C ANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the
lar manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar
of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CASE NO. 1 / IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG / AC NO. 1163, AUGUST 29,
1975
FACTS: Ramon Galang is a perennial bar candidate who flunked in
the 1969, 1967, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He
passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15% by virtue of a
Court of resolution making 74% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations. Oscar Landicho, who flunked the 1971, 1968, and 1967 bar
examinations, invited the attention of the Court to the fact that the grade of
Galang was raised in five subjects before the bar results were released.
Upon investigation, five examiners admitted having re-evaluated Galang's
notebook upon the representation to them by Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo
that they had the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned
failed only their particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Upon investigation by the NBI, it was found that Galang was a student in the
School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, and that he was charged in
1959 with the crime of slight physical injuries committed against another
student of the same university. Respondent Galang, in all his application to
take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.
ISSUE: WON respondent Galang’s concealment of his pending criminal case
for physical injuries is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law.
HELD: YES. Every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar is duty
bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Hence, the
necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record —
whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case
dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for
application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases
involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. The concealment of an
attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he
had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for
revocation of his license to practice law.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
no other alternative but to order the SURRENDER OF HIS
ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE AND THE STRIKING OUT OF HIS
NAME FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
CASE NO. 2 / DIAO V. MARTINEZ / AC NO. 244, MARCH 29, 1963
FACTS: Telesforo Diao passed the bar in 1953. Two years later, Severino
Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for
such Bar examination that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
Upon investigation, the Solicitor General found that contrary to the
allegations in Diao’s petition for examination, he had not completed his high
school training and he never attended Quisumbing College, nor obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom, before taking up law subjects. Such was the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education. In his answer, Diao claims that although he had left high school in
his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army and passed the
General Classification Test given therein. The said test is alleged to be
equivalent to a high school diploma. Thus, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high
school. Further, Diao asserts that he had obtained his A.A. title from Arellano
University in April, 1949. He says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
ISSUE: WON Diao’s false representation that he had the required academic
qualifications to take the bar examinations a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law.
HELD: YES. The applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath,
"That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education as prescribed by the Department
of Private Education." Plainly, therefore, Telesforo Diao was not qualified to
take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed
his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree.
CASE NO. 3 / IN RE: CHARGES OF LILIAN F. VILLASANTA / GR
AC-UNAV, APRIL 30, 1957
FACTS: In 1939, respondent Hilarion Peralta married Rizalina
Valdez. In 1951, he courted the complainant Lilian Villasanta who fell
in love with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent
then procured a fake marriage contract, which was then a blank
document, and made the complainant sign it. Since then the
complainant and the respondent lived together as husband and wife.
Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious ratification of
their marriage so the said ceremony was performed in Aparri by the
parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer required the
production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage
contract shown to him. After a while, complainant then discovered
that the respondent was previously married to someone else. Thus,
she filed the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code in the CFI of Cagayan of which the respondent
was found guilty. Respondent also filed the present complaint for
immorality which seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954
successful bar candidate, from being admitted to the bar.
ISSUE: WON respondent Hilarion Peralta engaged in immoral
conduct which is a ground for disqualification from being admitted to
the bar.
HELD: YES. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in
the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The act of respondent in
contracting the second marriage (even his act in making love to
another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still
valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and
morality. Thus lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, the respondent is disqualified from being admitted to
the bar.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules
of Court, the respondent is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED
from being admitted to the bar.
CASE NO. 4 / IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE LAWYERS' OATH BY
ARTHUR M. CUEVAS / BM NO. 810, JANUARY 27, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Arthur Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of a
Court resolution which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations
subject to the condition that should he pass the same, he shall not be
allowed to take the lawyers’ oath pending approval of the Court due
to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in
the initiation rites of the Lex Talionis Fraternitas, a fraternity in the
San Beda College of Law, sometime in September 1991, where Raul
Camaligan, a neophyte. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was
granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from
probation and his case was considered closed and terminated. In this
present petition, petitioner prays that he be allowed to take his
lawyers oath at the Court’s most convenient time.
ISSUE: WON petitioner Cuevas, Jr. should be allowed to take the
lawyers’ oath despite his participation in the initiation rites which
resulted in the death of a neophyte.
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s discharge from probation and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death
of the victim. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. Petitioner, however, is
exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live
strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Further, the Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas,
Jr., will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render
legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner
arthur m. Cuevas, jr., to take the lawyers oath and to sign the
roll of attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to
the payment of appropriate fees.
Attaching thereto the Order of the RTC of Antique discharging him
from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic
Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic,
through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo
Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph
Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the President of the Parish
Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique.
CASE NO. 5 / SAMANIEGO V. FERRER / AC NO. 7022, JUNE 18,
2008
FACTS: Early in 1996, complainant Marjorie Samaniego met
respondent Atty. Andrew Ferrer and the latter agreed to handle her
cases. Soon, Atty. Ferrer allegedly courted the complainant and the
two lived together as "husband and wife". In 1997, their daughter was
born, but their affair, however, ended in 2000. Since then, Atty. Ferrer
has failed to give support to their daughter. Thus, complainant filed
this petition before the IBP against respondent Atty. for immorality,
abandonment and willful refusal to give support to their daughter.
Complainant alleged that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a
relationship but did not think he was already married. On the other
hand, Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support their
daughter. However, he prayed that the IBP consider Ms.
Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with his wife and
children. He further reasoned that he found it unconscionable to
abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a
member of the bar.
HELD: YES. As provided by the Code of Professional Responsibility
under Canon, “ A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.” Rule 7.03 also provides that, “A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Atty.
Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair which ended in 2000. The
Court considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral
conduct subject to disciplinary action. On another point, even though
the complainant was not entirely blameless, that one complicit in the
affair complained of immorality against her co-principal does not
make this case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms.
Samaniego is in pari delicto. The Court's investigation is not about
Ms. Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct as one of its officers
and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer guilty of GROSS
IMMORALITY and, as recommended by the integrated bar of
the philippines and the office of the bar confidant, SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon
notice hereof, with WARNING that the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his
daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also agree with the Office of the
Bar Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair with Ms. Samaniego showed
his lack of good moral character as a member of the bar. We
dismiss, however, Ms. Samaniego's charge of abandonment since
Atty. Ferrer did not abandon them. He returned to his family.
CASE NO. 6 / ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT / AC NO. 1481, OCTOBER 17,
2008
FACTS: Complainant Rebecca Arnobit and respondent Atty.
Ponciano Arnobit were married in 1942, and 12 children were born
out of this union. Rebecca allegedly supported respondent through
law school, and she continuously supported him until he passed the
bar examinations. In 1968, however, respondent left the conjugal
home and started cohabiting with Benita Navarro, who later bore him
four more children. Benita was then already married to Melecio
Navarro, a fact which was allegedly known to the respondent.
Respondent’s infidelity, according to Rebecca, impelled her to file a
complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for
adultery against Benita and respondent later followed. In this present
case, Rebeca prays that the Court exercise its disciplinary power
over her husband on the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.
ISSUE: WON respondent Atty. Arnobit is guilty of immorality and
abandonment which is a ground for disbarment.
HELD: YES. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting
those moral standards. The fact that respondent’s philandering ways
are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save
the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. The
grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are
not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity. Undoubtedly,
respondent’s act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and
have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral
conduct.
Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED.
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis
of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
CASE NO. 7 / ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY V. DELA CRUZ / AC NO
6010, AUGUST 28, 2006
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz is a principal of Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS). Faculty
members and Staff of the aforementioned university filed a case for
disbarment against respondent on grounds of gross misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice. On the charge of grossly
immoral conduct, it was alleged that in 1982, respondent married
Teresita Rivera, but they separated in less than a year into the
marriage without seeking judicial recourse. Seven years after,
respondent married Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty
member of SLU-LHS. When the second marriage was entered into,
however, respondent’s prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still
subsisting. Then, in 1994, said second marriage was subsequently
annulled for being bigamous. Then, on the charge of malpractice, it
was alleged that respondent notarized certain legal documents on
different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of respondent’s
notarial commission in 1987.
ISSUE: WON respondent’s act constitutes gross immoral conduct
which warrant disbarment
HELD: NO. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly
immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment. The Court has laid
down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct,
vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. Undoubtedly, respondent
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him
as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was
still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
However, measured against the definition, the Court is not prepared
to consider respondent’s act as grossly immoral.
Respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two years, and another two
years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
commission or a total of four years of suspension.
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to
flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to
wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or
for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically
involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total
love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and
child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry with
relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted
ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the
pending criminal case for child abuse allegedly committed by him
against a high school student filed before the Prosecutors Office of
Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before
the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal
deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they
are still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the
respondent.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon
the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a
reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business
of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a
retirement plan even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit sharing agreement.
CASE NO. 8 / ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC. / BM NO. 553, JUNE
17, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Ulep seeks to prohibit respondent The
Legal Clinic from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of
the law profession other than those allowed by law. Petitioner alleges
that the advertisements of the respondent are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the
bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements. In its answer, respondent
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering
of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly.
ISSUE: WON the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., as advertised by it, can be performed by paralegals in the
Philippines.
HELD: NO. In our jurisdiction, the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. The practice of
law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Thus, the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law." That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out
its services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged
in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
Further, facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of
respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law.
CASE NO. 9 / GUBALLA V. CAGUIOA / 78 SCRA 207, JULY 29,
1977
FACTS: PetitionerJose Guballa is an operator of a public utility
vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident
resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo
Forteza Jr. A complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against
petitioner with the CFI of Bulacan. An Answer thereto was filed on
behalf of petitioner by Irineo Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates. Because petitioner and counsel failed to
appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice,
petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was
allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, a decision was
rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI.
Then, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a
different counsel, Atty. Isabelo Santos II. However the same was
denied and the decision became final. A Motion for Execution was
later filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was
granted by respondent Judge. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo
Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member
of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been
adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being
confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the fact that petitioner was represented at the initial
stage of the litigation by a person who is not a member of the Bar
amounted to a denial of petitioner's day in court.
HELD: NO. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the
proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner
was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence
and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other
words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was
subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was
at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not
only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference
on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same,
without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken
well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida,
Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" is hereby ordered to
explain, within 10 days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo
W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer when he is not a
member of the Bar.
CASE NO. 10 /PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS V. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR CO. / 42 SCRA 302,
NOVEMBER 29, 1971
FACTS: Petitioners Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas were
complainants in the case of PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Co., et al. After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of the
complainants. Thereafter, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also
filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's
fees for 25% of their backwages. On the same day, Quentin Muning
filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to
20% of the backwages. Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano
Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. Subsequently,
CIR awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, with the award of 10% to
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates, 10% to Quintin Muning, and 5% to
Atty. Atanacio Pacis. The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not
a lawyer, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
ISSUE: WON a non-lawyer may recover attorney's fees for legal
services rendered.
HELD: NO. It has been previously held by the Court that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a
non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral
and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no
less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear
or defend in court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle
the representative to compensation for such representation. The
award for attorney’s fees provided by law imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship. No one is entitled to recover
compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has been
duly admitted to practice and is an attorney in good standing at the
time.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside
insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's
fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
CASE NO. 11 / FIVE J TAXI V. NLRC / GR NO. 111474, AUGUST 22,
1994
FACTS: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon were hired by the petitioner Five J Taxi as taxi drivers. As
such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay
P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to
answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual
working day. Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for
the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits
as such was spent on repairs. When Maldigan insisted on the
reimbursement, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his
part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. Thus,
private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration
Office of NLRC, which later dismissed said complaint. Upon appeal,
NLRC affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter, but modified the
decision by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon
at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the
date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for
attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON Guillermo Pulia, private respondents' authorized
representative and a non-lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees.
HELD: NO. Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3
of PD 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or
any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be
true that Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a
reasonable compensation for his services necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless
the client's representative is a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by
deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses
and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to
order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners
of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's
deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of
this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
CASE NO. 12 / CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO / AC NO.
6290, JULY 14, 2004
FACTS:Complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of
respondent Atty. Ana Luz Cristal-Tenorio, charged the latter with
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office. The complainant alleged that the respondent,
among others, cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her
husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Complainant
bolstered her claim by submitting: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office where the name of Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a
senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio Group
identification card signed by the respondent as Chairperson where
her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. She added
that respondent’s husband even appeared in court hearings. Upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, respondent admitted that
Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo
Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners
because they have investments in her law office.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of the charge of cooperating in the
illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.
HELD: YES. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of
violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The term practice of law implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. In this case, Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he
holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted
and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
this purpose is attained.
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent
Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or
to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his
part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
CASE NO. 13 / BELTRAN, JR. V. ABAD / BM NO. 139, OCTOBER
11, 1984
FACTS: Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad, a successful bar
examinee but has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, in
contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the
fine. (121 SCRA 217). He paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr.,
the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO
MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact,
over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed
Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila
courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with
the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe should
be called to account for his association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B"
and "D", and the signatures therein, denied that he filed the same
and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he
appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the
said trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He
also testified that the only explanation he could give regarding the
signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been
effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he
(respondent) was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for
examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator,
to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his defense, sought the
assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare
respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures
appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which
latter signature he admits as genuine and as his own. The aforesaid
documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of
the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing
law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUES: WON Atty. Jacobe is liable in his collaboration with the
respondent.
HELD: YES. He violated Canon 9 Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not
delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar. in good
standing. A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not a member of
the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he must not take as
partner or associate in his law firm a person who is not a lawyer, a
lawyer who has been disbarred and a lawyer who has been
suspended from practice of law. The lawyer who assists in an
unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to
disciplinary action. Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to
explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
disciplined for collaborating and associating in the practice of the law
with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
CASE NO. 14 / AGUIRRE V. RANA / BM NO. 1036, JUNE 10, 2003
FACTS: Respondent Edwin Rana passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before he took his oath as
a member of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
filed a petition charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law
and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while
not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate wherein he filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated May 19, 2001 that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing for the Office of Vice-
Mayor for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan.
However, respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer, but as a person who knows the law.
Respondent admits signing the May 19, 2001 pleading, but he
explains that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
ISSUE: WON respondent is liable for indirect contempt of court for
having engaged in unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: YES. The Court held that respondent was engaged in
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do
so. The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In
Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had
not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in
the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The
fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
CASE NO. 15 / JUDGE LAQUINDANUM V. QUINTANA / AC NO.
7036, JUNE 29, 2009
FACTS: Executive Judge Lily Lydia Laquindanum of the RTC of
Midsayap, Cotabato filed an administrative case against Atty. Nestor
Quintana for the latter’s act of performing notarial functions in
Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for
allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence. Upon
investigation, Judge Laquindanum allegedly discovered that it was
Atty. Quintana’s wife who performed notarial acts whenever he was
out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit executed by
Kristine Guro and Elenita Ballentes. For his part, Atty. Quintana
admitted that the evidence presented by Guro and Ballentes were
signed by his wife, but such were the result of an entrapment
operation of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have
them notarized by his wife, when they knew that his wife is not a
lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to
stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
ISSUE: WON respondent Atty. Quintana is liable for the act of his
wife despite not having authorized the latter to notarize documents in
his absence.
HELD: YES. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes
full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. Respondent
cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wife’s act and that he did
not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally
accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his
personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary. Atty. Quintana
is personally accountable for the documents that he admitted were
signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing
the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of violating Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor
Q. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for
a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six months effective immediately, with a
WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt
with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date
of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt
that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed the
following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial acts with an
expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his
absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.
Canon 10
1. Director of Lands v. Adorable
Facts: Adorable files a land claim before the Director of Lands. The
case went to the CA for appeal. However, the war broke out. After the
war, Adorable files a reconstitution case before the SC believing that
the case was not resolved by the CA. Atty. Zamora, counsel of the
appellee of the case informed the Court that the case was already
settled by the CA in favor of Adorable.
Issue: WON the conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
Held: Yes. The conduct of Atty. Zamora is proper.
The Court in this case praised Atty. Zamora’s conduct as the highest
standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becomes of the
deserving member of the bar. Hence, the act of Atty. Zamora is
proper.
2. Carlet v. CA and Zarate
Facts: Carlet who is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Sevillo
through Atty. Jimenez files before the Trial Court an action for
reconvenyance of property of Sevillo. Zarate then moved to dismiss
such action invoking res judicata since it was the same facts that had
been settled by the trial court, CA and SC. The action was then
dismissed by the Trial Court and ordered Atty. Jimenez regarding
forum-shopping. Atty. Jimenez then appealed it before the CA, but to
no avail.
Issue: WON the action of Atty. Jimenez is proper.
Held: No. The action of Atty. Jimenez is not proper.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court”.
In the case at bar, the action of Atty Jimenez of filing a reconveyance
case despite his knowledge that there is finality of the case shows
that he does not have good faith towards the court.
Hence, his conduct is not proper.
The Insurance Life Assurance Co. Employees Assoc. v.
Insular Life Assurance Co.
Facts: The Employees Assoc. Files before the CIR a complaint for
unfair labor practice against the Company. The CIR then dismissed
such complaint. In its decision, CIR Judge Martinez misquoted a SC
decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees
Ass’n: (1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT
appear in the original;
(2) Martinez used “For it is settled that...”; the original reads, “For it
must be remembered...” (3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of
Martinez is actually part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in
the SC decision.
In the respondents’ brief, counsels for respondents quoted the CIR’s
decision
Issue: Whether or not the Judge and the respondent’s counsel are
liable for contempt.
Held: No. The Judge and the respondent’s counsel are not liable for
contempt.
In citing SC’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts,
judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word
and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This
is because “only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” (Miranda v. Imperial).
However, there was good faith in both the Judge and the
respondent’s counsel, hence their action is not liable for contempt.
4. Del Rosario v. Chingcuanco and Imperio
Facts: The CAR rendered a decision evicting Del Rosario from the
land which he leases from Imperio. However, the former refused to
vacate the land since the latter does not want to refund him of the
improvement he had done to the property. Del Rosario, further, filed a
motion before the SC to stay such execution. Due this, Imperio filed a
petition to cite Del Rosario’s counsel in contempt since said counsel
quoted a non-existing SC decision. However, it was discovered that
such belief was brought by a mere typographical error.
Issue: WON the conduct of Del Rosario’s counsel deserves a
disciplinary action.
Held: No. The conduct of Del Rosario’s counsel does not deserve a
disciplinary action.
In this case, the Court ruled that the name of the case was given
correctly and there was clearly no deception on the part of the
counsel.
Hence, the conduct of said counsel does not deserve a disciplinary
action.
SURIGAO MINERAL VS. CLORIBEL (31 SCRA 1 01/09/1970)
In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F.
Meads
In 1968, the Supreme Court promulgated a unanimous decision (24
SCRA 491; G.R. No. L-27072) which was not favorable to MacArthur
International Minerals Co. The latter’s lawyer, Atty. Vicente Santiago
then filed a motion for reconsideration. Eventually, a third motion for
reconsideration was submitted by him where the following paragraph
was stated:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for
a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala
daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of
court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending of the
violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez
who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is
the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials are just amoral?
Scattered in his motion were other statements where he attacked the
1968 decision of the Supreme Court as false, erroneous, and illegal.
In another motion, Atty. Santiago sought the inhibition of two
Justices: Justice Fred Castro, because allegedly, he is the brother of
the vice president of the opposing party. And Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion because immediately after the 1968 decision, his son
was appointed to a significant position in the government. (Here Atty.
Santiago implied that the justices were not fair and that their decision
was influenced).
In his defense, Atty. Santiago said that he originally deleted the
above paragraph and was only included due to inadvertence. But
that any rate, he averred that the language he used was necessary
to defend his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Santiago is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. Lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. Thus, Santiago’s
defense is not tenable.
A lawyer must avoid language that tend to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief in the judicial system. A lawyer’s duties to the
Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any
valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.’
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.
Atty. Santiago was fined for his infractions.
5. Munoz v. CA and Sutton

Facts: Sutton made some misrepresentations in the facts of the
case where she seeks a review before the SC.
Issue: WON such conduct deserves disciplinary action.
adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties
consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The
private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the
Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

Held: Yes.The conduct of Atty. Sutton deserves disciplinary action.
Under the Canon 10 of the CPR, a lawyer shall owes candor and
honesty to the court.
In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Sutton made false facts in her
pleading for review in SC is a clear manifestation that she lacks
candor for the court.
Hence, her conduct warrants a disciplinary action.
6. Adez Realty v. CA
Facts: Atty. Dacanay made some intercalation in the decision of the
Court of Appeals when he appealed before the SC. Due this, the
Court had suspended him indefinitely. Dacanay argued that it was his
client who made the intercalation and later on he admitted that his
secretary made the intercalation on the document.
Issue: WON the conduct of Dacanay warrants a suspension.
Held: Yes. The conduct of Dacanay warrants suspension.
Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of the paper, language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority.
In the case at bar, the fact that Atty. Dacanay made the intercalation
on the CA decision makes him liable under such rule.
Hence, his conduct warrants a disciplinary action.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO
HERRERA,respondents.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition
over the said properties.
Ruling: By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity
of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him
any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in
the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have
tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed
his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his
oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his]
clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not
a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a
fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded
not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and
certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man
for money."
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own
shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot
overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable
for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his
lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other.

Facts: The private respondent own several parcels of land located in

Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He secured loans
from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the
parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said
loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The
private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said
foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after
the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation
entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be
insured another year for the said properties. Included in the
stipulations were the attorney’s fees amounting to Php 100,000.00.
The private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it
came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the
attorney’s fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed
by petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem
the parcels of land and to register the same to his name.

Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the

parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties
were already registered under the petitioner’s name. The private
respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said