01 AZNAR v.
GARCIA Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
January 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS:
 Edward Christensen executed a will dated March 5, 1951. The
will contained provisions saying that Edward has only one
child, Maria Lucy Christensen; that he devised unto Maria
Helen Christensen an amount of P3,600; that even if Maria
Helen was surnamed Christensen, she was not related to Edward
nor was she adopted; that the income from the rest of his
property be devised to his only daughter, Maria Lucy.
 the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to Lucy
 Helen filed an opposition to the approval of the project partition,
saying that it deprived her of her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child of Edward as she was declared as one by the
Supreme Court in Aznar v. Aznar (1958)
 The legal grounds of opposition are:
o (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws
of the Philippines, and
o (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in
full ownership.
 CFI ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California,
in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of
his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute
dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
ISSUES/HELD: WON the Renvoi doctrine should have been applied
– Yes
reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
RATIO:
Re Edward’s citizenship, domicile and residence
 There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death.
o the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until
1946 and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another.
 There is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
o He was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
 Difference between “residence” and “domicile”
o Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise
of intention as well as physical presence. Residence
simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
So what law determines the validity of the testamentary
dispositions? Private law of State of California
 The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the application of which, requires the determination
of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
 There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated
in CC Art 16 can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any
general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property?
 Exeutor-appelle claims that under the California Probate Code,
a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and
manner he desires (as found in In re Kaufman). Helen
(appellant), on the other hand, invokes the provisions of Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, which says: “If there is no
law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.” It is based on this
provision and following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of
the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the
Philippines.
What is the renvoi doctrine?
1 testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
(digester’s note: basically, there is renvoi when the conflict of rule of
the forum makes reference to a foreign law, and that foreign law has a
rule that refers back to the law of the forum. Ie. PH refers to California
law but California law refers to PH law)
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.
 "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of
the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
o Renvoi – foreign law
o Opponents of renvoi - This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references". The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law,
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
o It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-
go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
of reference.
o BUT strange enough, the only way to get uniformity is if
the different courts disagree with each other. If both
accept renvoi or both reject, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. (digester’s note:
if both accept renvoi, if filed in PH, PH law will apply
but if filed in California, California law will apply. If
both reject, ganun din)
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
 o In revoi, a jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
So how do we apply the renvoi doctrine? (explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal)
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court
shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law
of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad.
o The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines.
o The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
o THEREFORE, as the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided

it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.

Applying it in the case at bar

o Article 946 of the California Civil Code (invoked by Helen) is

its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman
(invoked by the executor), is its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to
such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in
other jurisdictions.
o The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
02 ANNESLEY v ANNESLEY
95 LJ Ch. 404 (1926)
Russell, J.
Topic: Renvoi
Facts:
Sybil Annesley, a British subject, was married in 1860 to an
army officer whose domicile was English. They resided in Pau, France
until her husband’s death in 1884. From that date, Mrs. Annesley was
open to adopt a domicile of her choice. She remained in France until
her death in 1924. She went back to England only a few times, to visit
one of her daughters and for short periods of time.
She considered France as her home. She never had any place
of residence in England. According to her daughter, her mother
expressed her dislike of England and the English people, and stated she
never wished to live anywhere but in France. She also declared that she
wished to be buried in France of Germany, where her husband was
buried.
Mrs. Annesley never took steps prescribed by Art. 13 of the
French Civil Code to obtain a formal French domicile according to
French law.
Mrs. Annesley owned immovable property in France only and
owned movable properties in both France and England.
On Dec. 13, 1919, she executed in France a will in English form,
which revoked all former testamentary dispositions and purports to
dispose of all her real and personal estate. In Clause 5, she left the
residue to her daughter. In Clause 8 of her will, she declared that
although she has lived in France for many years it was not her intention
to abandon her domicile of origin and she has not made any application
to fix her domicile in France, nor had she done anything to become a
naturalized subject of France and she intends to remain a British subject.
Mrs. Annesley was domiciled in France according to English
law, but not according to French law for not complying with the
provisions of the French Civil Code for the acquisition of French
domicile.
Issues:
1. WON she had abandoned her English domicile and acquired a French
Domicile of choice in accordance with English law -- YES
2. Whether the domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was
French or English (If it were French, she could only dispose of 1/3 of
her personal property.) – According to English law, she is domiciled
in France.
Ratio:
1. The requirements of English law are the factum of residence
coupled with the animus manendi, regardless of whether she complied
with the formalities of French law. She resided in France since her
marriage and remained there until her death and she only had real
property in France.
- She was a British national domiciled in France, according to
English law. BUT, according to French law, she was not
domiciled in France.
2. The domicile of the testatrix at the time of her death was French.
According to French municipal law, the law applicable in the case of
a foreigner not legally domiciled in France is the law of that person’s
nationality, in this case English law. But the law of that nationality
(English) refers the question back to French law, the law of the
domicile. (DOUBLE RENVOI)
According to French law, the French courts, in administering the
movable property of a deceased foreigner who, according to the law of
his country (ENGLAND) is domiciled in France, and whose property
must, according to that law (ENGLISH LAW), be applied in accordance
with the law of the country in which he was domiciled (FRANCE), will
apply French Municipal law.

- In this case, she could only dispose of 1/3 of her English

personal estate and her French movable property.
- The English court employed double renvoi – it decided the case
as a French court would have decided it in accordance with its
own municipal law.
- Had the English court applied single renvoi, it would have
followed English internal law.
03 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO v. DATER

Facts
 The spouses George R. Dater (“George”) and Nellie E. Dater and the
spouses John R. Price (“John”) and Clara A. Price (“Clara”) obtained
a USD 75,000 loan from the Chicago Title and Trust Company
secured by a trust mortgage over a piece of property owned by George
and John.
 The promissory notes and deed were prepared in Illinois and mailed
to Michigan for the signature of the mortgagors.
 The promissory note was payable in Illinois.
 The checks constituting the loaned amount were payable and cashed
in Illinois.
 After John’s death, foreclosure proceedings were instituted in Illinois.
 In the meantime, a suit was filed in Michigan involving the same
transaction in which no cause of action was found against Clara.

Issue
Whether or not Clara is liable for the loan.

Held
No. The laws of Michigan governs her capacity to enter into the
contract, under which, she is not capacitated to do so.

Ratio
 The issue involved is not which law governs the contract, but whether
or not Clara had the capacity to enter it in the first place.
 The present case is similar to that of Burr v. Beckler (which also
involves a resident of Illinois) in which the court ruled that the law of
the state where the delivery of the loan instruments were completed
governs the capacity of the debtor.
 In the present case, the promissory notes were delivered completely
in Michigan under the laws of which, Clara had no capacity (Michigan
law does not allow a married woman to bind her separate estate for
the benefit of others.).
04 BELLIS v. BELLIS
Testate Estate of Amos Bellis v. Edward Bellis (1967)
Bengzon, J:
Facts:
- Amos Bellis, an American citizen, was born and resided in
Texas. He had 5 legitimate children by his first wife, 3 legitimate
children by his second wife and 3 illegitimate children.
- He executed a will in the Philippines, directing that his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children in equal shares
- On July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
- As executor of the will, People’s Bank and Trust Company paid
$240,000 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the 3
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, amounts totalling P40,000 each.
- When the executor submitted its Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their oppositions to the project of partition on
the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children.
- The CFI of Manila overruled the oppositions and approved the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
- Appellants argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16
of the Civil Code. “Art 17(3)-- Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.”
Issue: WON Texas or Philippine law should apply  Texas Law
Ratio:
- The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death. Even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would still refer to Texas law.
- Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.
- Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
- Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph 3 of
the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16
a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
- Whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
- Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Such intention would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void
- The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
05 TALAROC v. UY
Laureto A. Talaroc, petitioner-appellee, v. Alejandro D. Uy,
respondent-appellant
G.R. No. L-5397
September 26, 1952
Tuason, J.
Facts:
1) Respondent Alejandro D. Uy was elected as municipal mayor of
Manticao, Misamis Oriental on November 13, 1951. He
defeated, among others, petitioner Laureto A. Talaroc.
2) Talaroc filed a petition for quo warranto against Uy in the CFI
of Misamis Oriental, on the ground that Uy was a Chinese
national, and therefore ineligible to be municipal mayor.
3) The CFI ruled in Talaroc’s favor and declared the position of
municipal mayor vacant.
a. Uy’s personal circumstances, as found by the court, were
as follows (this was written in Spanish):
i. He was born on January 28, 1912, in Iligan,
Lanao, to a Chinese father and Filipina mother.
ii. When he was born, his parents were living
together as husband and wife. But they did not
contract “ecclesiastical marriage” until March 3,
1914.
iii. Since arriving in Iligan from China in 1893, his
father resided continuously in Iligan until his
death in 1917. He also acquired properties in
Lugait, Misamis Oriental.
iv. His mother died in 1949, without remarrying.
She had campaigned for women’s suffrage in
1935 and voted in subsequent elections/
v. He never went to China, had voted in previous
Philippine elections, held several positions in
government (in the Bureau of Plant Industry,
Bureau of Public Schools in the District of
Manticao, and Municipal Treasury), served in the
Infantry Regiment of the guerillas during the
war, and acted as a tax collector during the
Japanese occupation.
vi. His 3 brothers all married Filipino women and
were never identified with any Chinese political
or social organization.
b. Uy’s contentions, which the court rejected, were as
follows:
i. His father was a subject of Spain as of April 11,
1899, by virtue of Art. 17 of the Civil Code.
ii. His mother ipso facto reacquired her Filipino
citizenship upon her husband’s death in 1917,
and her children followed their mother’s
citizenship.
iii. He is a citizen of the Philippines by mere fact of
his birth herein.
c. The CFI judge noted that under the doctrine in Roa v.
Insular Collector of Customs, promulgated on October
30, 1912, Uy would be deemed a Filipino citizen
regardless of his parents’ citizenship (jus soli). However,
the Roa doctrine had already been abandoned in
subsequent jurisprudence (Tan Chong v. Secretary of
Labor and Swee Sang v. Commonwealth of the
Philippines, both promulgated on September 16, 1947.
i. Roa was born in 1899 in the Philippines to a
Chinese father and Filipino mother. His father
was domiciled in the Philippines up to 1895,
when he returned to China and remained there
until his death in 1900. In 1901, Roa, who was
then a minor, was sent to China by his widowed
mother for studying. When he returned in 1910,
already of legal age, he was denied admission by
the Board of Special Inquiry. The CFI affirmed.
The SC reversed, holding that Art. 17 of the Civil
Code “is sufficient to show that the first
paragraph affirms and recognizes the principle of
nationality by place of birth, jus soli.”
4) Uy appealed to the SC.
Issue: Is Uy a Filipino citizen, and therefore eligible for the office of
municipal mayor? YES.
Held: The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and the
respondent-appellant DECLARED a Filipino citizen and eligible to the
office of the municipal mayor. The petitioner and appellee will pay the
costs of both instances.
Ratio:
1) On the strength of the Roa doctrine, undoubtedly was considered
a full-fledged Philippine citizen on the date of the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution, when jus soli had been the prevailing
doctrine.
a. The 1935 Constitution established jus sanguinis as the
basis for citizenship. However, Uy is a Filipino citizen in
accordance with Art. IV (“Citizenship”), Sec. 1(1),
which provides:
SECTION 1. The following are the citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
b. In the case of Ramon Torres, et al. v. Tan China, Justice
Laurel wrote, “in abrogating the doctrine laid down in
the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the
predominating principle in the determination of
Philippine citizenship, they [members of the
Constitutional Convention] did not intend to exclude
those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were
citizens of the Philippines by judicial declaration at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution.”
c. Unlike in Tan Chong, Uy had already attained the age of
majority when the 1935 Constitution went into effect,
and had been allowed to exercise the right of suffrage,
hold public office, and take the oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth Government or Republic of the
Philippines.
d. The Tan Chong decision itself makes an express
reservation: “this decision is not intended or designed to
deprive, as it cannot divest, of their Filipino citizenship,
those who have been declared to be Filipino citizens, or
upon whom such citizenship had been conferred by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle ofres
adjudicata.” It would be neither fair nor good policy to
hold such persons aliens after they have exercised the
privileges of citizenship and the government has
confirmed their citizenship.
e. Under the Roa doctrine, a Filipino woman married to
Chinese ipso facto reacquired her Filipino citizenship
upon her husband’s demise, and her minor children’s
nationality automatically followed that of their mother’s.
This rule was not changed by the adoption of the jus
sanguinis doctrine, and was in force until
Commonwealth Act No. 63 went into effect in 1936, by
which the legislature, for the first time, provided a
method for regaining Philippine citizenship by Filipino
women in such cases.
f. When Commonwealth Act No. 63 was passed, Uy’s
mother had been a widow for 19 years and Uy himself
had been of age 3 years, and that the new law carries the
provision giving it retroactive effect.
Separate opinions
Pablo, J., concurring (this was written in Spanish):
1) Basically, he believed that Uy was a Filipino citizen because
when he was born, his parents were not yet married, and as an
illegitimate child, he followed the nationality of his Filipino
mother. His parents’ subsequent marriage legitimized him and
made him a Chinese citizen, since under the law then, the child
follows the nationality of his “legal father.” His mother also
became a Chinese citizen, since the wife follows the nationality
of her husband. Her husband’s death did not automatically
restore her Filipino citizenship, since the law at the time required
Filipino women who had married foreigners to make a
declaration of their intention to reacquire Filipino citizenship,
and she made no such declaration.
2) Likewise, the children of foreigners in the Philippines must
demonstrate to the civil registrar within the year following his
 majority or emancipation if they wish to opt for Filipino
citizenship. Uy appears to have made such a demonstration to
the civil registrar. He has also by his acts (see Fact #3)
demonstrated a “clear and unequivocal” desire to be a Filipino
citizen, not a Chinese citizen.

Padilla, J., concurring:

1) He was of the opinion that Uy was a Filipino citizen by virtue of
the fact that he was born out of wedlock in the Philippines to a
Filipino mother and a Chinese father. He was a Filipino citizen
at birth, became Chinese citizen when his father and mother
were married, and reacquired his original citizenship on the
death of his father, because being underage he followed the
citizenship of his mother who reacquired her Filipino citizenship
upon the death of her husband and never remarried.
2) However, he did NOT agree with the proposition that persons
born in this country of alien parentage or whose father is an alien
must be deemed Filipino citizens under and by virtue of the
doctrine laid down in Roa. The subsequent cases of Tan Chong
and Swee Sang have held that the Roa doctrine is in conflict with
the law in force at the time and thus must be abandoned.
06 MERCADO v. MANZANO
G.R. 135083
Mendoza
May 26, 1999
Facts
 May 1998 elections: Ernesto Mercado, Gabriel Daza and
Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor of Makati.
o A petition for disqualification (filed April 27, prior to the
election) of Eduardo Manzano was brought by Ernesto
Mamaril.
 Mamaril claimed that Edu was a citizen of the
US, and not of the Philippines. (Edu was born in
San Francisco, but of Filipino parents.)
 2ndDiv COMELEC cancelled Edu’s certificate of candidacy.
o Ground: Edu is a dual citizen and under the LGC,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position.
o Edu filed a motion for reconsideration.
 Pending MR, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes in
May 1998 elections. Second is Mercado. Proclamation of the
winner was then suspended. Mercado sought to intervene in the
case pending before the COMELEC.
 COMELEC en banc reversed and ruled that Edu was qualified
to run.
o Edu was a US citizen by virtue of jus soli, but also a
Filipino citizen by virtue of the 1935 constitution. At age
6, Edu was brought to the Philippines with an American
passport. He was registered as an alien with the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration, and issued an alien
certificate registration. But this did not result in the loss
of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce such
nor take an oath of allegiance to the US. Edu registered
himself as a voter upon reaching the age of majority. He
also voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections.
 Manzano was proclaimed the winner, Hence, this petition by
Mercado.
Issues:
(1) Does Mercado have standing to bring this suit? YES
(2) Is dual citizenship a ground for disqualification? NO
(3) Did Edu elect Philippine citizenship and renounce American
citizenship? YES.
Mercado has standing.
1. There had been no proclamation at the time the petition was filed.
Mercado is not yet a defeated candidate. He still has an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene. Further, his right to intervene is clearly sanctioned by the
Electoral Reform Law.
Dual citizen ship is NOT a ground for disqualification. DUAL
ALLEGIANCCE is.
Argument of Mercado: Through Sec. 40, LGC, Congress has
commanded the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to
hold local elective office. The provision declares as “disqualified from
running for any elective local position: (d) Those with dual citizenship.”
Court: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
 Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto, and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
 Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
  With respect to dual allegiance, Sec. 5, Article IV, of the
Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

EDU elected Philippine citizenship when he filed a COC in time for

the 1998 May Elections
 COMELEC en banc: By participating in the Philippine elections
in 1992, 1995, and 1998, Edu “effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law,” so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
 Mercado: Merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was
already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
 Court: By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his
present post, Edu elected Philippine citizenship, and in effect
renounced his American citizenship.
 The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
 Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent
admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate
of candidacy, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him
can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
07 CO vs ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF o Was a minor of 9 years when his father was naturalized
REPRESENTATIVES o He finished elementary education in Samar. He moved
GR Nos. 92191-92 to Manila to acquire secondary and college education.
1991 | Gutierrez o He also worked in Manila (in the Central Bak as an
examiner and in the hardware business of his family).
GR No 92191-92 o He frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he
Petitioners:Antonio Y. Co grew up and spent his childhood days.
Respondents:House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose o Registed voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly,
Ong, Jr. voted there during the 1984 and 1986 elections.
 In the 1987 elections, Jose Ong ran and was elected
GR No 92202-03 representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Petitioners: Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr o The other candidates were petitioners Balanquit and Co.
Respondents:House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jose
Ong, Jr. o Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress.
SUMMARY:Jose Ong, of a Chinese-and-later-on-naturalized father Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
and of a natural born Filipino mother, was elected representative of the combined, Ong would still lead by more than 7000 votes.
second district of Northern Samar. HRET declared him a natural born  Petitioners filed election protests against Ong, arguing that
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting o Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
purposes. Philippines
o Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
DOCTRINE:Jose Ong does not need to elect Philippine citizenship. He Northern Samar
is already a Filipino. How can a Filipino elect Philippine citizenship?  The HRET decided in favor of Jose Ong, Jr. and declared that
he is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
FACTS: Northern Samar for voting purposes.
 Jose Ong’s grandfather:
o Arrived from China and established residence in Laoang, ISSUE:
Samar in 1895 (W/N the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion - NO)
o Obtained a certificate of residence from the Spanish W/N Ong is a natural born citizen - YES.
administration W/N Ong is a a resident of the second district of Northern Samar - YES.
 Jose Ong’s father:
o Born in China in 1905, but was brought to Samar 1915 RATIO:
o Resided in Samar
o Married Agripina Lao, a natural born Filipina ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
o CFI of Samar declared him a Filipino citizen, after he  Jose Ong’s mother is a natural born citizen. It is alleged that Jose
took the oath of allegiance in 1955 Ong must elect to be a Filipino citizen upon reaching the age of
o Obtained a certificate of naturalization majority
 Jose Ong:
 o Consti Art. IV, Sec. 2 accords natural born status to
children of Filipino mothers before Jan. 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
 However, this does not apply to Jose Ong. He is already a
Filipino citizen.
o To expect a Filipino citizen to elect to be a Filipino
citizen would be an unusual and unnecessary procedure
o He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to
require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969
electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was
nine years old.
 Why does the SC say he is a Filipino already?
o Lived the life of a Filipino since birth
o His father is a naturalized Filipino
o His mother is a natural born Filipino
o He is Roman Catholic
o He worked for a sensitive government agency
o He is part of a profession that is open only to Filipinos
o He has participated in the political exercise of suffrage
o There is nothing to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values
o There is no allegation to indicate any tinge of “alienness”
o He was voted by an overwhelming majority
 To repeat, the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration
is a requirement for those who still have to elect Filipino
citizenship
o For those already Filipinos, their acts of deliberate
choice (such as those enumerated above) are as binding
as a formal declaration
 Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would
also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen
elect Philippine citizenship?
 The HRET observed that "when protestee was only nine years
of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this
country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such.”
ONG THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
 The term residence has been understood as synonymous with
domicile.
o The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,
one intends to return. The absence of a person from said
permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that
person. In other words, domicile is characterized by
animus revertendi.
• The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the
domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. He never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to
the present.
o After the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one
was constructed.
o After the second fire which again destroyed their house
in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
residence.
o The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name
of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of
his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant
to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof
(as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were
still in the names of his parents.
o Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
any property in Samar, it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile.
 o It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as
a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence.

Padilla dissenting:
 Appling statutory construction
o 1935 Consti, which was applicable during Ong’s birth,
provides that only those whose fathers were citizens of
the Philippines were considered as Filipinos
o If they had natural born mothers, they would still have to
elect Filipino citizenship
 Clearly, Ong had to elect Filipino citizenship
08 FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
June 28, 1996
Panganiban, J.
FACTS
 On March 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his COC for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 1995 elections.
 Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the
COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking
or holding any public office or position on the ground that he
lacks a Philippine citizenship. COMELEC granted this petition
and declared Frivaldo disqualified to run for office.
 Frivaldo’s MR remained unacted and so his candidacy continued
and he was voted for (and had the highest number of votes)
during the elections on May 8, 1995. Only on May 11 did
COMELEC en banc affirmed Frivaldo’s disqualification.
 Lee (having the 2nd most number of votes) then filed a petition
praying that he be proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon which COMELEC en banc acted upon. As a result, it
was Lee who was proclaimed as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the evening of June 30, 1995.
 Frivaldo filed with COMELEC a new petition praying for the
annulment of Lee’s proclamation and for his own proclamation.
According to him, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of
the Philippines in the afternoon of June 30, 1995 after his
repatriation under PD 725 has been granted. Hence, there was
no more legal impediment for him to be proclaimed as the
winning gubernatorial candidate.
 COMELEC acted on Frivaldo’s petition and held that he is
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
NOTE: This one involves two consolidated cases filed by both Frivaldo
and Lee. Lee’s issues were:
1. The jurisdiction of COMELEC
2. The judicially declared disqualification of Frivaldo (lacking
Philippine citizenship) was a continuing condition and rendered
him ineligible
3. Frivaldo’s alleged repatriation was neither valid nor has
retroactive effect
4. His proclamation as the duly-elected Governor resulting from
Frivaldo’s disqualification was valid
On the other hand, Frivaldo was questioning the COMELEC
resolutions which “judicially declared” his disqualification on
the ground that they were not rendered within the period allowed
by law, i.e. not later than 15 days before the election, violative
of Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUES
 WON Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal.
 WON Frivaldo’s “judicially declared” disqualification for lack
of Filipino citizenship was a continuing bar.
 WON the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, was
valid and legal.
HOLDING/RATIO
1. WON Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid and legal. YES.
Arguments:
Effect of Aquino’s memorandum on PD 725
LEE: PD 725, a law which allowed the repatriation of
Frivaldo, had been effectively repealed by a
memorandum issued by Corazon Aquino, directing the
Special Committee on Naturalization to cease and desist
from undertaking any and all proceedings.
SC: That memorandum cannot be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal. No express repeal
was made in that memorandum. It cannot be regarded as
a legislative enactment for not every pronouncement of
 the Chief Executive should be regarded as an exercise of
her law-making powers. On the other hand, it is a basic
statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored.
Repatriation proceedings
LEE: There were serious irregularities in the
proceedings. Frivaldo’s application was filed on June
229, 1995 and was approved in just one day or on June
30, 1995, which prevented a judicious review and
evaluation of the merits thereof.
SC: No indecent haste in the processing of Frivaldo’s
application. His application for repatriation was filed
with the Office of the President on Aug. 17, 1994.
However, the Special Committee was reactivated only
on June 8, 1995, when presumably the Committee started
processing his application. Moreover, there were 10
other persons who were granted repatriation together
with Frivaldo so there could be no favoritism as posited
by Lee. There is also a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which Lee was not able to
successfully rebut.
Point when citizenship requirement is reckoned from
LEE: Assuming that repatriation was valid, the Sec. 39
of the LGC prescribes that citizenship must exist on the
date of his election, if not when the COC is filed
(remember Frivaldo was only able to reacquire his
citizenship after election and on the day of his supposed
proclamation).
SC: Sec. 39 does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship. Elections
laws must be construed liberally. So too, even from a
literal construction, it should be noted that Sec. 39 speaks
of qualifications of “elective officials,” not of
candidates. In Vasquez v. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,
it was pronounced that citizenship qualification applies
to the time of proclamation and at the start of the elected
official’s term.
Registered voter requirement
LEE: Sec. 39 also requires that an elective official must
be a registered voter, apart from requiring citizenship.
Under the law, a voter must be a citizen. Therefore,
Frivaldo could not have been a voter, much less a validly
registered voter if he was not a citizen at that time.
SC: The law intended citizenship to be a qualification
distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. The voter requirement was
included as another qualification not to reiterate the need
for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to
govern. Frivaldo was and is a registered voter of
Sorsogon and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration. He, in fact, has
voted in past elections.
Retroactivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation
SC: Frivaldo’s repatriation retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994. This is so
because a statute could be retroactive if it is curative or
remedial in nature or when it creates new rights. PD 725
created a new right.
2. WON Frivaldo’s “judicially declared” disqualification for lack
of Filipino citizenship was a continuing bar. NO
LEE: COMELEC’s resolution became final and
executory. Also, the Court had two rulings in the past
which declared Frivaldo as an alien and these too have
become final and executory.
SC: No. Those two rulings were rendered in connection
with the 1988 and 1992 elections. So they only final and
executory only for purposes of those two past elections.
 There is no record of any final judgment of the
disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the 1995
elections. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial
of citizenship cannot govern a person’s’ future status
with finality because a person may subsequently
reacquire or lose his citizenship.

3. WON the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, was

valid and legal. NO.

SC: Paraphrasing this court in Labo v. COMELEC, “the

fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign
will,” and in Aquino v. COMELEC, Lee is “a second
placer, just that, a second placer.” The rule is that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected, unless
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would
nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected (Labo
Doctrine). HOWEVER, there has been no sufficient
evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was fully aware in fact and in law of Frivaldo’s
alleged disqualification.
09 UYTENGSU v REPUBLIC (1954)
In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted
a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED UYTENGSU, Petitioner-
Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He began his primary
education at the Saint Theresa’s College in said municipality.
Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then
the San Carlos College and, still later the Siliman University — all
in the same locality — where he completed the secondary course.
2. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute
of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States,
where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford
Junior University, in California, and was graduated, in 1950, with
the degree of Bachelor of Science.
3. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4)
months vacation. On July 15, 1950, his present application for
naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States
and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another
educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this
course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until
October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally
scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be postponed on
motion of counsel for the petitioner.
4. The Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment for the
petitioner and granted his application for naturalization. The
Solicitor General, who maintains the negative, has appealed from
said judgment.
ISSUE: WON the application for naturalization may be granted,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately
after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months
after the first date set for the hearing thereof.
HOLDING AND RATIO: Petitioner has not complied with the
requirements of Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the
aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and,
accordingly, is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in
his favor.
1. Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word
"residence", as used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization
Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost
by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that,
from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a
resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United
States, at that time, being, merely to study therein.
2. It should be noted that to become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization, one must reside therein for not less than 10 years,
except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence is
sufficient (sections 2 and 3, Commonwealth Act No. 473). Pursuant
to the provision above quoted, he must, also, file an application
stating therein, among other things, that he "has the qualifications
required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications include the
residence requirement already referred to, it follows that the
applicant must prove that he is a resident of the Philippines at the
time, not only of the filing of the application, but, also, of its hearing.
If the residence thus required is the actual or constructive permanent
home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile, then the
applicant must be domiciled in the Philippines on both dates.
3. Consequently, when Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application
"that he will reside continuously in the Philippines" in the
intervening period, it cannot refer merely to the need of an
uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, irrespective of actual
residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under
the law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in said
clause, and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal
provision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage,
and, accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the
law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. These consequences
may be avoided only by construing the clause in question as
demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the
 petition for naturalization to its determination by the court. Indeed,
although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct
and different from that of the other.
4. There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is
used to indicate the place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain
for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile,
but is not by any means necessarily so, since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Kennan on
Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)
5. In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance
whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye on petitioner herein.
Immediately after the filing of his application — and —
notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made him, under oath,
to the effect that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
"from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United
States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951. For
this first time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for
opportunity needed by the Government to observe petitioner herein
was enhanced by the fact that, having been born in the Philippines,
where he finished his primary and secondary education, petitioner
his not have to file, and did not file, a declaration of intention prior
to the filing of his petition for naturalization. Thus, the Government
had no previous notice of his intention to apply for naturalization
until the filing of his petition and could not make the requisite
investigation prior thereto.
6. Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United
States, practically without interruption, from early 1947 to late in
1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of
which preceded the filing of the application, it may be said that he
resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States
at that time and for over a year subsequently thereto
7. Although in these cases the word "residence" has been construed,
generally, to mean "domicile" — that is to say, actual residence,
coupled with the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time
of the acquisition of said domicile - it would seem apparent from the
foregoing that the length justifies the conclusion that he was residing
abroad when his application for naturalization was filed and for
fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that this is precisely the situation
sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining the applicant to
"reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of
the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship," unless this legal mandate — which did not exist under
Act No. 2927, and was advisely inserted, therefore, by section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 — were to be regarded as pure
verbiage, devoid, not only, of any force or effect, but, also, of any
intent or purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn out to be, were we
to adopt petitioner’s pretense.
8. Petitioner has not complied with the requirements of Section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise
made by him in his application, and, accordingly, is not entitled, in
the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor.
DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs against the petitioner,
but without prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so
desires, in conformity with law. It is so ordered.
10 CAASI v. CA
EN BANC G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI v. CA and MERITO C. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE v. COMELEC and MERITO C.
MIGUEL
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts: Consolidated cases for the disqualification under Sec 68 of
Omnibus Election Code of Merito Miguel for the position of municipal
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in Jan. 1988, on
the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of
the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508: 3 petitions of Anecito Cascante, Cederico Catabay and
Josefino C. Celeste, for the disqualification of Miguel filed prior to the
elections.
Miguel: Admitted that he holds a green card, but denied that he is a
permanent resident of the US.
 Green card for convenience so that he may freely enter US for
his periodic medical exam and to visit his children there.
 Permanent resident of Bolinao, he voted in all previous
elections, including plebiscite on Feb. 1987 for ratification of
Constitution, and congressional elections on May 18,1987.
COMELEC: Dismissed.
 Possession of a green card does not sufficiently establish that he
has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
 Miguel has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously
reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality.
 As he meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence
for candidates to elective local offices as provided for in Sec 42
LGC, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of
Bolinao.
Dissenting Opinion: Comm Badoy, Jr.:
 A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an
immigrant of a foreign country and Miguel having admitted that
he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Sec
68 OEC, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office.
 This, Miguel has not done.
G.R. No. 88831: Petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival
candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, also to
disqualify Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
RTC: Denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition
CA: Reversed and ordered RTC to dismiss and desist from further
proceeding in the quo warranto case.
 Pointless for RTC to hear the case after the COMELEC has ruled
that he meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local offices.
 There is no legal obstacle for Miguel’s candidacy, considering
that decisions of the RTCs on quo warranto cases under the
OEC are appealable to the COMELEC.
Issues/Held:
1st Issue: Is a green card proof that the holder is a permanent
resident of the United States. YES
(Note: There were rumors then that a good number of elective and
appointive public officials in the administration of Pres. C. Aquino are
holders of green cards in foreign countries.)
 In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration"
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to
the US Embassy before his departure in 1984, his answer to the
question regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently,
so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
 On its face, the green card that was issued by US DOJ and
Immigration and Registration Service identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN.
 On the back of the card, the upper portion:
 Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States."
 Miguel's immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
 He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently
as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's
or tourist's) visa.
o Immigration is the removing into one place from
another; the act of immigrating the entering into a
country with the intention of residing in it.
o An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for
the purpose of permanent residence.
 As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local
allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides.
This is in return for the protection given to him during the period
of his residence therein.
2nd Issue: Has Miguel waived his status as a permanent resident of
or immigrant to USA prior to the elections in 1988. NO.
 Sec. 18, Art. XI Constitution: "any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law" is not applicable to Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of US before he was elected to public
office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao.
 Law applicable to him is Sec. 68 OEC: Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall
not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
 To be "qualified to run for elective office", the candidate who is
a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
o His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of the US.
o The waiver should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country.
o Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run
for any elective office".
 Records are bare of proof that he had waived his status as
permanent resident before he ran for election.
 Reason for Sec. 68 OEC: Residence in the municipality where
he intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the time
of filing his COC, is one of the qualifications that a candidate
for elective public office must possess.
o Miguel was a permanent resident of the US and he
resided in Bolinao for only 3 months (not 1 year) after
his return to the Philippines in Nov 1987 and before he
ran for mayor on Jan 1988.
 OEC policy: Excluding from the right to hold elective public
office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and
allegiance.
o The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who
have cast their lot with our country "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion."
 Assuming he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false
pretenses; that he only had one foot in the US but kept his other
foot in the Philippines, SC will not allow itself to be a party to
his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him
the best of both worlds so to speak.
 Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines.
o The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
 Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said
public office, hence, his election thereto was null and
void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of COMELEC and CA are set

aside. The election of Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao is
annulled. Costs against the said respondent.
11 ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
Kapunan | Sept. 18, 1995 | En Banc
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that
she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent
Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the
constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her
COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial
election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason
that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with
Comelec's head office in Manila.
The Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and
struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in
division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en
banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the
election. But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must
be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before
the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on April 24,
1995, fourteen days before the election, Comelec already lost
jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives.
Issues:
Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 1995 elections.
Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case after the elections?
Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after
the May 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election
purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications
to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives
for the following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired
is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact
of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father
brought his family back to Leyte.
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the
husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence
may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the
Civil Code is concerned — affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to
mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under
Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it
would have clearly indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.
Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos‘ domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she
married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by
law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She
has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August
1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in
Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both
places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
Romero, J. (Separate):
Women‘s rights as per choosing her domicile after husband‘s death is
evident in this case. Marcos‘ living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the
legal residency requirement.
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death
of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its
original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.
Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or
agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The
COMELEC‘s resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this
particular agency‘s powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: woman’s
domicile.

Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared
disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which
they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates
may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not
necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy
should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified.
And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified
candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
12 ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. – Petitioner, VS. AMERICAN
EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. Respondents.
TITLE: G.R. NO. 159507 - APRIL 19, 2006
FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against
the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian
T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas,
Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The
case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo)
"is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX,
Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in
providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office
address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City." The other defendants (herein respondents Fish and
Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with
summons and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful
dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened
when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to
pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The
second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal
credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while
he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the
Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as
they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner
Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of
March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received the
corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly
wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his
credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents
on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience,
wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and
besmirched political and professional standing as a result of
respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith,
and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that
respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Before the Court is the Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof,
to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January
2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding
judge2thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case, except
to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue.
The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the term resides' means the actual residence or domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death?
2. Whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that
venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172
because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff
therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the
complaint
3. Whether Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was
only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield
influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful
and influential figure in the said province could be regarded as a "specie
of forum shopping"
HOLDING: The term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on
personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place
of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the
defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the
purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house
in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for
election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically,
personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places.
Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize
plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte
without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically
residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio
v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil
Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in
the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has
been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated
August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001
and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are
REINSTATED.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he

would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for
vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in
connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have
residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that
one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or
physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there with
intention to stay there permanently.

'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,

the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that
is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary
13 LIMBONA v. COMELEC
Oct 16, 2009 | Nachura, J
FACTS:
 prior to May 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Limbona and
husband, Mohammad each filed a CoC for Mayor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte
o respondent Alingan filed a disqualification case against
the two before the Provincial Election Supervisor of
LDN, premised on the ground that they lacked the 1-year
residency requirement and both were not registered
voters of Pantar
 petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her CoC
which was approved by the Comelec; filed a MTD the
disqualification case against her for being moot and academic
 Comelec First Division disqualified Mohammad. Petitioner then
filed her CoC as substitute candidate. Respondent filed a petition
for disqualification against petitioner for, among others, lacking
the residency requirement
 Comelec Second Division ruled that petitioner was disqualified
o petitioner only became a resident of Pantar in November
2006; petitioners domicile of origin was Maguing, her
birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident
of Brgy Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband
was Barangay Chairman until November 2006.
o Brgy Rapasun was petitioner’s domicile by operation of
law under the Family Code
o Comelec also took note of its resolution in another case
where it was found that petitioner was not even a
registered voter in Pantar
 Comelec En Banc affirmed
Petitioner: in a disqualification case against her husband, Comelec
considered her husband as a resident of Pantar; since her husband was
qualified to run in Pantar, so is she
 actually residing and was physically present in that municipality
for almost 2 years prior to May 2007 elections
 performance of her husband’s duty in Rapasun did not prevent
the latter from having his domicile elsewhere
OSG: no evidence that petitioner has abandoned her domicile of origin
or her domicile in Marawi City
 this Court has ruled on the issue of petitioner’s residency
in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. COMELEC and Malik Bobby
T. Alingan
ISSUE: WoN petitioner is disqualified for failure to comply with the
1-year residency requirement (YES)
HELD: petition dismissed; COMELEC affirmed
 this has been previously ruled upon by SC (OSG’s cited case;
the first disqualification case filed against her)
o Although the petitioner had withdrawn her CoC,
Comelec resolved the petition and found she failed to
comply with the residency requirement, and was,
therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar
o decision has now attained finality, shouldn’t be ruled
upon again
 term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with
domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the
law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community.
 For purposes of election law, the question of residence is
mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by
which to determine where a person actually resides but
these 3 rules well established:
1. man must have a residence or domicile somewhere
2. where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired
3. a man can have but one domicile at a time.
 In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.
 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one, and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
o there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
 Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present
and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months
prior to the elections, is self-serving and
unsubstantiated. Evidence consists merely of self-
serving affidavits. COMELEC found no other act that
would indicate respondent’s intention to stay in Pantar
for an indefinite period of time. Filing of her CoC in
Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she
has chosen Pantar as her new residence. It has even
found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.
 We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners
domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which
is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by
operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun,
Marawi City.
o Mohammad effected the change of his domicile
in favor of Pantar, LDN only on November 11,
2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and
wife live together in one legal residence, then it
follows that petitioner effected the change of her
domicile also on November 11, 2006, Family
Code 68 and 69 provide:
Art. 68. The husband & wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect & fidelity, & render mutual help & support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are
other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
 Petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence
to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the
Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human
experience.