A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 applied for a marriage license.
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together
at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house,
which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on
his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead
left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a
heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence,
which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest
complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he
was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget
him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in
1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know
that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged
by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor
ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were
still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The
minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals [2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR
CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution [4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositiveportion
of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-
0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court
for trial on the merits.[5]
The Facts The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three
(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as
the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father
had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition
should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to
either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.
Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code,
which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained
the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that
right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after
the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the
latter.
II Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four
years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285
of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family
Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for
failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition,
because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family
Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right
would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as
follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been
omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given
by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are
usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny
the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead. [10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested
prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for
recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to
the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an
action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said
to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys
under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. [14] (Citations omitted)
 Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for determining whether
a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test
is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to
file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the
plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On
the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for
recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent,
because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other.
In other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified
by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court
explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this
Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition
even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint
averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz
Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an
action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens
parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint
to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed
father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions
of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children,
commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of
wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married
man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support
and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of
the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles
283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof
of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for
natural children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with
respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary
recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then
his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory
recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural
children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.
[22]
(Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over
spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including
the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to
seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the
Family Code.
 Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could
not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent
aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minors
right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and
only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required
to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under
Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence,
the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it
is in fact the correct procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged
in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after
the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together
for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff,
demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them,
which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and
different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to
induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the
home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the
consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil
Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed
between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the
agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,
duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity
the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from
this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and
none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new
relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public
policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these
principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the
question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De
la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the
Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo
vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist
each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph
deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he
charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just
cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a
foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
 ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole
extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in
his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall
cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other.
The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her
husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes
to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do
so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May
the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to
pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The
supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article
149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying the pension
fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is entitled to the
same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either
because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or
because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal
of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be understood as
being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was
whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by
article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive
and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and inasmuch
as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of
Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that
the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to
her maintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the support
until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demand it; it is seen that
these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and
that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all
constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option
in the present case, without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper
with regard to the other questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion
should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576),
wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not
absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of
these cases which was opposed to the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in
the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a
woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already
been established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two
cases clearly established the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code
may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme
court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain
business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to
administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he gave her all the muniments of
title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which
he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being
reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife,
who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore
granted in reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the
wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support
and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not
be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife
appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her
favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and
that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are
mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to
the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family organization and the
duties of spouses not legally separated, among which duties are those of their living
together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56 of the
aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who
has property to furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it
for subsistence, is to be understood as limited to the case where, in accordance
with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this
case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is
rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management
of his wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to the
conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely incompatible
with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein
 and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity
with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doña Adela Galindo are not
legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and
support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of support
from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal abode where
it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose even of the
fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and,
consequently, those of his own support without need of going to his wife;
wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso
for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked
in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the
spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least
there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained
in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and
separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not
be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode
by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to
force him to furnish support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high
tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against
her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any
cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon
the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the
conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that
the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the
house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife who is party abandoned,
the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he
therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the
ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty
sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In
not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of this
duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it
indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged,
because the nature of the duty of affording mutual support is compatible and
enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spouse does not create any illicit
situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision
of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in
the case under consideration, that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other
outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured
one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not
necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every
particular the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the
Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law
governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78
of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105
of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in every
case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results
therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the
husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the
husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or to
prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only
ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive
and absolute doctrine was announced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive
examination of the entire subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal
did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only
ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in
December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore,
the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce
or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good
and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks
power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance
must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to
grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the
one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital
obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the
husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied
terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws
will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and
payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term,
but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and
the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and
indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded
as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the
public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the
marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment,
heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.1 Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable
by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year
prescriptive period commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . .3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the
document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry
consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy
has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated
by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with
the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public
record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is
considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence,
prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this
reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990
and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as
declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our
Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the
marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin
from the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was
in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied
in criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy
notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate
court succinctly explains —
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should
be applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the
cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v.Dinsay (40 SCRA
50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should
not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by
the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting
marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place
 where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to
conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving
any right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place
where the said property is located. Verification in the office of the
Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the said
property can easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a
bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the authorities
of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein
constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or property
disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that
penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from
registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders
thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married
person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place
where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may
be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender,
if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted
from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of
the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by
the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution
cherished and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National
Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no
second or even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment,
order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of
the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the
time of such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the
documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in
the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married
man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent
marriage in Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He
knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage
as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner had
no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the
probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In
the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the
local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period
against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we
would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract
of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due
regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of
which is a primary concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals,
the same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO
PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA
PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO,
ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA
PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO,
MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and
LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No.
37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil
Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first
wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and
Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5)
children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his
second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living.
Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio,
Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter
of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead,
but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio
and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only
child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509,
513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts
about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the
children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein
among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by
the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false
promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and
that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and
therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the
"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition
of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five
children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the
lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot
No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and
heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino
Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido,
deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido,
Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido
and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as
the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita
Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring
all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be
divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because
of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to
Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido,
of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age,
married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to
Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz;
1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but
because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo
Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is
already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted
as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo
Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he
is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age,
single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita
Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is
already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted
as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age,
married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to
Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to
Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already
dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married
to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote;
1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo
Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the
11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as
follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal
shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5)
equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by
the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner
of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined
accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the
plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and
without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages, they
being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in
declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido,
were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in
declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part,
807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that
said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed
it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they
instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the
arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first
three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the
last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or
after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in
1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido
and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a
widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio
Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established
through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to
show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding
conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido
had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in
1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to
him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to
show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and
insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are
married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved,
as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale
behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No.
28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that
Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it
because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers
from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the
ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children
of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore,
legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471,
506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In
disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership
of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that
the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all
declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that
the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p.
21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of
the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second
marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided accordingly
among his legal heirs.
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered
conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
The finding of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is
expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the
registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the
previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name
of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil.
144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the
presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the
spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else,
like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No.
458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by
clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is
the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that
6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife,
Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the
proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first
marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves
appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the
matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination
of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of
witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one
another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It
would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review
on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has
been established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.

The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned
lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to
establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The
question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of
Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES
SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,"
the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize
the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered
as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex
was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks
and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition
to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
 possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through
the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering
the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of
Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect
of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048.
It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in
the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age,
status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
 The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more
or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the
newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship
and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d)
civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data
as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female"
as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction between
male and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-
to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need
for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims
asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an
ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
People v De La Cruz , Feb 11, 2010
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal,[1] seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated October 31, 2008, which affirmed with
[3]
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, dated August 15, 2005, convicting appellant Victoriano dela
Cruz y Lorenzo[4] (Victoriano) of the crime of Parricide.
The Facts
Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information [5] dated January 2, 2003,
which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of
Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill his
wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, use personal violence and stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela
Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her
body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two
varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he and two
others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing a card game known as tong-its just
three to four arms length away from the latters house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna Liza
Caparas-dela Cruz[7] (Anna), in front of their house.Joel knew the wifes name as Joan.
Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the
door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they were already inside the house. [8]
Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young
daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joels
help. Joel noticed blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and
gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to
the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died.[9]
On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1 Condrado Umali and Eligio Jose,
responding to the call of duty, went to the hospital for investigation. There, Victoriano was
turned over to the police officers by the hospital's security guard on duty. [10]
The Certificate of Death,[11] prepared by Police Senior Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer, Dr.
Ivan Richard Viray (Dr. Viray), showed that Victorianos wife died of hemorrhagic shock as a
result of a stab wound, trunk. Moreover, in his Medico-Legal Report [12] dated August 21, 2002,
Dr. Viray had the following findings:
HEAD and NECK:
1) Hematoma, frontal region, measuring 3 x 3 cm, 3 cm right of
the anterior midline.
2) Hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 2 x 2 cm, 3 cm from
the anterior midline.
CHEST and ABDOMEN:
1) Stab wound, penetrating, right shoulder region, measuring 2 x .
5 cm, 2 cm right of the posterior midline, about 12 cm
deep, directed lateralwards and slightly downwards, piercing
the underlying tissues and muscle, lacerating the upper lobe of
the right lungs.
xxxx
> There are about 2000 cc of blood and blood clots at the
thoracic cavity.
UPPER and LOWER EXTREMITIES:
1) Hematoma, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 7 x 4
cm, bisected by its posterior midline, with superimposed
abrasion, measuring 1.5 x 7 cm, along its anterior midline.
Version of the Defense
Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he came home very drunk
from a friend's house. Before he could enter their house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him
saying, Hindi ka naman pala namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa. He asked her to go inside
their house but she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her inside their
house.
Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside so he could go out of
the house. However, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he
helped her stand up, Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered
glass of the jalousie. He brought her outside immediately and asked the help of his neighbors
who were playing tong-its nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his
wife to the hospital.
At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for questioning. It was only
in the following morning that Victoriano learned of his wifes passing.
Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he consumed hard liquor at the
time of the incident; that Anna was not immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his
wife; and that he did not intentionally hurt her. [13]
The Lower Courts Ruling
On August 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Victoriano L. dela Cruz Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz the
following sums of money, to wit:
1. P60,000.00 as civil liability
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Aggrieved, Victoriano appealed to the CA.[15]
On October 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 August 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award of civil indemnity is
reduced to P50,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Hence, this appeal.
In its Manifestation[17] filed before this Court, appellee, People of the Philippines, as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, intimated that it was no longer filing any
Supplemental Brief in support of its position.
Meanwhile, in his Supplemental Brief,[18] Victoriano, as represented by the Public Attorney's
Office, claimed that the CA erred in appreciating Joel's testimony, since the latter merely
testified on the non-mortal wounds that Anna suffered when the couple were outside the
house. Insofar as the actual killing was concerned, Joel's testimony was merely circumstantial.
Moreover, Victoriano averred that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong against his
wife, evident from the facts that he carried the injured body of his wife; that he sought for
help after the accident; and that he brought her to the hospital for medical treatment.
Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated that he was very drunk at the time. Thus, he prayed that
these mitigating circumstances be appreciated in his favor.
Our Ruling
The instant appeal is bereft of merit.
The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key
element in Parricide ― other than the fact of killing ― is the relationship of the offender to
the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of
the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as
the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. [19] Clearly, then, it was
established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.
Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which refers to the slapping
incident that occurred outside their house. It does not at all point to him as the actual
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, Victoriano submits that Joels testimony is merely
circumstantial.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled in People v. Castillo:[20]
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt.
Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided
that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
the guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the
degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.[21]

In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated his wife,
not merely by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her.
Second, it was Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling her
hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to
Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth, the location and extent of the wound indicated
Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab
wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ. The extent of the physical
injury inflicted on the deceased manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as
found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna were inside the house, other
than their young daughter. Thus, it can be said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone
assailant. Sixth, we have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded
victim and bringing her to the hospital ― as Victoriano did ― does not
manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.
[22]
The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no reason to discredit
Joels testimony and Dr. Viray's Report. Besides, well-entrenched is the rule that the trial
court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this well-entrenched rule. [23]
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that the injury sustained by his
wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that
Victoriano was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may
be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC,
the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care,
and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention
of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act that causes the
injury has to be lawful.[24] Victoriano's act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not
a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on
violence against women. Thus, we fully agree with the apt findings of the CA, to wit:
With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of appellants wife was
not caused by mere accident. An accident is an occurrence that happens
outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some
act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences. It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons overt acts.
In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant started beating his
wife outside their house and was even the one who dragged her
inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory that he only pushed her
so as to go out of the house to avoid any further quarrel. Such incongruity
whittles down appellants defense that he did not deliberately kill his wife.
[25]
Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken
a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce
the effect of obfuscating reason.[26] In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is
not habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the accused's
drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this case, the absence of any independent proof
that his alcohol intake affected his mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he
was so intoxicated at the time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability. [27]
In sum, Victoriano failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its
assailed Decision. His guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, considering that there was neither
any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the
victim and the culpability of the accused for such death. Likewise, moral damages, in the

amount of P50,000.00, should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the
emotional suffering of the victim's heirs, because certainly the family suffered emotional pain
brought about by Anna's death.
However, the CA erred when it deleted the award of exemplary damages. In line with current
jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary damages, in the sum of P30,000.00, be awarded,
considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of
Parricide.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01575, finding
appellant, Victoriano dela Cruz y Lorenzo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
De Santis v Intestate Estate Jalandoni, Dec 1, 2010
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders[3] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein
petitioners and their siblings[4] to intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.[5] The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED,
the assailed Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is
hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and
anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed
Orders. No costs.[6]
The antecedents are:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966. [7] He died without issue.
[8]
On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration [9] with the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition
was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court. [10]
On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a
Manifestation[11] before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves
as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of
Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.[12]
The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the
time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter. [13]For which reason, Isabel is entitled to
a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that
they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.[14] As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have
already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter. [15]
To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the
following documents:
 a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;[16] evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by

that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;[17] and behalf.[26]

c.) Their respective proof of births.[18] The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that

there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.[27] It ventured on the

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status

evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the

lawful representatives. social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock. [28]

The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in

its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the its order dated 26 January 2006.[29] Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition

ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders

Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was of the intestate court.[30]

purportedly married to Rodolfo.

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the

In its Comment to the Manifestation,[19] the respondent called attention to the entries in the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate. [31] The

birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946. [20] As it turned out, the record appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima

of birth of Sylvia states that she was a legitimate child of Isabel and John Desantis.[21] The facie evidence of the facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her parents.

document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as married.[22] The [32]
Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as

respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, established.

constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [23]

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any

According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by

that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-
initio.[24] Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.[33] From that premise, Isabel cannot be

considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.

to take part in the settlement proceedings. [25] The intestate court was convinced that the
Hence, the instant appeal.[34] Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary

weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. [43] In assessing the

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of

of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement a typical practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to save face and not to

proceedings. embarrass their families, concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child

begot by them is legitimate.[44]

The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not

One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.[35] In satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with

nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of Rodolfo is bigamous.

whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion. [36] Rather, it chose to re-assess

the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. [37] We are not impressed.

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of First Argument

discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or

capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.[38] Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the

intestate court is belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether

marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.[39] there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person

the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. [45] Otherwise stated, a

from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none. [40] A proper evaluation of court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to

the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage intervene therein.[46]

with John Desantis.[41]

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of
executed between Isabel and John Desantis. [42] The conspicuous absence of such certificate jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can

can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place. only be the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be

reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.

 Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent

of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.As mentioned earlier, it contains the

sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were married and (b) that Sylvia is

siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already their legitimatechild.[50] In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a

mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention.Ultimately, the re- subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the

assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with Pursuant to existing laws,[51] the foregoing entries are accorded prima

grave abuse of discretion. facie weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing

evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested. [52] In the case at bench, the

We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners. petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth

Second Argument certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to save face.[53] They urge this Court to

take note of a typical practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot

the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence countenance.

to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners

and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate. The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do

not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that

marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue

notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful

on record. statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed,

it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. [47] Jurisprudence teaches previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable

certificate.[48] Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

evidence of the marriage between his parents. [49]


The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that
Isabels prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the
estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the
settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner, v. WENIFREDA BALCOM-
TAMBUYAT, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 14, 2012 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 affirming with modification the May 26,
2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-
443-99, as well as its July 26, 2012 Resolution 4 denying petitioner�s Motion for
Reconsideration5 of the herein assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat (Wenifreda)
were married on September 16, 1965.6 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real
properties, including a 700-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan (the subject property),7 which was bought on November 17, 1991.8 The
deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing
witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed
therein as �Rosario Banguis.�9 When Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-
145321) covering the subject property was issued, however, it was made under the name of
�ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.�10
All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco (Nolasco). They were
married on October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his
marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never annulled.11
On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate.12
On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation 13 of TCT T-145321, which was
docketed as LRC Case No. P-443-99 and assigned to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC). She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of
Adriano; that TCT T-145321 was erroneously registered and made in the name of �ADRIANO
M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS;� that per annexed Marriage Contract,
Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to Adriano;
that the issuance of the title in Banguis�s name as Adriano�s spouse was due to �an
insidious machination by her and the person who brokered the sale of the subject property,
allegedly a cousin or relative of hers;�14 and that consequently, she suffered damages. Thus,
Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled; that a new certificate of title be made out
in Adriano�s name, with her as the spouse indicated; that Banguis be ordered to surrender
her copy of TCT T-145321; and that moral and exemplary damages, attorney �s fees, and
costs of litigation be adjudged in her favor.
In her Opposition15 to the petition for cancellation, Banguis denied specifically that the
subject property was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage. She claimed
that on the other hand, she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds; that
she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a
married couple; that their union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding � considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether
the property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose
rights will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case; and that Wenifreda is guilty of
forum-shopping in filing LRC Case No. P-443-99, considering that a prior similar case was
already filed by her and dismissed on April 22, 1999 by Branch 76 of the Malolos RTC. Banguis
prayed for the dismissal of LRC Case No. P-443-99 and to be paid moral damages and
attorney�s fees by way of counterclaim.
During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the following evidence, among
others:
1. Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda; 16
2. Publication of Adriano�s death;17
3. Social Security System (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is his
spouse;18
 4. Barangay Council Certificate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally
married and residents of No. 13 Hyacinth Road, Phase V, Pilar Village, Las Pi �as
City since 1981;19
5. Marriage Contract of Banguis and Nolasco dated October 15, 1975; 20
6. Banguis�s SSS Member�s Data Change or Addition Report indicating that
Banguis: a) sought to change her name from �Rosario E. Banguis� to �Rosario B.
Nolasco�; b) listed Nolasco as her husband; and c) changed her civil status to
�married;�21
7. Banguis�s correspondence at work � Ocean East Agency Corporation (Ocean
East), which was owned and operated by Adriano � in which she signed as
�Rosario B. Nolasco;�22
8. Banguis�s r�sum� on file with Ocean East, reflecting that she was married; 23
9. Negative Certification of Marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the
effect that the Civil Register does not have any record of Adriano and Banguis �s
marriage which was supposedly solemnized on September 2, 1988; 24
10. Certification dated April 17, 2002 issued by Rev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priest
of St. Joseph Parish, to the effect that the parish never had a parish priest by the
name of Fr. Roberto de Guzman � who is claimed to have solemnized the alleged
marriage between Adriano and Banguis;25
11. Banguis�s testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were married on
September 2, 1988; that they had a son named Adrian; that Adriano purchased the
subject property on November 17, 1991 per Deed of Sale � executed in Manila
and with Adriano as the purchaser � entered as �Document No. 173; Page No.
3550; series of 1990� in the notarial registry of Mr. Julian B. Tubig; that she paid
for the same with her own money; and that she stayed at the subject property each
Friday night up to Sunday night;26
12. Banguis�s testimony on cross-examination that she is married to Nolasco, who is
still alive; that her marriage to the latter is still subsisting and has not been
annulled; and that she knew that Adriano was married to someone else; 27
13. Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis as a couple and with a child,
supposedly taken at the subject property.28
On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED in favor of the petitioner
herein, as follows:
1. Directing the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCT No.
T-145321 (M) and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title in the
name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda �Winnie � Balcom
Tambuyat;
2. Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco of 1714 Ibarra St.,
Sampaloc, Manila to surrender to the Register of Deeds for Meycauayan,
Bulacan, the owner�s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-145321 (M) within five
(5) days from receipt of the order, failing which the Register of Deeds
should proceed with the cancellation of said TCT.
3. Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of
P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
4. Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum of
P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; and
5. Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner
attorney�s fees in the amount of P100,000.00, and the cost of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.29
In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others that under Section
112 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act � now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (PD 1529) or the Property Registration Decree 30 � court authorization is required for
any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate,
or when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of the title; that it has
been established that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano, and the subject property
was acquired during their marriage, but it was erroneously registered in the name of another;
that Banguis had a subsisting marriage with Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued with her
being erroneously included and referred to therein as Adriano �s spouse; that Adrian �s
filiation may not be proved collaterally through LRC Case No. P-443-99; that Wenifreda is
entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages without proof of pecuniary loss, for
the damage caused upon her reputation and social standing caused by the wanton,
fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguis�s name in the title; and that
Wenifreda is likewise entitled to attorney�s fees as she was compelled to litigate and incur
expenses to protect her interests by reason of Banguis�s unjustified act.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the trial court�s Decision with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
84954, the appeal basically revolved around the thesis that the trial court erred in applying
Section 108 of PD 1529; that with the serious objections raised by Banguis and considering
that she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a
different court exercising general jurisdiction should be filed, rather than in the current trial
court which sits merely as a land registration court; that the trial court disregarded Article
148 of the Family Code31 which provides for the division of properties acquired by individuals
united in a defective marriage; that the trial court erred in awarding damages, attorney �s
fees and costs of suit; that the trial court erred in granting execution pending appeal despite
the absence of any good or special reasons; and that the denial of her counterclaim was
improper.32
Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal. It appears
that Banguis failed to oppose the motion; she did not appear during the scheduled hearings
on the motion as well. As a result, the trial court issued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the
issuance of a Writ of Execution. Such writ was thus issued on April 14, 2004. TCT T-145321
was cancelled, and a new title � TCT T-433713(M) � was issued in its place.
On February 14, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26, 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney �s fees and cost of
the suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.33
The CA sustained the trial court�s application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that
Banguis�s name was included in TCT T-145321 by error or mistake. It held that the evidence
adduced proved that Wenifreda � and not Banguis � is the lawful wife of Adriano; that
there is a valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted
to such fact during the course of the proceedings in the trial court; and that Banguis �s
opposition to Wenifreda�s petition for cancellation of TCT T-145321 is not real and genuine
as to place the latter�s title to the subject property in doubt. 34
The CA added that contrary to Banguis�s position, a separate and different proceeding is not
necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in
effect acquiesced and freely submitted her issues and concerns to the trial court for complete
determination, submitting all her relevant documentary and other evidence to the court in
order to prove her allegations � particularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that
she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject property; and 2) pursuant to law 35 and
jurisprudence,36 the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and
as a court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the passage of PD 1529. It held
further that, based on the evidence adduced, Adriano and Banguis are not co-owners of the
subject property as it has been shown that: a) both of them had valid and subsisting
marriages when they conducted their adulterous relations; b) Banguis failed to present even a
modicum of evidence that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property; and c) the
deed of sale itself indicated that Adriano alone was the vendee. Finally, in denying
Wenifreda�s pecuniary awards and Banguis�s counterclaim, the CA held that the parties
are not entitled thereto as there is no legal and factual basis to grant them.
Banguis moved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was
unconvinced. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Banguis cites the following issues for resolution:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CANCELLED AND CORRECTED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-
145321 (M) FROM �ROSARIO E. BANGUIS� TO �WENIFREDA
�WINNIE� BALCOM TAMBUYAT� UNDER SECTION 108 OF THE
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE THE LACK OF JURISDICTION TO
HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS AND WEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF
THE PETITIONER AND THAT THE INSTITUTION OF ESTATE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE LATE ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT AND THE CONSEQUENT
APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS THE
PROPER REMEDY WHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY OTHER
PERSONS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-
145321 (M) THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
PROOF OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-
145321 (M) IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE
PROVIDING FOR THE SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS
UNITED IN A DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RTC WHICH
GRANTED THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF ITS DECISION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEASONABLE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER AND
THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOOD OR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE
SAME.37
Petitioner�s Arguments
In her Petition and Reply38 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA dispositions and
thus dismiss Wenifreda�s petition for cancellation in LRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists
on her original position adopted below that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of
the contentious and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation,
which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the court sits not
merely as a land registration court, but as a court of general jurisdiction. She cites Tagaytay-
Taal Tourist Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,39Liwag v. Court of
Appeals,40 and Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals,41 which made pronouncements to such
effect.
Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adriano�s estate which in effect
transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests her and her son Adrian of their
rights and interests therein; that based on the evidence she introduced, it should be
concluded that the property belongs to her as it was acquired using solely her own funds and
money borrowed from her sister, and because she has been in constant possession thereof,
introducing improvements thereon through the years; that the subject property is owned in
common by her and Adriano since it was acquired during their cohabitation; and that the CA
erred in refusing to rule on the propriety of the trial court �s grant of execution pending
appeal.
Respondent�s Arguments
In Wenifreda�s Comment,42 it is stressed that the distinction between the trial court acting
as a land registration court, on one hand, and its acting as a court of general jurisdiction, on
the other, has been removed with the effectivity of PD 1529; thus, trial courts are no longer
fettered by their former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in land
registration cases only when there is unanimity among the parties, or when none of them
raises any adverse claims or serious objections. It is further argued that Banguis �s claim of
ownership cannot stand, for the evidence fails to indicate that she contributed to the
purchase of the subject property, even as the deed of sale to the property itself shows that
Adriano alone is the vendee thereof, and Banguis signed merely as a witness thereto. Finally,
respondent explains that during the proceedings covering the motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis was accorded the opportunity to participate, but
she did not; as a result, the old title was cancelled and a new one was accordingly issued in its
stead.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving the objections
raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for cancellation; a separate action need
not be filed in a different court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered
to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete
determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and submitted all her
relevant evidence to the court. �The active participation of the party against whom the
action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction
and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body�s jurisdiction.�43
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased;
(2) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;
(3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on
the certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and
has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and
(7) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. 44 The present
case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in
issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of �Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis �
when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda � and not Banguis � is Adriano �s lawful
spouse.
Proceedings under Section 108 are �summary in nature, contemplating corrections or
insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial
issues.�45 Banguis�s opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised
controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian,
which she claims to be her son by Adriano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of
Banguis�s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda�s petition, the evidence apparently
indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of
the issue of succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of
Wenifreda�s petition. The Court is thus led to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of
Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano �s spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact
that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence � among others,
the parties� respective marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are
considered the primary evidence of a marital union46 � indicates that Adriano was married
to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco � and both marriages were subsisting
at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of the certificate of title
thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each
other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,
Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano�s spouse; the right and
privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman
not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife
in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which
is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another
woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In
Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil
Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property)
stated: �Be it noted however that with respect to �spouse�, the same must be the
legitimate �spouse� (not common-law spouses).�
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term �spouse �
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal
Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the
Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
�spouse� contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse . Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.47 (Emphasis supplied)
The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is � who should be
included in the title to the subject property as Adriano �s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda?
Was there error in placing Banguis�s name in the title as Adriano �s spouse? If Banguis is
Adriano�s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the
other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano�s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be
erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required in resolving this
issue is to determine who between them is Adriano�s spouse; it was unnecessary for
Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different
from the certificate of title to it.
x x x. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title
and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land
under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer
be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that
other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws
do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 48
Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true
owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need to
cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such effect.
Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda �s documentary and other evidence, Banguis
may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the
property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed ownership; the
view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners
of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the
purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering the subject property
showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it must rely on
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and
binding.49 Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the
property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she nonetheless
acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she
were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require
that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness �
which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its
purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee
just the same. Her failure to explain why � despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the
property � she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of
ownership doubtul. �Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining
the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so
furnishes a strong inference against him.�50 One cannot also ignore the principle that �the
rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.�51
Neither can the Court believe Banguis�s assertion that Wenifreda �s petition for
cancellation of TCT T-145321 is in reality a partition of Adriano�s estate which in effect
transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of
their rights and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of
the wrongful entry in TCT T-145321; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of title
� that Adriano is married to Wenifreda � and nothing else. It would have been a summary
proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are
irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.
Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the trial courts March 30, 2004 Order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ
of Execution issued, as they have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision and July 26, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation
of title with damages. The CA Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with
Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).

On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia)
(respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.)
and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya
Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the
petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an
Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property
measuring 49.5 sq m.6

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was
cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, 7 was issued in the name of the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold
her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents
submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit 9 dated July 12, 2005
purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed
away.10

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification
of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the
petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted
the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages
against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.12
G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate
ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents. children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article
992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the
DECISION legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.

After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September 28,
2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of
[the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466
issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been issued on
the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate
TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with
all the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse
claim of [Fidela]; [and]
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00
as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the cancellation of
TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed
of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the execution of the said Deed
of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this
wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to
initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J
and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name
'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the respondents'] respective birth certificates as the
mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz".
In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the
father.17 (Emphasis ours)
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of deed
of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the
brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.18
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in Civil Case
No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.19
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the issuance of
TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the
question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the legal
capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the appellees'
legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the
attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio,
Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the
certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a
marriage license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of
marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a
copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].
xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license number and in
the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated on that
ground.
x x x.
xxxx
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is
based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption
is of great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent
and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born during the
subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate children of [Anastacio,
Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.20 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in the Resolution22 dated
April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery was
indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer
of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner continues to assail
the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present action. Invoking the provisions
of Article 992 of the Civil Code,23 the petitioner insists that the respondents have no legal
right over the estate left by Silvestra for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra, she,
however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio,
Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently
proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage contract 24 presented by the respondents is
not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an
alleged marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil
Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever
received by said office. Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of
(Canonical) Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage license
required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical)
Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela.27cralawred
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not
conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the
petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only be
questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former either
by consanguinity or affinity.29
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not the
respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this Court however
deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine
their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of whether the respondents
have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon
by the parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of
marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul
with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a
reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to
certain requirements specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the
offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to
bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence, x x x.32 (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in
the case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births,
marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and
the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized
public officials.34 They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as
are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. 35 Accordingly, since
there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of
marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. 37
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective
Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office38 where Fidela signed as the
Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same
parents � their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden
name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents
were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte. "39
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents'
legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates of
live birth contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate
filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and value in the
determination of the issue at hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the
signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that
the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to
establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila40 where it was held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not
competent evidence of paternity.41
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of
birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
(Civil Registrar)."42Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them. 43
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as,
in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will
remain sufficient."44
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be
a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence.
In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that what was sought to
be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent of the new-born
legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only
in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if
the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration
shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar
not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by
the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall
not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed
consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate
children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of
birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which
they had two children � the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years
after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of
marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social
Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio �
Always presume marriage."50

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired
way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then
Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus: G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the vs.
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
CONCEPCION, J.:
October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court
SO ORDERED. of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of
her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the
latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said
court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite,
P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course,
later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima,

as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite,
ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty
pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the
actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to
P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for
breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years
younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he
had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a
life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon
he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a
private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married
one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October
4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain
permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code
provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the
enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by
a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the
celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who
without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the
expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers
must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate
the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus
vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith
of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code
of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the
report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these
articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed
Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other
particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that
might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That
authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of
marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under
Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future
spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent
or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty
years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such
consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis
of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen
years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of
the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be
liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement
shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on
account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the
report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of
breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in
many of the American States.
 See statutes of: The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344 allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762 and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's
Nevada 1943 — p. 75 fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141 P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223 the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral
California 1939 — p. 1245 damages to P7,000.00.
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009 With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Michigan 1935 — p. 201 hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in
New York 1935 this instance. It is so ordered.
Pennsylvania p. 450
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that
the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in
consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to
be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday,
May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear
and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The
Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,

plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual
desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold
that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages
may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the
new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used
in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is
the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal
Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say
that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because,
the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
[G.R. No. L-20089. February 26, 1965.]

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO X.

VELEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Defendant-appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s

decision promulgated December 26, 1964. The only point movant raises is the
alleged validity of his affidavit of merits attached to his petition for relief in the
lower court.

The affidavit of merits in question states "that he (defendant) has a good and
valid defense, his failure to marry plaintiff as scheduled having been due to a
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." The movant
contends that this is not a mere opinion or conclusion but positive and
categorical statement of a valid defense; that it stated there are fortuitous
events, i.e., fortuitous facts, which defendant puts forward as valid defense.
The previous rulings of this Court, movant further contends, held invalid only
affidavits of merits that disclosed no defense.

The rulings of this court require affidavits of merits to state not mere
conclusions or opinions but facts (Vaswani v. Tarachand Bros., L-15800, Dec.
29, 1960). An affidavit is a statement under oath of facts. Defendant’s affidavit
of merits stated no facts, but merely an inference that defendant’s failure was
due to fortuitous events under circumstances beyond his control. This is a
conclusion of fact, no a fact.

An affidavit of merits is required to avoid waste of the court’s time if the

defense turns out to be ineffective (Vda. de Yulo v. Chua Chuco, 48 O.G. 554,
555). Statements too vague or merely general do not — as movant admits —
serve the afore-stated purpose.

Defendant’s affidavit of merits provides no means for the court to see the
merits of his defense and determine whether reopening the case would be
worth its time. Said affidavit revealed nothing of the "event" or
"circumstances" constituting the defense. It stated, in substance, only
defendant’s opinion that the event was "fortuitous" and that the circumstances
were "beyond his control" ; and his conclusion that his failure to marry plaintiff
on schedule was "due to" them. The court, not the defendant, should form
such opinions and draw such conclusions on the basis of facts provided in the
affidavit. As it is, defendant’s affidavit leaves the court guessing as to the facts.

Conformably to previous rulings of this Court, therefore, the affidavit of merits

aforementioned is not valid. To repeat, it states a conclusion of facts, not facts
themselves; it leaves the court guessing as to the facts; it provides no basis for
determining the probable merits of the defense as a jurisdiction for reopening
the case.
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
vs.
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for
support and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the
defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both
being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection
for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for
carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of
which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM
Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became
unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as
promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a
month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary
damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the
case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition
of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause
of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing
as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing
the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to
marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa
vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628,
January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted
by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil
Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power
or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must
be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift
to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there
are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman,
Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre
Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting
and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the
defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff
who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are
wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close
 and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the
defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short
period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the
defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving
which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the
defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but
instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and
refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff
and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artul
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point,
this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of
the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would
get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result
of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the
true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did
not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place
with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to
the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by
reason of that deceitul promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be
held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives
and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the
temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence
for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as
follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and
that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just
a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several
times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on
August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown
of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters
that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during
the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant
later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this
live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
 told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to
her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to
the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-
trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking
for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends
to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him
to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in
toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or
so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant,
for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed
with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April
1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to
plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp.
6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife
in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in
Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustul country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And
as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages
and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at
bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love
or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He
criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian
ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to
the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes
that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could
be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of
his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There
are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court
took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-
called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
 Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has
not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under
the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed,
and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage,
she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21
has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much
more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner,
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having
a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion
were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor
who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage;
it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
 To constitute seduction there must in all cases be
some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her person to ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of
the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness
arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female,
and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class
of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artul persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court
of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code.
The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense
of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit
or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the
woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be
said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic),
the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if
the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have
been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter
is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage
in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate
 and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who 40 Phil. 209).
can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial
assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner. 34 petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were
Abanag v Mabute, AM P-11-2922
empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman
BRION, J.:
into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of We resolve the administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute (respondent), Court
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the Stenographer I in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
Jane Abanag (complainant) for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the complainant, a 23-
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent courted her and professed his undying
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
love for her. Relying on respondents promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, her to a manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became depressed
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling because of the humiliation that

she suffered.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court
procured by Administrator, the respondent vehemently denied the complainants allegations and claimed
fraud. 36
that the charges against him were baseless, false and fabricated, and were intended to harass
37
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, We declared: him and destroy his reputation. He further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the complainants

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be co-employee, was using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas resented him because he
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, had chastised her for her arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He believes that
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is the complainants letter-complaint, which was written in the vernacular, was prepared by
Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog; the respondent would have used
the waray or English language if she had written the letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the letter-complaint.
She belied the respondents claim that she was being used by Tordesillas who wanted to get
even with him.
In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005, the Court referred the letter-complaint to then
Acting Executive Judge Carmelita T. Cuares of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Catbalogan City, Samar for investigation, report and recommendation.
The respondent sought Judge Cuares inhibition from the case, alleging that the
Judge was partial and had bias in favor of the complainant; the complainant herself had
bragged that she personally knew Judge Cuares. The Court designated Judge Esteban V. dela
Pea, who succeeded Judge Cuares as Acting Executive Judge, to continue with the
investigation of the case.[1] Eventually, Judge Agerico A. Avila took over the investigation when
he was designated the Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan City, Samar.
In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7, 2010, [2] Executive Judge Avila
reported on the developments in the hearing of the case. The complainant testified that she
met the respondent while she was a member of the Singles for Christ. They became
acquainted and they started dating. The relationship blossomed until they lived together in a
rented room near the respondents office.
The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant when he
joined the Singles for Christ. He described their liaison as a dating relationship. He admitted
that the complainant would join him at his rented room three to four times a week; when the
complainant became pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with him. He vehemently denied
having brought the complainant to a local manghihilot and that he had tried to force her to
abort her baby. He surmised that the complainants miscarriage could be related to her
epileptic attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further testified that the
complainants mother did not approve of him, but the complainant defied her mother and
lived with him. He proposed marriage to the complainant, but her mother did not like him as
a son-in-law and ordered the complainant to return home. The complainant obeyed her
mother. They have separated ways since then, but he pledged his undying love for the
complainant.
The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent,
reporting that:
Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and
has maintained an amorous relation with a woman equally unmarried has
nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is between
two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a natural
effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not forced to live with
Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or machination.
The fact was, she freely acceded to cohabit with him. The situation may-
not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for administrative sanction.
There appears no law which penalizes or prescribes the sexual activity of
two unmarried persons. So, the accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas
initiated the abortion was calculated to bring the act within the ambit of
an immoral, disgraceful and gross misconduct. Except however as to the
self-serving assertion that Mary Jane was brought to a local midwife and
forced to take the abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support
that it was in fact so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned
sour. In no small way Mary Jane was also responsible of what befell upon
her.[3]
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless,
and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of
the community.[4] To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.[5] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.[6]
 Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents comment, and the WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative complaint

findings of the Investigating Judge, we find that the acts complained of cannot be considered against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,

as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.

We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant and the SO ORDERED.

respondent were consensual. They met at the Singles for Christ, started dating and

subsequently became sweethearts. The respondent frequently visited the complainant at her

boarding house and also at her parents residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the

respondent and they eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the

respondents office. They continued their relationship even after the complainant had suffered

a miscarriage.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. [7] The Court has repeatedly held vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are MARIATEGUI, respondents.
not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. [8]
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent,

private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their familys future. We cannot

intrude into the question ofwhether they should or should not marry. [9] However, we take this
BIDIN, J.:
occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their

obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel
must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official
duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

to preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts. [10]
The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116;
8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife,
Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely:
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her
children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana
Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo,
Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They
had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931
and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he
was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described
in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex
"A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court
issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was
issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners
caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate
transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian
and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163
together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo
Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of
the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for
partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana
Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged
the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well
as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for
recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo,
pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children
and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children
of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing
the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired
transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the
shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not
prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market
value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of
partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government
charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December
7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui,
and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for
recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of
these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of
the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn,
have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal,
pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo
Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the
decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action
filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the
relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although
it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127,
1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and
(his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present
(People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband
and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5
(z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v.
Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban,supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have
been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two
classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two
other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any
of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children
of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these
are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite
the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's
death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners
herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed
in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action
for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for
partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner
(Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco,
117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55
[1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of
the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by
petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set
in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181
SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and
convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of
their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners
fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According
to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario
about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been
assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot
No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must
have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice
of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as
a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case
where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an
incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct. 1
After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the
Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to
Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectully recommended that
the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross
misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on
removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of the
Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other
misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the
antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced
hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay
City, while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the
Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E.
Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant
commenced Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree
declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen
(16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a
civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long
engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of
the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case
involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a
close family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding,
they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception
over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in
Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours
later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a
woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant
confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply
remarked "it would have been just a call at the wrong number". What followed was
a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when
respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto
ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and
have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no
choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the
complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant
rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her
and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study
session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a
member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage
between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated
and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering
evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant
Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against
respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10,
1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and
bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the
truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez. This,
the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to
falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for
complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E");
and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between
her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").
Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the
complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained
that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh.
"B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed
against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in
1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Peña, his first wife, was
subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not
yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet
published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Peña
having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To
this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings
and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution of demanding respect and dignity.4 He himself asserts that at the time of his
marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first
wife, Librada Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to
petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false
statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been
annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not
justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a
defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of
respondent's sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he
is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal
Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware
of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites. 5
On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating
Justice Purisima which we quote with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and
signed a Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent
under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by
respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN,
April 2, 1996, p. 15a).
That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne
out by law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the
contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the
presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage,
Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age, were satisfied and complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was
nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration.
According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the
complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of
the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant before a competent
authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was
freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil
marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such
marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will
find in the criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming
for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing
the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pena had not
attained complete finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper
of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage
voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his
marriage with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he
(respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is
precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein
complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Peña
was subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or
not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and
circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481
before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that
what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a "sham"
marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is — that what respondent
perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar
and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge
against herein complainant in the administrative case instituted against her by Atty.
Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting
to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge.
Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a
wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair
with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to
help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could
have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that
what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was
without any factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the
sanctity of marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can
make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun
of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator
and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by
him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham" marriage is
unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay
sacrilege.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitul conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for
suspension or disbarment of lawyers.7
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive
conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive
behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered
some years of commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would
be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as
recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a
similar offense hereafter.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the
Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R.
SP No. 26178[2] and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites
on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would
meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21,
1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3]
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner
contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). [4]
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June
1990, when she learned about petitioners marriage to Santella, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August
9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6]
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry
her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time
of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.[7]
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of
their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality
by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the
time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to
petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his
marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.[8]
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for
showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel during the hearings of said
case.
The trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November
28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had
sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC also denied
petitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. [10]
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1)
exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel; (2) violating the
requirements of due process by denying petitioners [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to
comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and
(4) ruling that in a criminal case only prima facie evidence is sufficient for conviction of an
accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.[11]
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where
the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to
suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98,
respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.[12] When the Board denied the said motion in its Order
dated July 16, 1991,[13] petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition
for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold
that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative
case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the
administrative case could render nugatory petitioners right against self-incrimination in this
criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that
Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC
Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of
facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision
in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to
inhibit due to petitioners failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge
exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioners
motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with
law.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence
filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same,
considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the
elements of bigamy.[16]
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Boards
Order denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the
ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed
since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.[17]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL
[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19]
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioners
marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both
the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative
case for revocation of petitioners engineering license before the PRC Board moot and
academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding
and controlling precepts and rules.[20]
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. [21] The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.[22]
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended
until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
[23]
Petitioners argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People vs. Aragon[25] cited by
petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioners marriage to private respondent in
September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not
be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. [26] In Landicho vs.
Relova,[27] we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption of marriage exists.[28]
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
petitioners marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time
of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. [29]
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal
and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case
in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same
facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend
nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the
investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final
decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the
PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by
petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure
to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. [30] The existence of these other
charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial courts
denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him
and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly
identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied
with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and
Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that
there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by
him ever took place.[31]
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.[32] In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the
demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy
against the petitioner; and second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to
justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a
special civil action for certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
[33]
In view of the trial courts finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. [34] consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioners misimpression that by denying
his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima faciecase against him, the trial A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case,
court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an
adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecutions Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the
evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.
case.[35] The RTCs observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying
that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that
petitioners motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said
petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to
motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. [40] The instances when
rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.[36] Said declaration by the RTC should not be
Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his
construed as a pronouncement of petitioners guilt. It was precisely because of such finding
counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the
that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his
judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence
defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both
are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the
parties.
requirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not
him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges duty to disposing
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge of the courts business promptly.[41]
said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioners counsel manifested that he
had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented SO ORDERED.
that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a
medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was
going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and
declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judges hostile attitude
towards petitioners counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his
motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge
Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.
[37]
In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38] this Court held that while bias and
prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
not enough.There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
partiality.[39] vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not
among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the CARPIO, J.:
decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of
law states: The Case

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in 2009 as well as the Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court affirmed the 19 November
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused
Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts. The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P. Geraldino (Geraldino) for
the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being
then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage
has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who
knowingly consented and agreed to be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter
his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on
the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date,
pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered the following
stipulation of facts:
1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that
he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8,
2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit.
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not the
second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case
was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses were as follows:
xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working
there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got
married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch[sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard
rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines
(TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the
private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted
a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a certification as to the civil status
of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted
Rowena P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and
asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed
and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and
childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that Rowena
P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because
when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at
the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the
house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were
talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi
Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in
the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the
moral damages she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was
a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide. She
added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she
almost got raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their
residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not
enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of
her money in the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage
between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she
was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003,
 she was asked by the private complainant to accompany the latter to the
workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She
declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she
(Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the
private complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2)
marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second
with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim
convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first
marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or
Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the
private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of
Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by
one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim
A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside
from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated
January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert
prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was
courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant
filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned of his second
marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that
Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private
complainant and he did not tell her this fact because Rowena
P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of
his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware
why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with
Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also indicated because he
was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single
despite his first marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January
30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the
founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to
convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in
1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was
then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim
(Exhibit 14) and after receiving the application, said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10,
1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then
directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a
certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004,
he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a
Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could
marry more than one according to the Holy Koran. However, before
marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the
consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a
Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9,
2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets
married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to
the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four
times but he should be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was
not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his
second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with
the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena
P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise,
he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-
7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this
incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the
private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her
when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since
December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a
first marriage with the private complainant, she confronted the former
who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she
asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded that
he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to
their marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband,
 she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also claimed that after
learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the
Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant
that she was sought by the private complainant and that they had a
confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge,
she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted
that she only came to know the private complainant when she (private
complainant) filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8). 5
The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and
acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article
417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to
meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have
a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is
merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal
Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition,
Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent
marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place where his family
resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them
objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to secure
the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide
whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena
P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did
not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal
intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that
he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second,
third or fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should
have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon
accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court
that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in
accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that
has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only.
There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The
evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of the first
marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to
several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought
by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was
there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private
complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could
not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on
between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that (E)verycircumstance
favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the
test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People
vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure
of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 10
The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the trial
courts decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-
Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not immobilize
the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash
of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its
30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial
court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the
date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6
April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony.
The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states
that Nollora and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the
ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22,
1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices
of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd Distric
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once.
Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The
applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shariaand not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations
of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after
the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and
any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment
under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed to have
attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to
the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer
who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law
to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person designated
by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize
the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office
of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any
other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the
contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If
the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall,
upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the
parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil
Code of the Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither
is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the
crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is single.
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability
for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by
these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your
religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are
already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert
since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no
indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage
contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not
place any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us,
Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January
10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret
my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society
doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my
religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there that youre single,
Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?
xxx
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under
the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights
[sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to
secure the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the
start, she was always very mad, maam.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage
to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prisioncorreccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate
sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.


G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed
the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a
complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-
98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married
to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on
the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30
September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War
II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December
1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In
1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with
another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any
issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the
name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989
in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in
Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and
Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to
1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,
Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages
that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO
Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were
totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12
 i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by
Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of
Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription
from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30
March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and
Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife,
but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary
evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date
of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single
when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law
relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco,
Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; 19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of
Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
21
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of
the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between
Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA
to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance
of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of
the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative
value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the
same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same
thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila.
The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise,
issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of
Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter
part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office
has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of
marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September
1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony
of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the
trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot
four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence
especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the
fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence,
even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of
the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of
Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution
of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document
is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or
recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but
not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying
on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those
to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held
that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one
who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been]
lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present
during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss
was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence –
testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v.
TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido
and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-27930. November 26, 1970.]
AURORA A. ANAYA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Arturo A. Romero, for Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-
00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, Plaintif, v. Fernando O. Palaroan, Defendant."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and
defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an
action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23
September 1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage
and granting Aurora’s counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the
counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a
close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital
secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently
doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced . . . frank disclosure of which, certitude
precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted `FRAUD’, in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of
No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegations in paragraph IV of the complaint
and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no
circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives
the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having committed any
fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her
having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed
the support that had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious
filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for
its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."cralaw virtua1aw library
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she
alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to
shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely
happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative
of his whose immediate members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry
her (the close relative);
"(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because
he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties
and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to
live with her;
"(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized
for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the
first girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live
with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter’s love
cohabited and had several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No.
21589, had been litigated between them (parties);" (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expediente, the court
realized that Aurora’s allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage, and, on the authority of Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168,
holding:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts
can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or
annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such
decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record." —
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it
inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the
complaint; it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage,
which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code,
which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
"(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;"
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species
of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:jgc:chan robles.com.ph
"ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:chanrob1es virtual 1aw li brary
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or
more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced
from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void
and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a
cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically
dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds
by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, nondisclosure
of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that
Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the
enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not
one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for
an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society,
and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being plain, the Court’s
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her
husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise,
alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any
intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up
his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred
in ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and
absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and
additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of
allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the
Complaint . . ." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore,
improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not
permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint
(Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege
a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings
of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
intention on the husband’s part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage.
Since appellant’s wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground
was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
 In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,[5] Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the

petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with

her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her

after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that

petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born

prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary

damages, attorneys fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of

which states:

Villanueva V CA WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in
[1]
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the
Decision[2] dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment
SO ORDERED.[6]
of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary

damages, attorneys fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution[3] denying
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
award of attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages

to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
The antecedent facts are as follows:
for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned

errors:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED
and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND
INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that
WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. [4]
 II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW. [7]
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on
the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial
court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. [8] We affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and
that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance
that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized
his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17,
1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months
when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage
annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in
Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the
hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which
was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone
the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a
judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of
the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal
in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be
hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this
Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed
in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his
marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to
the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to
his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of
the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening
presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples
Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to
enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to
assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is
even doubtul if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what
with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His
counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime
in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where the sexual act
was consummated, with the defendant on top x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife,
appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing
her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a
year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the
registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa
City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is
inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of death of
appellees fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-
examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely
born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil
Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and
throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion
as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself
had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the
date her fetus died.
Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellees
evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her
 claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she
could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had
testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is
complete by that time. Whether the appellees impression that she had
delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she
had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellants
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988,
and his failure to attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man,
appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into
marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the letters
allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-examination,
when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven
(7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x
x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love
and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly
changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming
that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm
by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the
admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with
the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a
hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those
letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his
marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between
him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will
of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to
cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or
undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to
cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.[9]
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208 (11) of the
Civil Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where the court deems it just and
equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual
and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support
an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless
portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent
schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x[10]
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any
testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,[11] we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to
prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the
witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he
purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere
allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages
except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not
entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need
not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In
case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of
loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting
exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show
that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
 Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that

no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to

moral damages.[12] In the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her

claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12,

1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil

Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with

private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages

is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.