taking and novelty. Initially, however, employee compensation continued to be based
on measures of routine performance (such as opening new customer accounts.)
The espoused goal of increasing innova- The role of failure in experimentation mistakes, errors, and failures against him or
tion thus was inconsistent with the reward Failures are unavoidable outcomes of her.Without psychological safety, individu-
system; individuals’ compensation could experimentation, because the outcome of als are likely to be concerned with the
suffer from time spent experimenting with any single experiment or trial is always interpersonal risks of failure and to be
new ideas or from failed experiments. uncertain in advance. For example, when reluctant to engage in experimentation.
Understandably, many employees were selecting one unknown key out of many to Differences across organizations in
reluctant to experiment much until man- unlock a door, one does not know in psychological safety have been shown to
agement made changes to align reward advance whether or not the key will work; affect the level of anxiety people feel when
systems with the organization’s new value of risk of failure is thus unavoidable. Such fail- confronting ambiguity and uncertainty.
experimentation. ures can be beneficial because they provide Psychological safety can be created by sup-
the experimenter with new knowledge portive structures such as information and
Defining ‘experimentation’ about the solution and thereby facilitate inno- reward systems, and by the words and
Experimentation is a trial-and-error process vation and performance in the long run. actions of high-level management. In
in which each trial generates new insights Research shows that when pharmaceu- particular, messages that indicate support-
on a problem. Learning by experimentation tical companies such as Eli Lilly launch new iveness, openness, and tolerance for error
is fundamental to solving problems for drugs, or automotive firms like BMW affect beliefs about the level of psychologi-
which outcomes are uncertain and where introduce new cars, the products are the cal safety throughout an organization.
critical sources of information are non-exis- result of as many failed experiments as suc-
tent or unavailable. Imagine trying to cessful ones.An innovation process is at least Normative vs. instrumental influences
unlock a door with a set of unfamiliar keys. partially based on ‘accumulated failure’ that Research shows that creativity is related to
Putting one key into the lock to see if it will has been carefully understood. Individuals organizational culture, reward systems,
turn is experimentation; even if the experi- who select tasks in which failures are likely supervisory encouragement, trust, and
ment fails, new knowledge is created that (rather than safe tasks in which they know resources. Feedback, help-seeking and
narrows the scope of subsequent trials. they can perform well) tend to persevere in issue-selling behaviours are all predicted
Each trial in experimentation gener- the midst of hardship and perform better in by supportive organizational norms, lead-
ates information about a solution that the the long run than others. ership openness, and trust. Proactive
experimenter could not know in advance. Despite its benefits, failure has costs, learning behaviours are related to sup-
Information learned in a previous trial can and is often avoided by both organizations portive organizational contexts (access to
be used to modify subsequent experimental and their members. Clearly, failures can resources, information, training, and sup-
designs, conditions, or even the nature of alienate customers, reduce business, and portive reward systems), leader coaching,
the desired solution. Tasks that are con- lead to dissatisfaction among employees. At and routines that encourage exchange of
ducive to effective experimentation are the extreme, failures can harm employees relevant information, reduce sensitivity to
those that allow multiple problem-solving or customers, financially undermine the feedback, decrease defensiveness, and
trials and present opportunities to use organization, and lead to the organization’s increase trust.
knowledge gained from earlier trials to demise. Yet, even when these costs of fail- Organizational variables that affect
enhance learning in subsequent trials. ure are greatly reduced, people are still innovation behaviour include both normative
Experimentation is critical to organiza- reluctant to experiment. One study and instrumental influences. Normative influ-
tional innovation. Important discoveries in showed that when new technologies dra- ences, such as organizational culture and
science – such as artificial vaccines – and matically reduced the economic costs, espoused values, influence employee beliefs
technology, such as the electric light bulb, time, and effort associated with experi- and behaviours by establishing norms and
resulted from constant trial-and-error mentation – such that incurring failures standards that define appropriate and inap-
experimentation through which inventors would not harm the organization’s budget, propriate forms of behaviour. Normative
systematically built up a knowledge base. deadlines, cost structure, employees or cus- values can be explicitly stated by leaders
Research shows that R&D teams spend tomers – individuals still seemed to avoid (e.g., through speeches, signs or memos) or
almost 80 per cent of their time on experi- experiments in which failures were likely. tacitly communicated in features of the
mentation, and that these experiments This avoidance can be explained by the organizational environment (e.g. organiza-
constitute an important source of technical interpersonal or social costs of failure. tional routines). There is evidence that
information. Experimentation advances Specifically, failures make one’s gaps in when normative values state that failures are
understanding of new concepts, promotes expertise and knowledge salient to others, expected and acceptable as part of learning,
new ways of thinking, and creates new while avoiding failure helps to maintain people are less hesitant to discuss mistakes
knowledge. More broadly, individuals who one’s image and professional standing and more willing to try novel tasks even at
constantly improvise, tinker, and experi- among colleagues. Interpersonal costs of the expense of incurring more failures.
ment are able to remain adaptive in failure are exaggerated when people lack The second category – instrumental
fast-paced industries where new ideas are ‘psychological safety’ – a belief that a group influences – pertains largely to formal
constantly in demand. or organization will not hold a person’s reward systems and incentives. Instrumental