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to Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
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Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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647 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 648
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649 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
Laws ofnature-Thirdness
To provide an answer, let us return to the questions posed earlier:
What are laws of nature? Are they figments of the mind or real?.12
Antirealists, or, in Peirce's terminology, nominalists,13 following the
Humean tradition, claim that every event is an actual occurance, "and
so it will be no matter how numerous the repetitions". So, in a world
that is composed of a long series of independent events, laws can be
nothing more than a description of the similarity with which things
happened in the past. Peirce admits that "there might be some force
in the argument if the events were confined to the past. But they are
not, since the law extends to the future... Future events cannot be
experienced... I can only imagine that a certain general kind of event
will occur. Consequently, it is not true that expected repetitions ex-
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 650
tending into the future are mere additional affirmations of actual ex-
istential happenings" ( MS 320, c.1907 ). And he goes on to remark,
"generals, or rational necessities, laws, although they are not existent
and can neither be smelled, nor tasted nor heard, nor seen nor be
discerned by any skin-sensation, may nevertheless sometimes be real"14
( MS 320, c. 1907, p. 21 ). Moreover, laws for Peirce are "formula-
tions of relations", so law should be expressed in a "conditional propo-
sition whose antecedent and consequent express experiences in a fu-
ture tense" ( 8.192, 1904), which future tense is connected with an
endless future.15 This is why law can never be considered as com-
pleted. " No collection of facts", claims Peirce, " can constitute a law;
for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts" ( 1 .420, c.1896 ). It
only contains the general conditions of the realization of particular
events. This is the reason why law takes on an indeterminate yet de-
terminable character as regards its future instantiations.
Generality-continuity-law
In order to bring into light the full meaning of the above features
of Peirce's account of law, which is another expression of Thirdness, I
propose to examine it first through the looking glass of scholastic real-
ism. The best starting point, in my opinion, is the scholastic idea of the
general or universal. Peirce himself appeals to the scholastic definition:
"Generale est quod natum aptum est dici de multis" ( 5.102 ). As he
correctly points out, this represents only the predicative or the logical
aspect of the universal. However, the most important one is that of real
generality or law. "If sol" for e.g., Peirce continues, " is apt to be predi-
cated of many, it is apt to be predicated of any multitude however
great, and since there is no maximum multitude, those objects, of which
it is fit to be predicated form an aggregate that exceeds all multitude"
( 5. 102, 1902 ).16 It is in this latter analysis of generality that the idea
of continuity makes its appearance in order to offer the grounds for the
explanation of the character of inexhaustible possibility which is,as far
as I can understand - and as I will try to establish - the quintessence
of generality or law in Peirce's ontological scheme.
Peirce frequently repeats his contention that generality and conti-
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651 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 652
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653 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 654
Continuity-infinity
To be able to follow Peirce's line of thought, it would be helpful
if we made some preliminary clarifications concerning the relation of
continuity to infinity. It must thus first be noted that any attempt to
provide a definition of continuity involves the idea of infinity. With-
out a clear understanding of infinity there can be no clear answer to
the issue of continuity and vice versa.29 It must also be added that
both these notions have a long standing history. Questions concern-
ing their definition and nature have provoked endless debates and
stimulated profound analyses concerning their logical, mathematical
and metaphysical aspects, since antiquity. For our purposes it is also
important to notice xhzt^ grosso modo, there are two basic notions of
continuity: the mathematical and the geometric one, as well as two
notions of infinity respectively; the first leads to the acceptance of
actual and the second of potential infinity. This antithesis is as old as
it is tricky. Its origin can be traced back to Zeno and the atomists on
the one hand and Aristotle on the other.30 In the nineteenth century
the ideas of continuity and infinity were clarified by the significant
work of Richard Dedekind (1831-1916) and Georg Cantor (1845-
1918 ). According to Cantor's analysis, which prevailed in the nine-
teenth century and has been accepted by the majority of mathema-
ticians - at least until the appearance of Robinson's non-standard
analysis - the continuum was a collection of points.31 A corollary of
this thesis was the acceptance of the idea of the actual infinite.
This was a view that Peirce could not adopt for a very serious
reason, that will be analysed in what follows. But let us first see in
more detail how Peirce developed his theory. His starting point for
the idea of continuity , just as Dedekind's and Cantor's , is the logico-
mathematical analysis of the continuity of a line.32 However, Peirce
transcended the logico-mathematical level and went much further in
the direction of a qualitative speculation which was grounded, as we
shall see, on an Aristotelean ontological view. Now, according to
Cantor there is an isomorphism between the system of points on a
line and the system of real numbers. So, if a line is divided into two
parts, what will happen to the line is analogous to what will happen
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655 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
A P D AB CD
fig.l fig. 2
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 656
to the right (fig. 2). According to Aristotle, this must not be consid-
ered as an one-to-one mapping of one collection of points onto an-
other, but as a primitive and irreducible geometrical transformation.
Hence, the end-points A and D are not to be regarded as members of
the line segment AD, but simply as points that are located there be-
cause of the fact that the line we have constructed ends there. More-
over, it must be noted that in fig.2 the L half AB of the original
segment AD still has two points and this is because for Aristotle the
idea of an "open" line interval had no meaning at all; a line interval
by the mere fact of existing as a line interval defines its endpoints.
The same holds for the line interval CD.36 But the question naturally
arises here: Where did C come from? The answer is simply that the
act of dividing and separating the line segments had as a result the
division of point P into two points B and C, or, in Peirce's words,
"the point P has ' become' the two points B and C". This is an idea
which has no place in the Cantonan ( atomists' ) view of a line as a
collection of distinct points. It can only work if we introduce the idea
of infinitesimals.
Continuity - Infinitesimals
We must say that the issue of infinitesimals has a long history of
its own. There have been many attempts through the centuries, start-
ing with Aristotle, to use them as a tool in order to provide an answer
to Zeno's paradoxes. However, it is of interest that in the nineteenth
century infinitesimals lost out as they came to be thought of by math-
ematicians as mere chimera. It was only by the 1960's that their
"ghostly thread in the corridors of mathematics" became quite real
once again due to the work of Abraham Robinson and others. So,
infinitesimals have now become mathematically respectable in the so
called nonstandard analysis of Robinson; and since then several meth-
ods have been devised that make use of infinitesimals.37
Now, to come back to the Dedekind's Theorem, we must re-
member that it was built on the assumption of standard points. In
other words, every point had to be located in the monad of a "stan-
dard point", a point whose distance from the origin is a (standard)
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657 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
real number. So, on this view, there was no place for infinitesimals,
for infinitesimals are line intervals whose length lies between zer
and every positive standard number, or in other words, an infinitesi-
mal is greater than zero, but less than any possible length whatsoever.
This is expressed by Peirce, whose thinking at this point is Aristotelean
as follows: within a single point one can find at least c different point
parts where c is the power of the set of real numbers and the cardinal
number of points on the line is not only greater than ¿, but greater
than the cardinal number of all sets. In other words, he believed that
the points on the line are of a higher order of infinity than the real
members. This implies the existence of nonstandard points on the
line, and cosequently the existence of infinitesimals.38 Thus Peirc
came to think of a continuum as consisting of the standard points
together with all the nonstandard points in their monads, or as h
himself remarks, a continuum is "merely a discontinuous series with
additional possibilities" ( 1.170, c.1897) . But what does he mean
by additional possibilities? To understand this view we must come
back to Aristotle.
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 658
possibilia 39, which as possibilia " lack distinct individuality", but are
nonetheless real.
This is, therefore, how Peirce arrived at his idea of a "potential
aggregate" through the idea of continuity grounded on that of gen-
erality as well as on potentiality. On his view, the aggregate of all
abnumeral collections finally leads to such a dense field of possibility
that the units of the aggregate lose their individual identity. The ag-
gregate ceases to be a collection ( in the Cantorian-atomists' sense )
and becomes a continuum. Hence, the reason that a line is a collec-
tion of points that " lack distinct individuality" is that it is not a col-
lection of mathematical objects but a collection of possibilia and
possibilia are not fully determinate. It is a potential collection inde-
terminate and yet determinable.40 It must be added here that the
potential character of these infinitesimal entities which lose their dis-
tinct identity and merge into one another can be grounded on the
mathematical fact that two concrete numbers - those having nu-
merical content - cannot differ by an infinitesimal amount. As a
result both end points of an infinitesimal interval cannot be labeled
using concrete numbers. Thus, an infinitesimal interval can never be
captured through measurement; infinitesimals remain in principle for-
ever beyond the range of observation.
This offers a powerful instrument for dealing with Zeno's para-
dox, as has recently been argued.41 The arrow's tip is caught at rest at
concretely labeled points of time, but along the vast majority of the
stretch some kind of motion is taking place. Peirce had already seen
this, as did Aristotle. It was his contention that we can only explain
our perception of the flux of time through infinitesimals. As he re-
marks in his New Elements of Mathematics, if we try to imagine time
as "a series of instantaneous photographs... [t]hen, no matter how
closely they follow one another, there is no more motion visible in
any one of them than if they were taken at intervals of centuries "
(3.59 ). So, Peirce, exactly as Aristotle, made an appeal to time as a
"continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envis-
age every other continuum" (6.86, 1898).42 He thus associated points
on a line sequent with instants in an interval of time in order to show
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659 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
that "between any two instants of time or between any two points on
a line, there is room for any multitude of instants or of points, what-
soever - not merely room for any enumerable multitude, but room
for any one of the single denumeral series of abnumerable ( abzahlbor
) multitudes". This led him to the idea that time is not a collection of
discrete instants, but " [t]heir being is welded together" (MS 137, p.
4-5, 1904), so that they lose their identity.43 Hence, instants of time
as points on a line, become a collection of possible points, a collec-
tion of possibilia which as possibilia lack distinct individuality but are
nonetheless real.
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 660
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661 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
NOTES
*This paper was read at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the SAAP, Toronto,
March 7-9, 1996; it is the product, in its most substantial part, of research th
I pursued at Harvard University as a Fulbright senior research scholar in th
Fall of 1991. I should thus like to express my gratitude both to the Fulbrigh
Institute as well as to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University and
Hilary Putnam in particular for kindly sponsoring my visit. I would also like t
thank the Houghton Library at Harvard University for giving me permissio
to have access to C.S. Peirce's manuscripts. Finally, I am grateful to Hilar
Putnam for invaluable discussions and Richard Robin for encouraging my in
terest in Peirce's Synechism and for stimulating discussions. I must also ad
that my present work draws, in one respect, on a paper on "Peirce and Laws o
Nature" that I presented at a Round Table organized by the Charles S. Peirc
Society in the context of the XIX World Congress of Philosophy, Moscow, Rus
sia, 22-28 August 1993. I am indebted to the organizers, Richard Robin and
Christian Kloesel as well as to the participants for their invaluable comment
Finally, I would like to thank the discussant of my present paper at the 23r
SAAP Meeting, Andrew G. Bjelland, for his stimulating comments.
1 . I have earlier dealt only very briefly with the role of continuity
in some other aspects of Peirce's philosophy in my ( 1980), (1991), (1993a ),
(1993b), (1993c).
2 . The issue of the intimate connection of synechism with Peirce's
account of laws of nature has not been the object of particular interest in Peirce
scholarship, as far as I know. However, significant work has been done: (1 ) on
Peirce's theory of laws of nature in relation to the idea of generality ( see for
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 662
e.g. E. Moore 1952 , 1968 , 1978, 1994 and L. Friedman , 1995 ); (2) on
Peirce's doctrine of synechism as an instance of his logico-mathematical specu-
lations in relation to generality and thirdness but not to laws of nature; ( 3) on
Peirce's commitment to scholastic realism but not to Aristotle . As regards (3),
J.F. Boler ( 1963) has done tremendous work on the issue. Of great interest
is also the work of E. Moore ( 1950), ( 1964), ( 1968 ), ( 1994); S. Haack, (1987),
(1992); D. Roberts ( 1970 ); C. Engel-Tiercelin ( 1992); F. Michael ( 1988); P.
Skagestad (1981 ) etc. It must be added that Edward Moore is one of the few
Peirce scholars who emphasized the role of potentiality in the function of laws
of nature in Peirce's thought. On the other hand, C. Hartshorne (1929) has
written interestingly on Peirce's notion of continuity in relation to the Third
Category. Finally, as regards the logico-mathematical analysis of Peirce's theory
of continuity in relation also to his ontological scheme and its linkage to Aristotle's
thought, H. Putnam (1995) has provided a profound analysis. See also Ketner
and Putnam (1992 ), C. Eisele ( 1979 ) and S. Levy (1991 ).
3. The difficulty of an attempt to work on the "principal thing"
of Peirce's thought, which remained "unpublished" is illustrated by Peirce
himself in a most discouraging way: " ... All that you can find in print of my
work on logic are simply scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich
vein which remains unpublished. Most of it I suppose has been written down;
but no human being could ever put together the fragments. I could not
myself do so. "1903.
4. I have earlier tried to analyze the role of potentiality in Peirce's
thought on several occasions. See for e.g. D.Sfendoni-Mentzou ( 1980), ( 1993a),
(1993c), (1994), (1995).
5 . The view that laws of nature express a real regularity in nature,
an inner bond between particulars, or, in Armstrong's terminology, a "relation
between universals", which can provide explanations of a deeper level of reality
not open to observation, is shared by the majority of present-day realists, al-
though each one of them defends his own version. J. Smart (1968), for in-
stance, holds that empirical adequacy cannot provide a criterion of the truth of
a theory, because it is restricted to actual prediction, whereas scientific theory
includes both actual and possible predictions. Regularities, then, of observable
phenomena must be explained in terms of a deeper structure of reality, other-
wise they can only be based on "lucky coincidences" or "coincidences on a
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663 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
cosmic scale" (see, 1968, p. 39). We must here notice that, as I. Hackin
(1983) has pointed out, there are two basic types of realism today: (I) Realism
about entities and (ii) Realism about theories. According to this distinction
Smart's realism is both about theories and about entities - as is the case,
believe, with Peirce - although the burden of his interest falls on the reality o
entities postulated by the theories. On the other hand Nancy Cartwright ( 1982)
accepts the reality of unobservable entities and of causal connections, but re
fuses to accept the explanatory power of theories. This attitude is also shared by
I. Hacking, who tries to abandon realism about theories, and adopts a realism
about entities, which can be used and manipulated by scientists.
6. For a critical analysis of the Platonist view on laws of nature
see my ( 1994). What I have tried to do in this essay is to show the weaknesses
of the Platonist approach through a critical discussion of James R. Brown's
(1991, 1994)theory of laws of nature. My claim in this paper is that although
Brown's theory successfully solves the epistemological problem, it nevertheless
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the ontological question regarding the
separation of the two worlds. I, therefore, try to establish an alternative solu-
tion which is constructed on an analysis of some key concepts of Aristotelean-
scholastic realism and C.S. Peirce's thought. In particular, I focus on the idea
of natural kinds and potentiality, on the basis of which I draw the conclusio
that laws of nature must be considered as instantiatable, i.e. potentially real as
they point to their future instantiations.
7. I have dealt with the issue of laws of nature and the problems
created for Armstsrong's alleged realism by his insistence on the principle o
instantiation, in my (1996). My thesis in this paper is that a careful reading of
Armstrong reveals that some of his most basic assumptions cannot possibly liv
in harmony with the traditional doctrine of universals. His theory, which start
as a vigorously defended realism, eventually transforms into a disguised nomi-
nalism. I thus proceed to propose an alternative picture of laws of nature. In
my account, which I call a potential -pragmatic realism, because of its linkag
both to Aristotle and to C.S. Peirce, Armstrong's belief in the reality of univer-
sals is retained. What is criticized is his emphasis on the principle of instantiatio
on the one hand, and his rejection of the idea of potentiality on the other. By
contrast, my thesis is that potentiality is a sine qua non for a genuine realis
account of laws of nature .
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 664
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665 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
which they are realized (2) and this is because an embodied or instantiat
quality is not completely identical with its instantiation, i.e. there still is a differ
ence between the quality perse and its individuation, for e.g. "redness in itsel
even if it be embodied , is something positive and sui generis" (1.25, 1903);
(iii) the "mode of being of redness , before anything in the universe" was yet
red was not really an unembodied or uninstantiated quality. It was " a positive
qualitative possibility" in other words, although it was not instantiated yet, i
was nevertheless instantiatable; if this is true then an unembodied quality
Peirce's ontology couldn't be characterized as a transcendental or a priori {ante
res) quality, in the Platonic sense, because it is in its own way immanent {i
rebus) , in virtue of its having a prospect of its future instantiation. All this a
plies to laws of nature as well.
Therefore, I cannot share the opinion that Peirce would accept com-
pletely uninstantiated laws as real laws ; and this is something, I must say, th
Friedman points out on one occasion in her paper. The only real laws, she says
that Peirce accepts are those which are instantiable, i.e. those that have a pros
pect of their future instantiation: " A true general cannot have any being unle
there is to be some prospect of its sometimes having occasion to be embodi
in a fact, which is itself not a law or anything like a law" (1.304). Friedman
making use of the above quotation, correctly remarks that "this means that law
is dependent [not upon the actual occasion but] upon the possibility of i
being instantiated. That is, it must be at least possible for the law to have i
stances , or be realized in a fact"(p.384). She thus, quite correctly, suggest
that a distinction must be made between "uninstantiated laws with nomical
impossible antecedents" and " uninstantiated laws with nomically possible an
tecedents" (according to Armstrong's terminology, see Armstrong 1983, p. 16
Still, on Friedman's view, Peirce rules out the latter type of law (see p. 386
This thesis is, in my opinion, absolutely correct.
As I will try to establish in the present paper, Peirce defends not a
Platonist-transcendental realism (realism ante res) but an Aristotelean (imm
nent, in rebus) realism. It is true, laws for Peirce are those which are neith
instantiated nor uninstantiated but those which are instantiatable. However
Friedman finally draws the unsupported conclusion, even by her own analysis
that Peirce has two types of realism: he is both a transcendental and an imma
nent realist. "Insofar as they [laws] are uninstantiated", claims Friedman, "bot
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 666
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667 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
exactly the crucial point that offers the real grounds for a passage from a realism
about properties to a realism about laws of nature. "[T]o say that a body is
hard, or red, or heavy, or of a given weight, or has any other property, is to say
that it is subject to law and therefore is a statement referring to the future"
(5.545, c. 1902 ). As we shall see in detail, for Peirce "the essence of a thing
is... the law of its being" ( 2.409 n. 2, 1893 ). The relation expressed in the
predicate serves as the passage to higher order relations which are laws of na-
ture. This is why Peirce claimed that what the scholastics called natura was in
reality a law of nature. Laws are formulations of relations, so all properties are
in the end laws expressed in subjunctive conditionals , or conditional proposi-
tions: "the law", claims Peirce, "should be a truth expressible as a conditional
proposition whose antecedent and consequent express experiences in a future
tense, and further, that, as long as the law retains the character of a law, there
should be possible occasions in an indefinite future when events of the kind
described in the antecedent may come to pass... But in all the range of science
there is no single proposition that goes by the name of a law, from which con-
ditional predictions as to future experiences may not be deduced" (8.192, 1904).
16. And the text continues: " Take any two possible objects that
might be called suns and, however much alike they may be, any multitude what-
soever of intermediate suns are alternatively possible, and therefore as before
these intermediate possible suns transcend all multitude. In short, the idea of a
general involves the idea of possible variations which no multitude of existent
things could exhaust but would leave between any two not merely many pos-
sibilities but possibilities absolutely beyond all multitude" ( 5.103 ).
17. " True generality" for Peirce "is, in fact, nothing but a rudi-
mentary form of true continuity. Continuity is nothing but perfect generality of
a law of relationship" (6.172, 1902).
18. For a more detailed analysis of the scholastic idea of gener-
ality see my (1995b ).
19. In fact, there are three aspects of the universal: " Est triplex
universale: quoddam quod est in re, seu natura ipsa, quae est in particularibus...
est etiam quoddam universale quod est a re acceptum per abstractionem... Est
etiam quoddam universale ante rem, quod estprius re ipsa" , St. Thomas, Comm.
in Sentt., Lib. II, dist. iii, q. 2, art 2. For the purposes of this paper we will refer
only to the two of them.
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 668
20. Esse denotes only the act of being, while existence denotes
what is in space and time with particular determinations.
21. See, St. Thomas, Summit Theol. la pars. q. 39 art. 2.
22. See, ibid. In this respect, Scotus shares with St. Thomas the
view that matter stands to form as potency to act. He also defines form in an
Aristotelean fashion as the actuality of matter. However, matter for Scotus is
not only potentiality; it also has an actuality of its own, apart from its mere
potential existence: "Forma communicat materiae suam actualitatem et suam
actum essendi et suam operationem" , Scotus, De rerum Principio, q. ix, n. 53.
23. It must be noted, that the term universal is properly used only
when one refers to the universal concept or idea in the mind, which has an
objective foundation in things (fundamentum in rebus ), while the universal as
unum in multis is what is called natura communis. All individuals belonging to
the same species share a common nature, e.g. Socrates is a man in virtue of
something real which is called natura (communis ), i.e. in virtue of manness. At
this point several questions, regarding common nature, have been traditionally
raised. The most important are the following: (1) Is Socrates' nature as an
individual numerically different from Plato's nature as it is from a cat's nature?
If this is not the case, and if we wish to maintain that Socrates and Plato have
something real in common, then this real cannot be a singular; it cannot be
numerically one; it must therefore have a unity which is neither numerical nor
merely conceptual. This is a specific type of nature which Scotus characterizes
as "less than numerical" but nonetheless real (see, Scotus, Rep. Par. II, dist. ii,
q.5,n.ll). As to the question, how common nature, which is not a de se haec,
becomes a part of the individual, Scotus claims that common nature is "con-
tracted" in the individual, by haecceity, so that it becomes, in some respect,
identical with it (see Scotus, Op. Ox. II, dist, xlii, q. 4, n. 7 ). This is one of the
main reasons that Scotus has been criticized by Peirce for his nominalistic incli-
nation. Scotus tried to escape this difficulty created by the need to define the
character of the unity of particularity and universality by inventing his famous
"formal" distinction. What is peculiar about it is the fact that it is very close to
a logical but not itself a logical distinction; It is a distinction aparte re, i.e. a
distinction which has an objective ground in reality itself, which, however, is
not physical, since essence and thisness are not two separate things , but are
different moments or aspects of the same particular thing.
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669 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 670
conditional proposition.
28. " It is vague, but yet with such a vagueness as permits of its
accurate determination in regard to any particular object proposed for exami-
nation" ( 6.186, 1898), or else, "[i]t is a potential collection indeterminate yet
determinable" ( ibid. ) .
29. As both Peirce and Aristotle point out, the concept of conti-
nuity involves that of infinity. " [I]t is in connexion with continuity that we first
encounter the concept of the 'illimitable' ", claims Aristotle, " [a]nd this is why
in definitions of continuity this concept of the 'illimitable' frequently occurs, as
when we say that the continuous is that which is susceptible of division without
limit" ( Physics, 200b 18-22 ). " So then, (a) if a single continuum is what is
meant by 'one', it follows that ' the One' is many, for every continuum is divis-
ible without limit" ( Physics 185b 10-12). In the same line of thought Peirce
remarks, "[continuity involves infinity in the strictest sense, and infinity even
in a less strict sense goes beyond the possibility of direct experience "(1.166, c.
1897; cf., 1.165) . The only difference between the two thinkers, in this par-
ticular case, is that Aristotle refers to infinity in his treatment of the issue, while
Peirce is concerned with the idea of continuity. However, both are definitely
dealing with the same issue in a remarkably similar way.
30. The exposition of such problems is to be found in Zeno's para-
doxes ( 5th cent. BC) and Aristotle's attempt to reply to them. For the An-
cient Greek ideas of continuity and infinity see, M. Kline ( 1972), W.
MacLaughlin and S.L. Miller ( 1992), E. Sondheimer and A. Rogerson ( 198 1 ),
W. MacLaughlin ( 1994 ), G.E. Melbourne ( 1995 ).
31. To this idea Kronccker was opposed as well as Peirce, as we
shall see in more detail.
32 . I must say here that for the exposition of Peirce 's logico- mathe-
matical analysis of continuity I have benefited greatly from H. Putnam (1995),
(cf. K. Ketner & H. Putnam, 1992). I also owe a lot to C. Eisele ( 1979 ) and S.
Levy ( 1991 ).
33. See H. Putnam (1995), p.3.
34. H. Putnam (1995) provides both a most profound and illu-
minating analysis of Peirce's linkage to Aristotle concerning his theory of con-
tinuity.
35. Geometry for Peirce is the study of continuity. In the geomet-
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671 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
rie analysis Peirce was led to topology and modes of connection with the con-
tinuum. In this respect, his logic is a modal logic.
36. Peirce himself was perfectly aware of Aristotle's view on conti-
nuity (cruvexéG ) and infinity (á neipov). Indeed, he explicitly refers to Aristotle's
definition of a continuum as "something whose parts have a common limit"
(6.122, 1892) and claims that his continuity consists in Kanticity and
Aristotelicity ; the Kanticity means that there is a point between any two points,
while the Aristotelicity makes for the inclusion of every point which is a limit. In
his Elements of Mathematics, Peirce says that, " a whole is said to be continuou
or a continuum if it is infinitely divisible and if, further, it contains the limit of
every inenumerable but numerable series which it contains" (I take this from C
Eisele, 1979, p. 212) ; see also, " The property of Aristotelicity may be roughly
stated thus: a continuum contains the end point belonging to every endles
series of points which it contains" (6.123, 1892).
37. For a very interesting and illuminating analysis of the idea of
infinitesimals see, S. Levy (1991), J. Dauben (1988), W. MacLaughlin and S.L
Miller (1992). It should be noted here that, although Robinson's nonstandard
analysis is connected with the re-introduction of infinitesimals, it can in no wa
be identified with Pierce's idea of a continuum. This point is illuminated by H
Putnam (1995), p. 12.
38. Peirce's set theory presented in his Harvard lectures III and
VIII, of 1898, has points of resemblance to that of both Ernst Zermelo and
John von Neumann. See H. Putnam (1995), p. 10.
39. In an extremely interesting manuscript (MS 137, 1904), tided,
Topical Geometry, Peirce remarks: " the points on a line are not a collection of
discrete objects. Their being is welded together, so that no one can logically be
removed alone. That is as much as to say that there really exist no points upon
a continuous line... they have a potential being; but they do not exist unti
something happens which marks them... therefore those intermediate point
being possible, are already there in the only sense there is in speaking of un-
marked points. Such is the notion of continuity... Let part of a surface be painted
green while the rest remains white. What is the color of the dividing line; is
green or not? I should say that it is both green and not. ' But that violates the
principle of contradiction, without which there can be no sense in anything
Not at all; the principle of contradiction does not apply to possibilities". Thi
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 672
view is also connected with the boundary problem in Peirce's topological stud-
ies (See C. Eisele , 1979, p.212 ). Peirce tried to explain that, if a series of
points up to the limit is included in a continuum, the limit is also included. As
he explains in his Topical Geometry ( MS 137), the fact that "there really exist
no points in a continuous line", and the fact that they are "welded together"
leads to the idea that no one can logically be removed alone. In such a case a
line would be without an end. But this is "absurd - as soon as it is assumed
that the line is truly continuous. For no point is on the line by its own blind
force of existence, as independent individual objects are in existence..., and
though you may suppose a single particle to be separated from the end of the
line, thereby supposing it to take on an independent existence, you cannot take
away the possibility of the line's having a point at the end of it. That point
remains logically possible".
40. In this sense Peirce's picture is that of L.E J. Brouwer, but
with a substantial difference, which is explained by H. Putnam in H. Putnam
(1995), p.15.
41. For a very interesting analysis of this idea see, W.
MacLaughlin ( 1994).
42. This, as far as I know, has escaped attention in Peirce scholar-
ship; For e.g. H.Putnam (1995 )(and K.Ketner and H. Putnam, 1992 ) does
not refer to Peirce's treatment of time as a continuum. C. Eisele ( 1979 ) on
the other hand, although she refers to Peirce's treatment of time as a con-
tinuum, makes the remark that it is perhaps Hamilton that influenced Peirce
on this particular issue. I must say here that the reason for my calling attention
to this fact (which deserves to be treated as an autonomous subject) is not only
because I wish to add one more point showing Peirce's linkage to Aristotle,
but also because I believe that it can offer the key to a deeper understanding of
the metaphysical aspects of continuity and generality in Peirce's philosophy.
Subsequently, my hope is that it will further illuminate the basic characters of
laws of nature.
43. Cf., the instants of time are not distinct, but rather "are so
close together as to merge into one another..." ( NE, 360) . They "are every-
where welded together" ( NE, 360) . NE stands for C.S.Peirce (1976).
44. Cf., " the unlimited potentially exists" ( Physics 206a 19 ), "it
never exists as a thing, as a determined quantum does" ( 206b 14-22). In
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673 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
other words it " is the potential, though not the realized whole" ( 207a 22
Here we have the Aristotelean view which has become the source of inspiratio
for Peirce's treatment of the continuity of time. It is obvious that seen from this
point of view potentiality becomes for Aristotle an indispensable ingredient o
the idea both of continuity and infinity and subsequently of the continuity o
time. Indeed , his claim is that in this case we are to understand potentiality no
in the sense in which we say that the potentiality of a statue exists in the bronze.
"[T]he only sense in which the unlimited is actualized at all is the sense in
which we say that it 'actually is' such and such a day of the month, or that th
[Olympic] games 'actually are' on; for in these cases, too, the period of time or
the succession of events in question is not ( like the statue-potentialities of th
bronze) all actualized at once, but is in course of transit as long as it lasts. The
Olympic games, as a whole, are a potentiality only, even when they are in pro
cess of actualization" ( Physics 206a 22-25 ). This is an extremely importan
point because it stresses the fact that the potential being of infinity in real tim
is not the same as the logical divisibility, but it is a physical process progressively
being actualized and never being able to be all as a whole. This is made clear by
Aristotle as follows: " Moreover, 'having no limit' is not quite the same thing
applied to time or to the human race and as applied to the possibility of con
tinuously dividing a 'magnitude', as it decreases. In all these cases, the 'absence
of limit' may be regarded as the open 'possibility of more' the 'more' that
actually taken being always limited, but always different... [for] the parts take
are constantly perishing in such a way that the succession never fails" ( 206a 26
206b 2 ). Thus Aristotle is in a position to define the real infinite which is
another expression of real continuity as an endless potentiality of approxima-
tion by reduction of intervals.
45. If this analysis be accepted, then I think it can serve as an
answer to the following comment of Andrew G. Bjelland's on my paper : "None
theless, although I endorse Peirce's insistence that time is 'continuity par exce
lence' through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum
(6.86) and his unquestioning acceptance of Time as "a/orw, that is, [as] bein
of the nature of a Law, and not of Existence" (6.96), I remain unpersuaded tha
qualitative continuity and temporality are fruitfully explored by way of quant
tative abstraction and logico-mathematical analysis. I side with James, Whitehead
and Bergson, among others, in their insistence that the phases of a qualitative
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 674
REFERENCES
Aristotle
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675 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 676
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677 Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou
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Peirce on Continuity and Laws of Nature 67 S
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