WORKIN G CONDITIONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES

A. WOMEN

PT&T vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary
Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who
went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on
leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to Augus t 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary
period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married
women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed
down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who ha d already
gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to r egulate manpower and
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases
of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of
the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The
record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to
be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary
to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the
very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the
foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

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LIBRES V NLRC G.R. NO. 123737. MAY 28, 1999.
BELLOSILLO, J
Facts:

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel
Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual
harrassment filed against him by the VP's secretary Capiral. This was included with a waiver of his right tobe heard
once he didn't comment.

On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to
submit himself for clarificatory interrogation.

The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing
her nape and telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the
sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor." They suspended Libres for 30 days without pay.

He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter, but the latter held that the company acted with due
process and that his punishment was only mild.
Moreover, he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the massaging of her shoulders never
“discriminated against her continued employment,” “impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code,” or
“created a hostile, intimidating or offensive environment.”

He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't given the right be heard. This was due to his
demand for personal confrontation not being recognized by the MEC.

In the Supreme Court, petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 or the law against
sexual harassment to the instant case. Moreover, petitioner also contends that public respondent’s reliance on
Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga ’s immediate
filing of her letter of resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her
complaint against him. He now surmises that the filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not
borne out of a valid complaint, hence, the Villara ma case should have no bearing on the instant case.

Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for personal confrontatiom?

Held: Yes Petition denied.

Ratio:

On not strictly applying RA 7877- Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the
act complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor
Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case
when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to r ely on the MEC report and the
common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public . Faced with the same
predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of
discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of a
managerial employee committing sexual harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the
complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into insignificance. On the contrary, it even
invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination.
Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day suspension by the NLRC, Villa rama , in the other case was
penalized with termination. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He

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failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when
such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordina te, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for
lack of trust and confidence.

“It is the the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.” Public respondent
therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and
jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful for.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres was Capiral’s immediate superior. Fear of
retaliation and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty
usually suffer, are all realities that Capiral had to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth
derived from the facts. Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral’s allegations. In fact his
narration even corroborated the latter’s assertion in several material points. He only raised issue on the
complaint’s protracted filing.

On the question of due process - Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional
precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to ex plain or defend himself. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual
harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his
written explanation to his superior. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session He was
given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.

Personal confrontation was not necessary. Homeowners v NLRC- litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.

MA. LOURDES T. DOMIN GO, petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a
Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DO LE).

The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of
the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.

On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the r ecommendation that r espondent be meted only the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case because of the
nature of the position of Reyala as occupying the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. Long digest by
Ernani Tadili.It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct.

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Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of service for the maximum period of
one (1) year.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.

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Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of
sexual harassment.

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The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.

G.R. No. 155831 – Domingo Petition -

1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and

2. AO No. 250 does not cover presi dential appointees.

G.R. No. 155840 – Rayala Petition

In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:

1. He’s act does not constitute sexual harassment;

a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner
in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are
without malice or ulterior motive. It was mer ely Domingo’s perception of malice in his alleged acts – a "product of
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her own imagination" – that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint.

Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that
the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole.

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of
the for ms of sexual harassment:

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMEN T

Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. – Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following
forms:

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 a) Overt sexual advances;

b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;

c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like
for the same purpose;

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally
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annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual
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harassment as contemplated by the law. He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in
Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the power
to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassmen t, or to come up with its
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own definition of sexual harassment.

G.R. No. 158700 - Republic

The Republic raises this issue:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines m ay validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of
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the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.

The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome
or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or
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offensive to the victim.

It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala’s
dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman s olely rests
upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process clause.

The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the
OP from validly imposing the penal ty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential
appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
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the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service. The Republic
adds that Rayala’s position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he shou ld be
dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states that the
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Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior. Since Rayala’s
security of tenur e is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has
failed to live up to this standard.

All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:

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 (1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? - guilty

(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty? - suspension

CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only differ in the
appropriate imposable penalty.

That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the common
factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be
remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi -judicial and
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administrative bodies are accorded great r espect and even finality by the courts. The principle, ther efore,
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dictates that such findings should bind us.

He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her
complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued
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employment or for her promotion to a higher position. Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v.
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Acosta.

We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
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independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual
harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or
otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, r egardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privil eges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

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This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for
damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:

Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related , Educa tion or Training Environmen t. – It
shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end,
the employer or head of office shall:

(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with a nd jointly approved by the
employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing
the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.

Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts
of sexual harassment.

The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others,
guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or trai ning institutions.

(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The
committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees,
teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase
understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation
of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.

The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this
Act for the information of all concerned.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA
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7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found
substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.

Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor."
But it is not necessary that the demand, request or r equirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical
oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Hol ding and
squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate
conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and
making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity
the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

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Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts
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result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of Rayala
generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of
the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitu m. He argues that
intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly
without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.

The SC reiterated that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime
ofsexual harassment is malum in se or malum p rohibitum is immaterial.

The SC also rejected Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of
office and thus constitute merely political harassment. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that
Domingo and her witnesses – all employees of the NLRC at that time – stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant
consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.

Furthermor e, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on
Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OP’s decision finding him guilty of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and
total nullity."

The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded due process.The records of the case indica te that Rayala was
afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of
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the Committee to try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.

On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complai nt, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part ther eof allegedly violated, these being mer e conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but
the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.

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It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any
finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He
also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.

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Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year,
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while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus
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Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Unifo rm
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Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is
punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she reaches the
age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the
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duties of the office.

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine
whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by
the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Ex ecutive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other
than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of
either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for th e Office of the President to impose upon
Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court o f Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED (Modification of Penalty). Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831,
155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION V. GLAXO WELCOME, G.R. NO. 162994, SEPT. 17, 2004

Facts: Petitioner, Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo as medical representative, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation. He signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he
agrees to study and abide by existing compa ny rules. Another stipulation which is also found of Glaxo’s Employee
Code of Conduct provides the duty to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur -Camarines Norte sales area. He,
subsequently entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, branch coordinator of Astra in Albay, a competitor
of Glaxo. She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared
marketing strategies for Astra in that area. The two married even with the several reminders given by the District
Manager to Tecson. In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a
conflict of interest. Despite several reminders and time allowances, Tecson was not able to resolve the issue on
conflicting interest. This situation eventually led to his alleged constructive dismissal. This is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing CA’s decision and resolution.

Issue: Is Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid?

Held: Yes. No r eversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting
an employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management pr erogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing

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strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are
rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social
justice and the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect a nd enforcement
in the interest of fair play.

G.R. NO. 164774, APRIL 12, 2006

PETITIONERS: STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO, AN D SEBASTIAN CHUA

Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella

Ponente: J. Puno

Facts:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Th e following facts were presented:

(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;

(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995. Simbol
resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee whom she
married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned company policy.
Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an
illegal company policy.

(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co -worker, whom
petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedl y could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a married but
a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her
relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.

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(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty -one (21) days as advised by
the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was on hold at
the gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum that stated that she was being
dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless.
She resigned because she was in dire need of money and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.

On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of meri t.

On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution.

On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:

(a) The petitioners’ dismissal from employment was illegal:

(b) The private respondents are order ed to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss of
seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of
the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The issues raised by this petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constituional
rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code: and

(2) Whether or not the respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.

Held:

(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the constitutional rights
towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136 of the Labor Code:

(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed r esigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.)

(from another digest) --

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

RULIN G:
No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees under the constitutio
n. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employer to re

11
quire as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married,
or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed r esigned or sepa
rated , or to actually dismiss, discharge , discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason
of her marriage.” The company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement of reason
ableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marria
ge of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could
be detrimental to its business operations. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor C
ode but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judic
ial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the a
bsence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
STARPAPER VS. SIMBO L

D. HOUSEHELPERS
1
APEX MIN ING COMPANY, INC., PETITION ER, V. NLRCAND SINCLITICA CANDIDO
22 April 1991; Gancayco
I. Facts
1. Candido was employed by Apex on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at
Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte.

◦ In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, sh e was paid on a
monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month
2. On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry,
she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate
supervisor De la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Asirit.
3. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave
for medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P2,000.00 which was eventually increased to
P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
4. Apex did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
5. On March 11, 1988, Candido filed a request for assistance with the DOLE. The LA ordered Apex to pay a
total of P55,161.42:
1. Salary Differential 1. — P16,289.20
2. Emergency Living Allowance 2. — 12,430.00
3. 13 th Month Pay Differential 3. — 1,322.32

4. Separation Pay
(One-month for every year of
service (1973-1988) 4. — 25,119.90

6. Not satisfied therewith, APEX appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, the herein
petition for review by certio rari (which appropriately should be a special civil action for certiora ri, and
which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such).
II. Issues

1 Bullet points in a lighter font are included “just in case”.

12
Whether the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company is a domesti c helper or a regular employee
2
of the said firm. Regular employee
III. Holding
The petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IV. Ratio
1. Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or
"domestic servant" are defined as follows:

▪ "The term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the ter m ‘domestic servant' and shall
refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services i n and about the employer's
home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family."
2. The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in
the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.
3. The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a
company, like Candido who attends to the needs of the company's guests and other persons availing of
said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to the driver, houseboy, or gardener
exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises.
4. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work may be similar in nature, the differ ence in
their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter
case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
5. Apex contends that it is only when the househelper o r domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of
the business of the employer that su ch househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee.

◦ The Cour t disagreed. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its
staffhouses for its guests or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such
househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee and not as a
mer e family househelper or domestic servant.
6. Apex denies having illegally dismissed Candido and maintains that she abandoned her work.

◦ This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an accident which
took place while Candido was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was
ultimately separated from the service.

◦ She is, ther efore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as
private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the
payment of separation pay to her is in order.

2 Apex (the employer) wants Candido to be declared a domestic servant.

13
REMIN GTON CORP. VS. CASTANEDA
November 20, 2006
G.R. Nos. 169295-96
FACTS: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
overtime services, non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. before the NLRC-NCR.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged in
the trading business and that she continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented
from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular
employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products.
In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the
personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director), finding that her work as a cook was not usually necessary
and desir able in the ordinary course of trade and business of the petitioner corporation, and that the latter did not
exercise control over her functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the
respondent who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and that,
therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.

ISSUE: is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?

HELD: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED
She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE

In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial
company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms “househelper” or “domestic
servant” are defined as follows:

“The ter m ‘househelper’ as used her ein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any
person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family.”

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such
definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar
househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the fa mily of the employer in the home of said employer.
While it may be true that the natur e of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home
or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former
instance they are actually serving thefamily while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single
proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being
rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the
business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an employee. The
Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is
working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its
business, as in its st affhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion th at
such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and

14
NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper thatrespondent worked at the company
premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as
the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to
that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the
doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises, and that she does not
cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family , is reflective of the existence of the
petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her functions, which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.

NOTES:

1. THE O THER ISSUE:

2.
was there illegal dismissal? NO

Petitioner contends that ther e was abandonment on respondent’s part when she refused to report for work when
the corporation transferred to a new location in Caloocan City, claiming that her poor eyesight would make long
distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, the r espondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no longer called for duty
and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that her services were no longer needed. She contends
that the petitioner dismissed her without a just or authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence
rendering the dismissal illegal.

We rule for the respondent.

As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and
may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, other wise the dismissal becomes illegal and the employee
becomes entitled to reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to
the time of actual reinstatement.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to r esume his employment. It is a form of
neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer.

For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work.
The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
This, the petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.

Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to return
to work, greater stock may be taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC.
Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have
abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a
prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of
abandonment.

15
In termination cases, the burden of proof r ests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid
cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer’s case succeeds or fails
on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense. If doubt exists between the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter

2. It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands
of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity
and the substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.

HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMEN T PROGRA M

B. APPREN TICESHIP AND LEARN ERSHIP

NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILI G.R. No. 114337
FIRST DIVISION / KAPUNAN, J.:
September 29, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hi r ed
Rober to Ca pili s ometi me i n Ma y 1 9 90 as a n a ppr enti c e ma c hi nis t, mol der and c or e maker as
evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28,
1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage. On August 2, 1990,
Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of
an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hos pi tal . Fur ther , Ca pili enter ed a wor ks hop wi thi n the
offi c e pr emis es whi c h wa s not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without
authority and in the pr oc ess i nj ur ed his l eft thumb. Th e fol l owi ng da y he wa s as ked to r es i gn. Thr ee
da ys after, , private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.

The Labor Ar bi ter r ender ed his decisi on fi ndi ng the ter mi na tion of pri va te r es pondent as
vali d a nd dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto Enterprises and not an
apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution or deri ng for the r ei ns ta tement of Ca pili
a nd to c oll ec t hi s bac k wa ges . Peti tioner , Ni tto Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of Ni tto Enterprises?

LAW: Article 280 of the Labor Code

RULIN G:

Ye s. Th e a ppr enti c es hi p a gr eemen t b etw e en pe ti ti oner a nd pri va te r es pondent wa s

ex ec uted on Ma y 2 8 , 1 9 9 0 all egedl y empl oyi ng the la tter as a n a ppr entic e i n the tr a de of "care
maker/molder. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.Notwithstanding the
absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it
was signed. Th e a c t of fi li ng the pr opos ed a ppr enti c es hi p pr ogr a m wi th the D epa r tmen t of La bor a nd

16
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.

Ni tto Ent er pr is es di d not c ompl y wi th the r equir ements of the l a w. I t is ma nda ted tha t
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with
the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship
agreement has no force and effect; and Capili is considered to be a regular employee of the company.

OPINION:

I concur with the Courts findings that since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent have no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE,
private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by
Article 280 of the Labor Code.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INST. VS. IAC G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
NOVEMBER 2, 2017

FACTS:

Kapunan, Sr. an 82 year old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned by Filamer Christian Institute and
driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a criminal case
against Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.

Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case for damages against Funtecha and Filamer
and its president. The RTC and the CA found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this petition.

Filamer contends that it is not civilly liable because Funtecha was not its employee, as he was only a working
scholar assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Filamer
anchors its contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code,, which excludes working scholars from
the employment coverage as far as substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is
concerned.

ISSUE:
Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer?

RULING:

YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner
Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for
only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan’s house, Funtecha definitely was
not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a “frolic of his own” but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf

17
of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done
beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense,
was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing
the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines
on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be ex ercised; on what records should be kept;
maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident
physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working
conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus,
makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit
for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and
against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee
and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent
acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the r eliance on the implementing rule on
labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive
provisions of the Civil Code

ATLANTA IN DUSTRIES VS SEBOLINO

January 26, 2011

Brion

Summary: Complainants were engaged as apprentices in Atlanta Corp. and now suing th e corporation for illegal
dismissal, among others, for its refusal to grant them r egular status 6 months after commencing their
apprenticeship.

Doctrine: With the expiration of the apprenticeship agreement and the retention of the employees, Atlanta had,
to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular
employee status.

Facts:Complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, et.al., filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization,
underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners Atla nta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief
Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes.

The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to wo rk with Atlanta for more
than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They

18
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the second apprenticeship agreement expired and that they were
actually already employees of Atlanta before they we put in the apprenticeship program.

In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers wer e not entitled to regularization and to their money
claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The
company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the
section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of
employees (Master List) prior to their engagement as apprentices.

Subsequently a compromise agreement was entered into by the respondent with Atlanta, but the remaining
respondents had refused to sign.

Issues:Whether or not the termination of the employees after the expiration of the apprenticeship agreement was
valid cause for dismissal

Held:No.

Ratio:Based on company operations at the time material to the case, Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were
already rendering service to the company as employees be fore they were made to undergo apprenticeship. The
company itself recognized the respondents’ status through relevant operational records.

The Master List (of employees) that the petitioners heavily rely upon as proof of their position that the
respondents were not Atlanta’s employees, at the time they wer e engaged as apprentices, is unreliable and does
not inspire belief.

The fact that Costales, Almoite, Sebolino and Sagun were already rendering service to the company when they
were made to undergo apprenticeship (as established by the evidence) renders the apprenticeship agreements
irrelevant as far as the four are concerned. The respondents occupied positions such as machine operator,
scaleman and extruder operator - tasks that are usually necessary and desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade
as manufacturer of plastic building materials.These tasks and their nature characterized the four as regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Thus, when they wer e dismissed without just or authori zed cause,
without notice, and without the opportunity to be heard, their dismissal was illegal under the law.

Even if we recognize the company’s need to train its employees through apprenticeship, we can only consider the
first apprenticeship agreement for the purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the
employees, Atlanta had, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their
acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the s econd apprenticeship agreement for a second
skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Code’s implementing rules
and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees, to say the least.

C. EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION VS. TORRES

G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He
possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board of Special
Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s employment permit be
changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines.

19
Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job.
Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment per mit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Con e’s Alien Employment
Permit?

HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit.
GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 o f the
Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the
Department of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an
employment permit.

The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a
“person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services
for which an alien is desired.”

Case Digest
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in
his capacity as the Se cretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the
Acting Se cretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and IN TERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

I. Facts

Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than th eir counterparts
hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreign -hire would necessarily uproot himself
from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of devaiting from a promising career path -
all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land and such person does
not enjoy security of tenure as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field of
international education.

The school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired
locally are being classified as local -hires. Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and
that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

On the other hand, the Ac ting Secretary of Labor upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in
salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is
based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class.

Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a
limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation
package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.

II. Issues

20
 Whether or not the hiring systemis violative of the equal protection clause.
 Whether the school employs a discriminating classification for foreign-hires and local-hires.

III. Ruling of the court

The court ruled that the point-of-hire classification employed by res pondent School to justify the distinction
in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local-hires was an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of a ccording of higher
salaries to foreign-hires contravenes publicpolicy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.

IV. Reason for the ruling

The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the sa me position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he r eceives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign -hires
perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local -hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reas onable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.

MCBURN IE V GANZON
October 17, 2013
J. Reyes
Topic: Alien Employment Regulation

Facts:
On October 4, 2002, McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and
other monetary claims against the respondents. McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he signed a five-year
employment agreement with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the management
of the company’s hotel s and resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime in
November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating
from his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer
needed because their intended project would no longer push through.

The r espondents opposed the complaint, contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly
invest in and establish a company for the management of hotels. They did not intend to create an employer -
employee relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie was
solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines. At the time McBurnie
left for Australia for his medical treatment, he had not yet obtained a work permit.

In a Decisiondated September 30, 2004, the LA declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from
employment, and thus entitled to r eceive: (a) US$985,162.00 as salary and benefits for the unexpired term of their

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employment contract, (b) ₱2,000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and (c) attorney’s fees equivalent to
10% of the total monetary award.

On appeal, the NLRC dismis sed the appeal and motion to reduce the bond of approximately P60M. On
one of the many appeals to CA, it granted the motion to reduce appeal bond and directed NLRC to give due course
to their appeal. NLRC then r eversed and set aside the ruling of LA above. The NLRC rule that: (1) McBurnie was
never an employee of the respondents and (2) he failed to obtain work per mit that would have allowed him to
work for the respondents. The third division of SC however reversed the decision of CA granting the motion to
reduce the bond and it directive for the NLRC to give course to the appeal. The earlier ruling of LA thus became
final. This is deemed a third MR. (Note: The court held that even if it is p rocedu rally defective since it’s already a
third MR, it does not preclude the court from ruling for the sake of substantial justice.)

Issue: W/NMcBurnie, an Australian national can be considered as an employee of Ganzon? NO

 The court basically adopted the ruling of NLRC.
 Court held that befor e McBurnie can allege illegal dismissal, it was necessary for him to establish, first and
foremost, that he was qualified and duly authorize to obtain employment w/in our jurisdiction. This
requirement for foreigners who intend to work w/in the country to obtain employment permit is l aid
down in Art. 40 Title II of the Labor Code. Failure to do so poses serious problem in obtaining relief from
the Court. Hence, by the very fact that McBurnie failed to obtain employment per mit necessitates the
dismissal of his labor complaint.
 The court also noted that McBurnie failed to establish employer –employee relationship. The records
disclose that employment of McBurnie is conditional on the successful completion of the project financing
for the hotel project in Baguio City and his acquisition of Alien Employment Permit.
o It must be noted that the project didn’t push through.
 McBurnie likewise failed to prove employer-employee r elationship in accordance w/ the four-fold test: (1)
selection & engagement (2) payment of wages (3) power of dismissal and (4) control.
 McBurnie also failed to show any document such as payslips or vouchers of his salaries during the time
that he allegedly worked for the respondent.

PRE-EMPLOYMEN T
A. PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

JMM PROMOTIONS AND MANAGEMENT, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ULPIANO L.
DELOS SAN TOS (paki review kay dili ko sure if mao ni na case)
GR No. 109835, November 22, 1993

Involved:

Petitioner: JMM Promotions and Management, Inc.

Respondent: National Labor Relations Commissions, Ulpi ano L. Delos Santos

Law: Article 223 of the Labor Code providing that in the case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfectedonly upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company dulya ccredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgmentappealed from.

And Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as
follows:Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an
appeal by theemployer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued

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 by a reputablebonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an
amount equivalentto the monetary award.

Facts:

 On October 30, 1992, JMM Promotions and Management filed an appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission for dismissing the petitioner’s appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond.
 The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI,
Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
 The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to
decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed
recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a
surety bond of P50,000.
 In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National
Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and
legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
 Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the
rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA .
Appeals from decisionsof the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII
of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of
payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in
Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement
of the date when the appellantreceived the appealed decision and/or awar d and proof of service
on the other party of such appeal.
A mer e notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall
not stop therunning of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administra tion involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfec ted only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to
the monetaryaward. (Emphasis supplied)

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the
POEA to the NLRC after posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the a mount of P200,000 as
required by the POEA Rules.

Ruling:

 Yes, the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond as the PO EA Rules are clear. The reading shows
that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent
to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. The appeal bond is
intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually
affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

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  It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care
should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodgepodge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magisvaleat quam p erea t. Under the
petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule
should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would
in effect nullify Section 6 as a s uperfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find
that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent pr ovisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
 Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule,
it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
 The petition is DISMISSED.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON . DRILON

G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a recruitment firm for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 , Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSP ENSION OF
DEPLO YMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HO USEHOLD WORKERS.” In this petition for certiorari and prohibiti on,
PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the DO LE on the following grounds:
1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The
respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:

Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It constitutes an
implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police power is not without its own limitations. It may not be
exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. “Equality before the law" admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.

Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement wher eof. Hence it is a
valid exercise of police power.

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PNB VS. CABANSAG
Date: June 21, 2005
Ponente: J. Panganiban
Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and eventually applied
with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private banking corporation organized and
existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer,
it was stated, among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment
may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of
notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended for
her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank pr esident, that she would have to resign in
line with some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She r efused but was informed by Tobias
that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.

Issues:

W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction

W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue

W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations
including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an
OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country
and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the
commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies
upon certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment
certificate.

A migrant worker “r efers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated
activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino
worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch
office in Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for
illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbi tration Branch where she resides or the RAB wher e the
employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid
choice of proper venue.

The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was alr eady a regular employee at the time of her
dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. This ruling is in
accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period
shall be considered a regular employee.” Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed
her, by giving her one month’s salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her
employment Contract.

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