GOITIA v CAMPOS-RUEDA

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is
obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven
away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance
even outside the conjugal home.
ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On
July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to
leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership,
and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees

Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home
and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home

2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:

1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with
a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of
the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband.
She is under obligation to return to the domicile.

“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake
off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled
to support.
ILUSORIO v BILDNER

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely
Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at
Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived
in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during
this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May
1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus to compel the husband live with the wife should be issued.

HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact
that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his
actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will
be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses
to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond
judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1965)

Pastor Tenchavez, 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24,
1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."

On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Ru ssel Leo Moran in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955,
Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.

Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign
divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no
evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to
perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

ISSUES:

1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.

2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial
of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

HELD:

1. YES. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15
of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view
of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalousdiscrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those
members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils. Therefore, a foreign divorce
bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.

2. YES. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful
infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10)
authorizes an award of moral damages.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision
that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.

But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders
this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu
personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum"
PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE,

FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was
found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and damages.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.

Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets,
not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil
liability in the murder case.

HELD: No, under Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
VALENCIA v LOCQUIAO

- 2 consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of title and an action for ejectment concerning the same parcel of land in Pangasinan originally
owned by spouses Locquiao.

- May 22, 1944: they executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son Benito and prospective bride Tomasa, which includes the land in
question. The donees took their marriage vows and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 18383.

- With the permission of Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia took possession and cultivated the subject land. When her husband got sick, her
daughter Constancia was in possession of the land.

- Respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the deed of donation propter nuptias and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in their name.
Constancia then filed an action for annulment of title against respondents in RTC of Pangasinan, the case was dismissed but it did not indicate the reason
for dismissal.

- EJECTMENT CASE: Benito then filed with the MTC of Urdaneta a complaint seeking the ejectment of Constancia from subject property. MTC ruled
in favor of Benito and ordered Constancia to vacate the property.

- ANNULMENT OF TITLE: Constancia and Romana countered with a complaint for the annulment of TCT No. 84897 alleging among others, that the
donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument.

- The decision for the ejectment case was appealed on the same RTC, finding that the question on ownership was the central issue the ejectment case was
suspended until ownership issue is settled.

- RTC ruled in favor of Benito in the complaint for annulment of title and as such affirmed in toto the decision of MTC in the ejectment case.
Petitioners then elevated the 2 decisions with the Court of Appeals which AFFIRMED the assailed RTC decisions.

ISSUE: WON acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donations propter nuptias.

HELD: No, acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of
marriage are those made before its celebration in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. Distinction is crucial since
they have different formal essential requisites.

- Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property must be specifically described. However,
Art. 1330 of the same code provides that acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts. The marriage between the beneficiary couple, and
compliance with the prescribed form, is enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias.

- Under the New Civil Code, as per Art. 127 donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statutes of Frauds. Art. 1403(2) requires that the contracts
must be in writing to be enforceable. However, as provided in Art. 129, express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations.
Implied acceptance is sufficient.

- The Old Civil Code applies to the case at bar since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950. Although the Philippines was under Japanese occupation at the time, only political laws are deemed abrogated by a change of
sovereignty. As such, petitioners' arguments must fail either under the Old or New Civil Code. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
MATABUENA v. CERVANTES

FACTS:

Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were
married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
“Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not
yet married and were simply cohabiting.

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since
the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure
being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily
mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.
ARCABA v TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take
care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took
care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of
Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the
master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the
nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any
wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura
testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150
sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration
of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s
nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the
testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the
death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
NOBLEZA v NUEGA

Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him
money for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13,
1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) from Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley
claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer
through SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While
overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and was able
to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as his wife.

In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another for Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of
selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) - of
the existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and
terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's
consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on
the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.

ISSUE: Is the Deed of Sale null and void for lack of the consent of the wife?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the
seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent's financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual
contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community
property. Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the
spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage
settlement. Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if
any, of such property.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name
appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
ARTURO FLORES v SPOUSES ENRICO AND EDNA LINDO

In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To secure the loan, Edna executed a deed of real estate mortgage on
a property which is however part of the conjugal property (it was both in her name and her husband’s name Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed.
But in November 1995, Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to mortgage the property.

Edna was not able to pay the loan despite repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed an action to foreclose the mortgage.

The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper because it appears that there was no valid mortgage between
Edna and Flores. Edna mortgaged the property without the consent of her husband and the special power of attorney executed by Enrico a month after the
execution of the deed did not cure the defect. The trial court however ruled that Flores can instead file a personal action (collection suit) against Edna.

Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of sum of money against Edna and Enrico (raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo spouses filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The spouses then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.

The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled that when Flores filed an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned the remedy of filing a
personal action to collect the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually exclusive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a mortgagee-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt; and that he
has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. These
remedies are indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case, the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision (applicable only to this case and as an
exception to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a personal action despite his prior filing of a real action to recover the indebtedness. This
procedural rule cannot be outweighed by the rule on unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted her liability of indebtedness.

Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33 is erroneous when it ruled that the mortgage between Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true that a
disposition (or in this case a mortgage, which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal property by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse is
VOID. However, under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code:

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the outset but it was ratified when a month later, Enrico executed a special power of attorney authorizing Edna to
mortgage the subject property. (So I guess this is an exception to the rule that “no void act can be ratified”.)
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels
of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged
that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always
visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of
their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the
conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the
separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:

WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.

HELD:

The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere
separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of
one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness
himself.

SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the
progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the
partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.