Reyes vs Mauricio GR No 175080

24 November 2010
11 TuesdayOct 2016
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Remedial Law Review 2
≈ Leave a comment
Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by
Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and her alleged daughter Leonida) for annulment of contract
between Librada and Eugenio parties.
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan. Subject land herein.

Respondentss alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was
the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the
subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused the preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the subject property, and
had the same notarized in Pasig; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that
Librada was illiterate and the contents of the said contract (Kasunduan) were not read nor
explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantages of the weakness, age, illiteracy,
ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan
rendering it void for lack of consent.

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of Respondents. On
appeal with the CA, Petitioner assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity
to substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the case. Petitioner averred that
Leonida is merely a ward of Librada.

Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally?

Decision: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Citing Dr. Tolentino’s book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,
Dr. Tolentino explained thus:
“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm
this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.”
THE SAME RULE IS APPLIED TO ADOPTION

 It also cannot be made subject to collateral attack.

Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo (GR No. 189476)

Facts:
 Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed that his parents were never married and
filed a petition in QC to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng
(using the maiden name of his mother)
 Respondent submitted proof
o Mother has no record of marriage from NSO
o Records which show that he has been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood
(academic records)
 Trial Court granted petition and ordered Civil Registrar to:
o Delete the entry “date and place of marriage”(of parents) in respondent’s live birth
certificate
o Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
o Delete entry of Coseting from “Middle name”
o Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for “Father”
 Republic filed a motion against the order of the court stating that:
o The change of name of respondent also calls for a change of civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate.
o Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered deletion of name of the father
 A person can effect a change of name under rule 103 using valid grounds:
o when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce
o when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation
o when the change will avoid confusion
o when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage
o a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody
o when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest
Issue:
 WON respondents change of name was affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding
Held:
  Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as anyone of the recognized
grounds in rule 103 (respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his legal status in relation to
his parents)
 Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply
 Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties
to the proceeding.
 When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated
 Decision of Trial Court was nullified

On a side note, there were other cases mentioned in this case to try and explain rule 108 better. I
didn’t include them here anymore but if you want to read them, here is a link to the original case.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_189476_2011.html

G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015 EUGENIO SAN JUAN

GERONIMO vs. KAREN SANTOS Civil Law; Family Code;
Filiation. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status
cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties, and within the period limited by law.
FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a
document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Ru no and
Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to
transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased
Ru no and Caridad Geronimo. She led a complaint for the annulment of
document and recovery of the possession against the defendants,
brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of
intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child
and sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Ru no and Caridad
were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s
sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth certificate
of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had
alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the
plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned
in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never led
a maternity leave during the period of her service, as supported by a
certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative
parents. The trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly
established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in
evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was
tampered. It further stated that even granting that the birth certificate is
questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently
proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action
to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of
these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the
marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the
civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further
resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify
as the valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not
signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or
the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law required.
However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove
her filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by
her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other
school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of
Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied
for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the
plaintiff from the estate left by Ru no; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on
the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the
introduction of secondary evidence and rendered judgement
notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a
direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is
meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot
be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for
annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule
is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child is at issue. In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What
petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly
admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art.
172 of the Family Code. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the
lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and
sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts.
The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of
birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable, as
supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In
addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient
to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s
birth. With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity
ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.
G.R. No. 183965
 Uy vs. Chua
 Petitioner: JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Respondent: JOSE NGO CHUA, Facts:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She alleged in her

complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa and that the

respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended

at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names:

“ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of

Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother.

However, respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her.

He and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s

illegitimate children. During petitioner’s wedding,

respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and Respondent’s relatives even

attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.

Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.

Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate

filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation

against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February

2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was made between the two parties prior

wherepetitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation
between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two

Million Pesos each. The court ruled in favor of the respondent hence this appeal

Issue:

Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise

agreement

on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

Held:

Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namelypublic policy

and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that the

hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.

The requisites must alsoconcur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must

have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and

(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case.

The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a

litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise

agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the

Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status

of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future Legitime.

The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she

is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they

are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although

unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away

her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the

Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the

prohibition

under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v. Advincula.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation

or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its

existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between

petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal
effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial

or full) of their respective prestations.

Decision Reversed and Set Aside.

GOTARDO vs BULING
G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
BRION, J.:
PRINCIPLE: In traditional paternity action, the one claiming for filiation and
support must prove a prima facie case. A prima facie case exists if a woman
declares – supported by corroborative proof—that she had sexual relations
with the putative father; at this point, the burden shifts to the putative father.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation;
a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
FACTS:
 On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition and support pendent lite claiming that
petitioner, Charles Gotardo, is the father of her child Gliffze.
 They met at Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee while
petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
 Sometime in September 1993, petitioner started intimate sexual
relations with the respondent Sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and eventually, on August 8, 1994 the respondent was
pregnant.
 They both made plans and allegedly applied for a marriage license,
until petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.
 Petitioner failed to support Gliffze and was sent a demand letter for
recognition and support for their child but when petitioner did not
answer the demand, the respondent filed a complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendent lite.
 RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving
Gliffze’s filiation.
 On appeal, CA ordered petitioner to recognize and provide legal
support to his minor son Gliffze Buling.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not CA is correct in ordering petitioner to recognize and
provide legal support to his minor son.

RULING:
YES. No error in the CA’s ruling. Petition denied.
Filiation proceedings are filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support
(as in this case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, burden of proof is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child. A prima facie cases exists if a woman declares – supported by
corroborative proof—that she had sexual relations with the putative father;
at this point the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. There are
two affirmative defenses available to the putative father: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency
or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that petitioner is
the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. The
testimony was corroborated by Rodulfo, the witness.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation;
a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The
amount of support is variable, hence, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to support.

CASE DIGEST: GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,v. PATRICIO T.

ANTONIO,Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio
was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and
Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take
Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause
the entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting
the primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to
immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil
Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and
record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to
their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE:

Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation?
HELD: Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: "Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force."

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the
surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is
enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial
conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his
childrens surname as Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

***

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers
surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255.

An administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales

Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R No 170633, October 17, 2007 We held:

After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the

implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened
by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an
act of Congress.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an
illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given
the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

Perla vs Baring
GR No. 172471 November 12, 2012
Facts: A complaint for abandonment and support was filed by herein respondent Mirasol Baring together with her
son, Randy Perla allegedly the son of Antonio Perla. It is Randy’s birth certificate that was presented as evidence to
support the the claim which was later denied by petitioner that such information has discrepancies and not signed by
him. Such was neither signed by Antonio.

Issue: Whether or not illegitimate filiation was established.

Held: No. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide
as follows:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

xxxx

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said
certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the
same. It is settled that “a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.” We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information through
Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the preparation of the document as well as the
absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain
entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal
circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its
preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness
stand.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994
Randy called Antonio “Papa” and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that
his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place, cannot be
considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172(1). “To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent
desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.” Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support him cannot
be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, “the father’s conduct towards
his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist.” Here, except for that singular occasion in
which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his son. Neither can Antonio’s paternity be
deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done due to
charity or some other reasons.

Calimag vs Heirs of Macapaz

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N.
Macapaz (Silvestra).

Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the
children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de
Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street,
Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of Virginia Calimag
married to Demetrio Calimag and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said
certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting
rights and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.[6]

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and
a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,[7] was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Sale[8] dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088
was an Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was
stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away. [10]

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public
documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. Case was however
dismissed.

Respondents later asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of
Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of
Deeds of Makati City. Petitioner averred that respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil
action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondents and ruled that the
attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license failed.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of marriage issued by
the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the marriage contract
were duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].
The Marriage Contract clearly reflects a marriage license number and in the absence of a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and
[Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. Here, the fact of marriage between
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who
were conceived and born during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate
children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents have the legal capacity to institute said action considering that they
have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra as they are the illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr?

Ruling: The documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or
photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal
basis to establish the fact of marriage. But the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the
respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office
where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents —
their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa
Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For
legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-
alang, Leyte." A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of
birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil
Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid,
and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child
shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth
of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. The certificates
of live birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth
of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children. Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they
had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child,
Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.

In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be
presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate
of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before
the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in
favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law
or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Hence the respondents have the legal capacity to institute an action as they were able to
prove their filiation.

G.R. No. 189289

GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, Petitioner
vs.
ERNESTO SALES, Respondent

Teodoro Sales and Ernesto Sales filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the
illegitimate children of the late Louis C. Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional ;Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19781 and raffled to Branch 110. 4 Subsequently, an
Amended Complaint was filed where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay City on
March 20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the illegitimate children of Louis and his
common-law wife named Epitacia who was a house helper in the Fernandez household. Louis and his
legal wife, Marie Louise Fernandez, a French national, did not have any child. According to the plaintiffs,
Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb
marks, viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia
finaally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Louis on
December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children. Petitioner opposed. She alleged that
she is the niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she
was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo, the former houseboy
of the Fernandez household. RTC ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate
children of Louis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teodoro & Ernesto are recognized as the illegitimate children of Louis?

Ruling: Yes. The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the present concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to cast doubt
as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner purported that
documents were spurious. The petitioner claimed that during the execution and notarization of the
documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the
contested documents. However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was no longer capable of
writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb mark to the
document dated November 11, 1980. A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of
signature. The Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga,29 held that a signature may be made by a
person's cross or mark.1âwphi1A notarized document is a public document and as such it enjoys the
presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. It serves as
a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its
existence and due execution. The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is
Corpus. She presented various evidence like school report card and death certificate wherein Teodoro's
surname followed that of Corpus. The use of Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the
illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto. As correctly observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to
Marie Louise must have prevented him from making any declaration that would have exposed his
relationship with Epitacia. The use of Louis' surname by his children during the lifetime of Marie Louise
would run counter to his intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father who
voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is emphatically underscored
that it is the law and only the law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one's
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.

PEOPLE vs. NONIETO GERSAMIO CASE

DIGEST [G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015,
PEREZ, J.]
TOPIC: Paternity and Filiation- Compulsory Recognition

DOCTRINE: The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision
ordering Gersamio to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the
absence of evidenc. In this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant
when she was medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that
happened on August 28, 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. With these,
Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

FACTS: August 28, 2002: In the afternoon, Gersamio, with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force, violence and
intimidation and having carnal knowledge with the complainant [AAA], 15 years
old, a minor, at the time of the incident against her will. Evidence was established
that: AAA’s first sexual ordeal at the hands of Gersamio happened sometime in 1999,
when she was only 13 years old, having been born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated
for several times. The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the said
date, AAA was about to enter their house, Gersamio, who was then hiding behind a
coconut tree, suddenly grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their house – a
banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as he pointed a knife at her
neck. He commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick
the latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground, he removed her t-
shirt, short pants and underwear. He also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA
simply cried. He inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina. He warned AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.

On 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancybecause

of the changes in her physical appearance. When asked about the father of her child,
it was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing experiences at the hands of
Gersamio, which began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was
on 28 August 2002. Such sexual advances by him resulted in her pregnancy. At once,
BBB went to his house and confronted him regarding what he did to
AAA. Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their whole family from shame as he
is AAA’s uncle, being the first cousin of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep
the matter among themselves and merely asked him to acknowledge and support the
child of AAA. He, however, denied the accusation and he even got mad at
BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB, sought the
assistance of their Barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The
Barangay Captain then advised them to have a medical examination, which they did.

The Trial Court held him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
ordering him to pay AAA for moral damages; and acknowledge or recognize AAA’s
offspring resulting from the rape; and support AAA’s child in the event his means
improves after serving his sentence.

The CA deleted, however, the portion ordering him to acknowledge paternity and to
support AAA’s child, as the issue of whether the child is Gersamio’s is yet to be
resolved in a full-blown trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s child should be recognized and supported by

Gersamio.

HELD: NO. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to

overturn the findings of both lower courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that,
indeed, Gersamio raped her and his guilt was sufficiently proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.

Even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002
showed that she was already five and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not
necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28 August 2002 rape
against her. Contrary to Gersamio’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue
since pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the
child whom the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent,
and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.

The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the
appellant to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of
evidence thereof. In this case, AAA was already five and a half months pregnant when
she was medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened
on 28 August 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there were
allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002, only two Informations
for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the
appellant was acquitted for the rape committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to
specify with certainty the exact month in 1999 the offense was committed. With
these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the
guilt of the appellant for the crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat,
not only is the impregnation of the rape victim not an element of rape; it must also be
stressed that AAA stated that the appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28
August 2002. Although the appellant cannot be held liable for such alleged rapes, as
this case does not cover other incidents of rape prior to 28 August 2002, AAA’s
testimony on this point provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5 January
2003 as her child turned one on 5 January 2004.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is further ordered to
pay AAA civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and
P30,000.00.

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's
orders declaring that petitioner has failed to establish by competent evidence his
alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays
for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a
son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such."
Respondent judge correctly ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed
a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita
de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having
earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her predeceased
husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition of
private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of
an adopted child of the without his first producing competent and documentary
that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which
resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.

On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City,
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters,
respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon, and
respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso. One month after
Mariano's death, his widow, Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate
proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted
illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz,intervened.
Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted
illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow,
Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29,
1970, providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to
respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo
Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara,
son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime,
Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the People's Bank and Trust
Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de
Leon could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon,
accompanied by her husband, respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety
deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption
papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother. Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she
opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by
her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get
her stock certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to
close the deposit box, the bank personnel informed her that she needed an
authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she
removed everything from the box. Upon the order of the probate court, presided
over by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara, the safety deposit box was opened on
November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because prior thereto
respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents. On November 22,
1974, or seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened
for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.

Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a
petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita de Asis to examine private
respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on January
31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the
properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently,
however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano Lazatin, and 2341-P,
Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C.
Campos, Jr.

On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for
respondents Nora L. de Leon and Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers
and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the same to the
custody of the court within one week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora
L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two
keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of the
court. On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-
P, as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin,
brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, the petitioner was an
"illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was
later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both
Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife Margarita de Asis. Petitioner then filed on March
16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption in
view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of
respondent court to deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit
box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor, petitioner invokes the sanction of
Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of the
court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered
as an order for production and inspection of documents under Rule 27. Private
respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976, respondent court
denied petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon
deposited with respondent court the items she had removed from the safety
deposit box. An inventory was conducted by respondent court, with notice to the
parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock
certificates.

On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite

resolution declared as established the fact of adoption:

As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as
an adopted child, The Court has ruled that he has failed to establish such status.
The any motion for reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof.

At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for
probate of the alleged holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de
Lazatin, petitioner has failed to establish his status as an alleged child of
Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can show
some documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the deceased
Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted illegitimate child, win have to decide
whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such admitted illegitimate
child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of action and
whether or not he may be duly showed to intervene in the proceedings below as
such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in the event of an adverse
ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence,
oral and documentary, and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed and the questioned orders denying
petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the fact of
[his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on
June 16, 1976 and amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective
immediately. Without costs.

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO (1989)

Petitioners: Nelson L. Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon Cervantes

Respondents: Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo

FACTS:
- Angelie Anne C. Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife.
- The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
- Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-
Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old.
- An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon
on 29 April 1987.
- The petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20 August 1987, which
granted the petition.
- The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie
Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate."
- Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150, 000.00; otherwise, they
would get back their child.
- While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioner's
residence and brought the child to her house.
- Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her
child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had exectued was not fully explained to her.
She will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount.
- Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon
to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption case, testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had
interviewed respondent Gina Carreon and that respondent manifested to the social worker her desire to have the child
adopted by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
- W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted to the petitioners.

HELD/RATIO:
- Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and care of minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account
the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be
separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting
the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an
illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with
the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
 authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to care and custody of
the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him (Art 17,
PD 603).

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent

of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He

was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless
and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biologicalmother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered
as the parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking
into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there
are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is

concerned, the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
grounds for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor
of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate
of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court
ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
Michelle Lim

Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married

Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was
barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on
15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. The spouses reared and
cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty

given under RA 8522 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and
seven months old.

The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have
filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.


RULING: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee,
or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at
least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country
may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse;
or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;

or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was
correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does
petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First,
the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must
comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application
for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to

adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the
Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent
to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree
for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage
still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
REPUBLIC VS TOLEDANO

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Regional

Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I,
entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph
Alcala", raising a pure question of law. The sole issue for determination concerns
the right of private respondent spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse
who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Iba, Zambales, private respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing
on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3)
consecutive weeks. The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin
A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married
Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a
twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon
Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability
to support and educate her son. = petition granted. Petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION

OF ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO
ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known
as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse
are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not
included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance
with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified
to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the
aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a
natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate
child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondent spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990,
private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her
Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former
Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article
185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article
185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1)
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a
joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June

27, 2006
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors,
natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married
there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the
petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is
necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish
in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To
dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.