KRONENFELD Using S - Goodys Formalization of Kin Terminology PDF

Anthropological Theory
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Using Sydney H. Gould's formalization of kin terminologies: Social

information, skewing and structural types
David B Kronenfeld
Anthropological Theory 2001; 1; 173
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02 Kronenfeld (JB/D) 1/5/01 3:21 pm Page 173
Anthropological Theory
Copyright © SAGE Publications

London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi
Vol 1(2): 173–196
[1463-4996(200106)1:2;173–196;017336]
Using Sydney H. Gould’s

formalization of kin
terminologies
Social information, skewing and structural
types
David B. Kronenfeld
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
Parts of the formalism recently developed by Sydney H. Gould (Gould, 2000) are
used to explore three interrelated problems relating to kinship terminologies. (1)
What insights into the role of kinship in a modern society may be gained from a
comparison of terminological variants in use within that society. (2) How we are to
understand the relationship between skewed and unskewed variants of a terminology
such as Fanti. (3) What may be some of the practical formal and cognitive constraints
that affect possible transitions from one terminological type to another. Gould’s
algebraic definitions of the different system types is utilized – as is the graphic device,
called a ‘kingraph’, which he developed to render the structure of the different types
clear and to enable the easy tracing out of the terminological categories to which
different relatives belong.
Key Words
cognitive constraints • Gould, Sydney H. • kinship algebra • skewing • structural
types • terminological variants
I want to use one piece of the formalism recently developed by Sydney H. Gould (Gould,
2000) to help explore some problems regarding kinship terminologies. My goal here
is not to get into any issues concerning the formal characteristics of Gould’s system – he
does that himself quite well – nor to argue the superiority of Gould’s approach over
others. I am in general fairly catholic in my use of alternative formalisms, and I am
confident that the best way to sort out what is best for what is to see what kinds of sub-
stantive or theoretic insights each approach can lead to. In particular, I want to examine
173
ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)
three problems regarding: (1) what insights into the role of kinship in a modern society
may be gained from a comparison of terminological variants in use within that society,
(2) how we are to understand the relationship between skewed and unskewed variants
of a terminology, and (3) what may be some of the practical formal and cognitive con-
straints that affect possible transitions from one terminological type to another.
KIN GRAPHS
The formal constructs of Gould’s that I want to use are kin graphs – graphic represen-
tations of the algebraic structure of terminological systems. Kin graphs provide an easy-
to-read and not terribly technical representation of the formal relations that structure
one or another terminology.
In a kin graph each box represents a set of structurally equivalent kin types, where
‘structurally equivalent’ means that in any longer expression including one of the types
as an internal link, the other types may be substituted for the one without changing the
kin term category to which the longer expression belongs. The equivalences that gener-
ate such a structure are written as X ↔ Y, while X = Y is used for definitional statements,
and X ≈ Y is used for specific terminological equivalences (concurrences) among kin
types that may or may not be structurally significant. The bold letters next to boxes indi-
cate the basic relationship category (as defined in Gould’s notational/analytic system)
the box belongs to. The basic categories that we will be concerned with are F (father),
– –
M (mother), F (fatherling = a man’s child), M (motherling = a woman’s child), I (identity
– – – –
or self ), J (sibling, MM or FF), and X (cross-cousin, MF or FM – where a ‘father’s
motherling’ is understood to refer to the father’s female sibling’s motherling and a
‘mother’s fatherling’ is understood to refer to the mother’s male sibling’s fatherling).
Sometimes P (for parent) will be used where F and M are interchangeable (since
– – – – –
F ↔ M), as will P (for child) where F and M reciprocally are interchangeable (F ↔ M).
– –
It will be noted that F is the reciprocal of F and M of M; since a string of these cat-
– –
egories represents a succession of relative products, the reciprocal of MF is FM; J and I
are self-reciprocal. The kin terms into which the box’s kin types fall are written inside
the box, separated by lines, which represent the semantic components on which they
differ from one another. In the examples in this article, a plain vertical line within a box
distinguishes sex of alter (with male on the left and female on the right), while a heavy
vertical line within a box distinguishes sex of ego (with male on the left and female on
the right). A solid line connecting two boxes represents a father–child link (with the
father in the higher box), while a dashed line represents a mother–child link. If a con-
necting line has no arrow, then it can be followed in either direction; if it has an arrow
then it can only be followed in the indicated direction. The lines go to and from the
box, and not to or from any particular part of the box. In systems in which there exist
structural marriage relations, the relevant boxes can be linked with an equal sign (=).
The ‘equivalences’ listed in the figures, after the actual kin graph, represent the minimal
set of equivalence equations necessary to produce the structure of the system, as rep-
resented in the kin graph. In Gould’s work on classificatory systems, these equivalences
define the terminological types.
In a kin graph one can determine a terminological assignment of a kin type by tracing
that kin type through the boxes. For instance, in Fanti, the kin term category of a
–
‘mother’s brother’s child’ (MF in Gould’s system; afoma in Romney’s notation) would
174
KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies
be determined by starting in the I box, tracing up the dashed line to the M box, staying
in the M box for the sibling link (since, in classificatory systems J ↔ I), and then tracing
down the solid line to whatever box that led to; the applicable kin term would be the
one within the box whose semantic components matched those of the kin type.
CASE 1
For my first problem I would like to start with the following three kin graphs – of a
system that is probably familiar to most readers, but that I will leave unnamed for the
moment as a way of focusing our attention on what the formalism shows.
The first kin graph, Figure 1, offers the fully elaborated system, at least that part of
it that falls within a certain genealogical range (the terminal lines leading out imply that
it continues). All the boxes in the rightmost two columns (Columns III and IV) fall into
a single kin term category, but each box represents the attachment of a different set of
modifiers to that kin term.1 The topmost and bottommost boxes of Columns I and II
belong to the same kin term categories as the boxes immediately below or above them
(as the case may be), but with a modifier (always, here, the same one). This fully elabor-
ated version is not much used in actual practice, and, in fact, is not fully understood by
many members of the culture. However, there is evidence that it was historically more
salient than it now is. The second kin graph, Figure 2, shows the system if one ignores
the modifiers for Column III and IV terms, and just uses the basic kin term categories.
The changed column labels reflect the fact that we are no longer counting collateral lines.
This version is universally understood within the culture and seems widely used. Figure
3 shows the system if one ignores all modifiers and just attends to the kin term categories
themselves. This version is often used informally in conversation, but rarely in any
serious account of the relevant relations (those on which it differs from Figure 2).
In Figure 1 we simply have Lewis Henry Morgan’s collateral lines, showing degree of
collaterality. This pattern suggests a culture with bilateral descent in which some sig-
nificant aspect of relatedness (perhaps succession, perhaps some form of institutional-
ized support) depended primarily on lineal (parent–child) links and secondarily on
genealogical distance from ego of various lines (other than ego’s own) where that dis-
tance is defined by how far removed from ego is the common ancestor of ego and
members of the line in question.
What seems primarily lost in the transition from Figure 1 to Figure 2 is all that infor-
mation about the genealogical ranking of collateral lines. The relevance of relatively
distant collateral kin would seem to have largely disappeared – certainly any aspect of
that relevance that depended on relative distance. The preservation of more information
about vertical distance (generation distance for lineals and co-lineals), especially given
the disappearance of vertical distance’s role in structuring collateral distance, suggests
that there is some positive function being served by these vertical distinctions. Presum-
ably the issue concerns relative closeness – involved in distinguishing the categories (GF,
GM, etc.) represented by known individuals with clear interactive relations from those
(known or unknown) with little or no direct relevance (GGF, GGM, etc.). The modi-
fiers (that subdivide the relevant lineal and co-lineal kin term categories – GGF vs. GF,
GU vs. U, etc.) seem, then, to be distinguishing relatively relevant from relatively irrel-
evant members of the given kin term categories.2
Figure 3 gives us a picture based on the kin term categories alone, without any
175
Figure 1. Maximal System

– –
Equivalences: F ↔ M (and reciprocally M ↔ F )
modifiers. The picture suggests a somewhat different view of the terminology from that
of Figure 1. This picture strongly suggests a series of concentric circles: (1) ego, (2) ego’s
own nuclear family members, (3) members of closely related nuclear families. This
picture suggests not succession but something more of direct interpersonal interaction
(perhaps social support or sharing).
Taken as a whole, the series of kin graphs of this terminology suggests that several
very different kinds of social information have been represented within the terminology.
The information about usage suggests a historical shift in which the relevance of the one
kind of information is considerably lessening, while the other remains strong.
The terminology that I am discussing here, obviously, is English. Hopefully, leaving
that identification out until now has enabled readers to consider my presentation rela-
tively directly on its own terms without first processing it through their knowledge of
176
Figure 2. Simpler System

– –
Equivalences: M ↔ F (and reciprocally F ↔ M)
–––– –––
PPPP↔PPP (and reciprocally PPPP ↔ PPP)
the many formal analyses of English that have formed a salient part of the literature on
the formal analysis of kin terminologies. I do want to claim that such a pattern, if
encountered in a less known culture, would suggest similar hypotheses about that ter-
minology and culture. The formal shape of this analytic presentation, in its treatment
of collaterality, obviously more closely matches that of Wallace and Atkins than that of
Romney and D’Andrade,3 but I do want to note that the comparative frame of this struc-
turally based analysis (i.e. comparing the three structurally based figures) does highlight
the issues raised by the Romney and D’Andrade picture, even if it does not totally
account for their psychological data.4
Gould’s approach (as my application of it here) is clearly and explicitly genealogical;
177
Figure 3. Minimal System

– –
Equivalences: M ↔ F (and reciprocally F ↔ M)
––– ––
PPP ↔ PP (and reciprocally PPP ↔ PP)
as such it contrasts with another kind of approach (e.g. Read, this issue, but also, though
much less elegantly, Kronenfeld, 1980b), which attacks the analysis directly through an
algebraic treatment of the relations among the terminological categories without any
recourse to genealogy.5 It is interesting (or, perhaps, reassuring) to note, though, that the
picture produced by Gould’s system matches pretty well with that produced by Read’s.
Gould’s approach is similar in significant ways to that of Lehman (Lehman and Witz,
1974, referred to in Lehman, this issue).
CASE 2
For my second problem I would like to turn to the Fanti kin terminology on which I
have written much in the past (see, for example, Kronenfeld, 1973, 1975, 1980a, 1980b,
1991). Figures 4 and 5 show the kin graphs for the unskewed, Cheyenne type,6 and
178
Figure 4. Kin Graph for Fanti Unskewed System

Equivalences: Specific Cheyenne Type: X ↔ J
– –
General Classificatory: I ↔ J ↔ MM ↔ FF
skewed, Crow type, variants of the Fanti terminology. Table 1 provides the componen-
tial analysis of Fanti focal kin types in Gould’s format, along with English glosses for the
Fanti kin terms. Note that the same componential analysis serves for both variants. The
shared componential analysis is one of my reasons for speaking of variants of a single
system rather than two different systems. The shared componential picture is also one of
my reasons for treating skewing as an overlay on something else, rather than taking
skewed systems (Crow type or Omaha type) as representing full-blown types of their own.
I want to suggest that Gould’s graphic representation system allows an easy examin-
ation of structural differences between systems. A comparison of the two Fanti kin
graphs shows two major differences: (1) in G2 and G2 all four types of grandrelative,
–– –– –– ––
FF, FM, MF, MM and F F, F M, M F, M M, each have their own box in the skewed
system, while in the unskewed system, grandrelatives linked through F or M, respectively,
– –
and reciprocally through F or M are together in a common box. (2) Fatherlings (related
179
Figure 5. Kin Graph for Fanti Skewed System

– – –
Equivalences: Specific Crow type: MF ↔ F (and reciprocally FM ↔ F)
– –
General Classificatory: I ↔ J ↔ MM ↔ FF
through solid descending lines) of ascendant female relatives (related through ascending
dashed lines) are moved down one or more generations while motherlings (related
through dashed descending lines) of ascendant male relatives (related through ascend-
ing solid lines) are moved up a generation.
The first difference is simply the finer subdivision that is needed to distinguish struc-
turally fatherlings of ascendant male relatives from fatherlings of ascendant female rela-
tives and, reciprocally, motherlings of ascendant female relatives from motherlings of
ascendant male relatives. The G2 relatives are not themselves distinguished termino-
logically (all are in the single nana category), but in the skewed system – for linking pur-
poses – it matters through which route ego is related to them, and so that information
is represented in the kin graph by separating their boxes. Linguistically these different
kinds of relatives are not directly distinguished (all ‘grandrelatives’ are in the same nana
category), but they are easily distinguished indirectly (as ‘mother’s’ ‘uncle’ vs. ‘father’s’ –
180
Table 1. Fanti Componential Analysis of Focal Kin Types
G2 nana /PP/ C0•/G2/
G1 egya, na F, M G1•µ,ϕ
C0•
ba C G1
wofa MB
C1•χ•/G1•µ/
awofsi µZC
G0 nua J C1•G0
Notes:
FZ ≈ M
akyereba µZ C1•G0•µ0•ϕ overlaps part of nua’s range and
is reciprocal with another part
Key: µ,ϕ sex of alter: male, female

µ0 sex of ego: male
Gx generation x
Cx consanguineal line x (where 0 is lineal)
χ indicates cross (vs. parallel)
// both the enclosed expression and its reciprocal
• the product of the expressions on either side of it
, separates alternative categories
— separates reciprocal categories, senior above, junior below
≈ links concurrent categories (belong to same kin term, but not structurally equivalent)
P, F, M, B, Z, C, J parent, father, mother, brother, sister, child, sibling – respectively
or ‘father’s’ ‘mother’ vs. ‘mother’s’). See my Introduction to this issue for further discussion
of this nana category.
In order for skewing to take place, it is necessary that such distinctions be able to be
(fairly easily) represented in the language of the kinship terminology.
Note that even in the unskewed (Cheyenne-type) pattern, the box for father’s side
‘grandrelatives’ is separate from the box for mother’s side ‘grandrelatives’, because the
two kinds are not structurally equivalent – their information is needed to distinguish
distant ‘fathers’ from distant ‘uncles’.
In order to make this discussion easier to follow, I am using English glosses for Fanti
kin terms (the Fanti terms are given in the table and figures). For example, ‘uncle’
glosses wofa, which refers to mother’s brother and extensions therefrom; ‘father’ glosses
egya, which refers to father and its extensions. Similarly, ‘mother’ glosses na, ‘sibling’
glosses nua, ‘child’ glosses ba and ‘nibling’ glosses awofasi.
The second difference is the representation of Crow-type skewing7 vs. its absence. The
kin graph gives a direct visual impression of what skewing does. It also enables one to
ascertain the kin term category of any relative by tracing the genealogical path out on
the kin graph.8 The kin graph thus provides a graphic representation of the algebraic
relationships among kin types and kin terms in the given terminological system – based
on a combination of the set of equivalences that apply to all classificatory systems
– –
(I ↔ J ↔ MM ↔ FF ) and the specific equivalences that characterize the given type of
181
system – here, either Cheyenne-type equivalence (X ↔ J)9 or Crow-type equivalence

– – –
(MF ↔ F, and its reciprocal FM ↔ F).
EXAMPLES OF REDUCTIONS
Let me offer a few examples of how the system works.
1
! I
I ! unskewed: sibling
skewed: woman’s child
ego P I alter or man’s nibling
(1) Father’s mother’s brother’s daughter’s son (in Romney’s notation: amfom
––
fm). In Gould’s notation the expression would be FMF Mµ (which is equivalent to
––
FMJF Mµ since the J is implicit). In the Cheyenne-type pattern the reductions go as
–– –
follows: FMF Mµ (the expression in Gould’s notation) → FXMµ (by definition of X)
– –
→ FJMµ (by X ↔ J) → FMµ (by J ↔ I) → Xµ (by definition of X) → J (by X ↔ J).10
––
In the Cheyenne-type kin graph, Figure 4, FMF Mµ would be traced out as follows: start
in the J-box (since I ↔ J), move up the solid (father) line to the F-box, move up the
dashed (mother) line to the FM/FF-box, stay in the FM/FF-box (representing the
implicit J), move down the solid (fatherling) line to the F-box, and then down the dashed
––
(motherling) line to the J-box. FMF Mµ, then, is seen to be a ‘sibling’.
––
In the skewed, Crow-type, pattern: FMF Mµ (the expression in Gould’s notation) →
–– – – – – –
FF Mµ (by MF ↔ F ) → JMµ (by FF ↔ J) → Mµ (by J ↔ I), a male motherling, which
is either a woman’s ‘child’ or a man’s ‘nibling’, depending on the sex of ego. In the Crow-
––
type kin graph, Figure 5, FMF Mµ would be traced out as follows: start in the J-box
(since I ↔ J), move up the solid (father) line to the F-box, move up the dashed (mother)
line to the FM-box, stay in the FM-box (representing the implicit J), move down the
solid (fatherling) line to the J-box, and then down the dashed (motherling) line to the
– ––
M-box. FMF Mµ, then, is seen to be a motherling, which is either a male’s ‘nibling’ or
a female’s ‘child’.
2
! I
ego I !
!
skewed: grandrelative
I alter unskewed: grandrelative
(2) A male’s mother’s brother’s daughter’s daughter’s son (in Romney’s notation, m
–– –
fomffm) would be µMF M Mµ in Gould’s notation. The Cheyenne-type reduc-
–– – –– ––
tions go as follows: µMF M Mµ → µXM Mµ (by definition of X) → µJM Mµ (by X ↔ J)
→ µMMµ (by J ↔ I), which is a male’s sister’s grandchild, or ‘grandrelative’ in Fanti.
182
In the Cheyenne-type kin graph, Figure 4: start in the J-box (since I ↔ J), move up one
dashed line to the M-box, stay in the M-box (for the implicit J), move down the solid
–
line to the J-box, move down the dashed line to the M-box, move down the dashed line
–– ––
to the M M/M F-box, for ‘grandrelative’.
–– – –– – – –
The Crow-type reductions would be: µMF M Mµ → µF M Mµ (by MF ↔ F ), which,
as a great-grandchild, is in Fanti a male’s ‘grandrelative’. In the Crow-type kin graph,
Figure 5: start in the J-box (since I↔J), move up the dashed line to the M-box, stay
–
there (for the implicit J), move down the solid line to the F-box, move down the dashed
–– –– –
line to the F M-box, and move down the dashed line to the (implicit) F M M-box, for
the indicated kind of ‘grandrelative’.
3
I !
I I
ego ! I
unskewed: child
! alter skewed: sibling
(3) A female’s father’s father’s sister’s son’s son’s daughter (fmmofmmf in
–––
Romney’s notation) would be φFFM F Fφ in Gould’s notation. The Cheyenne-type
––– –– ––
reductions go as follows: φFFM F Fφ → φFXF Fφ (by definition of X) → φFJF Fφ (by
–– – – –
X ↔ J) → φFF F (by J ↔ I) → φJFφ (by FF ↔ J) → φFφ (by J ↔ I), which is a female’s
brother’s daughter, or ‘child’ in Fanti. In the Cheyenne-type kin graph, Figure 4: start
in the J-box, move up the solid line to the F-box, move up the solid line to the FF/FM-
box, stay in the FF/FM-box, move down the dashed line to the F-box, move down the
–
solid line to the J-box, move down the solid line to the F-box, for ‘child’.
––– –– –
In the Crow-type reductions, we have: φFFM F F φ → φFFF F φ (by FM ↔ F) →
– – – –
φFJFφ (by FF ↔ J) → φFFφ (by J ↔ I) → φJφ (by FF ↔ J), which, as a woman’s sister,
would be ‘sibling’ in Fanti. In the Fanti-type kin graph, Figure 5: start in the J-box, move
up the solid line to the F-box, move up the solid line to the FF-box, stay in the FF-box
(for the implicit J, sibling link), move down the dashed line (back) to the FF-box, move
down the solid line to the F-box, move down the solid line to the J-box, for ‘sibling’.
These examples should offer some indication of how the system works, including how
the kin graph represents the structural relations among terminological categories.
We can see in these examples that the major difference between the two Fanti vari-
– –
ants concerns the structural equivalences of cross-cousins, MF and FM (sometimes
together represented by X), that is, the categories to which cross-cousins are set equival-
ent. The Fanti system is consistent, and the other differences all follow from these
– –
alternative equivalences: MF ↔ FM ↔ J for the unskewed, Cheyenne-type pattern, and
– – –
MF ↔ F, FM ↔ F for the skewed, Crow-type pattern. Since these are equivalences, rep-
resenting structural substitutability (and not ‘concurrences’, which would represent two
kin types being labeled by the same kin term, but not being substitutable for one
another), the kin type expression on one side of the double arrow can be substituted for
the kin type expression on the other side anywhere in a genealogical expression where
183
one of them is found. These equivalences thus affect various parts of the kin graph –
and the kin graph represents or summarizes their net effect; as such, the kin graph gives
us a visual representation of these algebraic relations.
It is interesting to note, given the preceding, that Fanti speakers themselves explained
the skewed (Crow-type) pattern as being based on an equivalence, my ‘uncle’s ‘child’ is
my ‘child’,11 which does not obtain in the unskewed (Cheyenne-type) pattern (‘uncle’
in Fanti refers to a ‘mother’s brother’). Fanti speakers did not have any comparable expla-
nation for the unskewed pattern; it seemed normal and obvious to them, while the gen-
erational skewing seemed to them strange enough to merit explanation.
Gould’s system offers us a natural and easy picture of the relationship between the
two Fanti kin terminological patterns. It does not give us the added information that
the Fanti consider their skewed pattern to be a kind of elaboration of (or overlay on)
their unskewed pattern.12 At the same time, the Fanti position seems plausible in terms
of it, because of its general and basic reliance on generational relations, and because one
can interpret the Cheyenne-type rule, X ↔ J, as merely undoing a distinction intro-
– –
duced somewhere else in the terminology (while the Crow-type rule, MF ↔ F, seems
better seen as setting equal two otherwise disparate kin types).
CASE 3
For my third problem I would like to continue with the idea of construing skewed
systems as overlays on some kind of unskewed base, and, from that perspective, to
explore the compatibility of various terminological types as bases for skewing. This
exploration represents one part of an old issue in kinship studies – an issue at least as
old as Lewis Henry Morgan’s work: what transitions from one terminological system
type to another are possible, impossible, likely, or unlikely? In papers and conversations
I have noted that the Lounsburian rule sets for skewed systems seem – by some reason-
able definitions – to include the rules for some kind of unskewed system as a subset; this
relationship is one that I have demonstrated for alternative Fanti terminological patterns
(Kronenfeld, 1973, 1980a). I have sometimes spoken of the skewed systems in question
as ‘skewed versions’ of the terminological type that one would get if one subtracted the
skewing rule, and I have sometimes spoken of skewing as an overlay on some (other)
basic type of terminological system. That is, the rules that generate the skewed systems
are the rules of some other type, to which a skewing rule has been added. I have sug-
gested that the addition or loss of skewing – that is, changes from one to the other among
the matri- (Crow-type) version, the patri- (Omaha-type) version, and no version of
skewing (i.e. Dravidian) – are relatively easy and rapid, in contradistinction to changes
in the basic terminological categories and paradigmatic (or componential) contrasts
among those categories, which seem much slower (see Kronenfeld, 1989: 102–3, Note
10, 1976: 914). This suggestion has been based, on the one hand, on comparisons,
particularly within Morgan’s (1871) corpus, of kin term paradigms among closely related
languages where some were Crow type, others Omaha type and others unskewed13 (in
the Morgan data, these last were shown mostly as Iroquois type, but some might have
been Dravidian type) and, on the other hand, on comparisons of similar type systems
from widely divergent language stocks and culture areas (as, for example, the Crow-
type Fanti with the Crow themselves). In my Fanti work, as we have just seen, I found
a single system that had fully functioning skewed (Crow type) and unskewed (Cheyenne
184
Figure 6. Generational (Hawaiian-type) Kin Graph

– –
Equivalence: General Classificatory: I ↔ J ↔ MM ↔ FF
– –
Specific Generational: M ↔ F (and reciprocally M ↔ F)
type – which I have sometimes described as quasi-Hawaiian or quasi-generational) vari-

ants that both were fully understood and widely used by all members of the community
I studied.14
My second past suggestion (see Kronenfeld, 1989: 102–3, Note 10; and Kronenfeld,
1976: 914; also see discussion of Fanti earlier in this article) has been to suggest that
skewed systems, commonly called Crow-type and Omaha-type systems, might not be
considered to be separate systems per se, but instead might better be seen as skewed
variants of one or another kind of unskewed system. That is, I suggest that skewing might
be better seen more as providing an overlay on top of some other (base) type system than
as producing a type or types itself. This second suggestion follows from the first in the
sense that if skewing is easily added or subtracted, even while the basic set of categories
can be either unchanged or only minimally changed, then the paradigmatic structural
185
Figure 7. Cheyenne-type Kin Graph

– –
Equivalences: General Classificatory: I ↔ J ↔ MM ↔ FF
Specific Cheyenne: X ↔ J
reality captured in a componential analysis of focal categories would seem more basic than
the more changeable patterns of extension that seem to get laid upon those focal categories.
From one perspective, the question of whether there exists some special kind of
skewed (or of Omaha-type) kinship system (in the wider sense of not just including a
terminological system but also some set of associated cultural practices) becomes the
question of whether skewed terminologies in general – or particular classes of skewed
terminologies such as Omaha-type ones – can be seen as signaling some particular kind
of wider kinship system. Does one expect all skewed systems (or, more narrowly, all
Omaha-type systems) to have significant non-terminological features in common? The
dependence of different skewed terminologies on different kinds of unskewed systems
as bases suggests that one should expect no particular systemic unity among the broader
cultural associations of the various skewed systems.
From another perspective, the question of the existence of skewed kinship systems
reduces to two specific questions. First, there is the question of whether the addition of
186
Figure 8. Seneca (Iroquois-type) Kin Graph

– –
–– ––
Specific Seneca: MF ↔ MM; FM ↔ FF (and reciprocally F M ↔ MM;
–– ––
MF ↔ FF)
skewing to a system’s terminology signals a sufficiently large and consistent change in

that system to make it into a truly different kind of system from its unskewed base. Does
adding skewing, for example, to a Dravidian-type system make it into something sig-
nificantly different from Dravidian-type ones? The answer to this question seems to
some degree a ‘judgment call’, depending on one’s specific analytic aims. But the relax-
ation of the Dravidian-type requirement of systematic marriages in skewed derivatives
(see later) does certainly suggest the possibility of significant differences. Second, there
is the question of whether all skewed versions of systems of the same base type have
enough systemically in common for them to be seen as signaling some particular kind
of wider kinship system. Does one expect all skewed systems deriving from a Dravidian-
type base to have significant non-terminological features in common? I have no par-
ticular answer to suggest for this last question.
This issue of skewed types of systems could be further complicated if my speculation
187
Figure 9. Tamil (Dravidian-type) Kin Graph

– –
–– ––
Specific Tamil: FF ↔ MM; FM ↔ MF (and reciprocally FF ↔ MM;
–– ––
FF ↔ FM)
that skewed terminological systems always co-exist with unskewed variants – of which
they are best seen as marked variants (see Greenberg, 1966 for the theory of marked and
unmarked categories; see Hage, 1999 and this issue for related applications) – were to
be borne out. The speculation is based in part on my Fanti material (Kronenfeld, 1973:
1583, 1980a: 603–6), including not just the facts of terminological variation, but
also the cognitive ways in which Fanti speakers dealt with skewing and adapted
skewing to their intuitive sense of kin terms as belonging to some specific generation.
The speculation is also based on my reading of other ethnographers’ descriptions of other
skewed terminological systems – including these ethnographers’ occasional incidental
comments regarding variation or native speaker ‘errors’. Such a reading is complicated,
of course, by the fact (once verbalized to me in a conversation by David Schneider)
that, until ‘recently’ (then the late 1970s), ethnographers had not been supposed to find
188
terminological variation, but had been expected, instead, to get the single ‘correct’
system. As I have explained elsewhere, when pressed on the correctness issue, my Fanti
informants would always opt for the skewed variant – for reasons that I showed had
more to do with the marking hierarchy than with either correctness or history
(Kronenfeld, 1980a: 603–6). This last is by way of saying that had I been looking for a
single ‘correct’ system I would easily have found it – and would have missed the
systematic variation that I have instead shown to characterize Fanti kin term usage.
As we saw earlier, the Fanti skewed and unskewed variants are based on the same (i.e.
identical) componential paradigm of focal referents. I also note that, among the unskewed
types of systems, the basic types (generational/Hawaiian, Cheyenne, Tamil/Dravidian –
and Eskimo, if one includes descriptive as well as classificatory systems) can be distin-
guished from one another by componential analyses of focal referents, while the skewed
types cannot necessarily be so distinguished from unskewed types.15
In a different vein, I have suggested, for Fanti, that the terminology may usefully be
seen as based on the intersection of basic nuclear family or socialization roles with
lineage-related rules of succession. From this viewpoint, the unskewed variant represents
an emphasis on (or foregrounding of ) nuclear family-related socialization roles in exten-
sion, while the skewed variant represents, instead, an emphasis on (or foregrounding of )
lineage-related relations of succession in extension.
Given the preceding I want first to consider which kinds of systems seem, in fact,
reasonable bases for the addition of a skewing overlay, and which might need some sort
of adaptation (to their componential paradigm of terms and focal referents) to enable
the overlay. I want, then, to consider which non-skewed systems can be seen as easy
reflections of some intersection of socialization and social (e.g. succession, marriage
alliance) components vs. those which cannot, and see how this distinction relates to the
one of ‘skewability’. What I aim at here is a kind of sociologically annotated typology
that will give some indication of what kinds of transitions among types are possible and
of what kinds of social information may underlie the types. In this context I want also
to consider why the Cheyenne type has been so little recognized as a type.
Skewing bases
Cheyenne-type systems obviously are skewable, on the Fanti example, in spite of not
distinguishing cross from parallel cousins. This points up that what is important is not
the cross-cousins per se, but the links to them – in this case the terminological distin-
guishing of mother’s brother (‘uncle’) from father. In the Fanti case, interestingly, there
is no complementary father’s side distinction of father’s sister from mother; instead the
skewing on that side is based on the link from ‘father’ to his sister’s child, which is coded
as the reciprocal of the ‘uncle’ relationship. Cheyenne-type systems, including the Fanti
system, are consistent in their extended calculations of ‘uncles’ and ‘fathers’, which is
needed for skewing; this kind of consistency will be described in our discussion of
Iroquois type (Seneca type in Gould’s treatment, following Morgan), where it will be
seen to be missing. Note that there is nothing about a skewed Cheyenne-type system,
such as Fanti, that suggests any connection at all with any kind of marriage pattern.
Dravidian-type systems (Tamil type in Gould) seem, on logical or systemic grounds,
at least, easy. In both Cheyenne-type and Dravidian-type systems, the children of
parental generation cross-relatives (or of parent’s parental generation cross-relatives, etc.)
189
are available for skewing, and the terminological categories of their descendents follow
regularly from them (i.e. ‘uniform descent’ holds). The symmetric treatment of cross-
cousins (as equivalent to spouses) in Dravidian-type systems is at variance with the asym-
metric treatment of cross-cousins (as G or G relatives) in Crow and Omaha-type
systems – and thus the adoption of skewing in a Dravidian-type system might require
some loosening (or recasting) of the symmetric marriage bond.16
Iroquois-type systems seem impossible to skew – at least without substantial changes
in the means of calculating cross vs. parallel relatives. Cross-cousin categories do exist
that could potentially be skewed, as in Dravidian-type systems, but the terminological
categories of the descendents of these cross-cousins are determined independently of the
category into which they fall, and so moving the cross-cousin up or down a generation
would not obviously or clearly affect these descendents in any consistent way. That is,
ego’s (A’s in the diagram below) first ascending generation relatives (represented by B in
the diagram), in Iroquois-type systems, are cross or parallel according to whether they
are of the same or different sex as the parent of ego through whom the link passes (E).
In the diagrammed example, B is of opposite sex to E, and hence cross. Reciprocally,
ego’s first descending generation relatives (represented by D in the diagram) in these
systems are cross or parallel according to whether ego’s sex matches that of the alter’s
linking parent (C). In the diagrammed example, C is of the opposite sex to A, and hence
D is cross. Ego’s (A’s) own generation cousin (C) is cross or parallel according to whether
or not the sex of ego’s linking parent (E) matches the sex of alter’s linking parent (B). In
the diagrammed example B is opposite in sex to E, and hence C is A’s cross relative.
I E ! B
! A I C
I D
Any systematic skewing seems impossible. Even if, from A’s point of view (using a Crow-
type skewing rule), C were moved up into A’s parental generation and A’s ensuing calcu-
lation of D’s generation (and hence the basis for calculating D’s cross vs. parallel status)
were held off until after C’s move (in which case D would become a parallel cousin of
A), the reciprocal calculation by D of A’s terminological category would not match,
since, as diagrammed, A would still be cross to D. By Iroquois-type rules, the relevant
comparison from D’s point of view for determining the cross vs. parallel status of A
would be the C-A comparison; and so D would have no basis (within the system) for
assuming A to be in any generation other than C’s (making A D’s ‘aunt’, as in normal
Iroquois type). That is, the way in which cross vs. parallel is calculated in Iroquois-type
systems is inconsistent with skewing’s presupposition of consistency in the underlying
pattern of relationships.
Hawaiian (or Generational) systems seem also impossible to skew – at least without
the introduction of relevant categories of cross relatives. That is, normally in a skewed
system, the categories of relatives whose children are skewed (cross uncles and cross
aunts) are terminologically distinguished from the categories whose children are not
skewed (parallel uncles and parallel aunts). Without such terminological distinction,
190
skewing would be logically possible, but would be hard to explain to children learning
the system and would be hard to trace out to distant kin.
In past publications (e.g. Kronenfeld, 1980a: 592, 1991: 20) I have suggested that
the Fanti unskewed system represented a kind of deviant Hawaiian or Generational type;
this characterization came before I fully realized, from Gould’s treatment, the system-
atic nature of the Cheyenne type. I do still want, however, to offer (here) some reasons
why my initial insight was not necessarily misguided and why, instead, that insight might
provide some explanatory perspective on at least some Cheyenne-type systems.
Non classificatory systems – that is, in Gould’s approach, ones in which J ↔
⁄ I (siblings
are not equivalent to self ) such as Eskimo-type ones – would seem inappropriate for
– – – –
skewing, since the basic skewing equations, MF ↔ F (Crow-type) or FM ↔ M
(Omaha-type), presume J ↔ I. However, one might consider whether Eskimo-type
features could be added into some other kind of system to produce something skewable
that was Eskimo like. In Kronenfeld (1991: 28–30) I offer some evidence suggesting
that the Fanti may possibly be moving in such a direction.
Social shapers
I want to suggest that our typology of major system types can be seen as deriving from
a mix of extension based on family socialization roles with distinctions based on import-
ant social facts.
Hawaiian (Generational) systems can be seen as representing extension on the basis
of socialization roles – no special social components are present or needed.
Dravidian systems can be seen as representing extension on the basis of the intersec-
tion of socialization roles with some moiety-like societal division – where ‘moiety-like’
recognizes an ongoing presupposition of marriages between the halves and exogamy
within each. The presupposition of marriages is indicated in the kin graph by the struc-
– –
tural equivalence of FFM to M, of MMF to F, and so forth.
My Fanti analysis (e.g. Kronenfeld, 1973, 1975, 1980a) suggests how a social fact
(shared lineage membership) can be seen as intersecting with socialization roles to
produce a Cheyenne-type terminology, but the relationship is more complicated than
what we see with Hawaiian or Dravidian. That is, there is no clean intersection as there
is with Dravidian and no absence of the social as there is with Hawaiian. Instead, in
Fanti, there is only a distinction between the social (lineage membership) and the social-
ization (nuclear family) for those generation/sex categories in which the closest social-
ization person (e.g. ‘father’, or ‘child’ for a man) is not in one’s lineage; in that situation
the social category gets its own kin term (e.g. ‘uncle’, or ‘sibling’). In Fanti, unlike the
more common practice for Cheyenne-type systems, there is no ‘aunt’ term; instead,
father’s sister is an extended member of the ‘mother’ category.17
My reasoning about the importance and effect of shared lineage membership may well
be correct; certainly lineages are important to the Fanti. But there exists another way to
look at the contrast between terms that embody a cross vs. parallel distinction
(‘uncle’/‘sibling’ vs. ‘father’/‘child’) and those that do not. These are the minimal termi-
nological distinctions that one must make, I think, if one is to have skewing. As a
thought experiment, let us imagine that people in a society with a Hawaiian-type ter-
minology and corporate unilineages wanted to skew (i.e. to recognize terminologically
191
the potential equivalence between a relative and that relative’s next generation heirs)
where inheritance went unilineally and adelphically and where (as is always the case with
skewing) such terminological equivalence is never within ego’s own lineage. In such a
society, those wanting to skew would have, at the minimum, to distinguish by gener-
ation and sex those senior relatives whose positions were to be inherited and would have
to distinguish those more junior relatives who were to be set equal to them. All that
Cheyenne-type systems represent, from this perspective, are Hawaiian-type systems to
which those distinctions needed for skewing have been added – as can easily be seen by
comparing the kin graphs for the two types of system.18
As I explained earlier in this article (and in Kronenfeld, 1989: 93–6), Iroquois systems
can represent no easy reflection of anything sociological. The inconsistencies across
generations (G0 vs. G1) in the calculation of cross vs. parallel make any sociological cor-
relate very hard to imagine.
It is interesting to contemplate a thought experiment for Iroquois-type systems par-
allel to that outlined here for Hawaiian-type ones. It seems that in order for skewing to
work (where the social definition is as in the Hawaiian-type example), the inconsisten-
cies regarding cross and parallel relatives have to be eliminated. First generation relatives,
ascending and descending, are, as we have seen, crucial for skewing, so they cannot be
dispensed with. On the other hand, as we have seen, skewing does not require any
cross/parallel distinction in G0. And, perhaps, one can imagine reasons apart from
skewing for getting rid of the Iroquois ‘sibling’/‘cousin’ distinction in G0 and its incon-
sistent relationship with the G1 oppositions. Elimination of the Iroquois-type cross par-
allel distinction in G0 transforms an Iroquois-type system into a Cheyenne-type system
– as can be easily seen by comparing the kin graphs of the two types.
While we are primarily concerned here, because of our skewing focus, with classifi-
catory systems, I might observe that Eskimo systems, as the English one that this article
opened with, can perhaps be understood as being based on the intersection of extension
on the basis of socialization roles19 with a linear and bilateral succession/inheritance-
based distance metric.
In conclusion I want simply to point out that Gould’s formalism, especially in the
present discussion of the kingraphs, has proved useful in helping to generate some inter-
esting and plausible substantive hypotheses about the relationships existing among
various classic types of kin terminologies. Such substantive payoffs are, to my mind, the
major reason for conducting formal analyses, and I offer that kinship studies are on the
verge of a variety of such payoffs from a variety of formal approaches – as can be seen,
for example, throughout the present issue.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank F.K. Lehman, Dwight Read and Per Hage for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to Mara G. Kronenfeld for preparing the draw-
ings.
Notes
1 There are two alternative sets of modifiers. The first is indicated by the pairs of
numbers below the kin term, while the second is indicated by the starred numbers
above and to the right of the kin terms.
192
2 While GF and GM have the shape of modified F and M terms, in fact they are con-
sidered by natives to represent distinct categories – as opposed to GGF and GGM
which are considered kinds of GF and GM, respectively. A similar argument applies
to GS and GD.
3 The differences in the treatment of generational distance/polarity are more epiphe-
nomenal; the componential analysis part of Gould’s analytic system does take
account of these concerns.
4 The role of ‘self ’ in this analysis, but not in Romney and D’Andrade’s, is perhaps
also relevant to this comparison (see Kronenfeld, 1996: Ch. 5).
5 In this discussion I am not trying even to throw any light on (let alone resolve) the
question of the relevance or necessity of some representation of genealogical space
for the analysis of kin term systems. I am only suggesting some of the ways in which
Gould’s analytic system seems capable of provoking interesting insights concerning
wider issues of kinship or culture.
6 For my purposes, the Cheyenne type is defined by the equivalences and resulting
kingraph of Figure 7. It is like Iroquois and Dravidian in terminologically grouping
father’s brother with father and in opposing them to mother’s brother, but is unlike
them in grouping cross-cousins with parallel cousins and siblings.
As nearly as I can tell, Lounsbury (1964: 204) has named the type. Gould (2000:
265) says ‘The Cheyenne system is distinguished by Morgan (1871) as having the
same kin terms for cross-cousins as for siblings . . . , and correspondingly by Dole
(1972: 136) as combining features of the Generational and Seneca types’ (1972:
265). Dole (1969: 105) recognizes the type, and calls it ‘bifurcate generation’. Dole
(1969: 107) has Eggan (1937: 93) referring to it as the Cheyenne subtype of the
generation pattern, but it is not clear to me that he sees it as a distinct type; Dole
similarly ascribes it, with different names, to Rivers and others, but again in circum-
stances where it is unclear that the cited authors meant to describe a type – as
opposed to a particular terminology that just happened to have Dole’s diagnostic
feature. The same would seem also to apply to Gould’s citation of Morgan.
7 In generational skewing, the terminological generation of cross-cousins is moved up
or down a generation from their genealogical generation – as when, in a Crow-type
system, one cross-cousin is moved up into the ‘father’ category and the reciprocal
cross-cousin down into the ‘son’ category.
8 Relatives related through more distant ancestors can be traced out by tracing out the
relationship of ancestors of ego and alter, and then substituting the reduced relation-
ship between those ancestors to ascertain the ego–alter relationship.
9 Also needed, but here (in the Cheyenne-type case) only to assign lineal relatives, are
the Seneca (i.e. Iroquois-type) equations: MF ↔ MM and FM ↔ FF, and their rec-
–– –– –– ––
iprocals: F M ↔ M M and M F ↔ F F .
10 Alternative routes exist, if one applies the Seneca rules more aggressively where poss-
––
ible, instead of the focus on the Cheyenne rule (X ↔ J). For example, FMF Mµ (the
–– – –
expression in Gould’s notation) → FFF Mµ (by FM ↔ FF) → FJMµ (by FF ↔ J)
– ––
→ FMµ (by J ↔ I) → Xµ (by definition of X) → J (by X ↔ J). Or, FMF Mµ (the
–– –– –– –
expression in Gould’s notation) → FMM Mµ (by F M ↔ M M) → FJMµ (by
– –
MM ↔ J) → FMµ (by J ↔ I) → Xµ (by definition of X) → J (by X ↔ J).
11 Because the I inherits from my uncle.
193
12 I have elsewhere (Kronenfeld, 1973, 1980a) offered an analytic approach that does
formally represent the sense in which Fanti skewing can be seen as a marked overlay
on the relatively unmarked unskewed variant; that approach also utilizes conjunctive
definitions of core referents of Fanti categories (and rules). And I have offered a formal
analysis (Kronenfeld, 1980b) that directly represents Fanti reasoning about termino-
logical assignments, and that does not build in any explicit genealogical representation
(thus similar to Read’s offering in this issue). On the other hand, neither of those
analyses offers the broad and uniform (across any given type) applicability of Gould’s
approach, and neither seems as clean and elegant in its representation of the under-
lying structure of the system. It is because alternative approaches seem each to offer
important insights not covered by other approaches that I have preferred to approach
kin term analysis through a variety of formal approaches rather than trying to pick
a single ‘best’ one. It may well eventually turn out that one (or a very few) subsume
all the others, but that realization will only come from pushing each as far as it will
go and attending carefully to what each has to offer.
13 The skewing overlay does seem easily added or lost. Consider, for example, the close
linguistic similarity of the Crow Indians to the Omaha, and the close match of the
phonetic shapes and paradigmatic oppositions of the kin terms of the one group to
those of the other (in Morgan, 1871: 293–382, Table II).
14 For the Fanti I have been able to offer data from native speaker conversations that
show that they treat skewing as a particular kind of operation added to an otherwise
(in their thinking) unskewed terminology (see Kronenfeld, 1973, 1980a, 1980b) –
that is, as an overlay.
15 Similarly, Seneca/Iroquois cannot be so distinguished from Tamil/Dravidian. In
general I want to suggest that type distinctions that show up in the componential
paradigm of focal referents are more basic than those that only serve to produce
alternative patterns of extension from a shared set of focal referents. Here and else-
where I have explained my reasons for considering skewed variants to be alternatives
to unskewed bases, and in Kronenfeld (1989) I have offered my reasons for con-
sidering Dravidian type to be the base from which Iroquois type varies. Of course,
social conditions that lead to the alternative terminological forms can be quite
important for our understanding of the societies in question.
16 Since skewed terminological systems assimilate the range of cross-relatives to certain
apical instances, they do not depend logically on the pattern of marriages, as do
Dravidian-type terminological systems – even where the skewed terminological
system in question might perhaps best be seen as a skewed version of a Dravidian-
type terminology. This observation raises the possibility that skewing – in the context
of a Dravidian-type system – might arise not just with the heightened emphasis on
lineal relations or succession that is assumed by our conventional wisdom, but also,
or, perhaps, alternatively, with a weakening of the Dravidian-type marriage con-
straints or with a narrowing of marriage relations down to specific lineage links.
17 Hage in a personal communication has suggested that the Fanti situation may not
be so uncommon and that it may be part of an implicational universal relating
fully bifurcated systems (distinguishing father’s sister from mother and mother’s
sister as well as mother’s brother from father and father’s brother) on the one side
from totally non-bifurcated ones (where neither father’s sister nor mother’s brother
194
is terminologically distinguished). Such regularities seem interesting, and well worth

exploring.
18 The issue of the corresponding other cross relative – i.e. paternal ‘aunt’ in a matri-
lineal system such as that of the Fanti (who lack such a category) or the closely related
Ashanti (who have such ‘aunts’) – is dependent on a separate, and simple cognitive
situation. In many areas of language there is a tension between cognitive ease (which
says make a given distinction either everywhere within a paradigm or nowhere) and
function (which says make it in one place but not in the other). The Fanti have let
the function dominate, while the Ashanti have let cognitive ease prevail; either could
easily shift to the other position.
19 The intersection means that no actual terminological extension takes place (apart
maybe for ‘cousin’, depending on how one understands that term). But the exten-
sion idea seems present in the attenuated parent-like roles of uncles, aunts and appro-
priately aged cousins – in a manner similar to the sense in which Fanti see their
uncles (wofa, focally mother’s brother) as a kind of father. And I should add that I
am not claiming (or even suggesting) any direct and simple expression of sociological
roles by kin terms. But I do want to suggest that kin terms are words that are used
to talk about something – usually something important and social – and that they
are adapted to the social categories about which they are used to converse. A
successful formal analysis represents the logical structure by which the terms are
organized; its particular shape presumably represents a response to the shape,
importance, etc. of the categories being talked about, to the cognitive constraints of
our ways of processing information, and to the logical or systemic entailments of
our categorizations and of the relationships among categories that we recognize.
Looking at social bases is in no way inconsistent with a formal analysis, and a
successful formal analysis will indeed have significant implications for our analytic
understanding of what some given terminology is about.
References
Dole, Gertrude E. (1969) ‘Generation Kinship Nomenclature as an Adaptation to
Endogamy’, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 25: 105–22.
Dole, Gertrude E. (1972) ‘Developmental Sequences of Kinship Patterns’, in
P. Reining (ed.) Kinship Studies in the Morgan Centennial Year, pp. 134–66.
Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington.
Eggan, Fred (1937) ‘The Cheyenne and Arapaho Kinship System’, in Fred Eggan (ed.)
Social Anthropology of North American Tribes, pp. 35–95. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Gould, Sydney H. (2000) A New System for the Formal Analysis of Kinship. Edited,
annotated and with an introduction by David B. Kronenfeld. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
Greenberg, Joseph H. (1966) Language Universals with Special Reference to Feature
Hierarchies. The Hague: Mouton (Janua Linguarum No. 59).
Hage, Per (1999) ‘Marking Universals and the Structure and Evolution of Kinship
Terminologies’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5: 423–41.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1973) ‘Fanti Kinship: The Structure of Terminology and
Behavior’, American Anthropologist 75: 1577–95.
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Kronenfeld, David B. (1975) ‘Kroeber vs. Radcliffe-Brown on Kinship Behavior: The

Fanti Test Case’, Man 10: 257–84.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1976) ‘Computer Analysis of Skewed Kinship Terminologies’,
Language 52(4): 891–917.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1980a) ‘A Formal Analysis of Fanti Kinship Terminology’,
Anthropos 75: 586–608.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1980b) ‘Particularistic or Universalistic Analysis of Fanti
Kinterminology: The Alternative Goals of Terminological Analysis’, Man 15(1):
151–69.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1989) ‘Morgan vs. Dorsey on the Omaha Cross-Parallel
Contrast: Theoretical Implications’, l’Homme 19: 78–103.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1991) ‘Fanti Kinship: Language, Inheritance, and Kingroups’,
Anthropos 86: 19–31.
Kronenfeld, David B. (1996) Plastic Glasses and Church Fathers. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Lehman, F.K. and Klaus Witz (1974) ‘Prolegomena to a Formal Theory of Kinship’, in
P. Ballonoff (ed.) Genealogical Mathematics, pp. 111–34. Paris: Mouton.
Lounsbury, Floyd G. (1964) ‘The Structural Analysis of Kinship Semantics’,
Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists. Reprinted in Stephen A.
Tyler (ed.) Cognitive Anthropology, pp. 192–212. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
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Smithsonian Institution.
DAVID B. KRONENFELD is a Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Riverside, where

he has taught since receiving his PhD from Stanford in 1969. He has conducted fieldwork in Ghana, Oaxaca
and California. His research interests include kinship, social organization, ethnicity and stranger communi-
ties, semantics, cognitive structures in culture, culture as distributed cognition, and computer and mathe-
matical applications. He has published extensively on various aspects of kinship, as well as on the semantics
of everyday words – including his recent Plastic Glasses and Church Fathers (Oxford University Press, 1996).
His publications include significant work in the area of mathematical and computational approaches to
anthropology and several contributions to general theoretical issues. Address: Department of Anthropology,
University of California, Riverside, CA 92521-0418, USA. [email: david.kronenfeld@ucr.edu]
196

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Using Sydney H. Gould's formalization of kin terminologies: Social

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Using Sydney H. Gould’s

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Figure 1. Maximal System

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

Figure 2. Simpler System

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Figure 3. Minimal System

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

Figure 4. Kin Graph for Fanti Unskewed System

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Figure 5. Kin Graph for Fanti Skewed System

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

Table 1. Fanti Componential Analysis of Focal Kin Types

G2 nana /PP/ C0•/G2/

Key: µ,ϕ sex of alter: male, female

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

system – here, either Cheyenne-type equivalence (X ↔ J)9 or Crow-type equivalence

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

Figure 6. Generational (Hawaiian-type) Kin Graph

type – which I have sometimes described as quasi-Hawaiian or quasi-generational) vari-

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Figure 7. Cheyenne-type Kin Graph

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

Figure 8. Seneca (Iroquois-type) Kin Graph

skewing to a system’s terminology signals a sufficiently large and consistent change in

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Figure 9. Tamil (Dravidian-type) Kin Graph

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

KRONENFELD Gould’s formalization of kin terminologies

is terminologically distinguished). Such regularities seem interesting, and well worth

ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1(2)

Kronenfeld, David B. (1975) ‘Kroeber vs. Radcliffe-Brown on Kinship Behavior: The

DAVID B. KRONENFELD is a Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Riverside, where

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