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EP Standard EP WELL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT MANUAL Restricted

EP Well Integrity
Management Manual
COMPANY STANDARD

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DOCUMENT HISTORY
Custodian Davie Stewart - T&OE Global Lead Well Services
Approved by John Rusz – T&OE Global Lead Production Technology
Document type Business Control Documents – Company Standard
Distribution Regional Chiefs Production Technology, Well Engineering &
Well Services
Available as download copy for all staff

Date Issue Reason for change


October 2006 0 First issue

This document will be maintained live on the SIEP intranet site. The Web-based
document will be the controlled version and revision announcements will be published
on the web. Copies or extracts of this manual, which have been downloaded from the
website, are uncontrolled copies and cannot be guaranteed to be the latest version.
FOREWORD
The purpose of the Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) is to describe how Shell EP
manages the integrity of its wells during the design and construction phases and then
safeguards that integrity during the operational phase, through to Well Abandonment.
Establishing and maintaining well integrity throughout the well lifecycle prevents the
occurrence of HSE incidents, production loss and costly remedial activities.
Well Integrity is therefore fundamental to maintaining a safe working environment, to
extracting maximum business value from an Asset and to upholding Company reputation. It is
a prerequisite to achieving lasting business success, a continued ‘license to operate’ and
positive and constructive relations with stakeholders and customers. It is therefore imperative
to demonstrate to regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders that the integrity of wells is
being effectively managed and that a system, allowing continuous improvement, is embedded in
the organization, the work processes, and practices.
The WIMM is the formal manual for wells in support of the EP Technical Integrity Objectives
(draft Standard), under the Technical Integrity Framework (TIF).
The WIMM spans several EPBM processes, namely EP63 (Design, Drill, Service & Abandon
Wells), EP72 (Maintain and Assure Facilities Integrity) and EP73 (Execute Well & Reservoir
Surveillance). The WIMM is supported by T&OE Minimum Standards on Technical Integrity
and Technical Authorities, and the Global Processes on Integrity Assurance (GP 16) and
Operations Readiness and Assurance (GP12).
The WIMM is developed to provide Operating Units (OU) and Service Companies (SC) with
the guidance to develop and implement an effective Well Integrity Management System using
proven practices and processes. The document focuses on the principles and the fundamental
building blocks for managing Well Integrity and will distinguish between mandatory (“shall”)
requirements and recommendations/best practices (“should”).
John Rusz
Global Discipline Leader Production Technology
Process Owner of Lifecycle Well Integrity Management

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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Purpose 1
1.2. Principles & Objectives of WIMM 1
1.3. Definition of Well Integrity 2
1.4. Overview and Scope 2
1.5. Relationship of WIMM to TIF (Technical Integrity Framework) 3
1.6. Relationship of WIMM to EPBM 5
1.7. Well Boundaries 5
2. ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6
2.1. Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart 6
2.2. Activities and Responsibilities 7
3. WELL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PROCESS DESCRIPTION 11
3.1. Well Integrity Management Map 11
3.2. Process Deliverables 11
4. DATA MANAGEMENT 12
4.1. Principles 12
4.2. Monitoring and Tracking 12
4.3. Well Status Traffic Lights 13
5. WELL FAILURE MODEL (WFM) 14
6. WELL INTEGRITY ASSURANCE 15
6.1. SCE Definition 15
6.2. SCE Performance Standards 15
6.3. Well Barriers 15
6.4. Leak Criteria 16
6.5. Corrosion Management 17
6.6. Wellhead and Xmas Trees 18
7. ANNULUS PRESSURE MANAGEMENT 19
7.1. Principles 19
7.2. Types of annular pressures 19
7.3. Calculation of MAASP 19
7.4. Setting of MAWOP (Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating Pressure) 20
7.5. Special provision for the ‘A’ Annulus MAWOP 20
7.6. ‘A’ Annulus MINAP (gaslifted wells) 20
7.7. Management and Control 21
7.8. Revisiting MAWOP values 22
8. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 24
8.1. Key Performance Indicators 24
8.2. Performance Improvement 24

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1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of the Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) is to describe how
Shell EP manages the integrity of its wells during the design and construction phases
and then safeguards that integrity during the operational phase, until the Well
Abandonment has been completed.
The WIMM is developed to provide Operating Units (OU) with the means to
implement an effective local Well Integrity Management System (WIMS) using proven
practices and processes. The document focuses on the principles and the fundamental
building blocks for managing Well Integrity and will distinguish between mandatory
requirements and recommendations/best practices.

1.2. Principles & Objectives of WIMM


This Manual describes what activities shall be done to manage WI throughout the well
lifecycle. Local Well Integrity Management Systems (at Region and/or OU level) shall
assure that those activities are done.

1.2.1. Well Integrity Principles


The following principles shall be followed by all staff and contractors involved in any
way in managing well integrity:
All EP assets must clearly demonstrate WI status at all times and all assets shall
set WI targets consistent with the requirements of these principles.
Whenever a conflict exists between completing repair to safety critical equipment
and other non-integrity related work, the safety critical work will always take
priority.
Deviations from Company Standards shall be approved by absolute exception.
Deviations shall not be approved to allow continued production unless it can be
clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the risks are tolerable.
The complexity of the required intervention shall never be a reason for delaying
the beginning (planning) of safety critical work. Consistent with EP priorities,
resources must immediately be made available to begin remedial work. Likewise
complexity, and therefore the time possible to complete work, shall not alone be
a reason to continue production pending repair.
All Asset leaders are expected to continually and consistently promote and
demonstrate these principles to their teams.
All parties with WI responsibilities shall fully understand their responsibilities
and shall be given training opportunities to maintain the required competency
levels. If they have any doubts regarding WI issues they should immediately raise
them with their supervisor.

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1.2.2. Objectives
The WIMM aims to provide a clear understanding of the expectations of Well Integrity
Management within Shell EP. This will enable local well integrity management systems
to be consistently implemented and rigorously followed. The WIMM document itself is
aimed at all parties involved in WI, including the Asset Management, Production
Operations, Maintenance, Production Technology, Well Engineering and Well Services.
The WIMM document is intended to:
Give clear guidance in creation of a local WI Management System.
Outline the expectations of lifecycle management of well integrity. It describes
the process, organisation and tools safeguarding and demonstrating the integrity
of the wells throughout their lifecycle including when permanently abandoned.
Combine good practices into one integrated approach to WI management.
Identify the roles and responsibilities of the personnel that are accountable for
delivering the necessary well integrity assurance.

1.3. Definition of Well Integrity


Well Integrity in design & construction is achieved when:
Functional performance standards (e.g. to isolate pressure) and operating
parameters (e.g. pressures, stresses, fluid/corrosion properties) have been
quantified and conditions modeled,
Significant functional failure modes have been considered and have the potential
to require a redesign. (e.g. corrosion induced tubing leak resulting in improved
tubing metallurgy),
The operating envelope has been updated prior to the well handover, to reflect
the changes made and lessons learned during construction (e.g excessive casing
wear or sub-optimal cementation),
Operating and maintenance requirements have been specified.
Well integrity in operation is achieved when:
Under specified operating conditions, there is no intolerable risk of failure
endangering the safety of personnel, environment or asset value.

1.4. Overview and Scope


Establishing and maintaining well integrity throughout the well life cycle prevents the
occurrence of HSE incidents, production loss and costly remedial activities.
The early detection of problems may lead to the avoidance of injuries to people (some
potentially lethal) and costly remedial work, while problems left undetected have the
potential to escalate and ultimately lead to uncontrolled situations (even blowouts).
Well Integrity is therefore fundamental to maintaining a safe working environment, to
extracting maximum business value from an Asset and to upholding Company
reputation. It is a prerequisite to achieving lasting business success, a continued ‘license
to operate’ and positive and constructive relations with stakeholders and customers. It
is therefore imperative to demonstrate to regulators, shareholders and other

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stakeholders that the integrity of wells is being effectively managed and that a system,
allowing continuous improvement, is embedded in the organization, the work processes,
and practices.
The activities described under this Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM) apply to
all exploration, appraisal and development wells designed, constructed and operated by
Shell EP Companies.
The WIMM spans all activities that directly affect well integrity (WI) from the early
stages of design through to well abandonment, including conceptual and detailed well
design, well construction / handover, well production operations and well intervention/
repair under Well Services.
Production Technology is the process owner for Well Integrity Management throughout
the entire well lifecycle. Carrying out Well Integrity activities is a line responsibility that
resides within the Wells and Production organizations. Depending on the lifecycle
phase, each organization has a distinct role:
Wells - for establishing Well Integrity through design, procurement, construction,
and commissioning (i.e., definition and application of design specifications,
performance standards, and verification).
Production - for safeguarding Well Integrity (i.e., application and verification of
good operating and maintenance practices, Performance Standards, Management
of Change and Deviation Control processes).
During all phases there is a crucial supporting role for the Technical Authority (TA) to
risk assess both deviations and Management of Change.

1.5. Relationship of WIMM to TIF (Technical Integrity Framework)


The Technical Integrity Framework (TIF) document provides the over-riding guidance
about general asset integrity policies within the Group.
Technical Integrity Framework
The TIF describes the following elements of a comprehensive asset integrity system that
are generic to all assets and hence not repeated within this WIMM document Structure
of the asset integrity management system.
Policy / Commitment Statement
Minimum Standards for Technical Integrity
Processes and Procedures
Integrity Audits
Management of Deviation and Change Control
Conflict Resolution
Risk Assessment
There are also specific mandatory documents that must be applied to local Technical
Integrity Management Systems.

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These are:
Global Process 9 for
http://sww-toe.shell.com/process9/
Well Delivery
Global Process 16 for
http://sww-toe.shell.com/process16/
Integrity Assurance

In addition, there are Minimum Standards that shall be complied with, these are:
Wells Minimum http://sww.shell.com/ep/toe/minimum_standards/wells.ht
Standard ml
Technical Integrity http://sww.shell.com/ep/toe/minimum_standards/integrity
Minimum Standard .html

The WIMM document fits within the global TI document structure (and hierarchy) as
indicated below, under the Operational Excellence document structure. The specific
purpose of each document is as follow:
Global Technical Integrity Provide direction and guidance for Technical Integrity
Framework (TIF) Management of Physical Assets in Shell EP.

Global Well Integrity Management Describes what activities shall be done to manage Well
Manual (WIMM) Integrity.

Well Integrity Guideline (WIG) Supports the Global Well Integrity Management Standard.
Contains the procedures, monitoring and reporting tools
that are deemed necessary to meet the expectations set
forth in the Global WIMM document.

Local Well Integrity Management Assures that the activities described in the Global WIMM
System (WIMS) are done locally.

Well Integrity Assurance Procedures Local adaptation of the WIG. Supports the local
(WIAP) Management System. Describes local practices and
procedures.

Global EP documents Business Unit Adaptation Documents

Global TI Framework
(TIF)

Well Integrity Management Manual Well Integrity Management System


(WIMM) (WIMS)

Well Integrity Guideline Well Integrity Assurance Procedures


(WIG) (WIAP)

Figure 1, Global TI Document Structure

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1.6. Relationship of WIMM to EPBM


The Well Integrity Management Standard spans several EPBM processes, namely
EP.63 – Design, Construct, Modify, Service & Abandon Wells
EP.72 – Maintain & assure Facilities Integrity
EP.73 – Execute Well & Reservoir Surveillance

EPBM v 4 Alignment of T&OE Global Processes


T&OE GP-04 T&OE GP-05 T&OE GP-07
Geophysical Acquisition HC Development Integrated Reservoir
and processing Planning Modelling

Upgrade Portfolio Explore Develop Produce Abandon

T&OE GP-01 EP.40


HC Resource Volume HRVM Manage Growth Strategy and Plan
Management Manage
Hydrocarbon EP.41
Resource Volumes Develop New Business
hc resource EP.80
maturation plans EP.42 Manage
EP.01 Develop Exploration Business Abandonment
T&OE GP-02 Manage
Asset Reference business ASS
EP Business Plan asset reference plans
Planning plan Manage Assets asset management
EP.60
integrated Plan Hydrocarbon Development

EP.02 activity plans


EP.51 EP.61
Manage IAP Execute Exploration
Reputation Activities Develop/ Update Integrated Reservoir Model
T&OE GP- 03 Integrated Activity T&O GP-09
Integrated Activity Planning
EP.52 EP.62
Well
Planning Execute Appraisal Delivery
Activities Acquire and Process Geophysical Data
EP.03
Manage PRO
EP Business
business Manage Process EP.63 EP.63 EP.63
Management controls Design, Drill & Modify Well(s) Service Well(s) Abandon Well(s) T&OE GP-12
System Operational Readiness
process management systems EP.64 and Assurance
EP.64
Manage EP Global Decommission
Design, Construct, Modify Facilities
Business Facilities

Regional EP.71 T&OE GP-16


Produce Hydrocarbons
EP.65 Integrity
EP.04 Execute Assurance
Manage ACT Operations Readiness EP.72
Legal Entity Manage Activities and Maintain & Assure Facilities Integrity
(Set-up-Operate-Wind up)
Assurance
T&OE GP-17 OpCos Activities T&OE GP-08
Logistics EP.73
Management of an Execute Well & Reservoir Surveillance Well and Reservoir
Management EP.05 Surveillance
Govern opportunity /project
Non Operated EP.74
Ventures ORP Market and Trade Hydrocarbons T&OE GP-13
JVs Opportunity Production
T&OE GP-25Manage Company & JVs Realisation Process Opportunity/project plans Forecasting
Technology
Development
EP.13 EP.14 EP.15 EP.16 EP.17 EP.18 EP.19 EP.20
Manage Manage Manage Manage Provide HSSE Manage Provide Staff Provide T&OE GP-14
Supply Chain Logistics Finance Information Support Geomatics Services Human Production System
Processes Resources
Optimisation
EP.21 EP.22 EP.23 EP.24 EP.25 EP.30 to 36
Manage and Manage Manage Provide IT Provide T&OE GP -15
Deploy Legal Application Solutions and Laboratory Facilitative
Technology Processes Portfolio & Services Services processes Support HC Production
Integration
OPF VAR PERT Processes Information
T&OE GP-18 EP.30 EP.31 EP.32 EP.33 EP.34 EP.35 EP.36 Management
Global Information Benchmarking Opportunity Value Assurance Project Assurance Practices Worth Risk & Opportunity Realise the Facilitative
Management Framing Reviews (VARs) Replicating Management Limit
Processes

T&OE GP-11 T&OE GP-21 T&OE GP-22 T&OE GP-19 T&OE GP-24 T&OE GP-23 T&O GPE-20
Wells Software Benchmarking of Benchmarking of Opportunity Project Execution Practices Worth Risk
Portfolio Management Project Performance Operational Framing Reviews Replicating Management
Performance

Figure 2, EPBM v 4 Alignment of Global Processes

1.7. Well Boundaries


The local Well Integrity Management System shall define the well boundaries that
specifically impact on the responsibilities for managing WI (e.g. upstream or
downstream of the choke flange; upstream or downstream of X-mass tree in subsea
wells).

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2. Organisation and Responsibilities


2.1. Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart
The local Well Integrity Management System shall provide clarity over accountability
and responsibilities for each activity falling under lifecycle well integrity management.
The RACI chart below provides a high level overview of the WIMM steps, and their
alignment with the Well Delivery Process (WDP) steps and across disciplines.

Development

WI Technical
WIMM Step

Engineering

Technology
WDP Step

Production

Production

Authority
Services
Subsea
Well

Well
No

No
Activity

WDP 3 to
1 Well Charter AR C R I
6
WDP 7 to
2 Well Functional Specifications AR C R I
9
3 Detailed Well Design WDP 11 C AR R C I
WDP 15 & i
4 Construct / service well C AR R AR C I
16
5 Calculate and set annulus MAASPs R AR I
6 Prepare Handover Documents WDP 18 C AR R I I
7 Sign-off Handover document C R R A C I
8 Calculate MAWOP I I C AR C
9 Monitor Well & Annuli WDP 19 R AR C
10 Manage Annulus Pressure R C AR C
Carry-out Well maintenance (preventative &
11 R R AR C C
corrective)
12 Carry out annulus investigation C R A C
13 Carry out MAASP / MAWOP re-calculation R C A C
14 Carry out Technical Review C C C AR C
Monitor Asset Compliance with WIMM
15 C C A
requirements
16 Review, maintain and update process I I I I I AR
WDP 7 to
17 Well Abandonment C R R A C C
18

Table 1, Well Integrity Lifecycle RACI Chart


RACI Legend
Code Title What the title means
R Responsible Responsible party, i.e., does it or gets it done. Controls the quality of the deliverable or
task.
A Accountable Is accountable for the activity to take place. May formally accept or reject the
deliverable. Should be consulted by Responsible party for guidance.
C Consult Contributing party, i.e., must be involved in the creation of the deliverable or execution
of the task.
I Inform Informed party. Receives copy of the deliverable or completion notification for the task.

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2.2. Activities and Responsibilities


The activities listed in the RACI chart (table 1) are described in the sections below.

2.2.1. Activities breakdown

WIMM Step 1. Well Charter


The Well Charter should provide clarity of purpose for the well objectives and
deliverables, and in addition identify the well functionalities that may be desirable from
a Production perspective, with due regard to life-cycle well integrity management.

WIMM Step 2. Well Functional Specifications


The purpose of the Well Functional Specifications is to capture a comprehensive set of
data and requirements to enable Wells to proceed with the detailed well design. It also
summarizes the long-term objectives of the well (e.g. a producer, injector or
observation well) and provides input to the detailed well design process with key
hydrocarbon characteristics and selected Critical Success Factors. Its compilation
should be a joint effort of the Development, Production Technology and Wells
organisations.

WIMM Step 3. Detailed Well Design


Detailed well design work is performed by Well Engineering in consultation with
Production Technology and in compliance with the Shell Group guidelines. Subsea
wells will also involve participation of the Subsea Engineering group.
Well Integrity issues that will be addressed include (but are not limited to):
Structural capacity of surface casing (and where applicable the conductor) to
support all axial loads imparted by suspended internal casing & tubing strings,
wellheads, BOP loads and operational loads, etc
Structural capacity to withstand dynamic loading, torque and bending moments
Compliance with Shell’s Casing & Tubing Design Guide.
Casing & Tubing thread selection, including integrity envelope, qualification
testing, etc
Determination of life cycle erosion and corrosion
Metallurgy of completion (production casing, tubing, etc)
Life cycle integrity of well bore seals (liner hanger, wellhead, Xmas tree, packer
operating envelope, etc)
Zonal isolation capacity of cement
Life cycle Barrier Philosophy compliance
Capacity to plug and abandon the well in accordance with Group Guidelines.

WIMM Step 4. Construct / Service well


Well Engineering is the ultimate accountable party during the well construction
activities, and the authority with regards to WI assurance during this phase.

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Subsea wells will involve Subsea Engineering during construction.


Well servicing activities are to be seen as a pause in the operate phase of the well,
during which the well is handed over to Well Services for a specific operation. During
that operation, Well Services is the ultimate accountable party, and the authority for
well integrity assurance. Consultation is however required with Production Technology
who oversees lifecycle aspects of the well.

WIMM Step 5. Calculate and set annulus MAASPs


The MAASPs constitute the core of the integrity envelope and are set at the time of
handover. For more details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7.

WIMM Step 6. Prepare Handover Documents


The handover of wells to the Asset should be formalised through a process that outlines
the expectations for information to be handed over together with the physical well
asset. Wells organization is responsible for collating that information.

WIMM Step 7. Sign-off Handover Document


The local Well Integrity Management System should provide clarity of expectations
regarding the sign-off of the handover document for both the Development / Wells and
Asset / Production organizations.

WIMM Step 8. Calculate MAWOP


The MAWOPs are calculated by Production Technology (derived from the MAASP) and
constitute the core of the operating envelope for the well. For more details about
annulus pressure management, refer to section 7.

WIMM Step 9. Monitor well and annuli


The well status condition (in particular the annulus pressure and annulus fluid levels) is
monitored by Production Operations. For subsea wells, this activity will involve Subsea
Surveillance. The local well integrity management system shall outline a requirement for
this data to be reviewed at regular intervals. This is for confirmation that integrity
remains intact, is safeguarded and that the well can continue in operation. For more
details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7.

WIMM Step 10. Manage Annulus Pressure


Production Operations is accountable for the management of annular pressure. For
subsea wells, this activity will involve Subsea Surveillance. For more details about
annulus pressure management, refer to section 7.

WIMM Step 11.Carry-out well maintenance (preventative and corrective)


The Asset (Production Operations) has accountability for preventative and corrective
well maintenance to be carried out (this excludes well intervention for which WS is
accountable – Ref. Step 4). The responsibility is shared with Well Services and with
Subsea Surveillance for subsea wells. The local well integrity management system should
provide clarity over what tasks are to be carried out by each organisation.

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WIMM Step 12. Carry-out annulus investigation


Production Technology is accountable for this activity, as custodian of the well integrity
envelope. Consultation is required with the Technical Authority. The local well integrity
management system should provide clarity over the appropriate triggers for annulus
investigation.

WIMM Step 13. Carry-out MAASP/MAWOP recalculation


Production Technology is accountable for this activity, as custodian of the well integrity
envelope. Those changes must be administered through the MOC process. For more
details about annulus pressure management, refer to section 7.

WIMM Step 14. Carry-out technical review


Production Technology is accountable for technical reviews, as custodian of the well
integrity envelope. This entails assessing whether or not identified anomalies are
acceptable, require repair or require a change to the well’s allowable pressure operating
envelope. Any change to the well’s operating envelope must be done through the MOC
process.

WIMM Step 15. Monitor Asset Compliance with WIMM requirements


The Well Integrity Technical Authority is accountable for monitoring Assets compliance
with the WIMM requirements as part of the Well Integrity Assurance process. This
activity is supported by the generation and reporting of well integrity KPI’s for each
Asset.

WIMM Step 16. Review, maintain and update process


The Well Integrity Technical Authority provides lifecycle oversight of the well integrity
process. As such, he is the custodian of the local well integrity management system and
is accountable for its review and update.

WIMM Step 17. Well Abandonment


Wells will be abandoned with due consideration given to the lifetime integrity
requirement to provide permanent barriers in the well. Such permanent barriers will
prevent cross flow between formations and prevent flow to surface. Consideration shall
also be given to the long-term consequence of any materials (wellheads, drill cuttings,
etc) left on or above the seabed (offshore wells), in addition to the potential for
degradation of any material used in the abandonment process.

2.2.2. Responsibilities for WIMM process execution


Proper execution of the well integrity management process (i.e. day to day) entails the
co-ordination of a number of well integrity activities at Asset level, including the
reporting of integrity issues. Those responsibilities may be filled from a number of
disciplines or positions, but could also be consolidated into one position. The local well
integrity management system shall provide clarity as to how the responsibilities for
process execution are allocated. That includes carrying out the following generic tasks.

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Create / gain approval for OU specific Well failure Model (WFM) with TA
support
Create / gain approval for safety critical tasks associated with WIT & SIT for
agreed local well types
Develop / schedule & maintain SAP / Maintenance Management System (MMS)
tasks (e.g. eWIMS checklists).
Implement / operate database (e.g. eWIMS) for all wells assigned to a particular
asset area - collate and validate well integrity data in database and MMS (e.g.
SAP)
Co-ordinate / lead Technical Reviews / QRAs etc associated with well changes /
failures specifically highlighted with the potential to impact well integrity
Create annulus investigation programmes and review results
Analyse well integrity test results, ensure WFM action codes are correctly
assigned and follow up on mitigating action with responsible parties
Ensure effective well operating envelope data handover between Well
Engineering and Operations
Create / input to WI part of well proposals where intervention for repair is
required
Manage process for scheduled changes in MMS of WIT / SIT
Creation and management of budgets for WI maintenance as required by owner
Report KPI’s as required

2.2.3. Specific Role of the Technical Authority


Each Region/OU shall have a Well Integrity Technical Authority, in line with the
Technical Authorities framework. The responsibilities of the Well Integrity TA include:
Provide technical decisions in determining how to manage wells whose integrity
has been compromised
Document and manage the process by which well integrity is defined and
safeguarded over the well lifecycle
Develop well integrity policies and guidelines
Oversee the Well Handover Process.
Provide the assurance role for barrier check
The local well integrity management system shall identify corresponding job
descriptions to meet the role description given above.

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3. Well Integrity Management Process Description


3.1. Well Integrity Management Map
The Appendix 1 maps the relationships between key Local and Global processes,
controls and documents. The relationships are explained in more detail in the
subsequent chapters.

3.2. Process Deliverables


This section describes what each WI lifecycle phase has been designed to deliver

DESIGN
It has to be ensured that WI risks have been taken into account whilst designing the
well to ensure the delivered well has integrity throughout its anticipated lifecycle.

CONSTRUCT
It has to be ensured that the well has been constructed as per functional specifications
and design intent and that variations from design intent have been verified to maintain
integrity assurance.

OPERATE
It has to be ensured that the well is operated within its defined operating envelope and
that any variances are dealt with in line with the Performance Standard / WFM.

MAINTAIN
It has to be ensured that all assurance tasks (preventative) are carried out within defined
frequencies and that any failures (corrective) are dealt with in line with WFM
requirements.

SUSPEND
It has to be ensured that all assurance tasks are still conducted in accordance with WFM
codes and definitions (which may include decreased testing / monitoring frequencies)

ABANDON
It has to be ensured that the well has been abandoned as per design intent, and that
there is confirmation through post abandonment assurance task to provide integrity
assurance.

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4. Data Management
4.1. Principles
It is important that the information used to assess the status of well integrity be
collected and interpreted correctly to reduce the risk of loss of integrity. Operational
guidelines and this WIMM document address the data required and the interpretation
that is necessary.
Achieving well integrity requires integrity at all stages, starting with data acquisition.
This requires all measurement gauges shall be calibrated and of appropriate type, scale
and accuracy for the measurement required, as a basic pre-requisite.
Data shall be collected, whether electronically or manually, in a consistent manner.
Whilst manual data gathering systems based, for example, on electronic files and
spreadsheets, can be acceptable, they become less effective as the volume of data grows
and may also suffer from security problems. Where practical, it is preferred to use
dedicated software such as the eWIMS tool that has been developed by SIEP
specifically for the lifecycle management of well integrity data.

4.2. Monitoring and Tracking


It is recommended to implement a tool (preferably eWIMS) with the functionality to
manage well integrity data throughout the well lifecycle, while interfacing other data
management tools for:
Maintenance scheduling – SAP or other MMS
Deviation management - FSR
Well mechanical status - DIMS / EDM / OpenWells
Production data – EPROMS / Energy Components
Working together, as illustrated in the diagram below, the tools provide reporting
capabilities and trend analysis during monitoring.
The eWIMS software tool (and the associated checklists / processes, and user guide) is
recommended by SIEP to allow Shell Global Regions to manage (either manually or
automatically) the WI process using a common system of tools throughout the well
lifecycle (Design, Construct, Operate, Intervene & Abandon).
eWIMS also enables the retrieval of statistical well integrity data, such as the number of
wells with overdue integrity monitoring or testing activities and the number of wells
operating under dispensation etc.
Where eWIMS is not used, an alternative WI Management tool should mirror the same
capability (utilizing similar processes, forms and checklists).

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Maint scheduling SAP FSR


SCE Status/Deviations

Automatic
Update

Testing & eWIMS EDM OpenWells


Maintenance Well Integrity Management System
Results Construction Data

Logic Loop
PI / EC
Production Data

WFM
Well Failure Severity
Action Code Required

Figure 2, eWIMS and interfaces

4.3. Well Status Traffic Lights


The well integrity tracking tool uses three colours to annotate all wells.

Satisfactory (Green) All monitoring and testing requirements have been


fulfilled within test criteria.

Unsatisfactory Failures have occurred where time based Actions are


(Amber) required.

Immediate Action Failures have occurred that require immediate action, or


(Red) scheduled WIT or SIT testing has not been carried out.

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5. Well Failure Model (WFM)


The Well Failure Model (WFM) is a risk-based matrix that has been developed to clearly
define cause and effects of failure types in wells on one single matrix. Its purpose is to
demonstrate that all of the possible well failure modes have been identified and that
each one has a suitable strategy in place for both monitoring and preventative
maintenance, such that well technical integrity is safeguarded.
The WFM should be at the centre of the local well integrity management system as it
clearly defines the ‘rules’ (the rules are codes and definitions) to be followed and the
key cause and effect criteria for programming of the tracking tool (e.g. eWIMS or
equivalent).
WFM creation and approval required input from the local experts in the PT, Operations
and Well Engineering / Services communities.
The following describes each part of the model:
Well Types
The naming convention and the number of well types are derived from agreeing the
minimum number of well types that will allow appropriate testing requirements and
resultant actions upon discovery of an integrity issue.
Well Failure Modes & Codes
Local decisions must be made on the level of failure mode detail to be used.
Descriptions of reasoning are covered as cell notes on the spreadsheet that can be seen
when viewing the model electronically.
Monitoring and Maintenance Frequencies
Assurance task frequencies should be based on “Best Engineering Experience and
Practices” and be refined to reflect experience and failure rate data. Those frequencies
must be aligned with regulatory requirements wherever applicable.
Action Codes
These are set globally to ensure consistency of meaning and cannot therefore be
changed locally. They are placed in ascending order of importance and risk - e.g. a
failure type 1 can be planned as low priority, whereas a 9 or 10 must be dealt with
immediately.
Guidance Notes
Guidance notes provide a more detailed explanation to allow the user to plan the
correct course of action and are based on the local Well Integrity Management System
and applicable legislation.
For an example of Well Failure model, refer to Appendix 2.

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6. Well Integrity Assurance


6.1. SCE Definition
Safety Critical Elements (Reference DEP 80.80.00.15 EPE) are integrity barriers,
including equipment, hardware, and related control systems, of which the failure could
lead to a Major Accident or Event or mitigate the consequences of a Major Accident or
Event.
The Appendix 3 captures the elements defined as safety critical for wells.

6.2. SCE Performance Standards


Performance Standards (PS) describe the minimum functional specification for a SCE.
A Performance Standard is a statement, which can be expressed in qualitative or
quantitative terms, of the performance required of a system, item of equipment, person
or procedure, and which is used as the basis for managing the hazard (e.g. planning,
measuring, control or audit) through the life cycle of the installation.
The PS for wells in an OU is owned and developed by the Technical Authority.
Performance Standards for wells follow up actions from failures that have been defined
in the local WFM.

6.2.1. PS Assurance Task (WIT, SIT)


Two tasks have been designed to provide assurance that a SCE operates as defined in
the Performance Standard. The Testing Matrix in the local WFM is used to define what
activities form part of these tasks split by well type.
The frequency of testing should be set by well type which takes account of design and
location / associated risks. Testing frequency shall be based on Reliability Based
Inspection RBI principles where data is available or otherwise defined by local
legislation. Where neither exist, frequencies shall be set based on best practices.
Tests shall be scheduled using the local maintenance management system and results
captured in eWIMS or the locally developed tracking tool.
The two preventative Performance Standard assurance tasks are:-
Well Integrity Test (WIT) – assesses the performance of the well surface
components (including the SSSV and maintainable items).
Sub-Surface Integrity Test (SIT) – assesses the performance of annular well
components and maintainable items.
Test failure results shall be applied to local WFM codes and definitions (this application
is an automatic step for eWIMS users).

6.3. Well Barriers


6.3.1. General
Well barriers are envelopes of one or several dependent physical elements preventing
fluids or gases from flowing unintentionally from the formation, into another formation

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or to surface (as such they are not to be confused with the ‘Safety Risk Barriers’ – see
Appendix 5).
The following guidance for well barriers is consistent with EP2002-1500 (Pressure
Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations):
Two independent and tested barriers shall be available during all well activities to
prevent an uncontrolled outflow from the borehole or well to the external
environment (i.e. at surface or seabed);
Note: One barrier may be acceptable in the case where the reservoir cannot produce to
the environment without prior pressure boosting.
One well barrier shall be in place during all well activities where a pressure
differential exists that may cause an uncontrolled crossflow in the wellbore
between permeable zones (i.e. subsurface or below seabed);
If a well barrier fails then activities in the well shall be directed solely towards
restoring the barrier.
For Producing wells, the concept of the two barriers will generally be applied in
reference to Hydrocarbon zones, i.e. 2 barriers between hydrocarbon (HC) zone and
surface.
During that “operation” phase of the well, annular pressures have to be monitored and
controlled such that these barriers are not endangered as a result of annular pressures
(see also section 7)

6.3.2. Well barrier schematics


It is recommended that well barrier schematics are developed for all operational wells as
a practical method to demonstrate and illustrate the presence of the defined primary
and secondary well barriers in the well. See Appendix 4 for an example of well barrier
schematic.

6.4. Leak Criteria


There shall be no leaks to the environment from the wellhead, tree, valve and
instrument connections as confirmed by visual Inspection.

6.4.1. Industry standard for leaks within the well system - API leak rate
The petroleum industry has only one leak rate defined in API Recommended Practice
14B Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety Valve Systems, 5 th
Edition, October 2005 (ISO10417 of 2004), the maximum leak rate for SCSSSV’s. It is a
function of manageable risk for safety and environment in the event of an uncontrolled
outflow of hydrocarbon well effluents. This leak rate has been the basis for API RP90
(Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells).

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6.4.2. Application of API Recommended Practice 14B (5 th Edition:2005)


The leak rate of any component of the well i.e. SCSSSV, tree valves or tubing or
shall not exceed the API RP14 B specified leak rate of 0.43m 3 / min (15scf /
min) gas or 400 cm 3 / min (13.5 oz / min).
An exception may be made for water injection wells in the case where it has been
determined that there is no potential for hydrocarbon flowback.
No leaks are allowed on internal seals like P seals, hanger neck seals, control
lines or wellhead feed-through conduits.
No leak is allowed from the production casing unless the next casing is capable
of sustaining closed-in wellhead pressure. This next casing then should not be
allowed to leak

6.4.3. Leak rates and Well Failure Model:


The local WFM shall provide a guideline on allowable leak rates based on API RP14B,
local wells standards and any legislative requirements.
Pressure build-up rather then flow maybe measured, where this makes it easier to assess
whether a leak is allowable or not. This trigger pressure should be specified in the WFM
and eWIMS or equivalent.
For further detail about leak criteria and calculation methods, refer to the document
below.
Well Integrity Guide

6.5. Corrosion Management


6.5.1. Production String
Corrosion can be managed by:
Fail to produce philosophy (i.e. repair when tubing has failed), with option to
monitor corrosion rate (i.e. predict failure).
Maintain condition with inhibitor injection, control corrosion and monitor
corrosion rate or inhibitor availability (i.e. predict failure).
Select material in design stage suitable for operating envelope of well conditions
(Reference DEP 39.01.10.11 - General for material selection).
The Operating Philosophy, supporting any of these cases, should specify how the
integrity of tubing is to be managed.
Tubing or Casing that is identified to have excessive wall loss shall be highlighted as an
integrity threat. The appropriate controls, mitigations and remediation should then be
implemented

6.5.2. Conductors and Casing


In offshore wells and onshore locations where conductor and external casing corrosion
is an identified significant risk, particularly for long-life wells, the well should be

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protected with an appropriately designed method of corrosion prevention. Methods that


are commonly used are; cathodic protection, epoxy coatings, pre-cemented casings and
grouting-off conductors, inhibitor treatment.
This type of failure has not been addressed in the Wells Failure Model but Local
Companies shall have Standards and Procedures in alignment with casing design
guidelines to ensure that surface casings and conductors are adequately designed,
existing wells are monitored, and remedial action are taken if necessary to prevent
collapse.
Well Integrity Guide

6.6. Wellhead and Xmas Trees


6.6.1. Design and Materials
Wellhead and Xmas Tree design and material selection shall comply with Surface and
Subsea Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment Global Functional Specification
EP2006-5283.

6.6.2. Maintain
All well safety critical components can only be replaced / repaired with original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) components or components that are manufactured by
others to same standard supported by OEM’s QA / QC process. In event that
components are obsolete / no longer patented alternatives shall be subject to an
approved QA / QC process equivalent to OEM standard or better.
Reference Appendix 6 – Use of spare parts based on Shell EP Well Services Position
Paper for Wellheads and Xmas Trees – Use of OEM Spare Parts

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7. Annulus Pressure Management


7.1. Principles
The principle of Annulus Pressure Management revolves around the fact that a well is
in effect made up of pressure vessels (completion and inner annuli) within other
pressure vessels (outer annuli) and that each pressure vessel must be managed within
operational limits.
A small positive pressure should generally be maintained in each annulus with a small
DP between annulus strings in order to provide ongoing assurance of annular integrity
as any pressure drop or rise or equalization between annuli is then obvious to the extent
that investigation action can be requested.
EP Annular Pressure management is consistent with the principles that the industry
standard API RP90 is built upon.

7.2. Types of annular pressures


7.2.1. Thermal Pressure (TP)
Wells with fluid filled enclosed annuli will exhibit thermal pressure changes during
warm-up and cool down periods. It is important to recognize this fact and to monitor
annulus pressure closely during start up of new wells. Pressure should not be bled off in
this instance unless MAWOP is breached (see section 7.4). It is vital to monitor annulus
pressure closely during initial start up of new wells as pressure can build up rapidly and
result in over-pressurised annuli.

7.2.2. Applied Pressure (AP)


Pressure may be applied on an annulus for various purposes, including gaslift,
compensating for bullheading loads or to assist in annulus monitoring.
This pressure may also come from pressure containment tests as part of preventative
SIT activities. Care must be taken to ensure this pressure is bled down after testing to a
suitable value to ensure that thermal pressure does not result in MAWOP being
breached.

7.2.3. Sustained Casing Pressure (SCP)


This pressure comes from a pressure source such as reservoir, adjacent annulus etc and
shall be investigated using the eWIMS (or equivalent local WI tool) internal process
whenever suspected or where observed pressure cannot be proven to be either AP or
TP.

7.3. Calculation of MAASP


MAASP is the absolute maximum pressure for a given annulus that shall not be
exceeded at any time, since it represents the integrity limit for that annulus.
The initial MAASP is calculated at the time of the well handover. The Production
Technologist of the Asset is the custodian of the MAASP, and accountable for keeping
it updated to reflect possible changes during the well life. These later updates of the

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MAASP may require the involvement of Well Engineering, and shall be controlled
under the Management of Change (MOC) process.
Further guidance is given in the MAASP calculation guide, part of the WIG.
Well Integrity Guide

7.4. Setting of MAWOP (Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating


Pressure)
As defined in API-RP90 (draft-K), the Maximum Allowable Wellhead Operating
Pressure (MAWOP) is a measure of how much pressure can be safely applied to an
annulus on a sustained basis. The MAWOP is measured relative to the ambient pressure
at the wellhead for any particular annulus. It establishes a safety margin when
considering the ultimate integrity limit for a given annulus, as indicated by the MAASP.
The setting of the MAWOP is based on the following rationale:
It is necessary to maintain a sizable margin between the MAWOP and the
MAASP, in order to allow for reaction time (i.e. assessment of the situation then
intervention) in the event that the MAWOP would be exceeded.
Since the MAWOP may be applied to the annulus on a sustained basis, it is
important to assure that a possible leak to the next outer annulus would not
compromise the integrity of that next annulus.
Further guidance for the setting of the MAWOP is given in the Well Integrity Guide
(WIG).
Note: It is recommended as a best practice to take formation strength tests at casing
shoes (Reference Casing and Tubing Design Guide - Appendix 8). In those cases
where the formation strength test was not taken and as a result there is
uncertainty in the value (and in the impact on the MAASP), the MAWOP may be
set by defaulting to the API-RP90 calculations.

7.5. Special provision for the ‘A’ Annulus MAWOP


The setting of the MAWOP for the ‘A’ annulus is solely based on the MAASP of the ‘A’
annulus itself, and does not take into account the MAASP of the next outer annulus (‘B’
annulus), based on the provision that the production casing is confirmed to be leak
tight.
Should the production casing develop a leak (confirmed communication between the A
and B annuli), then the A annulus MAWOP should be adjusted to account for the
MAASP of the B annulus.

7.6. ‘A’ Annulus MINAP (gaslifted wells)


Because gaslifted wells do not have a liquid column inside the ‘A’ annulus, the risk may
exist that the production casing collapses with insufficient applied pressure on the ‘A’
annulus. It is therefore worth considering the effect of the artificial lift being partially
or completely bled off (with or without an annular safety valve). This may generate high
burst loads on the tubing during a production shut-in case, or high collapse loads on
the production casing. Such cases result in the setting of a Minimum Annular Pressure
(MINAP) for the ‘A’ annulus of those wells.

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Further guidance on calculating the ‘A’ annulus MINAP is given in the MAASP
calculation guide, part of the WIG.
Well Integrity Guide

7.7. Management and Control


The management and control of annular pressures is schematically represented in flow
diagrams contained in the document below. In these flow diagrams, clear differentiation
has been made between start-up and late-life conditions and also between the ‘A’
annulus and the outer annuli.
Well Integrity Guide

7.7.1. Monitoring
All annulus pressures of producing, injecting and observation wells are to be observed
and recorded at regular intervals. For wells where there are no pressure transmitters
connected to the DCS or DACA system installed, the minimum frequency shall be set
in the local WFM. Critical wells should be equipped with remote monitoring.

7.7.2. Reporting
Field Production Operations is responsible for monitoring of annuli, data collection and
registration.
All recorded pressures (incl. bleed-off data) are to be stored in a database (e.g. eWIMS).
Wherever applicable, the reporting of Annuli Pressures and bleed-off data should
comply with local regulatory requirements.

7.7.3. Reaching High Pressure Alarm (HPA) values


Timely alarm in case of pressure build-up should ensure that pressures are bled-off in
time. The HPA should be set at the MAWOP or lower. When the annulus pressure
reaches the HPA, an assessment should be made as to whether the pressure is thermally
induced or sustained from a leak or influx. The pressure is then to be bled down to
below the MAWOP.
It is not advisable to bleed down the pressure to zero. The rationale for this is to limit
bleed-offs to a minimum and comes from the fact that bleeding-off annular pressures
may exacerbate the problem (i.e. increasing influx of low-density fluids into the annulus
from the formation and subsequent gravity inversion of fluids).
In the event of sustained annular pressure, operating the well at less than 50% of
MAWOP is considered good practice (i.e. in the lower half pressure band but above
zero – see figure 3).

7.7.4. Preventing MAASP values from being breached


Field Production Operations is responsible to ensure that the MAASP is not breached.
The local Well Integrity Assurance Procedure (WIAP) should include guidance to
Operations staff for responding to situations where timely intervention to bleed down
the annulus at HPA level was not possible and as a consequence, the MAASP value is
close to being reached. In such case the Operations staff should bleed down and

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control the pressure in accordance with the WIAP, until an assessment has been done
to determine the next course of action.

7.7.5. Problem well identification


The local WIMS should include criteria to identify and report wells that are required to
be blown down frequently, in order to avoid an annular pressure higher than the HPA.
This report should include a description of the possible cause, seriousness, history and
anticipated problem resolution. The purpose of this reporting is to carry out a risk
assessment. The outcome of the risk assessment could be the development of specific
annular pressure management procedures for those wells (i.e. through the MOC
process).
The following diagram outlines the relationship between MAASP, MAWOP, trigger
(HPA) and working pressures:

Annulus Triggers & Working Pressure

MAASP

MAWOP
50% of MAWOP Watch Out !
Trigger

Working
Pressures
Watch Out !

Zero

Figure 3, Annular Triggers & Working Pressures

7.8. Revisiting MAWOP values


Frequent HPA alarms, in particular when cold wells are started up, can be a reason to
revisit the original MAWOP settings. No standard procedure can be given as each well
has to be evaluated individually on its own merit. Issues to be considered in this context
include:
Age of the well and well history
Casing / liner (material type, connection type, corrosion, wear etc.)
Height of cement column

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Changes to MAASP and MAWOP settings need to be correctly and systematically


documented through the MOC process.

7.8.1. Cases of thermal pressure effects


In such cases, the MAASP and MAWOP may be increased by focusing the assessment
on those barriers whose load is not compensated on the other side. For example, if the
‘B’ annulus of a subsea well is sealed-off, the same thermal effects that induce pressure
on the ‘A’ annulus may also induce pressure on the ‘B’ annulus. As a consequence, this
effect should be taken into account when re-establishing the ‘A’ annulus MAASP.

7.8.2. Other Annular Pressure cases


In cases where the annular pressure increases are not caused by thermal effects, then a
formal investigation and a resultant plan of action are required. Refer to the flow
diagrams in the WIG for further guidance.
Well Integrity Guide

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8. Performance Management
8.1. Key Performance Indicators
Each OU shall track WI performance (KPIs etc) on an Asset basis and prepare reports
and trends. The KPIs shall be based on adherence to WFM assurance tasks and repair
limit requirements.
The following minimum tracking of KPIs shall be reported:
Preventative Maintenance (PM) and Corrective Maintenance (CM) compliance
shall be the main measures tracked, (i.e. carrying out the required assurance tasks
and follow-up repairs within the schedule defined).
In addition, the numbers of Deviations shall be tracked to ensure that instances
of operation outside the Standards are highlighted, managed effectively and areas
for improvement are identified.
Local OUs should define their own additional KPIs by making optimum use of the
tracking and reporting capabilities of their Well Integrity tool (e.g. eWIMS), through
data mining / download facilities.
FSR will provide the ability to track “Red” items greater than a 7-day timeline as an
overriding measure of WI.

8.2. Performance Improvement


Each OU shall have a mechanism where continuous improvement can be demonstrated.
eWIMS can provide this requirement.
Continued improvement of WI performance requires constant feedback from the
operational phase of the well lifecycle back to the well design phase.
Across the Group, the sharing of best practice is recommended and will assist OUs to
gain benefit from operating experiences.

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Appendix 1 - Well Integrity Lifecycle Map

Microsoft Word
Document

Appendix 2 - Example Well Failure Model

Microsoft Excel
Worksheet

Appendix 3 - Safety Critical Elements

Microsoft Excel
Worksheet

Appendix 4 - Example Well Barrier Schematic

Microsoft Excel
Worksheet

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Appendix 5 - Safety Risk Barriers & SCE Groups

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Appendix 6 - Wellheads and Xmas Trees – Use of OEM Spare Parts


A Well Services Position Paper has been prepared to provide a clear understanding of Shell Well
Services position with respect to the use of the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturers') spare
parts.

F1 - This need is driven by five (5) main concerns:


1. Use of non-OEM spare parts does not conform with Well Services' policy
of compliance with ISO 10423.
2. OEMs are not prepared to fully warrant their equipment if non OEM spare parts
are included, or if remanufacture is undertaken without full OEM involvement.
3. The potential for negative impact on Shell's reputation in equipment failure
attributed to non-OEM design or workmanship.
4. Common standards of equipment integrity and performance will be assured by
the use of OEM spare parts.
5. Divergence between the latest editions of API Specification 6A and ISO 10423 in
respect of remanufacture has weakened the internationally agreed technical
structure for life cycle integrity of Wellheads, Christmas Trees and ancillary
equipment.

F2 - The following Procurement Strategy should be implemented in order to ensure the


proper application of ISO 10423. The various spare parts that could be supplied have
been grouped into four (4) category Types 1, 2, 3 & 4. The definitions of these Types, the
associated procurement strategy recommendations and the associated justifications are as
follows:
Type 1 Parts:
Definition: OEM owns design and controls manufacturing methods.
Examples: Valve Blocks, Gate Valves & Custom Flanges.
Recommendation: Purchase from OEM - without exception.
Justification: ISO 10423 Section 5.2.2 Metallic Requirements & impact on OEM
Type Approval.

Type 2 Parts:
Definition: OEM owns specification - detailed design & manufacturing by others.
Examples: 'O' Rings, Soft Seals, Small Bore Valves, & Injection Stingers.
Recommendation: Purchase from OEM - unless written agreement with OEM that should
Shell procure from the OEM's supplier, then the OEM will provide the
latest design.
Justification: ISO 10423 Section 5.2.2 Metallic Requirements & impact on OEM Type
Approval.

Type 3 Parts:
Definition: OEM provides functional specification only.

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Examples: Standard API Flanges, ANSI Fasteners & BX Gaskets


Recommendation: Purchase from OEM unless OEM provides controlled Bills of Materials,
Assembly Drawings & Maintenance Procedures and there are independent
Quality checks to confirm that OEM's standards are met.
Justification: ISO 10423

Type 4 Parts:
Definition: OEM sets acceptance criteria based on knowledge of design.
Examples: Re-manufacture, re-work, welds, repairs.
Recommendation: Purchase from OEM – unless:
(i) Written agreement with OEM that should Shell procure then the
OEM will provide the latest design, specification and acceptance
criteria and,
(ii) Company undertaking work can provide a full equipment warranty.
Justification: ISO 10423 Annex J & impact on OEM Type Approval

F3 - The Supplier shall provide at Company well site, all necessary spares and replacement
parts within 30 days of any failure of their equipment.
Where Supplier cannot provide and manage all necessary replacement parts as detailed
within Global Scope of Work, Supplier shall provide Company all necessary technical
information to enable Company to contract to 3rd Party to manufacture and assure
replacement parts.

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Appendix 7 - Abbreviations and definitions


TIF: Technical Integrity Framework
WIMM Global Well Integrity Management Manual.
eWIMS Group approved WI software tool to manage lifecycle
well integrity.
SAP: Commonly used maintenance management (and
accounting) tool that schedules routine assurance tasks
and mitigating actions.
FSR: Facility Status Report software tool. Reports SCE status
through a traffic light system and manages deviations
from WI standards in the WFM
WFM Well Failure Model. Risk-based matrix spreadsheet that
has been developed to clearly define cause and effects
of failure types in wells.
EDM/Open Wells: Used to store well status diagrams and provide data to
be used by WFM to determine the well risk profile.
Eproms / Energy component: Uploads production information, including annuli
pressures to eWIMS
PACER / Cirrus: Provides corrosion data that might affect the as built
Operating Envelope
MAASP: Maximum Allowable Annulus Surface Pressure. Is the
actual annulus pressure integrity limit based on the as
built well
MAWOP: Maximum Allowable Well Operating Pressure. Is the
set annulus operating pressure limit that can be applied
on a sustainable basis. The MAWOP is always lower
then the MAASP.
SCE: Safety Critical Elements
PS: Performance Standards describe the minimum
functional specification for SCEs and are used as the
basis of verification throughout the lifecycle of the well.
WIT: Well Integrity Test
SIT: Sub-surface Integrity Tests
MMS Maintenance Management System
HPA High Pressure Alarm
MOC Management Of Change process

EP200610207566 EP.03.ST.05 2nd October 2006


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EP Standard EP T ECHNICAL I NTEGRITY F RAMEWORK Restricted

Appendix 8 - Reference

Title Document no
Safety Critical Element DEP 80.80.00.15 EPE
EPBM Version 4
Technical Integrity Framework (TIF) EP200509205865
Well Integrity Guide (WIG)
Global Deviation Process
Global MOC process
Pressure Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations EP2002-1500
General for material selection DEP 39.01.10.11
Surface and Subsea Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment EP2006-5283
Global Functional Specification
Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety API-14B / ISO10417 of
Valve Systems, 5th Edition, October 2005 2004
Testing of Thread Compound for Rotary Shouldered Connections API 7A
Annular Casing Pressure Management for Offshore Wells API RP90

i For Servicing the well activities, Well Services is the accountable party during WIMM step 4.

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