Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
the U.S.
Chinese Perceptions of
the U.S.
An Exploration of China’s
Foreign Policy Motivations
Biwu Zhang
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List of Tables ix
Foreword by Richard K. Herrmann xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Chapter 1 What Are China’s Foreign Policy Motivations? 1
Chapter 2 Image Study as an Approach to Explore China’s
Motivations toward the United States 13
Chapter 3 Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 37
Chapter 4 Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from
the United States 69
Chapter 5 Chinese Perceptions of American Power 101
Chapter 6 Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy 125
Chapter 7 Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 153
Chapter 8 Conclusion 183
Appendix I 207
Appendix II 217
Appendix III 229
Appendix IV 237
Bibliography 243
Index 257
vii
List of Tables
ix
x List
Introduction
of Tables
The rise of China may well be the most important trend today redefining
the geopolitics of Asia and the world beyond. Beijing’s relationship with
Washington will be central to the future of both countries and faces numer-
ous challenges. Although Sino-American economic interdependence has
grown exponentially over the past few decades, our understanding of the
worldviews from which decisions are made on each side has advanced more
slowly. Fundamental debates about Chinese perceptions and motives continue
to fuel arguments over policy on the U.S. side. It seems likely that parallel
arguments over America will continue in China. Biwu Zhang’s study takes
a look inside China to shed light on some of the most important of these
debates and arguments.
Although there have been numerous studies that summarize the competing
American perspectives on China, there are far fewer that explore in depth the
discussions about America that are going on in China. In the United States
experts disagree over whether Chinese leaders are (1) emboldened by the
P.R.C.’s increasing power and see great opportunities to reshape the system,
(2) are mostly interested in prestige and status and see the United States as a
necessary source of legitimacy, or (3) are worried about China’s continued
economic well-being and see America as a possible threat to this. In all these
analyses, the assumptions about Chinese perceptions of America sit at the
center of the strategic advice given for U.S. policy. What the Chinese percep-
tions are, whose perceptions should be taken as most reflective of Chinese
thinking, and how to determine the degree of threat and opportunity they
involve continue to be open questions.
Zhang makes several important contributions to the study of Chinese per-
ceptions of the United States. First, he moves beyond traditional inclinations
xiii
xiv Foreword
This project was essentially completed when I was pursuing my Ph.D. at the
Ohio State University. As I look back at my years of study and research at
this university, my heart is filled with gratitude for all of those who helped
me one way or another throughout this journey. I will be able to mention only
some of them here. My most profound gratitude goes to Prof. Richard K. Her-
rmann, the chair of my dissertation committee, whose theoretical framework,
intellectual insights, and frequent advice were invaluable to my research
project. I am equally grateful to Prof. Kevin J. O’Brien, a former member
of my dissertation committee, who, together with Prof. Herrmann, helped
me solve some of the most difficult problems. Profs. Mughan and Hopf gave
me indispensable assistance in the process. I wish also to convey my sincere
appreciation of their help to the following individuals: Andrew J. Nathan,
Edwin A. Winckler, David Shambaugh, and Alastair Iain Johnston.
During my days as a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science,
I learned important lessons and/or received significant help from the follow-
ing respectable professors: Paul A. Beck, Donald A. Sylvan, David M. Rowe,
Chadwick Alger, Judith Kullberg, Margaret Hermann, Brian M. Pollins, and
Randall L. Schweller. Years of financial assistance from OSU, the depart-
ment, and research funding from the Mershon Center contributed greatly
toward the completion of this project.
A special word of thanks is owed to Lianjiang Li, who has done for me
much more than one would normally expect from a friend.
It would have been impossible for me to proceed with this project without
the generous and untiring assistance from my parents. Jae, Qinyi, Abby,
Stella, and Yingru shared with me the ordeal during my extended efforts on
this project.
xv
xvi Acknowledgments
I also wish to thank Hongying, Jinping, and Kaiyuan for their assistance
when I was preparing this book for publication.
Finally, I am very grateful to the numerous Chinese authors cited in this
book. Without their works, it would have been impossible for me to complete
this project. In this book about Chinese perceptions of the United States,
every descriptive detail can be traced to an utterance by one or, often, several
Chinese authors in the sample to ensure the reliability of the research.
Chapter 1
How will the Chinese define their greatness in the twenty-first century?
Will they define their greatness in terms of the incredible potential of
their people to learn, to produce, to succeed economically, culturally and
politically? Or will they define their greatness in terms of their ability to
dominate their neighbors and others, perhaps against their will, or to take
other actions which could destabilize the march toward democracy and
prosperity of other people?
—Bill Clinton1
THE PUZZLE
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the sole and
indisputable hegemon, while China, because of its territory and population,
and because of its economic development, was widely regarded as a rising
power in the international arena.2 If post–Cold War international politics was
scrutinized through the lens of international relations theories, one puzzle
emerged. According to classic realism, because of evil human nature, states
would try perennially to dominate other states and to avoid being dominated
by others. A dominant power therefore would necessarily try to decrease
the power of second-tier states and second-tier states would necessarily try
to increase, or at least to preserve, their power.3 Structural realism offers a
basically similar prediction: the preponderance of power in the hands of one
single state is dangerous, especially to the security of other great powers. As
Waltz puts it, “unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger
1
2 Chapter 1
to others,” because the dominant power will inevitably try to weaken other
great powers in order to preserve and strengthen its dominance, and other
great powers will not rest at ease until they are secure from the not impossible
attack by the dominant power.4 Power transition theory also predicts inherent
tension between the dominant power and second-tier states: all great powers
eventually decline and the most attractive approach to prolong a hegemon’s
dominance is to weaken or even destroy rising powers before they are strong
enough to deliver a credible challenge.5 Taken together, in the context of
post–Cold War international politics, all the above three IR theories predict
intensified confrontation between the United States and second-tier states,
and second-tier states’ efforts to balance against the United States. But for
around two decades after the end of the Cold War, the relations between the
United States and its traditional allies (Western Europe and Japan) remain
close, the relations between the United States and its traditional enemy (Rus-
sia) have significantly improved, the relations between the United States and
its Cold War ally of convenience (China) remain lukewarm, and the United
States apparently accepts and accommodates the rise of another new great
power—India.6 Why has the prediction of reputable IR theories so far failed
to materialize in the post–Cold War context? In the case of U.S.-China rela-
tions, the general puzzle can be translated into the puzzle of why during the
post–Cold War period engagement rather than containment has been the main
tone of the United States’ China policy, and why accommodation rather than
balancing has been China’s preferred U.S. policy.7 To address this puzzle
in U.S.-China relationship, as will be elaborated further below, we need to
answer the fundamental question of whether China is a status quo or a revi-
sionist country, which will be the research question of this project.
Engagement Containment
Threat A C
Kristof, Mazarr, Shinn, Bernstein and Munro, Betts,
S. Goldstein Buzan and Segal, Dibb, Friedberg,
Mearsheimer, Rachman, Roy,
Waldron, Pollack, Gertz, Pillsbury
No/Little B D
Threat Brooks and Wohlforth, Brzezinski, Segal
Cronin and Cronin, Gallagher, Gill,
A. Goldstein, Harris, Johnston,
Kissinger, Lampton, Lieberthal,
Mandelbaum, Nathan, Oksenberg,
Overholt, Papayoanou and Kastner,
Ross
The threat school was generally associated with the containment perspec-
tive—Cell C; and the no/little threat school was generally associated with
the engagement perspective—Cell B. Some scholars regarded China as a
threat, but nonetheless suggested that engagement at least for the time being
was the appropriate policy with regard to China—Cell A—because engage-
ment might produce a better result, or because it was infeasible to contain
China.8 Some scholars did not regard China as a threat, but insisted that China
should be contained—Cell D—because “sell the Philippines a couple of
cruise missiles and the much-discussed Chinese threat will be easily erased,”
but China was nonetheless “a problem to be circumvented or moved.”9 The
threat/containment school was the minority, but a vocal and influential one.
Containment here often did not mean outright and comprehensive confronta-
tion, as in the case of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and it usually allowed for
engagement of one form or another, such as economic engagement.10 The
no/little threat/engagement school was apparently the majority, but different
scholars often had different things in mind when they talked about engage-
ment. Thus there were comprehensive engagement, constructive engagement,
realistic engagement, limited engagement, conditional engagement, coercive
engagement, etc. Because of the proliferation of engagement with adjectives,
engagement and containment sometimes become indistinguishable. Polite
containment, or hidden containment, for instance, was little different from
coercive engagement.11 Some scholars adopted different positions at different
times: Shambaugh 1995 (Cell C) vs. Shambaugh 1996 (Cell B); and Segal
1996 (Cell C) vs. Segal 1999 (Cell D). Some scholars suggested conflicting
policies at the same time: Betts’ article was containment in tone, but he also
pointed out that “active efforts to keep China poor or to break it up . . . would
4 Chapter 1
itself. One major power dissatisfied with the status quo would transform the
whole system into a revolutionary world order, thus greatly destabilizing the
world system. In his view, Napoleonic France and the former Soviet Union
were both revolutionary states.23
To Herrmann, the dichotomy is between offensively or defensively moti-
vated states. Offensively motivated states are power-maximizers with unlim-
ited aims while defensively motivated states are security-maximizers with
limited aims. Peaceful coexistence therefore is much easier with the latter
than with the former.24
Schweller distinguishes among a whole range of state interests (his term
for motivation), from states with unlimited ambitions to states strongly com-
mitted to maintaining the status quo. He regards a state’s level of satisfaction
with the status quo a critical variable for understanding its foreign policy,25
because a satisfied status quo country (e.g., the United States) would use
its power to help stabilize the world system and make other countries more
secure, while a dissatisfied revisionist country (e.g., Hitlerite Germany)
would use its power to disrupt or even destroy the existing world system.
Therefore, Schweller rightly points out that states are less concerned with
power imbalances than they are about who holds power.26
Waltz, who tends to regard all states as satisfied ones concerned mainly for
their own survival, has to admit that beyond the survival motive, the aims of
states may be endlessly varied: from the ambition to conquer the world to the
desire merely to be left alone. He also admits that things like the qualities and
the motives of actors are not uninteresting or unimportant.27
Even though Morgenthau is against studying state motives, he nonetheless
has to contradict himself by saying that identifying the motivation of possible
challengers is “the fundamental question” and the correct answer to which
determines the “fate of nations.”28 We may therefore conclude that realist
theorists would also support studying motivation as an indispensable task in
testing the China threat proposition.
Though different scholars give different predictions of the future evolution
of the international system, understanding the foreign policy orientation of
various major powers remains an important task. To Wohlforth, the world
system was unambiguously unipolar, and the unipolarity was both peaceful
and durable. In such an international system, balancing the United States by
any other countries was futile and impossible. The United States therefore
could afford not to learn, could be freer than most states to “disregard the
international system and its incentives” (meaning the systemic constraint
upon other countries to balance against the United States), because “a state
cannot be blamed for responding to systemic incentives” (meaning the sys-
temic constraint upon the United States to play the leading role in international
What Are China’s Foreign Policy Motivations? 7
a statue quo country), because an overly assertive strategy would most likely
intensify its apprehension, and result in an undesired spiral of hostility.39
The importance of correctly identifying second-ranking states’ foreign
policy motivation can also be shown by employing the concepts of type I and
type II errors in statistical hypothesis testing. Hard-liners would regard a type
II error as less risky than a type I error, since, according to them, mistaking a
status quo state as a revisionist one would only incur some unnecessary costs,
while failure to destroy a monster might curtail the United States’ primacy.
Soft-liners on the other hand tend to think that type II error is more danger-
ous, since, according to this perspective, unnecessarily coercive diplomacy
might create/exacerbate a threat from where there could have been none/little,
and eventually conjure up global catastrophes from what might have been
peaceful co-existence and benign hegemony, while failure to confront a revi-
sionist country in an early time would at worst result in another manageable,
if undesirable, cold war.40 To hard-liners, the fashion is “to commit type II
error is patriotic,” and to soft-liners, the catchword is “to avoid self-fulfilling
prophecy.” To hard-liners, demonization of a target country is natural, and to
soft-liners, the tendency is to give the target country the benefit of the doubt.41
As a social scientist, one should resist either temptation, avoid letting pre-
conception lead him astray, and allow only the reality principle to guide his
research.42 From a practical perspective, to err in either direction might lead to
serious, perhaps even disastrous, consequences. Hard-liners might think that
to demonize a target country might help mobilize internal support for the sake
of national interests, but such a posture might curtail the American primacy
through the mechanism of imperial overstretch. U.S.-China confrontation in
the 1950s and 1960s provides salient examples.43 On the other hand, Great
Britain’s inability to manage rising challengers resulted in the premature loss
of its vast empire.44
As mentioned in the above, a possible China threat can be studied from
two perspectives: China’s capability and its motivation. So far, scholars have
made solid contributions to the understanding of China’s capability. They
have done in-depth analyses of China’s military capability, the prospect of
China’s economic development, political stability, the possible integration of
a greater China, and China’s aggregate capability.45
As for China’s motivation, some relevant works have also been done. They
include those about Chinese nationalism, China’s prospect of democratization
and social development, China’s perceptions of the current world system,
China’s foreign/defense policy doctrine, China’s foreign policy behavior, and
China’s relations with other countries.46 Unlike works about China’s capabil-
ity, which directly and clearly present each author’s arguments and evidence
10 Chapter 1
as to whether China has or will have the capability to challenge the interna-
tional system, we do not yet have any direct and in-depth study of China’s
motivation. Each of the works cited in this paragraph can help shed light on
a certain aspect of China’s motivation, but as they are not meant to be stud-
ies of China’s motivation, they offer at most bits and pieces of circumstantial
and inconclusive evidence with regard to China’s motivation. Since China’s
motivation is one of the two fundamental questions in the study of a possible
China threat, a direct and in-depth study of China’s foreign policy motivation
is desirable, and indeed, imperative.
Notes
17. Heider, pp. 79–100, 1958; Jones et al., 1971; Shaver, 1975; cited in Herrmann,
p. 177, 1988.
18. Morgenthau, pp. 5–6; Waltz, pp. 82, 93–97, 1979, 1997; Zakaria, pp. 190–96,
1992; Grieco, pp. 498, 500.
19. Segal, pp. 29–32, 1999; Betts, p. 42; Christensen, p. 55, 1999; Singh; Gholz,
Press, and Sapolsky, p. 8; Viner.
20. Eberstadt.
21. Segal, p. 29, 1999.
22. Morganthau, pp. 35–66.
23. Kissinger, pp. 1–3, 1964; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 111–116, 1981.
24. Herrmann, pp. 3–5, 1985.
25. Schweller, p. 184, 1998.
26. Ibid. pp. 189, 201.
27. Waltz, pp. 81, 91, 1979.
28. Morgenthau, p. 59.
29. Wohlforth, pp. 8, 18, 25, 29, 40–41, 1999.
30. Muravchik, p. 36.
31. Kristol and Kagan, pp. 20–23, 26–32, 1996.
32. Kagan, p. 33, 1998; Brzezinski, 1997, cited in Maynes, p. 36, 1998.
33. What Wohlforth calls “conventional wisdom,” p. 8.
34. Haass, p. 38, 1999; Kupchan, pp. 40–42, 1998, Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, pp.
5–17, 1997; Russett and Stam, 1998; Art, 1998, Walt, pp. 3–11, 1998/99, Huntington,
p. 42, 1991; Layne, pp. 133–141, 1993, Maynes, pp. 39–47, 1998; Posen and Ross,
pp. 42–43; Kissinger, 1999.
35. Claude, pp. 1–5, 18–21; Nincic, 1992; Yankelovich and Destler, 1994; Kocs,
1994; Holsti, 1992; Hagan, p. 125; Kagan, 1998.
36. Muravchik, pp. 209–210, 1996.
37. Waltz; Brzezinski, pp. 48–56, 1997; Posen and Ross, p. 17, n. 14, 1996/97;
New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14.
38. Walt, pp. 5–6, 18–32, 263–266, 1987; Mastanduno, pp. 146–149,151–157,
167–170, 1999; Kupchan, pp. 73–79, 1998; Posen and Ross, pp. 42–43, 52; Riker,
pp. 211–243; Walt; Kagan.
39. Jervis, pp. 58–67, 1976; pp. 167–214, 1978.
40. A. Goldstein, p. 73, 1997/98.
41. Herrmann, p. 183, 1988.
42. Steinbruner, pp. 97–101.
43. Christensen, 1996; Lebow, pp. 169–184.
44. Kennedy.
45. Vasey, 1993; Shambaugh, 1996; Gallagher, 1994; Ross, p. 35–3, 1997; A.
Goldstein, 1997/98; Gill/O’Hanlon, 1999; Lilley/Ford, 1999; Mulvenon, 1999;
Puchala, 2001; Tsai, 2001; Overholt, 1993; Jue, 1994; Segal, 1994; Hornik, 1994;
Nolan, 1995; Jim, 1995; Segal, 1994; Huang, 1995; Goldstone, 1995; Pei, 1999;
Crane, 1993; Chen and /Gong, 1994/95; Metzger and Myers, 1996; Kristof, 1993;
Gurtov, 1994; Roy, pp. 150–156; Ross, pp. 86–90; Segal, pp. 108–112; S. Goldstein,
pp. 1–22, 25–27, 1998; Segal, 1999.
12 Chapter 1
46. Pye, 1993; Unger, 1996; Zhao, 1997; Harris, 1997; Garver, 1998; Fitzgerald,
1999, Gries, 1999; Gries, 2001; Zheng, 1994; Tyson and Tyson, 1995; White, Howell,
and Shang, 1996; Shi, 1997; Pei, 1998; Peng, 1998; Zweig, 1999; Crane, 1999;
Nathan, 1999; Li, 2000; Foot, 2001; Oksenberg, 2001; Zhao, 1992; Chu, 1994; Faust/
Kornberg, 1995; Sheng, 1992; Shambaugh, 1994; Zhao, 1995; Garrett and Glaser,
1995; Johnston, 1995; Yao, 1995; Zhao, 1996; Feigenbaum, 1999; Cordner, 1994; Wu
and Mesquita, 1994; Roy, pp. 160–162, 1994; Christensen, September/October 1996;
Ross, 1997; Johnston, 1998; Lieberthal, 1995; Langlois and Langlois, 1996; Ross,
pp. 92–96, 1999; Christensen, 1999.
Chapter 2
13
14 Chapter 2
Perceived Capability
Affect Superior Similar Inferior
for exploitation, and opportunity for mutual gains; or positive, neutral, and
negative) and capability (material and/or cultural) (see Table 2.2).
In Table 2.2, except in the case of the barbarian image, which indicates
superior capability but inferior culture, the cultural level of all the other
images is the same as their capability level.
From the perspective of the perceiver, three images (patron, ally, pro-
tégé) indicate the perception of opportunity for mutual gains, another three
images (child, degenerate, rogue) indicate perception of opportunity for
exploitation, three images (imperialist, barbarian enemy) indicate percep-
tion of threat. And the remaining two images (hegemon, neutral) indicate
perception of both threat and opportunity for mutual gains. To see whether
China is a status quo or a revisionist country vis-à-vis the United States,
one useful way through the image approach is to see what China’s image
of the United States is. The more China perceives threat and/or opportu-
nity for mutual gains, the more likely it is to be a status quo country; and
the more China perceives opportunity for exploitation, the more likely
it is to be a revisionist country. The more positive China’s perception of
the United States is, the more likely it is to be a status quo country, and
the more negative its perception of the United States is, the more likely it
is to be a revisionist country.
In studying national images, an author needs to tackle the following ques-
tions. First, who are the perceivers? In other words, whose perception can be
regarded as representative of one state’s perception of another state? Second,
through what approaches does the author intend to obtain data from which
to construct a meaningful image of the target state? And third, what is to be
perceived, i.e., what information about the target state is important in helping
to shed light on the source state’s understanding of the target state? In the
following, I will discuss how the existing literature addresses these questions
and how this book will deal with them.
16 Chapter 2
Perceiver Works
State as unitary actor Herrmann 1985, Frei 1986
Predominant leader Sheng 1997, Liu 1998
Decision-making elites R. Cottam 1977, Larson 1985
Influential elites Shambaugh 1992, Wang 2000
General public Steele 1966, Gries 1999
THE PERCEIVERS
Approach Works
Experiment Herrmann 1997
Survey Steele 1966; Kusnitz 1984; Yue 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley
1990
Sampled interview Isaacs 1958; Nakanishi 1975; Hall 1980; Holt 1989; Wang
2000
Literature survey Shambaugh 1988–1, 1988–2, 1992; Wang and Lin 1992;
Gries 1999
Quotation collection Pillsbury 2000; Frei 1986
Impression collection Grayson 1978, 1979; Arkush 1989
Archival research Larson 1985; Sheng 1997; Liu 1998
Government statements Herrmann 1985; Shimko 1991; Frei 1986
Media analysis Wang 1998; Liu 1991; Su 1991
Mixed approaches Hunt 1988; Liu 1963; Tu 1973; Kulma 1999; Mosher 1990;
Bronfenbrenner 1961; Whiting 1989
Others Fairbank 1974
SOURCE MATERIALS
that led to the Cold War between the United States and the USSR spanning
five decades.
Public government statements are also often used to study national per-
ceptions. When it comes to studying a state’s current perceptions, or past
perceptions for which relevant documents are not yet de-classified, public
documents remain a viable source. One problem with this approach is that
public statements are frequently meant for propaganda purposes and, in the
worst-case scenario, for “outright deception.”10 But according to Frei,11 for
the following reasons, public documents can still serve a useful purpose in
national image studies. First, there are strong incentives for governments to
be consistent in their statements. Playing around with foreign policy state-
ments could cost a government its “internal and external credibility,” which
few governments can afford. Second, words, especially those as authoritative
and official as statements by the representatives of a government, “tend to
create a reality of their own,” i.e., they are usually followed by deeds. Though
they do not necessarily determine deeds, they do usually guide or bound
deeds. Even in as closed a society as the former USSR, government state-
ments often provide ample information about subsequent behavior. Further-
more, judicious designs can ensure greater validity of the approach of relying
on governments’ public statements for research purposes, as in Herrmann’s
Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy.
Experiment often involves measuring the effect of an independent vari-
able on a dependent variable. Unfortunately, because we are interested in
foreign policy we are usually interested in leaders who will not participate in
experiments. Where necessary, scholars can use surrogates (such as univer-
sity students) in such experiments, but this practice raises serious questions
of validity. One effort to use an experiment to test the internal operation of
imagery is “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cog-
nitive Schemata.”12 The experiments described in this article demonstrate that,
among other things, subjects’ judgment of a target state’s relative capability
and culture, together with the perception of threat and opportunity, consti-
tute important components of a national image, and that a national image
does carry with it a certain set of policy choices. As these experiments used
American students as subjects, it is doubtful whether the conclusion can
be applicable to other countries; for instance, people of the former Soviet
Union might not necessarily associate democratic decision making with more
benign intention.13
The most frequently applied approach in studying national images is a
mixed approach. In such works, authors use data gathered through various
approaches, such as literature survey, government documents, media reports,
surveys, and perhaps authors’ direct experiences, to reconstruct a national
22 Chapter 2
THE PERCEIVED
Issue Areas
Most image scholars organize what is to be included in national image studies
into different issue areas, as is made clear in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, which list
major books and articles in the existing literature on the Chinese perceptions
of the United States. From these two tables, we can see that these authors
generally agree that China’s perception of the American economy, polity, for-
eign policy (especially that concerning the perceivers’ own country), people,
society, and culture are important issue areas in national image studies. The
American Image of Russia, 1917–1977 is another example. The dozens of
articles in this book were written by well-known Americans in various fields:
politicians, diplomats, writers, journalists, lawyers, social activists, philoso-
phers, etc. These authors are not image scholars, but their articles nonetheless
reflect the stereotypical perceptions of the USSR held by Americans during
the Cold War. Obviously, they mostly also organized their perceptions of the
USSR into these issue areas.
Dimensions
Some image scholars, however, organize information in national image
studies along different dimensions. The reason these dimensions are used
is because they posit theoretically that it is these things that affect strategic
26 Chapter 2
Snyder
Shimko Scott Boulding Frei Ole Holsti Stoessinger and Pruitt R. Cottam R. Herrmann M. Cottam
Diesing
Capabilities Perceived Strength/ Capabilities Power or Capabilities Capabilities Power
power weakness capabilities
Threatening Hostility/ Threat Threat and Threat and Threatening
or benign friendliness perception opportunity opportunity or benign
image intention
Like or Affect
dislike
Self-image Self-image
Motivation Sources of
motivation
28 Chapter 2
Author(s) Dimension
Scott Associated response repertoires
Snyder and Diesing Preference function
Snyder and Diesing Unity of government
Snyder and Diesing Bargaining style
Holsti Approaches to political calculation
R. Cottam Interaction of domestic forces
Pruitt Responsiveness
Boulding Geographical space
Frei Structure of adversary
Frei Assessment of information about the adversary
Shimko, R. Cottam Decision processes
Shimko, Frei Meta-perception
Pruitt, Frei Trust/distrust
Stoessinger Character of adversary
R. Cottam Decision loci
be harmful to the source country’s interest. And the adversary’s strategies and
tactics can be assumed to be implementing the goals and intentions harmful
to the source country’s interest. This approach, however, is not satisfactory
on three counts. First, when a target country is not necessarily an adversary,
its goals and intentions cannot be assumed to be harmful to the interest of
the source country. Second, even when a target country is considered an
adversary, not all of its goals and intentions can be assumed to be contrary to
the interest of the source country. Third, focusing only on a target country’s
goals and intentions, even when it is an adversary, cannot adequately reflect
the extent of threat to the source country’s interest.
On the other hand, focusing on threat and opportunity can more adequately
take into account the relevance of a target country to the source country’s
national interest. In the existing image literature, Richard Herrmann gives
an excellent treatment of the dimension of threat and opportunity in national
image. He regards threat and opportunity as central to any image of another
national actor.30 According to him, if leaders believe that another nation poses
a challenge to preferred political values, they perceive that nation as a threat;
and if leaders observe a chance to foster preferred political values, either
through direct exploitation or cooperative alliances, they perceive a situation
as offering an opportunity.31 Thus, the threat the target country poses to the
source country is a purely negative value, but perception of opportunity is
different. It can represent negative affect when the target country represents
a source for exploitation, as in the British perception of its colonies in the
nineteenth century32 or the United States’ perception of Latin American coun-
tries, or positive affect, as in the United States’ perception of its allies during
the Cold War. Since China’s perception of the United States differs from both
Cold War superpowers’ perception of their adversaries, and from the United
States’ perception of its allies during the Cold War, an exploration of both
threat and opportunity will ensure adequate consideration of the relevance of
national interest in China’s perception of the United States.
In the existing literature on the Chinese perception of the United States,
this dimension has not received adequate treatment. As mentioned in the
above, Shambaugh and Wang study the Chinese perception of the United
States mainly along issue areas, not how relations with the United States
affect China’s national interest. Pillsbury discusses only the security aspect of
U.S.-China relations. Other analysts of the Chinese perception of the United
States treat the element of national interest generally by analyzing some of
the United States’ China policies. By examining China’s perception of threat
and opportunity in its relations with the United States, this project intends to
give this indispensable dimension in national image formation a systematic
treatment. Chapter 3 will be devoted specifically to China’s perception of
32 Chapter 2
threat from the United States, and Chapter 4 to China’s perception of oppor-
tunity from the United States.
scholars attach great importance to the difference between the United States
and China in political system as a possible source of conflict between the two
countries. As Bernstein and Munro point out, “Of course, if China became
a democracy its military build-up would be far less threatening than if it
remained a dictatorship.”35 Mazaar argues that “Sino-American relations will
also suffer from a basic fact of life in international politics: democracies and
dictatorships generally do not get along well . . . The values, mode of opera-
tions, official personality, and many other aspects of democracies simply do
not accord with those of undemocratic nations.”36 Betts sees that a difference
in political system does matter in the case of U.S.-China relations: “Efforts
to prevent dominance by a single power center in East Asia should be limited
if the contender for dominance has a genuinely democratic government. The
level of tradeoffs with non-strategic interests (for example, absolute economic
gains), or of acceptable costs and risks in strategic competition, should vary
with the odds that a rival (in terms of national power) will be unfriendly and
dangerous. There is good reason to believe that such odds are lower with
kindred democracies.”37
Engagement scholars share this view with containment scholars. As Avery
Goldstein points out, this perspective suggests that democratic great powers
will feel justified in embracing confrontational policies against a Chinese
regime that rejects liberal democratic values and in which the foreign policy
decision-making process on crucial security matters is not much constrained
by institutions, but rather monopolized by at most a handful of leaders only
loosely accountable to a slightly larger elite. And because China’s small,
authoritarian ruling group believes that the West is engaged in a campaign
of “peaceful evolution” designed to subvert communist rule without a fight,
hostility and intransigence will be reciprocated.38 Zbigniew Brzezinski, in
his “Living with China,” clearly encourages China’s democracy though he
did not mention why. Mandelbaum suggests that “the desirable outcome, for
adolescents and post–Cold War Russia and China alike, is that they volun-
tarily adopt the norms of responsible adults—in the case of Russia and China,
those of the West.”39 “A democratic China would be more likely to work out
a mutually acceptable relationship with Taiwan. As full-fledged democra-
cies, both countries (Russia and China) would be more likely to cooperate
more closely with the United States to enforce international norms of nuclear
nonproliferation.”40
Obviously, people in the United States attach great importance to the dif-
ference between the two countries in political system and ideology. As the
other part of the dyad, what are the Chinese perceptions of U.S. politics, and
in what ways do these perceptions affect China’s choices with regard to the
United States? This is obviously an important but under-researched topic.
34 Chapter 2
system, which in turn would determine whether China would develop even
greater interdependence with the world economy. A great extent of inter-
dependence would change the interest preferences of China toward greater
willingness to cooperate with the world community, to solving disputes with
other countries through peaceful means. As a result, China’s perceptions of
the U.S. economy would shed light on whether China would be willing to
integrate itself more fully with the existing international community, thus
developing a stake in maintaining the system rather than challenging the sys-
tem. In a word, an exploration of China’s perceptions of the U.S. economy
may contribute greatly to the understanding of China’s inclination with regard
to both the current international system and the United States.
Notes
1. Herrmann, pp. 32–33, 1985; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 428, 1995; Her-
rmann, pp. 413–417, 1997; R. Cottam, pp. 62–67, 1977; M. Cottam, p. 19, 1994.
2. R. Cottam, pp. 63, 70, 1977; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, pp. 426, 428,
430–431, 434–435, 1995; Herrmann et al, p. 409, 1997.
3. Herrmann, pp. 32–33, 37–38, 1985; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, pp. 430–431,
433, 435; Herrmann et al., 1997, pp. 409, 411. The implications of all the other images
can be spelled out in a similar way, but are omitted here due to space considerations.
4. Cited in Shambaugh, p. 21, 1992.
5. Iriye, p. 16.
6. Wang, Jianwei, p. 44.
7. Frei, 1986; Pillsbury, 2000.
8. Herrmann, pp. 27–28, 1986.
9. Montgomery, Wolfe, Gross, Perry, Liu Liqun, Mei-ling Wang, Yanmin Yu.
10. Frei, p. 19.
11. Frei, pp. 19–22.
12. Herrmann et al., 1997.
13. Herrmann et al., p. 422, Bronfenbrenner, White.
14. In selecting the sample of articles for the research in this project, the author
follows one arbitrary rule: in all five journals (except Meiguo Yanjiu), the United
States (or the names of its leaders) should be specifically mentioned in the title for
an article to be included in the sample. In the case of Meiguo Yanjiu, all the relevant
articles are included as all articles in this journal are essentially about the United
States.
15. Shambaugh, pp. 5–16; Saunders, pp. 42, 44; Pillsbury, pp. 363–377.
16. Saunders, p. 44.
17. Shambaugh, p. 127.
18. Pillsbury, p. 373.
19. Pillsbury, pp. 368–373, 376–377.
36 Chapter 2
20. Shimko, pp. 12–13; Kenneth Boulding, JCR, 1959, p. 120; Wang, Jianwei,
p. 34; Whiting, 1989.
21. Michael J. Smith, p. 4.
22. Morgenthau, pp. 21, 97–98.
23. M. Cottam, p. 55, 1992.
24. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425, 1995; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and
Ciarrochi, p. 408.
25. M. Cottam, pp. 53–54, 1986.
26. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425, 1995.
27. White, p. 336, 1984.
28. Michael Joseph Smith, pp. 153–156.
29. Nuechterlein, p. 13.
30. Herrmann and Fischerkeller, p. 425.
31. R. Herrmann, p. 31, 1985.
32. R. Cottam.
33. Holt, pp. 43–45.
34. Gertz, p. xi, 2000.
35. Bernstein and Munro, p. 26.
36. Mazaar, pp. 21–22.
37. Betts, p. 74.
38. Goldstein, pp. 66–67.
39. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Living with China,” p. 94.
40. Ibid, p. 95.
41. Walder, Oi.
Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
37
38 Chapter 3
of threat and opportunity from the United States, I focus only on articles
relevant to international politics in the 1990s and with both the United States
and China specifically mentioned in the titles.1 This approach reduces the size
of the sample to 182 articles (see Appendix A for the titles of these articles).
Obviously, many articles containing information about Chinese perception of
the United States will not be included in the sample, but it is expected that
most dominant Chinese perceptions of the United States will be present in
the articles selected. Table 3.2 shows the number of articles in each of the six
journals included in the sample.
After selecting articles in the sample, I carefully read these articles and put
together all the sentences and passages in these articles reflecting a percep-
tion of threat from the United States. In this chapter, I intend to answer the
following two questions. One, did China perceive a threat from the United
States; and, two, what were the contents of the Chinese perceptions of threat
from the United States? The answers to the two questions will be based on
the quotations collected in the way described above.
To answer this question, refer to Table 3.3, showing the number of articles
having expressed perceptions of threat from the United States. From the table,
we can see that an overwhelming majority of articles in the sample perceived
more or less a threat from the United States. Threat in this chapter is defined
as anything the United States had done to China arousing negative comments
by Chinese authors, either criticism or complaint. This is not an academically
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 39
Table 3.3 Number of Articles in the Sample Having Expressed Perceptions of Threat
from the United States
The answer to this question constitutes the bulk of this chapter. In order to
increase replicability, I adapt Nuechterlein’s national interest matrix2 for the
presentation in this section (see Table 3.4).
In presenting the Chinese perceptions of threat from the United States, I
will adopt the first three categories in Nuechterlein’s matrix, i.e., perceptions
of threat to China’s national security, economic well-being, and favorable
Basic national
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
interest
Defense of homeland
Economic well-being
Favorable world order
Promotion of values
40 Chapter 3
Territorial Integrity
When it comes to the Chinese perceptions of threat from the United States to
China’s territorial integrity, Taiwan was undoubtedly the most salient topic.
In the sample of 182 articles, numerous times Chinese scholars emphasized
the importance of Taiwan in China-U.S. relations. The following are a few
examples from each of the six journals.
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao: “The most important, and the most sensitive
problem affecting China-U.S. relations is the Taiwan problem.”3
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu: “Taiwan problem has always been the most sensitive
and the most important problem in China-U.S. relations.”4
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi: “Taiwan problem has always been a core factor
affecting and obstructing the development of China-U.S. relations.”5
Zhanlue yu Guanli: “The key problem in China-U.S. relations is the Tai-
wan problem.”6
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi: The Taiwan problem was “the biggest obstacle”
in the constructive strategic partner relationship between the United States
and China.7
Meiguo Yanjiu: “Among all the problems in U.S.-China relations, the Tai-
wan problem is the most sensitive one, and it has the potential of leading to
China-U.S. confrontation.”8
In explaining why China attached such great importance to the Taiwan
problem, Chinese authors emphasized that “the Taiwan problem is relevant to
China’s national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and national unifi-
cation, and it thus concerns China’s fundamental national interest.” Besides,
it is a problem involving profound national sentiment and pride. They cited
Deng Xiaoping’s words to the effect that in such a problem concerning
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 41
the TMD, but the United States was taking steps in this direction “through
secret U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation and by providing Taiwan with
TMD-related equipments and weapons.” From a long-term perspective,
however, it may be possible that the United States would include Taiwan
in its TMD. One author pointed out the severe consequence for China of
the United States covering Taiwan with the TMD, since, according to a
senior U.S. officer, the TMD could basically be regarded as “a potential
anti-China alliance.” Another scholar pointed out that the TMD was “not
a simple problem of weapons technology, but a strategic problem with
comprehensive significance in China-U.S. relations. Once the TMD is
extended to cover Taiwan, a decisive change will take place in mainland-
Taiwan relations and in East-Asia strategic situation.”12 We may conclude
that the mainstream perception of Chinese authors was that China strongly
opposed covering Taiwan with the TMD and regarded it with great resent-
ment, since it would mean turning a part of China into a part of an anti-
China alliance.
4. Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Another salient source of Chinese alarm
and resentment was a Japan-U.S. security arrangement which used the
ambiguous term of “peripheral incidents” to indicate the areas covered.
Chinese authors generally believed that even though this security arrange-
ment did not exclusively target China, it did include China as one of its
targets, especially regarding the possible conflict over the Taiwan Straits.
The United States’ and Japan’s strategic ambiguity over the scope of their
security arrangement increased Chinese authors’ worry that the two big
powers in the Asia-Pacific region might gang up against China.13
The United States’ overall Taiwan policy was perceived to “maintain the
status quo” of “no independence and no unification, no war and no peace,” or
“separated but not independent” and “peaceful but not unified.”14
The United States’ weapon sales, military technology transfer, and secu-
rity guarantee to Taiwan was perceived as obstructing China’s unification,
and supporting separatist activities in Taiwan. It was because of the United
States’ support and connivance that “hidden independence” and “public
independence” forces in Taiwan coordinated with one another, and vigor-
ously promoted separatism. But the United States was also seen at times as
“properly containing the clamorous ‘Taiwan independence’ tendency and not
allowing Taiwan authorities to go too far on the road of separatism.” Con-
sequently, the United States was seen as encouraging dialogue between the
mainland and Taiwan, but at the same time hoping that the dialogue “would
not produce any substantive results.”15
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 43
On the whole, the United States’ Taiwan policy was perceived as vacil-
lating between prevention of China’s unification and support for Taiwan’s
independence. When U.S.-China relations were relatively peaceful, the
United States’ policy was perceived to prevent China’s unification, but when
there were more troubles in U.S.-China relations, the United States was
perceived to shift to promoting Taiwanese independence. During the Cold
War and after the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979,
the United States’ policy was perceived as maintaining Taiwan’s separate-
ness from China, “implementing its security commitment to Taiwan but very
seldom publicly emphasized it.” Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the
United States was perceived as making a greater effort to promote Taiwan
independence, including comprehensively enhancing U.S.-Taiwan relations,
especially in Congress, publicly advocating “two Chinas” or “one China and
one Taiwan.” After President Clinton’s visit to China in 1998, the United
States was again perceived as returning to the policy of maintaining main-
land-Taiwan separateness rather than promoting Taiwan independence.16
The United States’ support had been considered “the main reason why Tai-
wan’s Lee Tenghui authorities had the audacity to promote Taiwan indepen-
dence.” The reason why Chinese authors were resentful of the U.S. Taiwan
policy was that they regard the Taiwan problem as purely one of “China’s
internal problems in which no other country has the right to intervene.”
They opposed the United States’ intervention because they regarded it as not
acceptable for the United States to draw its security boundaries in China’s
territory. One author pointed out, “no matter what reasons the United States
uses to justify its Taiwan policy, it has to admit one basic fact, i.e., it was
the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs that produced the
Taiwan problem.” Another author argued, “If China and the United States,
or any other countries, are to develop normal and friendly relations, each has
to demonstrate the basic respect for the other’s fundamental national interest
such as sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.”17
Regarding the Chinese perception that the United States threatened China’s
territorial integrity, Tibet was also brought up from time to time by Chinese
scholars, though it was far less salient than Taiwan. The United States was
perceived as supporting Tibetan separatists and encouraging Tibetan indepen-
dence. “In November 1998, the Clinton administration ignored the Chinese
government’s firm opposition, and set up the position of Special Coordinator
for Tibetan Affairs”—perceived as an act of flagrant intervention in China’s
internal affairs. “In April 1999, during Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to the
United States, the United States urged China to conduct political negotiation
with the Dalai Lama.” From time to time, the U.S. president would drop by
44 Chapter 3
to meet with the visiting Dalai Lama. Just as in the Taiwan case, the U.S.
Congress, and especially Senator Jesse Helms, went much further than the
executive branch. It passed bills, resolutions, and amendments claiming that
Tibet was an occupied country even though the U.S. government, as well as
nearly every country in the world, officially recognized that Tibet was a part
of China.18
The Chinese articles reviewed here often described the United States as
using the protection of Tibetan religion as an excuse to intervene in Tibetan
affairs. Chinese scholars were resentful that some Americans ignored the fact
that after the serf system was abolished following the Dalai Lama’s depar-
ture, “human rights in Tibet have greatly improved.”19
The United States’ intention to intervene in Tibetan affairs was perceived
to obstruct China’s unification and disrupt its stability. It was seen as “urging
China’s central government to ‘retract’ its ‘control and influence’ in Tibet,
even to separate Tibet from China.” One most poignant comment was: “The
U.S. government and politicians know clearly that the Dalai Lama’s ultimate
goal is to pursue separatism, division of China, step-by-step, on the pretense
of ‘religion,’ ‘human rights,’ ‘protecting cultural heritage,’ and ‘autonomy.’”
The United States’ Tibetan policy fits well with Dalai’s goals. One cannot
but conclude that “the United States’ strategy and ultimate goal is the same
as that of the Dalai clique: to separate Tibet from China.” The United States’
intervention in Tibetan affairs aroused resentment from Chinese scholars
because it threatened China’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity,
“while China has not presented a threat to the United States’ sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and national security.” Chinese authors pointed out that
if some people inside and outside the U.S. government always tried to cause
troubles in things concerning China’s fundamental national interest, “it would
be very harmful to U.S.-China relations.”20
At one time, Hong Kong was perceived as one of the central foci in China-
U.S. security relations. The United States’ policy acts that Chinese observers
saw concerning Hong Kong included the following: (1) The U.S. Congress
passed six bills, resolutions, and amendments that concerned Hong Kong,
claiming that it had an interest in Hong Kong’s democratization and human
rights even after Hong Kong’s return to China; (2) the United States sent
delegations of representatives to Hong Kong to inspect implementation of
“one country, two systems” there; (3) the United States openly supported
Hong Kong’s British colonial authority in its confrontation with China; (4)
the United States president supported Hong Kong’s democracy advocates by
meeting their representative—Martin Lee.21 On the whole, Chinese authors
regarded the United States as having intervened inappropriately in Hong
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 45
Kong affairs. They regarded the United States as trying to “disrupt and
weaken the Chinese government’s resumption of its sovereignty in Hong
Kong” and to ensure the United States’ interest and status in Hong Kong.22
As Hong Kong concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as
in the case of Taiwan, the United States’ perceived intervention in the Hong
Kong affairs was seen as evidence that the United States did not fully regard
Hong Kong to be a part of China. This posture was generally opposed by
Chinese authors, but some of them also believed that the capability of the
United States to cause trouble in Hong Kong was limited.
China authors generally perceived a non-constructive role for the United
States regarding disputes in the South China Sea. They thought that at times
the United States’ position concerning these disputes had been unfriendly,
for example, instigating the perception of China’s threat to Southeast Asian
countries which had disputes with China over territorial waters. The United
States was perceived as being ready to intervene in these disputes, and one
major instrument of intervention was the U.S.-Japan security arrangement.23
It seems that none of the above was a complete list, and the status of dif-
ferent countries in the lists was also different. In the following, I will dwell
in some detail on each individual member, including some potential members
not mentioned above.
The most important member of this alliance was of course the United
States itself. The United States’ forward deployment of 100,000 troops in
Asia was regarded as having China as its likely target. It was seen as serving
several possible purposes, including: intervention in China’s internal affairs,
encircling China, and containing China’s rise in times of need.27 For some
Chinese authors, the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s speech on October 30, 1995
confirmed their concern that the U.S. troops in Asia were intended to deal
with China: Engagement (of China) was in complete conformity with the
United States adopting measures to prevent and stop the threat to the interest
of the United States’ allies and to the United States itself. It was because of
this that the United States would continue maintaining a strong force ready
for action and have a forward deployment of about 100,000 troops in the
Pacific region.28
Other than the United States itself, according to Chinese authors, Japan
was the most salient member in the United States’ design to encircle China.
On April 17, 1996, the United States and Japan promulgated a “Joint Com-
munique,” which expanded Japan’s defense parameter to encompass the
whole Asia-Pacific region. It only mentioned North Korea as a destabilizing
factor, and it did not specifically mention China. Instead, it mentioned that
“peripheral incidents” were not a geographical concept, but a situational
one.29
Chinese authors did not accept the United States’ and Japan’s claim, and
regarded this alliance as targeted at China. Some authors regarded the new
alliance as undoubtedly targeted at China, but most agreed that China was
not the sole target of this security arrangement. They pointed out that what
made China feel especially threatened was that this treaty openly or secre-
tively covered Taiwan, and its hidden purpose was to prevent China from
using non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwanese independence. One author
therefore argued that “the amendment of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation
guidelines gave Taiwan a wrong message.” Some authors pointed out that
the new U.S.-Japan defense treaty had changed from its defensive character
during the Cold War, covering only the security of Japan, to an offensive
treaty tasked with dealing with China’s rise, carrying with it the possibility
of containing China when necessary.30
The reason for their suspicion included the following.31 (1) “One of the
tasks of the U.S. base in Okinawa was to deal with situations in the Taiwan
Straits.” During the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, the U.S. aircraft carrier which
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 47
intervened in the crisis was based in Japan’s Yokosuka. (2) Japan’s nostal-
gia for its rule in Taiwan during the colonial period predisposed Japan to be
sympathetic to the United States’ intervention in Taiwan. (3) “The new U.S.-
Japan Security Guidelines and relevant acts did not clearly exclude Taiwan.”
(4) China was regarded by the United States as a potential adversary, and
the U.S.-Japan alliance could objectively play the role of containing China.
(5) The ambiguous concept of “peripheral incidents” in the treaty allowed
the U.S.-Japan security cooperation to cover any area in the world, espe-
cially in the Asia-Pacific region. (6) Given the different relations between
the Japan-U.S. dyad and the Japan-China dyad, if the United States chose
to contain China, “Japan might follow.” (8) “Everyone knew what its target
was, because there was no military alliance without a target.” (9) The U.S.
Defense Secretary once specifically pointed out that the Japan-U.S. secu-
rity alliance was the most important in preventing China’s strengthening of
military forces. (10) The United States’ and Japan’s joint efforts regarding
the TMD in recent years were mentioned, and a Chinese author used an
understatement: “it perhaps is not meant to deal only with North Korea.”
(11) According to a Japanese scholar, if the United States wanted to contain
China’s development, it conformed to Japan’s interest, since Japan was afraid
that its dominance in Asia might be “challenged by China’s economic rise.”
(12) Japan’s more aggressive action regarding the disputed Diaoyu Island
(Senkakus) was regarded as one result of the encouragement from the U.S.-
Japan new Security Guidelines. Therefore, one Chinese author pointed out,
the enhancement of security alliance relationship between the United States
and Japan “apparently includes the intention to erect a preventive ‘strategic
shield’ against China.”
In this probable alliance to encircle China, Taiwan was perceived, next
to Japan, as a salient potential member. Chinese authors argued that after
the Cold War, “U.S. political and military circles again recognize Taiwan’s
important strategic status,” and “consider the Taiwan problem more from
the perspective of the United States’ global strategy,” and in the context of
regarding China more than before as its “strategic competitor.” When the
United States played “the Taiwan Card,” it was perceived as a part of the dan-
gerous strategy of containing China’s rise. Taiwan constituted an integral part
of the United States’ effort to encircle China because the U.S. military was
afraid that a unified China may “break through the island chain of encircle-
ment and enter the Pacific.”32
Several Chinese authors mentioned South Korea as the United States’
potential partner in this alliance to encircle China, but none of them offered
a more detailed explanation. It seems that Chinese authors did not perceive
much threat from South Korea.33
48 Chapter 3
The United States’ change of support after the Cold War from Pakistan to
India was perceived as having taken into consideration the China factor, and
the strengthened military cooperation between India and the United States
was perceived to some extent as constituting a potential threat to China.36
After the collapse of the USSR, Washington was thought to regard China as
an ideological adversary, and as the last stronghold of communism. Some
Chinese observers believed that “the most fundamental conflict between the
United States and China was the one between two ideologies,” and China’s
rise was regarded by the United States as a challenge not only in a geopoliti-
cal sense, but also in terms of values.38
Consequently, the United States was seen as resorting to “peaceful evolu-
tion” as a strategy toward China, with China becoming a major target of
the United States’ crusade to promote democracy. Some Chinese observers
predicted that as the China-U.S. differences over ideology would persist for
a long time to come, “peaceful evolution” would be the United States’ long-
term strategy toward China.39
Most Chinese authors in the sample regarded peaceful evolution as pro-
moting evolution in China toward an “Americanized democratic political sys-
tem and capitalist economic structure.” This included, first of all, economic
liberalization, which in turn was seen as leading to political liberalization.
Some Chinese observers believed that peaceful evolution included dividing
China, and to divide and to Westernize China were closely related. The pur-
pose of peaceful evolution was perceived to be to “integrate China into the
Western world system led by the United States,” to force China to submit,
and to maintain the United States’ position as the world leader.40
Human rights were considered “a breakthrough point” to promote evolu-
tion in China, a big stick in the hands of the United States to cudgel China
into submission. Human rights were said to have become “the center of the
United States’ China policy.”41 The United States resorted to the following
approaches to promote human rights in China.
GATT/WTO: The United States’ policy regarding China’s GATT/WTO
membership was seen as having a political purpose, which was deeper than
the superficial economic purpose. The United States was thought to regard
China’s GATT/WTO application as an extremely favorable opportunity for
the United States to influence China’s domestic politics. And the United
States was seen as wanting to seize the opportunity to “force a major reform
in China, to compel China to deviate from the system of a socialist market
economy,” and to integrate China into the political and economic systems
dominated by the United States.42
MFN: Especially during Clinton’s first term, the MFN was seen as a fash-
ionable weapon for the United States to pressure China. Following its strategic
principle of promoting change through pressure, the Clinton administration
decided to link the MFN with human rights. In May 28, 1993 President
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 51
Clinton announced the extension of China’s MFN status for one more year.
At the same time, he put forward seven conditions, asking China to make
comprehensive and major progress in improving human rights conditions.
For Chinese authors, to accept the United States’ conditions meant accepting
the United States’ value system, and change China’s domestic policy and its
own political system. After the United States de-linked the MFN and human
rights, the MFN was seen as continuing to be a powerful tool for the United
States to pressure China over human rights.43
Taiwan/Hong Kong: The United States was thought to use Taiwan and
Hong Kong to promote peaceful evolution in China. The more or less sepa-
rate status of these two lands from China was seen as an incentive inducing
China to follow the road of Westernization. Several Chinese observers argued
that the United States supported the economic integration of Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and China, and wished to maintain the momentum toward democracy
in Taiwan and Hong Kong, in order to use them “to exercise political influ-
ence in China,” and to change China’s political and economic systems.44
Radio Broadcast: In the 1990s, the United States strengthened the VOA
broadcast and set up a new “Radio Free Asia.” Chinese observers saw China
as the main target and regarded Washington’s purpose as the promotion of
peaceful evolution. Just as one U.S. House representative put it, Radio Free
Europe helped break down the Iron Curtain, and Radio Free Asia could help
break down the Bamboo Curtain.45
Dissidents: The United States’ support of Chinese dissidents was con-
sidered an integral part of the United States’ strategy to promote peaceful
evolution in China. Washington was said to use human rights, freedom of
speech, etc. as excuses to protect those dissidents who attempted to overthrow
the Chinese government and China’s social and political systems. By doing
so, the United States was perceived to “sow the seeds of destruction” inside
China.46
Others: The United States was seen as resorting to other means than the
above to promote peaceful evolution in China. One author mentioned that in
order to promote peaceful evolution, the United States “urges American busi-
nesses in China to formulate ‘voluntary regulations’ to help promote China’s
human rights.” Soliciting support from Europe and Japan to pressure China
on human rights was another approach. And the United States also directly
used sanctions to promote human rights in China.47
Chinese authors generally agreed that human rights were one of the most
serious problems in U.S.-China relations. Even though it was “not as intense
as the Taiwan problem, it covered broad issue areas and had deep roots,”
causing disputes between the two countries. Both of these problems were seen
as the result of the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs. For
some Chinese scholars, human rights were no less a problem than the Taiwan
52 Chapter 3
problem, while for others, after the de-linking of human rights and the MFN,
human rights might “not assume a central position in the bilateral relations,”
but “would still be an important problem in the China-U.S. relations.”48
Some Chinese observers believed that the essence of peaceful evolution
was to overthrow the Chinese government and China’s political and eco-
nomic systems, and to disrupt China’s political stability. The collapse of the
USSR was perceived as the success of the United States’ peaceful evolution
strategy, and Chinese scholars did not want China to repeat the collapse.
Besides, to pressure other countries over human rights was said to violate
the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter, every sovereign state should
have the right to determine its own path of development. Chinese observers
argued that “the United States and China were different, and that each should
respect the other, and try to promote common interest while recognizing the
existence of differences. Differences should be the cause for exchange, but
not the reason for interfering in the other’s internal affairs.”49
Chinese observers suggested that China did want to change and to reform,
but “the process of China’s reform and opening has its own characteristics,
and it is China’s own national interest that determines the speed and extent of
China’s reform and opening, and it will not be determined or influenced by
any outside forces.”50 Chinese authors seemed to accept that the model which
China imported from the USSR might not be the right thing for China, but
they argued that “people of every country have the right to make their own
choice. Even if they have made a wrong choice, they can make the decision
again, and nobody should impose their decision on another country.” This,
according to Chinese scholars, was what “a real democratic spirit” should
be. Chinese scholars indicated that China did not reject the United States’
ideology and social system. One most liberal interpretation of socialism ran
like this: “whatever approach can help China realize modernization, can help
all the Chinese people to really get rich, we will adopt. This is the socialism
of our understanding.”51 Thus, they argued that the United States should not
overemphasize human rights in its relations with China, because it would
also hurt the United States’ realistic national interest, and create unnecessary
international tensions.
most prominent subjects in U.S.-China relations. The United States was seri-
ously dissatisfied with China’s efforts to protect intellectual property rights and
adopted quite an unfriendly policy toward China. Washington often resorted
to sanctions or threats of sanction to settle disputes over intellectual property
rights, which Chinese observers saw as trying to force China to behave in a
way consistent with the United States’ interest. Some interest groups in the
United States often opposed extension of the MFN to China on the ground of
China’s performance concerning intellectual property rights. Even advocates
of engagement supported U.S. pressure on China over intellectual property
rights. Sometimes the two countries were on the brink of a trade war over
this issue. Some scholars in the sample argued that the United States’ policy
toward China concerning intellectual property rights was unfair, unreason-
able, or discriminatory. One scholar pointed out that “solving the China-U.S.
intellectual property rights problem should be based on relevant international
conventions and treaties which the two countries had already participated in
or were about to participate in, and should not be based on the United States’
domestic laws.” Another scholar argued that “to a great extent, disputes
between China and the United States concerning intellectual property rights
reflect the different stages of development between the two countries . . .
After decades or perhaps over a century of efforts, developed countries have
a whole set of laws for the protection of intellectual property rights,” while
China had just begun making efforts in this direction. He thought it was not
helpful for the United States to readily resort to sanctions on this matter.
Some Chinese scholars did not deny that China had not done well concerning
intellectual property rights protection, but they at the same time argued that
“imposing sanctions on China over this problem will often be counterproduc-
tive because China is extremely unbalanced in development, and has a quite
immature market system.” Occasionally, Chinese authors complained that “if
China makes too many concessions to the United States concerning intellec-
tual property rights, China will suffer heavy economic losses.” They said this
was so because it had been the practice in developing countries to imitate a
lot of products in developed countries. One author cited developing countries’
argument that “it was because of exploitation by suzerain states that resulted
in the current backwardness of developing countries . . . Developed countries
which claim to help other countries to modernize should not limit their atten-
tion on the narrow scope of domestic laws in handling intellectual property
rights problem, but should put this problem in the broad historical context and
international relations context.”52 On the whole, intellectual property rights
disputes were not as serious as more sensitive disputes such as those concern-
ing human rights and Taiwan.
54 Chapter 3
2000 Olympics
In 1993, China applied to hold the 2000 Olympics in Beijing, but lost to
Sidney in the third round by two votes. China attributed its failure to the
United States’ obstruction, because the U.S. House of Representatives passed
a resolution in 1993 using human rights as an excuse against China’s holding
the 2000 Olympics, and the United States actively lobbied against China in
the IOC. Several Chinese authors in the sample mentioned this case, and all of
them expressed resentment against the United States’ obstruction. The United
States’ opposition to Beijing holding the 2000 Olympics, along with linking
MFN to human rights, the Yinhe incident, increased arms sale to Taiwan, the
56 Chapter 3
U.S. Media
China’s perception of United States media in the 1990s, as presented in the
sample, was more negative than positive. In the sample, Chinese authors bit-
terly complained about United States media and their role in China-U.S. rela-
tions. They argued that United States media were among the major culprits
in changing United States public opinion from idealizing China in the 1980s
to demonizing it in the 1990s. They complained that United States media
propagated the threat of China’s rise, opposed improvements in China-U.S.
relations, and advocated a tougher policy toward China.61 Chinese observers’
resentment toward American media was the result of their perception that
American media had both helped create and succumbed to the fashion of
China bashing, and they were reluctant to tell the truth about China to the
public, either distorting facts about China or focusing only on negative
aspects in China. They largely closed their eye to the profound changes in
China in recent decades.62 One author cited Owen Harris’ article approvingly
to the effect that the United States should recognize that individual freedom
in China had been greatly improved . . . “If we look back over the past 150
years, the last two decades have undoubtedly been the best years for China
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 57
and the Chinese people.” Occasionally, Chinese authors perceived “an atmo-
sphere in United States media that led American scholars who saw China
more comprehensively and more fairly to keep quiet and hesitate in uttering
their genuine opinion about China,” for fear of suffering dearly in their per-
sonal career.63
Chinese authors argued that it was difficult for the American people to
acquire sufficient independent information about China. The little they knew
about the country came mainly from the media and they were, therefore,
easily influenced by the media. As the media were seen as generally biased
against China, antipathy toward China spread among a significant portion
of the American public and China’s image was seriously tarnished. They
believed that the American people were friendly to the Chinese people, but
the media’s propaganda did arouse suspicion in them concerning China.64
Chinese authors argued that negative reports of China in American media
outlets affected the United States’ China policy and China’s interest was hurt
as a result of such reports. Chinese observers said that was true because the
media framed Americans’ thinking about China, “making it difficult for them
to treat some of China’s basic interest and basic national conditions reason-
ably.” The media’s negative reports “make the American people challenge
the United States’ China policy and challenge China’s core interests.”65
Chinese authors recognized that the United States had become the sole super-
power after the end of the Cold War. The fundamental goal of the United
States’ global strategy was perceived as maintaining and strengthening the
unipolar structure of the world, to lead the whole world, and to achieve world
hegemony. According to one observer, the United States “wants to be both
the world’s judge and policeman,” and “to pursue the leading position in the
world in both ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects.” Chinese observers said that
in order to maintain its sole superpower status, the United States intended to
prevent the emergence of any force in either Europe or Asia that would be
able to challenge the United States’ hegemony. Around the turn of the 1990s,
Washington was said to regard Japan and/or Germany as developing the
capability to challenge the United States. In the late 1990s, Washington was
said to regard China and Russia as potential challengers. The United States’
Eurasian strategy was described as “pressing from both East and West wings
toward the middle, trying to integrate the EU and Japan, another two potential
polar powers, into the United States’ unipolar hegemonic system, pressuring
and containing Russia and China, controlling the vast central regions such as
58 Chapter 3
the Middle East, the Central Asia, and the Balkans, which were strategically
important and rich in resources, so as to realize the ‘American dream’ of
dominating the world.”66
The potential actors promoting multi-polarity of the world were said to
include Russia, China, Europe, and Japan. Quite a number of Chinese schol-
ars did not accept the United States as the leader of the world, regarding its
leadership status to be self-proclaimed. One especially poignant comment put
it this way: “Though the United States was the undisputed leader in North
America, however, in Europe and Asia, it was not a natural leader, but rather
a guest insisting upon being a master.” Another author regarded the United
States’ hegemonic ambition in the world as originating from the key feature
of capitalism: monopoly, i.e., “to weaken others in order to enjoy an advan-
tageous position alone.” Chinese observers noticed that the United States
perceived China as one of the obstacles to American hegemony in the world
and in the Asia-Pacific region.67
China was described by Chinese observers as not entirely satisfied with the
current international order, and as wishing to have an international order in
which nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs could be accepted
as a basic principle, and a nation’s sovereignty could be more fully respected.
China was said to be concerned that in a unipolar world the hegemonic
power would use excuses such as humanitarianism to practice the law of the
jungle.68
Chinese scholars expected that the world in the 1990s and the follow-
ing two or three decades would be in the process of a struggle between the
United States trying to establish world hegemony and other major powers
such as China, Russia, France, and developing countries trying to promote
a multi-polar world. Russia and China were described as two active mem-
bers of the current group opposing a unipolar world order and as advocating
multi-polarity, because these two countries were said to be “under the most
intense pressure of hegemonism.” That was why Chinese observers said they
opposed hegemonism and “advocate a more ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ world
order.” To Chinese authors, a unipolar world order threatened China’s inter-
ests, because the unipolar power tended to disregard national borders and
had an inclination to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs.69
Militarily, China “wishes to negotiate with the United States concerning
non-use of force between the two countries, especially the non-first use of
nuclear weapons.” Chinese authors complained that “because of the United
States’ pursuit of interventionism and military hegemony, and because of the
Taiwan factor, the United States has no interest in talking about non-use of
force with China.” China was said to oppose the United States’ use of force in
international relations not only because of moral principles, but also because
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 59
the United States “in the past has used force or threat of force against China
and intervened in China’s internal affairs.” Chinese authors were concerned
that “the United States may do so again in future.”70
Chinese authors also perceived cultural pressure from the West, especially
from the United States. They regarded the conflict between the United States
and China centering on peaceful evolution and human rights as one between
Table 3.5 Major Differences between the United States and China Regarding World
Order (Chinese Conception)
Notes
1. Including the names of leaders in either country and, in the case of China,
including Taiwan and Hong Kong. Phrases like “our country” in a title are regarded
as referring to China.
2. Donald E. Nuechterlein: America Recommitted: United States National Inter-
ests in a Restructured World, University Press of Kentucky, 1991, p. 19.
3. Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo de dui Hua
Zhengce” [“Cold War Thinking” and the United States’ Post Cold War China Policy],
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1996), p. 23.
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 61
Guanxi (July 1998), p. 6; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji Baquan
Zhanlue yu Zhongguo Guojia Anquan” [The United States’ Hegemonic Strategy in
the New Century and China’s National Security], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February
2000), p. 54; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli Zhong Mei Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban
Guanxi” [Actively Promote the China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (May 1998), p. 5.
14. Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Ganshe Taiwan
Wenti Zhanlue Celue Pingxi” [Comments and Analyses of the United States’ Strat-
egy and Tactics in Its Post Cold War Intervention of Taiwan Problem], Shijie Jingji
yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 38–42; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli,” p. 5; Guo Zhe-
nyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 26; Zhuang Qubing, “Tuijian Yiben Haoshu: Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti Duhou” [Recommending a Good Book: Reading
the United States’ China Policy and the Taiwan Problem], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao
(Spring 1999), p. 45.
15. Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” pp. 39–41; Guo
Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 28; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 21; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli,” p. 5.
16. Guo Zhenyuan, “Meiguo dui Taiwan,” p. 27; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun
Zhengfu,” pp. 4–5; Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The
MFN and China-U.S. Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1994), p. 6; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Sino-U.S. Relationship Since
President Clinton Took Office], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1998), pp. 97–99; Gao E,
“Zhong Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi,” p. 75; Ding Shichuan and Wei Hongzhou, “Leng-
zhan hou Meiguo,” pp. 39–40; Chu Shulong, “Jiji Tuijin Jianli Zhong Mei Jianshexing
Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi” [Actively Promote the China-U.S. Constructive Strategic
Partnership], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (May 2000), p. 13.
17. Cao Fumiao, “Cong Nanbei Zhanzheng Shiqi Mei Ying Guanxi Kan Jinri
Taiwan Wenti” [Perceiving Today’s Taiwan Problem from the U.S.-British Relation-
ship During the United States’ Civil War], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1999),
p. 33; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” p. 23; Niu Jun,
“Duoshizhiqiu: Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xianzhuang ji Qianjing” [Troubled Times:
Present and Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p.
133; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi” [China-U.S. Cooperation and Dif-
ferences], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998), p. 5.
18. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti he Zhong Mei Guanxi: BianHua yu Tiaozhan”
[Human Rights Problem and China-U.S. Relations: Changes and Challenges], Shi-
jie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), p. 22; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi:
Kelindun Zhengfu de dui Hua Zhengce Pouxi” [Engagement Plus Containment],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), pp. 13–14; Zhang Linjun and Lu Qichang, “Leng-
zhanhou Meiguo Guohui dui Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xiaoji Yingxiang” [The Negative
Influence of the U.S. Congress on China-U.S. Relations in the Post–Cold War Era],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1996), p. 15.
19. Sheng Jiru, “Zhong Mei Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi jiang Zaofu
yu Zhong Mei Liangguo Renmin: San Lun 21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-
U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership Will Benefit the Two Peoples in China and
Chinese Perceptions of Threat from the United States 63
the United States], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 27; Xi Laiwang, “Jiji
Tuijin Jianli,” p. 6; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 13–14.
20. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 13–14; Chu Shulong, “Zhong
Mei Hezuo,” pp. 5–6; Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” p. 12.
21. Zhang Linjun and Lu Qichang, “Lengzhanhou Meiguo,” p. 15; Wu Xianbin,
“Lun Meiguo dui Xianggang de Zhengce” [On the United States’ Policy toward
Hong Kong], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 115; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng,” p. 101.
22. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 14.
23. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi Guanxi de Lishi Yanbian Wenti he Qianjing”
[The Evolution, Problems, and Prospects of China-U.S. Military Relations], Zhan-
lue yu Guanli (September/October 1997), p. 106; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong,
“Meiguo Xinshiji,” p. 57; Zhang Linhong and Han Yugui, “Meiguo Yatai Anquan
Zhanlue yu Mei dui Ri dui Hua Guanxi” [The United States’ Asian-Pacific Security
Strategy and the United States’ Policies Toward Japan and China], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (March 1999), p. 10; Li Changjiu, “Bu Pingheng de Zhong Mei Ri Sanjiao
Guanxi” [Unequal Triangular Relations Among China, the U.S., and Japan], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1998), p. 47.
24. Wang Chimin, “Shi Xi Wo Guo Zhoubian Huanjing zhong de ‘Meiguo Yinsu’”
[A Tentative Analysis of the U.S. Factor in our Country’s Surrounding Environment],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1994), p. 57.
25. Chu Shulong, “Meiguo Anquan Zhanlue de Xinfazhan ji qi Zhongguo Yinsu”
[New Developments in the United States’ Security Strategy and the China Factor],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1995), p. 59.
26. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” pp. 108–109; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo
‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun” [On the United States’ “Comprehensive Contain-
ment of China”], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (November 1996), p. 10; Xia Liping, “Xin-
shiji Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The United States’ Global
Strategy and China-U.S. Relations in the New Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Octo-
ber 2000), p. 25; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de Zhong Mei E Guanxi” [China-U.S.-
Russia Relations Around the Turn of the Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December
2000), p. 5.
27. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei,” pp. 9–10; Wang Haihan, “Lun
Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 7; Wu Jiong, “Ping Meiguo ‘Quanmian Ezhi Zhongguo’ Lun,”
pp. 9, 11; Xi Laiwang, “1995 nian Zhong Mei Guanxi Huigu yu Zhanwang” [A
Review of China-U.S. Relations in 1995 and the Future Prospects], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (December 1995), p. 8.
28. Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 12–13.
29. Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua,” p. 6.
30. Shi Ren, “Shiji zhi jiao Mei Ou Ri de Duiwai Zhanlue yu dui Hua Zhengce
Zouxiang” [The Foreign Strategy of the United States, Europe, and Japan Around
the Turn of the Century and the Trend of Their China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(March 1998), p. 2; Lu Zhongwei, “Zhong Mei Zhong Ri Shounao Hufang ji Zhong
Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi” [China-U.S., China-Japan Summits and China-U.S.-Japan
Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1997), p. 11; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu
64 Chapter 3
55. Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Zhengque Suoxiang”
[The Correct Way for Developing Sino-U.S. Economic Ties], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring
1994), p. 10; Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo Daiyu,” pp. 67–68.
56. Li Jiang, “Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi yu dui Hua Zhengce Bianlun” [Domestic
Politics in the United States and Debates Regarding the United States’ China Policy],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 26; Xi Laiwang, “1995 Nian Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 9.
57. Chen Xiangyang, “Cong Guoji Zhidu Jiaodu Kan Lengzhan hou de Zhongmei
Guanxi” [The Post Cold War China-U.S. Relationship from the Perspective of Inter-
national Institutions], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 2000), p. 55; Zhao Yongq-
ing, “Dangqian Shijie Jingji,” p. 26; Yu Zhida, “Zhong Mei Nongchanpin Maoyi de
Dongzhiwu Jianyi Zhengduan” [China-U.S. Disputes over Animal and Plant Inspec-
tion in Agricultural Trade], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (September 1996), pp. 26, 29; Xi
Laiwang, “1995 Nian Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 9; Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji Xingshi
ji dui Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Economic Situations in the United
States and the Impact on China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (April 1999), p. 18.
58. Zhang Ruizhuang, “Ye Tan Meiguo Xin Baoshou Zhuyi,” pp. 46–47.
59. Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 2; Niu Jun, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,”
p. 10; Lu Naideng, “Shi Shu Zhong Mei E,” p. 28.
60. Nai Zuji, “Kelindun Zhengfu Dier Renqi dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng”
[The Second Clinton Administration’s Adjustment in Its China Policy], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (August 1997), p. 13; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Guanxi Zonglun,” p. 21.
61. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 19; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu
Lengzhan hou Meiguo,” p. 21; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi ‘Jiaowang’: Ping Lengzhan
hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Containment or Engagement: On the United States’
China Policy in the Post Cold War Era], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1996), p. 1; Zhao
Yongqing, “Dangqian Shijie Jingji,” p. 27.
62. Zhang Zhongyi, “Yingxiang Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Jizhong Zhuyao
Liliang” [Several Major Forces Affecting the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (January 1997), p. 14; Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo “Rushi” dui Zhong
Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Impact of China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-
U.S. Relationship], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 2000), p. 10; Jia Qingguo,
“Kelindun Zhizheng,” p. 100; Niu Jun, “Duoshizhiqiu,” p. 134; Liang Gencheng,
“Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” p. 13; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo Chuanmei yu Meiguo de
dui Hua Zhengce” [U.S. Media and the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (July 1998), p. 39; Shi Yinghong, “Xifang dui Feixifang: Dangjin Meiguo dui
Hua Taidu de Genben Yuanyin” [West vs. non-West: The Fundamental Root of the
United States’ Current Attitude toward China], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1996),
p. 8; Wang Haihan, “Lun Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 8.
63. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 23; Shi Yinghong, “Xifang dui Feixifang,”
p. 8; Shi Yinghong, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Jiben Guonei Beijing” [The Basic
Domestic Backgrounds of the United States’ China Policy], Zhanlue yu Guanli
(November/December 1996), p. 35.
68 Chapter 3
64. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 16; Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xin-
shiji,” p. 5.
65. Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo ‘Rushi,’” p. 10.
66. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 22; Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 22; Zhao Jingfang, “Meiguo dui Hua ‘Jiechu’ Zhengce de Mubiao Fenxi”
[An Analysis of the Objectives of the United States’ “Engagement” Policy toward
China], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1999), p. 13; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de ‘dui
Hua Jiechu,’” p. 38; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,” p. 54.
67. Jiang Lingfei, “Meiguo dui Hua Ezhi Zhanlue de Zhiyue Yinsu he Keneng
Zouxiang” [The Constraining Factors in the United States’ Containing China Strat-
egy and Possible Future Trends], Zhanlue yu Guanli (September/October 1996),
pp. 46–50; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi,” pp. 15–16; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan
hou de Zhong Mei,” pp. 32–33;
68. Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” p. 93.
69. Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,” pp. 55–56; Zheng
Baoguo, “Lengzhan hou de Meiguo,” p. 33.
70. Liu Jingsong, “Zhong Mei Junshi,” p. 111; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui
Guoji Zhanlue Wenti de Kanfa Lichang he Zhuzhang” [The Opinions, Positions, and
Advocacies by China and the United States Regarding International Strategy], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), p. 52
71. Zhu Feng, “Renquan Wenti,” p. 22; Chen Zhuhua, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanjiao
Jiegou zhong de Wen Hua Yinsu” [Cultural Factors in the Triangular Relationship
Among China, United States, and Japan], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May 1999), pp.
53–56.
72. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo,” pp. 4–5; Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui
Guoji Zhanlue,” pp. 48–50; Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xinshiji,”
pp. 53–57; Yuan Peng, “Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi Xingzhi Chuyi” [A Tentative
Comment on the Nature of Current China-U.S. Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(September 2000), pp. 3–4; Fu Mengzi, “Mianxiang Xinshiji,” pp. 92–93.
Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
Table 4.1 demonstrates the number of articles in the sample in which a per-
ception of opportunity from the United States has been mentioned.
From Table 4.1, just as in Chapter 3 on the perception of threat, we can
see that an overwhelming majority of articles in the sample perceived more
or less an opportunity from the United States. Consistent with the research
in Chapter 3, opportunity in this chapter is defined as anything the United
States did to China which elicited positive comments from Chinese authors,
either approval or appreciation. Again, this definition is not academically
satisfactory, but is used just to serve the purpose of research in this chapter.
According to Richard Herrmann, perception of opportunity in international
69
70 Chapter 4
Table 4.1 Number of Articles Having Expressed a Perception of Opportunity from the
United States
strategic importance to the United States, not only by their own arguments,
but also by citing speeches of American politicians or scholars. As they did
so approvingly, I in the following will treat such instances also as revelation
of Chinese scholars’ own perceptions.
China is a big country, a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
and a nuclear power. It had important influence in the Asia-Pacific region and
among developing countries. Consequently, China was strategically impor-
tant to the United States and the United States needed China’s cooperation to
deal with various international problems. Harry Harding pointed out that in
many international problems, China could either make things worse or bet-
ter for the United States. Former president Bush said that China could easily
influence stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which would affect the peace
and prosperity of the world.2 Typically, Chinese authors perceived China’s
strategic importance to the United States in the following international
hotspots or problem areas.
A. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan problem, the
Cambodia problem, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Central
Asia.3
B. Maintaining balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, restraining Japan,
and balancing Russia. In the case of Japan, one Chinese author explained
that the United States wanted to “use Japan to restrain China and at the
same time use China to balance Japan.”4
C. The Middle East, especially during the Gulf War in the early 1990s.5
D. Nuclear proliferation in general, the North Korean nuclear program, mis-
sile control, the nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran, etc.6
E. Transnational problems such as environmental protection, drug trafficking,
international terrorism, illegal immigrants, and international crime.7
F. China’s support in the UN Security Council.8
Chinese authors pointed out that “whether the United States’ Asia-Pacific
strategy would be successful or not, to quite some extent depended on the state
of China-U.S. relations.” Since the United States regarded problems such as
those listed above as major threats to the United States in the post–Cold War
era, and China was considered capable of playing a major role in contributing
to the solution of many of the above problems, Chinese authors considered
their country as strategically important to the United States. But from a nar-
row security perspective, one Chinese author did agree with Robert Ross that
there was an asymmetry between the United States and China because the
United States did not depend on cooperation with China for its fundamental
interest and the guarantee of its national security. Another Chinese author
also pointed out that endeavors like controlling international crime “do not
72 Chapter 4
enjoy strategic status.” But on the other hand, things may change unexpect-
edly; anti-terrorism which was regarded in 1997 as not enjoying strategic
status, in 2001 became the first priority in the United States’ national security,
because “the United States has a far broader concept of national security than
any other country.”9
Chinese authors argued that China’s strategic importance to the United
States is more pronounced if viewed from a long-term perspective. China and
the United States have already engaged in substantial cooperation regarding
things important to the United States.10 In the following, I will briefly discuss
U.S.-China cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation and anti-terrorism.
Chinese authors were without exception quite optimistic about the future
prospect of China-U.S. economic relations, and were confident that bilateral
economic relations in the future would provide many more jobs for Ameri-
cans. As early as in 1994, one author cited President Clinton approvingly
as stating that in the 21st century, China would become the most important
emerging market in the world, and therefore would be more important to the
U.S. economy. One author mentioned in 1997 that “in the remaining years
of the 20th century, China’s cumulative imports would reach 1 trillion U.S.
dollars, which undoubtedly would provide the United States an opportunity
to expand exports, create jobs, and speed up its economic growth.” For one
instance, to meet China’s demand for nuclear power plants, according to the
American Nuclear Society, in the next 25 years “American suppliers can
export to China annually $1.6 billion in technology and equipments. These
exports can guarantee 25,000 high tech jobs” for the United States.16
One article analyzed in detail the benefits to the United States of trading
with China. The author argued that inexpensive Chinese products entering the
American market had the following benefits to the United States.
dicted in 1995 that “without imports from China, the United States’ annual
inflation rate would increase by at least 0.15 percent.”18
3. Chinese imports helped increase U.S. saving and in turn promote U.S.
investment. The U.S. savings rate had been very low, about 5 percent, total-
ing 212.6 billion U.S. dollars in 1992. The author assumed that American
consumers saved all the money because of the reduced cost of buying
Chinese products. It meant that about 7.5 percent of U.S. savings in 1992
came from China’s imports.19
Over the years, China has become an increasingly important trade partner
for the United States. In 1995, China was already the United States’ sixth
largest trade partner. In 1997, China became the fourth largest trade partner
for the United States, behind Canada, Japan, and Mexico. In 2000, China
remained fourth and the volume of the bilateral trade kept increasing. One
author mentioned that “if China increases the number of telephones from 2
among every 100 Chinese to 40, the size of China’s telecommunication mar-
ket would be the sum total of the United States’ market in the last 100 years.”
He added, somewhat resentfully, that if the United States was unfriendly to
China, China would give parts of this market to its competitors.20
OPPORTUNITY TO CHINA
least normal state-to-state relations with the United States. It of course will be
better if the two countries can develop their friendly cooperation.”22
Virtually all Chinese scholars in the sample shared the same opinion.
Though Chinese authors had different opinions as to whether the United
States actually practiced engagement or containment toward China, all of
them prefered engagement to containment. One author argued that the United
States’ engagement policy had positive implications since “it leaves more
room for the development of China-U.S. relations.”23 Another mentioned that
China’s modernization depended on integration with the international com-
munity, and the Chinese government had realized that China should “shift
from a challenger to cooperator” in its relations with the current international
regimes.24 The United States’ engagement policy aimed at integrating China
into the international community therefore was welcome.
Engagement was the mainstream preference in the United States. Chinese
scholars were aware of two schools in the United States regarding its China
policy, the engagement school and the containment school. The two schools
had been locked in intense debates for an extended period until finally, around
1996–1997, after the relaxation of the Taiwan Straits crisis in March 1996,
perhaps with Clinton-Jiang Seattle summit as the landmark, the engagement
school emerged victorious and became, in Chinese eyes, the dominant school
in the United States’ China policy decision making.
The following, according to Chinese scholars, were manifestations that
engagement had become the dominant school: frequent speeches by U.S.
decision makers advocating engagement, the United States’ actual policy of
engagement toward China, major decision makers in the Clinton administra-
tion supporting engagement, and the support of most former U.S. presidents,
former cabinet ministers, etc. Chinese authors believed that engagement had
won not only the support of the Democrats, who controlled the White House,
but also the support of the Republicans, who controlled Congress. They were
pleased that as the 1990s progressed, China MFN, and later PNTR, won more
and more support in the United States, especially in Congress. They pointed
out that engagement was also the dominant school in U.S. academia and
among American opinion leaders.
As Chinese authors believed that the engagement policy was guided by
realism, and as engagement had become the mainstream position in the
United States, they argued that this position would not easily change. No mat-
ter who is elected in the future, engagement would survive the United States’
presidential elections. It was so in 1996, and again in 2000.25
For Campaign 2000, if Gore was elected, Chinese scholars had confidence
that he would carry on Clinton’s engagement policy with China. Though
Bush in his presidential campaign used “competitor” to describe China,
78 Chapter 4
Chinese authors still argued against excessive pessimism. One author claimed
that even though “Bush is not friendly toward China during his campaign, he
definitely is not hostile to China either.” Besides, even during his campaign
Bush was positive on some of the most important indicators of engagement,
such as supporting China’s membership in the WTO, supporting China
PNTR, and regarding it important to maintain the engagement policy toward
China. Chinese scholars perceived George W. Bush’s hard-line position
toward China during the presidential campaign as more serving his campaign
needs than serving the United States’ interest, and they therefore predicted
that after he assumed office in the White House, Bush would return to the
basic framework of the late 1990s’ China policy.26
A lot of Chinese authors largely agreed that the United States had a benign
intention in its China policy. They were pleased with the United States’
announcement that a stable, open, and successful China conformed to the
United States’ national interest,27 that the United States wished to maintain
friendly relations with a powerful, stable, prosperous and open China,28 and
that it was “more beneficial to the United States for China to succeed in
its reform than to fail.”29 They cited approvingly the speeches of President
Clinton and other senior U.S. officials, such as James Sasser, that an isolated
China was unfavorable to the United States and a China which played an
appropriate role in the world was good for the United States.30 Though some
scholars pointed out that U.S.-China relations would improve only when
China was weak, a lot of Chinese scholars insisted that it was the growth
of the Chinese economy and comprehensive national power that helped the
United States to adopt an engagement policy.31
Complementarity
In talking about China-U.S. economic relations, Chinese authors often men-
tioned the strong structural complementarities between the two countries’
economies. They argued that the two countries had comparative advantages
in different areas, and economic cooperation would greatly benefit both of
them. Chinese authors often summarized the extensive complementarities
between the two countries by saying that the United States was the larg-
est developed country in the world while China was the largest developing
country, and there was therefore a great potential for economic and trade
cooperation between them. Because of the strong complementarities, some
scholars suggested that China in fact was one of the most ideal partners for
the United States.
According to Chinese scholars, the United States’ comparative advantages
were its capital, technology, and management skills, but labor costs in the
United States were too high. China’s comparative advantages were its cheap
and high-quality labor, and its natural resources, but China was short on capi-
tal and advanced technology. Both the United States and China had a huge
market, but as the two markets were vastly different, they might still comple-
ment each other. The U.S. market was considered highly important to China,
and the Chinese market was considered very important to the United States.
Different from the United States’ economic relations with Europe and
Japan, China-U.S. economic interactions were being conducted on two dif-
ferent levels, and there were therefore “only complementarities and basi-
cally no competition between the two economies.” The United States had
high-tech products, while China was a huge market for high-tech products.
For instance, transportation, energy, communications, etc. were the United
States’ comparative advantage while China’s huge market for infrastruc-
tural construction was China’s comparative advantage. China’s imports of
high-tech products from the United States contributed greatly to “the United
States’ structural adjustment and to the maintenance of the United States’
competitiveness in the high-tech area.” China had a large quantity of inex-
pensive consumer products, and the United States had a huge market for such
products. For instance, China made low-tech products such as “toys, shoes,
and electronic products, which the United States almost no longer produces,”
and the United States had a huge market for such products. Around early
1995, “over 40 percent of toys in the U.S. market were made in China, total-
ing about 4.7 billion U.S. dollars.”34
Chinese authors were pleased that the increased economic interactions
between the two countries had deepened their complementarities and
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 81
Investment
Investments from the United States were considered very helpful to China’s
modernization. In order to attract foreign investments, the Chinese govern-
ment tried hard to improve the investment environment. When China made
big concessions to the United States concerning intellectual property rights
protection, Chinese scholars justified the concessions by arguing that it
helped to attract more foreign investments.37
Since 1992, direct U.S. investments in China had kept increasing, often
by leaps and bounds. Around the end of 1992, “some 1,000 U.S. companies
made investments in China totaling over 4 billion U.S. dollars.” Around the
end of 1993, in the city of Shanghai alone, “there were over 80 transnational
companies from the United States.” By the end of 1994, U.S. investment
in China reached over 16,000 projects, “with the cumulative investment of
7 billion U.S. dollars.” Around 1995, the United States had “over 8,500
investment projects in China totaling over 10 billion U.S. dollars.” And in
1996, some 50–100 out of the 500 largest U.S. businesses had made invest-
ments in China. “By the end of 1996, real U.S. investments in China had
reached 14.3 billion U.S. dollars.”38
Chinese scholars generally agreed that the United States was one of the
largest investors in China. By the end of 1994, the United States was con-
sidered the third largest investor in the Chinese mainland, behind only Hong
Kong and Taiwan. By the end of 1996, the United States was second in
82 Chapter 4
foreign investment in China. By 1998, the United States had become the big-
gest foreign investor in China. And in early 2000, the United States remained
the largest foreign investor in China.
Besides investments in the Chinese mainland, the United States also had
large investments in Hong Kong. In the early 1990s, “U.S. investments
in Hong Kong were around 7 billion U.S. dollars, and most investments
were relevant with China trade.” “By the end of 1996, U.S. investments in
Hong Kong reached over 14 billion, employing 250,000 Hong Kong people,
accounting for one-tenth of the Hong Kong labor force.” In the late 1990s
around 37,000 Americans lived in Hong Kong.39
Besides their large amount and rapid development, U.S. investments in
China were also notable for some other features. They “cover broad sectors
and are high in technology.” In the beginning, they concentrated mainly in
big cities and coastal areas, but in 1992 they began to spread out to areas all
over China, and from service industry to manufacturing industry. The biggest
U.S. companies cover “26 sectors such as agriculture, light industry, food,
textile machinery electronics,” etc.40
U.S. businesses had been described as having high confidence in the Chi-
nese market, and were especially active in making investments in China. In
1994–1995, Chinese scholars cited the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s investi-
gation of 1,069 big companies to the effect that “63 percent of those that had
not yet made investments in China intend to take action in the next five years,
and 89 percent of those having already made investments in China intended to
enlarge production and reinvestment in the next five years.” American inves-
tors were especially interested in investments in China’s infrastructure such as
“electricity, telecommunication system, ports, railway, airport, etc.”41
The U.S. government sometimes had been described as playing a positive
role in promoting American investments in China. For several years, the
United States’ Department of Commerce “listed China as No. 1 among the
ten emerging markets in the world,” and wished that American companies
“can be a winner in the competition for China’s market.” The importance of
the Chinese market to the United States was occasionally described as affect-
ing to a large extent whether U.S. economy would be successful.42
Even though the United States was considered one of the largest investors
in China, quite a few Chinese scholars complained that U.S. investments
in China were still too little, and the increase too slow, because the United
States’ actual investments in China were considered by far incompatible with
its huge investment capability. During the 1979–1992 period, “big U.S. trans-
national companies’ investments in China accounted for less than 1 percent
of their overall overseas investments in 1992.”43 In 1992, direct investments
in China by the U.S. manufacturing industry accounted for only 0.14 percent
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 83
of its overall foreign direct investment. This figure rose very slowly in 1995
to 0.4 percent, and in 1996 to 0.55 percent.
Chinese scholars typically described China as an attractive locus for for-
eign investments. They pointed out that 64 percent of British transnational
companies intended to make or to increase investments in China, 80 percent
of Japanese investors regarded their investments in China as successful, and
almost all U.S. businesses regarded China as an ideal locus of investment.
They claimed that making investments in China was more profitable than
elsewhere. Important reasons why China was a good place for investment
included the following: its high GDP growth rate, high foreign trade growth
rate, and its huge market with over 1.2 billion consumers, in addition to low
labor costs and preferential treatment for foreign businesses. China’s invest-
ment in infrastructure, 1,000 billion U.S. dollars in 1998–2000, was consid-
ered highly attractive to Europe and the United States. With the continued
development of China’s economy, the passage of China PNTR, China’s entry
into the WTO, and China’s efforts to protect intellectual property rights,
Chinese authors were quite optimistic that China in future would provide an
even bigger and better market for investments from the United States and
other countries.44
Trade
All Chinese observers agreed that the United States was one of China’s major
trading partners. When Hong Kong was considered as an external economic
entity, especially before its return to China in July 1997, the United States
was often considered as either the second or the third most important trad-
ing partner to China. As Hong Kong was a part of China though enjoying a
special status, the United States therefore was usually either the first or the
second trading partner to China. All Chinese scholars agreed that China-U.S.
trade had developed rapidly. According to Chinese statistics, “in the 1990–
1997 period, the average annual China-U.S. trade growth rate had been 22.6
percent, surpassing the annual growth rate of 15.9 percent, which had been
China’s overall foreign trade growth rate. According to U.S. statistics, in the
1990s, the average annual U.S.-China trade growth rate was 16 percent, sur-
passing the United States’ annual trade growth rate with Asia of 11 percent,
and its annual growth rate of 7 percent in its trade with other regions in the
world.” Other scholars reported different growth rates for different years dur-
ing the 1990s, but all data were impressive, with the highest annual growth
rate being 28 percent, and the lowest over 16 percent.45
In terms of the absolute amount, in 1979, bilateral trade was a measly
2.45 billion U.S. dollars. As late as in 1990, China-U.S. trade was still quite
84 Chapter 4
Technology
Many Chinese authors mentioned that technology was an important area of
cooperation between the United States and China. As a developing country
trying to improve the economic well-being of its people, China was very
much interested in science and technology from the West, especially from
the United States. The United States was perceived as representing the pin-
nacle of human achievements in science and technology, and one Chinese
author argued that “for this reason alone, China should try to reach a his-
torical reconciliation with the United States.”47 One reason why China was
particularly interested in U.S. investments was that they were generally high
in technology.
Chinese authors deplored the U.S. government’s imposition of severe
restrictions on technology exports to China. They argued that restrictions
of this kind not only hurt China’s interests, but also the United States’. One
way it hurt the United States was that it weakened its competitiveness in
technology trade and enlarged its deficit with China. In 1998, for instance,
the United States exported only $8.9 billion of electronic products to China,
much less than Japan ($15.1 billion) and the EU ($14.8 billion), though Japan
and the EU were less competitive than the United States in this area. One
Chinese author argued that “if the United States increases the proportion of
technology exports to China to the normal ratio of such products in its overall
exports, the United States not only could make significant profit from such
trade, but it could also greatly reduce the deficit in the China-U.S. bilateral
trade.” American business circles were said by Chinese authors to realize
the negative effects of the United States’ over-sensitivity in technology trade
with China and complain about it. One technology transfer association in the
United States exclaimed that Congress’s investigation centering on the Cox
Report would bring disastrous consequences for U.S. exporters. As China
was one of the largest importers of technology, U.S.-China cooperation in
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 85
technology would not only fulfill China’s needs for modernization but it
would also serve the United States’ interest. In the case of technology trade,
for instance, “the United States currently has about 100 nuclear reactors
generating about 19 percent of its electricity, and it has no more plans for
additional nuclear stations,” but China intended to greatly increase its nuclear
electricity capacity. It meant that in the next 25 years, “U.S. exports to China
in commercial technology and relevant equipment will potentially reach 50 to
60 billion U.S. dollars . . . The U.S. (nuclear technology) suppliers can annu-
ally export to China 1.6 billion dollars, which alone, will provide 25,000 high
tech jobs for the United States.” In technology cooperation, China sometimes
could be the provider. Cooperation in satellite launching was a case in point.
“Launching one pound in the United States would cost 10,000 to 12,000 U.S.
dollars, while China charged only 4,000 to 5,000 U.S. dollars.” According
to one estimate, “in the next ten years, the United States will launch 1,200
commercial satellites, but the United States’ launching capability cannot meet
the need. Therefore, China-U.S. cooperation in this area alone will bring rich
benefits to both countries.”48
In spite of the United States’ restrictions, there still had been some coop-
eration in this area, and the U.S. government sometimes slightly relaxed its
restrictions on high-technology cooperation with China. As China-U.S. tech-
nology exchanges and cooperation conformed to the fundamental interests of
the two countries and the two peoples, some Chinese authors were optimistic
about the prospects for greater bilateral cooperation in this area.
steady progress toward agreement. In November 15, 1999, the two countries
finally made a landmark breakthrough and reached a final agreement. In spite
of the abundance of their complaints during the negotiations, Chinese authors
again regarded the final agreement as a win-win solution for both countries.
They expected that China’s membership in the WTO would stimulate China’s
economic development.
After China made big concessions to the United States, the United States
agreed to grant China the PNTR. Chinese authors appreciated the fact that the
executive branch of the U.S. government strongly supported China’s PNTR
status. They noticed that even George W. Bush, who was perceived as less
friendly to China during his presidential campaign, supported it.
In the U.S. Congress, the China PNTR bill was passed by a wide margin
first by the House (237 to 197) and then by the Senate (83 to 15). The govern-
ments of both the United States and China welcomed the passage, regarding it
as consolidating U.S.-China relations. Chinese authors generally regarded this
passage as capable of comprehensively improving the bilateral relations.
believed that world peace was beneficial to both the United States and China.
Both countries had made commitments to world peace and stability. Main-
taining world and regional peace and stability was therefore perceived as
one important common interest between the two countries. Some Chinese
scholars identified maintaining world peace as the biggest common interest
between the United States and China. In this respect, Chinese scholars per-
ceived a great potential for cooperation between the two countries.
They argued that favorable bilateral relations between the United States
and China were good for the world, since their peaceful coexistence was
a prerequisite for world peace. World peace and security therefore were
perceived as an important new foundation stone of bilateral relations. The
reasons why good relations between the two countries were important to the
world were that both countries were permanent members of UN Security
Council, and both were big countries with great influence in world affairs.
Consequently, Chinese scholars perceived not only common interests for the
two countries in maintaining peace and stability in the world and the region,
but also an obligation for the two countries to do so. One of the most forceful
arguments ran like this: “China and the United States as permanent members
of the UN Security Council and two big countries in the world, in quite a
few international issues they shoulder responsibility and play an important
role. For peace and development in the world, China and the United States
have the opportunity, conditions, responsibility, and obligation to engage in
dialogue and consultation regarding a lot of international issues.”53
According to Chinese scholars, in order to maintain world peace and stabil-
ity, the United States and China already had shown serious co-operation, for
instance, about the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the South Asia nuclear
crisis. The constructive strategic partnership facing the 21st century between
the United States under the Clinton administration and China under Jiang
Zemin was a serious attempt by the two countries to manage their bilateral
relations in the interest of maintaining peace and stability in the world.54
accepted that the United States played a very important role in promoting
peace, stability, and prosperity in the world. They pointed out, with approval
bordering on admiration, that “it was the United States that played a leading
role in defeating the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in bringing Israel/Palestine
and Bosnia/Herzegovina to the negotiating table.” Even one of the staunch-
est nationalists in the sample, Chu Shulong, expressed appreciation for the
United States’ role in the Middle East peace process. They at the same time
had reservations regarding a unipolar world order because they were not
comfortable with the United States’ presumed monopoly of world affairs, its
“self-proclaimed role as the world policeman, its habit of using U.S. domestic
law as international law, and forcing other countries to submit to the United
States’ will.” They argued that the United States should do unto others what
the United States itself would like done unto it.55 But they also recognized
that “the United States is not like other dominant powers in history, since the
United States attaches extreme importance to regulations and procedure.”
Chinese authors appreciate that “the United States would rather try to co-opt
other countries by resorting to apparently universal values than pressure them
with brute force.”56
Though China opposed a unipolar world order, Chinese authors regarded
the difference between the United States and China in this regard “not as a
conflict or confrontation of the two countries’ national strategies but rather
as the differences between the United States and China in ideal, ideology,
hope, and principle.”57 They insisted that “China favors multipolarization
only in theory, but in practice, in its relations with the United States,” China
recognized the United States’ superpower status, and regarded China itself as
only one of several secondary powers.
As for the United States’ military presence in Asia, its military alliance
with Japan, and the TMD, again, one of the staunchest nationalists in the
sample, Chu Shulong, believed that China’s position would be more moderate
if the United States was “not targeting China and not trying to intervene in
China’s internal affairs, and violating China’s independence, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity.” He also explained that “China’s opposition to any power
stationing troops abroad does not mean that China would try hard to push the
United States out of Asia.”58 Another scholar proclaimed that “China has no
intention of challenging the United States’ global strategic interests, but the
United States should fully respect China’s strategic interests.” He suggested
that “China-U.S. relations should be based on mutual respect, mutual trust,
and mutual interest.”59 Yet another scholar revealed that “some people in Bei-
jing even recognize the positive aspect of the United States’ military presence
in Asia,”60 perhaps referring to the United States’ role in containing possible
Japanese militarism. Regarding security in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese
90 Chapter 4
authors argued that cooperation with the United States rather than confronta-
tion was a better way for China to play a greater role in this region.
One Chinese author expounded at length that China and the United States
should both accept and support international norms, and by doing so foster a
certain kind of collective identity, against threats facing normal states such as
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, “international crime, drug trafficking,
illegal immigration, international terrorism, and environmental pollution.”
According to this scholar, China in the 1990s had already tried hard to par-
ticipate in various kinds of international arrangements.61
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that Chinese scholars perceived both threat and
opportunity from the United States. One important question is whether the
United States presented more a threat or more an opportunity to China. Natu-
rally, different people respond to threat and opportunity differently. In the fol-
lowing I will present my position regarding this question from the perspective
of a Chinese person who has closely monitored U.S.-China relations.
National Security
In terms of China’s national security, let us first explore the extent of the
American threat to China. Chinese authors repeatedly argued that the most
serious problem between the United States and China was the Taiwan prob-
lem. We could therefore conclude that the most serious threat from the United
States, according to Chinese authors, was its role in frustrating China’s goals
with regard to Taiwan. Reunification with Taiwan under a one-country,
two-system formula (in which Taiwan would enjoy much greater autonomy
than Hong Kong, including military autonomy) could serve the following
purposes for China. First, it would improve China’s security environment,
ensuring that Taiwan would not be used as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”
against China. Second, it would satisfy China’s desire of ending its history
of national humiliation at the hands of foreign powers beginning in the mid-
19th century. On the other hand, Taiwan’s current status might also bring
tangible benefits to China, especially to the current Chinese government.
First, Taiwan’s current status contributed to China’s internal stability, as it
reinforced the Chinese government’s image as the representative of China’s
national interest (Interestingly, decades of U.S. efforts resulted in the percep-
tion by many Chinese in the late 1980s that the United States was more rep-
resentative of Chinese people’s interest than the Chinese government. Such
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 91
Chinese were concerned that the United States’ human rights offensive would
cause the country’s collapse just like the former USSR. The threat from
the United States during the first Clinton administration regarding China’s
political system and internal stability was substantial. After de-linking human
rights and the MFN, and with the passage of the China PNTR, it seemed that
human rights no longer occupied a prominent position in the United States’
China policy, and the United States’ threat to China was in this respect greatly
decreased. On the positive side, over one century, the Chinese on and off
regarded the United States as a model of democracy. As demonstrated in
Chapter 7, the Chinese in recent years again accepted the American political
model as admirable. Democratization in China therefore would just be a mat-
ter of when and how but not whether. If the United States was able to handle
human rights disputes with China in a more pleasant way, taking into con-
sideration Chinese people’s sentiments and the predominant concern of the
Chinese people in the present to maintain political stability for the purpose
of economic development and improving people’s living standards, with the
exemplary role of the United States’ political system, and the United States’
gentle prodding for China to move toward political liberalization, the United
States would mean more an opportunity than a threat to China in this issue
area. It seems that the United States’ treatment of human rights under both
the second Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration
was much more acceptable to the Chinese people than during the first Clinton
administration. On the whole, I would rate more threat than opportunity to
China during the first Clinton administration in this issue area and perhaps
more opportunity than threat since the late 1990s.
Economic Well-Being
In terms of economic development, on the positive side, the United States
is one of China’s major trade partners, investors, and sources of technology
and management skills. Even though the United States probably was not
indispensable to China’s economic development, as evidenced by the non-
productive sanctions in the several years following the Tiananmen tragedy
in 1989, the United States did contribute importantly to China’s economic
growth. On the negative side, U.S. “troublemaking” in the 1990s regarding
China’s economic development, such as the constant disputes and troubles
over intellectual property rights, the MFN, and China’s WTO membership,
did indeed cause China no small amount of headache. But troubles of this
kind meant only a reduction in the substantial benefits China enjoyed from
its economic relations with the United States. Toward the end of the 1990s,
serious economic and trade problems between the two countries had been
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 93
solved one after another, and Chinese scholars generally are satisfied with the
solutions and regard them as win-win games between the two countries. We
may conclude therefore that in terms of U.S.-China economic relations, the
United States offered substantial opportunity and little threat to China.
National Prestige
As for China’s national prestige, the United States as the sole superpower was
in a position to either enhance China’s status or lower it. In the 1990s, the
U.S. media constantly criticized China, the U.S. Congress “brought China to
trial” every year over MFN, the United States year in year out tried to con-
demn China in the UN Human Rights Commission, and the United States
contributed to the defeat of China’s bid to hold the 2000 Olympic Games.
All these actions, according to Chinese authors, severely impaired China’s
national prestige. But in the late 1990s, the United States decided tentatively
to establish a strategic partnership with China, and to facilitate China’s entry
into the world community. In this golden era of the U.S.-China relationship,
U.S. media ran articles touting the importance of the bilateral relations, and
China’s progress in economic reform and human rights; the U.S. Congress
discontinued the annual ritual of China bashing; and the UN Human Rights
Commission ceased to be a forum for castigating China. Chinese authors
were pleased with the enhancement of their country’s national prestige as a
result. Shortly afterwards, China won the opportunity to host the 2008 Olym-
pic Games, and the United States did not resist China’s bid. We may conclude
therefore that with regard to China’s national prestige, for most of the 1990s,
the United States was more a threat than an opportunity to China, but in the
late 1990s, it was more an opportunity than a threat to China.
World Order
With regard to China’s preferred world order, the majority of Chinese schol-
ars regarded the United States as wanting to create a unipolar world system,
though some Chinese scholars regarded multi-polarity of a certain kind as
serving the United States’ interests. As China, like other countries, valued
sovereignty and independence, it was understandable that China preferred
a multi-polar world order. The United States’ presumed pursuit of a unipo-
lar world order, should it be true, would constitute more or less a threat to
China’s preferred world order. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, sus-
tained peace in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, conformed
to China’s greatest interest. In this respect, the United States, which was
perceived by Chinese authors in the 1990s as committed to peace, constituted
94 Chapter 4
an opportunity for China. If the United States decided to pursue its presumed
unipolar agenda regarding world order vigorously through military force,
especially in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States in this respect perhaps
would constitute more a threat than an opportunity tp China. If the United
States on the other hand pursued its foreign policy goals through peaceful
means, taking into consideration China’s strategic interests, it would be seen
as more an opportunity than a threat to China.
I would conclude that the United States in the 1990s on the whole consti-
tuted more an opportunity than a threat to China (see Table 4.3).
Notes
3. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de
Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 42–43; Gao E, “Zhong Mei Ri Sanbian Guanxi de Xian-
zhuang yu Wenti” [The Current Status and Problems in China-U.S.-Japan Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (November/December 1994), p. 75; Zheng Baoguo, “Lengzhan
hou de Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce”[The United States’ China Policy in the Post–Cold
War Era], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1998), p. 30; Wang Shuzhong, “Zouxiang
Xiayige Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S. Relations toward the Next Cen-
tury], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (December 1994), p. 4.
4. Zhai Xiaomin, “Zhong Mei Zhanlue Guanxi,” p. 35; Qian Wenrong, “Kelindun
Zhizheng hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [China-U.S. Relations after Clinton’s Inaugu-
ration], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1993), pp. 61; Zhou Lin, “Zhongmei
Maoyi Guanxi Zhanwang” [The Prospects of China-U.S. Trade Relations], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring 1997), p. 53; Jiang Lingfei, “Meiguo dui Hua Ezhi Zhan-
lue de Zhiyue Yinsu he Keneng Zouxiang” [The Constraining Factors in the United
States’ Containing China Strategy and Possible Future Trends], Zhanlue yu Guanli
(September/October 1996), p. 48.
5. Chen Demin, “90 Niandai Zhong Mei Guanxi Dongdang ji qi Yuanyin Tanxi”
[The Upheaval in the 1990s’ China-U.S. Relations and Its Causes], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (October 1999), p. 33.
6. Jia Qingguo, “Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Sino-
U.S. Relationship Since President Clinton Took Office], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer
1998), p. 106; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 43; Yuan Ming
and Fan Shimin, “‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo dui Zhongguo (Anquan) Xingxiang de
Renshi” [China’s Security Role in Post–Cold War American Perceptions], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Winter 1995), p. 17; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,”
p. 43.
7. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Zhang Yiting, “Kelindun de
‘dui Hua Jiechu’ Zhengce ji qi bu Wendingxing” [Clinton’s “Engagement of China”
Policy and Its Shaky Foundation], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Spring 1997), p. 36;
Yuan Ming and Fan Shimin, “‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo,” p. 17; Wang Yanjun, “Cong
Shidai Liyi he Zhengce,” p. 59.
8. Zhang Minqian, “Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce,” p. 61; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei
Guanxi Zonglun,” [On China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer
1996), p. 22.
9. Ding Kuisong, “Zongjie Guoqu Mianxiang Weilai: Ping Zhong Mei Guanxi
50 Zhounian” [Reviewing the Past and Looking forward toward the Future], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (October, 1999), p. 4; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi ‘Jiaowang’: Ping
Lengzhan hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Containment or Engagement: On the
United States’ China Policy in the Post Cold War Era], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Spring
1996), p. 2; Sun Jianhang, “Zhanlue·Liyi·Geju: Lengzhan hou Shijie Geju de Yan-
bian he 90 Niandai Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng” [Strategy, Interest, and
Structure: The Evolution of World Structure and the United States’ Adjustment of
Its China Policy in the 1990s], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 2000), pp. 25–26;
Wang Yi, Zhang Jiqiong, Wu Changhua, and He Kebing, “Quanqiu Beijing xia de
96 Chapter 4
Nengyuan yu Huanjing Hezuo: Zhong Mei Guanxi zhong de Zhanlue pai” [Global
Energy and Environment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (November/December 1997), p. 54.
10. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji de Xinzhu <<Daqiju.>>: Yi Lun 21 Shiji
de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [A Brief Analysis of Brzezinski’s New Book Grand Chess-
board: A First Analysis of China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (June 1998), p. 37; Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi: Ping
Kelindun Fanghua hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The New Relationship Looking For-
ward to the New Century: On China-U.S. Relationship After Clinton’s China Visit],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), pp. 16–17.
11. Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi, Zhanlue Kuangjia”
[The Strategic Framework of China-U.S. Relations Facing the New Century], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (October 1997), p. 7; Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji de
Zhong Mei Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi” [Establishing the China-U.S. Strategic Partner-
ship Facing the 21st Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (November 1997), p. 5; Chu
Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui Guoji Zhanlue Wenti de Kanfa Lichang he Zhuzhang”
[The Opinions, Positions, and Advocacies by China and the United States Regard-
ing International Strategy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 50–51; Wang
Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi ji qi Fazhan Qianjing de Jidian Kanfa”
[Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospects], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu (Winter 1998), p. 7; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 43;
Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi,” p. 16.
12. Jia Qingguo, “Kelindun Zhizheng Yilai,” pp. 101–102; Liu Yongtao, “Guifan
Rentong he Zhong Mei Anquan Hezuo Qianjing” [Norm, Identity, and the Prospect
of China-U.S. Security Cooperation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1999), p. 36;
Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi Xinqushi” [Clinton’s
China Visit and New Trends in China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(July 1998), p. 3; Chu Shulong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 7; Su
Ge, “Zhong Mei Gaoceng Hufang yu ‘Jianshexing Zhanlue Huoban Guanxi’” [China-
U.S. Mutual Top Level Visit and Constructive Strategic Partnership], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 20; Ma Jiali, “Zhongguo tong Mei E Ri de Guanxi ji qi
dui Nanya de Yingxiang” [China’s Relations with the United States, Russia, and Japan
and the Impact on South Asia], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April 1998), pp. 22–23.
13. Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi ji qi Fazhan Qianjing de
Jidian Kanfa” [Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospects],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1998), p. 9.
14. Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The MFN and
China-U.S. Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1994), p. 3; Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan
hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 43–44; Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chan-
quan Tanpan ji qi Yingxiang” [A Tentative Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights
Talks between China and the United States and the Impact], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(September 1995), p. 28; Su Ge, “Zhong Mei Guanxi Zonglun,” p. 23; Yu Guobin,
“Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo Daiyu zhi Zheng ji Qiangjing Fenxi” [The
United States’ Debates Regarding China MFN and Its Prospects], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (January 1998), p. 68.
Chinese Perceptions of Opportunity from the United States 97
15. Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo Chuanmei yu Meiguo de dui Hua Zhengce” [U.S.
Media and the United States’ China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1998), p. 41;
Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
16. Pan Tongwen, “Zuihuiguo Daiyu yu Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 3; Zhou Lin,
“Zhongmei Maoyi Guanxi,” p. 52; Zhang Qingmin, “Zhongmei Guanxi zhong de
Meiguo,” p. 23.
17. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” pp. 131–132; Xu Song, “Shi
Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
18. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” p. 132; Xu Song, “Shi Xi
Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 28.
19. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Maoyi zhong Shuangfang,” pp. 132–133.
20. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” pp. 28, 31; Chu Shulong,
“Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi” [China-U.S. Cooperation and Differences], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998), p. 3; Xi Laiwang, “Cong PNTR Kan Mei dui Hua
Zhengce” [Perceiving the United States’ China Policy from the PNTR], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (October 2000), p. 4.
21. Liu Jiangyong, “Kelindun Fanghua,” p. 5; Liu Jiangyong, “Mei Ri Chongjian
Anquan Tizhi, yu Zhong Mei Ri Guanxi” [The Re-establishment of the U.S.-Japan
Security System and China-U.S.-Japan Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Win-
ter 1996), p. 32; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu Zhong Ri Mei Sanbian Guanxi de Pingheng
Fazhan” [Seeking Balanced Development of China-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Relations],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1999), p. 21.
22. Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 49; Wang Yanjun, “Cong
Shidai Liyi he Zhengce,” p. 60; Lu Qichang, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce
de Jidian Kanfa” [Several Observations on the United States’ China Policy], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (September 1995), p. 2; Wang Zhihong, “Meiguo Liyi Jituan yu
Zhong Mei Jingji Guanxi” [Interest Groups in the United States and China-U.S.
Economic Relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (September 1998), pp. 70–73; Li
Shenzhi, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Huigu yu Qianzhan” [The Sino-U.S. Relation-
ship in Retrospect and Prospects] Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 130; Yuan
Ming and Fan Shimin, “ ‘Lengzhan’ hou Meiguo,” p. 26; Zhao Pingan, Li Xuebao,
and Guo Yuan, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng yu Zhong
Mei Guanxi de Zouxiang” [The Adjustment of the United States’ China Policy
and Future Trend of China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn
1996), p. 18; Li Shouyuan, “‘Lengzhan Siwei’ yu Lengzhan hou Meiguo de dui
Hua Zhengce” [“Cold War Thinking” and the United States’ Post Cold War China
Policy], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1996), p. 23; Wang Jisi, “‘Ezhi’ Haishi
‘Jiaowang,’” p. 6.
23. Sun Jianhang, “Zhanlue·Liyi·Geju,” p. 29.
24. Zhou Qi, “Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 47–48.
25. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu Tiaozheng dui Hua
Zhengce” [The American Presidential Election and Readjustment of Clinton’s China
Policy], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1996), p. 128; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de Zhong
Mei E Guanxi” [China-U.S.-Russia Relations around the Turn of the Century], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi (December 2000), p. 6.
98 Chapter 4
36. Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo,” pp. 67–68; Xu Song, “Shi
Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 30; Wang Shuzhong, “Zouxiang Xiayige Shiji,”
p. 4.
37. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” p. 29.
38. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong
Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Zhengque Suoxiang” [The Correct Way for Developing
Sino-U.S. Economic Ties], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1994), pp. 9–11; Li Zhongcheng,
“Zhongguo yu Mei Ri E, Dongmeng Guanxi de Xianzhuang ji Qushi” [The Current
Status and Future Trends of China’s Relations with the United States, Japan, Russia,
and Southeast Asian Nations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1995), p. 24; Zhou Qi,
“Lengzhan hou de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” pp. 43–44; Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongs-
hangjie Zaici Sheng Chui ‘Dalufeng’” [Another Wave of China Craze in the U.S.
Business Circles], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1996), p. 37; Yang Jiemian,
“Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 130 (one source says over 50, and the
other source says over 100); Yu Guobin, “Guanyu Meiguo dui Hua Zuihuiguo,”
pp. 68–69.
39. Fang Zhou, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 35; Wu Xianbin, “Lun Meiguo dui
Xianggang de Zhengce” [On the United States’ Policy toward Hong Kong], Zhanlue
yu Guanli (September/October 1997), pp. 114–115.
40. Deng Ruilin, “Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi Cunzai de Zhuyao Wenti yu
Duice” [The Main Problems in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations, and Our
Response], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1992), p. 61; Chen Jiyong, “Lun
80 Niandai Yilai Meiguo dui Hua Zhijie Touzi de Tedian Wenti ji qi Duice” [The
Characteristics and Problems in the United States’ Direct Investments in China and
Our Response], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1992), pp. 17–20; Qin Fengmin,
“Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 37.
41. Chen Baosen, “Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi,” pp. 9–11, 19–22; Qin
Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 38.
42. Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 38; Zhang Linhong and Han Yugui,
“Meiguo Yatai Anquan Zhanlue yu Mei dui Ri dui Hua Guanxi” [The United States’
Asian-Pacific Security Strategy and the United States’ Policies Toward Japan and
China], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1999), p. 11; Lu Qichang, “Shi ji zhi jiao de
Zhong Mei E Guanxi,” p. 5.
43. Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,” p. 37.
44. Xu Song, “Shi Xi Zhong Mei Zhishi Chanquan,” pp. 28–29; Chen Baosen,
“Fazhan Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi,” p. 22; Qin Fengmin, “Meiguo Gongshangjie,”
p. 37; Wu Xinbo, “Mouqiu Zhong Ri Mei Sanbian Guanxi,” p. 22; Chu Shulong,
“Zhong Mei Guanxi Mianlin Zhanlue Xuanze,” pp. 5–6.
45. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi,” p. 3; Ma Jiali, “Zhongguo tong
Mei E Ri,” pp. 20–21.
46. Li Zhongcheng, “Zhongguo yu Mei Ri E,” p. 24; Xiong Zhiyong, “Meiguo
dui Hua Zhengce,” p. 52; Zhang Yebai, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xingshi yu Women
de Duice” [China-U.S. Relations and Our Strategy in Response], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (June 1993), p. 39; Liang Gencheng, “Bian Jiechu bian Ezhi” [Engagement
Plus Containment], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), p. 9; Nai Zuji, “Kelindun Zhengfu
100 Chapter 4
Dier Renqi dui Hua Zhengce de Tiaozheng” [The Second Clinton Administration’s
Adjustment in Its China Policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1997), pp. 13–14;
Huang Renwei, “‘Shanghai Gongbao’ yu Zhong Mei Jingmao Guanxi de Fazhan”
[The Shanghai Communique and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and Economic Rela-
tions], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1997), p. 150.
47. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji,” p. 41.
48. Zhang Qingmin, “Zhongmei Guanxi zhong de Meiguo dui Hua Jishu Zhuan-
rang Wenti” [Technology Transfer to China in China-U.S. Relations], Zhanlue yu
Guanli (July/August 1999), pp. 23–24.
49. Shen Jiru, “Jian Lun Burejinsiji,” p. 37.
50. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” pp. 129–130; Song
Yimin, “Zhong E Mei E Zhong Mei Guanxi Yiji Sanzhe jian de Xianghu Zuoyong”
[China-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and China-U.S. Relations and Their Interactions], Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1997), p. 17; Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji,” pp. 3–4;
Jiang Yuguo, “Zhongguo ‘Rushi’ dui Zhong Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Impact of
China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-U.S. Relationship], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(September 2000), pp. 6–7; Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 9;
Zhao Jingfang, “Meiguo dui Hua ‘Jiechu’ Zhengce de Mubiao Fenxi” [An Analysis
of the Objectives of the United States’ “Engagement” Policy Toward China], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (June 1999), p. 12.
51. Zhang Yebai, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Xingshi,” p. 38; Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo
Daxuan he Kelindun Zhengfu,” p. 131; Wang Haihan, “Dui Dangqian Zhong Mei
Guanxi,” p. 10.
52. Zhang Linhong, “21 Shiji de Zhong Mei Guanxi,” p. 27.
53. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei Hezuo yu Fenqi,” p. 4
54. Shen Jiru, “Guojia de Liangzhong Zhineng he Kelindun Zongtong Maodun de
Hezhanlue: Er Lun 21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The Two Functions of the State and
President Clinton’s Contradictory Nuclear Strategy: A Second Analysis of China-U.S.
Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 1998), pp. 56, 60.
55. Li Shenzhi, “Zhong Mei Guanxi de Huigu,” p. 130.
56. Jin Canrong, “Mianxiang Xinshiji de Xinguanxi,” p. 18.
57. Chu Shulong, “Zhong Mei dui Guoji Zhanlue,” p. 51.
58. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhan hou Zhong Mei Shuangbian he Diqu Zhanlue yu
Anquan Guanxi” [The Post–Cold War China-U.S. Bilateral and Regional Strategy and
Security Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (May 2000), pp. 9–10, 12.
59. Xi Laiwang, “Jianli Mianxiang 21 Shiji,” pp. 5–6.
60. Wang Yizhou, “Meiguo Gaoceng Renshi dui Zhong Mei Guanxi Ruogan
Zhongyao Wenti de Kanfa: 1994 Huashengdun “Zhong Mei Guanxi Yantaohui Ceji”
[American Elite’s Opinions on Several Important Issues in China-U.S. Relations],
Zhanlue yu Guanli (January/February 1995), p. 48.
61. Liu Yongtao, “Guifan Rentong he Zhong Mei,” pp. 35–36.
Chapter 5
101
102 Chapter 5
just briefly, and whether sole superpower status was adequate for the United
States. Amid this uneasiness with American power, the so-called emerging
European suprastate remained fragmented, its economy stagnating. Japan,
once the much-heralded emerging “Number One,” slid further toward the
sidelines of world politics.
Consequently, self-perception of American power has experienced a drastic
reversal. Some scholars began to argue that U.S. unipolarity was stable and
long-lasting and that the country could afford to pursue any policy in world
politics.3 In the same vein, U.S. foreign policy became unprecedentedly
assertive. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was thrown into
the dustbin of history, military preemption for the first time became official
U.S. doctrine, and the United Nations dangled at the brink of irrelevance. In
the thick of this new triumphalism, however, some observers perceive a new
quagmire for the United States in Iraq that, together with the sluggishness of
the U.S. economy in the past few years, seems to foreshadow an America in
incipient decline.
Power is one central tool with which a state pursues its foreign policy, but
a state uses its power only on the basis of the self-perception of its relative
power status. To adapt a famous saying by Harold and Margaret Sprout: what
matters is how decision makers imagine the state’s power to be, not how it
actually is. An appropriate self-perception of its relative power status there-
fore is essential for a state to use its power to its advantage.
With the United States as the world’s sole superpower, every twist and turn
in American power status makes a significant impact on world politics. Schol-
arly discussions in the United States regarding American power raise some
important questions. In what sense was the United States a superpower? To
what extent had other countries recognized it as such? Was the United States
in decline or rejuvenation? And was American power adequate for ensuring
the country’s security?
While American scholars search tirelessly for answers to those questions,
it is illuminating to explore other countries’ perceptions of American power:
sometimes the onlooker sees most of the game. China was a good onlooker
for this purpose. Though Russia was militarily much stronger, China at
present seems to have more resources available for sustained development
of its comprehensive national power. Europe and Japan are economically
and technologically much more developed than China, but the latter is more
unified than Europe and a more normal state4 than Japan. India shares more
similarities with China than other secondary powers do, but China is now
one step ahead of India in economic development. To some extent, Chinese
perceptions of American power might represent perceptions of the United
States by all the secondary powers. Exploring the Chinese perceptions of
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 103
American power therefore might help the United States to better understand
its own power.
Chinese perceptions of American power are intrinsically valuable. Because
China has been widely regarded as a rising power, how it behaves toward the
United States depends to a large extent on how China perceives American
power. If China perceived a weak United States, there would be fewer inhi-
bitions for China to challenge it. If China perceived a strong United States,
Beijing might want to be very cautious in its U.S. policy. And if China
perceived a long-lasting American hegemony, bandwagoning would be its
optimal option. Only if and when the United States was perceived as being
overly imperialistic would China have a viable option of working with other
major powers to vigorously balance against it. Exploring Chinese perceptions
of American power therefore might not only help the United States to better
understand its own power, it might also shed important light on China’s U.S.
policy.
The research in this article was based on a sample of 256 articles in six
mainstream Chinese journals on international relations5 from 1991 to the
first half of 2004 whose titles suggest a focus on American power/capability.
In this article, I intend to explore the Chinese perceptions of American power
in the following areas: economics, science and technology, military, soft
power, and the perceived trajectory of American power.
The United States has been consistently perceived as enjoying absolute supe-
riority over other countries in science and technology. Some scholars argued
that the United States was about 10 years ahead of Europe and Japan in new
high technology, and 20 years ahead of China. They lamented that Western
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 105
countries, especially the United States, were far more advanced than develop-
ing countries in technology, and it was very difficult for developing countries
to narrow the gap. The United States was perceived as having by far more
research funding than any other country, more than that of several major
developed countries combined. In 1990, for instance, Japan’s research and
development (R&D) funding was only half that of America and Germany’s
was only one-fifth that of the United States. In 2000, one review article cited
an American source to the effect that the R&D funding of the G-7 accounted
for 90 percent of the world’s funding and the United States’ R&D funding
equaled the combined total of the other six G-7 countries.10
Chinese authors in the sample generally agreed that the United States
had many more R&D personnel than other developed countries. One author
pointed out in 1995 that Japan had 510,890 persons and Germany only
170,640, while the United States had 959,300 working in R&D. In 1995,
some 45 percent of global scientific research was conducted in the United
States, more than the combined total of the next several major countries such
as Japan, Germany, France, and Britain.11
The United States was perceived as being particularly strong in basic
research and military research, but its civilian technology was perceived as
developing relatively slowly. The United States possessed absolute superi-
ority in aerospace technology and was currently the only country trying to
develop a missile defense system. It was also considered to be particularly
strong in computer technology; about two-thirds of the world’s Internet-
capable computers were in the United States.
In the early 1990s, other Western countries, especially Japan, were per-
ceived as having become powerful U.S. competitors in high technology;
Japan was seen as poised to catch up in many high-tech areas. Toward the late
1990s, however, the United States was perceived as having again strength-
ened its lead in science and technology over other countries. The first Bush
and Clinton administrations were perceived as having strengthened Ameri-
can scientific research capability, leaving other countries lagging. Wang Jisi
argued in 1997 that because the United States was the first country to enter the
information age, it was well positioned to develop faster than other countries
in sophisticated areas such as bioengineering, medical science, aerospace, and
new materials. Writing the same year, Wu Yonghong drew from an American
source to note that in the 1990s, the United States “greatly increased its lead
over Japan and Europe in information and communication technology, [and]
enjoys superiority” in biology, medical science, agriculture, and the food
industry, although Japan and Europe had caught up with the United States in
manufacturing industry and energy and had moved closer to the United States
106 Chapter 5
Soft power was new to Chinese authors but had quickly become a popular
term for assessing American power. Scholars in the sample generally agreed,
usually implicitly, that the United States enjoyed superiority in this respect.
Some authors approvingly cite American scholars such as Joseph Nye and
Samuel Huntington to the effect that the West, led by the United States, was
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 109
able to dominate the world because it enjoyed superiority not only in hard
power but also in soft power.
In rare cases, Chinese authors have explicitly accepted that the United States
enjoyed superiority not only in hard power but also in soft power, including
American culture, language, systems, values, and management capability.21
Authors in the sample did not dispute that the United States had advantages
in its political system, which constituted a source of American soft power.
Zhou Sanming, Li Desong, and Xu Lisun recognized that international orga-
nizations, laws, norms, regimes, rules of the game, etc. had been established
basically in accordance with U.S. political will and constituted a source of
American soft power. A sophisticated international financial regime helped
the United States to compete with other countries. Arrangements such as free
trade, intellectual property rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and intervention
by the International Monetary Fund in the economies of developing countries
all contributed to American political, economic, and security interests.22
Unlike the case of Chinese perceptions of U.S. hard power, Chinese authors
did not uniformly accept that the country enjoyed absolute superiority in soft
power. Wang Jisi asserted that the United States suffered from problems such
as poor education and weak social cohesiveness because of racial conflicts, a
high crime rate, broken families, political scandals, etc. As a result, America’s
weakness lay not in its hard power but in its soft power.23 Nevertheless 9/11
was perceived to have had the effect of overcoming this weakness by mobi-
lizing resources in the United States to carry out the government’s foreign
policy.
When the United States emphasized human rights and democracy in its
foreign policy toward developing countries, some Chinese authors acknowl-
edged that this approach could indeed put developing countries on the defen-
sive and produce effects that could not be accomplished by the use of hard
power, but they also claimed that because of the resistance of developing
countries, the effect of this approach was limited. Pang Zhongying conceded
in 1997 that developing countries usually had too little soft power and could
not compete with countries with great amounts of soft power, but he also
argued that in the case of Asian countries, their culture, traditional values, and
development patterns could potentially endow them with greater soft power
than they currently enjoyed.24
The Iraq War had been perceived by some Chinese observers as both a great
success for the United States in power politics and a serious setback in terms
110 Chapter 5
of its soft power. After the initial U.S. military success in Iraq, Chinese authors
generally agreed that the United States had demonstrated absolute dominance
in world politics. The United States could do anything it wanted to do, could
fight any war anywhere it chose, and no country could challenge its power
status.25 Secondary powers and international institutions were constrained by
the United States much more than the United States was constrained by them.
Insurgents in Iraq did cause serious difficulties for the United States, but they
did not constitute a substantial threat to the U.S. military. But gradually, the
United States had begun to be perceived as being limited in its capability for
foreign intervention. It did not have enough troops for rotation, it did not have
enough money to fund the occupation, and the American people were not psy-
chologically prepared for sustained operations involving steady, significant
casualties and enormous expenditure.26
Most authors in the sample agreed that the Iraq War had caused the United
States to suffer a tremendous loss of its soft power. Soft power here referred
to moral appeal, national image, and international legitimacy. Consequently,
while the United States enjoyed greater hard power than before, its influence
on other countries had declined. Moreover, it was sometimes portrayed as the
biggest challenger to the international order and thus encountered soft balanc-
ing, especially by its own allies and by international institutions.
Some scholars believed it might not be easy for the United States to recover
its loss in soft power and suggested that a vague confrontation between
the United States and the international community already existed. If in an
unlikely scenario the United States continued forcefully along its unilateral
road, this course might ultimately spawn a broad anti-U.S. coalition. But oth-
ers, such as Qin Yaqin, argued that the United States could recover from the
deterioration of relations with its allies and could also restore its international
legitimacy.27
creditor nation to the biggest debtor nation, lower status within the world
banking system, and decreased levels of investment in foreign countries.
Other symptoms were said to include a low rate of productivity growth, fixed
capital investment and infrastructure investment, plus a large trade deficit.28
much better than its major competitors and America had increased its lead
over other countries. Since the mid- to late 1990s, the United States has been
perceived as either having solved its earlier problems or as being capable of
keeping them under control. In a sharp departure from scholars in the early
1990s, Song Yuhua and Chen Ze argued in 2002 that because the United
States was both the world’s largest importer and the largest exporter, a trade
deficit not only would not contribute to an American decline but ultimately
would be beneficial to this country.34
Toward the end of the 1990s, many Chinese authors predicted that the
United States would not decline and would maintain its status as the sole
superpower. Shi Ren was more cautious, expecting the status quo to continue
for at least the next 5 to 10 years, while Wu Yonghong and Zeng Bingxi pre-
dicted a much longer duration. Wang Jisi, Song Yuhua, and Lu Huajun argued
that the United States in many ways had not declined at all, even in the 1980s
and the early 1990s.35
Wang Fan was among the most optimistic observers, predicting that uni-
polarity would last for at least several more decades. Sun Shilian shared the
presumably dominant opinion toward the United States, tending to predict
that American economic expansion might continue endlessly. Wang Jisi was
more cautious, opining that the United States would not lose its status as
a superpower although its capability to dominate the world would become
somewhat limited. Li Desong, Xu Lisun, and Gu Wenyan argued that the
United States had positioned itself for continued economic dominance in the
world by developing economic relations in the Asia-Pacific region, transfer-
ring undesirable factories to other countries, and achieving a safe lead in areas
such as computers, information, and communication, regarded as the keys to
competitiveness through the twenty-first century.36
On the other hand, with the perceived rise of the United States in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, authors in the sample saw a relative decline of Japan
and Europe. Zhang Xiaotang in 1997 offered the gloomiest account of Japan,
comparing it to a “processing factory” for the United States. Some authors
were pessimistic about China’s development. Zeng Bingxi argued the next
year that because developed countries monopolized information technology,
it would be very difficult for developing countries to succeed in the so-called
information economy. Writing in 2002, Li Changjiu attributed the inability of
China to narrow the economic gap with the United States to China’s lack of
R&D funding, which in 1998 was less than one-thirtieth of the United States’,
one-eighteenth of Japan’s, and one-half of South Korea’s.37
In spite of the general optimism toward the end of the 1990s among Chinese
scholars regarding the U.S. economy, a minority continued to be cautious.
Wang Jian and Zhou Li asserted that U.S. prosperity was propped up by a large
114 Chapter 5
inflow of foreign capital and the economic bubble would explode sooner or
later. Somehow, even when the United States was perceived as having entered
a period of sustained economic growth in the mid- to late 1990s, most authors
in the sample continued arguing that multi-polarization would be the future
trend of the world. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, multi-
polarization was mentioned less often than before in the international relations
literature. “Speedy development toward multipolarity” quietly gave way to
“zigzag evolution toward multipolarity.”38 While in the 1990s Chinese authors
generally expected that the United States would maintain its absolute domi-
nance for another 10 to 20 years, by the early twenty-first century most leading
Chinese scholars had come to believe that the United States would remain the
sole superpower at least until 2050. Shi Yinghong and Jin Canrong claimed
that the United States actually was the strongest power in Western history,
stronger even than Rome at its zenith. Lin Limin argued that even if all great
powers would eventually decline, the United States would still be the longest-
lasting great power in history. Mei Renyi suggested that the United States at
the beginning of the twenty-first century was even more powerful than it was
right after the end of World War II. Wang Jisi nonetheless did not preclude the
possibility of an unexpected American decline stemming from major terrorist
attacks, high-cost wars, or loss of attraction for foreign talent, in addition to
the vague possibility of an anti-U.S. alliance among major secondary powers.39
Although in the 1990s Chinese authors obviously resented the United States’
self-proclaimed status as the leader of the world, in the early twenty-first
century, some Chinese scholars seemed to have accepted this status, although
sometimes grudgingly, saying that U.S. dominance was actually good for the
stability of the world and for China’s economic interests.40
authors now generally believed that in the foreseeable future, perhaps at least
until 2050, the United States would remain the sole superpower. Why had
their perception undergone such a drastic change? I suggest the following
explanations.
1. The reality principle. The human mind is not divorced from reality and
actively seeks information to form a true picture of the environment. After
all, not accurately understanding the environment would result in decisions
costly to the perceiver or decision maker. This cognitive principle suggests
that Chinese scholars do try hard to learn about what has happened in the
United States; the change in their perceptions reflects the real change in
U.S. power over the past 14 years.
2. The consistency principle. The human mind works to keep internal beliefs
consistent with one another. New information inconsistent with existing
beliefs is uncomfortable and will therefore be either neglected or dis-
counted. This cognitive principle suggests that when U.S.-China relations
are in trouble, Chinese perceivers are more likely to discount American
power. One salient example is China’s characterization in the 1950s of the
United States as a paper tiger, even though the PRC’s economy was then
deplorably backward. Consequently, the change of Chinese perception over
the past 14 years more or less reflects a reduced threat perception and an
increased opportunity perception toward the United States
3. Groupthink. People behave differently in a group than they do as individu-
als. As individuals, they cannot but think independently, but as members of
a group, they face pressure to achieve consensus. Especially when things
are uncertain, people have a strong inclination to accept the opinions of
others in the group. Views conforming to the dominant opinion are easy to
express and require little effort to rationalize; dissident views are uncom-
fortable and may even be costly. Groupthink theory suggests that Chinese
scholars do not function completely independently of their American coun-
terparts. Thus, the change of Chinese perception more or less reflects the
change of Americans’ self-perception of American power.
4. The availability effect. The human mind seeks accurate information about
the environment, but because of internal and external constraints the mind
can be only boundedly rational. As a result, people routinely resort to heu-
ristics in decision making. One important heuristic device is the availabil-
ity effect: judgment making is strongly influenced by the extent to which
relevant cases can be brought to mind. The availability effect suggests that
countries that have successfully demonstrated their power will convey an
image of strength. Thus, it was the American use of force abroad, especially
116 Chapter 5
against the will of the UN and other major powers, that accounts for the
change in Chinese perceptions of American power.
CONCLUSION
The research in this paper generally supports some American scholars’ opti-
mism in recent years regarding American power. While during the Maoist
period, the United States was typically portrayed as a paper tiger, mainstream
Chinese authors in the past decade have accepted that the United States is the
sole superpower, enjoying vast superiority over other countries. The United
States was perceived as sharing economic leadership with Europe and Japan
in the early 1990s, but since the late 1990s its leadership status in the world
economy has become much more salient than that of Europe and Japan.
The United States, Europe, and Japan were similarly leaders in science and
technology, standing head and shoulders above the rest of the world in this
respect. While Europe and Japan were perceived as being on a par, the United
States was regarded as being about 10 years ahead of them. The United
States was a military superpower; Russia was barely capable of maintaining a
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 117
tenuous equilibrium with its rival. The United States was perceived as enjoy-
ing significant superiority even in soft power, but Chinese authors seemed to
believe that narrowing the gap in soft power between the United States and
Third World countries might not be as difficult as narrowing the gap in hard
power. Chinese authors often identified China as a rising power, but they were
realistic enough to acknowledge that a vast power gap existed with the United
States. For the foreseeable future, China’s rise therefore would be more about
relative improvement of the country’s status in the world than about catching
up with or overtaking the United States. Though Chinese scholars generally
hoped that everything would go well for China in the next several decades,
many observers, both Chinese and Western, cautioned that there would be too
many possible slips between cup and lip. Even if China were to be blessed
with propitious fortune, possibly in due time, as James Hoge suggests, it
could be overtaken by an even more robust India.
Because China was one of the most salient rising powers, Chinese percep-
tions of American power seemed to suggest that for the foreseeable future, the
United States would most likely remain the undisputable sole superpower; the
power gap, especially military, between the United States and the rest of the
world might not easily be narrowed; and no country may be in a position to
challenge U.S. primacy. The perceived Achilles’ heel in American soft power
might perhaps arouse some concern, as one scenario of the premature termi-
nation of American dominance is the vague possibility of a broad anti-U.S.
coalition emerging as a result of serious deterioration of the United States’
international legitimacy.
China has been remarkably conservative in its U.S. policy. When China
disapproved of America’s international behaviors, its response was habitually
no more than verbal protests. As a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, China had demonstrated the utmost reluctance in exercising its veto
power. The research for this article indicated that among other things, such as
the Chinese admiration of many aspects of the United States and the Chinese
wish to benefit from a bilateral partnership, the perception of the power gap
between the two countries might also be a major factor explaining China’s
restraint in its U.S. policy. As China perceived the likelihood of a relatively
long-lasting American hegemony, trying to improve bilateral relations quite
possibly might remain China’s preferred policy for the foreseeable future.
The absolute U.S. superiority poses the question of what to do with
American primacy. The dominant school in the 1990s believed that unipolar
distribution of power was but an anomaly in human history, and the logic
of international politics would before long maneuver the world away from
unipolarity. The best option for the United States, therefore, was to prepare
for inevitable multi-polarity. As it became clear that unipolarity would not
118 Chapter 5
Notes
4. Every sovereign state theoretically has the right to use force in settling inter-
national disputes. Japan is not considered a “normal state” because it has thus far
renounced this right. According to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japan for-
ever renounces war “as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.” See http:// www.solon.org/Constitutions/
Japan/English/english-Constitution.html.
5. Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies Quarterly], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World
Economics and Politics], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], Waijiao Xueyuan
Xuebao [Journal of China Foreign Affairs University], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Con-
temporary International Relations], and Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy and Manage-
ment]. For more detailed references, see the author’s doctoral dissertation, “China’s
Perception of the United States: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy Motiva-
tions,” Ohio State University, 2002.
6. Wang Tiejun, “Kuaguo Ziben yu Meiguo Baquan” [Transnational Capital and
American Hegemony], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 246 (February 2001), p. 75.
7. Xiao Lian, “Shengchanlu he Meiguo de Lingdao Diwei Yishu Pingjie” [On
Productivity and the Leadership Status of the United States], ibid., 139 (March 1992),
p. 73.
8. Xin Benjian, “Meiguo 2002 Niandu Guofang Baogao: Pingxi” [Comment on
U.S. 2002 Annual Defense Report], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 155 (September 2002),
p. 16; Meng Honghua, “Guoji Jizhi yu Meiguo Baquan” [International Regimes and
American Hegemony], Meiguo Yanjiu 15:1 (Spring 2001), pp. 82–83, 85.
9. Zhou Lin, “Meiguo Gongsi Chouwen Pouxi” [U.S. company scandals: The
Whys and Wherefores], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 70 (Winter 2002), pp. 50–54; Edi-
torial Board, “Meishi Ziben Zhuyi de Kunjing yu Biange” [The Dilemma and Trans-
formation of American-Style Capitalism], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 268 (December
2002), p. 1.
10. Ding Haojin, “Cong Chanye Jiaodu Kan Meiguo Jingji de Weilai” [Perceiving
the Future of the American Economy from Its Industry], Meiguo Yanjiu 6:1 (Spring
1992), p. 31; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri Jingji Liliang Duibi jiqi Bianhua Quxiang”
[The Distribution of Economic Power among the United States, Europe, and Japan
and the Trend of Change], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 46 (Winter 1992), p. 14; Li Huiming,
“Zhishi Ziben yu Meiguo de Zhishi Jingji” [Knowledge Capital and the Knowledge
Economy of the United States], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 107 (September 1998), p. 29;
Wang Fan, “Wending de Danji Shijie: Pingjie” [An Analysis and Introduction of The
Stability of Unipolarity], Meiguo Yanjiu 14:1 (Spring 2000), p. 135. The G-7 countries
are Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
11. Wei Min, “Mei Ou Ri Jingji Shili Duibi de Bianhua Qushi” [The Trend of
Change in the Distribution of Economic Power among the United States, Europe, and
Japan], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 55 (Spring 1995), p. 34; Gao Feng, “Mei Ri Ou Jingji Shili
Duibi de Xin Dongxiang” [New Trend in the Distribution of Economic Power among
the United States, Japan, and Europe], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 176 (April 1995),
p. 34; Qi Chaoying, “Meiguo Tiaozheng Gaojishu Zhanlue Tanxi” [An Exploration
of the United States’ Adjustment Strategy Regarding High Technology], ibid., 170
120 Chapter 5
(October 1994), pp. 17–20; Liu Saili, “Shixi Meiguo Jingji de Chixu Zengzhang”
[A Tentative Analysis of the United States’ Sustained Economic Growth], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao 52 (Summer 1998), p. 37.
12. Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan: Lengzhan hou Meiguo de Shijie Diwei
Chutan” [High Place Is Very Cold: A Preliminary Exploration of the U.S. Status in
the World in the Post–Cold War Era], Meiguo Yanjiu 11:3 (Fall 1997), pp. 15–16;
Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie Jingji zhong Diwei de Bianhua” [The Change in
Status of the United States in the World Economy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 203
(July 1997), p. 67.
13. Han Weidong and Han Yaodong, “Meiguo Xin Shiji Baquan Zhanlue yu
Zhongguo Guojia Anquan” [The United States’ Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 234 (February 2000),
p. 54; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” p. 16.
14. Wang Weimin, “Meiguo de Beiyue Dongkuo Zhanlue Pingxi” [An Analysis of
the U.S. Strategy for NATO Eastward Expansion], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 87 (Febru-
ary 1997), pp. 6–7; Wu Zhan, “Meiguo Dangqian de Hewuqi Zhengce yu Hecaijun”
[The United States’ Current Nuclear Weapon Policy and Nuclear Reduction], Meiguo
Yanjiu 12:2 (Summer 1998), pp. 7, 10–15.
15. Liu Huaqiu, Qin Zhongmin, “Ping Mei E Di’er Jieduan Xuejian Zhanlue
Wuqi Tiaoyue” [On START II of the United States and Russia], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
48 (Autumn 1993), p. 4.
16. Xie Deyuan, “Geju Bianhua hou de Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce” [U.S. Foreign
Policy after the Change of the Polar Structure], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 31 (Spring
1993), p. 28; Zhang Yeliang, “Shilun Meiguo de Fan Kuosan Zhanlue” [A Tenta-
tive Analysis of the United States’ Anti-proliferation Strategy], Meiguo Yanjiu 10:4
(Winter 1996), p. 79; Su Ge, “Lun Zhong Mei E Guanxi” [On China-U.S.-Russia
Relations], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 89 (May/June 2002), p. 107.
17. Dai Bing, “Meiguo dui Taiwan de Jishu Shuchu” [The United States’ Technol-
ogy Transfer to Taiwan], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 229 (September 1999), p. 77.
18. Wu Zhan, “Meiguo Dangqian de Hewuqi,” pp. 24, 27–28; Ge Lide, “Meiguo
Tuichu Fandao Tiaoyue ji Zhanlue Fandao Xitong de Fazhan Qianjing” [The United
States’ Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and the Prospect of Its Anti-Missile System],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 260 (April 2002), p. 42.
19. Zhang Wenmu, “Lun Zhongguo Haiquan” [On China’s Sea Rights], ibid., 278
(October 2003), p. 13.
20. Hu Angang and Liu Taoxiong, “Zhong Mei Ri Yin Guofang Shili Bijiao”
[National Defensive Power: A Comparison among China, United States, Japan, and
India], Zhanlue yu Guanli 61 (November/ December 2003), pp. 42–44.
21. Li Dongyan, “Ping Lengzhan hou Meiguo de Ganyu Zhengce” [On the United
States’ Intervention Policy in the Post–Cold War Era], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 167
(July 1994), p. 68.
22. Zhou Sanming, “Guoji Huobi Tixi yu Meiguo Baquan [International Currency
System and American Hegemony], ibid., 235 (March 2000), pp. 33–34; Li Desong
and Xu Lisun, “Meiguo Ruhe Liyong Zishen Guoji Youshi Weihu qi Jingji Anquan”
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 121
[How the United States Uses Its Own International Advantage to Safeguard Its Eco-
nomic Security], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 118 (August 1999), pp. 29–30; Wang Tiejun,
“Kuaguo Ziben,” pp. 71–76.
23. Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” pp. 18–24, 34.
24. Liu Wenzhong, “Baquan Zhuyi de Zhuolie Biaoxian: Ping Meiguo Guowuyuan
Renquan Baogao” [An Awkward Demonstration of Hegemonism: On the U.S. State
Department’s Human Rights Report], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 40 (Summer 1995),
pp. 47–49; Pang Zhongying, “Guoji Guanxi zhong de Ruan Liliang ji Qita: Ping
Meiguo Yuesefu Nai de Zhuding Lingdao” [Soft Power in International Relations and
others: On American Scholar Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead], Zhanlue yu Guanli 21
(March/April 1997), p. 51.
25. Zhang Liangui, “Caoxian de Hewuqi yu Meiguo de Jingcha Juese” [North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the United States’ Police Role], ibid., 60 (September/
October 2003), p. 71.
26. Zhang Liangui, “Caoxian de Hewuqi,” p. 71; Li Zhilin, “Yilake Danqian Anquan
Xingshi zhi Wojian” [The Current Security Situation in Iraq], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
169 (November 2003), p. 39; Qian Qichen, “Yilake Zhanzheng yu Meiguo” [The Iraq
War and the United States], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 74 (Winter 2003), p. 6.
27. Qin Yaqing, “Quanshi Baquan, Zhidu Baquan, yu Meiguo de Diwei” [Power
Hegemony, Institutional Hegemony, and the Status of the United States], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), pp. 7–8.
28. Chu Yukun, “Shilun Zhanhou Meiguo Dijiuci Jingji Shuaitui” [A Tentative
Analysis of the United States’ Ninth Economic Recession after World War Two],
Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 135 (November 1991), p. 10; Sun Haishun, “Lun Mei, Ri,
Xi’ou Guoji Ziben Diwei de Xinbianhua” [On the New Changes in Status of the
International Capital of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe], Meiguo Yanjiu
6:1 (Spring 1992), pp. 91–92; Jin Dexiang, “Why Does the U.S. Decline Relatively?
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 33 (February 1992), p. 13; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji Mianlin de
Xinwenti” [The New Problems Facing the U.S. Economy], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi
158 (October 1993), pp. 6–8; Huang Hong, “Meiguo Quanqiu Zhanlue Tiaozheng
zhong de Neizai Maodun ji Zhiyue Yinsu” [The Intrinsic Contradictions and Con-
straining Factors in the Adjustment of the United States’ Global Strategy], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi 40 (March 1993), p. 32.
29. Ding Haojin, “Cong Chanye Jiaodu,” p. 31; Qi Chaoying, “Meiguo Tiao-
zheng,” p. 17; Wang Haihan, “Meiguo de Quanqiu Zhanlue Mianlin Yanzhong Tiao-
zhan” [The United States’ Global Strategy Faces Serious Challenge], Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu 46 (Winter 1992), p. 23; Xie Deyuan, “Geju Bianhua hou,” pp. 30, 32–33.
30. Cai Tuo, “NGO: Pingpan Meiguo Guoji Yingxiangli de yige Xinxiangdu”
[NGO: A New Dimension to Evaluate the United States’ International Influence],
in Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), pp. 24–25; Hu and Liu, “Zhong Mei
Ri Ying Guofang,” pp. 42–44; Peng Lei, “Zhongguo de Jueqi ji Zhongguo yu Qita
Disan Shijie Guojia de Guanxi: Yantaohui Jiyao” [Seminar Briefing: China’s Rise and
China’s Relations with other Third World Countries], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 284
(April 2004), pp. 79–80.
122 Chapter 5
31. Peng Lei, “Zhonguo de Jueqi,” p. 79; Shi Yinghong, “Meiguo Guoji Quanshi:
Bijiao yu Bianhua” [The United States’ International Power Status: Comparison and
Change], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173 (March 2004), p. 5.
32. Guo Shixian, “Luelun Zhanhou Meiyuan de Guoji Diwei Jiqi 90 Niandai
Qianjing” [A Brief Analysis of the U.S. Dollar’s International Status and Its Prospects
in the 1990s], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 154 (June 1993), p. 16.
33. Xi Runchang, “Qianxi Mei Ri Ou Sanji Jiegou he Shijie Duojihua Qushi” [A
Preliminary Analysis of U.S.-Japan-Europe Tripolarity and the Trend of the World
toward Multipolarity], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 15 (January 1991), pp. 4, 8.
34. Song Yuhua and Chen Ze, “Meiguo de Ju’e Maoyi Nicha Fenxi” [An Analysis
of America’s Large Unfavorable Balance of Trade], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 267
(November 2002), p. 64.
35. Shi Ren, “Lun Shiji zhijiao Mei Ou Ri de Jingji Fazhan” [On the Economic
Development of the United States, Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the Century],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 98 (January 1998) pp. 6–8; Wu Yonghong, “Meiguo zai Shijie
Jingji,” p. 68; Zeng Bingxi, “Dangqian Meiguo Jingji Kuozhang ji duiqi Baquan
Diwei de Yingxiang” [Current American Economic Expansion and the Impact on its
Hegemonic Status], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 73 (Autumn 1999), p. 45; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu
Bushenghan,” p. 33; Song Yuhua and Lu Huajun, “Guanyu Meiguo Waimao Nicha yu
Waimao Diwei de Shikao” [Thinking about the United States’ Foreign Trade Deficit
and Foreign Trade Status], Meiguo Yanjiu 11:3 (Fall 1997), p. 101.
36. Wang Fan, “Wending de Danji Shijie,” p. 143; Sun Shilian, “Meiguo Jingjijie
Renshi jiu Mei Jingji Qianjing Zhankai Bianlun” [Debate in American Economic
Circles on America’s Economic Prospects], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 218 (October
1998), pp. 68–69; Wang Jisi, “Gaochu Bushenghan,” p. 33; Li and Xu, “Meiguo
Ruhe Liyong,” pp. 29–30; Gu Wenyan, “Mei Jingji Xingshi jidui Zhongmei Jingmao
Guanxi de Yingxiang” [The United States’ Economic Situation and Its Impact on
China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 114 (April 1999),
p. 16.
37. Zhang Xiaotang, “Ping Meiguo Shuailuolun de Sida Jingji Zhidian” [On the
Four Economic Rationales of the American Decline Thesis], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
197 (January 1997), pp. 69–71; Zeng Bingxi, “Meiguo Xinjingji ji qi dui Shijie Jingji
de Yingxiang” [The New U.S. Economy and Its Impact on the World Economy],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 65 (May/June 1998), pp. 45–46; Li Changjiu, “Zhongmei Jingmao
Guanxi de Weilai” [The Future of China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations], Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi 152 (June 2002), p. 2.
38. Wang Jian, “Jijiang Daolai de Meiyuan Weiji” [The Coming U.S. Dollar Cri-
sis], Zhanlue yu Guanli 29 (July/August 1998), pp. 31–37; Zhou Li, “Quanqiuxing
Shuaitui Jianghui Daolai: Meiguo de Haishishenlou ji Shijie de Weixian” [The Immi-
nence of Global Recession: The Fake U.S. Prosperity and the Danger to the World],
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 235 (March 2000), p. 80; Wang Jisi, “Meiguo Baquan de
Luoji” [The Logic of American Hegemony], Meiguo Yanjiu 17:3 (Fall 2003), p. 28.
39. Wang Jisi et al., “Meiguo Guoji Diwei Zhoushi Pinggu” [Assessments on
the Future of the United States’ International Standing], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 173
(March 2004), pp. 2–28.
Chinese Perceptions of American Power 123
40. Guo Xuetang, “Baquan Zhouqilun de Pinkun” [The Poverty of the Theory
of Hegemonic Cycles], Meiguo Yanjiu 17:3 (Fall 2003), p. 45; Zhu Feng, “Yilake
Zhanzheng yu Guoji Zhanlue Geju de Xin Taishi” [The Iraq War and Its Implications
for International Strategic Patterns], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 279 (November 2003),
pp. 33–34; Jia Qingguo, “Danbian Zhuyi haishi Duobian Zhuyi” [Unilateralism or
Multilateralism], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 166 (August 2003), p. 10; Lin Limin, “Fuza
Tiaozhan xia de Nengli Xiandu” [Limit of Capability under Complicated Challenge],
ibid., 173 (March 2004), pp. 14–15.
Chapter 6
Chinese Perceptions of
the American Economy
125
126 Chapter 6
high interest rates, bankruptcies,” etc. “more than offset any cosmetic gains
from Reaganomics.”
Thus, the Chinese perception of the U.S. economy before the 1990s, as
correctly presented by Shambaugh, was quite bleak, even the record-breaking
peacetime economic expansion during the Reagan administration failed to
impress Chinese authors. Was this still the case during the 1990s? In what
way can a study of Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy shed light on our
understanding of China’s foreign policy orientation toward the United States?
This chapter will address these two questions.
METHODOLOGY
Sources
This chapter will be based on all articles on the U.S. economy, as indicated
by the titles, in the six journals in the 1991–2000 decade.2 Table 6.1 indicates
the number of articles in each of the six journals constituting the sample (see
Appendix 3 for the titles of these articles).
The articles in Table 6.1 can be further divided into two categories: those
on the overall economy and those on its specific fields. The former refers to
articles reflecting the overall condition of the U.S. economy and the latter
refers to discussion of one or more of its specific aspects. Table 6.2 lists the
number of articles in each category in the six journals.
One effective way is to look at the major differences between the United
States and China in terms of economic system, which obviously is market
economy vs. planned economy. It is therefore essential to study the Chinese
perception of the market economy system.
To see Chinese authors’ perception of market economy, as opposed looking
into what they said about this economic system, it would be more illuminat-
ing to see whether they perceived the economy as actually working well. One
important link between perceptions of an economic system and its economic
performance is whether Chinese authors attributed the success or failure of
the U.S. economy to the economic system, which therefore will be the third
aspect this chapter is going to explore. As will be explained shortly after-
wards, the exploration of the above three aspects may shed light on China’s
foreign policy orientation regarding the United States The answers to another
two questions may also contribute to this effort. They are: whether Chinese
authors regarded it as desirable to learn from the United States in economic
management and whether the United States was perceived as playing a posi-
tive or negative role in the world economy. Table 6.3 lists the aspects of the
Chinese perception of U.S. economy this chapter is going to explore.
Table 6.4 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy
Table 6.4 Inferences from the Chinese Perceptions of the American Economy
(Continued)
Whether China If Chinese authors argued Difference in economic system
should learn from for learning from the United could be a source of cooperation
the U.S. in economic States, between the two countries.
management If Chinese authors argued Convergence of the Chinese
for system-related learning, economic system on the
American model would be likely.
If Chinese authors argued Convergence of China’s economic
for non-system-related system on the American model
learning, would not necessarily occur.
If Chinese authors argued Differences in economic system
against learning from the might, but not necessarily, be a
United States, source of conflict.
If Chinese authors argued Convergence of China’s economic
against system-related system on the American model
learning, would be less likely.
If Chinese authors argued It would be uncertain as to
against non-system-related whether convergence of China’s
learning, economic system on the
American model would occur.
China’s response to If the United States was It would be more likely that China
the U.S. economic perceived as playing a would try to further integrate its
performance positive role in world economy with that of the United
economy, States.
If the United States was The economy could be a source
perceived as playing a of conflict between the two
negative role in world countries.
economy,
Inferences
Inferences about China’s foreign policy orientation could be made from
a study of the various aspects of the Chinese perceptions of the American
economy listed in Table 6.3, and will be presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
Table 6.6 Chinese Perception of the Performance of the U.S. Economy (1)
Positive/Negative
Journal Subtotal Positive Neutral Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 19 7 10 2 7/2
Zhanlue yu Guanli 1 1 0 0 1/0
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 29 19 3 7 19/7
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 8 5 0 3 5/3
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 4 3 1 0 3/0
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 10 6 2 2 6/2
Total 71 41 16 14 41/14
thus were in striking contrast to the perceptions before the 1990s as justifiably
presented by Shambaugh.
To repeat the process regarding articles on specific fields in U.S. economy,
refer to Table 6.7.
When we look at articles on specific fields in the U.S. economy, the pic-
ture is quite different from Table 6.6. In one journal (Guoji Wenti Yanjiu),
the U.S. economy was presented as simply negative, and in another three
(Zhanlue yu Guanli, Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao, and Xiandai Guoji Guanxi),
it was presented as neutral. As too few relevant articles in these four journals
were available in the sample, I would say the image of U.S. economy in these
articles was non-representative. If we combine all the articles across the
various journals, we may still find that an overwhelming number of articles
conveyed a positive rather than a negative perception of the performance of
the U.S. economy in various specific fields. If we further combine articles on
the overall U.S. economy and those on specific fields of it, we may conclude
Table 6.7 Chinese Perception of the Performance of the U.S. Economy (2)
Positive-Negative
Journal Sub-total Positive Neutral Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 32 17 11 4 17/4
Zhanlue yu Guanli 4 1 2 1 1/1
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 45 33 3 9 33/9
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu 1 0 0 1 0/1
Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao 2 1 0 1 1/1
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 5 2 1 2 2/2
Total 89 54 17 18 54/18
134 Chapter 6
Table 6.8 Chinese Perception of the Performance of the U.S. Economy (3)
Positive/
Journal Total Overall Specific Positive Neutral Negative Negative
Ratio
Meiguo Yanjiu 51 19 32 24 21 6 24/6
Zhanlue yu
Guanli 5 1 4 2 2 1 2/1
Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi 74 29 45 52 6 16 52/16
Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu 9 8 1 5 0 4 5/4
Waijiao Xueyuan
Xuebao 6 4 2 4 1 1 4/1
Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi 15 10 5 8 3 4 8/4
Total 160 71 89 95 33 32 95/32
that a great majority of articles in each of these journals, except Guoji Wenti
Yanjiu, still conveyed a perception of prosperity (see Table 6.8). This conclu-
sion is supported by the reasoning that in evaluating the Chinese perception
of the United States’ economic performance as a whole, articles focusing on
the overall economy should be regarded as carrying more weight than articles
on specific fields.
To better understand the Chinese perception of the performance of the
U.S. economy, it is advisable to go into further detail. In the following, I will
first present the positive Chinese description of the United States’ economic
performance, then focus on the negative one, and finally combine the two for
an overall assessment. The following analysis will be based only on articles
on the overall U.S. economy.
1. The United States’ achievements in science and technology had long been the
object of Chinese admiration, and continued to fascinate Chinese scholars
in the 1990s. They pointed out that the United States’ lead in science and
technology had increased in the 1990s, and it now led other countries by far
in this area. For instance, “the United States’ computer software accounted
for 59 percent in the world in 1985, and 70 percent in 1992.”7
2. Regarding traditional industries like automobile, steel etc., Chinese authors
observed that the United States in the 1990s had fully recovered its com-
petitiveness. Japan had already lost its leading position in manufacturing,
and “the United States’ production rate in this field was higher than Japan’s
and Germany’s by 17 percent and 21 percent respectively. At the same
time, its labor cost was lower than these two countries by 20 percent and
30 percent respectively.”8
3. U.S. achievements in agriculture were also regarded as extraordinary,
since “the United States was able to feed its entire population with a mere
2.6 percent of its labor force. In China over one-third of the labor worked
in the agricultural sector.”9
4. The United States was not only perceived as having greatly increased its in-
vestments in fixed assets, especially in information technology equipment,
136 Chapter 6
Chinese authors in the sample often compared the United States’ eco-
nomic performance with that of other countries, and quite a few Chinese
scholars regarded the U.S. economy as doing much better than Europe and
Japan. One scholar pointed out that in micro, medium, and macro levels, the
U.S. economy surpassed all other developed countries.15. One major reason
the U.S. economy was considered as doing better than other major Western
countries was its growth rate. Chinese authors repeatedly emphasized that the
U.S. growth rate had obviously been higher than that of other major Western
countries, was often higher than all the other major Western countries, and
was occasionally surpassed only by one of the major Western countries.
Another important area in which Chinese authors perceived a better per-
formance of the U.S. economy than that of other countries was its competi-
tiveness. Chinese authors pointed out that the United States greatly improved
its international competitiveness in the 1990s. Several scholars in the sample
mentioned that the United States was either obviously more competitive than
other major industrialized countries or was actually the most competitive
Chinese Perceptions ofthe American Economy 137
the past was largely immune to recession, this time also suffered. Real estate,
which suffered little in the past from recession and which usually has a dif-
ferent cycle, this time not only fell into a recession, but one that occurred at
the same time as the general economic recession. One author summarized
the woes in U.S. economy during this period as 3 highs and 3 lows: high
financial deficit, high trade deficit, and high national debt; low saving, low
accumulation, and low investment. But some others pointed out that this was
just a moderate recession. Some Chinese authors were pessimistic about the
prospects for a quick recovery from this recession. They pointed out that the
two traditional approaches to dealing with recession may not work well this
time. Interest rates were already too low to be lowered any further, and a high
national debt made it difficult to stimulate the economy through increasing
government expenditure.22
When the U.S. economy began to recover from the recession, some Chi-
nese authors were not optimistic about its prospects. One pointed out that “20
months after the recession ended, the U.S. economy was still no good; unem-
ployment was still increasing” and the economy went up and down. Another
pointed out that it was a recovery without an increase in employment, and the
U.S. government faced serious difficulties in the management of the macro-
economy. The U.S. economic structure was in urgent need of adjustment.
There were more and more trade disputes with foreign countries, and the
United States’ competitiveness in manufacturing industry was declining.23
Some scholars related this recession to the famous U.S. decline thesis: the
United States’ superiority was decreasing—in GNP, per capita GNP, economic
growth, foreign trade, foreign reserves, status as a creditor/debtor nation, and
science and technology. The United States was declining, and Japan was
an emerging economic big power, with adequate capital, and sophisticated
applied science and technology. “The United States’ share of GDP in the
Western world declined from 52.59 percent in 1960 to 33.2 percent in 1990,”
and it “turned from the largest creditor country to the largest debtor country.”
As late as 1995, one scholar still argued that the process of relative decline in
U.S. economic power would continue on a long-term basis, although he also
mentioned that the United States was still the sole superpower, and would
remain so into the foreseeable future.24
When we consider the Chinese perceptions of the United States’ economic
performance as a whole, we may conclude that the dominant Chinese per-
ception in the 1990s was that U.S. economy was doing very well. First, as
demonstrated in Tables 6.3 and 6.5, many more articles were optimistic than
pessimistic about the U.S. economy. Second, articles optimistic about U.S.
economy covered the most part of the 1990s while articles pessimistic about
it covered mostly the brief recession in the early 1990s. Besides, articles
optimistic about the U.S. economy tended to use highly enthusiastic terms to
Chinese Perceptions ofthe American Economy 139
describe its success while articles pessimistic about U.S. economy often used
moderate terms to describe the recession.
As the dominant picture of the U.S. economy for the Chinese was highly
positive, in this section, I will present the Chinese explanations of why the
U.S. economy had been so successful and ignore their interpretations of the
United States’ economic problems in the early 1990s. In accordance with the
inferential logic in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, the discussion can be divided into two
categories: reasons not closely associated with capitalism and reasons closely
associated with capitalism. I will base the discussion in this section only on
articles on the overall performance of the U.S. economy.
A. Reasons not closely associated with capitalism. In explaining why the
U.S. economy had been so successful, Chinese authors often pointed to
things not closely associated with the United States’ capitalist system.
Their explanations tended to fall into the following four categories.
important reason for the success of the U.S. economy. They argued that
the United States was able to achieve scientific management through
management reform or renovation. The United States’ successful man-
agement of its economy included adjustment of its overall economic
structure, adjustment in specific industries, micro-level enterprise re-
form, re-organization, innovation, improving working equipment, etc.
Big business annexations and economies of scale, better government-
enterprise cooperation, and coordination of various sectors in the na-
tional economy were considered as among the reasons contributing to
the United States’ prosperity. The United States’ appropriate financial
and monetary policy and its industrial development policy were also re-
garded as having contributed to the United States’ economic success.
4. Others. In addition to the above three major categories, quite a few
Chinese authors pointed to peace dividends—reduction in military
expenditure after the end of the Cold War—as an important explana-
tion. Other explanations included the result of the economic cycle,
hard working, always having a sense of crisis, “supporting medium and
small enterprises, protecting agriculture, improving infrastructure,”25
and rich natural resources.
B. Reasons closely associated with capitalism. In explaining the United
States’ economic success, some authors also pointed to things closely as-
sociated with capitalism. They included mainly a free and sophisticated
market system, little state intervention in economy, and a legal system
supporting the functioning of the market system. More details regarding
system-related reasons accounting for the United States’ economic pros-
perity will be discussed in the next section.
States’ lack of better results. Occasionally, Chinese authors argued that China
should not learn from the United States. On the whole, the overall enthusi-
astic portrayal of the United States’ economic success can be regarded as an
implicit endorsement of learning from the United States. Let us probe into
the details to see what Chinese authors accepted or rejected with regard to
the United States’ economic management and its economic system. In the fol-
lowing, I will focus mainly on aspects related to the United States’ economic
system.
System-Related Learning
Among the 33 articles on the U.S. economy touching specifically on the
topic of whether China should learn from the United States, 14 articles con-
tained information regarding Chinese authors’ assessment of the capitalist
system. They can be grouped under four broad categories: market system,
private property, legal system for a capitalist economy, and other trappings
of capitalism.
Chinese authors generally accepted the merit of the market economy sys-
tem. In explaining why the United States was able to achieve great success in
economic development, Su Ge argued that the market economy system was
one reason.26 Similarly, Wang Hao and Xing Daoyong explained that it was
the sophisticated market that led to continuing breakthroughs in science and
technology, and new productive forces which ensured the sustained growth of
the U.S. economy. They argued that “it is especially important for China to
establish and bring to perfection a market economy system.”27 In discussing
the performance of the U.S. economy in specific fields, Chinese authors often
revealed their preference for a market economy system. Guan Li and Liu
Ruling attributed the rapid development of the United States’ risk investment,
among other things, to a consummate market environment.28 In discussing
the United States’ IRA and reform of the retirement system in China, Xiao
Chen suggested turning the retirement problem over to society rather than
having the government take care of it, thus moving from a socialist to a more
capitalist problem solving approach.29 Wei Wei remarked with admiration
that “the United States has a most sophisticated market economy, actually
a model market economy, and China should learn from the United States in
some aspects of its economic system.”30 Chinese authors’ attribution of U.S.
economic prosperity to its capitalist market system was also apparent in quite
a number of other articles in the sample.
One key feature of a socialist economic system is state ownership of the
means of production, while one key feature of a capitalist economic system
is the private ownership of them. To advocate protection of property rights in
142 Chapter 6
In the above discussion, we can see that the overwhelming Chinese prefer-
ence was to move toward a more market-oriented economic system. This
perception, ironically, was also present when Chinese authors argued that in
some respects China should not learn from the United States.
When they sometimes insisted that China should not copy some U.S.
practices exactly, the reason was usually not because they regarded the U.S.
practices as unsatisfactory, but because China was not yet in the position to
adopt the U.S. model. Regarding, for example, whether China should copy
the United States’ IRA, one Chinese author lamented that China could not yet
adopt this approach because the IRA “set strict requirements on a country’s
market environment, financial environment, the quality of tax-payers, and the
quality of the public authorities.”35
China’s current social and economic systems had also been mentioned as
reasons why China could not copy U.S. practice exactly, for instance, in the
management of state-owned enterprises and in the management of the central
bank. But in the case of the latter, Chinese authors also pointed out that the
U.S. practice was the direction in which China should move, changing China-
style direct control into U.S.-style indirect control. Again, China was seen as
not yet able to do so only because conditions were not yet ripe. In another
article about commercial banking, the author pointed out that because all the
commercial banks in the United States were private, China could not exactly
copy the U.S. pattern. The author, however, also pointed out a middle ground
for China’s state to manage the economy in a more market-oriented way:
through shares owned by the state.36 In one article, the author did mention the
different economic and political systems in China and the United States as a
reason why China could not copy exactly the U.S. approach. But as the author
mentioned nothing about why China should stick to its own system, it gave
an impression that the author just wanted to take China’s local conditions into
consideration, and did not point to any merit in China’s existing system.37
Some authors pointed out aspects of the United States which China should
never copy whatever the change in China’s domestic conditions, such as
internal exploitation and oppression and foreign aggression.38 Here we see
remnants of Marxist thinking among some Chinese observers.
On the whole, when Chinese authors argued that China should not copy
some U.S. economic practices, they did not reject the United States’ eco-
nomic system per se. They still regarded U.S. practice as the direction in
which China should move. When they mentioned that China should not learn
from the United States in some respects, they more often regretted China’s
144 Chapter 6
not being in a position to adopt U.S. practice than they rejected the U.S.
approach for its own sake. Throughout the sample, abundant evidence was
available about how China should learn from the United States.
in the 1990s was perceived as representing the direction the rest of the world
would follow. One author cited President Clinton’s speech approvingly: the
United States’ “new economy” symbolized the future direction of the world
economy, and would have a profound influence on the world economy. The
author pointed out that the significance of the information revolution could
be compared to that of the industrial revolution several hundred years earlier.
It was perceived as being beneficial not only to Western countries but also to
developing countries. In the case of China, the United States’ new economy
was perceived as offering an approach and an opportunity for China to main-
tain sustained economic growth into the 21st century.41
The status of the U.S. dollar was also often associated with the well-being
of other countries. Chinese authors believed that the relative stability of the
U.S. dollar was undoubtedly beneficial to the world economy. One author
claimed that one reason why the world economy was so prosperous in the
1960s was the stable exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and other major
Western currencies, and the successive dollar crises in the 1970s invariably
exerted a negative impact on the world economy. When the dollar was stable
in the 1980s, the world economy registered eight years of sustained growth.
The author predicted therefore that the dollar crisis in mid-1990s would
undoubtedly suppress world economic growth.44 The stability of the U.S.
dollar was associated with the expansion of world trade, since it was the most
important currency for international trade. Chinese authors asserted that the
stability of the U.S. dollar was important not only to developed countries
but also to developing countries. If the U.S. dollar depreciated, developing
countries would suffer heavy losses in their foreign reserves. The dollar crisis
in the mid-1990s again caused heavy losses to China because it had heavy
debt in Japanese yen. Chinese authors deplored the fact that in the 1986–1994
period, whenever there was a dollar depreciation, China suffered losses vary-
ing from one billion to several billion. The authors expected that the dollar
crisis in the mid-1990s would cost China at least US$10 billion.45
On the whole, the overwhelming majority of Chinese authors making
relevant observations welcomed economic prosperity in the United States,
regarding it as beneficial not only to other countries in the world, but also
to China. Some Chinese authors in the sample, however, also perceived the
growing importance of euro in the world economy as a positive development.
One author believed that the emergence of the euro might lead to change
in the international currency system, was favorable to the stability of inter-
national currency exchange rates, and might balance the hegemony of U.S.
dollar. He nonetheless was quick to point out that if the euro could compete
with the U.S. dollar, the United States “might give up dollar depreciation as
an approach to balance its trade deficit, and resort to other approaches. And
if the new approaches were strongly protectionist, it might arouse imitation
in other countries.” Such a scenario was considered unfavorable to China’s
efforts to participate in international economic competition.46
CONCLUSION
To see what conclusion we can draw from the evidence presented above, let
us first summarize the findings in this chapter. In terms of the Chinese percep-
tion of the market economy, evidence presented in this chapter indicates that
most Chinese scholars enthusiastically embraced the market economy not
Chinese Perceptions ofthe American Economy 147
only as the mainstream of world economic practice, but also as a highly suc-
cessful approach to economic management. Chinese scholars not only had a
positive assessment of the market economy system as a whole, but they were
also quite positive about the sub-level practices of the system. Even though
they regarded the U.S. economy as not without problems, they seemed to
agree that most of the problems could be solved within the framework of the
system.
As for their assessment of U.S. economic performance, many more articles
focused on the United States’ economic successes than on failures. The
United States was perceived as not only having achieved sustained growth
in the 1990s, but also as being much more competitive than other countries,
especially comparable economies in Europe and Japan. The evidence in this
chapter represents a sharp departure from the perception before the 1990s. It
might be significant to point out that during the Reagan administration, the
United States’ economic success was comparable to that during the Clinton
administration in the 1990s. Thus, it was quite likely that the difference
between the perception presented by Shambaugh and what was presented in
this chapter indicates much more a change in the perceiver (Chinese authors)
than a change in the perceived (the United States’ economic performance).
Chinese authors attributed the United States’ great economic success to
both the United States’ economic system and to factors not necessarily related
to that system. Some scholars regarded the United States’ market economy
system as having played an important role in its success story, but many
more scholars focused on non-system-related factors, which include mainly
the United States’ great emphasis on science and technology, its effective
management of economic relations with other countries, the successful man-
agement of the economy by the U.S. government and businesses, and other
factors such as peace dividends and Americans’ hard work.
Many Chinese scholars straightforwardly advocated learning from the
United States in the area of economic management. They did not hesitate to
recommend adopting U.S. practices closely related with the capitalist eco-
nomic system, especially the market, property rights, the legal background of
market economy, and other practices such as annexation and the stock system.
Many scholars also advised against proceeding too rapidly in adopting U.S.
economic practices. In doing so, however, they usually did not denigrate
the United States’ economic practices, but more often admitted that China’s
local conditions were not yet ripe for hasty acceptance of the United States’
approach.
Chinese scholars on the U.S. economy usually welcomed U.S. economic
prosperity. They had an image of the United States as a leader in world econ-
omy, playing a vitally important role in promoting world prosperity and eco-
nomic liberalization, and setting the direction for the future world economy.
148 Chapter 6
They agreed that when the U.S. economy was prosperous, other countries,
including China, benefited, and when the U.S. economy was in trouble, other
countries, including China, also suffered.
An exploration of the Chinese perceptions of the U.S. economy may shed
light on China’s foreign policy orientation toward the United States. Accord-
ing to the inferential logic of Tables 6.4 and 6.5, given the evidence presented
in this chapter and summarized in the section above, we may conclude that the
economy was quite likely a source of cooperation between the United States
and China and that differences in economic system did not constitute a source
of conflict between the two countries, making it quite likely that convergence
of China’s economic system with the American model would occur.
Notes
Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang he yi Yizhiduxiu” [Why Only the Economy of
the U.S. among Western Countries is Prosperous], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1998),
p. 7; Song Yuhua, “Meiguo Jingji jiang zai Ruanzhuolu,” p. 23.
20. Yu Kexing, “Qian Yi Dangqian Meiguo Jingji Xingshi” [A Tentative Comment
on the United States’ Current Economic Situation], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (Janu-
ary 1991), pp. 4–7; Wang Huaining, “Meiguo Jingji Zhouqi yu Haiwan Weiji” [The
United States’ Economic Cycle and the Gulf Crisis], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March
1991), pp. 46–49; Chu Yukun, “Shi Lun Zhanhou Meiguo Dijiuci Jingji Shuaitui”
[The United States’ Ninth Economic Recession after World War II], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (November 1991), pp. 6–12; Xiao Lian, “Kelindun Jingji Zhengce de Shida
Zhuanbian” [Ten Major Changes in Clinton’s Economic Policy], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (February 1993), pp. 30–39; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji Mianlin de Xin Wenti”
[New Problems Facing the U.S. Economy], Shijie jingji yu Zhengzhi (October 1993),
pp. 6–8; Wang Menghua, “Kelindun Xinjingji Jihua zai Tuixing zhong Shouzu” [Clin-
ton’s New Economic Plan in Difficulty], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (November 1993),
18–20; Zhou Li, “Quanqiuxing Shuaitui jiang hui Daolai? Meiguo de Haishishenlou
ji Shijie de Weixian” [ Is Global Recession Approaching? The United States’ Bubble
Economy and the Danger to the World], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 2000), pp.
76–81; Xie Yao, “Meiguo Zheci Jingji Shuaitui,” pp. 1–8; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri
Jingji Liliang Duibi ji qi Bianhua Qushi” [A Comparison of United States, Europe,
and Japan’s Economic Powers and Their Trends], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Winter 1992),
pp. 13–18; Xie Yao, “Lue Lun Meiguo Zheci Jingji Fusu ji qi Fazhan Qushi” [A Brief
Comment on the Economic Recovery in the United States and Its Future Prospects],
Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1993), pp. 20–27; Jin Dexiang, “Meiguo he yi Xiangdui
Shuailuo?” [Why Does the United States Suffer from a Relative Decline?], Xiandai
Guoji Guanxi (February 1992), pp. 13–19; Wang Huihong, “Kelindun neng Jiejue
Meiguo,” pp. 9–14; Chen Baosen, “Mianlin Tiaozhan xia de Jingji Tiaozheng: 1992
Nian Meiguo Zongtong Jingji Baogao Pingjie” [Comments on Economic Report of
the President 1992], Meiguo Yanjiu (March 1992), pp. 7–25; Chen Baosen, “Meiguo
Liangzhong Jingji Zhexue de Xinjiaoliang: Jian Lun Liangdang Yusuanzhan” [New
Trial of Strength Between Two American Economic Philosophies], Meiguo Yanjiu
(Summer 1996), pp. 93–109.
21. Yu Kexing, “Qian Yi Dangqian Meiguo Jingji,” p. 4.
22. Xie Yao, “Meiguo Zheci Jingji Shuaitui,” pp. 2–5; Wu Tianbo, “Mei Ou Ri
Jingji Liliang Duibi,” p. 15; Wang Huihong, “Kelindun neng Jiejue Meiguo,” p. 9;
Chu Yukun, “Shi Lun Zhanhou Meiguo,” pp. 11–12.
23. Xie Yao, “Lue Lun Meiguo Zheci Jingji Fusu,” p. 20; Ji Wei, “Meiguo Jingji
Mianlin de Xin Wenti,” pp. 6–8.
24. Jin Dexiang, “Meiguo he yi Xiangdui Shuailuo?” p. 13; Huang Su’an,
“Meiyuan Bianzhi yu Meiguo Jingji Shili Xiangdui Shuailuo” [Devaluation of the
U.S. Dollar and the United States’ Relative Economic Decline], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Autumn 1995), pp. 37–40.
25. Sun Jingshui, “Meiguo Jiyuexing Jingji Zengzhang Fangshi de Jingyan ji
Jiejian” [The United States’ Integrated Economic Growth Pattern: Its Experience and
Relevance to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1997), p. 35.
Chinese Perceptions ofthe American Economy 151
26. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei de Lishi Jingyan” [The Historical Experience
of the Take-off of the American Economy], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 1994),
p. 63.
27. Wang Hao and Xing Daoyong, “Qian Tan Meiguo ‘Xinjingji’ ji qi Jiejian Yiyi”
[A Tentative Talk on the United States’ “New Economy” and Its Lessons to Us], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1998), p. 40.
28. Guan Li and Liu Ruling, “Meiguo Fengxian Touzi de Fazhan Licheng ji qi
Jingyan Jiaoxun” [The Development of the United States’ Risk Investment, Its Expe-
rience and Lessons], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1998), p. 53.
29. Xiao Chen, “Meiguo ‘Geren Tuixiu Zhanghu(IRA)’ yu Zhongguo Shehui
Baozhang de ‘Jinronghua’” [The United States’ IRA and the Financialization of
China’s Social Security], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (February 1996), pp. 41–42.
30. Wei Wei, “Zhong Mei Jingji Zhuyao Zhibiao,” p. 69.
31. Li Li, “Guojia Ganyu zai Mei Ri Jingji Fazhan zhong Zuoyong zhi Bijiao”
[A Comparison of the Role of State Intervention in the Economic Development of
the United States and Japan], Zhanlue yu Guanli (May/June 1995), pp. 21–22; Ma
Hongxia, “Meiguo Danyi Yinhang Zhidu de Gaige ji qi Qishi” [The Reform of the
United States’ Unit Banking System and Its Lessons to Us], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
(January 1995), p. 28; Guan Li and Liu Ruling, “Meiguo Fengxian Touzi,” p. 53.
32. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei,” p. 62.
33. Li Li, “Guojia Ganyu zai Mei Ri Jingji Fazhan,” p. 17.
34. Xiao Chen, “Lun Meiguo de ‘Fazhi Sheji’ dui qi Jingji Xiaolu de Zhichi” [On
the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in America], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 70–87.
35. Xiao Chen, “Meiguo ‘Geren Tuixiu Zhanghu (IRA),’” p. 42.
36. Ma Hongxia, “Meiguo Danyi Yinhang Zhidu,” p. 28.
37. Ye Xiangsong, [Relevance of the United States’ State-Owned Businesses’
Management System to Our Country’s Reform on State-Owned Business Manage-
ment System], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 1996), p. 66.
38. Su Ge, “Meiguo Jingji Tengfei,” p.63.
39. Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, and Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” pp. 9–10; Chen
Baosen, “Meiguo Jingji de Xianzhuang Wenti ji qi Shijie Yingxiang” [The Current
Conditions and Problems of the U.S. Economy and the Impact on the World], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 2000), p. 32.
40. Zhang Linjun, [The Direction of the United States’ Trade Strategy after the
Cold War], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1996), p. 42.
41. Lang Ping, “Qian Xi Meiguo ‘Xinjingji,’” p. 30; Zeng Bingxi, “Meiguo ‘Xin-
jingji’ ji qi dui Shijie Jingji de Yingxiang” [The United States’ “New Economy” and
Its Impact on the World Economy], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Autumn 1998), pp. 45–46.
42. Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang,” p. 11; Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji reng
chu,” p. 60; Tao Jian, Gu Wenyan, Ke Juhan, “Meiguo Jingji Jinru,” p. 10.
43. Gu Wenyan, “Meiguo Jingji zai Xifang,” p. 11.
44. Guo Shixian, “Qian Xi xin de Yici Meiyuan Weiji” [A Tentative Analysis of
the New U.S. Dollar Crisis], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1994), p. 20.
152 Chapter 6
45. Qin Liufang and Guo Shixian, “Meiyuan Weiji ji Wo Guo de Xiangguan
Zhanlue Gouxiang” [The U.S. Dollar Crisis and China’s Relevant Strategic Think-
ing], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (June 1995), pp. 16–17.
46. Zhou Xin, “Ping Oumeng Huobi Yitihua yu Mei, Ri Jinrongye Dachongzu”
[On the Integration of EU Currency and the Reconstitution of the Financial Industry in
the United States and Japan], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 1998), pp. 21–22.
Chapter 7
153
154 Chapter 7
the executive branch of the U.S. government, including various positions in it,
the personal character of leaders in it, the policy-making process, factions and
opinion groups in various administrations, etc. The pluralist school tended to
focus on the Congress, non-governmental actors (think tanks, interest groups,
etc.), and the electorate. They were interested in examining the liberal-
conservative orientation in American politics, and how a shift from liberalism
to conservatism or vice versa affected American domestic or foreign policies.
According to Shambaugh, non-governmental actors in the Chinese descrip-
tion included caituans, think tanks, interest groups, etc. Shambaugh explored
both Marxist and non-Marxist analysis of these groups, with the Marxist
approach focusing on caituans’ connections with other actors (such as politi-
cal parties, media, and schools) thought to be influential in the policy-making
process, while non-Marxist groups focused on more substantive issues such
as the policy orientations of various think tanks, interest groups, etc.
With regard to electoral politics, the Marxist school claimed that elections
were but futile exercises, examples of “sham democracy,” because both
parties serve monopoly capitalists. The non-Marxist approach to studying
American electoral politics tended to follow the ups and downs of election
campaigns and the different platforms of the candidates, voters’ preferences,
and so on. As time went by, Chinese authors were seen by Shambaugh as
becoming more and more sophisticated in their coverage of political cam-
paigns in the United States. By the end of the 1980s, very little Marxist
commentary appeared in the Chinese press regarding elections in the United
States.
METHODOLOGY
Sources
This chapter explores Chinese perceptions of American politics by examin-
ing all the articles on American politics published in the 1991–2000 decade
in the six mainstream Chinese journals on international relations identified in
Chapter 2.2 Table 7.1 lists the number of articles in each journal on American
politics constituting the sample.
Facets of If Inferences
Perception
1. What were If Chinese scholars regarded It is less likely that differences in
the Chinese democracy as a desirable political system would be a source of
perceptions of form of governance, conflict between the two countries,
democracy? and convergence of China’s political
system more or less toward the
American model would be possible,
though not inevitable.
If Chinese scholars regarded It is likely that differences in political
democracy as a problematic system would be a source of conflict
form of governance, between the two countries, and
convergence of China’s political system
toward the American model would be
less likely.
2. What If election outcome was The U.S. political system was perceived
determines considered to be determined to represent mainly a handful of elite
the outcome mainly by money, or by the rather than the broad masses, and
of elections influence of the rich and the American democracy worked more to
in the United powerful, deceive voters than to serve them.
States? If election outcome was The American political system was
considered to be determined considered likely to be a fair one, and
mainly by voters’ will, American democracy was considered
to be genuine.
3. What kind If Chinese scholars perceived It is more likely that China regarded
of people more negative than positive the American political system as
emerged traits in most major unacceptable or repulsive.
victorious American politicians,
in American If Chinese scholars perceived It is more likely that they regarded
elections? more positive than negative the American political system as
traits in most major acceptable or laudatory.
American politicians,
4. Whose If the American political The system should be regarded as
interests did system was regarded as unfair, repressive, and undesirable, and
the American serving the interests of only a such a system might well be a source
political handful of the rich, a ruling of conflict between the perceivers’
system serve? class, etc., state and the target state.
If the American political The system should be regarded as fair,
system was regarded as desirable, and perhaps imitable, and
serving the interests of most such a system is less likely to become
people in the country rather a source of conflict between the
than only of a handful of perceivers’ state and the target state.
elite, or ruling class,
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 157
can explore how American leaders are elected according to Chinese scholars’
presentations, and as for the outcome, we can explore, in the eyes of Chinese
observers, what kind of leaders were elected and whose interests the political
system served.
As for the second major difference between the two countries’ political sys-
tems, we can examine how checks and balances in the American political sys-
tem were perceived. In other words, did it work well or was it problematic?
Finally, it is important to explore whether the overall perceptions of Ameri-
can politics were positive or negative, and whether Chinese authors regard it
as desirable to learn from the American political system. Table 7.2 lists the
aspects of Chinese perceptions of American politics this chapter is going to
explore.
Inferences
Inferences concerning China’s foreign policy orientation can be made from
studying each of the facets of the Chinese perceptions of American politics
listed in Table 7.2, and presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
158 Chapter 7
Among the 85 articles in the sample on U.S. politics, 47 articles more or less
discussed how U.S. leaders were elected. Some articles focused exclusively
on this topic, and others provided unambiguous information regarding their
position as to the determinants of the election outcome. According to Chinese
authors in the sample, the rich and powerful could affect election outcomes
in the United States in three ways. First, top elites could often help increase
voters’ support for a candidate and sometimes they could influence a candi-
date’s inclination to carry on the campaign. Second, the rich and powerful
could influence election outcome through campaign contributions. Third, the
rich enjoyed greater voting convenience than the poor. But materials in the
sample also indicated that the extent of top elites’ influence depended largely
on whether the elites themselves were popular among voters, and voting con-
venience for the rich constituted only a minor source of injustice. The greatest
source of injustice, according to the authors in the sample, was the role of
money in election campaigns.
Three positions were possible as to the role of money in U.S. elections.
First, election outcomes were determined mainly by money. Second, both
money and voters’ will played an important role. And third, money played
a limited role in American elections and it was mainly the voters’ will that
determined the outcome of elections. Table 7.5 lists the number of articles
among the 47 holding each of the three different positions.
From the table, we can see that among the 47 relevant articles, 4 held that
United States election outcomes were determined primarily by money, 12
suggested that they were determined by both money and the voters’ will, and
the overwhelming 31 articles suggested that they were determined mainly by
the voters’ will.6 The fact that articles holding different positions appeared
relatively evenly across the 1991–2000 decade in different journals indicated
that each of the three positions was not an occasional occurrence by some
idiosyncratic authors in a particular journal in a particular time period. Thus
with regard to the process of elections in the United States, an overwhelming
majority of Chinese authors in the 1990s regarded the U.S. democracy as a
genuine democracy, rather than a sham democracy as presented by Sham-
baugh when he described the Chinese perceptions, especially in the early
1980s. In the following, I will briefly discuss each of the three positions
concerning the outcome of U.S. elections.
quite a number of invalid votes, thus “violating some citizens’ voting rights.”
Third, the Electoral College system might result in the ridiculous consequence
of a candidate not winning in an election even though he might have won the
popular vote. In addition to the above “flaws” in American democracy, the
article argued that the role of money to a great extent corrupted the election.
Two instances were mentioned to illustrate the corruption. One natural gas
company contributed $500,000 to George W. Bush, and “Bush compensated
the company by reducing the limitation on harmful gas emissions.” As one
petroleum company was one of Gore’s principal contributors, “Gore ignored
objections from others and gave permission to the company for the use of 21
hectares of state-owned land.”
Al Gore. The almost equal importance of money and voters’ will had been
dramatically illustrated by author’s conclusion regarding the two candidates’
approximately equal chances of being elected. Al Gore’s strong point was
the economy and people’s satisfaction. George W. Bush’s advantage was the
support of big companies and the rich.
Dole was portrayed as a dull, old man, mediocre in public speaking and
unable to inspire voters’ enthusiasm. But Chinese authors’ perceptions of
Dole were generally more positive than negative, since he was also rec-
ognized as having extensive experience in politics, widespread influence,
and a profound political foundation. What was more, according to Chinese
authors, Dole was untainted in character, was free from any scandals, and
was “one of very few respectable politicians in American politics.”15 Thus
on the whole, Dole was perceived as having mediocre capability but out-
standing character.
Clinton was described as the opposite of Dole. He was young and ener-
getic, with good manners and oratory talents. Chinese scholars tended to
marvel at Clinton’s remarkable capabilities. As a student, he attended the best
schools in the world and excelled there. As a governor, he was not only one
of the youngest in the United States, but also one of the best. As a politician,
he was flexible and pragmatic, and was able to accommodate various groups
with competing interests. As a candidate, he was a highly skillful campaigner,
and his Electoral College votes were way above those of his competitors. As a
president, he managed the U.S. economy so well that the United States under
his administration enjoyed the longest prosperity after the Second World War,
and European leaders rushed to the United States to learn from him. As a
humanist, he believed in racial harmony and a just society, was sympathetic
to the poor and minorities, and was hugely popular among them. And as a
fighter, he had a strong will, and again and again was able to survive the most
severe crisis.
Again in contrast to Dole, Clinton was described as heavily involved in
scandals, which was seen more as a factor affecting his political career than
as an unpardonable defect in his character. Not a single Chinese author took
advantage of him as an opportunity to revile the U.S. political system for
allowing such a scandal-ridden politician to succeed. Instead, they tended to
downplay Clinton as an unfaithful husband, and to focus on him more as a
successful president.
George W. Bush was described as somewhat like a combination of Dole
and Clinton. When he was young, he had Clinton’s character and Dole’s
capabilities. At that time, he liked mischief, and indulged himself in drink-
ing, parties, and girls. And he was engaged in various jobs, which he left with
unimpressive records. After he grew older, he seemed to have completely
changed, and to have developed Dole’s character and Clinton’s capabilities.
Now he was a devout Christian, faithful to his wife and true to his word. He
had been one of the most successful governors in the United States, and he
was hugely popular among not only elites but also poor people and especially
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 165
served the interest more of the rich than of the poor. And the rich and interest
groups had disproportionate influence in this system.19
Moving farther away from the above position, some authors were of the
view that the U.S. political system served the interest of both the rich and the
poor, with the Republicans more inclined to serve the interest of the rich and
Democrats more sensitive to that of the poor.20
In the sample of 85 articles, with the exception of 13, most articles pro-
vided information relevant to the question of whose interest the U.S. political
system served. Quite a number of authors presented an image that the U.S.
political system served the interest of the United States as a whole. One arti-
cle argued that the goal of the United States’ Founding Fathers in designing
the political system was to promote democracy in the country and prevent the
monopoly of power by any particular group. In an article comparing the plat-
forms of George W. Bush and Al Gore, the author argued that both of them
aimed at maintaining economic prosperity, promoting education and high
technology, enhancing the United States’ CNP, and strengthening national
security. In yet another article about Clinton’s victory in the 1992 presiden-
tial election, the author pointed out that domestically Clinton would focus on
solving economic problems, and in foreign policy, he would try to promote
the United States’ leadership role and American values in the world.21 Quite
a number of other articles took the similar position that the U.S. political
system served the interest of the United States as a whole.
In a similar vein, several articles presented the image that the American
political system was designed to serve the interest of the American people. Su
Pengfei explained with great admiration how the system of local autonomy
in the United States ensured that local governments closely follow the wishes
of local residents. Zhang Minqian argued that the U.S. political system was
such that corruption was very difficult and government officials were more
likely to be public servants than overlords.22 Many other scholars took a simi-
lar position.
For the greatest number of articles, the American political system was seen as
serving the interest of voters. According to Zhou Qi, popular sovereignty was
the guiding principle of the United States as a state, and it was voters who
were the masters of the state. Wang Guang demonstrated that voters’ wishes as
revealed in the 1994 midterm election forced Clinton to adopt some of the
conservative policies of the Republican Party, while at the same time attending
to “the wishes of the Union, the poor, minorities, and women.” Bi Yunhong
claimed that politicians cared a lot about messages from voters, which made
Clinton more conservative than before regarding welfare, abortion, the size of
the government, and so forth, and also made Dole accept some Republican
168 Chapter 7
Table 7.6 Whose Interests Does the American Political System Serve?
conservatives’ opinions, and at the same time become more moderate regard-
ing abortion.23 Many other articles can be classified under this category.
Chinese authors noted that the American political system not only served
the interest of the majority of people, it was also careful to protect the interest
of minorities, especially women and blacks. Thinkers such as Thoreau and
Hayek who emphasized the importance of individualism consolidated the
belief that in the U.S. political system, everyone’s interest would be respected
and protected. Some authors present an image of the U.S. political system
more often serving the interest of the poor and ordinary people than those of
the rich and privileged.
As discussed above, regarding the question of whose interest the United
States’ political system served, Chinese authors gave a wide variety of
answers. But what were the dominant perceptions? Table 7.6 lists the number
of articles holding each of the positions.
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 169
The second of the two major differences between the U.S. political system
and China’s is the division of powers in the American political system and the
concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party in China. As one Chi-
nese author put it, “the principle of checks and balances is the most important
feature of the American political system.”24 It therefore would be advisable
to study how Chinese authors perceived this feature in the American political
system.
Chinese observers noticed the checks and balances among the different
branches of the American government. They found that the Congress in the
United States had substantial power, not only in domestic affairs but also in
foreign affairs. Most relevant articles in the sample offered information about
the checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches,
but occasionally some authors also discussed the role of checks and balances
by the judicial branch. They noticed that the system of checks and balances
seemed to tie the hands of government leaders, rendering decision making
quite difficult, sometimes even impossible.
170 Chapter 7
As for the overall assessment of the United States’ checks and balances
system, Chinese authors pointed out that this system had both merits and
defects. Quite a few authors argued that checks and balances induced more
moderate policies by the government. Gao Huandong pointed out that the
pattern of divided government reflects the American people’s preference for
moderate policies as opposed to radical political changes. Lu Qichang and
others mentioned that though President Clinton was a Democrat, he took
care to move away from the Democratic Party’s traditional liberal policies
and accepted many Republican policies regarding tax reduction, abortion,
welfare, etc. Jin Canrong noticed that Clinton after 1995 was more receptive
to some of the Republicans’ policies which were popular among the people,
and as a result, the policies of the two parties had converged. Pan Tongwen
explained that Clinton made concessions to the Republicans mainly because
the Republicans had become the majority party in Congress.25
Another perceived advantage of the checks and balances system was that it
provides opportunities for more people to be involved in the decision making
process. In the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, because of
a lawsuit by Senator Goldwater, all three branches of the government were
involved in the decision making. A more salient case is the passage of the
China PNTR, which drew into the process not only the executive and legisla-
tive branches, but also an unprecedented number of interest groups across the
nation, resulting in a final decision reflecting the wishes of the nation as a
whole. Because of checks and balances, the U.S. government was forced to
be more attentive to people’s preferences. Several scholars pointed out that
as a result of the growing influence of the Republicans in Congress, Clinton
had to improve the image of the Democratic Party and consolidate its sup-
port among workers, the minorities and women. Clinton’s greater efforts to
cooperate with the Republicans after the 1994 mid-term election were also
perceived as catering to voters’ wishes.26
Most importantly, however, the system of checks and balances was per-
ceived as enhancing the quality of decision making. The main mechanism
was that Congress’s supervision helped avoid mistakes.27 Congress was
perceived as helping to “sharpen the decision makers’ thinking,” so that they
would consider things more thoroughly and more comprehensively. When
the same party controlled both the White House and Congress, the executive
branch’s decision making was less careful.28
Chinese authors also noticed that the checks and balances system had
serious problems. It seemed to be strong in obstruction and weak in con-
struction. The biggest problem was that it affected government efficiency in
that it made it very difficult to reach decisions and to implement policies.
One Chinese author basically regarded the checks and balances system as a
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 171
failure, complaining that Congress in the United States was so powerful and
the checks and balances system so problematic that the U.S. government had
almost lost the ability to make decisions. The worst example of this ineffi-
ciency was the government shutdown which in mid-1990s lasted almost one
month, and at one time 1.05 million federal employees were unable to go
to work. Too much checking and balancing was also perceived as making it
difficult to fill numerous important government positions within a time con-
ducive to the normal operation of the government.29
But most Chinese scholars in the sample seemed to regard the checks and
balances system in a much more positive than negative light. They pointed
out that “the American political system has its internal mechanism and rigor
to maintain its vitality” and, unlike the pessimistic view mentioned in the
last paragraph, they did not think that checks and balances caused serious
efficiency problems for the government. One author mentioned that the
executive branch had a lot of ways to bypass the problem of inefficiency.
One way was for the president to resort to executive orders rather than going
to Congress for a law. The presidential staff system was also considered an
effective way of enhancing the efficiency of the government, since the staff
were responsible only to the president and were beyond Congress’s supervi-
sion. Though Congress tried very hard to seize the war-making power, the
president could almost always succeed in launching a war when he deemed
it necessary.30
Besides, Chinese authors pointed out, the two parties in the United States,
or the executive and the legislative branches, had basically similar interests,
and their policy platforms were not much different from each other. They
therefore often had a strong incentive to cooperate so that checks and bal-
ances, though real, did not seriously affect government efficiency. Pressure
from voters also forced leaders from different branches of the government to
keep the practice of checks and balances from getting out of control.31
As a matter of fact, some Chinese authors actually perceived real efficiency
in the checks and balances system. One especially enthusiastic admirer of the
American political system argued that checks and balances were actually the
“automatic mechanism of efficiency,” since they made it very difficult for
a bad idea to become a policy or law, which he regarded as real efficiency
because a wrong policy would be much more costly than slow decision mak-
ing. He also argued that when it came to vital national interests, checks and
balances almost never prevented the U.S. government from making remark-
ably wise decisions, such as the Louisiana Purchase, the Monroe Doctrine,
etc., all of which had brought unbelievably huge benefits to the American
people. Checks and balances were also perceived to prevent lazy, corrupt,
or incompetent officials from getting into important positions, which again
172 Chapter 7
is socially efficient. What was more, checks and balances were regarded as
helpful in promoting political stability and preventing the misuse of power.
Moreover, political stability was probably the greatest source of efficiency
for the country.32
Thus, on the whole, the dominant Chinese perceptions of the system of
checks and balances in the American political system were more positive
than negative. It was perceived as having several major advantages, such
as inducing moderate policies, making decision makers more sensitive to
people’s interests, and improving the quality of decision making. Its only
major perceived defect was lack of efficiency, but many Chinese authors
either regarded the American political system as vigorous enough to keep this
problem under control, or regarded checks and balances as actually increasing
rather than reducing efficiency.
will remain the same: in the authoritative Chinese journals, there were many
more positive articles on American politics than negative ones.
CONCLUSION36
What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented in this chapter?
Let us first of all summarize the findings. Regarding the Chinese perceptions
of democracy, evidence presented in the section “Chinese Perceptions of
Democracy” indicates that Chinese scholars generally accepted democracy
as a laudable form of governance, representing the right direction in human
political development. Some observers enthusiastically embraced democracy,
regarding it as inevitable, while others, though with some reservations as to
actual practices of democracy, nonetheless accepted its basic ideas.
As for whether democracy in the United States was genuine or not, this
chapter has explored the Chinese understanding of how American leaders
were elected, what kind of politicians emerged victorious in the American
political system, and whose interests the American political system served.
Chinese scholars agreed that money did play an important role in American
politics, but their dominant perceptions were that it was mainly the voters’
will that ultimately determined the outcome of elections in the United States.
Chinese scholars on the whole had a much more favorable than unfavorable
image of political leaders elected in the United States, regarding them as
quite capable of managing the country, and their character was acceptable to
most voters. According to some Chinese authors, the United States’ politi-
cal system served the interest of the ruling class, but most Chinese scholars
agreed that this system served the American people as a whole, rich and poor
included.
As for the efficiency of the American political system, i.e., the mechanism
of checks and balances, though some scholars regarded it as too inefficient
in decision making, more of them perceived many more advantages than dis-
advantages in the system, including inducing moderate policies, encouraging
greater participation of various groups in society, and improving the qual-
ity of decision making. Some scholars even perceived real efficiency in the
checks and balances system.
There were many more positive than negative articles in the sample regard-
ing the overall perceptions of the American political system. Though only a
few articles specifically argued for learning from the United States in terms of
the political system, quite a few implicitly endorsed the idea, and the overall
positive presentation of the American political system suggests that Chinese
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 175
authors again, as in the early 20th century, assumed the position that the
American political system offered a viable model for China to emulate.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of exploring
Chinese perceptions of the American political system is to understand China’s
foreign policy orientation regarding the United States. According to the infer-
ential logic spelled out in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, we may conclude that it is quite
likely that China’s political system would converge more or less toward the
American model, and in Chinese eyes, any difference in political system
between the United States and China did not constitute a source of conflict
between the two countries. But the rarity of articles in the sample arguing
specifically for Chinese learning from the United States in terms of political
system indicates that the process of convergence might not be quick.
Notes
6. The 4 articles holding the “by money” position are as follows: Gong Weijing,
“Jianli zai Meiyuan Jichu shang de Meiguo Xuanju” [The U.S. Election Founded on
the Basis of U.S. Dollars], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (December 1992), pp. 41–45;
Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–14; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin
Zongtong Nanchan,” pp. 21–25; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo de Shangceng Jieji” [America’s
Upper Class], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1996), pp. 41–62.
The 31 articles holding the “by voters” position are as follows: Fan Ying,
“Xianru Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan zhi Zheng” [The United States’ Fight over Bud-
get in Deadlock], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1996), pp. 49–53; Dong Xiuli,
“Meiguo Zongtong Xuanju yu Zhong Mei Guanxi” [The United States’ Presidential
Election and China-U.S. Relations], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Autumn 2000), pp.
57–61; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1990 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju ji qi Yingxiang” [The
United States’ Midterm Election in 1990 and Its Impact], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Sum-
mer 1991), pp. 15–20; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1992 Nian de Zongtong Xuanju he
Kelindun Zhengfu de Zhengce Quxiang” [The 1992 Presidential Election in the
United States and Policy Trend of the Clinton Administration], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu
(Spring 1993), pp. 1–5; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju ji qi
Yingxiang” [The United States’ Midterm Election in 1994 and Its Impact], Guoji
Wenti Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 18–22; Zhao Shenggan and Lu Qichang, “Meiguo
Zhongqi Xuanju he Zhengju Qushi” [The United States’ Midterm Election and Politi-
cal Trend], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (January 1991), pp. 60–63; Zhang Xingping,
“Bushi hui Lianren ma?” [Will Bush Be Re-elected?], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (April
1992), pp. 45–47; Jin Canrong, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Zhengju yu Zhengce Zouxi-
ang” [U.S. Politics and Policy Trend after the Presidential Election], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (November 1996), pp. 12, 40–43; Lin Hongyu, “Meiguo Gongzhong Yulun
yu Meiguo dui Hua Zhengce” [Public Opinion in the United States and Its China
Policy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (August 1997), pp. 67–70; Luo Yunli, “Qian Lun
Kelindun Disantiao Daolu dui Xi’ou Shehuiminzhuzhuyi de Yingxiang” [A Tenta-
tive Analysis of the Impact of Clinton’s Third Way on Social Democracy in Western
Europe], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (July 2000), pp. 43–47; Zhao Shenggan, “Meiguo
Zongtong Jingxuan de Xingshi” [The United States’ Presidential Election Situations],
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April 1992), pp. 15–22, 36; Zhao Shenggan and Lu Qichang,
“Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” (December 1994), pp. 26–32; Gao Huandong, “Meiguo
Xinyijie Guohui Liangdang Liliang Duibi ji qi dui Hua Taidu” [The Balance of Power
in the New U.S. Congress and Their Attitude toward China], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(May 1997), pp. 17–19; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi
de Yixie Xianzhu Bianhua” [Some Obvious Changes in the United States’ Bi-Party
Politics after the Cold War], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (September 1997), pp. 7–12; Lu
Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Chuxi” [A Preliminary Analy-
sis of the United States’ Midterm Election], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1998),
pp. 22–24; Lu Qichang, Fu Mengzhi, and Yuan Peng, “Meiguo Zhengzhi Jingji he
Waijiao Xingshi ji Quxiang” [The United States’ Politics, Economy, and Foreign
Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (January/Feb-
ruary 1999), pp. 17–22; Chen Xiangyang, “Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi dui Lengzhan
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 177
hou Zhong Mei Guanxi de Yingxiang” [Domestic Politics in the United States and
Its Impact on China-U.S. Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (December 1999),
pp. 29–31; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan yu Mei Zhong Guanxi” [The United States’
Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 2000),
pp. 9–13; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Minzhudang Zongtong Houxuanren Ge er” [Gore:
The U.S. Presidential Candidate for the Democratic Party], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(August 2000), pp. 39–41; Chen Yu-jun, “Baoshoupai Liyi Jituan yu Gonghedang
Xuanmin Jiegou de Zhuanhua” [Conservative Interest Groups and the Changes in the
Republican Constituency], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1992), pp. 30–51; Jiang Jingsong,
“Lun Meiguo Guohui zhong Duoshudang de Lingdao Fangshi” [On the Style of
Majority Leadership in the U.S. Congress], Meiguo Yanjiu (Winter 1992), pp. 52–65;
Jia Hao, “YijiujiuerNian Daxuan yu Meiguo Zhengzhi Chaoliu de Xinbianhua”
[The 1992 Presidential Election and the New Changes in the U.S. Political Trend],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1993), pp. 45–75; Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo de
Xianzheng Weiji” [The Present Crisis of the U.S. Constitutional System], Meiguo
Yanjiu (Autumn 1993), pp. 53–76; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo dui Xifang Jindai Minzhuzhi,”
pp. 55–72; Jin Canrong, “Zhengzhi: Wenhua Fenlie yu Meiguo Zhengju Yanbian”
[The U.S. Politico-Cultural Split and Evolution of U.S. Politics], Meiguo Yanjiu
(Spring 1995), pp. 7–28; Fang Xiaoguang, “Xuanmin de Zaofan: Shi Xi 1994 Nian
Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju” [The Voters’ Rebellion: An Analysis of the 1994 U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 125–129; Zhang Liping,
“Lindeng Yuehanxun yu Minquan Fa’an” [Lyndon Johnson and Civil Rights Acts],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1996), pp. 110–132; Cui Zhiyuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa,”
pp. 121–136; Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang,” pp. 81–92; Liu Jianfei, “Lun
Fangongchanzhuyi,” pp. 81–108; Ji Hong, “Minquan Yundong yu Meiguo Nanfang,”
pp. 109–142.
The 12 articles holding the “by both” position are: Ren Xiaoping, “Meiguo
Xinwen Meijie yu Zongtong Jingxuan” [The United States’ News Media and Its
Presidential Elections], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1993), pp. 68–75; Jiang
Chengzhong, “Cong Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 15–19; Jin Junhui, “Shi Xi 2000 Nian
Meiguo Daxuan,” pp. 34–38; Zhao Shenggan, “Kelindun Dangxuan Zongtong,”
pp. 3–8; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi,” pp. 7–12; Lu
Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Dui hua PNTR An zai Meiguo Zhongyiyuan Tongguo de
Pingxi” [An Analysis of the Passage of China PNTR in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 2000), pp. 40–44; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan
yu Mei Zhong Guanxi,” pp. 9–13; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin Zongtong Nanchan,”
pp. 21–25; Zhou Qi, “1994 Nian Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Xunshi” [A Survey of the
1994 U.S. Mid-term Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 111–120; Jin Can-
rong, “Zhengzhi — Wenhua Fenlie,” pp. 7–28; Li Zhidong, “Baoweier yu Meiguo
Zhengzhi,” pp. 105–124; Xiong Zhiyong, “Jianxi dui Meiguo Guohui de Youshui: yi
Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Wei Li” [Lobbying in the U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy
Making], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1998), pp. 71–89.
7. Zhou Qi, “Meiguo de Shangceng Jieji,” p. 58; Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei
Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–13.
178 Chapter 7
[The Origin of the Women’s Movement in America], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1995),
pp. 127–132; Zhang Ye, “‘Xingbie Jiaodu’ he ‘Funu yu Fazhan’” [Gender Perspective
and Women in Development: Two Hot Subjects in the Women’s Movement],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1995), pp. 133–136; Zhang Liping, “Lindeng Yuehanxun,”
pp. 110–132; Li Zhidong, “Baoweier yu Meiguo Zhengzhi,” pp. 105–124; Cui Zhi-
yuan, “Guanyu Meiguo Xianfa,” pp. 121–136; Jin Canrong, “1997 Nian Meiguo
Zhengju,” pp. 138–140; Su Pengfei, “Cong Bokelishi Xianzhang,” pp. 81–92; Ji Hong,
“Minquan Yundong yu Meiguo Nanfang,” pp. 109–142; Bai Xuefeng, “Lun Meiguo
Sifa Duli,” pp. 114–131; Zhao Shenggan, “Kelindun Dangxuan Zongtong,” pp. 3–8;
Sheng Zhixun, “Meiguo xin Dangxuan Zongtong Kelindun” [The United States’
President Elect Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (June 1992), pp. 60–62; Ding Kui-
song and Sheng Zhixun, “Cong Kelindun Zhengfu Banzi Kan qi Zhengce Zouxiang”
[Perceiving the Clinton Administration’s Policy Trend from the Constitution of His
Administration], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1993), pp. 15–17; Zhao Shenggan,
“Meiguo xin Guohui ji yu Kelindun Zongtong de Guanxi” [The Relations between
the United States’ New Congress and President Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (April
1993), pp. 6–11; Lu Qichang, Zhao Shenggan, and Tang Leilei, “Kelindun Zongtong
1994 Nian,” pp. 2–5; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Zongtong Jingxuan Xingshi” [The Situ-
ation of the American Presidential Election], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1996),
pp. 10–13; Lu Qichang, “Kelindun Lianren hou Guonei Mianlin de Zhuyao Renwu
he Wenti” [The Main Tasks and Problems within the United States Facing the Sec-
ond Clinton Administration], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February 1997), pp. 2–5; Gao
Huandong, “Meiguo Xinyijie Guohui,” pp. 17–19; Ren Feng, “Kelindun de Zhexue
Sixiang,” p. 45; Lu Qichang, “Dangqian Meiguo Guonei Zhengzhi,” pp. 12–15; Ou
Bingmei, “Dangqian Ou mei “Disantiao Daolu” Chuyi” [A Preliminary Comment
on “the Third Way” in Current Europe and the United States], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
(December 1998), pp. 2–5; Lu Qichang and Zhang Yanyu, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju
Chuxi,” pp. 22–24; Lu Qichang, “Xiaobushi Miaozhun Baigong” [George W. Bush
Takes Aim at the White House], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 1999), pp. 33–35;
Lu Qichang, “Daxuannian Meiguo Guonei Xingshi,” pp. 34–38; Lu Qichang and
Zhang Yanyu, “Dui hua PNTR An,” pp. 40–44; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Daxuan yu
Mei Zhong Guanxi” [The United States’ Presidential Election and U.S.-China Rela-
tions], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 2000), pp. 9–13; Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Minzhu-
dang Zongtong Houxuanren Ge er” [Gore: The U.S. Presidential Candidate for the
Democratic Party], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (August 2000), pp. 39–41; Lu Qichang,
“Xiaobushi yu Ge er de Zhengce Zhuzhang,” pp. 26–29; Huang Zhaoyu, “Cong xin
Zongtong Nanchan,” pp. 21–25; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1992 Nian de Zongtong
Xuanju,” pp. 1–5; Pan Tongwen, “Dui Kelindun Ruzhu Baigong hou de Yixie Chubu
Kanfa” [A Few Tentative Thoughts Since Clinton’s Inauguration], Guoji Wenti Yan-
jiu (Winter 1993), pp. 8–11; Wen Yan, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Neiwai Zhengce
Quxiang Yantaohui Zongshu” [A Summary of the Symposium on the Trend of the
United States’ Domestic and Foreign Policies after the Presidential Election], Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi (March 1993), pp. 57–60; Zhang Minqian, “Shi Lun Meiguo de
Lianzheng Jianshe,” pp. 32, 38–43; Jin Canrong, “Daxuan hou de Meiguo Zhengju,”
Chinese Perceptions of American Politics 181
pp. 12, 40–43; Jiang Xinxue, “Meiguo Guohui de Fenquan he Lifa Kunjing” [The
Dilemma of Division of Powers and Legislature in the U.S. Congress], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi (April 1998), pp. 73–76; Tang Xiao, “Shi Lun Meiguo Xianfa zhong Yanlun
Ziyou Quanli de Xiandu ” [A Tentative Comment on the Limitation on the Freedom
of Speech in American Constitution], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Summer 1991),
pp. 40–53, Su Ge, “Cong Mei Zhong Jianjiao,” pp. 61–67; Jiang Chengzhong, “Cong
Meiguo Guohui,” pp. 15–19
Neutral: Yuan Ruijun, “Meiguo Zongtong Muliao,” pp. 97–117; Yang Jian,
“Cong Yuenan Zhanzheng,” pp. 7–29; Jia Hao, “1992 Nian Daxuan yu Meiguo
Zhengzhi Chaoliu de Xinbianhua” [Presidential Election and the New Changes in
the U.S. Political Trend], Meiguo Yanjiu (Summer 1993), pp. 45–75; Jin Canrong,
“Zhengzhi—Wenhua Fenlie,” pp. 7–28; Yang Dazhou, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi
Xuanju de Yingxiang Chutan” [A Preliminary Study of the Impact of the 1994 U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 106–110; Zhou Qi, “Meiguo
de Shangceng Jieji,” pp. 41–62; Zhu Shida, “Kelindun Zhengfu zai Kendingxing
Xingdong,” zhong de Liangnan Chujing” [The Clinton Administration’s Dilemma
in Affirmative Action], Meiguo Yanjiu (Autumn 1996), pp. 63–84; Xiong Zhiyong,
“Jianxi dui Meiguo Guohui de Youshui,” pp. 71–89; Liu Jianfei “Lun Fangongchan-
zhuyi,” pp. 81–108; Qian Chunyuan, Lu Qichang, and Tao Jian, “Kelindun Zhengfu
de Neiwai Zhengce,” pp. 19, 20–23; Peng Yan, “Meiguo Xuezhe Tan Meiguo xin
Zhengfu xin Guohui ji qi Neiwai Zhengce” [American Scholars on the United
States’ New Administration, New Congress, and the United States’ Domestic and
Foreign Policies], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (July 1993), pp. 37–41; Zhao Shenggan and
Lu Qichang, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 26–32; Lu Qichang, “Lengzhan hou
Meiguo Liangdang Zhengzhi,” pp. 7–12; Lu Qichang, Fu Mengzhi, and Yuan Peng,
“Meiguo Zhengzhi Jingji he Waijiao Xingshi ji Quxiang” [The United States’ Politics,
Economy, and Foreign Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi (January/February 1999), pp. 17–22; Chen Xiangyang, “Meiguo Guonei
Zhengzhi,” pp. 29–31; Tang Hao, “Meiguo Guonei Jituan Zhengzhi,” pp. 11–14; Jin
Junhui, “Shi Xi 2000 Nian Meiguo Daxuan,” pp. 34–38; Zhang Xingping, “Bushi hui
Lianren ma?” pp. 45–47; Lin Hongyu, “Meiguo Gongzhong Yulun,” pp. 67–70; Liu
Wenzhong, “Ping Meiguo Zuigao Fayuan Pizhun cong Waiguo Bangjia Xianyifan
dao Meiguo Shoushen de Caijue” [On the U.S. Supreme Court’s Approval to Kid-
nap Suspects from a Foreign Country to Stand Trial in the United States], Waijiao
Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1992), pp. 29–31; Ren Xiaoping, “Meiguo Xinwen Meijie,”
pp. 68–75; Qin Yaqing, “Meiguo Guohui Weiyuanhui de Goucheng yu Quanli: Xin
Zhidu Zhuyi he Xinxi Xuepai Pingjie” [The Constitution and Power of Committees
in the U.S. Congress: An Introduction of and Comment on Neo-Institutionalism and
Information School], Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao (Winter 1995), pp. 50–53; Dong Xiuli,
“Meiguo Zongtong Xuanju,” pp. 57–61.
Negative: Jiang Jingsong, “Lun Xianshi Meiguo,” pp. 53–76; Jin Junhui, “Meiguo
Shifou hui Chuxian Gengda de Dongdang: Zhongqi Xuanju hou de Yidian Sikao”
[Will the United States Become More Turbulent? An Afterthought on the U.S.
Midterm Election], Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp.121–124; Fang Xiaoguang,
182 Chapter 7
“Xuanmin de Zaofan,” pp. 125–129; Jin Canrong, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju Yan-
taohui Zongshu” [A Report of the Workshop on the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elections],
Meiguo Yanjiu (Spring 1995), pp. 145–148; Zhao Shenggan, “Meiguo Zongtong
Jingxuan,” pp. 15–22, 36; Lu Qichang, “Kelindun Mianlin de Kunnan he Tiaozhan”
[Difficulties and Challenges Facing Clinton], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (October 1994),
pp. 29–32; Wang Guang, “Meiguo Chuyu Guodu Shiqi,” pp. 6–12; Shi Ren, “Shiji zhi
jiao de Mei Ou Ri Zhengzhi Zouxiang” [On the Political Trend of the United States,
Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the Century], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (February
1998), pp. 2–5; Pan Tongwen, “Meiguo 1990 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 15–20; Pan
Tongwen, “Meiguo 1994 Nian Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 18–22; Zhao Shenggan and Lu
Qichang, “Meiguo Zhongqi Xuanju,” pp. 60–63; Gong Weijing, “Jianli zai Meiyuan
Jichu shang,” pp. 41–45; Bi Yunhong, “Meiguo Daxuan Zhengzhi,” pp. 23–25; Song
Shiming, “Gonggong Xuanze Lilun yu Meiguo Xingzheng Gaige” [Public Choice
Theory and the United States’ Administrative Reform], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi (May
1997), pp. 40–44, 60; Fan Ying, “Xianru Jiangju de Meiguo Yusuan,” pp. 49–53.
36. I wish to mention a few points as a caveat. (1) In this chapter, I have not
explored every aspect of the Chinese perceptions of the American politics. It is pos-
sible that other scholars looking at different aspects in the source materials may see
something not consistent with the overall image presented in this chapter. (2) The
inferential logic spelled out in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 should be regarded as suggesting
likelihood rather than a law-like relationship. (3) In coding articles as positive or
negative, I focused only on the performance of the American political system itself.
It was possible that an article would be coded as positive even though it at the same
time conveyed an image of the United States threatening China’s interests, so long as
the article presented an image of the American political system as working well. In
spite of the above reservations, the overall conclusion for this chapter would still be
valid, since it was quite limited.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
We are now in a position to draw together the findings from various chap-
ters and address the fundamental research question of this project: what are
China’s motivations vis-à-vis the United States? As discussed in Chapter 2,
a state formulates its policy toward another state mainly on the basis of two
considerations. One is the consideration of national interest, and the other is
the consideration of the character of the target state. One’s interest is usually
the more important consideration. When substantial interest is involved, a
state is willing to do business with another state even though it might find the
character of the target state objectionable. The U.S.-USSR alliance during the
Second World War was a case in point. And a state may not have much of a
problem supporting a regime led by a “son of a bitch” so long as he is “our
son of a bitch.” But when no substantial interest is involved, the character of
the target state is the paramount consideration in a state’s formulation of the
policy regarding a target state.
To explore China’s foreign policy motivations with regard to the United
States, this book is essentially divided into two parts. The first part, consist-
ing of Chapters 3, 4 and 5, explores the interest involved in the formulation
of China’s policy toward the United States. And the second part, consist-
ing of Chapters 6 and 7, explores Chinese scholars’ perceptions of two key
national characteristics of the United States, namely its economic and politi-
cal systems.
Using the research findings in the various chapters, we can probe China’s
motivations toward the United States through the following approaches. One
approach is to explore China’s motivations in two parts. The first part is to
see how consideration of national interest affected the formulation of China’s
policy toward the United States. And the second part is to see how China’s
183
184 Chapter 8
The more important behavioral implications of the research were that China
would on the whole adopt an appeasement approach toward the United States,
hoping that it would lead to restraint in the United States’ China policy. Usu-
ally only incidents perceived as intolerable would prompt China’s measured
response. It is understandable that China was aware of its weakness and was
apprehensive that the United States would take advantage of it. To prevent
the United States’ “abuse” of its power, it might be conceivable for China
occasionally to resort to strong responses. But the findings in Chapters 3 and
5 indicate that on the whole appeasement would be one of China’s predomi-
nant policy approaches toward the United States.
On the other hand, as revealed in Chapters 4 and 5, the United States was
perceived as having employed its superior power in a way that promoted
China’s national interest. The United States’ commitment to peace and its
engagement policy ensured a peaceful environment for China. The vast
American market provided an important outlet for China’s mostly labor-in-
tensive products, a tiny percentage of the United States’ overseas investment
would mean to China a significant inflow of foreign capital, and the occa-
sional relaxation in technology transfer could boost the quality of China’s
economy. Besides, assistance from the United States facilitated China’s entry
into the world community and enhanced China’s status as one of the major
powers in the world. With the steady development of U.S.-China relations,
the United States had been perceived as increasingly more important to
China’s pursuit of modernization.
The implications of the research in Chapters 4 and 5 were that Chinese
scholars were also appreciative of the U.S. role in promoting China’s national
interest, especially its role in facilitating China’s economic development. If
the drastic change in Chinese perceptions of the United States from the 1980s
to the 1990s is any indication, it would be predictable that such appreciation
would engender an increasingly positive image of the United States in China,
and cultivate new generations of pro-American Chinese.
The behavioral implications of China’s perception of opportunity from the
United States were that promoting cooperation would be another of China’s
predominant policy approaches toward the United States, in the hope of gain-
ing greater benefits from the bilateral relations. Obviously, when the Chinese
perceived opportunity from the United States, the United States’ superior
capability was no longer a target of resentment but one of appreciation.
Thus, from the perspective of national interest, China’s dominant tendencies
in its policy toward the United States would be appeasement and coopera-
tion. Brooks and Wohlforth1 were correct that in China’s perceptions of the
United States, there were both elements of resentment and fear, and elements
186 Chapter 8
China in economic and political systems would not necessarily lead to con-
flict between the two countries. Indeed, the differences would provide a basis
more for cooperation between the two countries than for conflict. Exploration
of Chinese perceptions of key characteristics of the United States suggests
therefore that China had been moving toward joining the international com-
munity. Progress had been more rapid regarding the economic system and
more slow but still steady regarding the political system.
Partner Image
A review of the existing works on image indicates that the partner image had
long been among the Chinese perceptions of the United States. During the
late Qing Dynasty, Chinese officials already entertained the idea of establish-
ing a partnership with the United States in the area of commerce.2 In the early
20th century, China thought about offering its market to the United States
in exchange for its capital and goods, and for its “strategic counterpoise”
to imperialists threatening China’s security.3 China-U.S. cooperation during
World War II almost elevated the Chinese image of the United States from a
potential partner to a virtual patron, with American aid perceived as “divine
wind” and the GI’s fighting in China against the Japanese invasion as “glori-
ous angels.”4 Following the Korean War, however, the partner image of the
188 Chapter 8
United States almost completely vanished even though Mao had long thought
about improving relations with the United States.5
As China-USSR relations deteriorated, China began more seriously to
seek improvement of relations with the United States and to establish trade
relations with it.6 But throughout the history of the China-U.S. contact up to
the end of the 1980s, the partner image of the United States in the existing
literature remained flimsy and largely latent.
It was in the 1990s that “partner” became one of the major images in the
literature on Chinese perceptions of the United States. The most prominent
portrayal of this image was by Wang and Lin,7 who regarded it as one of the
three major images of the United States. These authors argued that Chinese
scholars of this school perceived bilateral relations “in terms of interdepen-
dence rather than a zero-sum game,” with China accepting the United States
as playing a positive role in the world and the United States accepting China’s
development as befitting the United States’ interest.8 Saunders also presented
the partner image as one of the major Chinese images of the United States
in the 1990s. He, however, distinguished a liberal school of Chinese schol-
ars who perceived mainly mutual benefits in China-U.S. cooperation from
a realist school who reluctantly accepted interdependence with the outside
world and at the same time was “keenly aware of the political vulnerabilities
interdependence creates.”9
The research of this project, especially Chapter 4, indicates that the partner
image was indeed one of the dominant Chinese images of the United States
in the 1990s. Chinese scholars generally agreed that China-U.S. cooperation
was mutually beneficial. Some Chinese scholars also accepted that the inter-
dependence between the two countries was asymmetrical, with China being
dependent on the United States more than the United States on China. The
partner image was especially salient in the area of economic cooperation.
By the end of the 1990s, most of the serious problems in the two countries’
bilateral economic cooperation had been resolved, such as intellectual prop-
erty rights disputes, MFN/PNTR, and China’s WTO membership. Thus, in
economic relations, Chinese scholars perceived mainly mutual benefits and
little threat from the United States. In terms of security relations between the
two countries, however, some Chinese scholars perceived mainly a conflict
management type of cooperation rather than strong security needs in both
countries to cooperate in order to deal with an overwhelming common threat
as in the Cold War period. As China’s strategic goal for a long time to come
was to develop its economy and to improve Chinese people’s living standards,
and the China-U.S. economic relations conform strongly to China’s national
interest, the partner image was one dominant Chinese image of the United
States in the 1990s.
Conclusion 189
Model Image
The model image was once a salient Chinese image of the United States. In
the history of the U.S.-China relations, the first predominant Chinese image
of the United States was as a model. Science and democracy were considered
the “defining characteristics of American society,” U.S. foreign policy was
considered qualitatively different from the “unmitigated expansionism” of
imperial powers such as Japan and the European countries, and the United
States’ political system reminded Chinese of their own “legendary golden
age.” At the beginning of the 20th century, the great aspiration of Chinese
intellectuals was to create a new society in China with the United States as
its model. Tu Wei-ming divided the history of the Chinese perception of the
United States into four periods, and the first was the period of admiration.
Jerome Ch’en’s lengthy article on Chinese perceptions of the West is
mainly a presentation of the model image, especially of the United States.
In explaining the rapid change of the Chinese image of the West after initial
contact, the famous Chinese scholar Wei Yuan lamented, “They are extraor-
dinarily talented and should be considered as our good friends. How can
they be called ‘barbarians’?”10 Perhaps the best presentation of the model
image was by another well-known scholar, Hu Shih, who once studied
philosophy at Columbia University under the tutelage of John Dewey: “We
are not yet qualified to criticize other people’s (the Westerners’) shortcom-
ings. We should do well to notice only their strength.”11 Hu’s model image
was somewhat qualified by his sense of etiquette, but Professor Wen I-to
put forward this model image without such a concern: “Compare Chinese
and Western styles? What do you have to compare Western styles with?
Are you good enough for any comparison? In spite of your mealy mouth
and silver tongue, you cannot conceal your smallness, vulgarity, cowardice,
and hypocrisy; nor can you hide your greed, stealth, selfishness, and other
ugly characteristics . . . What else do you have to compare with the West?”12
According to Ch’en’s presentation, many Chinese often attributed the best
to almost everything American. American women were “the most lovely and
admirable,” the American political system ensured “the most virtuous man
at the helm of power,” American foreign policy was “almost altruistic,” and
the American economic system helped its people to “pursue their enterprises
with success.”13
Jerome Ch’en’s and Tu Wei-ming’s articles are the only pieces in the
existing literature on the Chinese perceptions of the United States to devote
significant attention to the model image of the United States, but they both
describe the image as reflecting Chinese perceptions before the PRC period.
In other relevant image works, the model image has been largely absent.
190 Chapter 8
This situation might reflect the fact that during the PRC period up to the
end of the 1980s, the Chinese usually did not think it desirable to learn from
the United States. Works published during the 1990s similarly paid scant
attention to this image. This might be the result of selective information pro-
cessing, as people tend to pay more attention to dramatic events such as the
Tiananmen tragedy, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the Chinese embassy bomb-
ing, to the neglect of non-dramatic but momentous changes in the Chinese
people’s perceptions, such as the revival of the model image.
The research of this project indicates that the model image was prevalent
in the Chinese perception of the United States in the 1990s. As demonstrated
in Chapters 6 and 7, Chinese authors had generally accepted that the Ameri-
can economic model was worthy of emulation, and the model image in this
respect was prevalent, strong, and explicit. As for the Chinese perception of
the American political model, Chapter 7 indicates that Chinese authors had
also accepted the merits of democracy and often agreed that the American
political model worked very well in the United States. They sometimes even
acknowledged that convergence more or less toward the American political
model should be the direction of China’s political reform. But they seldom
advocated immediate and unconditional acceptance of this model in China.
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, regarding the perception of threat to China’s
government and political stability, they seemed to prefer a go-slow approach
regarding political reform. Chinese model image of the United States in this
respect therefore was tentative, moderate, and usually implicit.
Chapter 4 also provides evidence supporting the model image of the United
States, especially regarding learning from the United States in terms of sci-
ence and technology. A cursory review of articles in the six journals on the
Chinese perceptions of the American culture (not discussed in detail in this
project) seems to indicate that the model image was present in this area as
well. We may conclude therefore that the model image had again become
one of the dominant images in the Chinese perceptions of the United States
in the 1990s.
Imperialist Image
According to the existing literature, “the imperialist” was one of the most
salient and persistent images in the Chinese perception of the United States.
It ran all the way from the late 19th century to the 1990s. As early as the late
Qing Dynasty, some Chinese were already concerned that the United States
was as covetous as other imperialist powers and that China might fall prey
to its expansionist foreign policy.14 During the Republican period in the early
Conclusion 191
Degenerate Image?
Several scholars in the existing literature presented more or less a degenerate
image of the United States held by Chinese perceivers. In Tu’s 1973 article,
the degenerate image was but one of many of the United States presented.
The degenerate image itself received sketchy attention, more a reflection of
China’s lack of understanding of the United States as a result of sustained
isolation than an informed assessment of the United States. The United States
was described as a paper tiger, “with utter chaos at home and extreme isola-
tion abroad,” unable to meet the challenges facing the nation.27
In a lavish portrayal of a dominant model image, Jerome Ch’en inserted a
few passages describing the United States’ degeneration: its educational sys-
tem on the verge of collapse, corruption in politics, the severity of economic
problems, and the poverty of the underprivileged.28
The most systematic studies of the degenerate image of the United States
held by Chinese perceivers were done by Shambaugh and Pillsbury. In
Shambaugh’s study of the Chinese perceptions of the American economy,29
Chinese scholars were described as trying to support and flesh out the classic
Marxist arguments that capitalism had been beset with insoluble contradic-
tions which would inevitably lead to a general crisis, and that capitalism was
on its last legs. But toward the late 1980s, Chinese authors were presented
as having somewhat revised their prediction of the American economy, and
they claimed that capitalism still had some vitality and was not “in danger of
dying any time soon.”
The predominant image presented in Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future
Security Environment is the degenerate image. According to Pillsbury, Chi-
nese authors argued that the American decline would be inevitable, and multi-
polarity would be the future trend of the world. Pillsbury focused mainly on
the United States’ military power. The United States would fail to implement
the RMA (revolution in military affairs), its logistics was unable to support
Conclusion 193
its military ambition, its aircraft carriers were like sitting ducks waiting to be
sunk, its allies were becoming more independent, and a small country like
North Korea was capable of defeating the United States.30
This degenerate image of the United States is somewhat supported by
the research of this project, in the section “Perceived American Decline in
the Early 1990s” (Chapter 5). Major differences between Pillsbury and this
author include the following.
It seems that the degenerate image had been persistent in the Chinese
perception of the United States. In the early China-U.S. contact, this image
received sketchy support, far from being the dominant Chinese perception
of the United States. It became the dominant Chinese image of the United
States during the Maoist period, supported not only by the dominant Marx-
ist theories but also by a lack of understanding of the United States because
of China’s isolation. During the 1980s, as presented by Shambaugh, the
degenerate image of the United States continued to be dominant. In the early
1990s, however, this image was salient but based more on empirical studies
of the United States, especially the American economic performance. In the
late 1990s, mainly because of the remarkable performance of the American
194 Chapter 8
Partner Image. China’s partner image of the United States indicates that
China often perceived the bilateral relations in win-win terms. It perceived
a substantial opportunity for mutual benefits and wanted the two countries
to make full use of such opportunities. China’s partner image of the United
States demonstrated its desire to integrate itself into the international com-
munity, and it thus supported the proposition that China was a status quo
country.
Model Image. China’s model image of the United States indicates that
there were elements of admiration in China’s perception of the United States.
It means that China not only took note of many things in the United States
which were superior over China’s, but also wished to learn from the United
States in important ways. A model image carries the implications that China
not only did not regard differences between the two countries as sources of
conflict, but regarded them as offering opportunities for cooperation between
the two countries. China’s model image of the United States implied a strong
desire on the part of China to integrate itself into the international community
more or less represented by the United States. This image therefore also sup-
ports the proposition that China was a status quo country.
Imperialist Image. China’s imperialist image of the United States indicates
that there were some elements of resentment and conflict in China’s policy
toward the United States. But the image also indicates that when China
resorted to confrontation, it was usually done in a defensive and reactive way.
China recognized the superior power of the United States in various aspects,
and would be generally reluctant to engage in conflicts with the United States.
The imperialist image also carries the implication that the United States was
perceived as trying to exploit China’s weakness. In the Chinese eye, there-
fore, confrontation between the two countries would usually occur when the
United States was trying to intervene in China’s internal affairs. The sup-
posedly defensive and reactive nature of China’s policy toward the United
States suggests that China was a status quo country, or at least that it wished
to be one.
Degenerate Image. China’s degenerate image of the United States in the
early 1990s involved mostly a descriptive dimension, an effort to present an
Conclusion 195
As this project is an analysis of the supposed China threat, before the end
of this book I would like to address the question of to what extent China is
a threat to the United States. To answer this question, we need to explore
whether there have been things the two countries wanted and could not both
have. If the United States wanted A while China wanted B, and the two coun-
tries did not have overlapping claims and neither was a threat to the other.33
But when the two countries had overlapping claims, they were more or less
a threat to each other, and the more the overlapping claims, the more serious
the threat.
As it is impossible for two big countries in the world not to have any
conflicting interests, it is unrealistic to say that one big country presented
absolutely no threat to another. Thus, Europe could be a threat to the
United States because it was capable of evolving into a pole more power-
ful than the United States. As a matter of fact, World War I and especially
World War II could be construed as wars between Europe and the United
States. One 2002 article pointed out that “it is time to stop pretending
that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or
even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of
power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of
196 Chapter 8
Table 8.1 Conflicting Interests between the United States and China
To what extent was China a threat to the United States? We can answer
this question by exploring the overlapping claims by the two countries. The
findings in Chapter 3 may serve this purpose.
The findings in Chapter 3 as summarized in Table 8.1 demonstrate that
the United States and China did have conflicting interests. But do the
findings indicate that China was a serious threat to the United States? We
may resort to three concepts to discuss the extent of China’s threat to the
United States. The first is relative threat, the second is absolute threat,
and the third is relative tolerance. From the perspective of relative threat,
it is possible for China to argue that in rows 1 through 4 in Table 8.1, the
conflict of interests between the two countries results mostly from the
United States’ efforts to intervene in China’s internal affairs. Row 5 no
longer represented a serious problem between the two countries because
the major causes of contention, such as MFN, PNTR, and WTO, had
already been removed.
Regarding row 6, from the Chinese perspective, even though both the
United States and China had the right to express their opinions regarding the
198 Chapter 8
Table 8.2 Claims and Accommodation between the United States and China
States had only limited claims on China, and China in recent decades had
more or less accommodated the United States’ wishes, the mutual absolute
threat therefore was limited (see Table 8.2).
Table 8.2 indicates that even though the two countries had conflicting
interests, they had been able to work out accommodations largely acceptable
to both. Although China made a lot of accommodations to the United States,
China often did so more or less voluntarily, because, after all, the Chinese
often accepted the universal values embodied in some of the United States’
claims, such as peace, democracy, human rights, mutual benefits, etc. Conse-
quently, even in terms of absolute threat, China’s threat to the United States
was limited. Besides, as discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7, China’s percep-
tions of threat had been greatly counterpoised by perception of opportunity,
200 Chapter 8
and China’s model and partner images of the United States further enhanced
the image of the United States more as an opportunity than as a threat.
To gauge the extent of the China threat to the United States, it may also
be helpful to bring in the concept of relative tolerance. Table 8.3 lists factors
which contributed to the differences between the two countries in relative
tolerance of threat.
Table 8.3 indicates that China might have a greater tolerance of foreign
threat than the United States. Thus, when India and Pakistan as China’s
neighbors turned nuclear, China did not perceive much threat and was ready
to accommodate them,44 while the United States perceived much threat from a
distant Iraq, which might have the potential in future to develop a small arse-
nal of nuclear weapons without means to deliver them. One Chinese author
argued that China should not overreact to the United States’ overwhelming
number of nuclear warheads targeting China if the United States demon-
strated a sincere intention not to actually use them against China.45 One of the
reasons why Chinese scholars enthusiastically applauded the constructive-
strategic-partnership relationship between the United States and China during
the late 1990s was that such a relationship reduced China’s threat perception
from the United States and therefore reduced China’s resentment, which in
turn would also reduce the supposed China threat to the United States. In
exploring the extent of the U.S.-China mutual threat. therefore, we should not
Conclusion 201
only look at the relative threat, but also take into consideration the absolute
threat and the different relative tolerance of threat between the two countries.
Ideally, the United States should pay more attention to relative threat, while
China should consider more the United States’ less tolerance of threat. One
laudable example was China’s low-key handling of Chen Shui-bian’s pro-
vocative speech about Taiwan independence in August 2002 and the United
States’ pressure on Taiwan.46 Chinese authors should be careful that their
criticism of the United States’ intervention in China’s internal affairs might
well be construed by some Americans, because of their lesser tolerance, as
evidence of threat.47 Americans, on the other hand, should perhaps perceive
Chinese criticism in their media more as resentment because of unrequited
love than as genuine anti-U.S. sentiment. By looking at the mutual threat
more from the other’s perspective, the United States and China could improve
efforts to promote mutual benefits and avoid playing a lose-lose game.
Throughout this project, I have been concerned mainly with presenting the
Chinese perception of the United States. A relevant question is how U.S.-
China relations should be defined. I will first summarize what China was and
would become, and what it wanted, and then I will address this question.
What was China? China was country full of contradictions. It was a very
large country, but a very underdeveloped one. It had a huge population, over
20 times that of a medium country like the United Kingdom, but the overall
size of its economy was smaller even than that of the United Kingdom. Its
economy was developing steadily but scholars were seriously suspicious of
the statistics behind its growth. It was supposedly a rising power, but it was
also regarded as being on the verge of collapse.48 It was considered one of the
major powers in the world, but it was still not able to achieve national unifica-
tion, not even a symbolic one. It had the largest military in the world, but its
military expenditure was less than one-fifth that of the United States. It was
sometimes called the most conflict-prone power in the world, but since the
founding of the PRC over 50 years ago, it had been rarely involved in inter-
national military conflicts, and for several decades it had never fought a war
beyond its own borders. It was afraid of being encircled, but it was sometimes
singled out as a threat. It was not a democracy, but its scholars, even in official
journals, had generally accepted democracy as an ideal form of governance.
It did not yet have a full-fledged market economy system, but it was moving
vigorously in that direction. As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, though
its political reform lagged far behind its economic reform, democracy in the
202 Chapter 8
1990s had already been accepted not only by the general populace, but also
in China’s authoritative publications, and elections had begun to be practiced
at the grassroots level. The research of this project indicates that the strategy
of “peaceful evolution” initiated by American leaders in the 1950s and vigor-
ously promoted by the Bush and Clinton administrations in the 1990s had
already begun to bear fruit in the Chinese land.
What did China want? Because of the very low per capita GNP, and because
of the embarrassing underdevelopment in its economy, military, and science
and technology, for a very long time to come China would concentrate on
developing its economy and improving the living standard of its people. For
this purpose, it needed a peaceful international environment, especially in the
Asia-Pacific region, and it wished to make friends with every country in the
world—especially developed countries, whose partnership could contribute
significantly to China’s efforts for modernization, and neighboring countries,
whose cooperation could extend China’s economic potential. It did not want
to be a threat to other countries, especially to the United States, but it did not
want to see other countries using force against China either, including the
use of nuclear weapons. Out of the prospect of benefits, admiration, and fear,
China wished to be the United States’ friend, partner, and perhaps even ally;
at the same time, it insisted on being the master of its own house.
Given what China was and would be, and what it wanted, how can U.S.-
China relations be defined? In the following, I will offer my understanding.
1. Neighbors in the global village. In spite of what had happened in the past
and what would happen in future between the two countries, because of the
advances of technology and globalization, they would remain neighbors in
the increasingly smaller global village. Given the size of either country,
one would have to take into consideration the interest and concern of the
other, and it would be highly costly for either country to be viewed as an
implacable adversary by the other. This was even more true for China than
for the United States because of the latter’s superior power.
2. Non-adversaries. As China was committed to improving relations with the
United States, the fact that China was equally committed to remaining the
master of its own house did not constitute an adequate ground for an adver-
sarial relationship. Even though China-U.S. confrontation would be highly
detrimental to China’s national interest, and would go against the Chinese
people’s enthusiastic preference for friendly U.S.-China relations, devel-
opment in that direction would also be quite costly for the United States.
Unlike the case of the U.S.-USSR rivalry, most countries in the world per-
ceived more of an opportunity than a threat in their relations with China. If
the two countries were to become adversaries, the United States not only
Conclusion 203
could not expect assistance from other countries in dealing with China,
but it would have to expend a large amount of resources to bribe every rel-
evant player against conducting normal operations with China. Besides, if
one country’s natural development was justification for another to become
confrontational, such a posture would make many countries in the world
feel threatened. Other secondary and tertiary powers, such as Russia,
Japan, India, Europe, and many others, would feel that they might be the
next on the list of the United States’ targets. To prevent the emergence of
a powerful anti-hegemonic coalition, much more in the way of resources
would be needed. Since China was enthusiastic about improving relations
with the United States and since it did not serve the United States’ interest
to turn China into an adversary, we can conclude that “adversaries,” “com-
petitors,” etc. were not appropriate terms to define China-U.S. relations.
3. Partners. The research of this project demonstrates that the United States
and China had both conflicting interests and common interests. Upon
closer reading of Chapters 3 and 4, one finds that while the common in-
terests between the two countries kept steadily increasing, the conflicts of
interest between the two countries could either be reduced and eliminated,
or they could be inflated and exasperated. Generally speaking, the United
States’ threat to China was massive but potential, especially in its not-
impossible effort to separate Taiwan from China and in its improbable use
of nuclear weapons against China. On the other hand, the United States’
opportunity to China was substantial and concrete, especially in its imple-
mentation of the engagement policy and its economic cooperation with
China. As discussed in Chapter 4 on balancing threat and opportunity, if
the status quo in U.S.-China relations since the second half of the 1990s
would be maintained, the United States in my opinion presented much
more of an opportunity than a threat to China. Consequently, the United
States was a valuable partner to China.
On the other hand, China has been able to provide the United States with
a substantial opportunity to enhance its interests. With the development of
China’s economy, the United States will gain more and more benefits from its
relations with China. Thus we may say that China was also a valuable partner
to the United States, and it will be more and more valuable a partner to the
United States in the days to come.
As China for a long time to come would remain inferior to the United
States in almost every dimension of national power, especially military
power, China would not constitute a threat to the United States. Indeed,
because of the tremendous cost to both countries of a confrontational rela-
tionship and the great benefits to both of a friendly relationship, U.S.-China
204 Chapter 8
Notes
17. Hongshan, Li. “The Unofficial Envoys: Chinese Students in the United States,
1906–1938,” in Hongshan Li et al. (eds.), Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-
China Relations, 1998.
18. Hunt, pp. 14–15.
19. Iriye, Akira. Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American–East Asia Rela-
tions, 1967, pp. 300–305.
20. Tu, p. 104.
21. Shambaugh, June 1988, pp. 21–22.
22. Shambaugh, May 1988, pp. 144, 145, 147, 154.
23. Shambaugh, David L. Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America,
1972–1990, 1991, pp. 226–276.
24. Liu, Yawei, 1998.
25. Xu, Guangqiu. “Anti-American Nationalism in China since 1989,” in Hong-
shan Li et al. (eds.), Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations,
1998, pp. 233–251; Ming Zhang, “Public Images of the United States,” in Yong Deng
et al. (eds.), In the Eyes of the Dragon, 1999, pp. 141–156.
26. Ren, Yue. “China’s Perceived Image of the United States: Its Sources and
Impact,” in Peter H. Koehn et al. (eds.), The Outlook for U.S.-China Relations Follow-
ing the 1997–1998 Summits: Chinese and American Perspectives on Security, Trade,
and Cultural Exchange, 1999, pp. 251–252.
27. Tu, pp. 104–106.
28. Ch’en, pp. 77, 80–81.
29. Shambaugh, May 1988, 1991.
30. Pillsbury, Michael. China Debates the Future Security Environment, 2000,
esp. pp. 63–105.
31. This difference may partly be attributed to the fact that Pillsbury focused
mainly on security while I more often focus on economy.
32. This argument is based mainly on this author’s reading of Chinese articles in
the 1980s, which have not been included in the sample for this project.
33. Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. The Contours of Power. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 58–59.
34. Kagan, Robert. “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, 2002, www.policy
review.org/Jun02/kagan_print.html.
35. Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “Russian Attitudes toward America: A Split between
the Ruling Class and the Masses,” World Affairs, Summer 2001, p. 17.
36. Joyce, Colin. “Japan Politician Threatens China with Nuke Talk,” Washington
Times, April 10, 2002.
37. Rozman, Gilbert. “Japan’s Quest for Great Power Identity,” Orbis, Winter
2002, pp. 88, 90.
38. Menges, Constantine C. “Blocking a New Axis of Evil,” Washington Times,
August 7, 2002.
39. Ricks, Thomas E. “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies,” Washington Post,
August 6, 2002.
206 Chapter 8
40. Thomas, Cal. “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe?” Washington Times, August 11,
2002.
41. Becker, Elizabeth. “United States Warns that Backers of Tribunal May Lose
Aid,” New York Times, August 12, 2002.
42. For instance, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji in his visit to the United States in
1999 implicitly expressed such an idea.
43. Layne, Christopher. “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2002, p. 243.
44. Yuan, Jing-dong. “India’s Rise after Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assess-
ments,” Asian Survey, November/December 2001.
45. Jiru, Shen. “Er Lun 21 Shiji Zhong Mei Guanxi” [Second Analysis of
China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century], Shijie Jingji yu zhengzhi (July 1998),
pp. 59–60.
46. Pomfret, John. “China and Taiwan Back away from New Confrontation: Bei-
jing Plays Down Provocative Speech,” Washington Post, August 10, 2002.
47. Gries, Peter Hays. “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Bel-
grade Embassy Bombing,” China Journal, July 2001.
48. Chang, Gordon G. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House,
2001; Joe Studwell. The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped Mar-
ket on Earth. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002; Peter F. Drucker. Managing
in the Next Society. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002.
Appendix I
Pan, Tongwen, “The MFN and China-U.S. Relations,” Winter 1994, pp. 1–7.
Wang, Jisi, “Containment or Engagement—on the U.S.’s China Policy in the Post
Cold War Era,” Spring 1996, pp. 1–6.
Wang, Haihan, “On Clinton Administration’s China Policy and its Prospect,” Spring
1997, pp. 3–9.
Song, Yimin, “China-Russia, U.S.-Russia, and China-U.S. Relations and Their Inter-
actions,” Autumn 1997, pp. 12–18.
Wang, Haihan, “Several Thoughts on Current China-U.S. Relations and the Prospect,”
Winter 1998, pp. 7–11.
Guo, Zhengyuan, “The U.S.’s Adjustment of its Taiwan Policy,” January/February
2000, pp. 25–28, 44.
Zhang, Ruizhuang, “On the U.S.’s Neo-Conservative Foreign Policy Thought and its
Impact on the U.S.’s China Policy,” March/April 2000, pp. 44–51.
Zhang, Hanlin and Chunlin Cai, “On the U.S. China Policy of Export Control and its
Prospect,” Summer 1991, pp. 21–36.
Wang, Jisi, “The ‘Strategic Triangle’ in U.S. Policy toward China,” Summer 1992,
pp. 7–35.
Zhu, Shida, “Thoughts on Sino-American Cultural Impact-Response Model,” Sum-
mer 1993, pp. 76–93.
1
I did the translation in the four appendices except the titles of articles in Meiguo Yanjiu, which
were done by the journal.
207
208 Appendix I
Chen, Baosen, “The Correct Way for Developing Sino-U.S. Economic Ties,” Spring
1994, pp. 7–23.
Wei, Wei, “Analyzing Gains of Both Parties in Sino-U.S. Trade,” Spring 1994,
pp. 131–134.
Zhu, Shida, “The Pattern of American Culture: Enlightenment for Chinese Culture,”
Autumn 1994, pp. 90–107.
Jia, Qingguo, “Re-Conceptualizing Sino-American Relations,” Spring 1995,
pp. 29–49.
Zi, Zongyun and Hong Ji, “Studies of Sino-U.S. Relations in America,” Spring 1995,
pp. 50–78.
Yuan, Ming and Shimin Fan, “China’s Security Role in Post-Cold War American
Perceptions,” Winter 1995, pp. 7–29.
Zhou, Qi, “An Appraisal of Post-Cold War Sino-U.S. Relations—Common Interests
and Disputes,” Winter 1995, pp. 30–50.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison of Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,” Winter
1995, pp. 69–82.
Niu, Jun, “Troubled Times—Present and Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Win-
ter 1995, pp. 131–134.
Liang, Gencheng, “Engagement Plus Containment,” Summer 1996, pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Yebai, “Perceptions of the U.S.-China-Japan Relations,” Autumn 1996, pp.
116–122.
Zi, Zhongyun, “Building the Bridge of Understanding—Comments on the Results of
the Studies of Sino-U.S. Relations History in the Last Fifteen Years of Reform and
Opening,” Autumn 1996, pp. 133–141.
Yang, Jiemian, “The American Presidential Election and Readjustment of Clinton’s
China Policy,” Winter 1996, pp. 128–133.
Zhang, Qingmin, “A Comparative Study of the U.S.’s Arms Sales and Technology
Transfer Policy toward Mainland China and Taiwan,” Spring 1997, pp. 34–61.
Li, Shenzhi, “The Sino-U.S. Relationship in Retrospect and Prospect,” Summer 1997,
pp. 125–131.
Wang, Jisi, “China-U.S. Relations at the Turn of the Century,” Summer 1997, pp.
134–137.
Tao, Wenzhao, and Jun Niu, “Drawing on Experience in Sino-U.S. Reconciliation,”
Summer 1997, pp. 137–141.
Li, Mingde, “Sino-U.S. Scientific and Technological Exchanges and Cooperation in
Retrospect,” Summer 1997, pp. 144–147.
Huang, Renwei, “The Shanghai Communiqué and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and
Economic Relations,” Summer 1997, pp. 147–150.
Bao, Jiaquan, “An Introduction to a New Bridge of Mutual Understanding: Review of
the History of U.S.-China Relations and Forecasts,” Winter 1997, pp. 144–147.
Niu, Jun, “The Evolution and Characteristics of the Clinton Administration’s China
Policy in its First Term,” Spring 1998, pp. 7–28.
Yuan, Ming, “Post Cold War U.S. China Policy: American ‘Strategic Elites’ and Sino-
U.S. Relations,” Summer 1998, pp. 48–59.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapters 3 and 4 209
Wang, Yong, “The Influence of Interest Groups on U.S. China Policy: A Case Study
of the MFN Issue,” Summer 1998, pp. 60–91.
Jia, Qingguo, “The Sino-U.S. Relationship since President Clinton Took Office,”
Summer 1998, pp. 92–112.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The Bush Administration’s Decision to Sell F-16 Fighters to
Taiwan: A Case Study of the Decisive Factors in American China Policy,” Winter
2000, pp. 97–122.
Fang, Xiaoguang, “China MFN and the U.S.’s China Policy,” August 1991, pp. 10–13.
Zhou, Shijian, “1992 China-U.S. MFN: Observations and Suggestions,” February
1992, pp. 47–49.
Liu, Liandi, “China-U.S. Relations and the U.S.’s China Policy Trend in the Election
Year,” September 1992, pp. 51–54.
Chen, Jiyong, “The Characteristics and Problems in the U.S.’s Direct Investments in
China and our Response,” November 1992, pp. 16–23, 61.
Li, Changjiu, “The Current Status and Prospect of China-U.S. Economic and Trade
Relations,” November 1992, pp. 55–57.
Deng, Ruilin, “The Main Problems in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations, and
our Response,” November 1992, pp. 58–61.
Dong, Fuquan, “The Current Status, Problems, and Prospect in China-U.S. Economic
Relations,” November 1992, pp. 62–64.
Fang, Zhou, “The U.S.’s China Policy and its Future Trend,” January 1993,
pp. 35–39, 54.
Qian, Wenrong, “China-U.S. Relations after Clinton’s Inauguration,” February 1993,
pp. 60–63.
Zhang, Yebai, “China-U.S. Relations and our Strategy in Response,” June 1993,
pp. 38–40.
Liu, Liandi, “Perceiving Clinton Administration’s Strategic Considerations and Policy
Trend from MFN,” September 1993, pp. 46–48.
Zhang, Minqian, “The U.S.’s Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and China-U.S. Relations,”
October 1993, pp. 57–61.
Ma, Chunshun, “Analysis of Factors Affecting the China-U.S. Relations,” October
1993, pp. 62–63, 68.
Wang, Chimin, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S. Factor in our Country’s Surrounding
Environment,” January 1994, pp. 56–61.
Guo, Shixian, “U.S. Dollar in the Next Five Years and Our Response,” April 1994,
pp. 17–23.
Liu, Liandi, “New Trends in the U.S.’s China Policy after China-U.S. Summit,” May
1994, pp. 56–58.
Chen, Yaoting and Linan Zhu, “The Trade Relations between China and the U.S.,
Japan,” August 1994, pp. 9–12.
210 Appendix I
Zhou, Bolin, “China’s Principle and Strategy toward the U.S.,” September 1994,
pp. 7–12.
Wang, Shuzhong, “China-U.S. Relations toward the Next Century,” December 1994,
pp. 3–7.
Sun, Hongchang, “On Obstacles in China-U.S. Trade,” February 1995, pp. 46–50.
Liu, Liandi, “The Trend in Clinton Administrations’ Taiwan Policy and China-U.S.
Relations,” March 1995, pp. 63–66, 58.
Tao, Jian, “The U.S. Increases Economic Considerations in its Strategy toward
China,” March 1995, pp. 67–70.
Zhou, Shijian, “A Review of the U.S.’s Sanction against China,” March 1995,
pp. 70–74, 32.
Qin, Liufang and Shixian Guo, “U.S. Dollar Crisis and our Strategies,” June 1995,
pp. 14–20.
Xu, Song, “A Tentative Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights Talks between China
and the U.S. and the Impact,” September 1995, pp. 27–31.
Chu, Shulong, “New Developments in the U.S.’s Security Strategy and the China Fac-
tor,” November 1995, pp. 58–61.
Xiao, Chen, “ ‘IRA’ in the U.S. and China’s Social Security,” February 1996, pp. 41–42.
Yang, Yunzhong, “The Evolution and Features of Clinton Administrations’ China
Policy,” April 1996, pp. 62–65.
Zhao, Yongqing, “One Noticeable Trend in Current World Economy—the Politiciza-
tion of World Economy in Economic and Trade Relations between the U.S. and
China, Japan,” July 1996, pp. 25–27.
Ye, Xiangsong, “The Management System of the U.S.’s State-Owned Enterprises and
the Revelations for the Reform of the Management System in our State-Owned
Enterprises,” July 1996, pp. 64–67.
Qin, Fengmin, “Another Wave of China Craze in the U.S. Business Circles,” August
1996, pp. 37–39.
Yu, Zhida, “China-U.S. Disputes over Animal and Plant Inspection in Agricultural
Trade,” September 1996, pp. 26–29.
Zhang, Ruhai, “A Tentative Analysis of China’s Status in the U.S.’s Foreign Strategy
after the Cold War,” October 1996, pp. 20–23, 68.
Lin, Jue, “The Disputes between the Two Major Political Parties in the U.S. and Their
Impact on Foreign Trade Policy, and our Response,” February 1997, pp. 21–25.
Zhang, Xuesong, “The Revelations of the U.S.’s ‘New Enterprise Culture’ to the De-
velopment of our Enterprises,” March 1997, pp. 46–47.
Liu, Liandi, “U.S. Ambassador to China Sasser Plays a Special Role in China-U.S.
Relations,” March 1997, pp. 78–80.
Xia, Liping and Jia Xu, “U.S. Policy toward Hong Kong’s Return to China and its
Impact on China-U.S. Relations,” April 1997, pp. 32–34.
Li, Jiang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and Debates Regarding the U.S.’s China
Policy,” June 1997, pp. 24–26.
Li, Changjiu, “China-U.S.-Japan Relations in Adjustment,” June 1997, pp. 39–43.
Lin, Hongyu, “Public Opinion in the U.S. and its China Policy,” August 1997,
pp. 67–70.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapters 3 and 4 211
Shi, Yinhong, “ ‘The Triangular Relationship’ among China, the U.S. and Japan,”
January 2000, pp. 49–51.
Chen, Xiangyang, “The Post Cold War China-U.S. Relationship from the Perspective
of International Institutions,” January 2000, pp. 52–55.
Han, Weidong and Yaodong Han, “The U.S.’s Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security,” February 2000, pp. 53–57.
Zhu, Feng, “Human Rights Problem and China-U.S. Relations: Changes and Chal-
lenges,” July 2000, pp. 19–24.
Ding, Shichuan and Hongzhou Wei, “Comments and Analyses of the U.S.’s Strategy and
Tactics in its Post Cold War Intervention of Taiwan Problem,” July 2000, pp. 38–42.
Chu, Shulong, “The Opinions, Positions, and Advocacies by China and the U.S. Re-
garding International Strategy,” July 2000, pp. 48–52.
Sun, Jianhang, “Strategy, Interest, and Structure—The Evolution of World Structure and
the U.S.’s Adjustment of its China Policy in the 1990s,” August 2000, pp. 25–29.
Yang, Zhicai, “Random Talks on Chinese and American Culture,” Summer 1991,
pp. 20–25.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “The Evolution and Prospect of the Foundation of the U.S.’s China
Policy,” Autumn 1992, pp. 49–54.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The Problem of the U.S.’s Arms Sale to Taiwan in China-U.S.
Relations,” Winter 1994, pp. 84–92.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Consistent Taiwan Policy,” Winter 1995,
pp. 46–49.
Su, Ge, “On the China-U.S. Relations,” Summer 1996, pp. 16–26.
Zhao, Pingan, Xuebao Li, and Yuan Guo, “The Adjustment of the U.S.’s China Policy
and Future Trend of China-U.S. Relations,” Autumn 1996, pp. 14–18.
Li, Shouyuan, “ ‘Cold War Thinking’ and the U.S.’s Post Cold War China Policy,”
Autumn 1996, pp. 19–23, 48.
Lu, Naideng, “A Tentative Analysis of the New Changes in China-U.S.-Russia Rela-
tions,” Winter 1996, pp. 24–29.
Liu, Jiangyong, “The Re-establishment of U.S.-Japan Security System and the China-
U.S.-Japan Relations,” Winter 1996, pp. 30–35.
Zhang, Yiting, “Clinton’s ‘Engagement of China’ Policy and its Shaky Foundation,”
Spring 1997, pp. 35–38, 30.
Su, Hao, “China Factor in the U.S.-Japan Relations,” Spring 1997, pp. 44–50.
Zhou, Lin, “The Prospect of the China-U.S. Trade Relations,” Spring 1997,
pp. 51–54.
Zhuang, Qubing, “Recommending a Good Book—Reading The U.S.’s China Policy
and the Taiwan Problem,” Spring 1999, pp. 44–47.
Yang, Jiemian, “The Role of American Academia in the U.S.’s China Policy Decision
Making in the Post Cold War Era,” Winter 1998, pp. 51–55, 96.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapters 3 and 4 213
Ke, Juhan, “The Characteristics and Prospect of China-U.S. Economic and Trade
Relations,” November 1993, pp. 39–40.
Liu, Wei and Wenyan Gu, “The Main Problems Facing the China-U.S. Economic and
Trade Relations and Our Suggestions,” June 1995, pp. 8–12.
Li, Zhongcheng, “The Current Status and Future Trends of China’s Relations with the
U.S., Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asian Nations,” July 1995, pp. 24–28.
Lu, Qichang, “Several Observations on the U.S.’s China Policy,” September 1995,
pp. 2–5.
Xi, Laiwang, “A Review of China-U.S. Relations in 1995 and the Future Prospect,”
December 1995, pp. 6–9, 15.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Trends of China-U.S. Eco-
nomic and Trade Relations,” April 1996, pp. 25–29.
Yu, Xiaohui, “The Adjustment and Evolutions of the U.S.’s Taiwan Policy after World
War II, June 1996, pp. 33–36.
Zhang, Linjun and Qichang Lu, “The Negative Influence of U.S. Congress on China-
U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” October 1996, pp. 14–18.
Chu, Shulong, “China-U.S. Relations Face Strategic Choices,” November 1996, pp.
2–7.
Wu, Jiong, “On the U.S.’s ‘Comprehensive Containment of China’,” November 1996,
pp. 8–11, 7.
Zhang, Zhongyi, “Several Major Forces Affecting the U.S.’s China Policy,” January
1997, pp. 13–16.
Gao, Huandong, “Distribution of Power between the Two Parties in the New U.S.
Congress and Their Attitude Toward China,” May 1997, pp. 17–19.
Nai, Zuji, “The Second Clinton Administration’s Adjustment in its China Policy,”
August 1997, pp. 12–14.
Chu, Shulong, “The Strategic Framework of China-U.S. Relations Facing the New
Century,” October 1997, pp. 2–8.
Xi, Laiwang, “Establishing China-U.S. Strategic Partnership Facing the 21st Cen-
tury,” November 1997, pp. 2–6.
Lu, Zhongwei, “China-U.S., China-Japan Summits and China-U.S.-Japan Relations,”
December 1997, pp. 9–14.
Shi, Ren, “The Foreign Strategy of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the Turn of the
Century and the Trend of Their China Policy,” March 1998, pp. 2–5.
Ma, Jiali, “China’s Relations with the U.S., Russia, and Japan and the Impact on
South Asia,” April 1998, pp. 20–24.
Xi, Laiwang, “Actively Promoting China-U.S. Constructive Strategic Partnership,”
May 1998, pp. 2–7.
Chu, Shulong, “China-U.S. Cooperation and Differences,” June 1998, pp. 2–6.
Liu, Jiangyong, “Clinton’s China Visit and New Trends in China-U.S.-Japan Rela-
tions,” July 1998, pp. 2–7.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “U.S. Media and the U.S.’s China Policy,” July 1998, pp. 39–42.
214 Appendix I
Zheng, Baoguo, “The U.S.’s China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” October 1998,
pp. 29–33.
Zheng, Ziyi, “Political Factors in China-U.S. Economic and Trade Conflicts,” No-
vember 1998, pp. 22–25.
Ding, Kuisong and Xinchun Niu, “The China-U.S. Relations in Exploring Coopera-
tion,” January/February 1999, pp. 79–83.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Impact on China-U.S. Eco-
nomic and Trade Relations,” April 1999, pp. 16–18.
Zhao, Jingfang, “An Analysis of the Objectives of the U.S.’s ‘Engagement’ Policy
toward China,” June 1999, pp. 11–15.
Ding, Kuisong, “Reviewing the Past and Looking forward toward the Future,” Octo-
ber 1999, pp. 1–6.
Yan, Julu, “The U.S.’s Central Asian Strategy and its Impact on China’s Security
Environment,” December 1999, pp. 22–24.
Chen, Xiangyang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and its Impact on Post Cold War
China-U.S. Relations,” December 1999, pp. 29–31.
Cao, Fumiao, “Perceiving Today’s Taiwan Problem from U.S.-British Relationship
during the U.S.’s Civil War,” December 1999, pp. 31–33.
Fu, Mengzi, “China-U.S. Relations Looking Forward to the New Century: Seeking
Win-Win in Competition and Cooperation,” January/February 2000, pp. 91–95.
Lu, Qichang, Yanyu Zhang, and Wenfeng Wang, “The Features and Backgrounds of the
U.S.’s Renewed Efforts in Anti-China Human Rights Bill,” March 2000, pp. 8–10.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “ ‘Taiwan Security Enhancement Act’ is a Dangerous
Political Move,” March 2000, pp. 17–21.
Chu, Shulong, “The Post-Cold War China-U.S. Bilateral and Regional Strategy and
Security Relations,” May 2000, pp. 7–14.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “A Comment on and Analysis of U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives’ Passage of China PNTR,” June 2000, pp. 40–44.
Lu, Qichang, “U.S. Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations,” July 2000, pp. 9–13.
Jiang, Xinfu, “China Entering the WTO and the China-U.S. Relations,” August 2000,
pp. 11–14.
Yuan, Peng, “A Tentative Comment on the Nature of Current China-U.S. Relations,”
(xian, September 2000, pp. 1–5.
Jiang, Yuguo, “Impact of China’s Entry into the WTO on the China-U.S. Relation-
ship,” September 2000, pp. 6–10.
Tang, Hao, “The U.S.’s Internal Group Politics and China-U.S. Relations,” September
2000, pp. 11–14.
Xi, Laiwang, “Perceiving the U.S.’s China Policy from the PNTR,” October 2000,
pp. 1–5.
Xia, Liping, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy and China-U.S. Relations in the New Cen-
tury,” October 2000, pp. 22–25.
Lu, Qichang, “China-U.S.-Russia Relations around the Turn of the Century,” Decem-
ber 2000, pp. 4–7, Lu Qichang.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapters 3 and 4 215
Wang, Jisi and Wenli Zhu, “ ‘Greater China’ in American Eyes,” March/April 1994,
pp. 65–69.
Gao, E, “The Current Status and Problems in the China-U.S.-Japan Relations,” No-
vember/December 1994, pp. 73–76.
Wang, Yizhou, “American Elite’s Opinions on Several Important Issues in China-U.S.
Relations,” January/February 1995, pp. 47–52.
Jiang Lingfei, “The Constraining Factors in the U.S.’s Containing China Strategy and
Possible Future Trends,” September/October 1996, pp. 46–50.
Shi, Yinhong, “West vs. non-West: The Fundamental Root of the U.S.’s Current At-
titude toward China,” May/June 1996, pp. 8–9.
Wang, Yong, “The U.S.’s Strategic Options in Asia-Pacific Region and Relations
among China, the U.S., Japan, and Australia,” November/December 1996, pp.
14–20.
Shi, Yinhong, “The Basic Domestic Backgrounds of the U.S.’s China Policy,” Nove-
meber/ December 1996, pp. 33–36.
Tang, Yongsheng, “Relations among China, the U.S., and Japan, and China’s Op-
tions,” January/February 1997, pp. 32–35.
Wang, Jian, “U.S.-Japanese Models of Regional Economy, and their Revelations to
China’s Cosmopolitan Areas,” March/April 1997, pp. 1–15.
Xu, Baoyou, “American Economist on the Development of China’s Regional Econ-
omy and Relevant Strategies,” March/April 1997, pp. 18–19.
Zhang, Linhong, “China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Confrontation or Coop-
eration?” May/June 1997, pp. 21–28.
Mei, Junjie, “China-U.S. Economy and Trade Relations and China’s Economy,” May/
June 1997, pp. 29–34.
Liu, Ji, “Options for the China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century,” November/De-
cember 1997, pp. 29–35.
Yang, Ping and Richard Bernstein, “Is China-U.S. Conflict Coming?” November/
December 1997, pp. 39–40.
Liu, Jingsong, “The Evolution, Problems, and Prospect of China-U.S. Military Rela-
tions,” September/October 1997, pp. 105–113.
Wu, Xianbin, “On the U.S.’s Policy toward Hong Kong,” September/October 1997,
pp. 114–118.
Wang, Yi, Jiqiong Zhang, Changhua Wu, and Kebing He, “Global Energy and En-
vironment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations,” November/
December 1997, pp. 54–59.
Nolan, Peter and Xiaoqiang Wang, “The Reorganization of the U.S.’s Military In-
dustry and its Revelations to China’s Industrial Integration,” November/December
1997, pp. 60–67.
Zhai, Xiaomin, “A Reflection on the China-U.S. Strategic Relations,” January/Febru-
ary 2000, pp. 33–36.
Appendix II
Xie, Yao, “The Characteristics of the Economic Recession in the U.S. and the Pros-
pect,” Summer 1991, pp. 1–8.
Pan, Tongwen, “A Preliminary Exploration of Bush’s New World Order,” Winter
1991, pp. 15–19, 26.
Liu, Huaqiu, “Analysis of the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Reduction in 1991,” Spring 1992,
pp. 9–15.
Wu, Tianbo, “The Distribution of Economic Power among the U.S., Europe, and
Japan and the Trend of Change,” Winter 1992, pp. 13–18.
Wang, Haihan, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy Faces Serious Challenge,” Winter 1992,
pp. 19–24.
Liu, Huaqiu and Zhongmin Qin, “On U.S.-Russia’s START II,” Summer 1993,
pp. 1–6.
Xie, Yao, “A Brief Analysis of the U.S. Economic Recovery at the Present Time and
its Future Trend,” Autumn 1993, pp. 20–27.
Wei, Min, “The Trend of Change in the Distribution of Economic Power among the
U.S., Europe and Japan,” Spring 1995, pp. 33–37.
Huang, Suan, “The Devaluation of U.S. Dollar and the Relative Decline of American
Economic Power,” Autumn 1995, pp. 37–40.
Ruan, Zongze, “The U.S. Forging Ahead with TMD and its Impact,” Autumn 1996,
pp. 38–42.
Song, Yimin, “The U.S. Pulls Ahead Temporarily but the Trend for Further Multipo-
larization has not Changed,” Spring 1998, pp. 7–10, 6.
Chen, Dezhao, “The Changes in the U.S. Economy in the 1990s and its Prospect,”
Spring 1998, pp. 21–26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and its Impact on World Economy,” Au-
tumn 1998, pp. 42–46.
217
218 Appendix II
Song, Yimin, “The New Adjustment in the U.S. Concerning Security Strategy, World
Distribution of Power, and Foreign Policy,” Winter 1998, pp. 1–6, 19.
Zeng, Bingxi, “Current American Economic Expansion and the Impact on its Hege-
monic Status,” Autumn 1999, pp. 41–45, 49.
Yang, Yonghong, “New Development of American hegemonism,” April 1999,
pp. 6–8.
Zhang, Lijun, “The U.S.’s Objectives in its Central Asia-Outer Caucasus Policy and
the Contradictions it Faces,” May/June 2000, pp. 38–43.
Guo, Xiangang, “The U.S.’s Sanction on Cuba Has Already Become Impotent,” July/
August 2000, pp. 38–40.
Yang, Jiemian, “The U.S.’s Global Strategy in the Cross-Century World Structure,”
November/December 2000, pp. 23–30.
Zhou, Jianming, “A Comparison between Quadrennial Defense Report of 1997 and
that of 2001,” January/February 2002, pp. 26–30.
Ruan, Zongze, “The U.S.’s Recent Reflection of its Foreign Policy and its Impact,”
January/February 2002, pp. 31–36.
Song, Yimin, “The U.S.’s Security Strategy and Foreign Relations Enter a New Ad-
justment Stage,” January/February 2002, pp. 37–42.
Guo, Xiangang, “The Changes in the U.S.’s Foreign Policy in the One Year of Bush
Administration and its Impact,” March/April 2002, pp. 32–36.
Zhou, Yunhua, “The Evolution of the U.S.’s Policy Regarding CTBT,” March/April
2002, pp. 49–53, 48.
Su, Ge, “On China-U.S.-Russia Relations,” May/June 2002, pp. 1–7.
Yin, Chengde, “A Tentative Analysis of China-U.S. Relations and the Prospect,” May/
June 2002, pp. 13–17, 26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s First Economic Recession in the
21st Century,” May/June 2002, pp. 42–48.
Guo, Xiangang, “The U.S.’s War on Terrorism in the New Stage,” July/August 2002,
pp. 11–15.
Xing, Yuchun, “U.S.-Russia Relations and NATO’s Strategic Adjustment,” July/
August 2002, pp. 20–24.
Zeng, Bingxi, “On China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations,” Winter 2002, pp.
38–45.
Yong, Qiang, “The Seminar on ‘Soft Power’: its Status and Impact in U.S. Foreign
Policy was Held in Beijing,” November/December 2002, p. 59.
Xia, Liping, “On New Conceptions of Global Strategy of the Realization of China’s
Peaceful Rise,” November/December 2003, pp. 31–35.
Qian, Qichen, “Readjustment of U.S. National Security Strategy and Interna-
tional Relations at the Beginning of the New Century,” January/February 2004,
pp. 1–3.
Xu, Jian, “Peaceful Rise: China’s Strategic Option,” March/April 2004, pp. 1–8.
Song, Yuhua and Hongya Xu, “Factors Underlying the Speedy Recovery of U.S.
Economy in 2004 and its Prospects,” March/April 2004, pp. 40–44.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 219
Chen, Baosen, “The Economic Position of the United States in the West during the
Nineties,” Spring 1991, pp. 7–24.
Zheng, Weimin, “Is the U.S. Economy Declining or Reviving?” Summer, 1991,
pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Hanlin and Chunlin Cai, “On the U.S. China Policy of Export Control and its
Prospect,” Summer 1991, pp. 21–36.
Zhang, Yebai, “Isolationism and U.S. Intervention in Asia,” Autumn 1991,
pp. 30–48.
Xu, Xin, “America and the Post-Cold-War Balance of Power in Southeast Asia,”
Autumn 1991, pp. 77–93.
Li, Yalian, “The Impact of U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement on World Economic
Pattern,” Winter 1991, pp. 18–22.
Xiao, Lian, “Dynamics of Changing World Economic Structure: U.S. Role and Influ-
ence,” Spring 1992, pp. 7–28.
Ding, Haojin, “The Future of American Economy,” Spring 1992, pp. 29–41.
Xiao Chen, “The Influence of U.S. Defense Budget Cut on Economy,” Spring 1992,
pp. 59–69.
Li, Changjiu, “The Status of U.S. Foreign Trade and its Prospects,” Spring 1992,
pp. 72–81.
Sun, Haishun, “On the Changing Relative Standing of U.S., Japanese and E.C. Inter-
national Capitals,” Spring 1992, pp. 82–92.
Du, Houwen and Qiang Zhang, “Changing U.S. and German Economic Statuses and
Their Bilateral Economic Relations in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 110–119.
Huang, Weiping and Wenhui Zhu, “A Discussion of the U.S. International Financial
Standing in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 120–134.
Xu, Guoqi, “America in Crisis: A Review of the Debate on American Decline,” Spring
1992, pp. 135–158.
Zhou, Maorong, “Impact of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement on the United
States,” Summer 1992, 93–106.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on Economic Report of the President 1992,” Autumn
1992, pp. 7–25.
Chen, Baosen, “A Blue-Print for Revitalizing U.S. Economy,” Summer 1993,
pp. 29–44.
Peng, Guangqian, “U.S. National Security Strategy and the Drastic Change of Inter-
national Strategic Pattern,” Winter 1993, pp. 7–21.
Jia, Shaofeng and Xiangjing Meng, “Is U.S. Territory too Large to Sustain a Good
Economy?” Winter 1994, pp. 114–125.
Wang, Xiaode, “A Historical Reflection of U.S. ‘Export of Democracy’ to Latin
America,” Summer 1995, pp. 134–138.
Liu, Jinghua, “Seeking Balance between Power and Morality: On Henry Kissinger’s
‘Balance of Power’ Theory in the Post-Cold War Era,” Autumn 1995, pp. 48–66.
220 Appendix II
Qin, Yaqin, “Hegemonic System and Regional Conflict—On the U.S.’s Supportive
Actions in Major Regional Armed Conflicts,” Winter 1995, pp. 51–68.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison between Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,”
Winter 1995, pp. 69–82.
Liang, Gencheng, “Engagement Plus Containment,” Summer 1996, pp. 7–20.
Zhang, Yeliang, “U.S. Counterproliferation Strategy,” Winter 1996, pp. 76–93.
Shi, Yinhong, “Intervention in International Politics: A U.S. Case,” Winter 1996,
pp. 111–127.
Wang, Jisi, “Lonely at the Top: A Reassessment of America’s Power Position in the
World,” Autumn 1997, pp. 7–38.
Song, Yuhua and Huajun Lu, “U.S. Trade Deficit and its Foreign Trade Status,” Au-
tumn 1997, pp. 82–103.
Wang, Rongjun, “U.S. Economy in 1997,” Spring 1998, pp. 141–142.
Wu, Zhan, “Current U.S. Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Disarmament,” Summer 1998,
pp. 7–28.
Xiao, Minghan, “Dynamics of the Southern Renaissance,” Summer 1999, pp. 77–97.
Li, Xiaohua, “An Analysis of ‘The Benign Unipolar Peace’,” Autumn 1999,
pp. 119–131.
Ni, Shixiong and Yiwei Wang, “Hegemonic Balance of Power: Post-Cold War U.S.
Strategic Choices,” Spring 2000, pp. 7–23.
Wang, Fan, “Comments on ‘The Stability of A Unipolar World,’ an Article by William
C. Wohlforth,” Spring 2000, pp. 133–146.
Zhang, Liping, “On American’s Role in the World: Comments on From Wealth to
Power by Fareed Zakaria,” Spring 2000, pp. 147–150.
Huang, Weiping, “Probing U.S. Economic Status and the Possibility of a ‘Soft-
Landing’,” Summer 2000, pp. 31–43.
Fan, Jishe, “Threat Assessment, Domestic Politics, and Post-Cold War U.S. Policy for
Missile Defense,” Autumn 2000, pp. 66–88.
Men, Honghua, “International Regimes and American Hegemony,” Spring 2001,
pp. 74–88.
Li, Haidong, “The Clinton Administration’s Role in NATO Expansion,” Summer
2001, pp. 54–69.
Liu, Jianfei, “The Role of Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Summer 2001, pp. 70–86.
Shi, Yinhong, “The Impact of September 11 Attacks on U.S. Diplomatic Postures,”
Winter 2001, pp. 21–28.
Wu, Zhan, “The ABM Treaty and U.S. Missile Defense Program,” Spring 2002,
pp. 7–21.
Ruan, Zhongze, “Neo-Imperialism and the Integration Doctrine,” Autumn 2002,
pp. 36–49.
Yang, Jiemian, “United States National Security Strategy and Relations between the
Major Powers,” Winter 2002, pp. 7–20.
Wang, Jisi, “The Logic of American Hegemony,” Autumn 2003, pp. 7–29.
Guo, Xuetang, “The Poverty of the Theory of Hegemonic Cycles: An Analysis of
Whether American Hegemony is Going Downhill,” Autumn 2003, pp. 42–51.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 221
Ding, Xinghao and Fan Deng, “How Far Can a Lonely Hegemon Go?” Autumn 2003,
pp. 65–73.
Chu, Yukun, “Difficulties Facing the U.S.’s Export Strategy in Asia,” June 1996,
pp. 43–44, 42.
Du, Jian, “The Sources and Revelation of Constant Troubles in the U.S.’s Banking
System,” August 1996, pp. 46–48, 65.
Zhang, Xiaotang, “On the Four Economic Rationales of American Decline Thesis,”
January 1997, pp. 69–71.
Ke, Juhan, “American Economy is still in the Period of Moderate Growth,” February
1997, pp. 58–60.
Zhang, Jikan, “The Challenges and Competition Facing the U.S.’s Oligarchic Enter-
prises in Internationalized Industries,” July 1997, pp. 18–22.
Wu, Yonghong, “The Change of the U.S.’s Status in World Economy,” July 1997,
pp. 65–68.
Song, Yuhua, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and Recent Economic Situ-
ation and Future Trend,” February 1998, pp. 16–20.
Song, Yuhua, “U.S. Economy will Continue to Expand in Soft Landing,” March 1998,
pp. 21–26.
Li, Bing, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and How China Should Speed up the Develop-
ment of its High Tech Industry,” August 1998, pp. 41–45.
Yang, Honglin, “The Reasons for the Continued Economic Prosperity in 1990s and
Future Trend,” August 1998, pp. 46–49, 76.
Sun, Shilian, “Debate among American Economic Circle on American Economic
Prospect,” October 1998, pp. 68–71.
Ge, Chengqun, “The Basic Experience and Revelation from the U.S.’s Efforts to En-
hance Research and Development Capability,” January 1999, pp. 73–77.
Yu, Yanchun, “The Trend of Change in the Structure of the U.S.’s High Tech Industry
and the Reasons,” March 1999, pp. 54–58.
Dai, Bing, “The U.S.’s Technology Transfer to Taiwan,” September 1999, pp. 73–77.
Chen, Baosen, “The Current Status, Problems of U.S. Economy and its Impact on the
World,” January 2000, pp. 27–32.
Han, Weidong and Yaodong Han, “The U.S.’s Hegemonic Strategy in the New Cen-
tury and China’s National Security,” February 2000, pp. 53–57.
Zhou, Sanming, “International Currency System and American Hegemony,” March
2000, pp. 30–34.
Zhou, Li, “The Imminence of Global Recession—the U.S.’s Faked Prosperity and the
Danger to the World,” March 2000, pp. 76–81.
Zhai, Xiaomin, “An Analysis of American Dominated Hegemony in the Post Cold
War Era,” April 2000, pp. 71–75.
Zhang, Lihua, “It is Really Not Easy to Dominate the Whole World—An Analysis of
the Constraining Factors to the U.S.’s Hegemonism,” June 2000, pp. 52–56.
Ding, Shichuan and Hongzhou Wei, “The U.S.’s Strategy and Tactics in its Interven-
tion of Taiwan Problem in the Post Cold War Era,” July 2000, pp. 38–42.
Tang, Renwu, “A Few Points about ‘American Century’,” April 2001, pp. 63–68.
Chen, Baosen, “Re-Understanding of the U.S.’s ‘New Economy’,” May 2001,
pp. 28–29.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 223
Zhou, Bolin, “Strategic Thinking on China-U.S. Relations in the New Century,” May
2001, pp. 40–43.
Tan, Yaling and Lianying Zhang, “The U.S.’s Economic Prospect from The U.S.’s
Current Economic Conditions and Risk,” July 2001, pp. 44–48.
Xiao, Chen, “Perceiving the U.S.’s ‘Quasi Recession’ and ‘New Cycle’ from Internet
Economy,” August 2001, pp. 4–10.
Fan, Jishe, “Several Factors Affecting the U.S.’s Arms Control Policy in the Post Cold
War Era,” September 2001, pp. 28–33.
Wang, Yizhou, “9/11 Syndrome and New International Security Posture,” November
2001, pp. 4–9.
Fu, Mengzi, “The Rise of China: The U.S.’s Basic Assessment and Its Disputes re-
garding its China Policy,” February 2002, pp. 20–25.
Liu, Haijun, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Alliance Hegemony,” February 2002,
pp. 32–37.
Mou, Weihan, “Institutional Analysis of Japan’s Backwardness Compared to the U.S.
in Information Technology,” March 2002, pp. 60–65.
Ge, Lide, “The U.S.’s Withdrawal from ABM Treaty and the Prospect of its Anti-
Missile System,” April 2002, pp. 37–42.
Chen, Changshen, “9/11 and the Adjustment of the U.S.’s Global Strategy,” May
2002, pp. 27–33.
Song, Wei, “Geo-Political Comparison between China’s Rise and the Rise of Great
Britain and the U.S.,” June 2002, pp. 33–37.
Zhu, Feng, “ ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ and Bush Jr. Administration’s New Nuclear
Strategy,” June 2002, pp. 21–26.
Li, Dongyan, “The U.S.’s Foreign Strategy Options: Thinking and Practice,” July
2002, pp. 16–21.
Sun, Zhong, “Some Thoughts on Ideology and American Foreign Relations,” July
2002, pp. 66–70.
Li, Xiaohua, “The Limits of Engagement: The Poverty of American Strategic Think-
ing and the Dilemma of its China Policy,” August 2002, pp. 10–15.
Zhufu, Xiaofei and Jingfang Zhao, “America’s Cultural Hegemony and China’s
Choices,” September 2002, pp. 23–27.
Hu, Xin, “From Restraint to ‘Strike First’—American New Strategy in the Era of Post
Cold War,” October 2002, pp. 34–39.
Xin, Benjian, “The Vulnerable Spots in American Hegemony and Its Strategy of Pre-
serving Hegemony,” November 2002, pp. 54–59.
Song, Yuhua and Zhe Chen, “An Analysis of American Large Unfavorable Balance of
Trade,” November 2002, pp. 60–65.
The Editorial Board, “The Dilemma of the American-Styled Capitalism and the
Transformation,” December 2002, p. 1.
Jin, Canrong, “U.S. Hegemony Came Across Soft Balancing,” December 2003, p. 1.
Zhang, Wenmu, “On China’s Sea Power/Right,” October 2003, pp. 8–14.
Xin, Benjian, “The Ascendancy of American Neoconservatives and the Grand Strat-
egy of the Bush Administration for the New Empire,” October 2003, pp. 27–32.
224 Appendix II
Wang, Shuying and Yunze Ma, “The Level of Information in America and its Influ-
ence on the American Economy,” August 2003, pp. 75–79.
Jian, Junbo and Jinglin Zhang, “The Crisis of a Conceited Empire: Unilateralism and
the End of the Legitimacy of Hegemony,” August, 2003, pp. 35–40.
Sun, Zhe, “Structural Reorientation: China’s New International Strategy of Rising
Peacefully as a Powerful State,” December 2003, pp. 58–63.
Ren, Haiping, “An Evaluation of Comparison of the Competitiveness of the Defense
Science and Technology Industry,” December 2003, pp. 64–69.
Zhu, Feng, “Iraq War and its Implications for International Strategic Patterns,” No-
vember 2003, pp. 31–36.
Li, Changjiu, “War and the U.S.,” November 2003, pp. 37–41.
Wang, Yizhou, “Chinese Should Study China’s Rise,” January 2004, p. 1.
Yu, Sui, “On the Multipolarization of the World,” March 2004, pp. 15–20.
Peng, Lei, “Seminar Briefing: China’s Rise and China’s Relations with Other Third
World Countries,” April 2004, pp. 79–80.
Xie, Deyuan, “U.S. Foreign Policy after the Change of the Polar Structure,” Spring
1993, pp. 27–34.
Su, Ge, “Historical Experience of the U.S.’s Economic Take-off,” Autumn 1994,
pp. 55–64.
Liu, Wenzhong, “An Awkward Demonstration of Hegemonism—On U.S. State De-
partment’s ‘Human Rights Report’,” Summer 1995, pp. 47–49.
Liu, Shuguang, “A Tentative Comment on the Dollar Exchange Rate in Recent Times
and its Impact,” Winter 1995, pp. 54–57, 69.
Su, Ge, “The U.S.’s National Security Strategy of ‘Engagement and Enlargement’,”
Winter 1997, pp. 23–30.
Liu, Saili, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Sustained Economic Growth,” Summer
1998, pp. 36–39, 47.
Liu Wenzong et al., “Strong Protests against the U.S.’s Hegemonic Behavior,” Sum-
mer 1999, pp. 1–10.
Wen, Bing, “A New Version of ‘Might is Right’—Comments on two Articles in For-
eign Affairs Advocating Neo-Interventionism,” Spring 2000, pp. 52–56.
Chi, Wencen, “A Tentative Analysis of the Reasons for Sustained Economic Develop-
ment in the U.S.,” Autumn 2000, pp. 71–74.
Zheng, Baoguo, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Global Hegemonic Strategy across the
Turn of the Century,” Winter 2000, pp. 43–63.
Zhao, Lei, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s BMD,” Spring 2001, pp. 90–93.
Sha, Benwang and Hong Shang, “Comment on Clinton’s Administration’s Foreign
Policy,” Summer 2001, pp. 39–46.
Di, Huisen, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Current Economic Trend,” Autumn
2001, pp. 57–60.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 225
Zhu, Qiangguo, “U.S. Unilateral Withdrawal from ABM Treaty,” Spring 2002,
pp. 62–69.
Wang, Fan, “The U.S.’s Adjustment of its Asia-Pacific Alliance Strategy after the
Cold War,” Summer 2002, pp. 29–35.
Zhou, Lin, “U.S. Company Scandals: the Whys and Wherefores,” Winter 2002,
pp. 50–54.
Qian, Qichen, “Iraq War and the U.S.,” Winter 2003, p. 26.
Zhou, Lin, “Exports from China and the U.S.’s Manufacturing Industry,” April 2003,
pp. 65–69.
Lu, Shiwei, “An Analysis of the Hegemony of U.S. Dollar and the Impact of the Iraq
War on it,” Autumn 2003, pp. 102–107.
Lu, Qichang, “The Difficulties and Challenges Facing Clinton,” October 1994,
pp. 29–32.
Hong, Guoqi and Xiaode Wang, “The Cultural Factors Accounting for the Frustra-
tions in Clinton’s Asia-Pacific Policy,” May 1995, pp. 18–22.
Wen, Weiji, “The U.S.’s Military Strategy for Seeking Dominant Status in the World,”
March 1996, pp. 2–6.
Li, Guofu, “The Intention and Impact of the U.S.’s Attack on Iraq,” October 1996,
pp. 19–22.
Wu, Jiong, “On the U.S.’s ‘Comprehensive Containment of China’,” November 1996,
pp. 8–11, 7.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situation in the U.S. and the Trend of China-U.S. Economic
and Trade Relations,” April 1996, pp. 25–29.
Lu, Qichang, “Major Domestic Tasks and Problems Facing the Second Clinton Ad-
ministration,” February 1997, pp. 2–5.
226 Appendix II
Wang, Weimin, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Strategy for NATO’s Eastward Expansion,”
February 1997, pp. 6–10, 5.
Liu, Guiling, “The Contradiction between Russia and the U.S. Regarding NATO’s
Eastward Expansion and the Relevant Test of Strength,” April 1997, pp. 2–6.
Li, Li, “Perceiving U.S.-Iran Relations from the Frustration in ‘Double Containment’
Policy,” October 1997, pp. 19–22.
Shi, Ren, “On the Economic Development of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the
Turn of the Century,” January 1998, pp. 4–9.
Gu, Wenyan, “Why U.S. Economy Alone has been Prosperous among Western Coun-
tries?” June 1998, pp. 7–11.
Li, Huiming, “Knowledge Capital and the U.S.’s Knowledge Economy,” September
1998, pp. 26–29.
Lu, Qichang, Mengzi Fu, and Peng Yuan, “The Political, Economic and Diplomatic
Situations in the U.S. and the Future Trend,” January/February 1999, pp. 17–22.
Gu, Wenyan, “The U.S.’s Economic Situation and its Impact on China-U.S. Economic
and Trade Relations,” April 1999, pp. 16–18.
Li, Desong and Lisun Xu, “How the U.S. Uses its own International Advantage to
Safeguard its Economic Security,” August 1999, pp. 27–30.
Wu, Xingzhuo, “The U.S.’s R&D Regarding Missile Defense System Hurt Interna-
tional Security,” September 1999, pp. 16–18.
Meng, Liang, “Military Struggle between the U.S. and Russia regarding the Five
Countries in Central Asia and the Prospect,” September 1999, pp. 32–34.
Gu, Wenyan, “The Trend in the U.S.’s Economic Development around the Turn of the
Century,” December 1999, pp. 5–8.
Li, Changjiu, “The Characteristics, Problems and Revelations in the U.S.’s Economic
Growth,” March 2000, pp. 1–7.
Sun, Xiaoqing, “Internationalization of Euro and the Geo-Economic Struggles be-
tween Europe and the U.S.,” June 2000, pp. 13–16.
Feng, Zhongping, “Europe’s Response to the U.S.’s NMD and its Impact,” September
2000, pp. 24–28.
Lu, Qichang and Yanyu Zhang, “The U.S. Temporarily Postpones but Will not Give
Up Deploying NMD,” October 2000, pp. 10–12.
Gu, Wenyan, “The U.S.’s Economic ‘Soft Landing’ and its Impact,” February 2001,
pp. 30–33.
Liu, Guiling, “The Test of Strength between Russia and the U.S. and its Trend,”
March 2001, pp. 30–34.
Chen, Fengying, “The Beginning of American Economic Decline after Great Prosper-
ity and the Future Prospect,” April 2001, pp. 12–15.
Lu, Qichang, “Bush jr. Administration’s New Military Strategy,” May 2001, pp. 33–37.
Xin, Benjian, “Security Dilemma, Balance of Power Theory and the U.S.’s China
Policy in the Post Cold War Era,” September 2001, pp. 24–27.
Shi Yinhong et al., “The Impact of 9/11 on International Relations,” October 2001,
pp. 2–23.
Chen, Baosen, “The Impact of 9/11 on the Economy of the U.S. and World,” Novem-
ber 2001, pp. 1–6.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 5 227
Gao, Zihu, “A Brief Comment on the U.S.’s Quadrennial Defense Report,” December
2001, pp. 61–63.
Zhao, Ganzang, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s New Military Strategy,” January 2002,
pp. 48–53.
Zhu, Qiangguo, “The Adjustment of the U.S.’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,”
February 2002, pp. 28–31.
Qian, Chuntai, “A Preliminary Analysis of Naval Military Security between China
and the U.S.,” April 2002, pp. 8–11, 7.
Zhu, Feng, “The U.S.’s ‘Nuclear Posture Review’: Blackmail or Policy?” April 2002,
pp. 17–23.
Jiao, Shixin, “Canada and the U.S.’s NMD,” April 2002, pp. 34–48.
Li, Changjiu, “The Future of China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations,” June 2002,
pp. 1–5.
Yang, Mingjie, “The Military-Industrial ‘Iron Triangle’ in the U.S.’s National Security
Strategy,” July 2002, pp. 33–39.
Guo, Xiaobing, “How the U.S. Formulates its National Security Policy,” July 2002,
pp. 61–63.
Liu, Jianfei, “Ideological Elements in the U.S.’s China Policy after the Cold War,”
August 2002, pp. 13–17, 28.
Xia, Liping, “The U.S.’s ‘Return to Southeast Asia’ and its Impact on Asia-Pacific
Security,” August 2002, pp. 18–22.
Jiang, Xiaoyan, “On Bush Administrations’ ‘Pre-Emptive’ Strategy,” September 2002,
pp. 7–11.
Xin, Benjian, “Comment on U.S. 2002 Annual Defense Report,” September 2002,
pp. 12–16.
Tan, Guodong, “A Preliminary Analysis of the Latest National Security Strategy of
the United States of America,” October 2002, pp. 18–22.
Zheng, Yingping, “The Thought of Bush Administration’s New Alliances Strategy,”
November 2002, pp. 43–47.
Gao, Zugui, “Soberly Understand U.S. Status and its Foreign Policy—A Comment on
The Paradox of American Power,” November 2002, pp. 62–63.
Wang, Jun, “Preventing the Weaponization of Space and its Prospect,” December
2002, pp. 8–13.
Li, Zidong and Xuezheng Liu, “Russia Factor in Post Cold War China-U.S. Rela-
tions,” December 2002, pp. 29–34.
Guo, Xiaobing, “The U.S. Intends to Monopolize the Space by the Offensive ‘Nega-
tion’ Strategy,” July 2003, pp. 37–38.
Liu Jianfei etc., “On the U.S.’s Global Strategy,” August 2003, pp. 1–21,)
Da, Wei and Li Li, “On the U.S.’s ‘Transforming the Middle East’ Strategy and Its
Limitations,” September 2003, pp. 16–21.
Li, Zhilin, “Current Security Situation in Iraq,” November 2003, pp. 38–39.
Ren, Xiao, “ ‘American Empire’ Thesis and the U.S.’s Grand Strategy,” December
2003, pp. 1–8.
Wang Jisi et al., “Assessments of the Trend of the U.S.’s International Standing,”
March 2004, pp. 1–28.
228 Appendix II
Jiang, Lingfei, “The Constraining Factors in the U.S.’s Containment Strategy against
China and its Possible Evolution,” September/October 1996, pp. 46–50.
Pang, Zhongying, “Soft Power in International Relations and Others—On American
Scholar Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead,” March/April 1997, pp. 49–51.
Zhang, Qingmin, “The U.S.’s Technology Transfer to China in China-U.S. Relations,”
July/August 1999, pp. 19–25.
Wang, Jian, “Coming U.S. Dollar Crisis,” July/August 1998, pp. 31–37.
Zhang, Wenmu, “The U.S.’s Petroleum Geo-Strategy and the Security of China’s
Tibet and Xingjiang,” March/April 1998, pp. 100–104.
Gu, Guoliang, “China’s Response to Arms Control,” July/August 2002, pp. 77–84.
Lin, Guorong and Xiaoli Zhao, “President Bush’s Rhetoric and Intention,” Septem-
ber/October 2001, pp. 98–106.
Tang, Shiping and Xiaoyang Cao, “Looking for the Basis of Mutual Security among
China, the U.S., and Japan,” January/February 2002, pp. 99–109.
Hu, Angang and Honghua Meng, “A Comparison of Tangible Strategic Resources of
China, the U.S., Japan, Russia, and India,” March/April 2002, pp. 26–41.
Lai, Hongyi, “Transfer of the Center of the World Economy – Rise and Fall of America
and Asia from the View of Endowment of Resources and Economy of Scale,” July/
August 2003, pp. 82–89.
Zhang, Liangui, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.’s Police Role,” Sep-
tember/October 2003, pp. 65–77,)
Hu, Angang and Taoxiong Liu, “National Security Capability: A Comparison among
China, the U.S., Japan and India,” November/December 2003, pp. 40–45.
He, Fan, Zhizhong Yao, and Jingchun Zhang, “Rethinking the U.S.’s Role in China’s
Economic Development,” November/December 2003, pp. 111–117.
Zhao, Hua-Sheng, “Can China, Russia and the U.S. Cooperate in Central Asia?”
March/April 2004, pp. 94–107.
Appendix III
Xie, Yao, “The Characteristics and Prospect of the Economic Recession in the U.S.,”
Summer 1991, pp. 1–8, Xie Yao.
Wu, Tianbo, “A Comparison of the Economic Power of the U.S., Europe, and Japan
and their Trends,” Winter 1992, pp. 13–18.
Xie, Yao, “A Brief Comment on the Economic Recovery in the U.S. and its Future
Prospect ,” Autumn 1993, pp. 20–27.
Zhou, Xingbao, “Clinton’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Centered around Economy,”
Winter 1993, pp. 12–18.
Wei, Min, “The Trend in the Change of the Distribution of Economic Power among
the U.S., Europe, and Japan,” Spring 1995, pp. 33–37.
Huang, Suan, “Devaluation of U.S. Dollar and the U.S.’s Relative Economic Decline,”
Autumn 1995, pp. 37–40.
Chen, Dezhao, “The Change and Prospect of U.S. Economy in 1990s,” Spring 1998,
pp. 21–26.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The U.S.’s ‘New Economy’ and its Impact on World Economy,” Au-
tumn 1998, pp. 42–46.
Zeng, Bingxi, “The Current Expansion of U.S. Economy and its Impact on the U.S.’s
Hegemonic Status,” Autumn 1999, pp. 41–45, 49.
Chen, Baosen, “The Economic Position of the United States in the West during the
Nineties,” Spring 1991, pp. 7–24.
Wang, Shusheng, “The Influence of American Private Enterprises on Government
Decision,” Spring 1991, pp. 52–69.
229
230 Appendix III
Zhu, Chuanyi, “New Strategies in Raising Social Welfare Funds,” Spring 1991,
pp. 133–143.
Zheng, Weimin, “Is U.S. Economy Declining or Reviving?” Summer 1991,
pp. 7–20.
Fang, Shaowei, “American Stock Exchanges and Their Transactions,” Summer 1991,
pp. 37–49.
Xiao, Chen, “Wall Street and Electronic Age,” Winter 1991, pp. 23–35.
Liu, Xuyi, “TVA (The Tennessee Valley Authority),” Winter 1991, pp. 36–43.
Xiao, Lian, “Dynamics of Changing World Economic Structure: U.S. Role and Influ-
ence,” Spring 1992, pp. 7–28.
Ding, Haojin, “The Future of American Economy,” Spring 1992, pp. 29–41.
Wei, Wei, “An Analysis of U.S. Investment, Trade and Government Budget,” Spring
1992, pp. 42–58.
Xiao, Chen, “The Influence of U.S. Defense Budget Cut on Economy, Spring 1992,
pp. 59–71.
Li, Changjiu, “The Status of U.S. Foreign Trade and its Prospect,” Spring 1992,
pp. 72–81.
Sun, Haishun, “On the Changing Relative Standing of U.S., Japanese and E.C. Inter-
national Capitals,” Spring 1992, pp. 82–92.
Feng Zhaokui, “U.S.-Japanese Economic Friction and Their Contention in Asia,”
Spring 1992, pp. 93–109.
Du, Houwen, and Qiang Zhang, “Changing U.S. and German Economic Statuses and
Their Bilateral Economic Relations in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 110–119.
Huan, Weiping and Wenhui Zhu, “A Discussion of the U.S. International Financial
Standing in the 1990s,” Spring 1992, pp. 120–134.
Zhou, Maorong, “Impact of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement on the United
States,” Summer 1992, pp. 93–106.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on Economic Report of the President 1992,” Autumn
1992, pp. 7–25.
Zhan, Baohong, “Celler-Kefauver Act and American Corporation Merger,” Winter
1992, pp. 104–120.
Chen, Baosen, “A Blue-Print for Revitalizing U.S. Economy,” Summer 1993,
pp. 29–44.
Zhang, Jian, “The Trend of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1990s,” Autumn 1993,
pp. 32–52.
Wang, Chunfa, “Merits and Demerits of the Education-Research-Extension System of
American Agriculture,” Winter 1993, pp. 43–62.
Wei, Wei, “Analyzing Gains of Both Parties in Sino-U.S. Trade,” Spring 1994,
pp. 131–134.
Chen, Kerong, “The Economics Bill Clinton Needs,” Spring 1994, pp. 134–136.
Chen, Baosen, “Comments on the Domestic and Foreign Economic Policies of the
Clinton Administration,” Winter 1994, pp. 7–22.
Jia, Shaofeng and Xiangjing Meng, “Is U.S. Territory Too Large to Sustain a Good
Economy?” Winter 1994, pp. 114–125.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 6 231
Chen, Baosen, “Postwar International Monetary System and U.S. International Finan-
cial Policy,” Summer 1995, pp. 7–24.
Xiao, Chen, “On the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in
America,” Autumn 1995, pp. 67–89.
Wei, Wei, “A Comparison between Major U.S. and Chinese Economic Indicators,”
Winter 1995, pp. 69–82.
Zhang, Xin, “U.S. Federal Deficits and Bonds,” Spring 1996, pp. 90–104.
Chen, Baosen, “New Trial of Strength between Two American Economic Philoso-
phies,” Summer 1996, pp. 21–39.
Zhang, Youlun, “Two Breakthroughs in U.S. Agriculture and Basic Experiences
Therein,” Summer 1996, pp. 93–109.
Huang, Keke, “A Fine Work in U.S. Urbanization Study --Comments on Wang Xu’s A
Study of American Big Cities on West Coast,” Summer 1996, pp. 140–144.
Jiang, Jingsong, “The U.S. Budget War in 1995,” Winter 1996, pp. 47–75.
Wang, Zeke, “The Hard-to-Change Federal Income Tax,” Summer 1997, pp. 52–68.
Huang, Annian, “Clinton’s Policy toward Family Welfare Reform,” Summer 1997,
pp. 87–104.
Huang, Renwei, “The Shanghai Communiqué and Developing Sino-U.S. Trade and
Economic Relations,” Summer 1997, pp. 147–150.
Song, Yuhua and Huajun Lu, “U.S. Trade Deficit and its Foreign Trade Status,” Au-
tumn 1997, pp. 82–103.
Tao, Wenzhao, “A Seminar on U.S.-China Economic Relations in the 20th Century,”
Autumn 1997, pp. 149–156.
Hu, Guocheng, “The Current Wave of American Enterprise Merging,” Spring 1998,
pp. 79–106.
Wang, Zihong, “An Analysis of America’s Bilateral Economic Relationships,” Spring
1998, pp. 107–121.
Wang, Rongjun, “U.S. Economy in 1997,” Spring 1998, pp. 141–142.
Chen, Baosen, “The Changing U.S. Economic-Financial Theory and Policy,” Summer
1998, pp. 29–47.
Sheng, Bing, “U.S. Foreign Trade Policy in the Changing World Economy,” Autumn
1998, pp. 30–49.
Wang, Xu, “Metropolitanization: The Main Trend of American Urban Development
in the Twentieth Century,” Winter 1998, pp. 65–77.
Liang, Xiwei and Shaojun Chen, “The Operational Mechanism of U.S. Venture Capi-
tal,” Autumn 1999, pp. 19–27.
Jin, Canrong, “Congress Role in the Formulation of American Trade Policy: History
and the Post-Cold War Characteristics,” Summer 2000, pp. 7–30.
Huang, Weiping, “Probing U.S. Economic Status and the Possibility of a ‘Soft-
Landing’,” Summer 2000, pp. 31–43.
Hu, Guocheng, “An Analysis of the Case of Microsoft Monopoly,” Autumn 2000,
pp. 21–41.
Li, Zhihui, “An Analysis of the Changes in the Management and Administration of
American Banks,” Autumn 2000, pp. 42–65.
232 Appendix III
Wei, Wei, “The Impact of Electronic Business on U.S. Economy,” Winter 2000, pp.
123–145.
Shan, Sha, “The U.S.: From NAFTA to the American Free Trade Zone,” August 1995,
pp. 35–38, 50.
Li, Jun, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Trade Deficit,” January 1996,
pp. 50–51.
Du, Xijiang, “Characteristics of the U.S.’s Foreign Trade Policy,” January 1996,
pp. 52, 14.
Xiao, Chen, “The U.S.’s IRA and the Financialization of China’s Social Security,”
February 1996, pp. 41–42.
Zhao, Shumin and Ge Wang, “The Management and Development of Human Capital
in U.S. Businesses,” February 1996, pp. 48–51, 56.
Zhang, Ling, “U.S. Laws Concerning Investment Capital and the Latest Relevant
Legislature,” March 1996, pp. 37–39.
Zhang, Linjun, “The Direction of the U.S.’s Trade Strategy after the Cold War,” June
1996, pp. 40–42.
Chu, Yukun, “The Difficulties Confronting the U.S.’s Export Strategy in Asia,” June
1996, pp. 43–44, 42.
Zhao, Yongqin, “Perceiving the Politicization of World Economy from Economic and
Trade Relations between the U.S. and China, Japan,” July 1996, pp. 25–27.
Ye, Xiangsong, “Revelation of the U.S.’s Management System of State-Owned Busi-
nesses to Our Country’s Reform of State-Owned Business Management System,”
July 1996, pp. 64–67.
Du, Jian, “The Causes and Revelation of Incessant Incidents in the U.S.’s Banking
Industry,” August 1996, pp. 46–48, 65.
Li, Shujie, “The U.S.’s Federal Reserve System: Currency Policy, Finance Regu-
lations, and Electronics of Service, and the Revelations to Us,” October 1996,
pp. 65–68.
Zhao, Lingdi and Yanjing Hu, “The U.S.’s Foreign Trade Strategy is in Urgent Need
of Transformation,” December 1996, pp. 38–41.
Zhang, Xiaotang, “On the Four Economic Pivots of American Decline Thesis,”
January 1997, pp. 69–71.
Ke, Juhan, “U.S. Economy is Still in Moderate Growth Period,” February 1997,
pp. 58–60.
Ye, Xiangsong, “On the Constitution of the U.S.’s Currency Market and its Charac-
teristics,” March 1997, pp. 38–40, 45.
Zhang, Xuesong, “The Revelation of the U.S.’s ‘New Business Culture’ to the Devel-
opment of our Businesses,” March 1997, pp. 46–47.
Ding, Dasong, “On the Trend of the U.S.’s Social Security,” April 1997, pp. 57–60.
Dai, Nianning, “On the U.S.’s Non-Banking Financial Institutions,” May 1997,
pp. 37–39, 64.
Sun, Jingshui, “The U.S.’s Integrated Economic Growth Pattern: its Experience and
Revelations to Us,” June 1997, pp. 35–38, 62.
Zhang, Jikang, “The Challenges and Competitions Facing the U.S.’s Oligarchic Busi-
nesses in Internationalized Industries,” July 1997, pp. 18–22.
Wu, Yonghong, “The Change of the U.S.’s Status in World Economy,” July 1997,
pp. 65–68.
234 Appendix III
Wang, Zhaofeng, “A Study of the Market Relationship between the U.S.’s Banking
System and its Enterprises,” December 2000, pp. 52–56.
Su, Ge, “The Historical Experience of the Take-off of the American Economy,” Au-
tumn 1994, pp. 55–64.
Liu, Shuguang, “A Tentative Comment on the Recent Trend of U.S. Dollar Exchange
Rate and its Impact,” Winter 1995, pp. 54–55-.
Liu, Saili, “A Tentative Analysis of the Sustained Development of the American
Economy,” Summer 1998, pp. 36–39, 47.
Zhu, Liqun, “Perceiving the U.S.’s Explication of Economic Security from the Theory
of Strategic Trade,” Spring 2000, 66–71.
Yang, Ning and Zhanwu Ma, “A Preliminary Analysis of the U.S.’s Federal Reserve
and its Currency Policy,” Summer 2000, pp. 60–63, 72.
Chi, Wenchen, “A Tentative Analysis of the Causes of the U.S.’s Sustained Economic
Growth,” Autumn 2000, pp. 71–74.
Jin, Dexiang, “Why the U.S. Suffers from a Relative Decline?” March/April 1992,
pp. 13–19.
Wang, Huihong, “Can Clinton Solve the U.S.’s Troublesome Economic Problems?”
November/December 1992, pp. 9–14.
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Clinton’s Series of Plans for American
Economic Rejuvenation,” March 1993, pp. 1–4, 25.
Ke, Juhan, Jian Tao, and Wenyan Gu, “Why Clinton Administration Attaches Great
Importance to Foreign Trade?” July 1993, pp. 9–12.
Tao, Jian, Wenyan Gu, and Juhan Ke, “U.S. Economy Entering into Sustained Moder-
ate Development,” January 1994, pp. 6–10.
Guo, Shixian, “A Tentative Analysis of the New U.S. Dollar Crisis,” August 1994,
pp. 18–22.
Gu, Wenyan, “Economic Situations in the U.S. and the Trend of China-U.S. Eco-
nomic and Trade Relations,” April 1996, pp. 25–29.
Shi, Ren, “On the Economic Development of the U.S., Europe, and Japan around the
Turn of the Century,” January 1998, pp. 4–9.
Gu, Wenyan, “Why Only the Economy of the U.S. among Western Countries is Pros-
perous,” June 1998, pp. 7–11.
Zhou, Xin, “On the Integration of EU Currency and the Reconstitution of Financial
Industry in the U.S. and Japan,” September 1998, pp. 18–22.
Li, Huiming, “Intellectual Capital and the U.S.’s Intellectual Economy,” September
1998, pp. 26–29.
236 Appendix III
Shu, Jingxiang, “The Reform of Financial Supervisory Systems in the U.S., Europe,
and Japan,” November 1998, pp. 36–39.
Lu, Qichang, Mengzhi Fu, and Peng Yuan, “The U.S.’s Politics, Economy, and
Foreign Affairs, Their Current Status and Future Trend,” January/February 1999,
pp. 17–22.
Li, Changjiu, “The Characteristics, Problems and Revelations of the U.S.’s Economic
Development,” March 2000, pp. 1–7.
Gu, Wenyan, “The Prospect of the U.S.’s Economy at the Turn of the Century,”
December 1999, pp. 5–8.
Li, Li, “A Comparison of the Role of State Intervention in the Economic Development
of the U.S. and Japan,” May/June 1995, pp. 16–23.
Wang, Jian, “Regional Economy Models in the U.S. and Japan and their Revelation to
China’s Cosmopolitan Development Strategy,” March/April 1997, pp. 1–15.
Wang, Yi, Jiqiong Zhang, Changhua Wu, and Kebing He, “Global Energy and
Environment Cooperation: A Strategic Card in China-U.S. Relations,” November/
December 1997, pp. 54–59.
Nolan, Peter and Xiaoqiang Wang, “The Revelation of the U.S.’s Military Indus-
try Reformation to China’s Industrial Integration,” November/December 1997,
pp. 60–67.
Wang, Jian, “Coming Dollar Crisis,” July/August 1998, pp. 31–37.
Appendix IV
Pan, Tongwen, “The U.S.’s Midterm Election in 1990 and its Impact,” Summer 1991,
pp. 15–20.
Pan, Tongwen, “The 1992 Presidential Election in the U.S. and Policy Trend of Clin-
ton Administration,” Spring 1993, pp. 1–5.
Pan, Tongwen, “A Few Tentative Thoughts since Clinton’s Inauguration,” Winter
1993, pp. 8–11.
Pan, Tongwen, “The U.S.’s Midterm Election in 1994 and its Impact, Spring 1995,
pp. 18–22.
Jin, Junhui, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Year 2000 Presidential Election,”
January/February 2000, pp. 34–38.
Yuan, Ruijun, “The Power Balance between the White House Staff and the Cabinet
Members,” Autumn 1992, pp. 97–117.
Yang, Jian, “Contention for War Power between the Congress and the President,”
Winter 1992, pp. 7–29.
Chen, Yu-jun, “Conservative Interest Groups and the Changes in the Republican Con-
stituency,” Winter 1992, pp. 30–51.
Jiang, Jingsong, “On the Style of Majority Leadership in U.S. Congress,” Winter
1992, pp. 52–65.
Jia, Hao, “The 1992 Presidential Election and New Changes in U.S. Political Trend,”
Summer 1993, pp. 45–75.
Jiang, Jingsong, “The Present Crisis of U.S. Constitutional System,” Autumn 1993,
pp. 53–76.
237
238 Appendix IV
Ni, Feng, “The Political Thought of Henry D. Thoreau,” Winter 1993, pp. 107–128.
Zhu, Shida, “On the Middle Class in the U.S.A.,” Winter 1994, pp. 39–53.
Zhou, Qi, “American Contribution to Modern Western Democracy—Representative
Democracy,” Winter 1994, pp. 55–72.
Jin, Canrong, “Politico-Cultural Split in the U.S. and the Evolution of U.S. Politics,”
Spring 1995, pp. 7–28.
Yang, Dazhou, “A Preliminary Study of the Impact of the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elec-
tion,” Spring 1995, pp. 106–110.
Zhou, Qi, “A Survey of the 1994 U.S. Mid-term Election,” Spring 1995,
pp. 111–120.
Jin, Junhui, “Will the United States Become More Turbulent?—An After-Thought on
the U.S. Midterm Election,” January 1995, pp. 121–124.
Fang, Xiaoguang, “The Voters’ Rebellion: An Analysis of the 1994 U.S. Midterm
Election,” Spring 1995, pp. 125–129.
Jin, Canrong, “A Report of the Workshop on the 1994 U.S. Midterm Elections,”
Spring 1995, pp. 145–148.
Wang, Enming, “The Women’s Movement in Contemporary America,” Autumn 1995,
pp. 31–47.
Xiao, Chen, “On the Compatibility of Law-Governing to Economic Efficiency in
America,” Autumn 1995, pp. 67–89.
Huan, Yahong, “The Origin of the Women’s Movement in America,” Autumn 1995,
pp. 127–132.
Zhang, Ye, “Gender Perspective and Women in Development: Two Hot Subjects in the
Women’s Movement,” Autumn 1995, pp. 133–136.
Zhang, Liping, “Linden Johnson and Civil Rights Act,” Summer 1996, pp. 110–132.
Zhou, Qi, “America’s Upper Class,” Autumn 1996, pp. 41–62.
Zhu, Shida, “The Clinton Administration’s Dilemma in Affirmative Action,” Autumn
1996, pp. 63–84.
Yang, Jiemian, “The American Presidential Election and the Readjustment of Clinton’s
China Policy,” Winter 1996, pp. 128–134.
Li, Zhidong, “Colin Powell and American Politics,” Summer 1997, pp. 105–124.
Cui, Zhiyuan, “Three Theoretical Questions Concerning the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution,” Autumn 1997, pp. 121–136.
Jin, Canrong, “The Basic Features of the American Politics in 1997,” Spring 1998,
pp. 138–140.
Xiong, Zhiyong, “Lobbying in U.S. Congress and Foreign Policy Making,” Autumn
1998, pp. 71–89.
Sun, Ru, “An Analysis of the Fund-Raising Enquiry,” Autumn 1998, pp. 91–108.
Su, Pengfei, “U.S. Local Autonomy: Charter of the City of Berkeley,” Autumn 1999,
pp. 81–92.
Liu, Jianfei, “Causes for the Emergence and Development of America’s Anticommu-
nism,” Summer 2000, pp. 81–108.
Ji, Hong, “Civil Rights Movement and the Rise of Black Political Influence of Black
Southerners,” Summer 2000, pp. 109–142.
The Sample of Chinese Articles for Chapter 7 239
Zhao, Shenggan and Qichang Lu, “The U.S.’s Midterm election and Political Trend,”
January 1991, pp. 60–63.
Zhang, Xingping, “Will Bush be Re-elected?” April 1992, pp. 45–47.
Gong, Weijing, “U.S. Election Founded on the Basis of U.S. Dollars,” December
1992, pp. 41–45.
Wen, Yan, “A Summary of the Symposium on Trend of the U.S.’s Domestic and For-
eign Policies after the Presidential Election,” March 1993, pp. 57–60.
Zhang, Minqian, “A Tentative Analysis of the U.S.’s Clean Government Construction
and its Lessons to Us,” August 1994, pp. 38–43, 32.
Bi, Yunhong, “An Analysis of the U.S.’s Presidential Election Situation,” June 1996,
pp. 23–25.
Jin, Canrong, “U.S. Politics and Policy Trend after the Presidential Election,”
November 1996, pp. 40–43, 12.
Song, Shiming, “Public Choice Theory and the U.S.’s Administrative Reform,” May
1997, pp. 40–44, 60.
Lin, Hongyu, “Public Opinion in the U.S. and its China Policy,” August 1997,
pp. 67–70.
Jiang, Xinxue, “The Dilemma of Division of Powers and Legislature in U.S.
Congress,” April 1998, pp. 73–76.
Dong, Xiuli, “The U.S.’s Presidential Election and China-U.S. Relations,” Autumn
2000, pp. 57–61.
Lu, Qichang, “George W. Bush Takes Aim at the White House,” August 1999,
pp. 33–35.
Chen, Xiangyang, “Domestic Politics in the U.S. and Its Impact on China-U.S.
Relations,” December 1999, pp. 29–31.
Lu, Qichang, “Domestic Situations in the U.S. in the Presidential Election Year,”
January/February 2000, pp. 34–38.
Lu, Qichang, and Yanyu Zhang, “An Analysis of the Passage of China PNTR in the
U.S. House of Representatives,” June 2000, pp. 40–44.
Lu, Qichang, “The U.S.’s Presidential Election and U.S.-China Relations,” July 2000,
pp. 9–13.
Lu, Qichang, “Gore: U.S. Presidential Candidate for the Democratic Party,” August
2000, pp. 39–41.
Tang, Hao, “Domestic Interest Group Politics in the U.S. and China-U.S. Relations,”
September 2000, pp. 11–14.
Lu, Qichang, “A Comparison of the Policy Platform of George W. Bush and Gore,”
October 2000, pp. 26–29.
Huang, Zhaoyu, “Perceiving the Defects in the Americanized Democracy from the
‘Difficult Labor’ in Producing the New President,” December 2000, pp. 21–25.
No relevant articles
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258 Index
Nuechterlein, Donald Edwin, political system, 32, 40, 50–52, 91, 155,
39–40, 70 166–169, 172; not as a source of
Nye, Joseph, 108 conflict, 175
Olympics: 2000, 55, 93; 2008, 93 politicians, 156, 163–165
one China and one Taiwan, 43 popular sovereignty, 159, 167
one-country-two-systems, 44, popular vote, 162
90–91 power, 29, 101–123
opportunity: for cooperation, 14–15, 70; power transition theory, 2
for exploitation, 14–15, 70. See also predominant leader, 16–17
threat and opportunity prerequisite for world peace, 88
overlapping claims, 196–197 presidential staff system, 171
prison labor, 60
Pakistan, 49, 56, 71 private property, 141
paper tiger, 116, 192 production rate, 135–137
parliamentary democracy, 159, promotion of values, 39–40
partner, 80, 203–204 property rights, 141–142
partner image, 187–190, 194 Pruitt, Dean, 27–28
peace, 87–88, 185 psychological theories, 4
peace dividends, 140 public independence, 42
peaceful coexistence, 59, 88, 202 puzzle in U.S.-China relations, 1–2
peaceful evolution, 33, 50–52, 59
perceived, 25–35 quality of workers, 137
perceivers, 15–18, 147 quotation collection, 18–19, 22
perceptions of: democracy, 155, 174;
economy 34–35, 125–152; economic Radio Free Asia, 51
capabilities, 103–104; military Rand, 196
power, 30, 106–107; opportunity, R&D funding, 105, 113
69–100; politics, 32–34, 153–182, R&D personnel, 105
caveat, 182n36; power, 101–123; Reagan, Ronald, 41, 101, 125–127, 147
prosperity, 132–137; science and realism, 1, 4, 29–30, 77
technology, 104–106; threat, 37–68, reality principle, 9, 115
191–192 reasons for economic success or failure,
peripheral incidents, 42, 46–47 128–129, 139–140
permanent normal trade relations, 54, recession, 137–139
77–78, 85–87, 92, 170 reconnaissance plane collision, 198
philanthropists, 132 relative decline, 101–102, 110–111,
Philippines, 45, 48 132, 138
Pillsbury, Michael, 22–24, 26, 30–31, relative security, 49, 59
192–193, 205n31 relative threat, 197–198, 201
planned economy, 34–35, 128, 142 relative tolerance of threat, 197, 200
pluralist sub-school, 153–154 Ren, Yue, 26
PNTR. See permanent normal trade replicability, 37, 39
relations representative democracy, 159
political stability, 172, 190 Republican Party, 167, 170–171
264 Index