Table of Contents

MCWD vs. Margarita A. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 14,2001. ........................................................... 2
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT ..................................... 3
MMDA v Jancom .................................................................................................................................... 4
HENARES V LTFRB ................................................................................................................................... 4
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay ...................................................................................... 5
SPECIAL PEOPLE v. NESTOR M. CANDA, GR No. 160932, 2013-01-14 .................................................. 7
John Eric Loney vs People of the Philippines....................................................................................... 11
Metro Iloilo Water vs CA mar 31, 2005 ............................................................................................... 12
BF Homes, Inc. and Phil. Waterworks and Construction Corp. v. NWRC and CA, G.R. No.78529,
Sept. 17, 1987 ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Metro lloilo Water District v. CA. et al.. G.R. No. 122855. March 31.2005 ........................................ 14
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network, Inc., GR 186450, April 14,2010 .... 16
Marilao Water Consumers Asso., Inc. v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 72807, Sept. 9, 1991 ........................... 17
MCWD vs. Margarita A. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 14,2001.
Facts: On October 24,2002, Margarita A. Adala filed an application with the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB) for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain
waterworks system in sitios San Vicente, Fatima, and Sambag in Barangay Bulacao, Cebu City. At the
initial hearing of December 16, 2002 the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), a govemment-
owned and controlled corporation created pursuant to P.D. 198 which took effect upon its issuance
by then President Marcos on May 25,1973, as amended, appeared through its lawyers to oppose the
application. In its Opposition, MCWD prayed for the denial of Adala's application on the following
grounds: (1) MCWD's Board of Directors had not consented to the issuance of the franchise applied
for, such consent being a mandatory condition pursuant to P.D. 198, (2) the proposed waterworks
would interfere with petitioner's water supply which it has the right to protect, and (3) the water
needs of the residents in the subject area was already being well served by petitioner. In support of
its contention that the consent of its Board of Directors is a condition sine qua non for the grant of the
CPC applied for by Adala, MCWD cites Section 47 of P.D. 198 which states: Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise.
- No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial
water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board
of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however,
shall be subject to review by the Administration. After hearing and an ocular inspection of the area,
the NWRB, by Decision dated September 22, 2003, dismissed petitioner's Opposition "for lack of merit
and/or failure to state the cause of action" and ruled in favor of respondent.
Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of the NWRB dated September 22,2003
in favor of Margarita A. Adala. The RTC also denied MCWD's motion for reconsideration.
Issues: Whether the consent of the Board of Directors of MCWD is a condition sine qua non to the
grant of certificate of public convenience by the NWRB upon operators of waterworks within the
service area of the water district:
Whether the term "franchise" as used in Sec. 47 of PD 198, as amended, means a franchise granted
by congress through legislation only or whether it includes in its meaning a certificate of public
convenience issued by the national water resources board for the maintenance of waterworks system
or water supply service
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Adala and dismissed MCWD's petition.
It also declared the law relied upon by MCWD, Section 47, PD 198 as unconstitutional. MCWD's
position that an overly strict construction of the term "franchise" as used in Section 47 of P.D. 198
would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this context, were strictly understood to
mean an authorization issuing directly from the legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot
issue franchises for operating waterworks systems without the water district's consent, the NWRB
may keep on issuing CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not only
would the NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive
character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory. Once a district is "duly formed
and existing" after following Secs. 6 and 7 of PD 198, it acquires the "exclusive franchise" referred to
in Section 47. Thus, P.D. 198 itself, in harmony with Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
gives the name "franchise" to an authorization that does not proceed directly from the legislature.
Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the
reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable
with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 - the
constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the
1973 Constitution reads: SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise. certificate. or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Batasang
Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of
any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises. In view of
the puposes for which they are established, water districts fall under the term "public utility" as
defined in the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals where it states: A "public utility"
is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of
public consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service. It
bears noting, moreover, that as early as 1933, the Court held that a particular water district - the
Metropolitan Water District - is a public utility. MDG-F 1919: Enhancing Access to and Provision of Wat

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT

G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) was organized to provide domestic water
services in Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, a local water utility created under PD No. 198,
authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose within municipality of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water Resources Board an application for Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD
claimed that under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.
August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises
are unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.
October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the latter cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held that Sec.
47 of PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of the Constitution is for the State, through its
authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and maintain ultimate control and
supervision over the operation of public utilities. What is repugnant to the Constitution is a grant of
franchise exclusive in character so as to preclude the State itself from granting a franchise to any other
person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so requires.
November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for reconsideration filed by TMPC.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is valid
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur
et per obliquum – Those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Under Sec. 2 and 11,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court cannot create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district
and Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
Sec. 47 of PD no. 198 is in conflict with the above-mentioned provision of the Constitution. And the
rule is that in case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the former prevails, because the
constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to.

MMDA v Jancom
G.R. No. 147465 January 30, 2002
FACTS:
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority filed a motion for reconsideration from the decision
of the Third Division, Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the lower courts declaring that there
is a valid and perfected waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom Environment Corporation.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not MMDA may petition for certiorari to the Court en banc a decision promulgated by the
Third Division, Supreme Court.

HELD:
NO. Circular No. 2-89 governing referral of cases to the Court en banc states that “[t]he Court en banc
is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed.” “A decision
of a Division of the Court is a decision of the Supreme Court.”

HENARES V LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG)
as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:
• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC.
4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens
are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental
policies and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and
programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking
or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental
or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively
under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to
seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised.
We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the
public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only
to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will
not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the
complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay ha
 d fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be
jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of
specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.–– Where the
quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best
u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section
20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and
c

lean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to
confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific
pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence
of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and
a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial
in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes
as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of
procedure for environmental cases.
20 days – Temporary restraining order
SPECIAL PEOPLE v. NESTOR M. CANDA, GR No. 160932, 2013-01-14
Facts:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay
Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water
from the Loboc River, and the distribution of the purified water to the... residents of Loboc and six
other municipalities.
seeking to be exempt from the requirement of... the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the project, respondent
Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his findings in a letter dated December 4,
2001, as follows:
1.
The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental Examination is required.
2.
The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social acceptability should be
established. Proper indorsement from the [Protected Area Management Bureau or] PAMB should be
secured.[2] (Emphasis supplied)... the petitioner appealed Canda's findings to respondent EMB Region
7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because
the project was no different from the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.
RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to enable the EMB to
determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area or not
RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following documents to enable the EMB to
determine whether the project was within an environmentally critical area or not,... Certification from
DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO
Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within the project do[ ] not
constitute [the habitat] for any endangered or threatened species or indigenous wildlife
Certification from the following:
(PAGASA)
(PHIVOLCS)
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7)
City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management
(BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime Agricultural Land
Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office
Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) that it is not
within areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preservation area,
sanctuaries and not within the purview of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act, and other issuances including international
commitments and declarations;
Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within the project do[ ] not
constitute [the habitat] for any endangered or threatened species or indigenous wildlife (Flora and
Fauna).
Certification from the following:
3.1.
Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) that the area
is not frequently visited or hard-hit by typhoons. This shall refer to all areas where typhoon signal no.
3 not hoisted for at least twice a year during the... last five (5) years prior to the year of reckoning.
Years to be considered shall be from January 1995 to December 2001.
3.2.
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the area was not subjected to an
earthquake of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent and hit by tsunamis during
the period of 1638 until the year 2001.
3.3.
PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel
scale or its equivalent during the period of 1949 until the year 2001.
3.4.
PAGASA that the area is not storm surge-prone.
3.5.
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the area is not located along fault lines or within
fault zones and not located in critical slope.
3.6.
City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
3.7.
Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils and Water Management
(BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime Agricultural Land.
Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its equivalent office that areas in your project are
not set-aside as aesthetic potential tourist spot.
Certification from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental Impact System (EIS) Law should not start
unless the Project Proponent should secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), otherwise
penalties shall be imposed.
petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (RO-MGB)
, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay,
Bohol,[12] alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with
the certification... requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar
waterworks project in the same area.
RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of against them involved an exercise of discretion
that could not be compelled by mandamus... that the petitioner's proposed project was located within
an environmentally critical area, and the activities... to be done were so significant that they would
create massive earth movement and environmental degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule
against forum shopping; and that the petitioner had no cause of action against them for failure to
exhaust administrative... remedies.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONER'S DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED
BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NON- COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR
BY PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB
REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal directly to this Court from
the RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.
Ruling:
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus
2.
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to demand the performance of the
act by the respondents.
Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional Director's decision to the EMB
Director,... who exercised supervision and control over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order No. 2003-30[23] in
order to define where appeals should be taken
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did not establish that the
grant of its application for the CNC was a purely ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence,
mandamus was not a proper remedy.
T
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application for ECC/CNC is not an
act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion
by the EMB Director or Regional Director, who must determine whether the... project or project area
is classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be submitted by the applicant.
The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application when
he made his finding.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the
requirement to submit the needed certifications.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
Principles:
The EIS System was established by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy) that required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on
the environment, thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and... entities shall prepare, file and
include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the
environment a detailed statement on
(a)... the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking
(b)... any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented
(c)... alternative to the proposed action
(d)... a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent
with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
(e)... whenever a proposal involve[s] the use of depletable or non- renewable resources, a finding
must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.
P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and areas not declared by the
President of the Philippines as environmentally critical,... Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical
Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by the Presidents as
environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit an
environmental impact statement.
The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however
require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental safeguards as it
may deem necessary.
the President issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring areas and types of projects as environmentally
critical and within the scope of the EIS System, as follows:
Environmentally Critical Projects
Heavy Industries
Non-ferrous metal industries
Iron and steel mills
Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
Smelting plants
Resource Extractive Industries
Major mining and quarrying projects
Forestry projects
Logging
Major wood processing projects
Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests
Forest occupancy
Extraction of mangrove products
Grazing
Fishery Projects
Dikes for fishpond development projects
Infrastructure Projects
Major dams
Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or geothermal)
Major reclamation projects d. Major roads and bridges.
Environmentally Critical Areas
All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species of indigenous Philippine
Wildlife (flora and fauna);
Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic hazards, floods, typhoons,
volcanic activity, etc.);
Areas with critical slopes;
Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
Recharged areas of aquifers;
Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;... tapped for
domestic purposes... within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate
authorities... which support wildlife and fishery activities
Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:... with primary
pristine and dense young growth;... adjoining mouth of major river systems;... near or adjacent to
traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;... which act as natural buffers against shore erosion,
strong winds and storm floods;... on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:... with 50% and above
live coralline cover;... spawning and nursery grounds for fish;... which act as natural breakwater of
coastlines.
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were considered non-critical to the environment
and were entitled to the CNC.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that
are discretionary.

John Eric Loney vs People of the Philippines

Facts:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro B. Hernandez are the Pres.and CEO, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corp., a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings
(mine waste) from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makulapnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnel’s end .On March 24, 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end.
In a few days, Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings in to the Boac and Makalupnit
rivers.In August 1996, the DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac,Marinduque with
violation of Art. 91 (B), subparagraphs 5 and 6 of P.D. No. 1067 or theWater code of the Phil., Sec. 8
of P.D. No. 984 or the National Pollution Decree of 1976, Sec.108 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Phil. Mining
Act of 1995, and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property. In the
Consolidated Order of MTC, granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Orderquashing the
information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation
of RA 7942 and Art. 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the
RTC assailing that the portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of
RA 7942 and the petition was raffled to Br. 94while public respondent’s appeal assailing that portion
of the Consolidated Order quashing the Info. for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984 and this appeal
was consolidated withpetitioners petition.MTC Br. 94 granted the public respondent’s appeal but
denied petitioner’s petition.Petitioners then filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that
Br. 94 acted withgrave abuse of discretion because 1.the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD
984, RA7942 and the Art. 365 of the RPC “proceeded from are based on a single act or incident
of polluting the rivers thru dumping of mine tailings, and the charge for violation of Art 365 of the RPC
absorbs the other charges since the element of “lack of necessary
or adequateprotection, negligence, recklessness
and imprudence” is common among them, 2. theduplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes
the ruling in People v. Relova. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the Br. 94 ruling.
Issue:
1. Whether or not all the charges filed against petitioners except one should bequashed for duplicity
of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Property should
stand2. whether or not Br. 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenesPeople v.
Relova.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges
more than one offense, as Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As early as the
start of the last century, the court ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense and the only limit is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishing for the same offense. In People vs. Doriquez, the court held that two or
more offenses arising from the same act are not the same. And so, double jeopardy is not an issue
because not all its elements are present. On petitioners claim that the charges for violation of Art. 365
of the RPC “absorbs” the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a
mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes the
former felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa) and what makes the latter crimes are the
special laws enacting them. Petitioners reiterate their contention in that their prosecution
contravenes ruling in People vs. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the court’s statement in Relova
that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by “multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements. Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not an issue
here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or
incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever fall under the first sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III which prohibits multiple prosecution
for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident

Metro Iloilo Water vs CA mar 31, 2005

DOCTRINE
The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and
jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s rights
as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke
the special knowledge and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention
FACTS Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198. It
was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration Conditional Certificate of Conformance No.
71. Its service areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City etc.Sometime between April
and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual yet identical petitions for injunction with prayer
for preliminary injunction and / or temporary restraining order against herein private respondents
the pertinent portions of which read:…4. –That pursuant to the provisions of section 31 (a) of P.D. 198,
as amended, the petitioner as a Water District was authorized toadopt laws and regulations governing
the drilling, maintenance and operation of wells within its boundaries for purposes other than single
family domestic use on overlying land, with then provision that any well operated in violation of such
regulationsshall be deemed an interference with the waters of the district;…Private respondents
invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, contending that the cases were within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council (Water Council) under Presidential
Decree No. 1067, otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code). In addition,
private respondents Emma Nava and Rebecca Berlin denied having extracted or withdrawn water
from the ground, much less sold the sameAdditionally, he alleged the petitioner’s rules and
regulations were not published in the Official Gazette and hence petitioner had no causeof action.
Meanwhile, private respondent Gerry Luzuriaga claimed that he was not the real party in interest, but
Shoemart, Inc. which hasthe control and possession of the property where the alleged withdrawal of
ground water was taking place.The trial court dismissed the petitions, ruling that the controversy was
within the original jurisdiction of the Water Council, involving, as itdid, the appropriation, exploitation,
and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within the Water Council’s competence.
Inaddition, the trial court held that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
doctrine of “primary administrative jurisdiction.”MR denied shortly thereafter.ISSUE:Whether or not
the trial court may entertain the positions
HELD
Petitioner anchors its claim on Section 31 (now 32) of PD 198, as amended, which reads:Sec. 32.
Protection of waters and Facilities of District. – A district shall have the right to :(a) Commence,
maintain, intervene in, defend and compromise actions or proceedings to prevent interference with
or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of any surface, stream or ground water supply
which may be used or useful for any purpose of the district or be a common benefit to the lands or its
inhabitants. The ground water within a district is necessaryto the performance of the district’s powers
and such districts hereby authorized to adopt rules and regulations subject to theapproval of the
National Water Resources Council governing the drilling, maintenance and operation of wells within
its boundaries for purposes other than a singled family domestic use on overlying land. Any well
operated on violation of suchregulations shall be deemed in interference with the waters of the
district.…(c) Prohibit any person, firm or corporation from vending, selling, or otherwise disposing of
water for public purposes within theservice area of the district where district facilities are available to
provide such service, or fix terms and conditions by permit for such sale or disposition of water.By
virtue of the above provisions, petitioner states that as a water district, it has the right to prevent
interference with the water of the district; and to enforce such right, it is given remedies of
commencing, maintaining, or intervening in, defending or entering into appropriate actions or
proceedings.In asserting the jurisdiction of the regular courts over its petitions and the propriety of its
filing of the petitions before the trialcourt, petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court inAmistoso v.
Ong,[28] as reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[29] thatwhere the issue involved is not the
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was
already granted, the regular court has jurisdiction and not the Water Council.A judicial question is
raised when the determination of the questions involves the exercise of a judicial function, i.e., the
question involvesthe determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. As opposed to amoot question or one properly decided by the
executive or legislative branch, a judicial question is properly addressed to the courts.The instant case
certainly calls for the application and interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to
determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s rights as a water district and
justify an injunction. This issue does not so much provideoccasion to invoke the special knowledge
and expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it mayappear
that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council, i.e., the
appropriation of water whichthe Water Code defines as “the acquisition of rights over the use of
waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in themanner and for any purpose
allowed by law,” in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the
petitions.The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, on the basis of whichthe petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, does not even come to play.The petition is remanded to the trial court.
BF Homes, Inc. and Phil. Waterworks and Construction Corp. v. NWRC and CA, G.R.
No.78529, Sept. 17, 1987
Facts: BF Homes, Inc. constructed water distribution systems at its subdivisions so that residents
would have an adequate supply of potable water. BF Homes, Inc. applied for and was granted a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for its water distribution system at its Las Pinas
subdivision. BF Homes, Inc. sought authority from the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) to
transfer the CPCN to Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC). NWRC did not act
upon the application. BF Homes, Inc. also has a CPCN to operate its water distribution system at B.F.
Homes Paranaque. BF Homes, Inc. sought authority from NWRC to increase the water rates at B.F.
Homes Paranaque. NWRC similarly failed to date to act upon this application to increase rates.
Lower Court's Ruling: BF Homes, Inc. filed a petition for mandamus with the CA to compel NWRC to
act on the application for transfer of the franchise at Las Pinas to PWCC and also to act upon the
application for authority to increase water rates.
The CA, in two Resolutions, dismissed the petition for mandamus. Mandamus will not issue to compel
NWRC to act on the matters pending before it, since such acts are not ministerial in nature.
Issue: Whether NWRC actions can be compelled by mandamus
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the CA's ruling. Mandamus will not issue to
control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging
duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a
specific application. BF Homes, Inc. does not seek to compel NWRC specifically to approve BF Homes,
Inc.'s applications pending before NWRC. What BF Homes, Inc. seeks, and is entitled to, is a writ that
would require NWRC to consider and deliberate upon the applications before it, examining in that
process whatever evidence lies before it and to act accordingly, either approving or disapproving the
applications before it, in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence and in the best interest of
the community involved. NWRC has failed, for unexplained reasons, to exercise its discretion and to
act, one way or the other, on the applications of BF Homes, Inc. for a prolonged period of time
imposing in the process substantial prejudice or inconvenience upon the many hundreds of families
living in the two subdivisions involved. NWRC also failed to inform BF Homes, Inc. of a supposed need
for additional data concerning PWCC.

Metro lloilo Water District v. CA. et al.. G.R. No. 122855. March 31.2005
Facts: Metro Iloilo Water District (MIWD) is a water district organized under the provisions of PD 198.
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) granted MIWD Conditional Certificate of
Conformance No. 71. MIWD's seryice areas encompass the entire territorial areas of Iloilo City and the
Municipalities of Ma-asin, Cabatuan, Santa Barbara and Pavia. MIWD filed nine (9) individual yet
identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
orders against Nava, et al. for unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground water without the
necessary permit and constitutes interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural
flow of surface or ground water supply.
Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC dismissed the petitions and ruled that the controversy is within the
jurisdiction of the National Water Resource Council (NWRC) under PD 1067 involving, as it did, the
appropriation, exploitation and utilization of water, and factual issues which were within the NWRC's
competence. In addition, the RTC held that MIWD failed to exhaust administrative remedies under
the doctrine of "primary administrative jurisdiction."
Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA denied the petition, holding that the RTC did not err in dismissing
the case for want of jurisdiction as it was the NWRC which had jurisdiction over the case. The CA stated
that the case actually involves also a dispute over the appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, control, conservation and protection of waters because Nava, et al. have allegedly
engaged in the extraction or withdrawal of ground water without a permit from the NWRC within the
territorial jurisdiction of the MIWD. Issue: Whether the trial courts have jurisdiction over subject
matter of the petitions
Supreme Court's Ruling: The petitions filed before the trial court were for the issuance of an injunction
order for Nava, et al. to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from MIWD's well and
from selling the same within its service areas. In essence, the petitions focus on the violations incurred
by Nava, et al. by virtue of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of ground water
within MIWD's service area, vis-dvis MIWD's vested rights as a water district. At issue is whether Nava,
et al.'s extraction and sale of ground water within MIWD's service area violated MIWD's rights as a
water district. It is at once obvious that the petitions raise a judicial question. While initially it may
appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of the Water Council,
i.e., the appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as "the acquisition of rights over the
use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters from a natural source in the manner and for any
purpose allowed by law," in reality the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the
petitions. The petitions having raised a judicial question, it follows that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, on the basis of which the petitions were dismissed by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, does not even come to play. MDG-F 1919: Enhancing Access to and Provision of
Water Services with the Active Participation of the Poor for the Compilation and Analysis of
Jurisprudence on Water Supply Case Digests with of Notably too, private respondents themselves do
not dispute petitioner's rights as a water district. The cases of Abe-Abe v. Manta and Tanjay Water
District v. Gabaton invoked by Nava, et al. are thus inapplicable. In Abe-Abe v. Manta, both petitioners
and respondent had no established right emanating from any grant by any govemmental agency to
the use, appropriation and exploitation of water, while in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton, petitioner
Tanjay sought to enjoin the Municipality of Pamplona and its officials from interfering in the
management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. On the other hand, in an analogous case of Amistoso
v. Ong, petitioner had an approved Water Rights Grant from the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications. The trial court was not asked to grant petitioner the right to use
but to compel private respondents to recognize that right. Thus, the Court declared that the trial
court's jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights
dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted. In like
manner, the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order to prevent Nava, et al. from
extracting and selling ground water within MIWD's service area in violation of the MIWD's water
permit. There is no dispute regarding MIWD's right to ground water within its service area.It is MIWD's
enjoyment of its rights as a water district which it seeks to assert against Nava, et al.

National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network, Inc., GR 186450, April
14,2010
Facts:
A.L. Ang Network filed on January 23,2003 an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)
with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) to operate and maintain a water service system in
Alijis, Bacolod City which application was later approved on August 20, 2003 despite opposition by the
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA). BACIWA opposed A.L. Ang Network's application on the ground
that it is the only govemment agency authorized to operate awater service system within the city.
BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due process was
violated when it was not allowed to present evidence in support of its opposition. The NWRB
reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present evidence prompting A.L Ang Network to file
a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against NWRB and BACIWA.
The NWRB moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to the
Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Lower Court's Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of NWRB and dismissed A.L. Ang Network's petition for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that with Art. 89 of PD 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as
amended, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies except those within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Appellate Court's Ruling:
The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that it is the RTC which
has jurisdiction over appeals from NWRB's decisions. As no repeal is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D.
No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals
or petitions for certiorari of the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph
2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is stated that, "If it involves the acts of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
involving the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule
admits of some exceptions as plainly provided by the phrase 'unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules" and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of these exceptions.
Issue:
Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from decisions, resolutions or orders of
the National Water Resources Board.
Supreme Court's Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NWRB and reversed and set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals and upheld the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod Citv. Since the appellate court
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
petitions for writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-
judicial agencies, like the NWRB, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for
procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs
otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by
the passage of BP 129. Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs,
Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified: x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules
of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x x x. The general repealing clause under Section 47
"predicates the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts." In enacting BP I29, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge
of the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it. The legislative intent
to repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to
provide a homogeneous procedure for the review of adjudications of quasijudicial entities to the Court
of Appeals. While Section 9 (3) of BP 129 and Section I of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not list
the NWRB as "among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or
awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is settled that the list of quasijudicial agencies
specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive. The employment of the word "among"
clearly instructs so.

Marilao Water Consumers Asso., Inc. v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 72807, Sept. 9, 1991
Facts:
Marilao Water District was formed through a Resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Marilao, which resolution was thereafter forwarded to the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA) and "duly filed" by it after ascertaining that it conformed to the requirements of the law.
Marilao Water Consumers Association, Inc. filed a petition before the RTC claiming that the creation
of the water district is defective and illegal. Marilao Water District filed its Answer with affirmative
defenses that (a) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter since the water district's
dissolution fell under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) while the matter of the propriety of water rates is within the primary administrative jurisdiction
of the LWUA and the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council. Marilao
Consumers Association countered that the SEC had no jurisdiction over a proceeding for its dissolution
since the Marilao Water District had not been organized under the Corporation Code; and that under
Section 45 of PD 198, the proceeding to determine if the dissolution of the water district is for the best
interest of the people, is within the competence of a regular court of justice, and neither the LWUA
nor the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) is competent to take cognizance of the matter of
dissolution of the water district and recovery of its waterworks system, or the exorbitant rates
imposed by it.
Lower Court's Ruling:
The RTC dismissed the Consumers Association's suit. The SEC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction
over this case. The motion for reconsideration was denied. A petition was filed before the Supreme
Court, but was referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court, but which cause could not prosper
because petitioners availed of a wrong remedy and jurisdiction does not vest in the trial court but
within the SEC's competence.
Issue:
Whether the RTC or the SEC has jurisdiction over the dissolution of a water district organized and
operating as a quasi-public corporation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 198, as
amended
Supreme Court's Ruling:
The present case does not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the SEC, but within the general
jurisdiction of RTCs. PD 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) authorizes the formation, lays down
the powers and functions, and governs the operation of water districts throughout the country. Once
formed, a district is subject to its provisions and is not under the jurisdiction of any political
subdivision. Under PD 198, water districts may be created by the different local legislative bodies by
the passage of a resolution to this effect, subject to the terms of the decree. The primary function of
these water districts is to sell water to residents within their territory, under such schedules of rates
and charges as may be determined by their boards. They shall manage, administer, operate and
maintain all watersheds within their territorial boundaries, safeguard and protect the use of the
waters therein, supervise and control structures within their service areas, and prohibit any person
from selling or disposing of water for public pu{poses within their service areas where district facilities
are available to provide such service. The juridical entities created and organized are considered quasi-
corporations, performing public services and supplying public wants. The decree also established a
government corporation attached to the Office of the President, known as the LWUA, to function
primarily as a specialized lending institution for the promotion, development and financing of local
water utilities. The juridical entities known as water districts created by PD 198, although considered
as quasi-public corporations and authorized to exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to
private corporations under existing laws, are entirely distinct from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code. The Code has nothing whatever to do with their formation and organization, all the
terms and conditions for their organization and operation being particularly spelled out in PD 198. The
resolutions creating them, their charters, are filed not with the SEC but with the LWUA. It is these
resolutions qua charters, and not articles of incorporation drawn up under the Corporation Code,
which set forth the name of the water districts, the number of their directors, the manner of their
selection and replacement, their powers, etc. The SEC which is charged with enforcement of the
Corporation Code as regards corporations, partnerships and associations formed or operating under
its provisions, has no power of oversight over such activities of water districts as selling water, fixing
the rates and charges therefor, or the management, administration, operation and maintenance of
watersheds within their territorial boundaries, or the safeguarding and protection of the use of the
waters therein, or the supervision and control of structures within the service areas of the district, and
the prohibition of any person from selling or otherwise disposing of water for public purposes within
their service areas where district facilities are available to provide such service. That function of
supervision or control over water districts is entrusted to the LWUA and the SEC obviously has no
claim to anv expertise. Under PD 198, it is the LWUA which is the administrative body involved in the
voluntary dissolution of a water district; it is with it that the resolution of dissolution is filed, not the
SEC. These argue against conceding jurisdiction in the SEC over proceedings for the dissolution of
water districts. For although described as quasi-public corporations, and granted the same powers as
private corporations, water districts are not really corporations. They have no incorporators,
stockholders or members, who have the right to vote for directors, or amend the articles of
incorporation or bylaw’s, or pass resolutions, or otherwise perform such other acts as are authorized
to stockholders or members of corporations by the Corporation Code. In a word, there can be no such
thing as a relation of corporation-and stockholders or members in a water district for the simple
reason that in the latter there are no stockholders or members. Between the water district and those
who are recipients of its water services there exists not the relationship of corporation-and-
stockholder, but that of service agency and users or customers. There can therefore be no such thing
in a water district as "intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates (or) between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively." The LWUA does not appear to
have any adjudicatory functions as it is primarily a specialized lending institution for the promotion,
development and financing of local water utilities, with power to prescribe minimum standards and
regulations regarding maintenance, operation, personnel training, accounting and fiscal practices for
local water utilities, to furnish technical assistance and personnel training programs therefor; monitor
and evaluate local water standards; and effect systems integration, joint investment and operations,
district annexation and de annexation whenever economically warranted. The LWUA has quasijudicial
power only as regards rates or charges fixed by water districts, which it may review to establish
compliance with the provisions of PD 198, without prejudice to appeal being taken therefrom by a
water concessionaire to the National Water Resources Council whose decision thereon shall be
appealable to the Office of the President. The rates or charges established by respondent Marilao
Water District do not appear to be at issue in the controversy atbar. NWRC, on the other hand, is
conferred original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, control, conservation and protection of waters within the meaning and context of the
provisions of PD 1067, and its decision on water rights controversies may be appealed to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated. It also has
authority to review questions of annexations and de-annexations. This case does not appear to be a
water rights controversy or one involving annexation or de annexation. The Consumer Association's
action is in the nature of a mandamus suit, seeking to compel the board of directors of the Marilao
Water District, and its alleged co-conspirators, the Sangguniang Bayan and the Mayor of Marilao to
go through the process for the dissolution of the water district. In this sense, and taking account of
the nature of the proceedings for dissolution described below, it seems plain that the case does not
fall within the limited jurisdiction of the SEC, but within the general jurisdiction of RTCs. The procedure
for dissolution thus consists of the following steps: 1) the initiation by the board of directors of the
water district motu proprio or at the relation of an interested party, of proceedings for the dissolution
of the water district, including: a) the ascertainment by said board that - 1) another public entity has
acquired the assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and liabilities attached thereto; and
liabilities attached thereto; and 2) all bondholders and other creditors have been notified and consent
to said transfer and dissolution; b) the commencement by the water district in a court of competent
jurisdiction of a proceeding to obtain a declaration that "said transfer and dissolution are in the best
interest of the public;" 2) after compliance with the foregoing requisites, the adoption by the board
of directors of the water district of a resolution dissolving the water district and its submission to the
Sangguniang Bayan concerned for approval; 3) submission of the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan
dissolving the water district to the head of the local government concerned for approval, and
ultimately to the LWUA, for final approval and filing.