Hare: A Moral Argument

R. M. Hare conceived of moral reasoning as a rational activity and the ‘logic’ of moral language

to provide its rules. According to Hare, the job of ethics is to explicate these rules. On the basis of these

rules, he felt we could indirectly establish moral principles by showing instances of them to have a kind

of ‘consistency’. In the following, I will explicate Hare’s conception of moral reasoning. This will be

illustrated by various examples which attempt to show what consistency in moral judgment is. The

examples will also illustrate Hare’s idea of how moral arguments may be resolved on the basis of the

logic of moral language. This explanatory section will be followed by my own interpretation of what Hare

might mean, or what he could say when confronted with certain ambiguities in his conception of ‘taking

on the interests and inclinations of another as your own.’ The ambiguity is of some importance because

the concept has a central place in Hare’s theorizing. I will argue for distinguishing between concrete and

abstract levels of description when characterizing the circumstances and individuals relevant to our moral

reasoning and judgments. By doing so, I believe we can come to a better understanding of how moral

arguments may be resolved and how it might assist in achieving consistency in our moral reasoning.

Hare takes the rules provided by the logic of moral language as only one aspect of moral

reasoning. They are accompanied by the relevant facts and inclinations of the parties involved in the

situation which occasions the moral judgment. Since the rules take this limited role, and since ethics is the

study of these rules, ethics remains morally neutral. The rules of chess are an analogous example. In

opening, the rules state that one may only move a pawn or knight and say nothing about what particular

moves ought to be made. Acceptable moves, like acceptable moral judgments, are simply those that are

legal. We search for and generate moral principles in a negative process. There is no deducing moral

principles from non-moral facts any more than a move on the chess board is deduced from the rules and

context of the game. Instead, we take the moral principles suggested to us when we reflect on cases where

moral reasoning is appropriate. We then examine the consequences of applying those principles. If use of

a principle leads us to violate the rules explicated by ethics they are rejected, if not, they may be accepted.
 On Hare’s account, moral reasoning is governed by the function and meaning of the word

‘ought’. By moral judgments including ‘ought’, they are both universalizable and prescriptive. I shall

illustrate through example. Suppose my neighbor Adam has an expired work visa and the law states such

individuals are to be reported for deportation. Ought I report my neighbor? In cases of moral decision,

even if we are initially inclined to judge one way or another, we determine the acceptability of moral

judgments by imagining our situation switched with the effected party. We assume ourselves to have all

the interests and inclinations of the effected party as our own. If the judgment ‘I ought to report my

neighbor’ is prescriptive, then I commend the action, in effect saying, ‘Let me report Adam’. If it is

universalizable, I am committed to accepting it as being an instance of a universal principal, in effect

saying, ‘Anyone in my position ought to report their neighbor’. In the hypothetical situation, the

universalization of my original judgment commits me to the further judgment, ‘I ought to be reported’.

Since ought judgments are prescriptive, I, by extension, commit myself to affirming the prescription,

‘Report me for deportation’. However, having assumed the interests and inclinations of Adam, who wants

not to be reported, I cannot sincerely affirm this without becoming inconsistent with this inclination. So,

moral judgments lead us to be inconsistent when the prescriptive consequences of universalizing them are

ones we cannot accept when we reflect on a hypothetical role switching situation. On this definition, we

can see how it would be consistent for me to judge, ‘I ought not to report my neighbor’. By drawing out

the consequences of proposed moral judgments, we can generate moral principles on the basis of those

that allow us to be consistent. In this case, ‘Anyone in my position ought not report their neighbor’.

There are various ways in which moral disagreement might arise. The hope is that resolving such

disagreements can largely be accomplished by showing that one party’s moral judgment brings with it

commitments to prescriptions they could not accept and remain consistent. However, there are cases of

only ‘apparent’ moral disagreement. These arise when parties to a moral dispute use moral language in

different ways and thereby talk at cross purposes. Suppose Bob uses ‘ought’ prescriptively but not

universalizably. Contrary to my judgement earlier, he judges that he ought to report Adam, and so

prescribes to himself, ‘Report Adam’. However, without being universalized, his judgment does not entail
that he himself ought to be reported in a hypothetical case in which their roles are switched. My judgment

is opposed to Bob’s because of what the universalized version of the judgment entails. Bob has no

universal principle for me to be in conflict with and so we are not in actual disagreement. Alternatively,

suppose Bob’s ought judgement is only universalizable. Without being prescriptive, the universal and

particular judgments just hang there; he is not prescribing anything to anyone. My judgment opposes

Bob’s because the universalized form entails affirming a moral judgment whose prescription is

inconsistent with my inclination not to be reported in the hypothetical case. There are no such

prescriptions for Bob to affirm or not affirm. Once again, we talk at cross purposes.

If an individual uses ought both universalizably and prescriptively, there may be actual moral

disagreement. However, the fact that one judgment is consistent (mine in this case) does not mean

differing judgments are necessarily inconsistent. There may be differing judgments neither of which break

the rules of consistency, and so the ones which do must be ruled out in piecemeal fashion. Returning to

the example, though Bob may be blocked, for the sake of consistency, from judging that he ought to

report Adam, there remain other options which allow for disagreement. Suppose Bob claims that he never

makes moral judgments or is indifferent in all his moral decision making. Alternatively, suppose he

claims that he only sometimes makes moral judgments. In the first case, according to Hare, there is

nothing to say in such a situation. There is no more of an argument here than a game of chess against a

wall. The ‘argument’ is resolved by forfeit. Hare holds the second position to be untenable. Since they use

‘ought’ in the ‘accepted’ manner, such an individual would have to offer some principle by which they

distinguished between cases. Without such a principle, the decision to do so has no moral justification.

Another source of argument stems from claiming that differences between cases may carry moral

weight. According to Hare, such an objection can in part be attributed to misunderstanding the nature of

moral reasoning. Generating and exploring moral principles may, at least initially, rest on purely

hypothetical circumstances. In the example, I simply stipulated that the circumstances of Adam and I

were identical and so have no moral differences. Of course, someone may claim further that no two cases

in actuality are ever identical, and some of these differences may warrant moral consideration. Hare leans
on hypothetical role switching to determine what may count as a morally relevant difference. For

example, Bob may claim that he must not be deported for the sake of his family. In determining whether

or not this is morally relevant, he must imagine this feature belonging to anyone but him, including

Adam. If it continues to carry the same moral weight regardless of who has this proposed relevant feature,

then it is morally relevant.

The last option available for argument against the original consistent judgment would be to say

that both ought to be reported. Here, an individual is perfectly willing to affirm the entailed prescriptions

on the basis of principle. For example, Bob may be perfectly willing to be reported and deported on

behalf of his utilitarian beliefs. He might believe that if such infractions go unpunished, the aggregate

happiness of the relevant population would be diminished. Hare admits there is difficulty in analyzing

such cases. This would involve extrapolating his two person model to an entire community, and it is not

entirely clear how this would be done. However, if a utilitarian like Bob could show what they believe

would happen would in fact happen, then they are perfectly consistent in judging that both they and Adam

ought to be reported for deportation.

Alternatively, the principal which might allow someone to accept the prescription in hypothetical

cases might be of an impersonal nature. For example, Bob may hold that ‘the law is the law’ and justice is

to be fulfilled regardless of anyone’s interests. Hare implies that such a position might often be the result

of imprudence, since it seems hardly anyone would be willing to maintain such principles ‘come rain or

shine’. It may be possible to show one who holds such principles that dogged adherence to them may

have intolerably disastrous results. For example, reporting all cases of expired visas may rip apart

families, resulting in hundreds of children suffering emotional trauma. Alternatively, we could convince

them to reflect on cases in which their own families were effected. They might then come to realize they

could not sincerely prescribe such things to happen to their own family. However, in the first instance,

even if such an individual were to agree as to the outcome described factually, they could very well

dispute its being worse than a state of affairs in which the law was not enforced. Furthermore, appeals

through role reversal may only yield a ‘so be it attitude’. Such cases of fanatically held principles, though
perhaps strange to many, are nonetheless consistent on Hare’s model. The person understands moral

language and makes the same judgment in similar cases. Their everyday inclination may be wanting not

to be deported or have otherwise negative things happen to them. However, there is nothing logically

barring them from changing their inclination upon reflecting on the consequences of universalizing their

judgment.