PUBLIC CORPORATION CLASSIFIED
It is "purely a
BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011
The BSP is a public corporation subject to the jurisdiction of COA.
First, Art. 44(2) of the Civil Code makes the BSP a public corporation
since it is an institution created by law for public interest or
purpose.
CA 111 which created the BSP lays out the functions of the entity.
Subsequent amendments in PD 460 and RA 7278 also contain provisions
supporting COA’s argument that BSP performs sovereign functions. The
BSP exists to implement the State policy declared in Art II, Sec
13 of the Constitution.
Second, it is a public corporation under the 1987 Administrative Code.
Title VI, Chapter 8, Sec 20 lists the BSP as an attached agency to the
DECS. As an attached agency, there is at least one government
representative in its governing board.
Finally, the BSP is not subject to the test of government
ownership or control and economic viability. Art XII, Sec 16 of the
Constitution should not be construed to mean that Congress is
prohibited from creating a public corporation. BSP is a public corporation
performing functions that are impressed with public interest.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DEFINED.
MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL v. HON BALINDONG, GR No.
193340, Jan. 11, 2017
Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural
and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, a
personal right which by nature is restricted to natural persons. Juridical
persons are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The
Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category.
Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body
politic and corporate that exercises powers as a political
subdivision of the national government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Furthermore,
as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects-
consistent with the non-establishment clause.
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing
principles, as it conceded that the Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a
Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious
affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on the
part of the Shari'a District Court. The municipality has a separate and
distinct personality form the officers composing it.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction
under the law to decide private respondents' complaint because not all
of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.
DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DOCTRINE; ELEMENTS
EMMANUEL PELAEZ v.THE AUDITOR GENERAL
GR No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may
partake of an administrative nature — involving the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power".
. As indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not
an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest"
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact.
legislative question", or a political question.
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR
265 SCRA 182
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created
as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that
the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter
and therefore the President was without power to create by executive
order the Municipality of Sinacaban. However, we have since held that
where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no
longer be questioned.
In this case, different factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban
the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that
its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and
officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez
v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity
of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949,
it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its
revenue.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of
the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the
ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec.
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to
have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.
Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 442(d) is
invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities.
This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained,
Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the
plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new
municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution.
MUNICIPALITY OF NARCISO v. MENDEZ
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the
municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing
the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal
districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth
be considered as regular municipalities." The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when
it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that
would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ALICIA, BOHOL
No. Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Respondent municipality's situation is strikingly similar to that of the
municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was
created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead
of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence
for all ofsixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was
promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all
indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence
thereof (i.e. the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities
comprising the Third District of Boholunder the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution)
As such respondent municipality of Alicia should likewise benefit from
the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
SULTAN OSOP CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005
Sec. 442(d) is not a blanket curative law; Municipal corporations with a
de facto status may be cured by Sec. 442(d). The recognition of a de
facto corporation requires factual ascertainment; one that the trial
court may look into.
As per ruling of Pelaez v. Auditor General, the SC held that Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch and is unconstitutional.
Unlike the municipalities of San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, Andong
remained inexistent because there was no legislative enactment that
recreated it after the Pelaezcase. (San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinabacan
were listed as apportioned districts in an Ordinance appended to the
1987 Philippine Constitution)
Section 442(d) of the LGC was also admittedly not complied with. It
required elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
LGC. Camid admitted that there were no elected officials, but only
appointed ones.
The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of
elections in the municipality in the last four decades are indications of
its non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town.
METHOD OF CHALLENGING THE EXISTENCE OF A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION
MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG v. BENITO (1969)
It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a
municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions
may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule
disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is neither a
corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its
existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or
proceeding by any one whose rights or interests ate affected thereby,
including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are
estopped by their conduct from doing so.
PERVIEW OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM; UNITARY V.
FEDERAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
ZOOMZAT, INC., vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ROMULO S. RODRIGUEZ, JR., et.al. (2005)
-CHECK FULL TEXT DECISION
PHILIPPINE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND THE
CONCEPTS OF LOCAL AUTONOMY, DECENTRALIZATION,
DEVOLUTION AND DECONCENTRATION
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T.
SANTOS G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991
The president, as granted by Constitution, is granted the power of
supervision over local government officials. Supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Difference between Power of Control and Power of Supervision
The two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which
differ one from the other in meaning and extent. "In administration
law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter."
It cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
Caveat (from transcript in previous years)
Bretch: But note that this was the ruling before where the president still
has the power to remove local officials under the previous LGC.
However, under Sec. 60 of the present LGC, the president can no longer
remove local officials. Such power is already lodged to the regular
courts.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
G.R. No. 79956 (1990)
E.O No. 220 did not pre-empt the enactment by Congress of an organic
act.
1. E.O. No. 220 simply provides for the consolidation and coordination
of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the
National Government in the areas covered by the administrative
region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
2. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive and
legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not
establish an autonomous regional government. It created a
region, covering a specified area, for administrative
purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services.
3. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella"
that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and
non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.
E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or
merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. CAR is not a public
corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a self-reliant communities and
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. make them more effective This power amounts to self-
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public partners in the pursuit of immolation since the
corporations. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to national government and social autonomous government
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services progress. becomes accountable not to the
in the covered areas. central authorities but to its
It relieves the central constituency.
Issue 3: government of the burden of
managing local affairs and
Whether the creation of CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee enables it to concentrate on
of local autonomy for the provinces which compose the CAR. national concerns.

No. As mentioned earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, national government
agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the has not completely relinquished all its powers over LGUs. Only
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying subdivisions, the purpose of which is to make governance more directly
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with responsive and effective at the local levels.
political autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy
PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE, July 19, 2000
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create
their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
Supervision v. Control national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power
Section 4 of Constitution vests in the President the power of general to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It does
supervision over LGUs. Such power excludes the power of control. not however rule out any manner of national government intervention
Control and Supervision are different in meaning and extent. by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs are
consistent with national goals. The President, being the head of
Control Supervision economic and planning agency of the government, may interfere in local
Means the power of an officer to Overseeing or the power or fiscal matters, provided that:
alter or modify or nullify or set authority of an officer to see 1. There is unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
aside what a subordinate officer that subordinate officers government.
has done in the performance of perform their duties. If the 2. There are consultations with presiding officers of the Senate and
his duties and to substitute the latter fail or neglect to fulfil House of Reps and the presidents of the various local league.
judgment of the former for that of them, the former may take such 3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of DOF, DILG,
the latter. action or step as prescribed by and DBM
law to make them perform their 4. Adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the
duties. collection of national internal revenue taxes of the 3rd fiscal year
Includes restraining authority Mere oversight over an inferior preceding the current one (Sec. 284, LGC)
over inferior body body
Officers lay down the rules in the It does not cover laying down of Section 1 is valid exercise of power of general supervision
performance or accomplishment rules. Officer merely sees to it
of an act. If these rules are not that the rules are followed; they The Court agrees that the requirements are not satisfied: (1) no showing
followed, they may, in their do not have the discretion to of unmanageable public sector deficit, and (2) no consultations with
discretion, order the act undone modify or replace them. league of local governments. However, the Court accepts the assurance
or redone by their subordinates or of solicitor general that Section 1 is merely advisory to prevail upon local
even decide to do it themselves. executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of
economic difficulty. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction
Under the present system of government, executive power is vested in may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such
the President. Members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are advice.
merely alter egos; as such, they are subject to the power of control of
President. On the other hand, heads of political subdivisions are elected Section 4 is not valid exercise
by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate,
therefore, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not Basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
control. of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, as
mandated by the Constitution. LGC provides that the release shall
Hand in hand with constitutional restraint on President’s power over be made directly to LGUs and shall not be subject to any lien or
local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy. Local holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
autonomy signified a more responsive and accountable local whatever purpose. Term “shall” is a word of command that must be
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. given compulsory meaning.
Decentralization means the devolution of national administration, not
power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the Section 4 orders the withholding of 10% of IRA pending the assessment
central government as the law may provide. by Development Budget Coordinating Committee. This is equivalent
to a holdback which means something held back or withheld,
Decentralization of Decentralization of power often temporarily. Temporary nature of retention does not
administration matter. Any retention is prohibited.
The central government This involves an abdication of
delegates administrative powers political power in the favor of PIMENTEL, et. al, v Executive Sec. OCHOA and (DSWD) Sec.
to political subdivisions in order LGUs declared to be JULIANO-SOLIMAN, July 17, 2012
to broaden the base of autonomous. The autonomous
government power and in the government is free to chart its
process to make local own destiny and shape its While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
governments more responsive future with minimum functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
and accountable and ensure intervention from central them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
their fullest development as authorities. services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision [section 17, LGC] provides a categorical exception
of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works
and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even
if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court defined the extent of the local
government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national
government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such
key concepts as integration and coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth
and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the
programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and
coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for
the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local
government unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the national
government in programs implemented in the local level would be to shift
the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would
amount to a decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin
as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy xxx. A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national
government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in
the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
LIMBONA v. MANGELIN (1989)
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in
these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the SangguniangPampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
33 In the second place, the SangguniangPampook, their legislative
arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services.
Xxx
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure
that enactment and acts of the SangguniangPampook and the
LupongTagapagpaganapngPook are in compliance with this Decree,
national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION (1994)
a local government cannot enact an ordinance in contravention of a
statute.
An ordinance is valid provided it follows the following substantive
requirements:
1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable
Under Sec. 458, LGU’s are empowered to prohibit “gambling and other
prohibited games of chance.” The SC explained that what the LGU is
allowed to prohibit are games of chance that are prohibited. Logically,
an LGU is not allowed to prohibit, by ordinance or otherwise, games of
chance that are no prohibited by law.
Furthermore, the ordinances enacted by the SP of CDO are invalid
since it contravenes a statute (PD 1869).
Basically, the SC explained that using the Mayor’s argument that Section
458 mandates the prohibition of all kinds of gambling (illegal or legal)
by the LGUs, then PAGCOR can no longer operate casinos anywhere at
all. Therefore, there is a clash between the LGC and PD 1869 IF we were
to use the argument of the Mayor.
However, there is no proof of express repeal of PD 1869 by the LGC
since the repealing clause (sec. 534) listed down the laws and provisions
expressly repealed by the LGC and PD 1869 is not included.
Furthermore, there is also no implied repeal in this case given the
principle that implied repeal is frowned upon by our legal system and
the Court must exert all effort to harmonize all laws before accepting
an implied repeal. In the case at bar, there is no indication at all of an
implied repeal of PD 1869. In fact, PD 1869 and the LGC can be
harmonized: under the LGC, local government units shall suppress all
kinds of gambling EXCEPT those allowed by statutes like PD 1869.
LINA V. PANO, GR No. 129093, Aug. 30, 2001
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995 merely states the disfavor of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to gambling. In itself is not self-executing as
it is merely a policy statement on the part of the Sanggunian.
Thus, it cannot be held as a valid ground to justify any act of
prohibition on the proliferation of gambling and all its forms in
Laguna, including the lotto system subject of the inquiry.
If we were to look at the policy statement in itself, the existence of such
is valid as the Sanggunian is allowed by law to raise and forward
their sentiments through resolutions or other legislative
measure. This is a manifestation of the local autonomy of the local
government units; they are free to air out their views. However, this
does not give the local government units the power to enact
ordinances that will contravene the laws created by Congress.
Hence, the prohibition of the Sanggunian of the operation of the lotto
system based on the ground of a mere policy statement is an error on
their part. It went beyond the scope of its authority.
Also, ordinances should not contravene the Constitution as well as
national legislations. This is grounded on the idea that local
governments are mere agents of the national government, thus, their
local councils only exercise delegated legislative powers from Congress.
The delegate cannot be superior than the principal and as such, is
prohibited to exercise powers higher than those of the principal’s. “The
spring cannot be higher than its source.”
The question if gambling should be prohibited is one that is lodged in
the Congress. Applying in the case at bar, since Congress allowed
PCSO to operate lotteries in Laguna, the SanggunianPanlalawigan of
the latter therefore does not have the authority to nullify the said
operation.
SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSSION GR No. 92299,
April 19, 1991
Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend
is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position
of PBO. Consequently, if the recommendations made by the
petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing
authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the
same. However, if the appointee is not qualified, DBM does not have
the right to appoint their own choice.
Petitioner’s arguments are on point. Petitioner states that the phrase of
said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned" must be given mandatory application in
consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
The President controls the executive departments. He has no
such power over local governments. He has only supervision
and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute.
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list
of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA December 7,
1995
POWER OF LGU TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges
was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the
fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering
local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2,
Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific
Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of
Local Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in
the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and
for lake quality control and management.
It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a
valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers
as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will
render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO G.R. No. 152774,
May 27, 2004
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the constitutional precept on local
autonomy.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs just share in this
wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government
units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization
that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to create
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which
shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be
retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which
shall be automatically and directly released to them without
need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local
government unit shall be released, without need of any further
action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer,
as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after
the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien
or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of
local government units under existing laws.
Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre,viz:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. As a
rule, the term SHALL is a word of command that must be given
a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
therefore, IMPERATIVE.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part
of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject
its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing
rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time
to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional
and statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be
automatically released to them. The LGUs are, thus, placed at
the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy.
The fairly recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre is particularly
instructive. The Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy
includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in
addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released
by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work
within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to
local needs and resources or not ..
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of
the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion
pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the
Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
TANO vs. SOCRATES (1997)
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association
composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim,
as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen,
without any qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense.
Amarginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin
of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price
levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering
the fish.
A subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood.
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer
or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing
which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or
marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. It bears
repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any
petitioner falls within these definitions.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal
marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development, and
conservation. The ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect
and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by
the people may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but
also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to
the use of marine resources is not at all absolute, since it is limited by
the Regalian Doctrine.
Decentralization
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution refers to the act by
which the National Government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within
the municipal waters.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units
under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149,
447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives
or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals
covered therein for a period of five years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the
devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters,
such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of closed
seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly
confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder
to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92
of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one
hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious.
In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the Ordinances may
not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein
violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers
to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not
the Mayors Permit.
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR AND
SECRETARY GR. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s
natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17,
b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale
mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the
provincial government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to
be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law makes
the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by
the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications
should be filed with the PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the
provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA
7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct
supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program,
and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers
and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining
Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through
their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral
Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in coordination with the
Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale
mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5
hectares.
Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not
confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate,
nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or
small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit
because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the
PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22
of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the
Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under
RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of
the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of
what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are,
with respect to the matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and
its IRR to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the DENR
can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over the
said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights
of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA (2014)
While Section 17 of LGC of 1991 endeavors the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services. The essence of this express reservation of power by
the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even
if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central
government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that
the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS vs. COA (2014)
COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire
ordinance as contrary to the GSIS Act because Section 6 of the said
ordinance is valid.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner
city’s issuance of EO no. 40, series of 2008, creating change
management teams as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan, , and consequently, ordinance no. 08,
series of 2009.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that
“any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favour, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favour of devolution
of power x x x.”
Unfortunately, these allegations of good faith are not enough to declare
the program created by the petitioner city as a reorganization that
justifies the creation of a retirement benefit plan.
Section 28 paragraph b of Commonwealth Act no. 186 (GSIS
Act) – Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers
or employees shall be created by any employer. All
supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in force
in any government office, agency or instrumentality or
corporation owned and controlled by the government, are
hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the
rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder
shall not be affected.
Hence, Section 5 of Ordinance no. 08, series of 2009, refers to an early
retirement incentive, the amount of which is pegged on the beneficiary’s
years of service in the city government. Consequently, this provision falls
under the definition of a retirement benefit.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement
incentives provides for benefits that are not computed based on
years of service. They are lump sum amounts and healthcare benefits.
It provides for a form of severance pay to those who availed of
GenSan SERVES, which was executed in good faith. The benefits
provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner city’s
employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early.
Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVE were only
given to a select few – the sickly and unproductive due to
health reasons. Certainly, this negates the position that the
benefits provide for supplementary retirement benefits that
augment existing retirement laws.
The proscription under section 28 paragraph (b) of CA no. 186 does
not apply to section 6 of the ordinance. Thus, the cash gift for the
sickly employees, lifetime free medical consultation in petitioner city’s
hospital, and other similar benefits under section 6 of the ordinance is
valid.
VILLAFUERTE, JR. VS ROBREDO (2014)
The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local and
fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the respondent went beyond the
confines of his supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President, when
he issued MC No. 2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of
the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs.
The Court, however, perceives otherwise.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of
an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to
remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section
287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for
development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to
examine themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must
be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in response to
the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly
categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
Contrary to the petitioners’ posturing, however, the enumeration was
not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization
of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature
of the development fund by delineating it from other types of
expenses. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide
them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of
the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be incompatible
with the purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain at liberty to map
out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own
judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that
20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may even
spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they partake
of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. In such case,
however, the concerned LGU must ascertain that applicable rules and
regulations on budgetary allocation have been observed lest it be
inviting an administrative probe.
LUCENA DEMAALA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (2015)
Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at
less than 1% is within the taxing power of local government units. It is
consistent with the guiding constitutional principle of local
autonomy.
The basis for the taxing power of local government units are provided
under Article X, Section 5 and Article II, Section 25 of the 1987
Constitution. The taxing power granted by constitutional fiat to local
government units exists in the wider context to “ensure the autonomy
of local governments.”
Also, this power must be read in relation to their power to effect their
basic autonomy. Consistent with the 1987 Constitution’s declared
preference, the taxing powers of local government units must be
resolved in favor of their local fiscal autonomy.
In City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes, the Court ruled that:
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress.
However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by
local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue
of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to
direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of
the Constitution.
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that
henceforth, in interpreting statutory provision on
municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
Hence, the limits on the level of additional levy for the special education
fund under Section 235 of the Local Government Code should be read
as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units.
Section 235’s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is no
limiting qualifier to the articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally
indicates that any and all special education fund collections must be at
such rate. At most, there is a seeming ambiguity in Section 235.
Consistent with what has earlier been discussed however, any such
ambiguity must be read in favor of local fiscal autonomy.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES; SECTION 12,
ARTICLE X, 1987 CONST.
BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs COMELEC and ADELINA Y.
LARRAZABAL | G.R. No. 100710 ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL vs
COMELEC and SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ (1991)
Does the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing the
provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered
voters to be elected as provincial officials?
1. YES
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall
be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of
their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of
Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial Board
of the Province of Leyte — The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in
the election of the provincial governor and the members
of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the
Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc
City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is,
nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which
it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from
voting for the provincial elective officials.
Larazzabal alternatively argues that if the prohibition to run was indeed
intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified
TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma should have
been used after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to clearly
indicate that the phrase "in the election of the provincial governor" is
modified separately and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the
words "not entitled to vote.
The SC ruled that the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the
COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte."
SPECIAL METROPOLITAN POLITICAL DIVISIONS; SECTION
11, ARTICLE X, 1987 CONST.
MMDA vs BEL-AIR VILLAGE
SEE FULL TEXT
TAN vs. COMELEC (1986)
Who are referred to as areas affected? And was the plebiscite valid?
What does “territory” include?
Territory refers only to land mass and does not include maritime areas.
Section 197 of the LGC says the "territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this
particular provision of the Local Government Code clearly reflects that
"territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area
and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
The plebiscite was void as it should have included the mother province.
The reliance of respondents on the case of Paredes vs Executive
secretary is understandable. However, the ruling should not be taken as
a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged therein that
"it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays
are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the
voters therein are affected."
The very case itself acknowledges that the decision is based merely on
the discretion and opinion of the court. Now this court believes that a
contrary view should now be adopted. Plus the instant case is not on all
four squares with the cited case. The Paredes case only involved
removing barangays, the smallest political unit from a municipality. The
instant case involves removing cities and municipalities from a province,
the largest unit.
Hence, this court now decides that when the Constitution speaks of "the
unit or units affected" it means all of the people of the proposed unit
and those of the parent unit.
PADILLA vs. COMELEC 214 SCRA 735
Is the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo valid?
Yes.
Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “No province,
city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected."
When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the
political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the
separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said
plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase "political
units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, in this case, those to be included in such political areas are
the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo.
1
Section 306 (i), LGC
The plebiscite conducted was thus valid.
ABBAS vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287
May the ARMM be validly created and be composed only of the provinces
and cities that voted favorably in the plebiscite?
Yes.
Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution, in fact, provides that “the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
The majority referred to by the Constitution is simply a majority in
each of the constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units. This is so because if the framers
intended otherwise, they could have simply adopted the same
phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution –
“majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”
In this case, Article 2, Section 1 of R.A. 6734 merely followed what the
constitution mandates.
Thus, R.A. 6734 is constitutional.
LOPEZ vs. COMELEC
SEE FULL TEXT
SULTAN OSOP CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, Jan. 17, 2005
-Supra
ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
Is the IRA included in the computation of the average annual income of
a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an independent
component city?
Yes, Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of LGUs.
Income is defined in the LGC to be all revenues and receipts collected
or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU. 1
According to the SC, IRAs are items of income because they form part
of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. The IRAs regularly
and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the LGC provides that the average
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non- recurring income. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there
a basis to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs
have a technical definition and meaning of its own as used in
the LGC that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds
or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from
the national government, its instrumentalities and GOCCs.
LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC (April 2011)
1. WON Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article
X of the Constitution,
2. WON Cityhood Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause, and
3. WON Cityhood Laws violate the right of local governments to
a just share in the national taxes.
 4. No. Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Xxx The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are
but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to
exempt the respondents, without exception, from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by
necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.
5. No. xxx the local government units covered by the Cityhood
Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component
cities of their respective provinces. They are and have
been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence
of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and
other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots.
6. No. The share of local government units is a matter of
percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific
amount.
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered
by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the
11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC
prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair
play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its
imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by
duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP (2008)
Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD?
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving
as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public
consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly
provided by E.O No. 3. The perambulatory clause of EO No. 3
declared that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalising the
people’s participation.
E.O No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to
effectuate continuing consultations, contrary to respondents position
that plebiscite is more than just sufficient consultation. The said law
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace
agenda as a corollary to the constitutional right to information
and disclosure.
PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
the pertinent consultation.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it
is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason
when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing
consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The
executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's
right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before
the government proffers its definite propositions.
Petitioners assert that the LGC of 1991 declares it a state policy to
"require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, non-
governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions" is well-taken. The LGC chapter on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
“Prior Consultations Required. “ No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which
could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999
Whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that
the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component
city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper
plebiscite.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. The
resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls
within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will
reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the
people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people in the political units directly
affected. The changes that will result from the downgrading of
the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit
will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions
and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed
by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the
city will now have to be shared with the province.
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of
Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should
not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when
R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is
more reason to consult the people when a law substantially
diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is
in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in
character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political
and economic rights of its people.
AURELIO UMALI vs COMELEC, JULIUS VERGARA, and the CITY
GOV’T OF CABANATUAN
May the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva
Ecija participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC?
Yes. Registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija may
participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city into an HUC.
Sec. 10, Art. 10 of the Constitution should be the basis for determining
the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite. Sec. 10, Art.
10 reads: “No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.”

In identifying the LGU/s that should be allowed to take part in the

plebiscite , what should primarily be determined is whether or not the
unit/s that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the change.
In Tan vs COMELEC, it has already been settled that LGUs whose
boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite.

Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to

Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to
be outside the general supervision of the province. The provincial
government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local
government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions, among others. Likewise, registered
voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for provincial officials.
The city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province.
The provincial government will no longer be responsible for delivering
basic services for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances and resolutions
passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city.

In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the

province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly
stands to be “directly affected” by the conversion of Cabanatuan City
into an HUC. Hence, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that
purpose.