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Atty. Adonis V.
Gabriel Notes
San Beda College of Law

Mendiola, Manila
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND COURT DECISIONS IN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
By: Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION
Definition
What is a constitution, what are its objects? It is easier to tell what it is not that
what it is. It is not the beginning of a community. It is not the origin of private
rights. It is not the fountain of law nor the incipient state of government. It is not
the cause, but the consequence of personal and political freedom; it confers no rights
to the people; it is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience
(Cooley; Treatise on Constitutional Limitations)
The Constitution is the work or will of the People themselves, in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the Legislature in their
derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the Creator, and the other
of the Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority,
and prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the
Constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all Legislative, Executive
and Judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet
in this there can be no doubt, that every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, as absolutely void.
The Constitution of a State is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the
temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events: notwithstanding the
competition of opposing interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains
firm and immoveable, as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the
ocean amidst the raging of the waves. (Vanhorne vs. Dorrance)
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration

of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the
authority from which it emanates. [Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156,
February 3, 1997]
In Marcos vs. Manglapus, the Supreme Court held that “it must be borne in mind that
the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good.”
Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. [Manila
Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]
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Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel Notes
Purposes of the Constitution
1. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government;

2. Assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and
3. Establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.
[Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]
Rules of Construction of the Constitution
Self-Executing vs. Non Self-Executing Provisions
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.

Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes
of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
In Case of Doubt, Constitutional Provisions are Self-Executing
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That
is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-

executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion
to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
Specific Tools of Constitutional Construction
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present
in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use.
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Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. A
foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. The members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted [provisions of the Constitution],
they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document. [Francisco vs. House of Representatives [G.R. No.
160261, Nov 10, 2003]
Extraneous Materials Can Only be used if the Above-Mentioned Rules Fail
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of

the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or
whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was proclaimed
per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The
thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the
date its ratification shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast
their votes to approve or reject it." This view was actually proposed at the
Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in the
face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on
the very day of the plebiscite." The record of the proceedings and debates of the
Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's judgment. It shows that the
clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Commission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the
aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that
"the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and
the proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an
act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when
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they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.” [De Leon vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
78059, August 31, 1987]
Amendments and Revisions
Proposal
The Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions to the Constitution is not

included in the General Legislative Power
The power to amend the Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is not

included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art, VI,
Const.) It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of
sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make
and hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power (Sec. 1, Art. XV, Const.). Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of government,
including the Constitution itself. [Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196,
November 9, 1967]
As a Constituent Assembly, Congress May Directly Propose Amendments or

Revisions AND at the same time, Call a Constitutional Convention
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae maintains that Congress may either propose
amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it cannot
do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2)
alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is,
however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and none has been
brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In
fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when
the spirit or context of the law warrants it. [Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
28196, November 9, 1967]
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assemble, may Propose Amendments or

Revisions, AND as a Legislative Body, Provide for the Rules and Regulations
Therefor
Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly pursuant to [Article XVII of the

Constitution], has authority to propose constitutional amendments [upon 3/4 vote]
or call a convention for the purpose by [2/3] votes of each house in joint session
assembled but voting separately; Such grant includes all other powers essential to
the effective exercise of the principal power by necessary implication; Implementing
details are within the authority of Congress not only as a Constituent Assembly but
also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power so long as it does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution; and Congress as a legislative body may
thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a
Constituent Assembly omitted. [Imbong vs. Ferrer, COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32432,
September 11, 1970]
Proposals to Amend and/or to Revise the Constitution does not need the
Approval of the President
In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt
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is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a

peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. While ordinarily it
is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.
In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic
character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of
policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed
amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing
to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. [Sanidad vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]
The President Cannot Guarantee a Change to the Constitution
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the
President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would
require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be
restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow?
Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel
groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she
considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as
recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them
pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In
particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and
3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the
people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers – as those powers may be
exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through
initiative and referendum – she may submit proposals for constitutional change to
Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent
powers. [Province of Cotabato vs. The Gov’t. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
The Constitutional Convention only needs Majority Vote of its Members to

Approve a Proposal that will be submitted for Ratification
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as
a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through
which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as
constitutional convention is concerned. [Occena vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 56350, April
2, 1981]
The System of Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution is Not

Self-Executing
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly stated
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
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the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. [Santiago
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]
Republic Act No. 6735 is a Sufficient Law to Implement Initiative on the

Constitution
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a people’s
initiative. [Resolution of the Supreme Court in Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
174153, November 21, 2006]
Tests in Determining the Characteristics of the Propose Changes
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and
does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances." [Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]
Essential Requirements for a Valid Initiative to Propose Amendments to the

Constitution
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they
sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature." [Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006]
Ratification
Ratification of the Proposals may be held simultaneously with a General

Election
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is
a "special," not a general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments
to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
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It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed

amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of
the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate
appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal
officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the
wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officers. They
do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the
term "election" used, without qualification, in the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution. [Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967]
Piece-Meal Submission of the Proposals for Ratification is not Allowed
The ultimate question, therefore, boils down to this: Is there any limitation or
condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of
the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation
that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted
to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the
amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment
the Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. [Tolentino
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971]
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
State vs. Foreign Country
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it
is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by
common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of
the nation." This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is
on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized,
exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within
it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then
as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its
allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver similarly would point to
the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions
of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite
satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood.
So Hyde did opine. [Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda, G.R. No. L-
13250, Oct 29, 1971]
People
Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen.
In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them. In its fourth meaning, Savigny
would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which,
according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." This is the concept of
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popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people,
is sovereign. In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their
convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional
prohibition. This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as
all life is all experiment." "The necessities of orderly government," wrote
Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently
fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting
decision of the people when they adopt it. [Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640,
October 12, 1976]
Territory
The National Territory Cannot be Dismembered through the Medium of a

Treaty
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national

territory” because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory
under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition
of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners
theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision
denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea
recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the
United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description,
Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the
Treaty of Paris.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III
was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to
codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise
treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-
living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf
(Article 77). [Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011]
Government
Traditional Functions of the Government
To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be defined as "that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social
state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government
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are exercised. These functions are twofold: constituent and ministrant. The former
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature;
the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the
constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare
those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.) [Bacani vs.
NACOCO, G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956]
The Traditional Functions of Government have been Abandoned
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group
of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is
to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else
the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here
of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by
the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social
justice." [Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975]
Decisions of Belligerent Courts Remain Valid After Cessation of Occupation
Suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes upon a
belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in
force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure
"I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social
and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader,
but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory
and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.
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We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean
judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not
deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in
sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say
that the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative
and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to
this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d
ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or
construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of
said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with
which the world "processes" is associated.
As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private
rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good
and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no crucial
instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored or
legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless
true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the
inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of nations
and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the
occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there
are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of such
judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate
them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal
would deprive them of their properties without due process of law. [Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5A, November 16, 1945]
Law on Treason is not Suspended During Belligerent Occupation
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a

territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it
is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the
supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state)
must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the
war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over
them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23,
44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation,
the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists,
and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on
10
which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests. [Laurel vs. Misa, G.R. No.
L-409, January 30, 1947]
Suspension of Political Laws During Belligerent Occupation Applies only to

Civilians
The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political
relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is
intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not
intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the
very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself.
Under the petitioners' theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied
territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be
stripped of the very lifeblood of an army, the right and the ability to maintain order
and discipline within the organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.
[Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
Sovereignty
Sovereignty is Comprehensive, but its Exercise may be Restricted
By the Agree it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as
a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested
itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of
the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional
rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is
implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the
express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan.
Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle
of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express
or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a
curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from
the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." [People vs. Gozo, G.R.
No. L-36409, October 26, 1973]
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
Concept
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of

sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was
11
indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of

the Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court,
at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective
obstacle, could very well be imagined." [Republic vs. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671,
November 28, 1973]
Instances when an Action is Against the State
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government. [Republic vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993]
Acts Committed by Officers in their Official Capacity are Covered by the

Immunity
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope
of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that
the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be
satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States
government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent. [Sanders vs. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10,
1988]
State Immunity Extends to Foreign States Sued in this Jurisdiction
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the
government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. So
we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the
doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to
foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence
to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where
we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. [Sanders vs.
Veridiano, G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]
par in parem non habet imperium (meaning, an equal has no authority over an equal)
12
State Immunity May Be Invoked at any Stage of the Proceedings
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the
case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings." [Republic vs. Feliciano, G.R. No. 70853, March 12,
1987]
Acts Committed Without or in Excess of Authority is not Covered by the

Immunity
If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred
on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. It
is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial,
or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization
of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he
exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea
that he is a public agent acting under color of his office, and not personally. In the
eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. [Festejo vs. Fernando,
G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954]
Waiver of Immunity
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is
implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to enable a person
to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government enters into a
contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver
is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim.
The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the
will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have held
that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its
non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.
As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. [United States vs.
Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]
Express Waiver of Immunity may only be done through Legislative Act
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly,

but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative
body. [Festejo vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954]
Initiation of Action by the State Results in a Waiver of Immunity
The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms
of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action
13
against the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes
down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against
the state. [Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21,
1916]
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of
its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of
an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.
The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit
except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. [Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, November 21,
1991]
Absolute Theory vs. Restrictive Theory
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987];
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Restrictive Theory of State Immunity
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities
or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. [United States vs. Guinto, G.R. No.
76607, February 26, 1990]
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act. [United States vs. Ruiz, G.R. No.
L-35645, May 22, 1985]. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the
start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in
the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested
by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
Procedure for Invoking State Immunity by a Foreign State
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead

sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of
the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where
the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests
the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he,
14
in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only
the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion".
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-
employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent
the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to
make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the
"suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
Suability vs. Liability
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy
to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. [Merritt vs. Government of
Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]
Extent of Waiver of Immunity
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent
to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its
immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if
it can, that the State has a liability.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action ònly up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." [Republic vs. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671,
November 28, 1973]
Public Funds Cannot Be Garnished to Enforce the Liability of the State
Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had

accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion,
speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus:
"A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of
public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the
creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the
State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment
would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
15
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in

garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason
which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it." [Republic vs. Villasor, G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]
Immunity Does Not Extend to Government Owned and Controlled Corporations
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As
a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision
that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause
of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by
petitioners. [Rayo vs. CFI of Bulacan, G.R. No. L-55273-83, December 19, 1981]
Government Agencies Performing Governmental Functions are Covered by the

Immunity
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality,

the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.) Any suit,
action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." The additional work it executes for
private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may be
deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing
said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general
governmental functions. [Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass.,
G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961]
Proprietary Functions which are Essential to the Governmental Functions do

not Divest the Government Agency of its Cloak of Immunity
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is
part of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of
its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is
governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles
and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602,
R. A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical
reasons said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and collected by
simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of
merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law.
Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the
merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs
premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre
operation.
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is

a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable
to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should
not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. [Mobil Phils. Exploration vs.
Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966]
16
Though Suable, Funds of the Local Government Units are Exempt from
Garnishment
It is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes
and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes,
and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject
to execution unless so declared by statute. [Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez, G.R.
No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which

are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy
a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes,
licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the
purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality,
are exempt from execution. [Mun. of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1,
1990]
Mandamus may lie to compel a Local Government Unit to Satisfy Judgments
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect
payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the
necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor. [Mun. of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990]
ARTICLE II – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 1
Good Intentions Cannot Justify Acts Done Without Authority from Law
Law defines power. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is
all the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for women
of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila
and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions
unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or
the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change
their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus
was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily
responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to comply with
the order of the court.
These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not
chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens. [Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919]
17
Section 2
By Incorporation, Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Automatically Become Laws of the Philippines
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles
of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two
Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. [Kuroda vs.
Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]
International Laws which are not Peremptory Norms May Only Find Application
in the Philippines by Transformation
The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced
by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the
assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to
traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by
the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; . . ." It is not for this
country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at
war with the principle of international morality. [Agustin vs. Edu, G.R. No. L-2662,
March 26, 1949]
Treaties May be Amended by Subsequent Legislation
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never
curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. [Ichong vs. Hernandez,
G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]
The Principle of Lex Posterior Derogat Priori Does not Apply to Executive
Agreements
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the
case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of
the United States. [Gonzales vs. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963]
Section 4
Compulsory Military Service is Constitutional
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service,

does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
18
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there
be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory
military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate
the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to
Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence
of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty,
and property of the citizen. Without violating the Constitution, a person may be
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and
even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the
army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. The
circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual
existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last
analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State,
whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need.
[People vs. Lagman, G.R. No. 45892, July 13, 1938]
Section 6
Concept of Religion
Theistic
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as
a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality,
its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. [Aglipay vs. Ruiz, G.R. No. 45459,
March 13, 1937]
Non-Theistic
Federal and state courts have expanded the definition of religion to include even
non-theistic beliefs such as Taoism or Zen Buddhism. It has been proposed that
basically, a creed must meet four criteria to qualify as religion under the First
Amendment. First, there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies
a central place in the believer’s life. Second, the religion must involve a moral code
transcending individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective. Third, a
demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the
truth or reasonableness of the belief. Fourth, there must be some associational
ties, although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person rather
than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause. [Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651,
August 4, 2003; June 22, 2006]
Reason for Separation
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of

church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of
this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the
history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to
both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. It is
almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom.
All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath
19
to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and
recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. [Aglipay vs. Ruiz, G.R.
No. 45459, March 13, 1937]
Characteristic of the Wall of Separation
The history of the religion clauses in the 1987 Constitution shows that these clauses
were largely adopted from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution xxxx
Philippine jurisprudence and commentaries on the religious clauses also
continued to borrow authorities from U.S. jurisprudence without articulating
the stark distinction between the two streams of U.S. jurisprudence [i.e.,
separation and benevolent neutrality]. One might simply conclude that the Philippine
Constitutions and jurisprudence also inherited the disarray of U.S. religion clause
jurisprudence and the two identifiable streams; thus, when a religion clause case
comes before the Court, a separationist approach or a benevolent neutrality
approach might be adopted and each will have U.S. authorities to support it. Or, one
might conclude that as the history of the First Amendment as narrated by the Court
in Everson supports the separationist approach, Philippine jurisprudence should
also follow this approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses’ history. As a result,
in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the face of a general law that
inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he faces an almost insurmountable wall
in convincing the Court that the wall of separation would not be breached if the Court
grants him an exemption. These conclusions, however, are not and were never
warranted by the 1987, 1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other
provisions on religion in all three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in
constitutional construction that the constitution must be interpreted as a whole and
apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner
that will give to all of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will be
ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent
neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine
constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the
constitution. [Estrada vs. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003; June 22,
2006]
Test to Determine Validity of Governmental Regulation Touching on the Wall

of Separation
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is
constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any
other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. The religious also
have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor

Relations Commission cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case.
The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are
beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the Austria case such as
"proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration
of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance." [Diocese of
Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015]
20
Jurisdiction of the Courts Over Intramural Religious Controversies
In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from
each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's." We have,
however, observed as early as 1928 that:
upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that

cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always
received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of
their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the
decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson
of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that,
in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow
themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members

of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. [Taruc vs. De la Cruz
[G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005]
In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that
in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which
the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
Section 10
Different Concepts of Social Justice
In Public Law
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number." [Calalang vs. Williams, G.R. No.
47800, December 2, 1940]
In Agrarian Law
It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed

with social function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but
of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." One governmental policy of
21
recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and
the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. [Almeda vs. CA, G.R. No.
L-43800, July 29, 1977]
Labor Law
Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle
of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able
legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social
justice in these cases is not equality but protection. [Ondoy vs. Ignacio, G.R. No. L-
47178, May 16, 1980]
Law on Obligations and Contracts
Social Justice provided for in Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under the Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The Social justice consecrated in our constitution
was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is
not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the Courts to grant.
[Salonga vs. Farrales, G.R. No. L-47088, July 10, 1981]
Section 11
The Right to Security is Separate and Independent from the Right to Liberty
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or
their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. [Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008]
Section 12
The Constitutional Guarantee of Protection to Life of the Unborn Starts from

Fertilization
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization. Webster's Third New International Dictionary
describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.
22
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the

Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress
from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins. [Imbong vs.
Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
The Constitution Does not Ban All Contraceptives
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based
on established evidence.
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible. [Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
Double Effect Principle
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor
is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author

of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-
effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the
child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict
situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he
can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or
the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence,
the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is
never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering

the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of
the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical
practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he
would be able to save. [Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]
23
Section 16
The Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology is Self Executing
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated
in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said
to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. [Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]
The Guarantee of a Balanced and Healthful Ecology Carries with it a Correlative

Duty on the Part of the Government
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty

of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which
recognize health as a fundamental human right. [Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. CA, G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]
Section 19
The Policy of Self Reliant Economy Does Not Mean International Seclusion
The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does

not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international
community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country

that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even
its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion;
rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business
or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies
should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. [Tanada vs.
Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997]
24
Section 21
The Imperfection of the Law Does not Make it Unconstitutional
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the
subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures
and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than
perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they
may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we
have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on
familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties.
This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to
use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so
we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot
expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we
struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have
unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil. [Association of Small
Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec. of DAR, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989]
The Constitution Allows Distribution Other Than Actual Distribution of Land
The wording of the provision is unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers

have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic
law allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct
transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely
accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is
the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. The
aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No
language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits
corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which
collective ownership can be exercised. The word “collective” is defined as “indicating
a number of persons or things considered as constituting one group or aggregate,”
while “collectively” is defined as “in a collective sense or manner; in a mass or body.”
By using the word “collectively,” the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land
and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition of the fact that
land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical
entities composed of farmers.
With the view We take of this case, the stock distribution option devised under Sec.
31 of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice
under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the landless
appears to be the dominant theme of that policy, We emphasize that Sec. 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does not constrict Congress to passing an
agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by farmers and
no other, or else the enactment suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the
intention were otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have worded said
section in a manner mandatory in character. [Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011]
Section 25
Autonomy of Local Governments Only Mean Decentralization
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the
power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative
but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of
25
local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does
not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
"Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution,
local governments can only be an intra-sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation,
it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only
mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government.
Decentralization of Power vs. Decentralization of Administration
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency. [Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989]
Associative Relationship with a Local Government Unit is Not Allowed by the

Constitution
An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish

durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.
In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used
as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws
as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to
any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
[Province of Cotabato vs. The Gov’t. of the RP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R.
No. 183591, October 14, 2008]
Section 26
The Guarantee of Equal Access to Opportunity to Public Service is not Sel-

Executing
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring “equal

access to opportunities for public office” is the claim that there is a constitutional
26
right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the
presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies
an interpretation of the sort.
The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,

entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article
are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the
policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts. [Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]
Section 28
Guarantee of Full Access to Transactions Involving Public Interest is a Self-

Executing Obligation
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the
duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be
provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the
access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State
policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III,
Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding
such as this one. [Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987]
Custodians Can Only Regulate the Disclosure of the Transactions, but Not to
Prohibit Outright Disclosure
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies
are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public
concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed
by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to
information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the
authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring
to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However,
the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to
prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss
of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the
custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that
the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with
it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse
outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation
upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature
may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the
27
government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public
records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right
by other persons shall be assured. [Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
72119, May 29, 1987]
Guarantee of Full Public Disclosure Extends to GOCCs
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding
upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created
by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed
pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
[Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
The Guarantee of Full Public Disclosure Does not Include the Duty To Demand
Copies, Abstracts or Summaries
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. [Valmonte
vs. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Concept
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. [Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with
pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle.
Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less." [In re: Manzano, A.M.
No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]
Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
28
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the

nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies
to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government. [Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
Political Question vs. Justiceable Question
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure"
A purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Before and after the ratification
and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as
the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.
[Casibang vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979]
Grave Abuse of Discretion
A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning.
It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave
abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. [Ongsiako
Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
29
DELEGATION OF POWER
Reason for Non-Delegation
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
potestas delegata non delegare potest. The classic statement of the rule is that of
Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of
his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through
the intervening mind of another. [People vs. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16,
1937]
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers
of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are
rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception. [Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633,
October 18, 1988]
Reason for Permissible Delegation
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation." [Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633,
October 18, 1988]
Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
30
or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known

as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law. [Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988]
The Standards May be Implied
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
a whole. [Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]
Delegated Tariff Powers May Be Delegated to the President for Revenue Raising
Purposes
Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may
take judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and
Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of
governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a
third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but still comparable
levels of revenue for the government — The Philippine Amusement and Games
Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates
are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and
for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name
given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax
assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." The
levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect
of protecting local industries — where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs
duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs
duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy
objective only. [Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992]
Limitations of the Emergency Powers of the President
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have
full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new
legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution
either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the
period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary
emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for
Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet
with the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override
the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might
delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by
a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the
law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may
not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative
delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and
abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated
31
powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . ." [Araneta

vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]
Under the 1935 Constitution, Delegated Emergency Powers Cease When the
Congress Meets in Regular Session
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive when
Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would
be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and
simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency
powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session
and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated.
Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the
President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the
same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became
inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In
setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we are giving effect to the
purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress
may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may
designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power
of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the
organic law. [Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]
Withdrawal of Emergency Powers Does Require a Law
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby
become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of
the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To
contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead
to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its
powers by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third
vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the
trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in
eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest. Rodriguez vs. Gella [G.R. No. L-6266,
February 2, 1953]
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1
While Comprehensive, the Powers of Congress Remains Limited
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in
the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
32
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore
of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive
and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself
and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations
are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. [Pimentel.
Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008]
Section 3
The Qualifications of the Members of Congress are Exclusive
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon
and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be,

as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. [Pimentel. Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008]
Section 5
District Representatives
Composition of the House of Representative May be Increased
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,
Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members
is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional. [Tobias vs. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8,
1994]
Reapportionment of Legislative Districts May Be Made Through Special Law
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as

in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members,
33
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No.
7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
[Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]
The Power to Reapportion Legislative District Cannot be Exercised by COMELEC
On the basis of their extensive debate, the Constitutional Commission denied to the
COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the phrase "minor
adjustments" was again clarified in the debates of the Commission. That consistent
with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance
did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the
respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
"apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created...."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated
section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte. [Montejo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995]
The Minimum Population for Cities Only Applies for the First Apportionment
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census
stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
[Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]
Initial and Subsequent Apportionment of Legislative Districts for Provinces Do

not Require a Minimum Population
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum

population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase
its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
34
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population. [Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010]
Party List Representatives
Four Inviolable Parameters of the Party List
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and

Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the

determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives

———————————— x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that

Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus,
even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" 22 to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.
35
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the

seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single
group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if
not the entire House.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
[Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000]
Panganiban Formula for Distribution of Seats Reserved to Party List System
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two -percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total
of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal
to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less
than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional
seat.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The
formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Panganiban Formula was Expressly Abandoned
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution
of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives."
36
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation
of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of
the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate
is entitled. [BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179171, APRIL 21, 2009]
Old Guidelines in Determining Participation in the Party-List System
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In
other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Third, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA

7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association

organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations

relating to elections;
37
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or

fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.”
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or
an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list
system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be

nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines
for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party
or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-

five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized
and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency,

the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
New Guidelines in the Party List System
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
38
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent

the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have
at least one nominee who remains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]
Other Sectors May Be Represented Aside From Those Listed in the Law
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Religion Cannot be the Basis of Disqualification
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. [Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]
Questions on the Qualifications of Party List Representatives Still Rests on the

HRET
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list

representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights,
salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly
benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.
39
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives
no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. [Palparan v. HRET, G.R.
No. 189506, February 11, 2010]
Failure to Participate in the Two Preceding Elections should be taken separately

from the Failure to Obtain 2% of the Votes
The law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word “or” is
a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the
other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of
the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure
to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a
party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by
default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused
interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture
or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a
strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not
within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive
interpretation of the law. [Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 190529, April 29, 2010]
Effect of the Change of Computation in BANAT
We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-
list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot
now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last
two elections. In other words, the application of this disqualification should
henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last
party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The
disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it registered.
The COMELEC cannot Withhold the List of Nominees
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for
the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it
40
extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in
the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the
absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the
party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure
aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007
elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
[Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 24, 2007]
Section 6
Residence is Synonymous with Domicile in Election Law
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual

to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile. [Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]
Conditions for Losing Domicile of Origin
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Mere Residence, which is not equivalent to Domicile, is Not Enough
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when
it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this
deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs.
Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular
district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him
to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either
had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
41
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually
was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second
Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same. [Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,
1995]
Citizenship Must Be Possessed at the Time Term of Office Begins
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public

office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure
that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern
or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on
June 30, 1995—the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,
even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted
that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the
time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
insists? Literally, such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in
the case of age and residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or
elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of his term — in this case, on June 30, 1995. [Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
120295, June 28, 1996]
Section 7
The Congress May, by Law, Shorten the Tenure of the Members of Congress,
but not the Term
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As
succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended

or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which
an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may
be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will
not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs.
Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short
his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to
serve its unexpired portion. [Dimaporo vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991]
42
Section 11
Reason for the Grant of Immunity of Speech
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the
motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country
and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides
of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts,
can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity. [Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25,
2009]
Requirements for the Application of Parliamentary Immunity of Speech
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of

their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. [Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. 15905,
August 3, 1966]
Members of Congress May Be Held Liable by the House to which they Belong
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause
1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the
43
practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the Congress of the United

States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to
the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts
or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or

could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of
their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of
informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment,
suspension or expulsion. [Osmeña vs. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28,
1960]
Section 13
Forfeiture of Congressional Seat Due Acceptance of Incompatible Occurs When

the Member of Congress Takes An Oath to the Incompatible Office and Starts
to Discharge the Functions Thereof
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official

voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law,
— which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — ,
qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and
enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly
created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former
appointment, and he cannot question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which he was last appointed. He is excepted from said rule only when his non-
acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is
compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies. [Zandueta vs. De la Costa, G.R.
No. 46267, November 28, 1938]
Section 14
Indirect Intervention in a Pending Case is Included in the Disqualification
The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances, there had been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before any administrative body" which is a
circumvention of the prohibition under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, held that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities
and Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said constitutional
prohibition.
Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Estanislao Fernandez in the quo warranto case filed before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in the
subject company, representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares.
He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on
May 25, 1979 before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved
to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing perhaps,
the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed
before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for
defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts
44
and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body" and in our opinion, that
is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or implied prohibited. [Puyat vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 51122, March 25,
1982]
Section 16
The Required Number to Elect a Senate President
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority
vote of all its members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of
"majority" and "minority", as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue
that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of
senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no
such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the
minority leader belongs.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to
a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater
than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words of the
subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the
votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the "minority," in the said body.
And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than
the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader. [Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]
Difference Between Majority of All The Members of the House, and Majority of
the House
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the
members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. [Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
2821, March 4, 1949]
Rules of Each House May be Disregarded; Exception
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
45
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In

Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where
the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members
of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved. [Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]
What Constitutes Disorderly Behavior is Purely Political Question
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive

constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many
arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted
in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing,
if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in
such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.
"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the state Senate
is given the power to expel a member, the courts will not review its action or revise
even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." [Osmeña vs. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144,
October 28, 1960]
Members of the Congress under R.A. 3019
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution
in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the
order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of Congress.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
46
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order. [Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April
18, 2001]
The Speaker of the House May Be Held in Contempt for Refusal to Implement
an Order of Suspension of the Members of Congress
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan in G.R. No. 118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent
the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses
or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before
the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the
Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a
penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. expired on June
30, 1988.This rendered moot and academic the instant case. [De Venecia vs.
Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002]
The Contents of the Legislative Journal are Conclusive Upon the Courts
From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as
those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of
the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the
Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands
of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment
apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the expiration of
the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the
clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as
compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon entertain oral
evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the
treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy
led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken for
all, and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain
and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private
individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters." [U.S. vs. Pons, G.R. No.
11530, August 12, 1916]
Enrolled Bill Shall Prevail Over Legislative Journal on Questions on the

Provisions of the Law
47
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct

and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner
contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea
formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses
the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive —
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. [Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963]
Enrolled Bills Are Conclusive Both in Contents and Proceedings
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid)
case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature

when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify
that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of
the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy. [Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993]
Section 17
Extent of Authority of the Electoral Tribunals
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended
to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution
(Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A.,
48
1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed,
the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission
in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would
the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with
the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then
be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking
cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render
that authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly has chosen to
act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in
procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the
entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire
abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted. [Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]
Decisions of the Electoral Tribunals are Not Appealable
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions
pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they
may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies
to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time and again
been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988,
thus:
"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the Power by the Electoral
Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
ìntended to be complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally
in the legislature'. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as 'full, clear and complete'. Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission The
same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review of decisions
or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only
in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . .
upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was
rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or, paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes
a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." [Robles
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990]
The Power to Appoint Members of the Electoral Tribunals Representing Each

House Rests on the Respective Houses
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,

within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET
49
and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate
and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal. [Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 141489, November 29, 2002]
Members of the Electoral Tribunals Representing Each House are Not Required
to Inhibit Even if They Are Involved in the Controversy
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended
that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when
it held that said provision ". . . is a clear expression of an intent that all (such)
contests . . . shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers
in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that the constitutional
provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision
of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of Senators
to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 —
an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting
the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative
but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all 24 Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will
be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members
of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
50
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election

contest. [Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988]
Members of the Electoral Tribunals representing Each House Enjoy Security of

Tenure
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the

framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce
if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence — even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership
in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member
may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of
this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member
of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for
a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure. [Bondoc vs. Pineda,
G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991]
Pre-Proclamation Controversies Are Not Allowed in the Election of the Members

of Congress
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that "pre-proclamation cases
(are) not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors
in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must
appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
[Chavez vs. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315 (1992)]
Conditions Before the Electoral Tribunals Acquire Jurisdiction Over the

Elections, Returns and Qualifications of the Members of Congress
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
51
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives. As to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction
as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. [Ongsiako Reyes vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]
Section 18
Proportional Representation Allows Rounding Up for the House of

Representatives
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was

based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership
(which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out
to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the
LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.
There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties therein." [Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990]
Proportional Representation Does Not Allow Rounding Up for the Senate
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments

by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance
with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the
same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall
be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make
a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the
LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character

and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or
disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a
majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer
force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
52
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power.
No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to
elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a
greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more
power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution
of its rightful membership in the Commission.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected
senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to

the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires
is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the
Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman
or a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it".
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution.
Among these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their functions so long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten
(10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists. [Guingona vs.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992]
Section 21
The Power to Conduct Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is Inherent in Congress
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of

Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process
to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed. [Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]
Valid Subject of Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in

Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
53
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in

connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They
may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution,
such as to legislate or to expel a member.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not

really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or
not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. [Bengzon vs. Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991]
Mere Filing of Criminal Complaint Does Not Divest Congress of its Power to
Conduct Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or an administrative investigation. [Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate
Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007]
Each House May Issue Contempt Order in the Exercise of its Power to Conduct
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain
the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent
to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within
the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department’s
authority to be full and complete, independently of each other’s authority or
power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body
must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is
impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with affronts committed against its
authority or dignity.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt
is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government
vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert
its authority and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as
it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign
character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches
of government.
The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to congress the power to punish its
Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any other person.
54
But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative
field than either the congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it
is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would
be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded. It is necessary for us to do so in this case. Suffice it to say it must be
coextensive with the range of the legislative power. [Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No.
L-3820, July 18, 1950]
Appearance in Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is Mandatory
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch
may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled,
is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper
subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are
one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction
involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being
related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the
transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch,
it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded
on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed
by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation
on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information
and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. [Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006]
The President Cannot Prevent Executive Officials in Attending Inquires in Aid

of Legislation
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. [Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
Executive Privilege Applies to Information, and not to a Person except the

President
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of
the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public
official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit
of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information
between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming
policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency
under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations.
It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because
55
it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of

governmental powers. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, [G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008]
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines
it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has

encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is
customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to
speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may
be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be
asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or
legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by
U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of
such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives.
Another variety is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to
disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers
charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal
deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts

the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or
organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and
extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to
an appropriate exercise of the executive' domestic decisional and policy making
functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-
governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily

mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the
validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether
the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also
whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. [Senate vs.
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
The President May Prevent Members of the Armed Forces to Attend Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation in the Exercise of his Military Powers
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18,

Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines . . ." Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian
law.
Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President
has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
56
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which
seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military
official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by
the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded
by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute. [Gudani vs. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]
No Law May be Enacted Exempting any Person From the Authority of the
Congress to Conduct Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant

with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from
the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. [In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L.
Sabio, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006]
Rules of Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Must Be Published Every Three Years in

A newspaper of General Circulation
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate
or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall
take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry
be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in
each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same
shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
57
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish
the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject
of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution. [Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December
23, 2008]
Section 22
Question Hour; Concept Of
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez
bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the
appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the
Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the
provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft
down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide

and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained
to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct
inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide's only concern was that the
two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being
complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical
functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a

definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the
Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation
of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period.
There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which
made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also
members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
58
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate

accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they
enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform
more fully to a system of separation of powers. 88 To that extent, the question hour,
as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of
the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in
a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless
to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of
a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
[Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]
Section 24
It is the Bill, Not the Law That Must Originate from the House of
Representatives
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems
from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment
of such laws.
To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility
of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point,
what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may
be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur
with amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate. [Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115544,
August 25, 1994]
A Bill That is Required to Be Initiated with the House of Representatives May

be Filed with the Senate in Anticipation of the Bill from the Lower House
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional

prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the
Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners
themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April
18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817
59
was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243.
Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated
in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy. [Alvarez vs. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996]
Section 25
Rider in An Appropriation Bill
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was a non-appropriation item

inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition
against 'riders' to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision
contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject expressed
in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject. [Garcia
vs. Mata, G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975]
Lump Sum Appropriation is Not Prohibited by the Constitution
We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and
needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its execution stage.
Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal
administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of offices,
particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance
budgeting to enable them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet
established work goals under changing conditions.128 In particular, the power to
transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that
may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in
the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds
pursuant to the GAAs, particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum
accounts. It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility
when the GAAs provide broader appropriation items. This flexibility comes in the form
of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase. The DAP
– as a strategy to improve the country’s economic position – was one policy that the
President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be

counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power, Prof. Louis Fisher, an American
constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy, has justified
extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:
“The impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be

resisted. There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays
by administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators.
Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in
advance of expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in
trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly
undergoing change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete
and mistaken the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation
stage. It is not practicable for Congress to adjust to each new
development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills.
60
Were Congress to control expenditures by confining administrators to

narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of the purse
but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and complexities
of public policy require executive discretion for the sound management
of public funds.
The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial

discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed
toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be
discretion, but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities
established by Congress.” [Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R. No. 209135, July 1,
2014]
Budget Re-Alignment; Concept
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within
their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their
offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of powers among the three
main branches of the Government. The Court has recognized this, and emphasized
so in Bengzon v. Drilon, viz:
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman

must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of
their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints
on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the
independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of
our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another
within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has
emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the American Governors-
General. Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the Governor-General to direct any
unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular
Treasury and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned
thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine Legislature, was the first
enabling law that granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The
authority was without any limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the Governor-
General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office
to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for
that bureau or office. [Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R. No. 209135, July 1, 2014]
Requirements for Valid Budget Re-Alignment
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be
made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the

appropriations for their respective offices; and
61
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices. [Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R.
No. 209135, July 1, 2014]
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted
under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer
funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
[Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987]
Cross-Border Augmentations are Not Allowed by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for
their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over
to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus,
we call such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the
entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary,
with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to
their respective Chairpersons. [Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R. No. 209135, July 1, 2014]
Savings Cannot Be Used for an Activity Not Included in The Appropriation
No funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA.
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer
should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations law for the respective
offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or
degree. [Syjuco vs. Abad, G.R. No. 209135, July 1, 2014]
Necessity if Re-Alignment May be Made by a Member of Congress, but Subject

to Approval of the Senate President or Speaker of the House of Representatives
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into
expenditures for salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits,
maintenance expenses and other operating expenses. In turn, each member of
Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a proportionate share of the
appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item
of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item
to another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92),
claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI of the Constitution.
62
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an
appropriation act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of

Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994,
which provides:
"Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the

Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure
items authorized in this Act and other appropriation laws unless in cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution." (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized
to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings
in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so
because they are the ones who know whether there are deficiencies in other items of
their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval, these two officials
will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items
of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items
of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
[Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]
Legislative Veto of Serious Constitutionality
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the "congressional or
legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the
legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a
form of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The
form may be either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or
affirmative, requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents a
significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the executive to shared
administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The
Executive on a Leash, 56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of

separation of powers.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What

Congress cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to
the exercise of that power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief) through
provisions in the appropriation law." [Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105,
August 19, 1994]
63
Executive Impoundment; When Allowed
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an

administrative embargo of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's
command to dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair
or withhold expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the
Appropriations Act nor other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No.
113888, pp. 15-16).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound
is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever
reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard
Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress
has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes
mandatory on the part of the President to implement the project and to spend the
money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the matter, for the
Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the

authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either
expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which
ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President
desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An
example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project,
substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President
to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law.
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that
would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle
for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law
considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a
provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws, in
this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. [Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.
113105, August 19, 1994]
Section 26
Purpose of One Subject of Every Bill, Which Must be Stated in the Title
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation;
(2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through
such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of
legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. [Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]
64
Rule on Sufficiency of Title
The Constitutional requirements with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to

reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed
in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content.
[Philconsa vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965]
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object."
The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should
be given a practical rather than technical construction. [Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory
Board, G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]
The Subject of the Bill Must be Stated in the Title, and Not the Effect of the Bill
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that
if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions
of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title,
but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted
to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included
in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by
which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such
matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the
title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the
title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal
of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new
statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to
conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished
thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and
not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title. As observed in one case, if the title of an
act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other
act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new
act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.
65
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law. [Philconsa vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-
23326, December 18, 1965]
Certification of Bills Dispenses with the Separate Readings and Printing of Bills
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
"except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless"
clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only
violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except"
clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified
in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as
to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether
doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days
before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the
convening of Congress in emergency session. [Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,
G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]
No-Amendment on the Third Reading Applies Only to the Proceedings of Both

Houses and not to the Bicameral Conference Committee
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure
to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said
respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its
concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe
any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity
as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec.
26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited. [ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1,
2005]
Section 27
Kinds of Veto Power of the President
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would
result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred
to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto
over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified,
the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other
words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
66
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to
approve the remaining portion of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and
first came into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August
1916. This was followed by the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar provision
in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto power was made more expansive
by the inclusion of this sentence:
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items

of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same
time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates . . ."
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the President's veto power to include the
veto of item or items of revenue and tariff bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact
form, thus:
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object."
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI,
Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official
concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a
provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a
disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated
purpose. The United States Supreme Court declared "that an 'item' of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation
of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill."
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section
27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent
of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not
changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term,
a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. [Gonzales vs.
Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]
Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions"
67
fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved
or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them,
resort will have to be made to the original recommendations made by the President
and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget
Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed
Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently,
Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled as "provisions," are
actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of
the President's veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)
"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional
powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive
the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief
executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill
matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's
constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be
abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing 'items' of
expenditure essential to the operation of government. The legislature
cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor
can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation
by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the
legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more
willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe
on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive
legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the
constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we
hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a
general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for
purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation
bills.
". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to

encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling
measure,' special interest provisions which could not succeed if
separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation
incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." [Gonzales vs.
Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]
The President May Not Exercise His Veto Power to Invalidate an Existing Law
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no

President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his
or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and
executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices
which privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by
Republic Act No. 3595.
68
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which
repealed Republic Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of
pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored
through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of
Justices and Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed
provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and budget
advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions is the 1992
General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990
veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P. D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P. D. No. 644
was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be
effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced from 1957 to 1975,
so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also produce
any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain
provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic
Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1797 never
achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]
Section 28
Concept of the Power of Taxation
It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider scope, The
reason was so clearly set forth by retired Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,'
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities
that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times." Hence the need for more revenues. The
power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance
of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To paraphrase a
recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain
availability is of the essence.
The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an attribute of
sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of government." It is, of course, to
be admitted that for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are
restrictions. The Constitution sets forth such limits. Adversely affecting as it does
property rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses may properly be
invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If
it were otherwise, there would -be truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall
that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." In a separate opinion in Graves
v. New York, Justice Frankfurter, after referring to it as an, unfortunate remark
characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric [attributable to] the intellectual fashion of
the times following] a free use of absolutes." This is merely to emphasize that it is
not and there cannot be such a constitutional mandate. Justice Frankfurter could
rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was
69
brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmes pen: 'The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this Court sits." So it is in the Philippines. [Sison vs. Ancheta,
G.R. No. L-59431, July 25, 1984]
Uniformity and Equality of Taxation
"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of
property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ...
As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained of "conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform." There is quite a similarity then to
the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally
to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation."
It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is
that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." That same
formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal protection clause is, of
course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the ideal of the laws benefits
being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene and
impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. There is,
however, wisdom, as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The
equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality.
[Sison vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. L-59431, July 25, 1984]
To be Exempt from Real Property Tax, the Property Must be Actually, Directly
and Exclusively Used For Religious Purposes
Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the
provisions of the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the
tax exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference.
Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The
present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and
improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and
"directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded
differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly taken into
consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words
"actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be proof therefore of the actual
and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable
purposes to be exempt from taxation. "From 1906, in Catholic Church v. Hastings to
1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it has been
the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is
never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris." [Province of Abra vs. Hernando,
G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981]
For Tax Exemption, Actual, Direct and Exclusive Use Includes Incidental
70
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as
provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use
of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of
the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use,
which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose — educational, the lease of
the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. [Abra Valley
College vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]
Section 29
Automatic Budget Allocation is Allowed by the Constitution
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes

any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made by law,' such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made
impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act
or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An
appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly
appears from the language employed, whether in the past or in the present."
[Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991]
Reversion to the General Fund Applies only to Special Fund Collected in the
Exercise of Power of Taxation
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power
of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98
Phil. 148). The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar
industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz
v. Araneta, supra).
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters
and producers for a special purpose — that of 'financing the growth and development
of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market
including the foreign market.' The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys
pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are
held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR
535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the
revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the
statute, 'administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of
the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution,
Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). 17
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by the
fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the
Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an
71
appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1)." (emphasis supplied.)
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they
are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF
is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is
segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as
a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and
review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without
precedent. [Osmeña vs. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993]
Section 32
Difference between Initiative and Referendum
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making
by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their
elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex
than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or
"No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as
"powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them,
or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in
this Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the
counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed
legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several
autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be
exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to
the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative". [Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125416,
September 26, 1996]
ARTICLE VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1
Extent of the Powers of the President
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested
in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define
what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to
Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].
72
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government
and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what
is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated. [Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211,
September 15, 1989]
Residual Powers
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace
and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean
that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing
a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from
another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the
President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common
good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything
not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand
[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve
and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The
American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the
President. [Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]
Immunity of the President from Suit
The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. The
principle of non-liability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has
no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of
his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would
mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly
abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must
submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like
the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally
mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance
73
of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is
properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any
person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is
assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal
or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The
thing which the judiciary cannot do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can
a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may not be
personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official.
On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly
that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such
liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is
held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he
actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question
of his authority. If he decides wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of
his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position,
might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain
that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he
acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer
for the consequences of his act.
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on
executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was
amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17,
Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter,
no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President

referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office
by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its
framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution,
(but reverted back to the Case Law privilege prior to the 1935 Constitution.) [Estrada
vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, March 2, 2001]
Executive Immunity May be Waived by the President
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President
74
is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by
the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. [Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R.
No. 82585, November 14, 1988]
Section 4
The COMELEC cannot Make “Unofficial Count” for Presidential and Vice
Presidential Elections
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and
totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official
canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with
more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes. [Brillantes
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004]
Section 13
Disqualifications of the President and his Official Family
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other
public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the
1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and
to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that
Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article
IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution
as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to
Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the
75
rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any
other office or position in the government during their tenure. [Civil Liberties Union
vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]
The Disqualification Also Applies to Appointments in Acting Capacity
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the
Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.

The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members
of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government
or in government-owned or government controlled-corporations was concerned. In
this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the
actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language
of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the
appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective
of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the
veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification
of officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power
of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.” [Funa
v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013]
Exception in the Disqualification
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section
13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. To
characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among which
are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the
Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense,
Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would
then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited. [Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]
Section 15
Reason for Prohibition on Midnight Appointments
Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at
noon at December 30, 1961. But it is common sense to believe that after the
76
proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-
taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare of the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate
had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use his powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filing up of
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance
of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them a few
hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to
make the corresponding appointments. [Aytona vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-19313,
January 19, 1962]
Two Appointments Prohibited by Section 15
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the
so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the
proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P.
Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker"
administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President." [In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela
and Hon. Vallarta, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998.]
The Appointment Ban Does not Apply to the Judiciary
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement
of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of
what the Constitution should contain.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall – an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced – should not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
77
of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to

the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated
by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII
prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such
interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the
Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15
as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the leading
case of Aytona v. Castillo.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we
have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend
the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the
JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments
in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments
to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from
such defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is
axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the
enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable
light on “the law of the statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should
seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the
establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level
backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being
recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the
JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the
intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent
from the Aytona midnight appointment. [De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R.
No. 191002, March 17, 2010]
Section 16
Appointment vs. Designation
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of
Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
78
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while
designation is legislative in nature. [Binamira vs. Garucho, G.R. No. 92008, July 30,
1990]
Appointments Which Require Confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted,
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others
not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision,
the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on
whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth
groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
[Sarmiento vs. Mison, G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987]
Appointments That Do Not Need Confirmation Remain So, Even if the President
Voluntarily Submits the Same to the Commission on Appointments
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among the
positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of
the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the

Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself,
unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested
by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointment.
79
Respondent Commission vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's

appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is one that, under
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the
President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit
such appointment to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief
in this contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President
(with Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power boundaries, in the
Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.
The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional Law,
to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency,
or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on
Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The evident
constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of
appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter acting
through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale
is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent that the
Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the
participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution
mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission
on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the
Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution
cannot be sustained.
Under this heading, we will assume, ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive may
voluntarily allow the Commission on Appointments to exercise the power of review
over an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in the President.
Yet, as already noted, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17
December 1988 to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with
the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of
her duties after taking her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the
subject position which, under the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, was then and there a
complete and finished act, which, upon the acceptance by Bautista, as shown by her
taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office, installed
her, indubitably and unequivocally, as the lawful Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights for a term of seven (7) years. There was thus no vacancy in the subject
office on 14 January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact,
there is no vacancy in said office to this day.
To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding oneself that day is night just because
the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive questions
of constitutional law raised by petitioner, the records clearly show that petitioner
came to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any indication of abandoning
her petition. [Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989]
The Congress Cannot Expand the List of Officers Whose Appointments are
Subject to Confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third
groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC
are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To
the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
80
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President. [Calderon vs. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992]
While the Congress Can Provide the Qualifications of the Appointee, It Cannot
do so in such a Way that the Congress Identifies the Specific Person
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the
appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext
of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power
as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick
his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can
only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion
of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the
power of appointment. [Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]
Ad Interim Appointments Apply only to Appointments That Require

Confirmation
Nor can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-
appointment on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the
Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely
for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim
appointments. [Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989]
Ad Interim Appointment is Permanent Appointment
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself
makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis. [Matibag vs.
Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002]
81
Section 17
Control vs. Supervision
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this,
and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision. [Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994]
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and
those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be
extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable
execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities
in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines,
plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority
of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such
agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically
but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of
reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and
inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to them. [Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez, G.R. No. 85439,
January 13, 1992]
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government
in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential
type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article
VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. [Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, G.R. No. 46570, April 21, 1939]
82
The President May Not Be Deprived of His Power to Review the Decision of
Executive Officers
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of

constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is,
that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them;
his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow
appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President. This Court has recognized
this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved
by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's on appeal. In
other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered
a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all
administrative remedies.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control
simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." [Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño,
G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967]
Powers vested to Heads of Executive Departments May be Directly exercised

by the President
Since it is the Director of Lands who has direct executive control among others in the
lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of the public domain
subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the President of the
Philippines has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc.,
the President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to dispose of
portions of the public domain as his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter
ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. [City of Iligan vs. Director
of Lands, G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988]
The Power of Control May Be Exercised on the Act, but Not on the Actor
The extent of the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all
officers and employees in the executive department was interpreted by this Court in
the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104 Phil., 175 to mean "the power of an officer to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter", to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the
actor or agent himself of the act. [Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-17169,
November 30, 1963]
President’s Control Power Covers GOCCs
We hold that the President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the
decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position
in the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement falls within the constitutional power
83
of the President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our
governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the government, such as
the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices, which are
administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic
Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive
Department" and who "shall be responsible to the President of the Philippines under
whose control his functions . . . shall be exercised." (Executive Order No. 386 of
December 22, 1950; section 1, issued under the Reorganization Act of 1950).
[National Marketing Corp. vs. Arca, G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969]
Take Care Power
The Power to Create Fact Finding Committee is Included in the Take Care
Power of the President
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine
if laws have been faithfully executed.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he
can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited,
this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the
PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the
Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because
the direction of the political winds have changed. [Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]
Section 18
Areal Saturation Drive is Within the Military Powers of the President
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the
express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct
concerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be
consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by
such actions.
84
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief
Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated
criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution
grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual
liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State.
However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The
Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems
both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are
not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections
which are their distinguishing features. [Guazon vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 80508,
January 30, 1990]
Court Martial Pertains to the President in the exercise of His Military Powers
Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for
the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional
functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation."
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they
are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring
to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the
government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and
making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: 'These provisions
show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military
and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and
that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article
of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed that the
two powers are entirely independent of each other.'
"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial
must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.' (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents; 2d Edition, p. 49.)
Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must
never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the
Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." [Ruffy vs. Chief of
Staff, G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]
Military Court Martial Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Civilians
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused
stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among
others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution,
in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive
or military process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are
called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. As explained by Justice
Teehankee in his separate dissenting opinion —
". . . Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses under
general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or
military process.
"Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme

Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial
power exists only in the courts, which have 'exclusive power to hear and
85
determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a

citizen.'
"Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we under a military

government and even on the premise that martial law continues in force,
the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly
functioning. . . .
"And in Toth v. Quarles, the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that
'the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial
law.'
"The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out . . ., in ruling that discharged
army veterans (estimated to number more than 22.5 million) could not
be rendered 'helpless before some latter-day revival of old military
charges' and subjected to military trials for offenses committed while
they were in the military service prior to their discharge, that 'the
presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and undiminished salary and
nurture by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.
Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military
trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of the possibility of
influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes
it, selects its members and the counsel on both sides and who usually
has direct command authority over its members is a pervasive one in
military law, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.'
"The late Justice Black . . . added that '(A) Court-Martial is not yet an
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline
is preserved,' and that ex servicemen should be given 'the benefits of a
civilian court trial when they are actually civilians . . . Free countries of
the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among
troops in active service.' "
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government

and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature
for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those
of his authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of
powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual
should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary.
It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are
regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of martial
law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians
for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts.
To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of
the civilian concerned. [Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54558,
May 22, 1987]
86
Court Martial Does Not Apply to the Members of the PNP
Republic Act No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP), which took effect
on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. — Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving PNP
members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided,
That the courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall
continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned, to include
appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth
Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended by Executive Order
No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, that
criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon
the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor
or municipal trial court judge." [Quiloña vs. General Court Martial, G.R. No. 96607,
March 4, 1992]
Calling Out Power of the President and Power to Declare a State of Rebellion
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of

"graduated powers." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion,
and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "these conditions are not required in
the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with
Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive power
shall be vested in the President. . . ." As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same
Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The provisions
trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-
in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together
with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to
address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or
the integrity of the State.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a

declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice
to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon
the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court's
mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents,
the declaration is deemed not written. [SANLAKAS vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004]
87
Section 19
A Condition that the Pardonee Shall Not Violate Any Law Does Not require
Conviction to Constitute Violation Thereof
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution
of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the
criminal law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has
breached his undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his
original sentence. The consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of
an ascertained breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional
pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted
by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was
charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed
upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has
chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. [Torres vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
76872, July 23, 1987]
Effects of Absolute Pardon
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the
offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his
criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt.
But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a `new
man', and às innocent as if he had never committed the offense;' is to ignore the
difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense
is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment,
though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society
than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him
following his conviction."
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which
has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would
explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for
lost earnings and benefits. [Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9,
1989]
88
The Grant of Pardon Does Not result in the Automatic Withdrawal of the
Pending Appeal
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent
the President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power.
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands
that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept
unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by
final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even without the
knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom he, in good
faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be denied that
under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had unimpeded
power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under the
1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at
any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either
case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration
of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction
of the trial or appellate court. Where the President is not so prevented by the
Constitution, not even Congress can impose any restriction to prevent a presidential
folly. Hence, nothing but a change in the constitutional provision consisting in the
imposition of "conviction by final judgment" requirement can change the rule. The
new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask
for the withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought
to finality. [People vs. Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995]
Executive Clemency May Be Granted in Administrative Cases
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the
same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the
coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses. [Llamas vs. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991]
The Grant of Pardon on the Administrative Case Based on The Innocence of

the Pardonee Obliterates the Administrative Liability
Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual to
whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly established the general
rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase
the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the
89
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back
lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains
his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled
to back wages.
But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not
been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because
he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial
court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he was
dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of
proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency
to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement by the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the

adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty
and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby
directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back

wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and
to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from
the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive
clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is
afforded to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated
or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is no doubt that
petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back
wages. [Garcia vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993]
Section 21
Treaty Making Power of the President
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. 13 In the realm
of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
90
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered
into by the executive.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By
requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary
in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth. [Pimentel vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005]
Executive Agreements Do Not Need the Concurrence of the Senate
The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the
making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which
are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements", which may be
validly entered into without such concurrence.
"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the

approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.
". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations,
most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity
of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. [Commissioner
of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading [G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961]
The Senate Does not Ratify Treaties, It Only Concurs
Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine

representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the
treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the diplomatic mission.
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held
to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,
1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its
ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine
representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and
forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the
President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the
same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to
render it effective.
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
91
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound
by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the
responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure
that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of
states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless
and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a
treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to
ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on
substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other
state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a
writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue
the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate. [Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6,
2005]
ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1
Nature of Judicial Power
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the
rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task.
From the above-quoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be gleaned that before
a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary
that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom
is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed With power and
authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is
nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to
assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors,
such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are
therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Worse still,
this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of
the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the
composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance
92
of that committee's duties. [Santiago vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-25024. March 30,
1970]
The Congress May define the Jurisdiction of Various Courts
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the
Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual
controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government"
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing
restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any
assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out
"the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations
and/or the assets thereof" (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by
Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the
system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts
over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to
the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by
them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority
and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an
injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
[Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 86540-41, November 6, 1989]
Section 3
The Veto Power Cannot Be Exercised to deprive the Supreme Court its Fiscal
Autonomy
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to
use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of
benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of
fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
We cannot overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary.
The Court has on various past occasions explained the significance of judicial
independence.
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums
93
as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of

their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the
Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations
is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant
reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should
cease to be a meaningless provision. [Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April
15, 1992]
Section 4
Composition of the Divisions of the Supreme Court is Internal in Character
What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division
which deliberated on private respondents' motions for reconsideration and by a
majority vote reversed the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More
specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the
chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division
should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice
Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the
Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to state that
the change in the membership of the three divisions of the Court with inevitable by
reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal
matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In fact, the
current "staggered" set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that
adopted in 1988. In the year, the Court's Third Division was likewise chaired by then
Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by the next
senior Justices — Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively. [Limketkai Sons
Milling, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996]
Section 5
Trial Court Must be Careful in Deciding Constitutional Questions

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in
the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action
has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged
with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
94
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative
or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out
of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation
by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who
participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty
of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that
the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the
requipped majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. [Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No.
112497, August 4, 1994]
Rules of Court Will Take Precedence Over Laws on Matters of Procedure
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91
because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot
be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article
82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal
can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this
Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI
should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of
this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal,
i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal. [First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 110571, March 10,
1994]
COMELEC Cannot Promulgate Rules Governing Proceedings Before the Courts

of Justice
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.
Section 6
Complaints Against Judges Must First Be Referred to the Supreme Court
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power
of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
95
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and
court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted
to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over
all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such
a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on
this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
[Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993]
Required Quantum Of Evidence if Administrative Cases Against Judges
The rules even in an administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should
be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented
against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary,
to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be
faulted, it should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no
less. This is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought
is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general
rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. [Raquiza vs.
Castañeda, Jr., A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]
Section 10
Salaries of Judges are Subject to Tax
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate
of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only
to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into
the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must
be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the
people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
96
share the burden of general income taxation equitably. [Nitafan vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]
Section 11
Not All Disciplinary Cases Need to Be Heard En Banc
At any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that
there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that
"the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and
decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be
explained.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon
and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the
Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled
"Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of
various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,

officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than
one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the
aforequoted provision was maintained.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty
of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert the
constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower
courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions
of three, five or seven members.
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower
courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of
the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members
of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of
more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter
may be decided in division. [People vs. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]
97
Section 13
Certification is Not required in Administrative Cases
The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution
due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to
decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied
by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in
administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon
considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-
510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the
Petition, is but an oversight. [Prudential Bank vs. Castro, A.C. No. 2756, March 15,
1988]
Section 14
Statement of Facts and Circumstances Are Additional Guarantee of Due

Process
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how

it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in
favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever
for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.
In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife
with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage."
Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the
other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of
words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling
and, having done so, ends. [Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 88709, February
11, 1992]
Dismissal on the Basis of Lack Of Jurisdiction Does Not Require a Statement of

the Facts and the Law Involved
It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a

judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is
no quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only
if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some
other additional ground is invoked.
A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed
not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence
to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial
court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff"
that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3,
Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it
believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was
remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and
98
cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was
unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal
basis thereof was fatal to the order. [Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 88709,
February 11, 1992]
Minute Resolutions Are Not Required to State the Facts and The Law
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if
the situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is
really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner. Had he
prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisional liberty. Under the
circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas
corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would
require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the
leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective contentions should
disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according
the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution.
Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the
ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the
constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a
minute resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a
constitutional command. [Mendoza vs. CFI, G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973]
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk
of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where
a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where
the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the
petition always gives the legal basis. "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case"
(Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it
and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on
the incidents or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases
through its three Divisions every Monday and Wednesday when the Divisions meet
and on one hundred (100) to one hundred twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and
Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand (1,000) cases a week. It is
only on Fridays and week-ends that the members of the Court work in their separate
chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session — either in
Divisions or En Banc.
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by
the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to
the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular case.
It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases
by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates
in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court.
The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. [Borromeo vs. CA, G.R. No.
82273, June 1, 1990]
99

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Atty. Adonis V.

San Beda College of Law

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND COURT DECISIONS IN

By: Atty. Adonis V. Gabriel

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Purposes of the Constitution

1. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government;

Rules of Construction of the Constitution

Self-Executing vs. Non Self-Executing Provisions

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.

In Case of Doubt, Constitutional Provisions are Self-Executing

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-

Specific Tools of Constitutional Construction

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

Extraneous Materials Can Only be used if the Above-Mentioned Rules Fail

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of

Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution

Amendments and Revisions

The Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions to the Constitution is not

The power to amend the Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is not

As a Constituent Assembly, Congress May Directly Propose Amendments or

Congress, acting as a Constituent Assemble, may Propose Amendments or

Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly pursuant to [Article XVII of the

is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a

The President Cannot Guarantee a Change to the Constitution

The Constitutional Convention only needs Majority Vote of its Members to

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

The System of Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution is Not

Republic Act No. 6735 is a Sufficient Law to Implement Initiative on the

Tests in Determining the Characteristics of the Propose Changes

Essential Requirements for a Valid Initiative to Propose Amendments to the

Ratification of the Proposals may be held simultaneously with a General

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed

Piece-Meal Submission of the Proposals for Ratification is not Allowed

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

State vs. Foreign Country

The National Territory Cannot be Dismembered through the Medium of a

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national

Traditional Functions of the Government

The Traditional Functions of Government have been Abandoned

Decisions of Belligerent Courts Remain Valid After Cessation of Occupation

Law on Treason is not Suspended During Belligerent Occupation

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a

Suspension of Political Laws During Belligerent Occupation Applies only to

Sovereignty is Comprehensive, but its Exercise may be Restricted

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of

indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of

Instances when an Action is Against the State

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

Acts Committed by Officers in their Official Capacity are Covered by the

State Immunity Extends to Foreign States Sued in this Jurisdiction

State Immunity May Be Invoked at any Stage of the Proceedings

Acts Committed Without or in Excess of Authority is not Covered by the

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.

Express Waiver of Immunity may only be done through Legislative Act

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly,

Initiation of Action by the State Results in a Waiver of Immunity

Absolute Theory vs. Restrictive Theory