Patricio v. Dario

8/23/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 507
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patricio vs. Dario III
*
G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.
PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G.

DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Home; The family home is deemed

constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence.—The
family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository
of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the
dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head
of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is
constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed
constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
439
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 439
Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the

owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual.—The
law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either
by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be
actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or actually
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016565371fff7fe89ed0003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something

which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however,
need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the
property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in
Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the inlaws
where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and
wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They
are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Same; Same; Beneficiaries of a family home enumerated in
Article 154 of the Family Code; Requisites to be a beneficiary of the
family home.—Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who
are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife,
or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their
parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the
family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support. To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
Same; Same; The family home shall continue despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family
for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefor; Rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.—Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that
the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family home.
440
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support;

Characteristics of legal support.—Legal support, also known as
family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the
following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties

which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible;
(3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is
free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is
variable in amount.
Same; Property; Coownership; Partition; No coowner ought
to be compelled to stay in a coownership indefinitely, and may
insist on partition on the common property at any time; An action
to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches.—The law does not encourage coownerships among
individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such
as in the instant case. Coowners should be afforded every
available opportunity to divide their coowned property to prevent
these situations from arising. As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 342
SCRA 753 (2000), no coowner ought to be compelled to stay in a
coownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the
common property at any time. An action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each coowner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.—In
Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 (2002), we held
that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should
find the existence of coownership among the parties, the court
may and should order the partition of the properties in the same
action.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ma. Patricia S. EncarnacionForia for petitioner.
441
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 441

Yee Law Office for respondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution
1
of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 in CA
G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for

partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law and
evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He
was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties
he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a
preschool building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford
corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT
30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds,
covering an area of 2seven hundred fifty five (755) square
meters, more or less.
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and
private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of
Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT30731
(175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R213963 was issued
in the names of petitioner, private respondent and
Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally
advised private respondent of their intention to partition
the subject property and terminate the coownership.
Private respondent refused to partition the property hence
petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q0144038 and
raffled to Branch 78.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp 3849. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and

concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. De los Santos and Jose C.
Reyes, Jr.
2 Id., at p. 59.
442

3
On October 3, 2002, the trial court ordered the partition of
the subject property in the following manner: Perla G.
Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
property by public auction wherein all parties concerned
may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject
property should be 4
distributed accordingly in the
aforestated manner.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration5
which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003,
hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which
denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a
motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on
December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now
assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino
Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should
continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found compelling
reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held
that the minor son of private respondent, who is a
grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla 6
G.
Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED

IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19,
2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE
PARTITION
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 7780. Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.

4 Id., at p. 80.
5 Id., at p. 88. Penned by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr. as Pairing
Judge.
6 Id., at pp. 4449.
443
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 443

AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT

PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON

FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO
7
OWNERSHIP.
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is

proper where one of the coowners refuse to accede to such
partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property
which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a
minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12year
old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues
that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the
same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of
age. Private respondent insists that even after the
expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino
on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject
property continues to be considered as the family home
considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario
IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home, still
resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject
property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs
of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997,
which was the 10th year from the date of death of the
decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino
Marc and private respondent Marcelino III 8were already of
age at the time of the death of their father, hence there is
no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
_______________
7 Id., at p. 21.
8 Id., at p. 26.
444

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is

the repository
9
of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife,
or by an unmarried head of10a family, reside, including the
land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
11
11
family. The family home is deemed constituted from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter 12
provided and to the
extent of the value allowed by law.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family
home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its
beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however,
need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather,
the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries”
enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may
include the inlaws where the family home is constituted
jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely
excludes maids and overseers. They 13
are not the
beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the
beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or
an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters,
_______________
9 A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of

the Philippines, Vol. I (1990 ed.), p. 508, citing Code Commission of 1947,
pp. 1819, 20.
10 FAMILY CODE, Art. 152.
11 Id.
12 Id., Art. 153.
13 Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735, 744; 277 SCRA 57, 66
(1997).
445
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 445

whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who

are living in the family home and who depend upon the
head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in
the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that
the family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations
where death occurs to persons who constituted the family
home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of
death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a
family on the continuing existence of the family home:
“Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to
the constitution of his or her separate property as family home,
the property will remain as family home for ten years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no
more beneficia ry left a t the time of dea th, we believe the
fa mily home will be dissolved or cea se, beca use there is no
more rea son for its existence. If there a re beneficia ries who
survive living in the fa mily home, it will continue for ten
yea rs, unless a t the expira tion of the ten yea rs, there is still
a minor beneficia ry, in which ca se the fa mily home
continues until tha t beneficia ry becomes of a ge.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by
the heirs. May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family home
keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the period
provided by this article? We believe tha t a lthough the heirs
will
446

continue in ownership by not pa rtitioning the property, it

14
will cea se to be a fa mily home.” (Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art.

159 in this manner:
“The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one
or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family.
Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent
upon whether there is still a minorbeneficia ry residing

therein. For a s long a s there is one beneficia ry even if the
hea d of the fa mily or both spouses a re a lrea dy dea d, the
fa mily home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is
no minorbeneficia ry, it will subsist until 10 yea rs a nd
within this period, the heirs ca nnot pa rtition the sa me
except when there a re compelling rea sons which will justify
the pa rtition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the
15
property or who constituted the family home.” (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be

expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who
survive and are living in the family home, it will continue
for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is
still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as
a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a
minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or
the unmarried family head who constituted the family
home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of
his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years
and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home
shall be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches
the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard
and protect
_______________
14 Supra note 9 at pp. 515516.

15 E. Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated (1999 ed.),
p. 291.
447
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 447

the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal

age and would now be capable of supporting himself.
However, three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2)
they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for
legal support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent,
can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the

Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family
home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term
“descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person
or persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who
constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish,
we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent’s
minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased
Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be
actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits
derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also
known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson
of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents,
especially his father, herein
448

private respondent who is the head of his immediate

family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father,
and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal
support not from his grandmother, but from his father.
Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a
descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third
requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal
support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal
support, and who must now establish his own family home
separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of
legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that
which is provided by law, comprising everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation,16
in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the
following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family
ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is
intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be
compromised; (5) It is free from attachment 17 or execution;
(6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren
cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if
they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
capable of supporting them. This is so because 18
we have to
follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with
this view.
_______________
16 FAMILY CODE, Art. 194.

17 Supra note 9 at p. 575.
18 Supra note 15 at p. 401. Art. 199 provides that “[w]henever two or
more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The
descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest
degree; (4) The brothers and sisters.”
449
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 449

The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and

Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the
stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability
for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer
relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without
means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to
prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was
willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson’s legal
support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the
partition of the property which shows an intention to
dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for

its existence after the 10year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to
partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage coownerships among
individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable
situations such as in the instant case. Coowners should be
afforded every available opportunity to divide their co
owned property to prevent these situations
19
from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, no coowner ought to
be compelled to stay in a coownership indefinitely, and
may insist on partition on the common property at any
time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. Each coowner may 20
demand at
any time the partition of the common property.
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition,
the court a quo should have ordered a partition by
commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested
persons should be appointed as commissioners to make the
partition, command
_______________
19 396 Phil. 928; 342 SCRA 753 (2000).

20 Id., at p. 948; p. 771.
450

ing them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in

interest such part and proportion of the property as the
court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the
real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without
great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may
order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the
same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or
sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property
be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court
shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at
public sale,21and the commissioners shall sell the same
accordingly.
The partition of the subject property should be made in
accordance with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil
22
22
Code. Under the law of intestate succession, if the widow
and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same
share as that of each of the children. However, since only
onehalf of the conjugal property which is owned by the
decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory
heirs (the other half to be given exclusively to the surviving
spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow
will have the same share as each of her two surviving
children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject
property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1)
Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II,
1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. 23
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, we held that an
action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determi
_______________
21 RULES OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 5.

22 Art. 996 states that “[i]f the widow or widower and legitimate
children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.”
23 436 Phil. 233; 387 SCRA 427 (2002).
451
VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 451

nate portion of the properties involved. If the court after

trial should find the existence of coownership among the
parties, the court may and should
24
order the partition of the
properties in the same action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No.
80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to
conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect
the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well
as the improvements that lie therein, in the following
manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6
and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is
DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons, who should determine the
technical metes and bounds of the property and the proper
share appertaining to each heir, including the
improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of

Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real
estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great
prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may
order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the
same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or
sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property
be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court
shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at
public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same
accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the
sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), AustriaMartinez,

Callejo, Sr. and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 240241; p. 434.
452

Limbona vs. Lee
Petition granted, resolution reversed and set aside. Case

remanded to trial court.
Note.—In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,

first, a declaration that he is a coowner of the subject
properties, and, second, the conveyance of his lawful share.
(Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 427 [2002])
——o0o——
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8/23/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 507

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G.

Civil Law; Family Home; The family home is deemed

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 439

Patricio vs. Dario III

Same; Same; Occupancy of the family home either by the

existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patricio vs. Dario III

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Legal Support;

following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties

PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 441

Yee Law Office for respondent.

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for

1 Rollo, pp 38­49. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED

3 Id., at pp. 77­80. Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 443

AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT

COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON

The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is

9 A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 445

whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

continue in ownership by not pa rtitioning the property, it

Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art.

upon whether there is still a minor­beneficia ry residing

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be

14 Supra note 9 at pp. 515­516.

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 447

the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal

can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

private respondent who is the head of his immediate

16 FAMILY CODE, Art. 194.

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 449

The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and

dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for

19 396 Phil. 928; 342 SCRA 753 (2000).

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ing them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in

21 RULES OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 5.

VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 451

nate portion of the properties involved. If the court after

improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Austria­Martinez,

24 Id., at pp. 240­241; p. 434.

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petition granted, resolution reversed and set aside. Case

Note.—In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,

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1 Rollo, pp 3849. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and

3 Id., at pp. 7780. Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.

upon whether there is still a minorbeneficia ry residing

14 Supra note 9 at pp. 515516.

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), AustriaMartinez,

24 Id., at pp. 240241; p. 434.