Reyes vs Mauricio GR No 175080 24

November 2010
11
TuesdayOct 2016
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Remedial Law Review 2
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Facts: This case stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by Respondents (Librada Mauricio, and
her alleged daughter Leonida) for annulment of contract between Librada and Eugenio parties.
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan. Subject land herein.

Respondentss alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio, who was the lawful and registered tenant of
Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document to eject Respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized in Pasig; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of the said
contract (Kasunduan) were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantages of the weakness, age, illiteracy,
ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent.

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, DARAB ruled in favor of Respondents. On appeal with the CA, Petitioner
assailed the status of Leonida as a legal heir and her capacity to substitute Librada who died during the pendency of the case.
Petitioner averred that Leonida is merely a ward of Librada.

Issue: Whether Leonida’s filiation may be attacked collaterally?

Decision: No. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Citing Dr. Tolentino’s book, Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Dr. Tolentino explained thus:

“The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.”
THE SAME RULE IS APPLIED TO ADOPTION

 It also cannot be made subject to collateral attack.

Republic vs. Coseteng- Magpayo (GR No. 189476)

Facts:
 Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed that his parents were never married and filed a petition in QC to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng (using the maiden name of his mother)
 Respondent submitted proof
o Mother has no record of marriage from NSO
o Records which show that he has been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood (academic records)
 Trial Court granted petition and ordered Civil Registrar to:
o Delete the entry “date and place of marriage”(of parents) in respondent’s live birth certificate
o Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
o Delete entry of Coseting from “Middle name”
o Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for “Father”
 Republic filed a motion against the order of the court stating that:
o The change of name of respondent also calls for a change of civil status from legitimate to illegitimate.
o Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered deletion of name of the father
 A person can effect a change of name under rule 103 using valid grounds:
o when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce
o when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation
o when the change will avoid confusion
 o when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage
o a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody
o when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest
Issue:
 WON respondents change of name was affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding
Held:
 Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as anyone of the recognized grounds in rule 103 (respondent denies
his legitimacy by affecting his legal status in relation to his parents)
 Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply
 Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made
parties to the proceeding.
 When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is mandated
 Decision of Trial Court was nullified

On a side note, there were other cases mentioned in this case to try and explain rule 108 better. I didn’t include them here anymore but
if you want to read them, here is a link to the original case.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_189476_2011.html

G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015 EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO vs. KAREN
SANTOS Civil Law; Family Code; Filiation. The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Ru no and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took
possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.
Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Ru no and Caridad
Geronimo. She led a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession
against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy.
The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother
stating that the deceased Ru no and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child
of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff
was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO
representative.
They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in
Bulacan, never led a maternity leave during the period of her service, as supported by a certification
from the Schools Division Superintendent.
The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found
that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in
evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered. It further stated that
even granting that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been
sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child under Article 172 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother
during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The
appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a
specific date. It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or midwife
in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law
required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary
evidence presented.
The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear
their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and
other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and
property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Ru no; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal
heirs of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary
evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth
certificate.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172
because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation
cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue. In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What
petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible
under Art. 172 of the Family Code. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s
declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on
misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of
birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the
corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not
offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth. With the declaration that the birth
certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not
entitled to inherit from the estate.

G.R. No. 183965
 Uy vs. Chua
 Petitioner: JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Respondent: JOSE NGO CHUA, Facts:

Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then

married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and her brother,

Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F.

SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of

Irene’s mother.
However, respondent Chua financially supported petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to each other

and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During petitioner’s wedding,

respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.

Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented

documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate

affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A

Compromise Agreement was made between the two parties prior wherepetitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood

relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each.

The court ruled in favor of the respondent hence this appeal

Issue:

Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement

on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

Held:

Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namelypublic policy and necessity, which makes it in the

interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.

The requisites must alsoconcur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and

the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of

action.

The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case.

The compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already

commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment

based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of

the requisites of such to be valid is that the compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and Future

Legitime.
The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In

exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan

P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights

to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between

petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition

under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v. Advincula.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no

compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it

is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and

vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged

performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.

Decision Reversed and Set Aside.

 GOTARDO vs BULING
G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012
BRION, J.:
PRINCIPLE: In traditional paternity action, the one claiming for filiation and support must prove a prima
facie case. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares – supported by corroborative proof—that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden shifts to the putative father. Since
filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
FACTS:
 On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendent lite claiming that petitioner, Charles Gotardo, is the father of her child Gliffze.
 They met at Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank, Southern Leyte branch where she had been
hired as a casual employee while petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.
 Sometime in September 1993, petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent
Sexual encounters occurred twice a month and eventually, on August 8, 1994 the respondent was
pregnant.
 They both made plans and allegedly applied for a marriage license, until petitioner backed out of the
wedding plans.
 Petitioner failed to support Gliffze and was sent a demand letter for recognition and support for their
child but when petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed a complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendent lite.
 RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation.
 On appeal, CA ordered petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze
Buling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA is correct in ordering petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son.
RULING:
YES. No error in the CA’s ruling. Petition denied.
Filiation proceedings are filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. In paternity cases, burden of
proof is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.
There are four procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child. A prima facie cases exists if a woman declares – supported by corroborative proof—
that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father. There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father: (1) incapability of sexual
relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency or (2) that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze
through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. The testimony was corroborated by Rodulfo, the witness.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support
his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. The amount of support is variable, hence, no final judgment on
the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged
to support.
CASE DIGEST: GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO,Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This
prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.

The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio
as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to
Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody
over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling
contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City
Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates
of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother;
Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor
children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio
that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child"
clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."

Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion
was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.

ISSUE:

Has the father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation?
HELD: Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: "Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force."

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father
if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with
the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity
of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says
and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the
minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its
words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.

***

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his recognition of
his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255.

An administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,
G.R No 170633, October 17, 2007 We held:

After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because
the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act
of Congress.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls, and
illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.

Perla vs Baring
GR No. 172471 November 12, 2012

Facts: A complaint for abandonment and support was filed by herein respondent Mirasol Baring together with her son, Randy Perla allegedly the son of Antonio
Perla. It is Randy’s birth certificate that was presented as evidence to support the the claim which was later denied by petitioner that such information has
discrepancies and not signed by him. Such was neither signed by Antonio.

Issue: Whether or not illegitimate filiation was established.

Held: No. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

xxxx

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish
Randy’s filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that “a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.” We also cannot lend
credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any participation in the preparation
of the document as well as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in
Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth certificate are
manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the
witness stand.

Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called Antonio “Papa” and kissed his
hand while Antonio hugged him and promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in
her place, cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172(1). “To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as
such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.” Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to
support him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, “the father’s conduct towards his son must be
spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist.” Here, except for that singular occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio treating
Randy as his son. Neither can Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court, Lelita’s actuations could have been done
due to charity or some other reasons.

Calimag vs Heirs of Macapaz

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).

Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and
was duly registered in the names of Virginia Calimag married to Demetrio Calimag and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a
portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.[6]

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No.
221466,[7] was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale[8] dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-
m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
Affidavit[9] dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim
filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela
passed away.[10]
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of
the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. Case was however dismissed.

Respondents later asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Petitioner averred that respondents have no legal capacity to
institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate
pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of
their father and mother. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ruled that the
attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that
their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage license failed.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-
]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the [respondents].
The Marriage Contract clearly reflects a marriage license number and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated on that ground.
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts
look upon this presumption with great favor. Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by competent and
substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate
children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have the legal capacity to institute said action considering that they have no legal right over the estate left by
Silvestra as they are the illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr?

Ruling: The documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and
(2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage. But the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live
Birth issued by the National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator
Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang,
Leyte." A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)." Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his
birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. The certificates of live birth were
duly executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of
Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children. Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children—the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three
years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.

In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents
over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Hence the respondents have the legal capacity to institute an action as they were able to prove their filiation.

G.R. No. 189289

GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, Petitioner

vs.
ERNESTO SALES, Respondent

Teodoro Sales and Ernesto Sales filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children of the late Louis C.
Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional ;Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19781 and raffled to Branch
110. 4 Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was filed where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay City on March 20, 1948
and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the illegitimate children of Louis and his common-law wife named Epitacia who was a house helper
in the Fernandez household. Louis and his legal wife, Marie Louise Fernandez, a French national, did not have any child. According to the
plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized
document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia finaally recognizing the plaintiffs as their children; and (2) a document
solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children. Petitioner opposed. She alleged that she is the
niece of Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of
the plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo, the former houseboy of the Fernandez household. RTC ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the
illegitimate children of Louis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Teodoro & Ernesto are recognized as the illegitimate children of Louis?

Ruling: Yes. The legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the present concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proven by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of illegitimate children. In order to cast doubt as to the authenticity of the documentary
evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner purported that documents were spurious. The petitioner claimed that during the execution and
notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents.
However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and bedridden at the time
he affixed his thumb mark to the document dated November 11, 1980. A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of
signature. The Court, in the case of Dr. Yason v. Arciaga,29 held that a signature may be made by a person's cross or mark.1âwphi1A notarized
document is a public document and as such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can only be overthrown by clear and convincing
evidence. It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto is Corpus. She presented various evidence like school report card
and death certificate wherein Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus. The use of Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the
illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto. As correctly observed by the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must have prevented him
from making any declaration that would have exposed his relationship with Epitacia. The use of Louis' surname by his children during the lifetime
of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father who voluntary recognized that
Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the law that determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised.

PEOPLE vs. NONIETO GERSAMIO CASE DIGEST [G.R. No.

207098, July 08, 2015, PEREZ, J.]
TOPIC: Paternity and Filiation- Compulsory Recognition

DOCTRINE: The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering Gersamio to
acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidenc. In this case, AAA was already five and a
half months pregnant when she was medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on
August 28, 2002 was not the cause of that pregnancy. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to
support AAA’s child.

FACTS: August 28, 2002: In the afternoon, Gersamio, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by means of force, violence and intimidation and having carnal knowledge with the complainant
[AAA], 15 years old, a minor, at the time of the incident against her will. Evidence was established that: AAA’s
first sexual ordeal at the hands of Gersamio happened sometime in 1999, when she was only 13 years old, having been
born on 11 April 1986. It was repeated for several times. The last incident of rape occurred on 28 August 2002. On the
said date, AAA was about to enter their house, Gersamio, who was then hiding behind a coconut tree, suddenly
grabbed and dragged her towards the back of their house – a banana plantation. AAA could not do anything but cry as
he pointed a knife at her neck. He commanded AAA to lie down but she resisted, prompting the former to kick the
latter in her thigh. When AAA was already lying on the ground, he removed her t-shirt, short pants and underwear. He
also threatened to kill AAA. Defenseless, AAA simply cried. He inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina. He warned
AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone what happened between them.

On 2 September 2002, AAA’s grandmother, BBB, discovered her pregnancybecause of the changes in her physical
appearance. When asked about the father of her child, it was then that AAA disclosed to BBB her harrowing
experiences at the hands of Gersamio, which began in 1999 when she was only 13 years old, the last of which was on
28 August 2002. Such sexual advances by him resulted in her pregnancy. At once, BBB went to his house and
confronted him regarding what he did to AAA. Nonetheless, in order to save AAA and their whole family from shame
as he is AAA’s uncle, being the first cousin of AAA’s mother, BBB would just like to keep the matter among
themselves and merely asked him to acknowledge and support the child of AAA. He, however, denied the accusation
and he even got mad at BBB. Leaving with no other choice, AAA, accompanied by BBB, sought the assistance of their
Barangay Captain and they told the former the whole incident. The Barangay Captain then advised them to have a
medical examination, which they did.

The Trial Court held him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, ordering him to pay AAA for moral
damages; and acknowledge or recognize AAA’s offspring resulting from the rape; and support AAA’s child in the
event his means improves after serving his sentence.

The CA deleted, however, the portion ordering him to acknowledge paternity and to support AAA’s child, as the issue
of whether the child is Gersamio’s is yet to be resolved in a full-blown trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not AAA’s child should be recognized and supported by Gersamio.

HELD: NO. A meticulous perusal of the records shows no compelling reason to overturn the findings of both lower
courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility and that, indeed, Gersamio raped her and his guilt was sufficiently proven by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Even though the result of AAA’s physical examination conducted in September 2002 showed that she was already five
and a half months pregnant at that time, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant could not have authored the 28
August 2002 rape against her. Contrary to Gersamio’s view, AAA’s pregnancy is immaterial to the issue
since pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. So, whether the child whom the rape victim bore
was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was
testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.

The SC affirms the deletion of the portion of the trial court’s decision ordering the appellant to acknowledge paternity
and to support AAA’s child in the absence of evidence thereof. In this case, AAA was already five and a half months
pregnant when she was medically examined in September 2002. Obviously, the rape that happened on 28 August 2002
was not the cause of that pregnancy. Though there were allegations of repeated rape from 1999 up to 28 August 2002,
only two Informations for rape was filed, i.e., the rape incidents in 1999 and on 28 August 2002. And, the appellant
was acquitted for the rape committed in 1999 for prosecution’s failure to specify with certainty the exact month in 1999
the offense was committed. With these, Gersamio cannot be ordered to recognize and to support AAA’s child.

Needless to say, the foregoing does not affect the earlier findings of this Court on the guilt of the appellant for the
crime of rape committed on 28 August 2002. To repeat, not only is the impregnation of the rape victim not an element
of rape; it must also be stressed that AAA stated that the appellant repeatedly rape her since 1999 until 28 August 2002.
Although the appellant cannot be held liable for such alleged rapes, as this case does not cover other incidents of rape
prior to 28 August 2002, AAA’s testimony on this point provides a possible explanation for her childbirth on 5 January
2003 as her child turned one on 5 January 2004.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 April 2012 finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the appellant is
further ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00.

The Court dismisses the petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that petitioner has
failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin
spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the
deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge correctly ruled that he
could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late
Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her predeceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural]
son), over the opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an
adopted child of the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial
proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his
adoption.

On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de
Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, married to respondent Bernardo de Leon,
and respondent Irma Lazatin, married to Francisco Veloso. One month after Mariano's death, his widow,
Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding before the Court of First Instance of Pasay, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural)
children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz,intervened. Subsequently, one Lily Lazatin also intervened,
claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after or on April 11, 1974, the widow,
Margarita de Asis, also died, leaving a & holographic will executed on May 29, 1970, providing, among others,
for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to
Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner
Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the
People's Bank and Trust Company, Roxas Boulevard branch, which either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon
could open. Five days after Margarita's death, respondent Nora L. de Leon, accompanied by her husband,
respondent Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b)
her adoption
papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother.
Respondent Nora L. de Leon claims that she opened the safety deposit box in good faith, believing that it was
held jointly by her and her deceased mother. Her sole reason for opening the box was to get her stock
certificates and other small items deposited therein. When she was to close the deposit box, the bank personnel
informed her that she needed an authority from the court to do so, in view of her mother's death and so, she
removed everything from the box. Upon the order of the probate court, presided over by Judge Arsenio B.
Alcantara, the safety deposit box was opened on November 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty,
because prior thereto respondent Nora L. de Leon had already removed its contents. On November 22, 1974, or
seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to
settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No 2326- P), as an admitted illegitimate (not
natural) child.

Under the same date of November 22, 1974, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate proceedings of
Margarita de Asis to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box, Whereupon, on
January 31, 1975, the probate court ordered respondent Nora L. de Leon to deliver the properties taken from the
safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P, Mariano
Lazatin, and 2341-P, Margarita de Asis) were transferred to the sala of respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr.
On May 29, 1975, Judge Campos issued an order requiring counsel for respondents Nora L. de Leon and
Bernardo de Leon to produce all those papers and items removed from the safety deposit box and to deliver the
same to the custody of the court within one week. Within the period ordered, respondent Nora

L. de Leon deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box
which could only be opened upon order of the court. On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias
Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis, Sp. Proc. No. 2341-P, as an
adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin, the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was
later modified on August 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife
Margarita de Asis. Petitioner then filed on March 16, 1976, in both cases, a motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption in view of respondent Nora L. de Leon's refusal to comply with the orders of respondent court to
deposit the items she had removed from the safety deposit box of Margarita de Asis. As authority therefor,
petitioner invokes the sanction of Rule 29, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, since according to him, the order of
the court for the production of the items in the safety deposit box can be considered as an order for production
and inspection of documents under Rule 27. Private respondents opposed the motion, and on March 26, 1976,
respondent court denied petitioner's motion. On April 26, 1976, respondent Nora L. de Leon deposited with
respondent court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted by
respondent court, with notice to the parties, and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and
stock certificates.

On June 3,1976, respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution declared as established the
fact of adoption:
As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is his Petition to establish his status as an adopted child, The Court has
ruled that he has failed to establish such status. The any motion for reconsideration unless based on some
documentary proof.

At the continuation of the proceedings below for declaration of heirship and for probate of the alleged
holographic the deceased Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin, petitioner has failed to establish his status as an
alleged child of Margarita de Asis (unless, as reserved to him by the court below, he can show some
documentary proof),and whose intervention in the estate of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin is as an admitted
illegitimate child, win have to decide whether he will pursue his first theory of having the of such admitted
illegitimate child of said deceased. Whatever be his theory and his course of action and whether or not he may
be duly showed to intervene in the proceedings below as such alleged admitted illegitimate child, his recourse in
the event of an adverse ruling against him is to make a formal offer of proof and of his excluded evidence, oral
and documentary, and seek a reversal on an appeal in due course. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed
and the questioned orders denying petitioner's petition below "to declare as established in this proceeding the
fact of [his] adoption" are hereby affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued on June 16, 1976 and
amended on July 21, 1976 is ordered lifted, effective immediately. Without costs.

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO (1989)

Petitioners: Nelson L. Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon Cervantes

Respondents: Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo

FACTS:
- Angelie Anne C. Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
- The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
- Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, who took
care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old.
- An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987.
- The petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20 August 1987, which granted the petition.
- The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from
now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate."
- Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150, 000.00; otherwise, they would get back their child.
- While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioner's residence and brought the child to her house.
- Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of
consent to the adoption she had exectued was not fully explained to her. She will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount.
- Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption case,
testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon and that respondent manifested to the social worker
her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners.

ISSUE:
- W/N the custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes should be granted to the petitioners.
HELD/RATIO:
- Yes. The Court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for writ of
Habeas Corpus be granted. In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be separated from a
child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent
of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents
have the right to care and custody of the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him (Art 17, PD 603).

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary

FACTS:
 John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was,
at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biologicalmother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter
was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the parental authority to
the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on
rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend
for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on
the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled,
include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive
the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

Michelle Lim

Facts: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it
appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael
Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was
born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of
birth is 1 August 1983. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario),
an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8522 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her
new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section
7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.


RULING: It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to
affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA
8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring
for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or
is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains
such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to
adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other;

or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Petitioner, having remarried at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only
by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second,
the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions
with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists
that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a
case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a
case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a
decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
REPUBLIC VS TOLEDANO

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named
Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law. The sole issue for determination concerns the right of
private respondent spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private
respondent spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18,
1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City
of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks. The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in
Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year
old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery
Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
= petition granted. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN
CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified
to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in
the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph
Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when
private respondent spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21,
1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when
she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in
her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to
adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article
184.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s
brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother
went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent
for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption
plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written
consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of consent and notice to the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
time of adoption.

De Asis vs. CA
GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged
father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the
complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue
the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his
counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to
give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim
support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the
parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With
respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing
the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the
parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity
must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in
the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action
asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since
future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

Rondina vs People

Support of the offspring "CCC"

The RTC ordered Victor to acknowledge "AAA’s" offspring "CCC" and give her support. "Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for
three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless
the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of
illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender
sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no ‘further positive act is
required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status’. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered to indemnify and support the
victim’s child."70 "The amount [and terms] of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with
Article 20171 of the Family Code."72

Mangonan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006

FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February
1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At
that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and
Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New
England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina.

2. Whether Francisco can avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

RULING:

1. Yes. Francisco is obliged to support his granddaughters Rica and Rina in default of the father.

Pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina.

2. No. Francisco cannot avail of the option under Article 204 anent his obligation.

Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With the filing of this case, and the
allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them.
Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see Rica and Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company of those who have
disowned them.

G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

Spouses Prudencio and Filomena Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, et. al.

Facts: In 1979, Cheryl married Edward, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation
with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation."

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC ordered Edward to
provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

On January 31, 1996, RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with
Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability. The defendants sought
reconsideration, questioning their liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable
with Edward because of the latter’s “inability to give sufficient support”.
Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" under
Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).

On April 28, 2003, CA affirmed RTC. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends
down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren. Should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy
all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of
the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only
in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. CA denied motion for reconsideration.

Issue: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Held: Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination
or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over
their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. There is no showing that private respondent is without
means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for
her grandson's legal support.

There is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is
also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs.
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.1avvphi1

Petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of
lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Cheryl’s share
from the amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial
court for this limited purpose.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to
fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. The application of Article
204 which provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case
there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house
which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity.

DK No. 14817 January 13, 2014

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY
VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.

Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko),1 her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on
September 23, 2011. On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon receipt of information that Shang Ko was
in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to
her, Shirly sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura), informed Shirly
that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that
the child was fine and had been attending school. This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent
Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City
citing as reason several threats against her life in that city.

In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012, the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP 07261 to deny the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has
custody of Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a
person or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of such person

Respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, 2011 police officers found Shang Ko crying outside a church. When queried, the
latter refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed her case to the Bacolod City Police Women and Children
Protection Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan , a temporary shelter
for abused women and children.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the minor who said that her mother Shirly had been
abusive in treating her. She narrated that on September 27, 2011 Shirly instructed another daughter to give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and take
her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo City.5 Shang Ko was told to look for a job there and to never come back to Bacolod City. Since
she had nowhere to go when she arrived in Iloilo City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the money given her. She went to
her best friend’s house but was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they,
too, turned her down.6

Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to return her to her mother. As a
result, the Bacolod City Police filed a complaint7 against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a conference but she refused to
receive such notice. Two days later, however, she came and spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that Shang Ko had been a difficult child with
a tendency to steal. From their conversation, Cabcaban surmised that Shirly did not want to take her daughter back, having offered to pay
for her daily expenses at the shelter.

Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, a private organization that
gave sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused children.8 On November 2, 2011 petitioner Shirly showed up at the police station
asking for her daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for abandoned children and that the police officer had to first
coordinate with it before she can disclose where Shang Ko was. But Shirly was adamant and threatened her with a lawsuit. Cabcaban
claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to use her as leverage for getting financial support
from him.

Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by Pura went to the police station to verify Shirly’s complaint that
Cabcaban had kidnapped Shang Ko. Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk to the institution’s social worker,
school principal, and director. They provided the NBI agents with the child’s original case study report9 and told them that it was not in
Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her mother who abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko herself told the NBI that she would rather
stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would happen to her if she returned home.10 As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating
that, contrary to her mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had nowhere to go after her family refused to
take her back.11

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor.12 The general rule is that parents
should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children,
treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their
lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled.

Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved
by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the
custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides
she herself has expressed preference to stay in that place.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8,
2013 and ORDERS this custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and adjudication as the evidence warrants.
Meantime until such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.

Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip to pay the balance of the docket and other legal fees within
10 days from receipt of this Resolution.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,

vs.

Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,
Respondents

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama, Jr.

TOPIC: Writ of amparo

FACTS:
 Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s
child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child
adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City.
Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered
Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for
Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody was then
commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for
the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality
on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her
parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparobefore the RTC seeking to obtain
custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody
of a minor child.

HELD:
 The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no enforced
disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
“enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never concealed
Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby
Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore,
no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly
indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody
over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights
over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child
but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy
available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of
the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to
life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
 Sheryl M. Mendez vs. Shari’ District Court
GR. NO. 201614
FACTS: Sheryl M. Mendez and Dr. John O. Maliga were married under Muslim rites, but they already have a daughter
before their marriage. Shortly after their marriage, their relationship became sour, and two years after, Maliga filed with
the Sharia Circuit Court a petition for judicial confirmation of talaq from Mendez, with a grant of probational custody of
their minor child. According to Maliga, Mendez was a Roman Catholic and only embrace the Islamic faith on the date of
their marriage and that her sincerity to Islam is dubitable. He also alleged that Mendez reverted to Christianity when she
went to Manila and brought their daughter with her without his knowledge and consent and she enrolled their daughter in
a Catholic School. Mendez denied the allegations and that she followed the religion of her Muslim grandfather, she also
averred that she became pregnant before she married and had been raising their daughter on her own and that Maliga
had been totally remiss in his material and moral obligations to support their child, and argued that she was the one who
raised the child from birth and that the custody of children below seven years old should belong to the mother. She further
contends that she never received the summons in connection with the urgent motion and never received a copy of the
order granting temporary custody to Maliga, which she had only picked up from the court herself. The ShCC partially
reconsidered its initial order awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of visitation to Mendez and
subsequently confirmed the talaq between the parties and awarded to Maliga the care and custody of Princess Fatima.
Upon appeal by Mendez of the ShCC Decision with respect to custody, the ShDC sustained the assailed decision.

Issue(s):sh
1. Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga’s urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody;
2. Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had jurisdiction on the issue of custody; and
3. Whether or not custody was properly granted.

HELD:
1. According to the Court, it is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who
have been married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. There is,
therefore, no doubt that the ShCC had jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and Maliga. Article 143 of the same
P.D., however, clearly provides that the ShDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving custody under P.D.
No. 1083. But, notwithstanding with the foregoing, as opined by Secretary Sadain, the ShCC does seem to have ancillary
jurisdiction over custody issues as they relate to a divorce decree. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the issue of
custody is a necessary consequence of a divorce proceeding. This Court, therefore, believes that to rule the ShCC is without
jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had decided on the issue of divorce, simply because it appears to
contravening to P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the foregoing
doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to resolve the issue of custody, it being a related issue
to the main cause of action.
2. The Court, nonetheless, agrees with Mendez that the urgent motion lacked the requisite notice of hearing. It is immediately
evident from the face of the motion that it did not contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has
suppletory application to the present case. Under the law, it provides that every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard and the notice of hearing shall be served in such manner as to
insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets
the hearing on shorter notice. A seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of hearing
indicating the time and place of hearing is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum
requirement of procedural due process. Therefore, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does
not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk has no right to receive it.
3.The orders of the ShCC and the ShDC awarding custody of Princess Fatima to Maliga were without evidentiary basis
because no hearing was actually conducted prior to the issuance of the order granting the urgent motion. Moreover, there
was no explanation given as to why the motion was resolved without notice to, or the participation of Mendez. Although the
ShCC stated that, in deciding on the custody case, it scrutinized the evidence on hand, it was remiss in its duty to state the
precise factual and legal basis on which its ruling awarding custody to Maliga was based. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based. The
decisions of courts must be able to address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive
analysis or account of factual and legal findings of the court. It is evident that the ShCC failed to comply with these
requirements. It merely stated that it was in Princess Fatima's "best interest in all aspects of life, economically, socially and
religiously" that custody be awarded to her father, and no express finding that Mendez was unfit in any way, or a hint of an
explanation as to why Maliga was in a better position to take custody of Princess Fatima. The ShDC, on the other hand, in
affirming the findings of the ShCC, stated that Mendez was disentitled to custody because she had turned apostate, and
held that she would remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith in accordance with the Muslim Law. It appears,
however, that disqualification due to apostasy under the Muslim Code pertains to disinheritance under Article 93 of the
Muslim Code, and not to the custody of children. Nevertheless, the award of custody is violative of the constitutional right
of Mendez to due process.
The Decisions, with respect to each issue presented, the Court declared null and void the Decisions rendered by ShCC on
Probational Custody and Permanent Custody of Princess Fatima and likewise the Order of ShDC affirming the ShCC
Decision insofar as the ruling on Custody is concerned. On the other hand, the Order of the ShCC confirming the
Pronouncement of Talaq by Dr. John O. Maliga against Sheryl M. Mendez is maintained.

BBB v AAA CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015,

REYES, J.]
Topic: Parental Authority & Custody of Children: Who May Exercise

Doctrine: The SC affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the
children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with.

FACTS: BBB and AAA allege that they started to date seriously only in 1996. AAA was then a medical student and
was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, named CCC, a boy. During their relationship, AAA bore
two more children namely, DDD (born on December 11, 1997) and EEE (born on October 19, 2000). BBB and AAA
married in civil rights to legalize their relationship. The birth certificates of the children, including CCC’s, was
amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage. Later on, their relationship turn sour
and they decided to live separately. Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed an application for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the
RTC. Finding good ground in AAA’s application, the RTC issued a TPO. The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by
virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August 14, 2007.

BBB appealed before the CA. CA affirmed RTC’s decision but ordered the remand of the case for the latter to
determine in the proper proceedings to determine who shall be awarded custody of the children. The CA found that
under the provisions of RA9262, BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic
abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and
psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public
appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. BBB
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a MOA alleging that he and AAA had entered into
a compromiseregarding the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE: that BBB shall
have the custody over both children.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should determine who shall be awarded custody over the children.

HELD: YES. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for
the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall
exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support. The RTC and the CA found
substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took
place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were
committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not
necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the
children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with. If all
the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall
continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBB’s care,
necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain
effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly
alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody
over the children.

Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the
children are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or increased
proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a mutual
responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should
consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.
 The Facts

Petitioner Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29, 20056 and have a daughter named Francheska A. Bucal (Francheska), who
was born on November 22, 2005.7 chanroble slaw

On May 7, 2010, Cherith filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection Order8(RTC Petition) based on Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,9 otherwise known
as the �Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.� She alleged that Manny had never shown her the love and care of a husband,
nor supported her and Francheska financially. Furthermore, due to Manny�s alcoholism, he was always mad and would even shout hurtful words at
her. Manny�s demean or even affected her health detrimentally, leading her to suffer dizziness and difficulty in breathing on one occasion.10Thus,
Cherith prayed that the RTC issue in her favor a Temporary Protection Order (TPO): (a) prohibiting Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting, or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly; (b)ordering a law enforcement officer and court personnel to accompany her
to the residence of Manny to supervise the removal of her personal belongings in order to ensure her personal safety; (c) directing Manny and/or any
of his family members to stay away from her and any of her designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay
away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by her and any of her designated family or household
member; (d) enjoining Manny from threatening to commit or committing further acts of violence against her and any of her family and household
member; (e) granting her custody and charge of Francheska, until further orders from the court; (f) ordering Manny to absolutely desist and refrain
from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of Francheska; and (g) directing Manny to provide
support to her and Francheska. Cherith also prayed that after hearing, the TPO be converted into a Permanent Protection Order (PPO).11 chanrobleslaw

The RTC Proceedings

After due proceedings, the RTC, in an Order12 dated May 14, 2010, issued a TPO granting the above-mentioned reliefs, effective for a period of thirty
(30) days. However, Manny was given visitation rights every Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with instruction that Francheska be brought to
his residence by Cherith�s relatives.13 chanrobles law

Anticipating the expiration of the TPO, Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Extension and/or Renewal of the Temporary Restraining Order14(Motion)
on June 10, 2010, which further sought a clarification of the visitation rights granted to Manny.15 chanrobles law

In an Order16 dated June 22, 2010, the RTC granted Cherith�s Motion and issued a PPO. It also ordered Manny to provide support to Francheska in
the amount of P5,000.00. The RTC also clarified that the visitation rights would only be from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. every Saturday and that �the
petitioner�s guardian� will bring the child, Francheska, to Manny�s home and accompany her until 5:00 p.m.17 chanroble slaw

On July 30, 2010, Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order,18seeking the reversal of the grant of visitation rights.19 She alleged that upon
perusal of her RTC Petition in the records of the court, she noticed an unauthorized intercalation praying for visitation rights for Manny.20 Moreover,
citing the further strained relations between her and Manny, Cherith argued that continuing Francheska�s weekly visits to her father defeated the
purpose of the protection order granted to them as the obligation made her and the child vulnerable to the abuse from which they sought
protection.21 chanrobles law

On August 12, 2010, Manny filed an Omnibus Motion22 praying that:(a) the attached Answer23 be admitted; (b) the PPO issued on June 22, 2010 be
set aside; and (c) the case be set for trial. Manny also sought Cherith�s citation for contempt due to her failure to abide by the visitation rights
granted to him.24 In his Answer, Manny belied Cherith�s accusations of abuse by alleging delusion and paranoia on her part and claiming himself to
be a responsible and dedicated family man.25 Cherith opposed26Manny�s Omnibus Motion, alleging that after she filed her petition,Manny personally
appeared before the court but did not file any pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her RTC Petition.27 chanroble slaw

Pending resolution of Manny�s Omnibus Motion, Manny filed a Manifestation and Opposition to Petition,28basically reiterating his averments in the
Omnibus Motion. In response, Cherith filed her comment,29 positing that the Manifestation and Opposition to Petition was a prohibited pleading for it
sought, among others, the reconsideration of the PPO and the re-opening of trial.30In the same pleading, Cherith prayed that her previous Ex-
Parte Motion to Amend Order, which sought the reversal of the grant of visitation rights, be granted.31 chanrobles law

After due hearing, the RTC, in an Order32 dated November 23, 2010 modified its June 22, 2010 Order, ordering Cherith to bring Francheska to
McDonald�s in Tanza at exactly 9:00 a.m. on Saturdays where she will be picked up by her father, Manny, and be returned in the same place the
following day, Sunday, at 5:00 p.m.

Dissatisfied, Cherith filed a petition for certiorari33 before the CA, arguing that it was beyond the RTC�s authority to grant visitation rights to Manny
because the trial court cannot grant a remedy that was not prayed for.34 chanroble slaw

The CA Ruling

In a Decision35 dated October 16, 2012, the CA dismissed Cherith�s petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC Orders dated June 22, 2010 and
November 23, 2010.36 chanrobleslaw

At the outset, it pointed out that Cherith�s failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, without any justification therefor, rendered her
resort to certiorari premature.37 On the merits,it held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting visitation rights to Manny
because the same was only based on Cherith�s own prayer.38 chanrobleslaw

Aggrieved, Cherith moved for reconsideration,39 which was denied in a Resolution40 dated April 15, 2013; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court�s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cherith�s certiorari petition, thus, affirming the June 22,
2010 and November 23, 2010 RTC Orders granting visitation rights to Manny.

The Court�s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

On the matter of procedure, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing Cherith�s certiorari petition on account of her failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed RTC Orders.

The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex-parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.41 chanro blesl aw

The second and third exceptions obtain in this case.

During the course of the RTC proceedings, Cherith filed three(3) pleadings, namely: (a) an Ex-ParteMotion for Extension and/or Renewal of the
TPO;42 (b) an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order;43 and (c) a Comment to Respondent�s Manifestation and Opposition to the Petition,44 all seeking for
the clarification of, or the withdrawal of the visitation rights granted to Manny. Each was resolved by the RTC reiterating the award of visitation rights
to the latter.45 As such, it cannot be denied that Cherith�s opposition to the award of visitation rights had been squarely and definitively presented to
the RTC which arrived at the same result. Thus, there was no need for the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.

The urgency for resolution also rendered such filing unnecessary. It should be emphasized that Cherith had already been issued a PPO. As defined in
Section 8 of RA 9262, �[a] protection order is an order issued x x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her
child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim�s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim
to independently regain control over her life. x xx.� With a standing PPO issued for the purpose of protecting not only the woman, but also her child
against acts of violence committed by the person against whom the order is issued � in this case, Manny � the resolution of the issue of whether or
not Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any discernible basis therefor, is urgent,else Cherith and Francheska be unduly exposed to the
very danger which they are seeking protection from. As the Court sees it, any further delay would substantially prejudice their interests, thus, allowing
a direct recourse to certiorari.

That being said, the Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case.46The
rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston,47viz.: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.48
For the same reason,this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be available to petitioners. Verily, both parties to a suit are
entitled to due process against unforeseen and arbitrary judgments. The very essence of due process is �the sporting idea of fair play� which forbids
the grant of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be heard.49 chanroble slaw

The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he
neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.

Neither was it shown that Cherith sought the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband. In fact, Cherith�s RTC Petition specifically prayed
that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly (which
would tend to occur if Francheska would be turned-over to Manny during weekends), order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any
restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family members to
stay away from her and any of her designated family or household members under the limitations set by the court. Further, as above-intimated,
Cherith has repeatedly contested the award of visitation rights during the course of the proceedings before the RTC, but to no avail. While there
appears an intercalation of a prayer for visitation rights in Cherith�s RTC Petition, it is evident that she never authorized such intercalation because:
(1) she had consistently contested the grant of visitation rights in favor of Manny, and (2) it was merely penned in the handwriting of an unidentified
person, which, thus, renders the same dubious. Meanwhile, Manny or any of the courts a quo did not proffer any credible explanation to the contrary.

Hence, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of Manny, as contained in the PPO, and
reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari. With this pronouncement, there is no need to delve into the other
ancillary issues raised herein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated April 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 117731 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The portions of the Orders dated June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23granting
visitation rights to respondent Manny P. Bucal are hereby declared VOID.
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos
FACTS: Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign.
Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva
on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old
student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which
resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy. RTC and CA found St
Mary’s Academy liable.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

Ruling: TheCourt of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 & 219 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in
not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
(1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teacher Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done;
the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury
complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.[12]

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving
of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause
of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses
Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep
to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities,
or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility
under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession
and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the
remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event
over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.

CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and

SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA
TAGORIO
GR No. 150920, November 25, 2005

FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution
operated and maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found
himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He started to panic so he
banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided to open
the window to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell
down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the CLC,
the members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that
the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s comfort
room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence.
CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father
of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The trial court
ruled in favor of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court
of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.
RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by
a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.

In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures
to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door
knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on
the window where Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the comfort room
was actually put in place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows
that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the
defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly
answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in
working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the
door, shows that something was wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on the
window, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds
the regular exit, the door, not functioning.

The provisions regarding the Special Parental Authority of schools over minors over whom they have
responsibility are in the Family Code -

“Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child care while under
their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that
they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. Related to these
provisions are Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code on one’s liability for the acts of persons for whom
one is responsible:

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.”

Article 2180 above refers to the liability of teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades to be in
loco parentis or in the place of a parent. As an aside, in Amadora, et al. vs Court Of Appeals, et al. the
Supreme Court held that as regards the term teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades,
“teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable”.[4]

Holy Spirit vs Taguiam

“On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter to the grade school principal requesting permission
to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity and allowed
the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, [Class Adviser Corazon P. Taguiam] distributed
the parent’s/guardian’s permit forms to the pupils.

[Taguiam] admitted that Chiara Mae Federico’s permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded
that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her
to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the
deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. [Taguiam] went after
them to verify where they were going.

Unfortunately, while [Taguiam] was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When [Taguiam] returned, the
maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still
alive when [Taguiam] rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.

As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, [Taguiam] should have made sure that the children
were protected from all harm while in her company. [Taguiam] should have known that leaving the pupils
in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder “not to go to
the deepest part of the pool” was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially when [Taguiam] knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim. Dismally,
[Taguiam] created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the
pupils but of the school itself.

Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed by Chiara Mae’s parents, the Assistant City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict respondent for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that [Taguiam] “should have foreseen the danger lurking in
the waters.” By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool, [Taguiam] displayed an “inexcusable lack of
foresight and precaution.” While this finding is not controlling for purposes of the instant case, this only
supports our conclusion that [Taguiam] has indeed been grossly negligent.”

Based on the Supreme Court’s decision below, an outside catechist is apparently a religion teacher
provided by a congregation to teach religion in a school and whose conduct is nobody’s responsibility but
himself/herself.

The Facts
“In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School
(Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at
that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class.

On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went
over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his
seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to
tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several
times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat. Finally, she told the child to stay
where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on
the floor.

As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on
behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic
Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.

With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC
… ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary
damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.

Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). They asked the CA to increase
the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-
employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose
Luis. The CA, however, declined to increase the award of damages. Jose Luis moved for partial
reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA
decision through a petition for review on certiorari.”

The Ruling

So is the school liable for harm brought by a teacher to a student? Not in this case. Why not? Because,
believe it or not, Aquinas School – named after St. Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of Catholic schools
of all things – does not have control over its catechists. So the school says and so the Supreme Court
believes.

The SC found that –

“Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the
congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. The SC favored
Aquinas’ insistence that “it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for
the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the
catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that
Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress’ testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin.”
Wow, it’s hard enough to imagine that any school would have an arrangement where they lose control
over how their students are educated but who would believe that a private catholic school would even
think of losing control over the religious education of their students?

The SC refers to Sr. Margarita as an “outside cathechist” yet Sr. Margarita is from the same order, O.P.
or Ordo Praedicatorum, the Dominican Order. Why then when it comes to religious teaching, is she
deemed “outside”? The only reason she is “outside” is likely because Aquinas is an exclusive school for
boys run by Dominican fathers. Aquinas’ lay teachers would be more “outside” when it comes to
catechism as they are outside the Dominican Order.

Anyway, the SC writes it “applied the “four-fold test” to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has
power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control
the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.”

The SC does not specify, beyond finding the existence of the teaching agreement with the congregation,
where the loss of Aquinas’ control over Sr. Margarita Yamyamin’s work begins.

The SC admits that “[O]f course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students.” The SC enumerates the steps
Aquinas took to “avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion
teacher”:

“First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach
religion.

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she
would behave properly towards the students.

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the
standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was
allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was
really catechizing the students.

And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation. Unfortunately,
since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity
to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the
school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.”

But why does the SC limit its findings on the school’s responsibility only to the above 5 steps to justify
absolving Aquinas of neglect? In any case, aren’t they applicable as regards any teacher “outside” or not?
What now prevents a school from having an agreement with other congregations/groups under which
the latter would provide teachers to teach other school subjects so that the school is absolved from any
responsibility for any of said teachers’ misconduct?

It seems parents must now check what kind of teaching arrangements their children’s schools have. As
these arrangements may matter when a school’s liability is raised once a teacher does wrong to their
children. Obviously, a Catholic school is not beyond doing a Pontius Pilate by washing its hands of liability
for a sister’s act.

Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School
Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises. While they
were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and
thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was
brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got
blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages
(cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.
HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of
this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which
accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states “that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.”
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had
the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to
her parents.

On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who
was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner
asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his
seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she
held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk.
As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and
repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN,
November 13, 1997, p. 7).

After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying
and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt
Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN,
February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael
Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to
the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only
for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less
than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in
loco parentis), viz:

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over
the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by
Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in
Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely
three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;

2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;

3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;

4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr.
Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:

A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the
extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the
victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and
fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the
victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be
caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victim’sleft inner
thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound
No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the
boy was limping as he walked.14