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4- 0.-
5 We shall sometimes express (3) by saying, more tersely, that social structures
have been (or are) propitious.
6 For a fuller exposition of the derivation of (3) from (2), see KMTH, 158/9. For a
fuller one still, see Andrew Levine and Erik Wright, "Rationality and Class Strug-
gle," New Left Review, No. 123 (Sept./Oct. 1980): 51-56.
7Joshua Cohen, review of KMTH, this JOURNAL, LXXIX, 5 (May 1982): 253-273.
8
op. cit., pp. 61-63.
9 KMTH, p. 152. Joshua Cohen calls them the "Smithian premisses," at op. cit.,
p. 263.
10On the present meaning of 'historical', see KMTH, pp. 23, 152. The historical
situation of humanity excludes conditions in which nature is bountiful without
human assistance, and in which, by virtue of centuries of historical human effort, it
has been made bountiful.
17 Others, too, lean toward this identification, such as Richard Miller, when he
writes that "in a Marxist technological determinism, economic structures. . . have
some impact on productive forces (otherwise they could not facilitate their growth)
but the most basic changes in the productive forces result from their own expansion
in people's pursuit of greater productive efficiency" [Analysing Marx (Princeton,
NJ: University Press, 1984), p. 180]. Counterposing the result of that pursuit to the
impact of economic structures strongly suggests that the pursuit achieves its result
independently of the impact of those structures, and that is the RAP view.
18 On the compatibility between the full development thesis and the fact that
capitalist relations induce productive development, see G. A. Cohen, "Reply to
Four Critics," Analyse und Kritik, v, 2 (December 1983): 196, 201, parts of which
are reproduced in the present section.
in Cohen, op. cit., which overlaps pages 264/5. We have interpreted it under
Joshua Cohen's guidance. The paragraph is difficult because of an apparent shift in
its author's intention which occurs on the ninth line of p. 265. Up until that line, the
problem seems to be this: either one says that structures have (merely) as a matter of
fact been propitious for productive development, in which case the argument for
the development thesis is too feeble, since no tendency to productive growth could
be inferred; or one says that it is in the nature of structures that they tend to be
propitious, in which case one can indeed infer that the development thesis is true,
but one may not then, on pain of circularity, use it to argue for the primacy thesis.
After the ninth line, the problem seems, instead, to be this: either one uses the social
fact that structures are (or tend to be) propitious to explain the development thesis,
in which case circularity results; or one uses it merely as evidence for the develop-
ment thesis, in which case the latter will lack a convincing explanation. We have
opted for the second interpretation, since it is the one Joshua Cohen chose in
conversation with G. A. Cohen.
26 Cohen, op. cit., p. 265.
27 KMTH, p. 153.
arise at the political level, and they therefore do not explain how they
are overcome at the economic level.
V.
Although neither of the discrepant rationality problems described in
section III above was expressly formulated in KMTH, the existence
of problems of that general kind was noted, and the circularity ob-
jection which they threaten to sustain was more or less envisaged
(153). Then, to show that, despite such problems, the asocial prem-
isses might strongly support the development thesis, a subargument
was offered. Its premiss-called, by Joshua Cohen, the Alleged
Facts3"-was that societies frequently replace productive forces by
better ones, and only very infrequently by inferior ones. Its conclu-
sion was that, although there exist obstacles to the expression of
rationality, the asocial premisses formulate circumstances that do
have a big impact on the world, since, unless one supposes that they
do, one cannot explain the contrast between the frequency of pro-
ductive progress and the rarity of productive regression. Part of the
explanation of lack of regression might, of course, be sheer social
inertia, but "inertia is too unselective to explain, by itself," a general
"lack of regression in face of the fact that there is often conspicuous
progress."32
The subargument's conclusion is that the asocial premisses have
considerable general explanatory power. That conclusion is intended
to suggest that they might have enough explanatory power to justify
the claim that there is a tendency to productive progress, which is the
conclusion of the main argument. Thus, the frequency of actual
progress, in face of the rarity of actual regress, is used to defend the
operation of inferring a tendency to productive progress from the
asocial premisses. "The facts which best explain why the productive
forces frequently advance, but rarely regress, also make it reasonable
to believe that the productive forces have a natural propensity to
expand."33
Now, Joshua Cohen denies the alleged facts, on which the subar-
gument is based, and we confront that denial in section VI. But he
also maintains that the alleged facts do little to overcome the dis-
crepant rationality objection even if they are exactly as alleged. We
italicize that clause because we find the thought it expresses extraor-
dinary, and we emphasize that, from now until the end of this sec-
tion, we shall suppose, with full polemical propriety, that the facts
are exactly as alleged.