Pointers in Criminal Law

2015 Bar Examinations

Prof. Victoria V. Loanzon
(With the Assistance of DLSU College of Law Central Bar Operations)

I. Preliminaries

Q. What is the nature and scope of Criminal Law?

A. (1) Generality – will apply to people who commit any criminal act committed within the territory of the Philippines and will
generally deal with the characteristic of the person accused of committing the crime;
(2) Territoriality – Philippines will have jurisdiction over crimes committed inside its territory except as provided for in treaties and
laws of preferential application and will normally deal with the characteristic of the place where the crime was committed; and
(3) Prospectivity – based on Art.22 of RPC, the appreciation of the crime committed must take into consideration the date of the
passage of the law and give it retroactive effect (a) if it is favorable to the accused; and (b) if the accused is not a habitual delinquent.

Q. What provisions of the Bill of Rights are relevant to Criminal Law?

A. The Bill of Rights
Sec. 1: due process and equal protection clause;
Sec. 2: right against illegal arrest, illegal search and seizure (in relation to admission in evidence of extrajudicial admissions,
warrantless arrest, warrantless search and seizure and planted evidence);
Sec. 3: privacy of communications (in relation to Wire Tapping Law);
Sec. 5: freedom of religion (in relation to crime offending a religion);
Sec. 6: liberty of abode (in relation to restraint of travel (issuance of Hold Departure Order; illegal detention committed by a public
officer or a private individual);
Sec.11: free access to courts (in relation to right to appropriate legal representation);
Sec. 12: (1) and (3) Miranda rights (in relation to extrajudicial confessions and when one can become a state witness), (2) and (4)
Rights while under detention (in relation to Human Security Act of 2007 and Human Torture Act of 2009;
Sec. 13: Right to bail (in relation to non-bailable offenses like Plunder, Rebellion, etc. Please attention to JPE v. Sandiganbayan
where a new ground was invoked to grant bail);
Sec. 14: Presumption of innocence (in relation to degree of proof required to convict);
Sec. 15: Limitation on the privilege of habeas corpus;
Sec. 16: Right to speedy trial;
Sec.17: Right against self-incrimination;
Sec. 18: Nature of penalty of imprisonment (in relation to imposition of penalties under RPC, Probation Law, Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Diversion and Rehabilitation);
Sec. 19: Nature fines and physical detention in case of conviction (in relation to appreciation of attending circumstances in the
commission of the crime, suspension of death penalty);
Sec. 20: Non-imprisonment for debt or non-payment of a poll tax;
Sec. 21: Prohibition against double jeopardy; and
Sec. 22: Prohibition against ex post fact law/ bill of attainder.

Q. Fr. Robert Gonzales was undergoing preliminary investigation and was about to attend an engagement abroad. Will the writ of
amparo lie to a petitioner who is undergoing preliminary investigation for rebellion? De Castro, J.
A. No. Citing Manalo v. President Arroyo, the Court said: “xxx As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." Reyes v. Sec. Gonzales, 606 SCRA
580 (2013)

Q. The Senate requested the appearance of certain military officers to attend its congressional inquiry on alleged election fraud
committed by the administration. The President did not allow them to attend such hearing. Is the freedom of movement violated if
the President restricts the appearance of key military officers to attend congressional inquiries?
A. No. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple
declaration that "[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x x" Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as
commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law.

Q. JPE is one of the senators who was ordered arrested by the Sandiganbayan. His plea for provisional liberty was denied by the
trial court. May such public officer charged with plunder punishable with reclusion perpetua and when evidence of guilt is strong
still be entitled to bail?
A. Yes. Citing Dela Rama v. The People’s Court, the Court said: “x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the
particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its
discretion to admit the prisoner to bail; x x x”
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. Juan Ponce Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, August 18, 2015

Q. What is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused in a drug-related case? De
Castro, J.

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A. In order for the prosecution to successfully overturn the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, it should, in drug-related cases, prove not only the acquisition of the subject specimens through a legitimate buy-bust
operation, but likewise the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti by a substantially unbroken chain in the custody of said
specimens from their acquisition to the necessary laboratory examination. People v. Meriam Guru, 684 SCRA 544 (2012)

Q. Accused-appellant appealed his conviction alleging that prosecution largely hinged its evidence on the buy-bust operations
conducted by the law enforcers. Is entrapment sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprenhending criminals? De Castro,
J.
A. Yes. Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and capture
lawbreakers in the execution of their plan. People v. Legaspi, 710 SCRA 284 (2013)

Q. Distinguish entrapment from instigation. De Castro, J.

A. Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such case,
the instigators become co-principals themselves. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may be
had. People v. Legaspi, 710 SCRA 284 (2013)

Q. Fernando appealed his conviction for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He said the prosecution failed to show with moral
certainty that the law enforcers proved his guilt. How should inculpatory facts be appreciated to establish the guilt of the accused?
De Castro, J.
A. Where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one consistent with accused’s innocence and another with his guilt, the
evidence thus adduced failed to meet the test of moral certainty. An honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and
that fact a material one, cannot be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but throws
doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable. People v. De los
Reyes, 656 SCRA 417 (2011)

Q. What are the elements of double jeopardy?

A. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has
entered a valid plea during arraignment. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014

Q. If one has been convicted for violation of an ordinance, may be held accountable again under a national law?
A. No. Requisites of Double Jeopardy (Ivler v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010):
1. Identity of the elements of the crime committed as set forth in the information.
2. Accused has entered his plea.
3. Prosecution and the defense have presented evidence.
4. The court has ruled on the merits.
5. The decision has become final and executory.

Other relevant Supreme Court rulings:

People v. Dante Tan G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010: In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court explained the general rule that
the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable. The demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Bangayan, Jr., v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777, October 19, 2011: It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is
the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of
the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer
to evidence in a criminal case.
It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such
acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
The exception where the acquittal may be questioned based on denial of the State's right to due process can be found in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan (1986)

Exception, when invoked: Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal
places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for
this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused.

Q. What is the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine?

A. The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also
ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. However, the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that warrantless searches and
seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances:
(1) search of moving vehicles;
(2) seizure in plain view;
(3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches;

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(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. People of the Philippines v. Vicente
Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February 19, 2014.

Q. Is a hearing necessary to determine probable cause in the issuance of a warrant?

A. No. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.”
Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, the Supreme Court has ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination
thereof. In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for
determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830,
February 11, 2014 citing People v. Grey G.R. No. 180109, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 523, 535

Q. Explain how a judge determines probable cause before issuing a warrant.

A. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the existence of
probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no
probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. De los Santos–Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., 317 Phil. 101, 111 (1995).

Q. Can the accused move for the dismissal of the case against them based on the political offense doctrine prior to determination
that certain criminal acts have been absorbed in furtherance of rebellion?
A. No. The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court
that the murders were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character
as “common” offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.”
People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 541 (1956).
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone. People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 489 (1995).
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether
the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Q. Cite the distinction between mala en se and mala prohibitum.

A. The distinctions are:
(1) in mala en se by itself the act is inherently wrong (ex. killing another person) while in mala prohibitum the act is merely
prohibited by law (ex. smoking or jay walking);
(2) good faith is a defense in mala en se but not in mala prohibitum;
(3) stages of commission under Art.6 of RPC is considered in mala en se but not in mala prohibitum;
(4) degree of participation under Title II of RPC is considered in mala en se but not in mala prohibitum;
(5) in mala en se, modifying circumstances are considered in determining imposable penalty but not mala prohibitum; and
(6) in mala en se, generally, the crimes are punished under RPC while generally, crimes considered mala prohibitum are
punished under special penal law.

“[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs during parties, social gatherings
or meetings under Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of malum prohibitum, that is, the act is made wrong or evil because there is
a law prohibiting it. x x x

Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of participation of the offenders is not
considered. All who perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same extent. There is no principal or accomplice or
accessory to consider. In short, the degree of participation of the offenders does not affect their liability, and the penalty on all of
them are the same whether they are principals or merely accomplices or accessories. Citing Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised
Penal Code, 2008 edition.

II. Circumstances Affecting the Appreciation of Commission of a Crime

Attending circumstance in the commission of crimes: justifying, mitigating, exempting and aggravating (generic and
qualifying), alternative circumstances ; appreciation of each circumstance will depend on the facts surrounding the criminal
act as it would affect the criminal liability and extent of liability of the accused. MEMORIZE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF
THE RPC.

Q. How is the qualifying circumstance of treachery appreciated in criminal prosecution?

A. There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias “Fred”, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014.

Q. What are the elements to establish treachery? De Castro, J.

A. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. People v. Vergara 700 SCRA 412 (2013); People v/ Hastero G.R. No. 192179, July 3, 2013; People v,
Vilbar, 664 SCRA 749 (2012); People v. Sabangon, 712 SCRA 522 (2013); People v. Jadap, 617 SCRA 179 (2010); People v. Asilan,
669 SCRA 405 (2012); People v. Rosas, 570 SCRA 117(2008)

Q. How is intent to kill establish in the crime of murder? De Castro, J.

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A. To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. People v. Las Pinas 730 SCRA 571, 23 July 2014

Other relevant Supreme Court ruling:

The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to
prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014

Q. What is the probative value of out-of-court identification of the accused?

A. The following ruling of the Court in People v. Teehankee, Jr. is instructive on the conduct of and test for a valid out–of–court
identification:chanResOut–of–court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show–ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line–ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for
the purpose. Since corruption of out–of–court identification contaminates the integrity of in–court identification during the trial of
the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out–of–court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (Citation omitted.)

Q. What is conspiracy? De Castro, J.

A. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the
commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and
objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.
People v. Milan, Chua and Carandang, 653 SCRA 607 (2011)

Other Supreme Court ruling:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. While direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which
point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests. People of the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano,
G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014

Q. What is the principle of criminal conspiracy? De Castro, J.

A. Citing People v. Nelmida, the Court elaborated on the principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications in this
manner:cnoblThere is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and then
decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide
to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by
any one of them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because
the act of one is the act of all. People v. Dadao 714 SCRA 524 (2014); People v. Regalario, 582 SCRA 738 (2009)

Q. Is proof of previous agreement necessary to establish conspiracy?

A. No. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or inferred from the
acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Proof of a
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential, but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the
same objective suffices. People of the Philippines v. John Alvin Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969, February 27, 2013

Q. What is the rule on the admission of extrajudicial confession to appreciate the element of conspiracy?
A. The exception provided under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator
requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. The Supreme Court, however, has previously
stressed that mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and
companionship do not prove conspiracy. It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to
cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. Gerry A. Salapuddin v. The Court of Appeals, Gov. Jum Akbar, and Nor-Rhama J.
Indanan, G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013.

Q. What are elements to establish self-defense? De Castro, J.

A. Anent accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be proved:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. A person who invokes self-defense has the burden
of proof.
The accused must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete
or incomplete.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it
must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating action.” It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to one’s life.” People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 496, 502-503; People v. Laurio, 680 SCRA
560; People v. Escleto, 671 SCRA 149 (2102); David v. People, 562 SCRA 22; People v. Regalario, 582 SCRA 738 (2009; People v.
Tabarnero, 613 SCRA 492); People v. Punzalan, 687 SCRA (2012)

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Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a justifying
circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with:
(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and
(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
People v. Punzalan, 687 SCRA (2012)

The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound
the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk
to life and limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. People v. Regalario, 582 SCRA 738
(2009)

Other relevant rulings of the Supreme Court:

By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them by invoking the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense. Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is
the element of unlawful aggression. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170462, February 5,
2014

There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense. Simon A. Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013.

Q. Where evident premeditation is alleged, what elements must the prosecution establish? De Castro, J.
A. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. People v. Gary Alinao, . G.R. No. 191256,
September 18, 2013; People v. Delpino, G.R. No. 171453, June 18, 2009

Q. How is the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength and generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the
victim appreciated in the crime of murder? De Castro, J.
A. To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend
himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take
advantage thereof. The presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the body of the victim was manifested when
accused-appellants did not just kill the victim. They tied him hog-style after rendering him immobilized. This action constituted
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. . People v. Regalario, 582 SCRA 738 (2009)

In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be “evident premeditation.” To warrant a
finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder, must be established by clear and
positive evidence showing the planning and the preparation stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and
inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice.

Q. What is alibi?
A. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must
adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Alibi cannot prevail over and
is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime. People of the
Philippines v. Jonathan “Uto” Veloso y Rama, G.R. No. 188849, February 13, 2013

Q. What is the nature of the defense of alibi? De Castro, J.

A The established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place
at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its
immediate vicinity. People v. Asis, 624 SCRA 209 (2010); People v. Baroquillo, 656 SCRA 250 (2011); People v. Tejero, 674 SCRA
244 (2012)

Q. When is alibi applicable as a defense?

A. It has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
during its commission. People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014

Q. When is intoxication appreciated as considered as an aggravating circumstance? De Castro, J.

A. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a
felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication
is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
ART. 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating
according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship,
intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. x x x.” People v. Andres Fontanillas, 638 721 (2010)

Q. What is the probative value of an affidavit if the affiant is not presented in court?
A. An affidavit is hearsay unless affiant presented in court. It is settled that while affidavits may be considered as public documents
if they are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a public officer authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as
hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon and the adverse party is accorded the

5
opportunity to cross-examine them. With the prosecution’s failure to present the affiant to affirm his statement should be treated as
hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims.

Q. How is circumstantial evidence appreciated in establishing one’s culpability in a special crime of rape with homicide? De
Castro, J.
A. It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is generally unwitnessed and very
often only the victim is left to testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with homicide, resort to circumstantial evidence is
usually unavoidable. People v. Alfredo Pascual, 576 242 (2009)

Q. What will support a conviction based circumstantial evidence? De Castro, J.

A. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who
has committed the crime.

In People v. Mansueto, the Court held: Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way
as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. People v. Lagat and Palalay, 657 SCRA 713(2011)

Other relevant rulings of the Supreme Court:

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred
based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188694, February 12, 2014

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder
draws from the evidence established. It is sufficient for conviction if: [a] there is more than one (1) circumstance; [b] the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accuser’s guilt and inconsistent with the accuser’s innocence. People of the Philippines v.
P/Supt. Artemio E. Lamsen, et al, G.R. No. 198338, February 20, 2013.

Q. What is the best evidence to establish minority to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance?

A. To establish minority one’s Certificate of Birth may be introduced as evidence.
Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the law in extending
such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less discernment. This is
regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our
consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs. People v. Agacer et.
al., January 7, 2013

On Minority as qualifying circumstance (People v. Padigos, 687 245 (2012), De Castro, J.):
“In People v. Pruna,Ï‚rνll we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either
as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the
sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show
the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony,
if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
victims age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.”‚rνll (Citation omitted.)

Q. Can an accused claim insanity as a defense? De Castro, J.

A. Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved.
Garchitorena who never denied his participation in the killing, insisted that he is exempt from criminal liability because he was
suffering from a mental disorder before, during and after the commission of the crime. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the
defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the expert witness herself attested that accused Garchitorena was experiencing
remission and was even aware of his murder case in court. People v. Gatchitorena, 687 SCRA 420 (2009)

6
Q. Will the delay in charging the accused of murder raise serious doubt on the testimony of an eye witness to the crime? De Castro,
J.
A. No. Well settled is the rule that Delay in making criminal accusations will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness if such
delay is satisfactorily explained. It has been established that the delay in filing a criminal complaint is attributed to his confusion and
desire to consult his sister-in-law who is the wife of deceased Danilo. People v. Adallom, 667 SCRA 652 (2012)

Q. What is flight from justice? De Castro, J.

A. Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing
and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while others may remain in the
same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community. Non-flight
does not necessarily connote innocence. People v. Dadao, 714 SCRA 524 (2014)

PLEASE MEMORIZE all attending circumstances BECAUSE YOU MIGHT BE FACED WITH QUESTIONS WHICH
WILL CALL FOR THE APPLICATION OF THESE DISTINCTIONS IN COMPUTATION OF PENALTIES, ACTORS IN
THE COMMISSION OF CRIMES, STAGES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, APPRECIATION OF
ATTENDING CIRCUMSTANCES AND AVAILMENT OF PROBATION.

III. Felonies and other related matters

Classification of crimes; see your RPC on crimes against persons, national security, committed by public officers etc. and those
under Special Penal Laws; concept of impossible crime and when one can be held liable for it;

Stages of commission of a crime and actors involved: attempted, frustrated and consummated; Principal, accomplice and
accessory. Please note the stage and degree of participation will determine the penalties; actors may also be multiple offenders
and may be covered under any of the following - recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habituality, habitual delinquency( nature of
crime, time element and nature of aggravating circumstances are factors which are considered if the defendant is covered)

Q. What is the liability of conspirators?

A. Conspiracy makes all the assailants equally liable as co-principals by direct participation. People of the Philippines v. Erwin
Tamayo y Bautisa, G.R. No. 196960, March 12, 2014.
Q. What are the elements of frustrated homicide?
A. The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present. Rodolfo Guevarra and
Joey Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014

Q. What are the elements of consummated homicide?

A. The crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying
circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People , G.R. No. 170462,
February 5, 2014

Q. Accused-appellant Camat appealed his conviction for murder arguing that that his conviction was erroneous because it was
based on contradictory and improbable testimonies made by prosecution witnesses who were among the surviving victims of the
massacre. He maintains that these witnesses could not have possibly identified him with moral certainty as one of the gunmen
because it was unlikely that they were able to see the faces of the assailants firing at them since they were more concerned with
taking cover for their safety. What elements must be proved to hold one liable for murder? De Castro, Jr.
A. As encapsulated in jurisprudence, to be liable for Murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither
parricide nor infanticide.
All the elements of the crime of murder concur in this instance. With regard to the first element, the prosecution was able to establish
the fact of death of Marcelina and Elmer Hidalgo as shown by their death certificates as well as the autopsy reports which clearly
indicate that the common cause of their untimely demise is massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds that they sustained
during the shooting incident in question. The fourth element is present as well since both the victims are adults and not related by
consanguinity or affinity to appellant Camat which forecloses any possibility of classifying their fatal shooting as either parricide or
infanticide. People v. Camat, 677 SCRA 640 (2012)

Q. What are the elements of murder?

A. To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is
neither parricide nor infanticide. People v. Mark Joseph R. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713, February 20, 2013.

Q. Is intent to kill essential to establish homicide?

A. The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.
Accused’s intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a
bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. Nonetheless, accused continued to shoot at
the victim three more times, albeit unsuccessfully. These belie the absence of petitioner’s intent to kill the victim. Edmundo Escamilla
y Jugo v. People, G.R. No. 188551, February 27, 2013

Q. How is evident premeditation proven as an aggravating circumstance in murder? De Castro, J.

A. For evident premeditation to be established, the following requisites should be proven: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) act manifesting that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of the act. People v. Delpino, G.R. No.
17153, June 18, 2009

7
Q. What are the elements of frustrated homicide? De Castro, J.
A. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, of the means used by the malefactors; the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and the motive of the accused.
The elements of frustrated homicide are:
1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. People v.
Lanuza, 565 SCRA 293(2011)

Q. What is the essential evidence which the prosecution must establish in robbery with homicide? De Castro, J.
A. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take
place before, during or after the robbery. For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed. People v. Dui et al., 695 SCRA 229 (2013)

Homicide on occasion of robbery, victim is immaterial. People v. Welvin Diu, et al., April 3, 2013. When homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of
robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not
all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and
can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission
of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the
homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.

Q. AAA was first raped by her stepfather when she was eight years old in 1987. The other five rape incidents kept on until 1999.
She did not disclose the incidents out of fear but was impelled to share her horrendous experience when his stepfather started to
rape her younger sister. Arpon, the stepfather, was found guilty of qualified rape. What must the prosecution prove to establish
statutory rape? De Castro, J.
A. Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the
law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes
that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of
her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. People v. Arpon, 662 SCRA 506 (2012)

Other relevant rulings of the Supreme Court:

In the prosecution of statutory rape cases, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only
subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern good from evil. People v. Padilla, 651 SCRA 571 (2011)

De Castro, J.: In incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral
influence of the father would suffice.
Accused-appellant was indicted for four counts of rape and one count of attempted rape, all qualified by his relationship with and the
minority of the private offended party. All the rape incidents occurred when the victim was only 12 years old. The prosecution
presented four witnesses, namely, the private offended party, AAA; her mother, BBB; her relative who claimed to be an eyewitness to
the sexual abuse, CCC; and the medico-legal who physically examined her for signs of sexual abuse. People v. Dominguez, 636
SCRA 134 (2010)
De Castro, J.: In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not necessary that actual force and intimidation be employed. The moral ascendancy
of appellant over the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation. People v. Ortega 664 SCRA 273

Q. Can Abella be convicted of statutory rape when the victim is a 38-year mental retardate? De Castro, J.
A. Yes. Citing People v. Andaya, it was held that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate with the mental age of a
child below 12 years old constitutes statutory rape with or without the attendance of force, threat, or intimidation. The Court said that
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented
person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-
year old child and that she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship. These facts
support the allegation of sexual abuse. AAA also identified without uncertainty the accused-appellant as her attacker and related
distinctly that he forcibly laid her down, held her at knifepoint, and sexually abused her. People v. Abella, 610 SCRA 19 (2010)

Other relevant ruling of the Supreme Court:

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) said act was
accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. People v. Felimon Patentes y Zamora, G.R. No. 190178, February 12,
2014
De Castro, J.: The ability of mentally deficient rape victims to communicate their ordeal capably and consistently does not undermine
the gravity of the complainant’s accusations, but even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and
guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of
the accused.

8
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC provides for two circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental
disability is considered rape: (1)when the offended party is deprived of reason,and (2) when the offended party is demented. People
v. Caoile, 697 SCRA 638 (2013)

Q. Can a grand uncle be held liable for qualified rape? De Castro, J.

A. No. In order that qualified rape under Article 266-B of the RPC to exist, xxx the victim should be under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third (3rd) civil degree,
or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. xxx Absence of the acts enumerated in the above-stated provision would only
amount to simple rape.
The granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victim’s grandfather, is a relative of the victim in the fourth civil degree, and is
thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1). People v. Deligro, 696 SCRA 822 (2013)

Q. When can one be accused of attempted rape? De Castro, J.

A. Under Article 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. For there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. People v. Dominguez,
636 SCRA 134 (2010)

Q. A 67-year old woman was a victim of rape. The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. In his appeal, Jastiva
argued that rape could have not taken place because the 67-year woman never offered resistance. Is this legal defense tenable? De
Castro, J.
A. No. The Court said that it is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of rape is easy to
make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits; and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if
the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s testimony.
This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the risk of public contempt unless she
is, in fact, a rape victim. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman involuntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at
all, just like what happened in this case. Thus, the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What needs
only to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim.
People v. Jastiva, 716 SCRA 125 (2014)
.
Q. What is sweetheart theory appreciated in the crime of rape?
A. For the sweetheart theory to be believed when invoked by the accused, convincing evidence to prove the existence of the supposed
relationship must be presented by the proponent of the theory. For the [“sweetheart”] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving
and of no probative value. People v. Mervin Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014.

De Castro, J : The sweethearts defense does not necessarily preclude rape. Even if it were true, such relationship would not, by itself,
establish consent, for love is not a license for lust. A love affair could not have justified what Buban did -- subjecting complainant to
his carnal desires against her will. People v. Buban, 603 SCRA 205 (2009)
De Castro, J. The sweetheart theory as a defense necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves
the prosecution the burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart
theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has
successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual. People v. Alcober, 709 SCRA 479

Q. Is pregnancy an essential element of rape? De Castro, J.

A. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the
accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. People v.
Paras, 724 SCRA 691 (2014)
De Castro, J.: It is well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in
determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the
rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the
victim in a truthful manner. People v. Gahi, 717 SCRA 2009 (2014)

Crime of Rape – Complex crime of rape with homicide may result if after the incident of rape, the victim was killed where
there was no original intent to kill her. Aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nocturnity disguise and if alcohol was used to
embolden the offender may be appreciated by the court in imposing the penalty.
Rape; elements of statutory rape; carnal knowledge of a female without her consent is the essence of statutory rape. The elements
of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force,
threat or intimidation on the female, nor the female’s deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on
the female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. People of the
Philippines v. Tomas Teodoro y Angeles, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013

Q. How is the crime of acts of lusciousness committed? De Castro, J.

A. “The term “lewd” is defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. “ An
accused committing lewd acts is necessarily a mental process. Such can be inferred by overt acts showing such intention. What is lewd
cannot fit into a precise definition. The intimidation applied in acts of lasciviousness need not be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the victim. Here, the victim was threatened by
a gun at her forehead. Sombilon v. People, 601 SCRA 405 (2009)
9
Q. What are the elements of Qualified Theft?
A. The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it
be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence. Zapanta v. People, March 20, 2013

Q. What are the elements to establish kidnapping?

A. wIn order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration
of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. People v. Betty Salvador, April 10, 2013

Q. What are the elements of kidnapping under Article 270 of the RPC? De Castro, J.
A. Article 270 of the RPC on kidnapping has two essential elements: The first is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of a
minor person. The second is that the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually
being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians. People v.
Marquez, 648 SCRA 694

Q. What constitutes kidnapping? De Castro, J.

A. For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
the crime, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4)
the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a
minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
The essential elements for this crime is the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned circumstances and
the same is coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be a purposeful or knowing action
by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013

Q. What are the elements of the crime of libel? De Castro, J.

A. The following elements constitute libel:
imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another;
publication of the imputation;
identity of the person defamed; and
existence of malice.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Yambot v. Tuquero, 646 SCRA 249

Distinguish compound crime (when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less felonies); complex crime proper (when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other); composite crime (special complex crime composed of two or more
crimes that the law treats as single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse);
continued crime (3 elements must concur: plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of criminal
intent and purpose; and unity of penal provision violated).

Distinguish libel, internet libel and oral defamation – malice is an essential element in libel and under Art. 361, RPC proof of
truth shall be admissible only if the same imputes a crime or is made against a public officer with respect to facts
related/published.
Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c)
identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. There is “actual malice” or malice in fact when the offender makes the
defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless
disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
Jose Jesus M. Disini Jr., et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.
Cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect,
Section 4(c) (4) of R.A. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar
means” for committing libel. But the Supreme Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes only the
author of the libelous statement or article.

IV. Penalties
General principles; purpose why penalty is imposed; classification of penalties; duration and effect of penalties.
Under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from

10
the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived."

Q. What is the general rule on the imposition of two indivisible penalties? De Castro, J.
A. When the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is not attended by any aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. People v. Aleman, 702 SCRA 118 (2013)
On computation of penalties – It is important to relate the felony committed with the corresponding penalty prescribed for
such felony, then consider the attending circumstances which may shorten or lengthen the service sentence and if ISLaw
applies, then the corresponding adjustments will have to be made.
Effect of Acquittal on Civil Liability. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, November 11, 2013.If acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt, will not relieve the accused of the corresponding civil liability.

A. Probation Law: nature and purpose of the law; when may defendant avail of probation – after conviction and no appeal is
made during the period perfecting an appeal; it is error on the part of the court to issue a Commitment Order on the same day
of promulgation because defendant’s right to appeal has not yet prescribed; conversely, if defendant filed an appeal, he can no
longer avail of probation and if defendant files an application for probation, he can no longer appeal; individuals found guilty
of drug trafficking cannot avail of probation; probation also applies even if penalty is only a fine; probation shall not exceed
six years; consequences for violating the terms of probation; when probation is deemed terminated.

Q. If one avails of the benefits of probation, can he still appeal his conviction?
A. Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation
as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed
to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led
to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying
for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid. Enrique Almero y Alcantara v. People of the Philippines, et al, G.R. No. 188191,
March 12, 2014.

PLEASE READ SEC. 9 OF THE PROBATION LAW AS TO WHO CANNOT AVAIL OF THE BENEFITS OF
PROBATION.
B. Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLaw): purposes of the law; where a special law adopted penalties from RPC, ISLaw will
apply just as it would in felonies. PLEASE READ SEC.2 OF ISLaw WHEN BENEFITS OF ISLaw MAY NOT BE AVAILED
OF BY THE DEFENDANT. For example, a person convicted of plunder which is punishable by life imprisonment cannot
avail of ISLaw.

Q. Who are the persons not eligible for Parole?

A. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other
aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. It must be emphasized, however, that appellant is
not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.’ People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Gunda Alias “Fred”,
G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014.

C. Graduation of Penalty: graduation of penalties may be appreciated as follows – stage of execution: for frustrated, 1 degree;
for attempted stage, 2 degrees except: for frustrated homicide, parricide or murder, 1 to 2 degrees and for attempted
homicide, parricide or murder, 1 to 2 degrees; nature of execution – as an accomplice, 1 degree and as accessory, 2 degrees;
privileged mitigating circumstance – for minority, 1 degree and incomplete justification or exemption(except accident), 1 or 2
degrees.

Q. How is minority as mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty?

A. The penalty imposed upon Franklin, being a minor, must be accordingly modified. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. A degree lower is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be
imposed on Franklin should be reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, which ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of which ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the
seriousness of the crime and the manner it was committed, the penalty must be imposed at its most severe range. People v. Agacer et.
al., January 7, 2013.

Q. When can the court impose of two indivisible penalties?

A. Under Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 20, Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, the unauthorized sale of 200 grams or more of shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. The total weight of the shabu confiscated in this case
is 983.5 grams. Hence, the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death. But since the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
consists of two indivisible penalties, appellant was correctly meted the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that when there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. People v. Seraspe, January 9, 2013

Q. Is the penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua composed of three periods?

A. No. The information specifically alleged that the house burned by the accused was an inhabited dwelling. Pursuant to Section 3(2)
of Presidential Decree No. 1613 (Amending the Law on Arson), the penalty to be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house
or dwelling is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Not being composed of three periods, however, such penalty should be
divided into three equal portions of time, and each portion forms one period of the penalty. Yet, reclusion perpetua, being an
indivisible penalty, immediately becomes the maximum period, leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in order to fix the
medium and minimum periods of the penalty. The three periods of the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
are then as follows:

11
 Minimum period – 12 years and 1 day to 16 years;
Medium period – 16 years and 1 day to 20 years;
Maximum period – reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this case should be within the range of the medium period of the penalty,
i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to 20 years, because neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime; and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the crime, without regard to its periods. Bacolod v. People, July 15, 2013. Graduating Death Penalty – Death penalty
is still the penalty to be reckoned with. With the suspension of death penalty, the next imposable penalty shall apply.

D. Three-fold and 40-year limitation rule: distinguish simultaneous service (ex. imprisonment and fine) from successive rule
(ex. where there is multiple penalties of imprisonment); three-fold rule on maximum period of imprisonment; and 40-year
limitation rule.
E. Subsidiary Imprisonment: when defendant shall be subjected to subsidiary imprisonment after final conviction; imposition
of civil liability
F. Exemption from Criminal Liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act: Distinguish between Diversion and
Rehabilitation; how it can be availed of;
G. Modes and Extinction of Criminal Liability: 1. from the Executive Branch: acts of clemency by the President; 2. from the
Legislative Branch: amnesty; 3. Prescription of crimes; 4. Prescription of penalties; and 5. pardon by offended party, where
allowed.
General Rule: In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.

V. The following are matters which are likely to be asked under Special Penal Laws:

1. R.A. 3019 – Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: A public officer may be charged both under this law and a provision of
the RPC ex. when a Mayor and the City Treasurer connive to use public funds not for the purpose intended, they may also be
held for malversation of funds under the RPC; or when a Sheriff alters a date of execution of a court order, he may also be
charged with falsification of public documents under the RPC; there is complex crime under R.A.3019 under both
circumstances; PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS A DISTICNTION IN PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY
THE PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER THE RPC AND R.A.3019; review the participation of private individuals and relatives
under this law.

Q. What are the elements of Corruption under Sec.4 (a) of R.A. 3019?
A. The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld.
The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: that the offender has family or close personal relation with a
public official; that he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government; that the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal
relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government. Disini v. Sandiganbayan

Q. What characterizes direct bribery and indirect bribery?

A. The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: that the offender makes offers or
promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery. Disini, ibid.

Q. What are the offenses under Section 3(e) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)?
A. In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either mode or under
both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other words, the
presence of one would suffice for conviction. To be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative and judicial functions.” The element of damage is
not required for violation of section 3(e) under the second mode. Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Considering that all the elements of the offense of violation of section 3(e) were alleged in the second information, the SC found the
same to be sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (1st
Division), G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013.

Q. Can a private individual acting in conspiracy with a public officer be held liable under Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
A. Yes. Under Section 3(g) of R. A. No. 3019, private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The only
question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy
in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the
filing of the Information. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper. The Supreme Court was not persuaded and it
said that the only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime
nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. People of the Philippines v.
Henry T. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.

Q. What is the basis for the indictment of the private person under Sec.3 (g) of R.A. 3019?
A. Under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted. The requirement
before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone. People of the Philippines v. Henry T.
Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014.
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 R.A. 3019; Section 3(e); proof of the extent of damage is not essential. The third element of the offense – that the act of the accused
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in
the discharge of the functions of the accused – was established here. Proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient
that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. Danilo O. Garcia and
Joven SD. Brizuela v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197204, March 26, 2014.
Liability under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Plameras v. People, September 4, 2013. The following elements must concur to be liable
under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019:
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Laws Governing Liability of Public Officers

1. Republic Act No. 6713 – Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers
2. Republic Act No. 3019 – Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law
3. Revised Penal Code – Crimes Committed by Public Officers:
Article 209–Revelation of Secrets, 210-Direct Bribery, 2
Article 11-Indirect Bribery, 211A-Qualified Bribery
Article 212-Corruption of Public Officials
Article 213-Frauds against public treasury and similar offenses
Article 214- Other frauds
Article 215-Prohibited Transactions
Article 216-Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer
Article 217- Malversation of public funds or property
Article 218-Failure of accountable officer to render account
Article 219-Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country
Article 220-Illegal use of public funds or property
Article 226-Removal, concealment or destruction of documents
Article 227-Officer breaking seal
Article 231-Open disobedience
Article 232-Disobedience to order of superior officer, when said order was suspended by an inferior officer
Article 234-Refusal to discharge elective office
Article 237-Prolonging performance of duties and powers
Article 238-Abandonment of office or position
Article 239- Usurpation of legislative powers
Article 240-Usurpation of executive functions
Article 241-Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 242- Disobeying request for disqualification
Article 244-Unlawful appointments
Definition of Public Officer under Article 203, RPC
THE PLUNDER LAW – Republic Act No. 7080, as amended: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.148560, November 19,
2001
2. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 (R.A. 9165) – Review of the concept of chain of custody as it relates to the
evidence and eventual prosecution of the case (Sec. 21); no mitigating and aggravating circumstances will be appreciated
under law because mere possession or any other act under the law is considered mala prohibita but knowledge must be
established by the prosecution that the offender freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority (animus
possidendi).

Q. What is the chain of custody rule?

A. There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy bust situation, namely: “first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.” In this case, the prosecution established clearly the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No. 190621, February 10, 2014.

Exception to the chain of custody rule: People v. Romeo Ong et. al., July 3, 2013. Prosecution should establish the following links in
that chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
Still, jurisprudence has established a rare exception with respect to the first required link—immediate seizure and marking of the
seized items in the presence of the accused and others—namely, that (a) there must be justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the
procedures; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

Q. What purpose does the chain of custody serve? De Castro, J.

A. The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain is ideal, the realities and variables of actual police
operation usually makes an unbroken chain impossible. With this implied judicial recognition of the difficulty of complete compliance
with the chain of custody requirement, substantial compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers.
The chain of custody requirement has a two–fold purpose:
1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and
2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence. People v. Morate, 715 SCRA 115 (2014)

Q. Magundayao appealed her conviction for illegal sale of shabu. A buy-bust operation was thereafter planned and conducted. The
accused-appellant asked the poseur-buyer how much he was going to buy and he answered that he would buy only P200 worth of
shabu. He handed to her the P200 marked money and she accepted the same. She then pulled out from her pocket one transparent

13
plastic sachet containing white crystalline powder and gave it to him. She was then arrested. She claimed that she was framed up.
Will the Supreme Court affirm her conviction? De Castro, J.
A. Yes. Citing People v. Hernandez that “[t]o secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment thereof.” People v. Naquita further adds that “[w]hat is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.”

Q. What are elements of illegal possession of drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act?
A. With regard to the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must be proven: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. People of the Philippines v. Vicente Rom, G.R. No. 198452, February
19, 2014
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of drugs; elements. In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the
following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Place. People of the Philippines v. Glenn Salvador y Balverde, et al, G.R. No.
190621. February 10, 2014.

Q. To be held liable for transporting illegal drugs under the Dangerous Drug Act, how must the prosecution prove it?
A. “Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means “to carry or convey from one place to another.” The very act of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or
knowledge. People of the Philippines v. Javier Morilla y Avellano, G.R. No. 189833, February 5, 2014

Q. Distinguish between entrapment and instigation to support the legal apprehension of criminals in the former.
A. A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is distinct from
instigation, in that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is enticed or lured or talked into committing the
crime. While entrapment is legal, instigation is not. In entrapment, prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation
legitimate, especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the informant. Also, the presentation of an
informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused in view of the need to
protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Only when the testimony of the informant is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect his security is disregarded. People
of the Philippines v. Noel Bartolome y Bajo, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013.

Q. What are the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act?
A. To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu as defined and punished under section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution
must prove beyond reasonable doubt the following: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the
consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, the Prosecution must show that the transaction or sale actually took place, and
present in court the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines v. Arnold Tapere y Polpol, G.R. No.
178065, February 20, 2013

3. Anti-violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. 2562) – Nature of violence is not limited to physical but
may cover economic and psychological acts. Review S.C. ruling in People v. Genosa on battered woman syndrome which
consists of three phases: tension-building phase; acute battering incident and tranquil, loving or non-violent phase. Battered
woman syndrome is a valid defense that will exonerate a woman from killing her spouse/partner.

Q. How is violence established under the VAWC law?

A. The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in the pursuit of the declared
policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. The law is broad in
scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women
through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in
physical harm or suffering. Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Dabalos v.
RTC, Br. 59, Angeles City, January 7, 2013

4. Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22): elements of the crime; an offender can be charged both with estafa for each party offended
and violation of B.P.22 for each count of checks dishonored covered by the prohibition (ex. A pyramiding scam committed by
Zebra was uncovered which victimized 200 vendors for which 6 posted dated checks were issued to each vendor to pay interest
on their capital investment. Zebra shall be held on 200 counts of estafa under the RPC and as many counts of violation of B.P.
for each check dishonored upon presentment.); relate situation with definition of continued crime or delito continuado.

Q. What are the elements to establish one’s liability under B.P. 22?
A. To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice
of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason, the Court cannot convict her
with moral certainty of violation of B.P. 22. San Mateo v. People, March 6, 2013

Q. What is the gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. 22? De Castro, J.
A. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment—not the nonpayment of an obligation. Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must also
establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days
from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent
proof of the receipt of such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. Such notice must be in
writing. People v. Ambito, 579 SCRA 69 2009)
14
Q. What would constitute estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of RPC? De Castro, J.
A. The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the RPC are:
1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
3) damage to the payee. (People v. Montaner, 656 SCRA 605 (2011)

Q. What are the essential elements of the crime of estafa? De Castro, J.

A. Damage and deceit are essential elements of the crime of estafa and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check.
It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the RPC, and not the non-payment of a debt.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by concealment
of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury. Lopez v. People, 555 SCRA 525

5. Syndicated estafa; elements.

Q. What are the elements of syndicated estafa?
A. The elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. Rafael H. Galvez and Katherine L. Guy v. Asia
United Bank/Asia United Bank v. Gilbert, et al./Gilbert Guy, et al v. Asia Untied Bank, G.R. Nos. 187919/G.R. No. 187979/G.R. No.
188030, February 20, 2013

Q. How is illegal recruitment committed? De Castro, J

A. It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that
he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order
to be employed. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment “whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.” Among such acts, under Section
6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the “failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault.”
People v. Ocden, 650 SCRA 124 (2011); People v. Calimon, 577 SCRA 116 (2009)

Q. Can an accused be held liable for violation of illegal recruitment under R.A. 8042 and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code? De Castro, J.
A. Yes. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in
relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. In the case of People v. Yabut, the Court
reiterated that, “in this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately
of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the RPC. The offense of illegal recruitment is
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the RPC does not bar a conviction
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa w not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.” People v. Ocden, 650 SCRA 124 (2011)

De Castro, J.: It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042,
in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Conviction for offenses under
the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. People v. Ochoa, 656 SCRA 382 (2011)

De Castro, J.: Citing People v. Cortez and Yabut, the Court said that in this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. People v. Gallemit, 724 SCRA 359
(2014)

6. Anti- Fencing Law: Being a crime considered as malum prohibitum, mere possession of a stolen good gives rise to prima
facie presumption of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. A question involving sale of Ukay-ukay items might be asked.

Q .What are the elements of Fencing?

A. . The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused,
who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. Ong v. People, April 10, 2013hanr
7.

7. Illegal Possession of Firearms (P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294): elements of the crime; differentiate criminal intent
from intent to possess; how will a person be treated if found to have possessed an illegal firearm in a COMELEC check point,
will he be charged for violation of the Omnibus Election Law or for illegal possession of firearm, or both; review concept of
absorption in criminal law and when it will and will not apply.

8. Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001: define suspicious transactions, covered transactions, covered institution, and covered
persons; knowledge of the culprit’s identity is not essential; effect of freeze order (only the Court of Appeals may issue this
order)

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9. Anti-Hazing Law: definition of hazing; requisites under Sec. 2 of the law; liability of persons under Sec.4 of the law – who
may held principals and accomplices; Read the Lenny Villa case and latest decision penned by Justice Mendoza on the
fraternity rumble inside the U.P. campus resulting to death of a U.P. student. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Peralta.

10. Carnapping
Q. What is carnapping?
A. Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The crime of carnapping
with homicide is punishable under Section 14 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his
original criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." People v. Nocum, April 1, 2013

VI. Other possible matters which may be taken up in Criminal Law

1. On prescription of a crime: The reckoning date of crime if not known right after its commission may be computed from the
date of discovery. Example: If a crime was committed 10 years from its commission on October 17, 1993 was only reported by
an eyewitness on October 17, 2003 and the culprit was arrested only on October 17, 2013, prescription will be counted only
from October 17, 2003 and not from October 17, 1993.lesvirtu

2. Crimes covered under Art. 365 – In cases of criminal negligence, courts may impose a penalty without considering any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Thus, voluntary surrender will not be appreciated.
Negligence; Medical negligence; four elements the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence. An action upon medical negligence
– whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements,
namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with
the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance
with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the
negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014
Res ipsa loquitor; applicability in medical negligence cases. The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, where the Court said–Medical
malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances
attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The
application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine
whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because
there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. Dr.
Fernando P. Solidum v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014

3. Distinction between crime of rebellion and that of sedition – who may liable; elements of each crime; can crime be
considered as complex with robbery, complex with homicide, complex with damage to property?
Saturnino C. Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, et al, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character
as ‘common’ offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.”
Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder but the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone

4. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (R.A. 9208) ; Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (R.A.9775), Special Protection of
Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (R.A. 7610, as amended) – acts punishable and who are
liable; In case of aliens, violating R.A. 9775, may they be subjected to both deportation proceedings and a criminal action?
YES; Read the conviction of Judge Adoracion Angeles – judge was not suspended from judicial duties while conviction was
pending appeal; issuance of Protection Order even at the barangay level
Balois Alberto et. al. v. C.A. et. al. As held in People v. Pangilinan: “[I]f the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy
will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony
under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.”
Cabalo v. People, June 10, 2013. Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads: SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.” As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), the elements of the foregoing offense
are the following: (a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) The said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

4. Illegal Use of Alias

Illegal use of aliases. A person who uses various names and such contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous
middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance is not guilty of violating the Anti-Alias Law when he was not
also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public. The Court that the dismissal of the
charge against him was justified in fact and in law. Revelina Limson v. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, G.R. No. 162205, March 31, 2014.

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