CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I (Atty. Arias / Atty. Pullido)
Prepared by: Kenneth Ray Tagle
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Nature of the Constitution
1. Constitution Defined – That written instrument enacted by
direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers
of the gov’t are established, limited and defined, and by which
those powers are distributed among the several departments
for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body
politic.
2. Purpose – To prescribe the permanent framework of a system
of gov’t, to assign to the several dept or their respective
powers and duties, and to establish certain first principles on
w/c the gov’t is founded.
3. Classification:
 Written or unwritten – the former, is one whose precepts
are embodied in one document or set of documents ; the
latter, consist of rules w/c have not been integrated to a
single source, scattered in various sources (e.g. judicial
decision, commentaries)
 Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative) – the
former, as enacted by a constituent body or ruler after
deliberate effort. The latter, as result of political
evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than by any systematic
method.
 Rigid or Flexible – the former w/c can be amended only
by a formal and usually difficult process; the latter, is one
that can be changed by ordinary legislation.
4. Qualities of a good written constitution:
 Broad – Not only provides for the organization of the
entire gov’t and covers all persons and things w/in
territory of the state but bec. It must be comprehensive
enough to provide for every contingency.
 Brief – It must confine itself to basic principles to be
implemented w/ legislative details more adjustable to
change and easier to amend.
 Definite – Prevent ambiguity in its provision w/c could
result in confusion and divisiveness among people.
5. Essential Part of a good written Constitution
 Constitution of Liberty – Series of prescriptions setting
forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of gov’t
as means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (e.g.
Art. III “ Bill of Rights”
 Constitution of Gov’t – outlining the organization of the
gov’t, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules
relative to its administration, and defining its electorate
(Art. VI,VII, VIII and IX)
II.
 Constitutional of Sovereignty – the provisions pointing A.
out the mode or procedure in accordance with which
formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought
about. E.g. Art. XVII.
B. Changing the Constitution
1. Lambino v Comelec, G.R. 174153 (2006)
 Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution.
o By Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members.
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o By Constitutional convention.
o Through a People's initiative.
 Only Congress or a Constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. A people's
initiative is only available to propose amendments.
 Two Essential Elements in the exercise of people’s
initiative
o The people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf.
o the proposal must be embodied in a petition
 Amendment vs Revision of the Constitution
o “Revision” broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. Revision generally
affects several provisions of the constitution. The
intention of a revision is to contemplate a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions
of the document which have over-all implications for
the entire document
o “Amendment” broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved. Amendment generally affects only
the specific provision being amended. The intention
of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may
have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. [Examples: reducing the voting age from
18 years to 15 years; reducing Filipino ownership of
mass media companies from 100 percent to 60
percent; change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency]
2. RA 6735
 "Initiative"is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitutions or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose.
o "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the
people through a proposition sent to Congress or the
local legislative body for action.
 "Referendum"is the power of the electorate to approve
or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
Role of the Judiciary as interpreter of laws.
1. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1 and 5
 “SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
 the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
 SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
o (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting:
 Ambassadors,
 Other public ministers and consuls,
 And over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
o (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
 (a)All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of:
1. Any treaty,
2. International or executive agreement,
3. Law,
4. Presidential decree,
5. Proclamation,
6. Order,
7. Instruction,
8. Ordinance, or regulation is in question.
 (b) All cases involving the legality of any:
1. Tax, Impost, assessment, or toll,
2. Or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
 (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue.
 (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher.
 (e) All cases in which only an error or question of
law is involved.
 (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to
other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
 (4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice.
 (5) Promulgate rules concerning:
1. The protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights,
2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts,
3. The admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar,
4. And legal assistance to the underprivileged.
5. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, Shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
 (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
2. Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137
 The court ruled that the new president, Thomas
Jefferson, via his secretary of state, James Madison, was
wrong to prevent William Marbury from taking office as
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justice of the peace for Washington County in the District
of Columbia. However, it also ruled that the court had no
jurisdiction in the case and could not force Jefferson and
Madison to seat Marbury. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave
the Supreme Court jurisdiction, but the Marshall court
ruled the Act of 1789 to be an unconstitutional extension
of judiciary power into the realm of the executive
 In writing the decision, John Marshall argued that acts of
Congress in conflict with the Constitution are not law and
therefore are non-binding to the courts, and that the
judiciary’s first responsibility is always to uphold the
Constitution. If two laws conflict, Marshall wrote, the
court bears responsibility for deciding which law applies
in any given case. Thus, Marbury never received his job.
3. Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139
 The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof. This moderating power of the
courts is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
 Judicial Supremacy - When the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.
B. Rules of Interpretation
1. Francisco v House of Representatives, G.R. 160261 (Nov. 10,
2003)
 Statutory Construction (of the Constitution)
o First, verbalegis, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
o Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legisest
anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers.
o Finally, utmagisvaleat quam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established
rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together. In other words, the court must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review
1. Actual Case or Controversy
 Mariano v Comelec, G.R. 118577
o The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run
again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may
or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy.
 Montesclaros vs Comelec, G.R. 152295 (2002)
o There can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is
enacted, not before.
 Facial Challenge (Estrada v Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148560 (2001))
o A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is over broad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing.
o Chilling Effect – In a legal context, a chilling effect is
the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate
exercise of natural and legal rights by the threat of
legal sanction. (Wikipedia)
o Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine – states that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."
o Overbreadth doctrine – decrees that a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
o Doctrine of Strict scrutiny– government is required to
show the presence of a compelling government
interest, rather than a mere substantial interest, and
the absence of a less restrictive means for achieving
the interest.
(https://tamayaosbc.wordpress.com/2014/06/20/bill-
of-rights/)
 Political Question (Gonzales v. OP / Pacquito v. Ochoa, Jr.
G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014)
o Justiciable Question – is one which is inherently
susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized
by law, as where the court finds that there are
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the
powers conferred on a political branch of the
government.
o Political Question– doctrine arising from the principle
of separation of powers, the Judicial Branch cannot
decide questions "in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. (Tañada vs.
Cuenco 103 Phil.1068).
 Moot and Academic
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o A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. (David v.
Arroyo)
o The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise
moot and academic for any of the following:
 There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
 Paramount public interest is involved
 When constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public.
 The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.
2. Standing
 KMU v. Garcia (G.R. 115381 (1994))
o Locus Standi – One who is directly affected by and
whose interest is immediate and substantial in the
controversy has the standing to sue. (KMU v. Garcia)
o Exception – may be set aside in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues raised.
o Delegation Power (Main Issue of the case)
 Delegation of legislative power to an administrative
agency is permitted in order to adapt to the
increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects
for governmental regulation multiply, so does the
difficulty of administering the laws. Hence,
specialization even in legislation has become
necessary.
 Potestasdelegata non delegaripotest – what has
been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine
is based on the ethical principle that such as
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
 IBP v Zamora GR 141284 (2000)
o "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
o The term "interest" means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest.
o The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general
an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. IBP has not shown any specific injury
which it, or nay of its members, has suffered or may
suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.
 Tanada v Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
o General rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be
granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at
 large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved.
o When the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws.
o Publication Requirement
 The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law.
 Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
 Ople v Torres 293N SCRA 141 (1998)
o “Petitioner Ople, as a senator, ataxpayer and member
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS
funds to implement A.O. No. 308.”
 ITF v. COMELEC
o Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of
public funds," or if public money is being "deflected
to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek
to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
 Kilosbayan v Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)
o A party's standing before the Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the
issues raised.
o In line with the liberal policy of [the Supreme] Court
on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-
profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and
prosecute actions before this Court to question the
constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities.
3. Earliest Opportunity
 Need to notify Solicitor General (Mirasol vs CA GR
128448 (2001)
o Power and Function of OSG – Appear in any court in
any action involving the validity of any treaty, law,
executive order or proclamation, rule or regulation
when in his judgment his intervention is necessary or
when requested by the court. (Sec. 1 [c] of P.D. 478)
o Notice to Solicitor General – In any action which
involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or
regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by
the party attacking the statute, executive order, or
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regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon
such question. (Rule 64, Sec. 3 Rules of Court)
 In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation,
notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
 To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court.
 Symbolic Decisions (Salonga v Cruz Pano 134 SCRA 438)
o The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
given by constitutional guarantees.
D. Effects of declaration of unconstitutionality
1. Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1972)
 In the classic language of Justice Field: "An
unconstitutional Act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as
though it had never been." Norton v. Shelly County, 118
US 425 (1886).
 Doctrine of Operative Fact (Effect of unconstitutional
statutes)
o Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when not contrary to
the Constitution, the latter being supreme and
paramount. However, prior to the declaration of
nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act
was in force and thus, entitled to obedience and
respect.
o The operative fact principle states that the existence
of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached.
III. The Philippines as a State
A. Elements of a State
1. Definition of a State - A state refers to a community of
persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a
definite portion of territory, independent of external control,
and possessing an organized government to which the great
body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
2. Elements of a State
 People– A community of persons sufficient in number
and capable of maintaining the continued existence of
the community and held together by a common bond of
law.
 Territory– Territory as an element of a state means an
area over which a state has effective control.
 Sovereignty – It is the property of a State force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal determination
and restriction.
 Government – That institution or aggregate of
institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules of action which are necessary to
enable men to live in a social state, or which are impose
upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them
B. The Philippines as a State
 1. Territory
 Article I
o The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting
of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including
its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
 Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968 (1969)
o Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines
being independent and sovereign, its authority may
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its
limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were
not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
o It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.
2. People
 Article II, Sections 1, 4, 15, 16
o Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
 Democratic – because we elect our leaders thru
every citizen’s direct vote.
 Republican – because we elect our representative
in the congress who will basically execute people’s
legislative power.
o Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal
military or civil service
 People of the Phil. v. Lagman and Sosa
o Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
o Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
 Article III, Sections 1,2 and 7
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o Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
o Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
o Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
 Article VII Section 4
o Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the peoplexxxxxxxx The
person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
 Article XVI Section 2
o Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name
for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal,
which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the
ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law
shall take effect only upon its ratification by the
people in a national referendum.
 Congress initiate
 People ratify by national referendum
 Article XVIII Section 25
o After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America concerning Military Bases,
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
 President enters to treaty
 Concurred by senate, if it requires
 Ratified by people thru referendum
3. Government
 Section 2, Administrative Code
o (1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines
refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
 autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.
o (2) National Government refers to the entire
machinery of the central government, as
distinguished from the different forms of local
governments
o (3) Local Government refers to the political
subdivisions established by or in accordance with the
Constitution.
o (4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the
various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or controlled corporations, or a
local government or a distinct unit therein.
o (5) National Agency refers to a unit of the National
Government.
o (6) Local Agency refers to a local government or a
distinct unit therein.
o (7) Department refers to an executive department
created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having
or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its
name or designation.
o (8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit
of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall
include any principal subdivision or unit of any
instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a
bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as
in the case of department-wide regional offices
o (9) Office refers, within the framework of
governmental organization, to any major functional
unit of a department or bureau including regional
offices. It may also refer to any position held or
occupied by individual persons, whose functions are
defined by law or regulation.
o (10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the
department framework vested within special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned or controlled corporations.
o (11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly
vested with jurisdiction to regulate, administer or
adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and
interests of private persons, the principal powers of
which are exercised by a collective body, such as a
commission, board or council.
o (12) Chartered institution refers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges and the
monetary authority of the State.
o (13) Government-owned or controlled corporation
refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in
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nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital
stock: Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may be further categorized
by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for
purposes of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with
respect to such corporations.
o (14) "Officer" as distinguished from "clerk" or
"employee", refers to a person whose duties, not
being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of the government. When used with
reference to a person having authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular function in the
exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes
any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.
o (15) "Employee",when used with reference to a
person in the public service, includes any person in
the service of the government or any of its agencies,
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities
 MIAA v Court of Appeals GR No. 155650 (2006)
o Government-owned or controlled corporation –
refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital
stock.
o Instrumentality
 refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
 Government instrumentalities vested with
corporate powers and performing governmental or
public functions need not meet the test of
economic viability. These instrumentalities perform
essential public services for the common good,
services that every modern State must provide its
citizens. These instrumentalities need not be
economically viable since the government may
even subsidize their entire operations
o When Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the
national government instrumentality.
 It is not a stock corp. since its capital was derived
from Nat’l Government’s contribution and is not
divided into shares.
 it is also not a non-stock because it has no
members and its MIAA’s charter also mandates
 MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating
income to Nat’l Treasury
 Constituent v Ministrant Functions (Valmonte v
Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256)
o Constituent – very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature. Example: Keeping of order and
providing for the protection of persons and property
from violence and robbery.
o Ministrant – Undertaken only by way of advancing
the general interest of society, and are merely
optional. Example: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations,
regulations of trade and industry.
o The right to privacyispurely personal in nature and
hence may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated.
o Right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of lists, abstracts, summaries
and the lik
 Concept of ParensPatriae (Cabanas v Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94)
o Judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parenspatriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit
of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest.
o This prerogative of parenspatriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that power is
lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has
no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of
their liberties
o The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution
4. Sovereignty
 Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77
o Political Law has been defined as that branch of
public law deals w/c the organization and operation
of gov’t organs of the state and define the relation of
the state with its inhabitants. When there is change
of sovereignty, political laws of former sovereign,
whether compatible or not w/ new sovereign are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by new sovereign.
 Harvey v Commissioner, 162 SCRA 840
o Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as
it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of state,
an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good
and the domestic tranquility of the people.
C. Philippine Citizenship
1. Lee v Director of Lands, G.R. 128195 (2001)
 The sale of the land in question was consummated during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935
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Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession
 The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of
lands of the public or private domain was intended to
protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In
this case (Inherited by Filipino Citizen), however, there
would be no more public policy violated since the land is
in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own
such land the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved
2. Republic v Chule Lim, GR No. 153883
 Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution “provides
that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
child elected Philippine citizenship” (Those born before
January 17, 1973)
o Above constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. These do not apply in the case of
respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,
considering that her Chinese father and Filipino
mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and
statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen.
By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth.
o Filipina women validly married to a foreign man will
automatically be a foreigner, thus, the result of their
offspring will also be an alien, who has to elect
Filipino citizenship at the age of majority.
3. Calilung v Datumanong, GR 160869
 RA 9225, entitled “an act making the citizenship of Phil.
Citizens who acquire foreign citizenship permanent.
o In resolving this case, the court checked the intent of
the authors of said RA by checking the deliberation
record.
 Purpose of the said law is to provide speedy
process to those who wants to reacquire their
Philippine citizenship.
o With regards to the dual allegiance, since the latest
oath will be taken by former Filipino, and it will
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship, the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from
Philippines to Foreign Country concerned.
o Dual allegiance clause of the constitution is not self-
executing, thus legislature still has to enact law on
dual allegiance. The court cannot set parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance when the
constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what constitutes dual allegiance for
study and legislation by congress.
4. Republic v Nora Sagun
  1935 constitution declares Phil. Citizens whose mothers
are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority which was
recognized by 1973 and 1987 constitution. If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under
the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the
new charter.
 The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made generally within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
 Statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
(1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
5. In re ching, bar matter
 1935 Constitution which provides that legitimate child of
alien father and Filipino mother followed the citizenship
of the father, unless, after the age of majority, the child
elected Phil. Citizenship. Reasonable time as pronounced
by US State is 3 yrs. after attaining the age of 18.
6. Co v. HRET, Ong
 Children that were born under 1935 constitution, with
father who was originally alien who undergone
naturalization as Filipino citizen during minority of the
said children, shall also be considered natural-born
citizen and need not to elect anymore Filipino citizenship
as required.
o Effect: 1) The legitimate minor children of the
naturalized father become Filipinos as well.
o 2) The wife also becomes a Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not have any disqualification
which would bar her from being naturalized.
 Residency
o Based on the existing jurisprudence, it is enough to
establish residence and domicile if he should live in
municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend
or relative. Property requirement would tantamount
to property qualification.
o Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession does not constitute loss of residence
provided there was no intention to abandon the
residence.
7. Bengson v. HRET and Cruz
 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law, one of the manner is repatriation w/c was used by
respondent cruz. Repatriation, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces;(2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in
the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5)
political and economic necessity.
o Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
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registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last
reside. This results in the recovery of the original
nationality, wherein if a natural-born citizen lost his
Phil. citizenship, he will restore status a natural-born
Filipino.
8. Nicholas-Lewis v. COMELEC
 “Sec. 2, Art. 5 of constitution which mandates congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad is an” exception to 1 year residency
requirement as provided in Sec. 2 of the same Article.
o In response to mandate of Sec. 2, congress enacted
“RA 9189 – OAVL which provides that all citizens of
the phil. abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified
by law, at least 18yrs old on the date of election are
allowed to vote for national elections”.
o As provided in the exception under Sec. 5(d) of the
same RA, which states that: Immigrants who are
recognized abroad are not allowed to vote unless,
he/she prepared an affidavit that he/she will resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Phil. not
later than 3 yrs. Approval otherwise the same will be
cancelled and will result to permanent
disqualification.
 In accordance to Sec. 1 of Art. 5, records of constitutional
commission states that “residency” is synonymous with
“domicile”, and “domicile” is the intent to return to one’s
home, that’s why they put Sec. 2 on the same Art.
9. Aznar v. COMELEC and Osmena
 Mode of losing Philippine Citizenship
o by naturalization in a foreign country
o by express renunciation of citizenship
o by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country
10. Valles vs. COMELEC and Lopez
 Dual Citizenship - an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of
another state.
11. Poe v. COMELEC
 Material Misrepresentation
o A candidate's disqualification to run for public office
does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a
COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective
office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as
to one's qualifications to run for public office.
 There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
o (a) residence or bodily presence in a new locality
o (b) an intention to remain there
o (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile
  Ruling for Poe’s citizenship as foundling
o There is less 99.83% chance that births are natural-
born citizen vis-à-vis the foreigner born in the
Philippines
o She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal
bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and
an oval face.
o It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do
not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant
and leave their newborn babies behind
o The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. Though
the Rafol's amendment was not carried out, it was
not because there was any objection to the notion
that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens
but only because their number was not enough to
merit specific mention. All three Constitutions (1935,
1973, and 1987) guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
o Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation.
 Petitioner's evidence shows that at least 60
countries have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen, and 42 of those countries
follow the jus sanguinis regime. It was also pointed
out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or
87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens.
These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.
 Two Elements of generally accepted principles of
international law to be form part of the laws of the land
by virtue of incorporation clause
o (A) The established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States.
o (B) A psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
 Result of Repatriation
o Results in the recovery of the original nationality.
(Whether Natural-Born or Naturalized)
D. Doctrine of State Immunity
1. Suit vs. Philippine State
 Article XVI, Section 3
o “The State may not be sued without its consent.”
 Republic v Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)
o A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in
rem, but an action in personam. It is an action
directed against a specific party or parties, and any
judgment therein binds only such party or parties.
9|Page
The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private
respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No.
3844.
o A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is
not permitted, except upon a showing that the State
has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the
courts at any stage of the proceedings.
 Philippine Agila Satellite v Lichauco, G.R. No. 134887
(2006)
o Elements of Prejudicial Question
 The previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action.
 The resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
 The rationale for the principle of prejudicial
question is that although it does not conclusively
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint or information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. Hence, the
need for its prior resolution before further
proceedings in the criminal action may be had.
o To give imprimatur to the Ombudsman’s dismissal of
petitioner’s criminal complaint due to prejudicial
question. It would sanction the extinguishment of
criminal liability, if there be any as stated in Revised
Penal Code w/c states that: Criminal Liability shall be
totally extinguished by prescription of the crime or
when the proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
o The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of
the government by a private citizen that would result
in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the
State itself, although the latter has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit
will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in
the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is
personal because it arises from a tortious act in the
performance of his duties.
 Sayson v Singson 54 SCRA 282
o Even if there is contract, Money claim against the
gov’t is voidif the cause or consideration is contrary to
law, morals or public policy. (in this case: Over-
pricing)
o Mandamus to compel the auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the state,
which cannot be prosper or be entertained by the
Court except with the consent of the State.
 Respondent should just have filed his claim with the
General Auditing Office.
 Republic v. Purisima
o The consent, to be effective though, must come from
the State acting through a duly enacted statute.
o They could still proceed to seek collection of their
money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to
appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication.
 PNB v. CIR
o A motion to quash is a request to a court to render a
previous decision of that court or a lower judicial
body null or invalid. It can arise out of mistakes made
by any lawyer in a court proceeding
o Garnishment: A legal procedure by which a creditor
can collect what a debtor owes by reaching the
debtor's property when it is in the hands of someone
other than the debtor.
 Effect of garnishment – freeze the whole account.
Except: Gov’t funds wherein only up to the amount
being claimed can be freeze.
o Based on existing jurisprudence, government owned
and controlled corporation has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government, thus, not exempted to garnishment
even if such funds is deposited in the bank (w/c is
being contented as public in nature)
 SSS v CA, 120 SCRA 707 (1983)
o SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It
has corporate powers separate and distinct from the
Government, therefore, it can sue and be sued in
Court
o The paramount importance in this controversy is that
an injustice is not perpetrated and that when damage
is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of
redress particularly when it arises from a purely
private and contractual relationship between said
individual and the system.
 Farolan v CTA, 217 SCRA 298 (1993)
o The political doctrine that "the state may not be sued
without its consent," categorically applies. As an
unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of it’s invested with an
inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As
an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
governmental function of collecting revenues which is
definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private
respondent's claim for damages against the
Commissioner of Customs must fail.
 Republic v Sandiganbayan, BREDCO - GR No. 85384
(1990)
o Intervention just to defend and no pray for damages
is not a suit against the state.
o The private respondents’ intervention was merely to
unite with the defendants therein in resisting the
claims of petitioner, as plaintiff, and for that reason
asked for no affirmative relief against any party in
10 | P a g e
their answer in intervention. In other words, this is
not a case where the private respondents take the
initiative in an action against petitioner by filing a
complaint in intervention or a complaint. They do not
pray for damages against RP. In effect, they occupy a
defensive position as regards those shares of stock or
interest.
o Private respondents' action for intervention is not,
therefore, a suit or counter-suit against petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
 Froilan v Pan Oriental Shipping
o The Supreme Court held that the government
impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a
complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting
claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the
recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state
from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff
may avail itself of the different forms of actions open
to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in
an action against a private party, the state surrenders
its privileged position and comes down to the level of
the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defenses he might have against the
state.
 Lim v Brownell
o An act existing to a former sovereign to which the
new sovereign consented will still be valid.
 Santiago v. Republic, BPI
o The constitutional provision itself allows a waiver.
Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent
need not be express. It can be implied. The doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen.
o It must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule
that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency
being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of
an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation.
He has the right to be heard. Non-suability cannot
stand in the way. The government, in the final
analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of
the people, the repository of the sovereign power.
 Amigable v Cuenca
o When the government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes
manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
Gov’t cannot use or reclaim a land without give just
compensation to the owner.
 Torio v Fontanilla
o The powers of a municipality are two fold in character
public, governmental, or political on the one hand,
and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
  Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the
state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public, and political,
municipal powers. If the injury is caused in the
course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had
from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so long
as they performed their duties honestly and in good
faith or that they did not act wantonly and
maliciously.
 On the other hand, proprietary powers are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of
the community and include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate. The settled rule
is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons
o Holding of town fiesta is an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality, as it is
optional on the part of municipality and not a duty to
observe.
o Under the doctrine of respondent superior,
petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for
damages if that was attributable to the negligence of
the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
o To make an officer of a corporation liable for the
negligence of the corporation, there must have been
upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to,
or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he
must be a participant in the wrongful act.
o On these principles, SC absolved the municipal
councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they
personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.
2. Suits vs. Foreign State
 The Holy See v Rosario, (December 17, 1994)
o In public international law, when a state or
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
foreign office of the state where it is sued to convey
to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
 In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to
first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity. In some of
previous jurisprudence, DFA just sent a letter to
another dep. Concerned; DFA also sent telegram to
trial court.
o As express in Art. II, Sec. 2 of 1987 Constitution, we
have adopted the generally accepted principles of
international law. Even w/o this affirmation, such
principles are deemed incorporated as part of the law
11 | P a g e
of the land as a condition and consequence of our
admission in the society of nations.
o Two conflicting theory of sovereign immunity
 Classical or absolute theory – a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made respondent in the
courts of another sovereign.
 Newer or restrictive theory –immunity is
recognized only with regard to public acts, but not
with private acts
1. Jure gestionis refers to activities of a
commercial nature carried out by a foreign
State or one of its subdivisions or agencies.
However, the acts are not immune from the
jurisdiction and process of local courts
under the modern doctrine of restrictive
foreign sovereign.
2. Jure imperii is a Latin term meaning, acts by
right of dominion. This term is commonly
used in conflict of laws. Acta jure imperii
are activities of a governmental or public
nature carried out by a foreign State or one
of its subdivisions. Acta jure imperii also
qualifies for state immunity under the
modern doctrine of restrictive foreign
sovereign immunity.
o Restrictive Theory has created a problem of its own
as to determine as to which is purely commercial or
governmental function, especially for the communist
who took control of nationalized business activities
and international trading.
o Mere entering into contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be the ultimate test, only start of
an inquiry. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperil, especially when it is not undertaken for gain
or profit.
o The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property,
real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the
creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered
into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
 In the said convention, a diplomatic envoy is
granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real
action relating to private immovable property
situated in the territory of the receiving state which
the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for
the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is
provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason should immunity be recognized as regards
the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy
See.
 USA v. Ruiz (G.R. No. L-35645)
o Rules of International Law have been developed, this
it is now necessary to distinguish between sovereign
 and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now
the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and
other states in Western Europe.
o The correct test for the application of State immunity
is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the
legal nature of the act.
o In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both
the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order.
 Minucher v. CA, Scalzo
o Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the
State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in
parem, non habet imperium - that all states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another.
o While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties
o A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state (Job Description). The
consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
 Indonesia v. Vinzon
o The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract
stating that any legal action arising out of the
agreement shall be settled according to the laws of
the Philippines and by a specified court of the
Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign
immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains
language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign
immunity.
o Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction
must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication.
 WHO v Judge Aquino
o It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government.
o It is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the judicial
department of (this) government follows the action of
the political branch and will not embarrass the latter
by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
 DFA v. NLRC
12 | P a g e
o One of the basic immunities (by virtue of its’ charter)
of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction. The obvious reason for this is that
the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would
impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially behalf of its member-
states.
 Animos v. PVAO
o Doctrine of non-suability of state has no application,
where the suit against such a functionary had to be
instituted because of his failure to comply with the
duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds
for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. Such is the
present case.
 Shaul v. CA
o The doctrine of immunity from suit without its
consent has a rule which if such duty is require by the
state itself to perform. It is a different matter where
the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of plaintiff. Unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine
of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument
for perpetrating an injustice.
3. Execution vs the state
 Nessia v. Fermin
o Gov’t official may not be compelled by mandamus to
approve vouchers if exceeded the budgetary
appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable
for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction
because he did not act on the vouchers which is
claimable for the performance of an official duty of a
gov’t employee.
 Caloocan City v Allarde, GR No. 107721
o The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure
or garnishment does not apply where the funds
sought to be levied under execution are already
allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the
money judgment against the government. In such a
case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced
by judicial processes.(Such garnishment should be
applied only up to the amount that is due and
demandable)
IV. Philippine Principles and Policies
A. Preamble
 “We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society/
and/establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations/, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony/, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy/under
the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace/, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.”
B. Principles and Policies (Art. II, Phil. Const)
1. PableOcampo v. HRET
 Complaint was sought after proclamation
o Effect: 2nd placer cannot be declared winner
o Exception: If the position being sought has more than
1 vacancy slot, e.g. councilor
 The Wreath of Victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election
in favor of the person who obtained plurarity of votes
and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected.
 Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a
second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the
remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily give
the candidate who obtained the second highest number
of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office.
2. Maquiling v COMELEC, G.R. 195649 (2013)
 Pre-proclamation complaint
o Effect: 2nd placer can be declared winner
 It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the
principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos are
qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens
who wish to run for public office to renounce their
foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their
foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for
these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the
prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local GovernmentCode
3. Villavicencio v Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919)
 Law defines power. Centuries ago, Magna Charta decreed
that – "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor
will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right."
 No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The law
is the only supreme power in our system of government,
and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to
that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it
imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.
13 | P a g e
 Habeas Corpus - was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
o The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforceable
anywhere in the Philippine Islands. Whether the writ
shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court
or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of
the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances.
o The important fact to be observed in regard to the
mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed
to and served upon, not the person confined, but his
jailor. It does not reach the former except through
the latter. The officer or person who serves it does
not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free,
but the court relieves him by compelling the
oppressor to release his constraint. The place of
confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief,
if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to
release his grasp.
o If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The great writ may not be
easily evaded.
4. Agustin v Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
 Exercise of Police Power - State Authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
 Principle of non-delegation of legislative power – To
avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a
standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to
be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. E.g. Public Safety
 Presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record in
overthrowing the statute. As long as laws do not violate
any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret
and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary. Court is not supposed to override
legitimate policy and never inquire into the wisdom of
the law.
5. Ichong v. Hernandez
 Constitutionality (Equal Protection Clause)
o As a general rule, aliens are under no special
constitutional protection w/c forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of
the class falls along the lines of nationality. Broadly
 speaking, the difference in status between citizens
and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.
o Exception: laws that were found to be arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or
product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there
was no question of public interest involved or
pursued.
 Constitutionality (Due Process Clause)
o In determining whether a given act of the Legislature,
passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate
the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional,
one of the first questions to be considered by the
court is whether the power as exercised has a
sufficient foundation of reason in connection with the
matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and
capricious use of that power, without substantial
relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and
general welfare of the public.
o A prospective law passed makes it reasonable.
6. In RE Garcia, 2 SCRA 984
 Treaty between Phil. and Spain which provides that the
Nationals of each of the two countries can practice their
professions within the territory of the other cannot be
invoked by a Filipino Citizen in his own country. As in this
case which is law profession, for which in effect, may not
encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the SC to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in
the Phil. Such act is reserved only to the Congress of the
Phil.
7. People of the Phil. v. Lagman and Sosa
 Sec. 2, Art. II of the constitution states that “The defense
of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service."
 The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life,
liberty, and property of the citizen
 Without violating the Constitution, a person may be
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his
pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the
army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot
down in its defense.
 This is not in violation of the “supremacy of civilian over
military”, as the orders do not come from the military
authority but the civilian authority.
8. Estrada v. Escritor
 Two main standards used by the Court in deciding
religion clause cases:
o (A) Strict Neutrality approach: The government
should base public policy solely on secular
14 | P a g e
considerations, without regard to the religious
consequences of its actions.
o (B) Benevolent Neutrality approach:Allows for
interaction between the church and the state as
called for by necessity or practicality.
Accommodations are government policies that take
the religion specifically into account to allow
individuals and groups exercise their religion without
hindrance.
 “Compelling state interests” test from a ‘benevolent
neutrality’ stance was applied since the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief
o Under this test, not any interest or the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom
as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights.
9. Bayan v Exec Secretary, GR No. 138570 (2000)
 The power to ratify a treaty is vested in the President and
not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of
the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification
 International law continues to make no distinction
between treaties and executive agreements: they are
equally binding obligations upon nations. To be sure, as
long as VFA possesses the elements of an agreement
under international law: the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.
10. Pamatong v Comelec GR No. 161872 (2004)
 There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public
office. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law.
 “Equal Access” provision requires implementing
legislation to make it operative.
 The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public
office may be subjected for limitations. As long as the
limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated.
11. Maquera v Borja, GR No L-24761 (1965)
 Property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature
and essence of the Republican systemordained in our
Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same, for said political system is premised upon the
tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them, and this, in
turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the
individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes
equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that,
accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be
denied the chance to be elected to public office.
12. Calalang v Williams 70 Phil 726 (1940)
 The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the
law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To
 deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the
law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed.
294.)
 Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
 To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights
of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a Blessing
which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the
fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preserving.
 The right to exercise the police power is a continuing one,
and a business lawful today may in the future, because of
the changed situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public health and
welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."
 Social Justice
o The promotion of social justice, however, is to be
achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group, it must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons,
and of bringing about “the greatest good to the
greatest number.
o Social justice is “neithercommunism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.
o Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principles of saluspopuliestsupremalex.
13. APCD v PCA, GR No. 110526
 Any change in policy must be made by the legislative
department of the government. The regulatory system
15 | P a g e
has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an
administrative agency to dismantle it.
14. Simon v CHR, GR No. 100150 (1994)
 ‘Civil rights’ refers to those rights that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or in a wider sense, to all
its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of government. These are
rights pertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in
a state. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of laws, freedom of contract, et. al.
 ‘Political rights’ refers to the right to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right to petition and in general, the rights to
appurtenant to citizenship vis-à-vis the management of
the government.
 Scope of CHR’s investigative powers is limited to “human
rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 Scope of CHR contempt powers apply only to violations
of its operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatory powers.
 CHR is fact finding body, and does not exercise quasi-
judicial function.
 CHR has no power to issue injunctive writs.
15. PASEI v Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
 Police power is defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with the personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
 It is true that police power is the domain of the
legislature but it does not mean that such an authority
may not be lawfully delegated. (E.g. thru Labor Code)
 The right to travel is subject to the requirements of public
safety as may be provided by law
 Protection to labor does not signify the promotion of the
employment alone, what concerns the constitution more
paramountly is that such employment be above all,
decent, just and humane.
16. UP BOR v CA, GR No. 134629 (1999)
 In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
is simply the opportunity to explain one's side of a
controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of
the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
claim to have been denied due process.
 1973 Constitution [Art. XV, 8 (2)] likewise provides for the
academic freedom or, more precisely, for the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of
higher learning.
o It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of
authority certainly extending to the choice of
students." If such institution of higher learning can
decide who can and who cannot study in it, it
certainly can also determine on whom it can confer
the honor and distinction of being its graduates.
 (Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology,37 [68 SCRA 277 (1975)]
o While it is true that the students are entitled to the
right to pursue their education, the University as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its
academic freedom and in the process has the
concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.
17. Camacho v Coresis, GR No. 134372 (2002)
 Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives and the methods on how best to attain them,
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for
itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study.[23] The right of the school to confirm and
validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once
apparent in the third freedom, i.e., how it shall be taught.
 Academic freedom is two-tiered that of the academic
institution and the teacher's.
18. SSS Employees Assn. vs CA, 175 SCRA 686
 Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.
o Resort to the intent of the framers. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the
right to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike.
o Strike by government employees . . . enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government
officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service.
Memorandum Circular of CCS.
 Rationale
o Principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through
compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially
voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are
settled through the process of collective bargaining.
o In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated
power, the administrative heads of government
which fix the terms and conditions of employment.
And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.
16 | P a g e
19. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113
 The State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health.
 For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortionexcept where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
20. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 262 US 510
 Issue:Mandatory Act to compel all children to attend
public school
o The Supreme Court ruled that the inevitable practical
result of enforcing the Act was the destruction of the
private primary schools and perhaps all other private
primary schools for normal children within the state.
o Supreme Court believes that the act unreasonably
interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of their
children. Though Society of Sisters were corporations,
they could claim constitutional protection for their
business and property. They sought against
protection against a present and real threat of injury
from the arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful
interference with their patrons and injunctive relief
was proper.
21. Tanada v Angara, GR 118295 (1997)
 The Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
 The WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some
protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus,
with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment
is given to developing countries in terms of the amount
of tariff reduction and the period within which the
reduction is to be spread out.
 The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national
treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot
be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are
rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
"equality and reciprocity," the fundamental law
 encourages industries that are "competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with
the best in the foreign markets.
 Portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating
the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with
all nations.
 Derogation of legislative power. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if
any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain
an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system. And since the
Philippine is a signatory to most international
conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the
adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not
be substantial.
V. The Exercise of Government Power
1. In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382
 Overview: Penalty imposed by SC motu proprio to lawyer
 Letters addressed to individual justice, in connection with
their judicial functions become part of the judicial record
and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
 Our Constitution "as 'a definition of the powers of
government' placed upon the judiciary the great burden
of 'determining the nature, scope and extent of such
powers' and 'when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which the instrument
secures and guarantees to them.'
 In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court
notes that "disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court Motu Proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such.
2. INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)
 Overview: Delegation of legislative power of congress to
executive
 Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the
Executive Branch, the authority to allow deportable
17 | P a g e
aliens to remain in this country in certain specified
circumstances. Congress may delegate authority, but
once it does so it must abide by its decision until that
delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
3. Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)
 Overview: Contempt power by Senate/Congress
 SC avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its
exercise of departmental discretion in the means used to
accomplish legitimate legislative ends
 Courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means
adopted by the legislature are the only means or even
the best means possible to attain the end sought, for
such course would best the exercise of the police power
of the state in the judicial department.
 It has been said that the methods, regulations, and
restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent
with the public welfare are purely of legislative
cognizance, and the determination of the legislature is
final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the
constitutional rights of the citizen.
 All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings
taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to
determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process
has been accorded him before his incarceration by
legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the
Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived
life, liberty or property without due process of law.
o In the case at bar such right has fully been extended
the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity
to be heard personally and by counsel in all the
proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution
ordering his continued confinement.
 No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by
another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the
offense. Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly,
that is the real name of the person whose identity is
being the subject of the inquiry. It may well be taken as
insult to the intelligence of the honorable members of
the body that conducted the investigation
 Period of imprisonment did not exceed the period as
provided by law as punishment for contempt. (6 months)
4. Goldwater v Carter, 444 US 996
 Issue: Whether a president can terminate a treaty
without congressional approval a non-justiciable political
question?
 Without oral argument, the court found that the case
was not justiciable. He reasoned that there was no
conflict for the court to resolve
 The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the
allocation of power between the President and Congress
until the political branches reach a constitutional
impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups,
or even individual Members, of Congress to seek judicial
resolution of issues before the normal political process
has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
5. Garcia v Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
  Issue: Whether the congress may allow the president to
increase tariff duties
 Yes. Under Art. VI, Sec. 28 (2), the congress may, by law,
authorize the president subject to such limitations as it
may impose, tariff rates and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national dev’t program of
the gov’t. The relevant congressional Statue is the TCCP
104 and 401
 Customs duties may be reduced or even removed
precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from
the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service
that tariff-protected and subsidized local manufacturers
may otherwise impose upon the community.
 Customs duties may be seen to be imposed either for
revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to
discourage any importation of the items involved. In
either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and
imposed entirely apart from whether or not there are any
competing local industries to protect.
6. US v Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
 Overview: Delegation of congress to executive to issue a
proclamation to fix a price of a commodity where
violation of which constitutes a crime is unconstitutional.
 By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the
Constitution of the United States. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute
the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. Subject
to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is
supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or
is not constitutional.
o If the said is a law does nothing more than to
authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. No delegation of
power and it is valid.
o If the Act within itself does not define a crime, and is
not a law, and some legislative act remains to be
done to make it a law or a crime ,the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional
 In so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-
General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing
the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the proclamation a crime is unconstitutional and void.
7. Conference v POEA, 243 SCRA 666
 Overview: Delegation of legislative power to executive
 Making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains
exclusively to Congress; nevertheless, congress may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation
and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that:
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o The regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law.
o Regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
 It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated
by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for
the classification to be reasonable:
o Must rest on substantial distinctions;
o Must be germane to the purpose of the law;
o Must not be limited to existing conditions only;
o Must apply equally to all members of the same class
 The constitutional prohibition against impairing
contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness. It has no, application to
statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of
the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper
exercise by the State of its police power by enacting
regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the
community, even though contracts may thereby be
affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract
beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them.
8. Pelaez v Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
 Overview: Creation of Municipal Corporation by
Executive unconstitutional ; General Supervision by
President over local government
 Authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is
"strictly a legislative function"
 Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, to
stop the violation of principle of separation of powers,
that said law is essential to be:
o Be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate.
o Fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable - to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
 Section 10 (1) of Article VII which states that President
shall exercise general supervision over all local gov’t as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
o President’s authority is only to check whether said
local government performs their duties as provided
by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as the same
or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
o He may not veto or set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may
be.
 o He may not even suspend an elective official of a
regular municipality or takeany disciplinary action
against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.
 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he
could compel local officials to submit to his dictation,
thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.
9. People v Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90
 Overview: Constitutionality of Excessive Fine; Undue
delegation of legislative power to judiciary to fix term of
imprisonment without designated limit is
unconstitutional.
 Constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or
nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between
the penalty and the crime. “Excessive" penalty was
upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a
recommendation for executive clemency.
 Principle of separation of powers is not violated by
vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence
or amount of fine between “designated limits” in
sentencing persons convicted of crime.
o However, it is not for the courts to fix the term of
imprisonment where no points of reference have
been provided by the legislature. The absence of
which designated limits will constitute such exercise
as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion
into or assumption, of legislative power.
 By invalidation of the provision on imprisonment, the
imposable penalty for violations of said law should be
limited to a fine (by virtue of separability clause)
VI. Structure and Powers of Government
A. The Legislative Branch
1. Article VI, Philippine Constitution
 SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested:
o In the Congress of the Philippines which shall:
 Consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives,
 Except: to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
 SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed:
o Of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large
by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law.
 SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless:
o He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and,
o On the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years
of age,
o Able to read and write,
o A registered voter, and
o A resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the election.
 SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be:
19 | P a g e
o Six years
o And shall commence at noon on the 30th day of June
next following their election.
o unless otherwise provided by law
o No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive
terms.
o Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
 SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of:
o Not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law
o Who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area
o In accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants,
o And on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
o And those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
o (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list.
 For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law,
 By selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
o (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable
 Contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Shall
have at least one representative:
 Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand,
 Or each province
o (4) Within three years following the return of every
census,
 The Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
 SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless:
o He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
o On the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age,
o Able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives,
o A registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and
o Aresident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.
  SECTION 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected:
o For a term of three years which shall begin,
o At noon on the 30th day of June next following their
election.
o unless otherwise provided by law
o No member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
o Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
 SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday
of May.
 SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the
House of Representatives,
o A special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law,
o But the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
 SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall be determined by
law.
o No increase in said compensation shall take effect:
 Until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
 SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall:
o In all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment
 Be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session.
o No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate
 In the Congress or in any committee thereof.
 SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office:
o Make a full disclosure of their financial and business
interests.
o They shall notify the House concerned of a potential
conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors.
 SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may:
o Hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat.
o Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created
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o Or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.
 SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may:
o Personally appear as counsel before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies.
o Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office.
o He shall not intervene in any matter before any office
of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
 SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene:
o Once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session,
o unless a different date is fixed by law,
o And shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before
the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
o The President may call a special session at any time.
 SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its Presidentand
the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
o Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
o (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business,
 But a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner,
 And under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
o (3) Each House may:
 Determine the rules of its proceedings,
 Punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
 With the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member.
 A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
o (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same,
 Excepting: such parts as may, in its judgment,
affect national security;
 And the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.
o Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
 (5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress
shall, without the consent of the other,
 o Adjourn for more than three days,
o Nor to any other place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
 SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall:
o Each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be:
o The sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members.
o Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members,
 three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
 The remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be,
 Who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein
 The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.
 SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of:
o The President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
o Twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives,
o Elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein.
 The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie.
o The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
 SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission
on Appointments shall be:
o Constituted within thirty days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been
organized with the election of the President and the
Speaker.
o The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session,
o At the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
Members, to discharge such powers and functions as
are herein conferred upon it.
 SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the
Congress shall be:
o Preserved and be open to the public in accordance
with law,
o And such books shall be audited by the Commission
on Audit which
o Shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts
paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
21 | P a g e
 SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective committees may:
o Conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.
 The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
 SECTION 22. The heads of departments may:
o Upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President,
o Or upon the request of either House, as the rules of
each House shall provide,
 Appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments.
 Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the
House of Representatives at least three days
before their scheduled appearance.
 Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
o When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
 SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of
both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to:
 Declare the existence of a state of war.
o (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law:
 Authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
 To exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy.
 Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
 SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall:
o Originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives,
o But the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
 SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
o The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
o (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
o (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the
Congress shall:
 Strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
 o (4) A special appropriations bill shall:
 Specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
 Shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer,
 Or to be raised by corresponding revenue
proposed therein.
o (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations;
 However, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law,
1. Be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
o (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
o (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year:
 The general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall:
 Remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
 SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall:
 Embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
o (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless:
 It has passed three readings on separate days,
 And printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage,
1. Except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency.
 Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
 SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
o If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
 Otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to:
 The House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it.
 If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be
22 | P a g e
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
the Members of that House, it shall become a law.
o In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal.
o The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof;
 Otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.
o (2) The President shall have the power to veto:
 Any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill,
 But the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
 SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation.
o (2) The Congress may, by law:
 Authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions
 As it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts
 Within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
o (3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposesshall be exempt from taxation.
o (4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.
 SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury,
o Except: In pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
o (2) No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
 Except: when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
o (3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special
purpose shall be treated:
 As a special fund and paid out for such purpose
only.
 If the purpose for which a special fund was created
has been fulfilled or abandoned,
  The balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government.
 SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
 SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility
shall be enacted.
 SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible:
o Provide for a system of initiative and referendum,
and the exceptions therefrom,
o Whereby the people can directlypropose and enact
laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body
o After the registration of a petition therefor signed by
at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters,
o Of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters thereof
2. Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486
 Overview: Power of house to exclude or deny a member
a seat in congress
o Congress is limited to the standing qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution. Respondents concede
that Powell met these. Thus, there is no need to
remand this case to determine whether he was
entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. Therefore,
we hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly
elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional
District of New York and was not ineligible to serve
under any provision of the Constitution, the House
was without power to exclude him from its
membership.
3. Macias v Comelec. 3 SCRA 1
 Overview: Disproportion of representative vis-à-vis
inhabitants.
 Disproportion of representation has been held sufficient
to avoid apportionment laws enacted in States having
Constitutional provisions similar to ours. (e.g. It gave
Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number
of inhabitants got four only)
o Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment
has been before the courts, it has been held to the
contrary to the constitution. It has been said to be
'arbitrary and capricious and against the vital
principle of equality.
o Equality of representation in the legislature being
such an essential feature of republican institutions,
and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not
with a clear conscience stand by to give free hand to
the discretion of the political departments of the
Government.
4. Tan v COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
 Overview: Meaning of “unit or units affected” that may
join plebiscite
23 | P a g e
 The “unit or units affected” includes all affected due to
division and not only to inhabitants of the new province
created.
 The 3,500 sqm land area requirement by Local Gov’t
Code Excludes the waters over which the political unit
exercises control.
5. Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
 Overview: Increase in number of members of House
Representatives and Party List
 1987 Constitution expressly allows for an increase in the
number of members of the House of Representatives
provided a law is enacted for the purpose
o Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads
“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law xxxx”, thus, the
Legislature has the option to choose whether the
increase in the number of members of the House of
Representatives is done by piecemeal legislation or by
enactment of a law authorizing a general increase.
 The party-list ratio automatically applies whenever the
number of district representatives is increased by law.
o The mathematical formula for determining the
number of seats available to party-list representatives
is “Number of seats available to legislative districts x
.20 = Number of seats available to party-list
representatives.”
o There is no need for legislation to create an additional
party-list seat whenever four additional legislative
districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such
additional party-list seat
 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does
not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution
o Provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating
that "those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the
proportion to their total number of votes" can no
longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent
party-list seats in the total membership of the House
of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill
up.
o Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list
organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be
distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties
receiving at least two percent of the total party-list
votes.
o Remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that received less than
two percent of the total votes
 The continued operation of the two percent threshold
as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold
 mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of
the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be
distributed to the parties in a second round of seat
allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down
in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this
Resolution.
 Three-seat cap is constitutional
o The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system. There is no violation of the Constitution
because the 1987 Constitution does not require
absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The
well-settled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative
of the Constitution.
6. AngLadlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)
 Overview: Ang Ladlad’s application for party list
accreditation.
 SC ruled that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of “AngLadlad”
 Government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects. As held in Estrada v.
Escritor that “the morality referred to in the law is public
and necessarily secular, not religious”
 The denial of “Ang Ladlad's” registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather thana tool to further
any substantial public interest.
 There is no ruling by COMELEC that Ang Ladlad is not
qualified toregister as a party-list organization under any
of the requisites under RA 7941or the guidelines in “Ang
Bagong Bayani”
7. Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
 Issue: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of Arroyos qualifications as AGPPs nominee
after his proclamation and assumption to office as a
member of the House of Representatives.
 HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and
assumption of office.
o Party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
As stated in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution:
 Members of the House of Representatives are of
two kinds: 1.) members x x x who shall be elected
from legislative districts and2.) those who x x x
shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
 Once elected, both the district representatives and
the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. They have the same deliberative rights,
salaries, and emoluments.
24 | P a g e
o Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to,
among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
 By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of
the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office
as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins.
o In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo,
AGPPs first nominee, has already been proclaimed
and taken his oath of office as a Member of the
House of Representatives.
 Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions
and that the HRET now has the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos
qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives
8. AtongPaglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
 Overview: Reversal of the doctrine laid down in “Ang
Bagong Bayani case” allowing only those political party,
sector, organization or coalition that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941 may participate in the party-list
system.
 In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following new parameters:
o 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-
list system:
 (1) National parties or organizations,
 (2)regional parties or organizations, and
 (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
o 2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
o 3. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
o 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.”
 “Marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers
 “Well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
 o 5. Majority of the members must belong to the sector sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the
they represent plurality of the legally cast ballots.
o 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or o Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice.
least one nominee who remains qualified
 Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
B. Legislative Branch (continued: Organization)
parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a
1. Santiago v Guingona, G.R. 134577, (1998)
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
 Overview: Claim for Minority Leader position
provides that
 Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
o a “political party refers to an organized group of
must be elected by a number constituting more than one
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
half of all the members thereof; it does not provide that
and policies for the general conduct of government.”
the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
o On the other hand, Section 3(d)of R.A. No. 7941
constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the
provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
minority leader.
advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides  Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or
different definitions for a political and a sectoral whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and
party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."
each other. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even
9. Aquino v Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995) the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have
been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
 Overview: COMELEC’s jurisdiction over candidate not yet
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
proclaimed; definition of domicile and residency;
done within their competence and authority.
proclamation of winner
2. Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
 COMELEC has jurisdiction
 Overview: Jurisdiction of SC over Senate’s power to elect
o A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who
its president; What constitutes a quorum
has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
member of the House of Representatives subject to  In view of the separation of powers, the political nature
Section. 17 of the Constitution wherein the HRET or of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the
SET as the case may be has jurisdiction. Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
 Petitioner wasn’t able to prove that he has establish 1
the judiciary.
year resident as required by constitution
o It is furthermore believed that the recognition
o The place "where a party actually or constructively
accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
has his permanent home," where he, no matter
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the
where he may be found at any given time, eventually
hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that
matters of similar nature.
to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
o As the petition must imply to be acceptable, the
residence for the purposes of election law.
majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside,
o Establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall - not in the
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
Supreme Court
one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does  When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each
not engender the kind of permanency required to House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not
prove abandonment of one's original domicile mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a
especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of majority of "all the members of the House" and a
two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number
testified that his intention was really for only one (l) than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
year because he has other "residences" in Manila or the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
Quezon City. constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.
 The “first” among the qualified candidates cannot be
3. Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924)
proclaimed winner
o Wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an  Overview: Jurisdiction of SC over power of senate to
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the punish its members
 Court has no jurisdiction over the said case

25 | P a g e
 o It is here only necessary to recall that under our
system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to the
control of another department. The power to control
is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate
is the power to usurp. Each department may,
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
o The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been
held that there where a member has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement.
 Power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for
one year.
o Yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-
conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine
Senate take any particular action.
o If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is
not the repository of all wisdom and all power. It
would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume
the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous
censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls
of legislation and of administration giving heed to
those who have grievances against the Legislature
and the Chief Executive.
4. De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
 Overview: Sandiganbayan may direct the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to implement the preventive
suspension order it issued in a criminal case against a
member of the House.
 Suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law (RA 3019)
is mandatory
o It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution
by influencing witnesses or tampering with
documentary evidence and from committing further
acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court.
o On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion
contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed
sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a
penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline,
maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its
honor and integrity.
5. Casco Chemical v Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
 Overview: Enrolled-bill conclusiveness
 It is well settled that the enrolled bill - which uses the
term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" - is conclusive upon the courts as regards
26 | P a g e
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President.
 If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive - on which SC cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system - the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
6. Philconsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
 Overview: Effectivity of Salary increase by members of
congress
 The said Constitutional Provision requires all members of
the house also that of all the senators who approved the
increase must have fully expired before the increase
become effective.
 Constitutional provision refers to "all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives" in the same
sentence, as a single unit without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
"expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference
in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for
Representatives), thereby rendering more evident the
intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature.
 Fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of
all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
(whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired
before the increase in compensation can become
operative.
7. Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
 Overview: Member of congress’ retirement benefits vis-
à-vis salary increase during his term.
 By virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI,
section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that
the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of
Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as
petitioner must necessarily be the compensation he had
received during his incumbency.
 Retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation
within the purview of the Constitutional provision
limiting their compensation and other emoluments" to
their salary as provided by law.
 To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of
retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to
reason that while he could not legally receive such rateas
salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed
to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."
8. People v Jalosjos, G.R. NO. 132875
 Overview: Effect to a winning candidate of House of
Representative even pending appeal or after final
conviction
  Immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives does not apply
for offenses punishable by more than six years
imprisonment.
o One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others. A person charged
with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice.
o Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or
more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
o It would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding
their liability for a criminal offense, they would be
considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the
same.
o "Imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal
to the accused
 When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with
the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.
9. Adaza v Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
 Issue: Whether a provincial governor who was elected
and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can
exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously.
o Section 10, Article VIII of the1973 Constitution
provides as follows:"Section 10. A member of the
National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not
hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except
that of prime minister or member of the cabinet”
 The dictate of the people in whom legal
sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions
save the two offices specifically cited in the above-
quoted constitutional provision.
 In the case at bar, there is no question that
petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected
Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging
his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned
constitutional provision, this fact operated
tovacate his former post and he cannot now
27 | P a g e
continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to
discharge its functions.
 Issue: Whether a loser vice-governor who ran for a
position for congress may validly reclaim his position?
o When respondent reassumed the position of vice-
governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was
acting within the law. His succession to the
governorship was equally legal and valid.
10. Puyat v De Guzman 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
 Issue: Whether an intervention to a case by a member of
congress who acquired a share over a particular company
can circumvent the prohibition to “appear as counsel” for
their members.
 "Intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity
o Under provided facts and circumstances, SC is
constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative
body and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition.
 A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body
is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of
the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings
11. Abbas v SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)
 Overview: Complaint filed before the SET against 22
senators who happened to be members also of SET
 Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling
such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly
and collectively.
o Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of
a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
 Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such;
absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
12. Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 732
 Overview: Expulsion of a political party to a Party -HRET
member for such to be subsequently removed from
HRET.
 Interference by the House of Representatives in the work
of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal
to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme
Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to
 stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all
hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
 As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality, and independence
even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal.
 Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
may not be terminated except for a just cause. Such as:
o The expiration of the member's congressional term of
office
o His death, permanent disability,
o Resignation from the political party he represents in
the tribunal
o Formal affiliation with another political party, or
removal for other valid cause
13. Codilla v De Venecia, G.R. 150605 (2002)
 Overview: HRET and COMELEC jurisdiction
 COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second
Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution.
o Thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the
assumption in officeof the respondent as the duly
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
 Issue on the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division has not yet been
resolved by the COMELEC en banc, hence, the
HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
 Administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives representing the 4th legislative district
of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC, thus, ministerial duty.
o A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, inobedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer andgives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
14. Cunanan v Tan 5 SCRA 1 (1962)
28 | P a g e
 Overview: Resolution of House of Representatives
declaring the 12 seat of Commission on Appointment
vacant void
 The powers of the Commission on Appointment donot
come from Congress, but emanate directly from the
Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. And In
order that the members of the Commission could
properly discharge their duties as such, it is essential that
their tenure therein be provided with a certain measure
of stability to insure the necessary freedom of action.
 Constitutional provision to the effect that 'there shall be
a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12)
Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on
the basis of proportional REPRESENTATIONOF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN', necessarily connotes the
authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with.
o Shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature,
like the one that has led to the formation of the so-
called 'Allied Majority', does not suffice to authorize a
reorganization of the membership of the Commission
for said House. Otherwise, the Commission on
Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as
votes shiftfrom one side to another in the House. The
framers of our Constitution could not have intended
to thus place a constitutional organ, like the
Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each
House of Congress.
15. Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board
 Overview: Promulgation of an act regulating and
supervising a new industry (Videogram) by imposition of
30% tax
 Single-Subject Rule
o An act having a single general subject, indicated in the
title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means
of carrying out the general object. The rule also is that
the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation
 The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory
but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization
that earnings of videogram establishments have not been
subjected to tax; thereby depriving the Government of an
additional source of revenue. It is a tax that is imposed
uniformly on all videogram operators.
o The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if
the motive which impelled the legislature to impose
the tax was to favor one industry over another
o It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free
to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
 singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
o Taxation has been made the implement of the
state'spolice power.
16. Araullo v Abad, G.R. 209287 (2014)
 Overview: Unconstitutionality of DAP
 The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under
Section 25(5), must be made upon a concurrence of the
following requisites, namely:
o (a) There is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective
offices;
o (b) The funds to be transferred are savings generated
from the appropriations for their respective offices;
and
o (c) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item
in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices.
 First requisite (GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid
provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP;
hence, transfers under the DAP were unconstitutional)
o Section 25(5), not being a self-executing provision of
the Constitution, must have an implementing law for
it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a
given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite,
the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of
funds.
o The provision of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were
textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not
carrying the phrase “for their respective offices”
contained in Section 25(5). The provisions carried a
different phrase (“to augment any item in this Act”),
and the effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs
thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from
savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the
item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To
that extent the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravened the
Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted
provisions cannot be used to claim authority to
transfer appropriations from the Executive to another
branch, or to a constitutional commission.
 Second requisite (There were no savings from which
funds could be sourced for the DAP)
o Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP were not
savings, and the use of such appropriations
contravened Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
o The balances of appropriations that remained
unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be
reverted to the General Fund. This was the mandate
of Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the
Administrative Code. The Executive could not
circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased
29 | P a g e
appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year.
 Third requisite (No funds from savings could be
transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA)
o It appears that the “savings” pooled under the DAP
were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriations in the pertinent GAAs.
 Third requisite (Cross border augmentations from savings
were prohibited by the Constitution)
o It appears that DAP funds were transferred to the
COA (P143.7 Million) and House of Representative
(P250 Million) Those transfers of funds, being from
the Executive, constituted cross-border
augmentations.
 Impoundment - refers to a refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type.
 Effect of unconstitutionality of DAP: The doctrine of
operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no
longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good
faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the
authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their
favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal,
civil, administrative and other liabilities
17. Belgica v Ochoa, G.R. 208566 (2013)
 Overview: Pork Barrel
 Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
o (a) Separation of Powers – Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, legislators have been authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of
budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities” and the
“regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the
separation of powers principle. From the moment the
law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and
is thus unconstitutional.
o (b) Non-delegability of legislative power.- The power
to appropriate is lodged in Congress and must be
exercised only through legislation, pursuant to
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred unto
legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine, it has violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.
o (c) Checks and balances.- Insofar as it has created a
system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted
the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the
 process, denied the President the power to veto
items
 Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork Barrel
o The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President’s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
o Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the
power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he
may deem fit as well as other public funds under the
broad classification of “priority infrastructure
development projects”, it has transgressed the
principle of non-delegability.
 Effect: Operative Fact Doctrine
18. ABAKADA Guro v Ermita, G.R. No. 168207
 Overview: Tax bill should originate exclusively from
House of Rep; internal rule of BCC
 It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action,
a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. It would
be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the
two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
o Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose
amendments, the Senate can propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House
o Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that
the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the
House of Representatives on the theory that, elected
as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national
30 | P a g e
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws
 If a change is desired in the practice of the Bicameral
Conference Committee it must be sought in Congress
since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. To
date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes
adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that
Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference
committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and
efficient legislative action.
19. Fabian v Desierto, G.R. No. 129742 (1998)
 Overview: Appellate jurisdiction of SC for review
 While courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings. The rule
has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It
does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own
jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter.
o If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, thecourt has
no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
o Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and
orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The
court has a clearly recognized right to determine its
own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
o In view of the constitutionality and validity of the
grant of said appellate jurisdiction is in issue, Court
deems it necessary that the parties be heard thereon
and the issue be first resolved before conducting
further proceedings in this appellate review.
 Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
o There is no showing that even up to its enactment,
Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to SC for its
advice and consent.
o When it is clear that a statute trangresses the
authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of
the courts to declare that the constitution, and not
the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgement.
 When invalidity of a statute concerning jurisdiction was
declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be
sustained.
 o If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.
o It cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction
to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of
the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate
appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a
substantive power. Neither can we consider such
transfer as impairing a vested right because the
parties have still a remedy and still a competent
tribunal to administer that remedy
20. Gonzales v Macaraig, G.R. No. 87636, (1990)
 Overview: Partial veto power of the president over
appropriations bill which contains: “No item of
appropriation recommended by the President in the
Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII,
Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for
other purposes by augmentation.”
 Contention by petitioner that the President may not veto
a provision without vetoing the entire bill disregards the
basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto.
o It also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein
and that any such provision shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
 Assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the
executive power to veto court opined that the vetoed
provision are not provision in the budgetary sense of the
term. Article VI, Section 25(2) of the 1987 Constitution
provides: "Sec. 25(2) No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."
o The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not
relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation.
They apply generally to all items disapproved or
reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
o Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To
discover them, resort will have to be made to the
original recommendations made by the President and
to the source indicated by petitioners themselves,
i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring
Office"
o Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of
31 | P a g e
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation
 If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the
veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional, the
remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A
Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-
thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article
VI, Section 27. But Congress made no attempt to override
the Presidential veto. Petitioners' argument that the veto
is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" (citing
Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto
having been herein upheld.
21. Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
 Overview: Publication requirement
 Publication in the Official Gazette of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is mandated by law.
o Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax
and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.
o Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice
to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one
22. Tan v Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324 (2000)
 Overview: One-subject rule ; uniformity in taxation ; due
process in relation to taxation
 Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been
envisioned so as:
o (a) to prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite
the members of the legislature who favor any one of
unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act,
o (b) to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the
legislature, and
o (c) to fairly apprise the people, through such
publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of
the subjects of legislation.
 Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as:
o (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary,
o (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose,
o (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and
 o (4) the classification applies equally well to all those
belonging to the same class
 With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to
determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent
(rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation.
This court cannot freely delve into those matters which,
by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment.
o Court can only delve on issues when tax measure
becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount
to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to
strike it down, for, despite all its plenitude, the power
to tax cannot override constitutional proscriptions
23. Lung Center v QC, G.R. No. 144104 (2004)
 Overview: Charitable Institution
 In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift,
to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the
benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their minds and hearts under the influence of
education or religion, by assisting them to establish
themselves in life or otherwise lessening the burden of
government.
 As a general principle, a charitable institution does not
lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes
simply because it derives income from paying patients,
whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or
receives subsidies from the government, so long as the
money received is devoted or used altogether to the
charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no
money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution.
 Portions of its real property that are leased to private
entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these
are not actually, directly and exclusively used for
charitable purposes.
o The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws
granting exemption from tax are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and
exemption is the exception. The effect of an
exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a
claim for exemption from tax payments must be
clearly shown and based on language in the law too
plain to be mistaken.
o The tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of 1987
Constitution covers property taxes only. As Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, explained: ". . . what
is exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those
exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings
and improvements actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes."
 What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use
of the property for charitable purposes is the direct
and immediate and actual application of the
property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. It is not the use
32 | P a g e
of the income from the real property that is
determinative of whether the property is used for
tax-exempt purposes.
24. First Lepanto Ceramics v CA, 237 SCRA 519
 Overview: B.P. 129 and SC power to promulgate rules.
 It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies
on the Court of Appeals
o Twin-objective of B.P. 129 is to provide a uniform
procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi-
judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the
bar and to unclog the docket of the Supreme Court to
enable it to attend to more important tasks
 Supreme Court pursuant to its Constitutional power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of
B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules
governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final
orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions
and confusing rules of procedure.
 "Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . .
Substantive right is a term which includes those rights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give
rise to a cause of action, as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtains a redress for their invasion."
o Indeed, the question of where and in what manner
appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought
pertains only to procedure or the method of
enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by
E.O. 226. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue
of appeals from decisions of this agency to
respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different
period of appeal. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.
25. Tolentino v Secretary of Finance, G.R. 115455
 Overview: Constitutionality of widening the base of tax
system which is a result of consolidation of two distinct
bills from the house and the senate.
 “Art. VI, ‚§ 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.”
o Does not violate this provision. To insist that a
revenue statute - and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment
of the law - must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not
only to "concur with amendments" but also to "
propose amendments." It would be to violate the
 coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
 The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.
 The result is a third version, which is considered an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only
requirement for which being that the third version be
germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.
o It is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is
not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.
If the committee can propose an amendment
consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason
why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an "amendment in the nature of a
substitute," so long as such amendment is germane
to the subject of the bills before the committee. After
all, its report was not final but needed the approval of
both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of
the legislative department. The charge that in this
case the Conference Committee acted as a third
legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
o If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought
in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution
provide that "Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings. . . ."
 There is no any reason for requiring that the Committee's
Report in these cases must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. The nature of the bill,
therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house
on a "take it or leave it" basis, with the only alternative
that if it is not approved by both houses, another
conference committee must be appointed. Art. VI, §
26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the first time in either house of
Congress, not to the conference committee report.
26. Bengzon v Blue Ribbon Committee
 Overview: Power of legislative to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation
 The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited.
o Investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill
33 | P a g e
of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not to be compelled to
testify against one's self.
 Speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry
to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon Committee
was to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the
law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.
o Contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is
not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find
out whether or not the relatives of the President or
Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No.
3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a
matter that appears more within the province of the
courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the
Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
died during the pendency of this case. Investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of
the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are
indefensible.
o If SC presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear,
testify and produce evidence before it, it is only
because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and, If pursued, would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of
government, ordained by the Constitution.
 Power of congress to conduct investigations is inherent in
the legislative process. That power is broad. It
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this
power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of individuals
without justification in terms of the functions of
congress. This was freely conceded by the Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress
a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of government.
No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress (John T.
Watkins vs. United States)
  "Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without
limitations. Since Congress may only investigate into
those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are
within the exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power
given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that
are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive. . . . ."
27. Senate v Ermita, G.R. 169777 (2006)
 Overview: Executive Privilege, in aid of legislation vs.
question hour
 Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from thepublic, the
courts, and the Congress."
 Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
still recognized exemptions to the power ofinquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege."
 According to Tribe, executive privilege come in a variety
of forms:
o a) State secrets privilege: invoked by U.S. Presidents
on the ground that the information is of such nature
that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives.
o b) Informer's privilege: or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
o c) Generic privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intra-governmental documents
reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
 Executive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories
of persons. Executive officials are not exempt from the
duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts,or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character. A claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. That a type of information is
recognized as privileged does not necessarily mean that it
would be considered privileged in all instances.
 Neri vs. Senate: 2 types of executive privilege: (1)
presidential communication privilege and (2)deliberative
process privilege
 Article VI, Sec 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) vs. Sec 22
(question hour)
o While both powers allow Congress or any of its
committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are
different.
 Section 21
34 | P a g e
1. Relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit
information that may be used for
legislation.
2. Congress can compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21.
 Section 22
1. Pertains to the power to conduct a question
hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress'
oversight function.
2. Congress cannot compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 22
o When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the
only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power - the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment.
o Members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from
this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial
power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each
member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of
separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy
and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration covers all senior officials of
executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the
PNP, and all senior national security officials who are
"covered by the executive privilege." The enumeration
also includes such other officers as may be determined
by the President.
o Sec. 3 actually creates an implied claim of privilege.
o The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly
has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefore and whyit must be
respected. The infirm provisions of EO 464, however,
allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons
therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
 To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
 information in such investigations necessarily deprives
the people of information which, being presumed to be
in aid of legislation, is presumed to be amatter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress.
 Publication requirement: While E.O. 464 applies only to
officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that
the same is exempt from the need for publication. Based
on Tanada v Tuvera, the requirement of publication of
laws applies even to those that do not directly apply to
people in general.
28. Article VII, Philippine Constitution
 SECTION 1. The executive power shall be
o Vested in the President of the Philippines.
 SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless:
o He is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
o A registered voter,
o Able to read and write,
o At least forty years of age on the day of the election,
o And a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.
 SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall:
o Have the same qualifications and term of office and
o Be elected with and in the same manner as the
President.
o He may be removed from office in the same manner
as the President.
o The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet.
 Such appointment requires no confirmation.
 SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall:
o Be elected by direct vote of the people
o For a term of six years
o Which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election and
o Shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter.
o The President shall not be eligible for any reelection.
o No person who has succeeded as President and has
served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
o No Vice-President shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms.
o Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of the service for the full term for which he
was elected.
o Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall be held
on the second Monday of May.
o The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
 Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall,
35 | P a g e
 Not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all certificates
 In the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session,
 And the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
o The person having the highest number of votes shall
be proclaimed elected,
 But in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes,
 One of them shall forthwith be chosen by:
1. The vote of a majority of all the Members
of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
2. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for
the canvassing of the certificates.
o The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the:
 Election
 Returns, and
 Qualifications of the President or Vice- President,
 And may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 SECTION 5. Before they enter on the execution of their
office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting
President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
o “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that:
o I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of
the Philippines
o Preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws,
o Do justice to every man,
o And consecrate myself to the service of the Nation.
o So help me God.” (In case of affirmation, last
sentence will be omitted.)
 SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence.
o The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall
be determined by law and
o Shall not be decreased during their tenure.
o No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the
incumbent during which such increase was approved.
o They shall not receive during their tenure any other
emolument from the Government or any other
source.
 SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
o If the President-elect fails to qualify:
 The Vice-President-elect shall act as President
 Until the President-elect shall have qualified.
o If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-
President-elect shall act as President
 Until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
o If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled,
  The Vice-President-elect shall become President.
o Where no President and Vice-President shall have
been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both
shall have died or become permanently disabled,
 The President of the Senate or,
 In case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President
 Until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
o The Congress shall, by law:
 Provide for the manner in which one who is to act
as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of
death, permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph.
 SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of the President,
o The Vice-President shall become the President to
serve the unexpired term.
o In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President,
 The President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability,
 The Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
then act as President
 Until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
o The Congress shall, by law,
 Provide who shall serve as President in case of
death, permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President.
o He shall serve until the President or the Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
 SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of
the Vice-President during the term for which he was
elected,
o The President shall nominate a Vice-President from:
 Among the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives
 Who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
 SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the
morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices
of the President and Vice-President occurs,
o Convene in accordance with its rules without need of
a call and
o Within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President
o To be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later
than sixty days from the time of such call.
 The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26,
36 | P a g e
Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law
upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
o Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall
be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4,
Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor
the special election postponed. No special election
shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next presidential
election.
 SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives
o His written declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary,
o Such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice-President as Acting President.
o Whenever a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit:
 To the President of the Senate and to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives
 Their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office,
 The Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
 Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration
that no inability exists,
1. He shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office.
 Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office,
1. The Congress shall decide the issue. For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is
not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need
of call.
2. If the Congress, within ten days after
receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble,
3. determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office,
4. The Vice-President shall act as the
President; otherwise, the President shall
 continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.
 SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President,
o The public shall be informed of the state of his health.
o The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national
security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
 Shall not be denied access to the President during
such illness.
 SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
o Hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.
o They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly,
o Practice any other profession,
o Participate in any business,
o Or be financially interested in any contract with,
o Or in any franchise,
o Or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
o They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
o The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President
 Shall not during his tenure be appointed as
members of the Constitutional Commissions,
 Or the Office of the Ombudsman,
 Or as Secretaries,
 Undersecretaries,
 Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
 Including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
 SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting
President shall remain effective,
o Unless revoked by the elected President within ninety
days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
 SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall:
o Not make appointments,
 Except: temporary appointments to executive
positions
 When continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.
 SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and,
o With the consent of the Commission on
Appointments,
 Appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.
37 | P a g e
 He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government
 Whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law,
 And those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.
o The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in
the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
o The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
 Whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective:
 Only until after disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments
 Or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
 SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the:
o Executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
o He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
 SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary:
o He may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
o In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it,
o He may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
o Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
o Place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.
 Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus,
 The President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress.
o The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special
session,
 May revoke such proclamation or suspension,
o Which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President
o Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress
may, in the same manner,
 Extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period
 To be determined by the Congress,
o If the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
 The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or
suspension,
 Convene in accordance with its rules without any
need of a call.
o The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen:
  The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or
 The suspension of the privilege of the writ
 Or the extension thereof,
 And must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
o A state of martial law does:
 Not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
 Nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies,
 Nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function,
 Nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
o The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons:
 Judicially charged for rebellion
 Or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
the invasion.
o During the suspension of the privilege of the writ,
 Any person thus arrested or detained shall be:
 Judicially charged within three days,
 Otherwise he shall be released.
 SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may:
o Grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures,
 After conviction by final judgment.
o He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
 With the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
 SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
o With the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
o And subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
o The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the
end of every quarter of the calendar year,
 Submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted
or guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations
 Which would have the effect of increasing the
foreign debt,
 And containing other matters as may be provided
by law.
 SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective:
o Unless: concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
 SECTION 22. The President shall submit to the Congress,
within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill:
o A budget of expenditures and
o Sources of financing,
38 | P a g e
o Including receipts from existing and proposed
revenue measures.
 SECTION 23. The President shall address the Congress at
the opening of its regular session.
o He may also appear before it at any other time.
29. Republic v Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 (2003)
 Overview: Agreement between PCGG and Marcos that
US$356 million in swiss banks belongs in principle to the
Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met... ; prima facie”
 The declaration of nullity of said agreements was
premised on the following constitutional andstatutory
infirmities:
o (1) The grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos
heirs was against the law;
o (2) The PCGG's commitment to exempt from all forms
of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos
heirs was against the Constitution; and
o (3) The government's undertaking to cause the
dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses
pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts
encroached on the powers of the judiciary.
 Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can
therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining
the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the
Swiss funds.
o Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to
establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the
Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential
elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)
of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions
are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly
against the petitioner and liberally in favor of
respondent Marcoses.
 SC hold that it was not for petitioner to establish
the Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption
to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to
know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically
stated the same in their answer. Insofar as
petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough
to specify the known lawful income of
respondents.
 Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations
provides that, in determining prima facie evidence
of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated
assets, properties and other material possessions
of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful
income of such persons. The respondent Marcos
couple did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could
be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in
itself a violation of law and to allow them to
 successfully assail the Republic for not presenting
their SAL would reward them for their violation of
the law.
30. Estrada v Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
 Overview: Resignation of Estrada
 EDSA 1 vs 2
o EDSA People Power I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the
whole government while EDSA People Power II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
o EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra
constitutional.
o EDSA I presented a political question while EDSA II
involved legal questions.
o EDSA 1 – Cory took an oath to freedom constitution ;
EDSA 2 – GMA still took an oath to 1987 constitution
 Based on the totality test, the Supreme Court held that
the petitioner resigned as president – which was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang.
o Resignation is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble:
 (1) There must be an intent to resign and
 (2) The intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.
 The validity of a resignation is not governed by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as
the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect
o Facts show that petitioner did not write any formal
letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
 Proposal of snap election where he would not be
candidate.
 Petitioner has no objection to a graceful and
dignified exit as per conversation with Senator
Pimentel
 1st round of negotiation, ERAP said, “ayoko na,
masyado ng masakit”
 2nd round of negotiation, resignation treated as a
given fact and the only unsettled points were the
measures to be undertaken for the transition.
 In the press release containing his final statement,
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo
as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace,
the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
39 | P a g e
peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears;
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people
as President;
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country.
Petitioner’s reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and
5. He called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the
presidency.
 Conviction by impeachment is not a condition before
prosecution. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. It will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be
the object of a criminal prosecution.
 Unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any other trespasser
o Estrada does NOT enjoy immunity from suit.
Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure but not beyond in
accordance with the ruling in In Re: Saturnino
Bermudez.
o The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal
in character (plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption). Estrada cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any other trespasser.
C. Executive Department (Session 9)
1. CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
 Overview: Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple
Offices
 Prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is all-embracing and covers both public and private
office employment.
 o These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed
on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and
members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and
his official family as a class by itself and to impose
upon said class stricter prohibitions.
 While all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
o In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
 Exception to Prohibition on Multiple Offices
o The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to
be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office, namely:
 (a) The Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
Article VII; or
 (b) The Vice-President acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)and
(3), Article VII;
 (c) The Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
o The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of
office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position."
 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary
of Transportation and Communications is the ex-
officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine
Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit
Authority.
 The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possible
refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article IX-B of the 1987Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as such would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the
40 | P a g e
framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding other offices or employment in the government
during their tenure.
 It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments
of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office.
2. Cruz v COA, G.R. No. 138489 (2001)
 Overview: Prohibition to receive additional or extra
compensation by ex-oficio members and their alternates.
 Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio
members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from
receiving "extra (additional) compensation, whether it be
in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows
that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot
likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A
contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than
their principals.
 Prohibition under Section 13, Article VII, 1987
Constitution
o The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise
'any other office' within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said
official.
o Prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office. The term
ex-officio means 'from office; by virtue of office'. It
refers to an 'authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual
character, but rather annexed to the official position.'
Ex-officio likewise denotes an 'act done in an official
character, or as a consequence of office, and without
any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office.' An ex-officio member of a
board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to
a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of
law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the
 Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light
Rail Transit Authority.
 The reason is that these services are already paid
for and covered by the compensation attached to
his principal office.
 He is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution."
3. NAC v COA G.R. No. 156982 (2004)
 Overview: Prohibition to receive additional or extra
compensation by ex-oficio members and their alternates
 Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides “The President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure cannot
be invoked by petitioner.
o Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
o The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials.
 The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office.
o …[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official
concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of his office do not fall under the definition
of "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition
 In Civil Liberties Union, SC elucidated on the two
constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple
positions in the government and receiving double
compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph 2,
Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees
against holding multiple government offices, unless
41 | P a g e
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of
their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official
family from holding any other office, profession, business
or financial interest, whether government or private,
unless allowed by the Constitution.
o The NAC ex officio members' representatives who
were all appointive officials with ranks below
Assistant Secretary are covered by the two
constitutional prohibitions.
 First, the NAC ex officio members' representatives
are not exempt from the general prohibition
because there is no law or administrative order
creating a new office or position and authorizing
additional compensation therefor.
 Second, the ex officio members' representatives
are also covered by the strict constitutional
prohibition imposed on the President and his
official family
o Again, in Civil Liberties Union, SC held that cabinet
secretaries, including their deputies and assistants,
who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are
proscribed from receiving additional compensation
because their services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to their
principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC
meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled
to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra
compensation, whether it was called per diem,
honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism.
Such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.
 The representatives cannot be considered de facto
officers because they were not appointed but were
merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are
not entitled to something their own principals are
prohibited from receiving. Neither can they claim good
faith, given the express prohibition of the Constitution
and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union
prior to their receipt of such allowances.
o Such position is a designation and not an
appointment - There is a considerable difference
between an appointment and designation. An
appointment is the selection by the proper authority
of an individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office; a designation merely
connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually
by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.
o Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not
entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.
4. Laurel v Garcia, GR No. 92013 (1990)
 Overview: Alienation of properties of state and intended
for public service cannot be alienated
  The Roppongi Property is classified under paragraph 2 of
Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
 The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
o Article 419. Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
o Article 420. The following things are property of
public dominion
 (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads,
and others of similar character;
 (2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
o Article 421. All other property of the State, which is
not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
 Under Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), conveyance of real
property of the Government must first be authorized by
law. It is not for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole will.
Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive
and legislative concurrence.
 A law or formal declaration to withdraw a property from
public domain is necessary to make it alienable.
o The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that the
Roppongi Property has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service does not automatically
convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use. A property continues to be part of
the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration (i.e., law) on the part of the government
to withdraw it from being such.
o Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone especially if the non-use was attributable not to
the government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property Abandonment must be a
certain and positive act based on correct legal
premises.
5. Marcos v Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760
 Overview: Right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right underinternational law,
independent from although related to the right to travel.
o The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
treat (i) the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, (ii) the right toleave a
42 | P a g e
country, and (iii) the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights.
 Right to Return to One's Country is not guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights, but nevertheless recognized as a
generally accepted principle of international law
o The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right
to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec.
2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
 The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the
President's powers as protector of the peace. It is a
power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution.
o Exercise of President's residual power not a political
question, but subject to Judicial Review
 Question for the Court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual bases for the President to conclude
that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines.
o The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed
as a supervening event, has not changed the factual
scenario under which the Court's decision was
rendered. The threats to the government, to which
the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to
have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears
as to the destabilization that will be caused by the
return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she
called President Aquino "illegal," claiming thatit is Mr.
Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President
of the Philippines, and declared that the matter
"should be brought to all the courts of the world."
6. De Leon v Carpio, 178 SCRA 457
 Overview: Direct control of the president over cabinet
members, etc.
 The President's power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by
his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under
their respective jurisdictions in the executive
department. The constitutional vesture of this power in
the President is self-executing and does not require
statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be
limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
o In Lacson-Magallanes v. Paño, 13 the Court held that
a statute making decisions of the department
 secretaries final and unappealable would
nevertheless not prevent the President from
reviewing and if necessary reversing such decisions by
virtue of his constitutional power of control over the
members of his Cabinet.
 Theoretically, the President has full control of all the
members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees
fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and
replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at
all times under the disposition of the President as their
immediate superior
o Justice Laurel put it aptly in Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior, when he said that "without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that
of the President." Hence, "their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."
7. Blaquera v Alcala, GR 109406 (1998)
 Overview: President’s power to give honorary distinction
to its subordinates and employees ; non-suability of the
state
 The President was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the respondents who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources. In the view of the President,
respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In
so acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-
protected prerogative.
o "The president shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed." (Section 17,
Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
 Control means "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter."
 When the President issued AO 29 limiting the
amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of
government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without prior approval from him, and
directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the President was just
exercising his power of control over executive
departments.
 Considering, however, that all the parties here
acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the
refund of subject incentive benefits for the year
1992, which amounts the petitioners have already
received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be
detected under the attendant facts and
43 | P a g e
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices
concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the
honest belief that the amounts given were due to
the recipients and the latter accepted the same
with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve
such benefits.
o It is "the President or the head of each department or
agency who is authorized to incur the necessary
expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the
government." It is not the duty of the Commission to
fix the amount of the incentives. Such function
belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter
ego.
 Not all contracts entered into by the government will
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487). The acts
involved in this case are governmental.
8. Hutchison Ports v SBMA, GR No 131367 (2000)
 Overview: Power of control by President over
Instrumentalities
 Though the SBMA Board of Directors, by resolution, may
have declared HPPL as the winning bidder, said award
cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA
Board of Directors and other officers are subject to the
control and supervision of the Office of the President.
o All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval
of the President of the Philippines under Letter of
Instruction No. 620, which places the SBMA under its
ambit as an instrumentality
o As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under
the direct control of the Office of the President,
particularly when contracts and/or projects
undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts
of money.
o When the President issued the memorandum setting
aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in
favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be
conducted, the same was, within the authority of the
President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative
9. Pimentel v Aguirre, GR 132988 (2000)
 Overview: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No.
372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of
their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their
internal revenue allotments.
 Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy
Local fiscal autonomy. does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision,
in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is
merely directory and has been issued by the President
consistent with his powers of supervision over local
 governments. A directory order cannot be characterized
as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is
intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures
that will help maintain economic stability in the country.
It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance.
 The Local Government Code also allows the President to
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain
requisites are met:
o (1) An unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government;
o (2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues;
o (3) The corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and
Local Government, and Budget and Management;
and
o (4) Any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than 30% of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
 Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of
local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government
Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and
the law.
10. Manalo v Sistosa, GR 107369 (1999)
 Overview: Prohibition to expand the power of
confirmation by Commission on appointment ; PNP
different from AFP
 Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there
are four groups of officers of the government tobe
appointed by the President:
o First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
o Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint;
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
 It is well-settled that only presidential appointments
belonging to the first group require the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. Congress cannot expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
o Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
44 | P a g e
andrequire confirmation of appointments of other
government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
o Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975— which
empower the Commission on Appointments to
confirm the appointments of public officials whose
appointments are not required by the Constitution to
be confirmed — are unconstitutional.
 Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no
less, sets forth the distinction:
o (a) Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution:
 The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
composed of a citizen armed force which shall
undergo military training and service, as may be
provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State."
o (b) Section 6 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution:
 "The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian
in character to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law."
o Thus, directors and chief superintendents of thePNP,
such as the herein respondent police officers, do not
fall under the first category of presidential appointees
requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
11. Soriano v Lista GR 153881 (2003)
 Overview: Statutory Authority of the President to
reorganize the office of the president in effect affects the
jurisdiction of Commission on Appointments
 Then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his
statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the
President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the
DND to the Office of the President. He later on again
transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to
the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC).
o Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer
part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of
respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer
from the rank of captain and higher for that matter,
do not require confirmation by the CA.
o It is clear from the foregoing provision of the
Constitution (Art. VII, Sec. 16, 1987 Const) that only
appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval
captain in the armed forces require confirmation by
the CA.
12. Pimentel v Ermita, GR 164978
 Overview: Appointment in an acting capacity and ad-
interim appointment
 The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature,
and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of
 this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.
 Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence.
 Law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO
292 states that "[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch." Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.
 Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments
cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section
17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has
incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the
use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 Ad-interim appointments vs. Appointments in an acting
capacity
o Ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy.
o Ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection. Acting appointments are not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can also be
away of circumventing the need for confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.
13. Echegaray v Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96
 Overview: Jurisdiction of SC over cases with final
judgment
 The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of the
judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court
to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. The former continues even
after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when
the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has
become final facts and circumstances may transpire
which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
 Notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper
time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in
sentences of death.
45 | P a g e
 Court's power of control over execution of its decisions
o The Court may not restrain the effectivity of a law
enacted by Congress but it may restrain temporarily
the execution of its own decision.
o The constitutional provision which is the source of the
pardoning power of the President cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality;
 The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life.
14. Constantino v Cuisa, GR No. 106064 (2005)
 Overview: Power of the president to contract foreign
loans
 The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it
is broad. It allows the President to contract and
guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the
issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to
which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than
others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution
meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the
powers of the President. The plain, clear and
unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of
the power provided therein.
 The authority to contract foreign loans and guarantees
without restrictions on payment or manner thereof
coupled with the availability of the corresponding
appropriations, must include the power to effect
payments or to make payments unavailing by either
restructuring the loans or even refusing to make any
payment altogether.
 When taken in the context of sovereign debts, a buyback
is simply the purchase by the sovereign issuer of its own
debts at a discount.
 The theory of petitioners that the power to incur foreign
debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the
person of the President is negated by the doctrine of
qualified political agency.
o The Constitution allocates to the President the
exercise of the foreign borrowing power "subject to
such limitations as may be provided under law." The
presidential prerogative may be exercised by the
President's alter ego, who in this case is the Secretary
of Finance.
o The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego
of the President is bound to secure the latter's prior
consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In
the matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, the repudiation by the President of the very
acts performed in this regard by the alter ego will
definitely have binding effect. Petitioners do not
assert that respondents pursued the Program without
prior authorization of the President or that the terms
of the contract were agreed upon without the
 President's authorization. The lack of showing that
the President countermanded the acts of
respondents leads us to conclude that said acts
carried presidential approval.
 There are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised
by an agent or alter ego of the President. The declaration
of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
mustbe a showing that the executive power in question is
of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
o The power of the President to contract or guarantee
foreign debts does not fall within the same
exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to
contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public
interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation
undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from
any extraordinary incident, but from the established
functions of governance. (since the others involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms)
15. Gudani v Senga, GR No 170165
 Overview: Power of the president as commander-in-chief
 Congress holds significant control over the armed forces
in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the
President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and
functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President’s ability to control
the individual members of the armed forces be accorded
the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate,
the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer
has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate,
who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
 The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-
chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to
unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite
the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that
with its pronouncement today that the President has the
right to require prior consent from members of the
armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
 The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate
branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle
to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify
before Congress must do so. There is considerable
46 | P a g e
interplay between the legislative and executive branches,
informed by due deference and respect as to their
various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy
idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort
that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate
branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic
with either the legislative or executive branches.
Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its
inability to originate national policies and legislation, such
is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered
by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by
the other branches of government.
 An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of
officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice
proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service.
16. Gloria v CA, GR No. 119903
 Overview: Security of Tenure
 As held in Bentain: "Security of tenure is a fundamental
and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil
service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal
removals
o While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee's
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is
a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme
to lure him away from his permanent position, or
designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force
his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure
of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
 After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the
respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to
MIST "appears to be indefinite" The same can be inferred
from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President
Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of
private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and
experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical
education”
o It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has
been described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being
an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the
said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of
private respondent is temporary or would only last
until a permanent replacement is found as no period
is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention
on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration.
D. The Judicial Department (Session 10)
1. Miranda v Aguirre, G.R. No 133064 (1999)
 Overview: Plebiscite requirement
  Constitution requires a plebiscite under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 "No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
 It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions - -
o First, the creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundary of a local
government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the
Local Government Code on income, population and
land area and;
o Second, the law must be approved by the people "by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."
 The changes that will result from the downgrading of the
city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be
placed under the administrative supervision of the
provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of
the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by
the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be
collected by the city will now have to be shared with the
province.
o Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people
when a law substantially diminishes their right.
o In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of
the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and
they involve requirements on income, population and
land area. These requirements, however, are imposed
to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed
to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the
people.
 The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area are designed to
achieve an economic purpose.
 In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to
achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's
voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering.
2. MMDA v Jancom, GR 147465
 Overview: Appeal by certiorari ; Contract perfection
 As provided in Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari will lie only where a court has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. If the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and of the person, its rulings upon all questions
involved are within its jurisdiction, however irregular or
erroneous these may be, they cannot be corrected by
certiorari. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal
from the final decision.
47 | P a g e
 Since the RTC decision is not immediately executory,
appeal would have stayed its execution. Consequently,
the adverse effects of said decision will not visit upon
petitioners during the appeal. In other words, appeal is a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law
o But as no appeal was taken within the reglementary
period, the RTC decision had become final and
executory. Well-settled is the rule that the special
civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a
substitute for the remedy of appeal (BF Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267). Therefore, the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari does not lie.
o Moreover, petitioners instituted the instant action
without filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC
decision. Doctrinal is the rule that certiorari will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent tribunal to allow it an
opportunity to correct its errors
 Article 1315 of the Civil Code, provides that a contract is
perfected by mere consent. Consent, on the other hand,
is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract (See Article 1319, Civil Code).
o In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the
contract by the parties (JANCOM and MMDA) clearly
show that, as between the parties, there was a
concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to
the material details of the contract, thereby giving
rise to the perfection of the contract
 Signature of the President is necessary only for its
effectivity (not perfection), pursuant to Article 19
of the contract.
 While the twenty-five year effectivity period of the
contract has not yet started to run because of the
absence of the President's signature, the contract
has, nonetheless, already been perfected.
o There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot
revoke or renounce the same without the consent of
the other. From the moment of perfection, the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may
be in keeping with good faith, usage, and law. (Art.
1315, Civil Code)
 "Final" order or judgment is one which "disposes of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined." An
order or judgment is deemed final when it finally
disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can
be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final
order is that which gives an end to the litigation.
 A final order or judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates,
or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the
parties, either on the entire controversy or on some
definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes
 them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no issue is
left for future consideration, except the fact of
compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the
judgment or doer, such judgment or order is final and
appealable.
3. Tirol v CA, GR No. 133954 (2000)
 Overview: Question of law to be raised at SC ; Decisions
of ombudsman are not directly appealable to SC
 Only questions of law may be appealed to us by way of
certiorari. This Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to errors of law.
o There is a question of law in any given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts.
o A question of fact arises when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
 It is settled that this Court ordinarily does not interfere
with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
 Decisions or Orders of the Ombudsman are not directly
appealable to the Supreme Court(Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is unconstitutional)
o We have declared Section 27 to be unconstitutional in
Fabian v. Desierto for increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the
Constitution without its advice and consent.
Moreover, even if said provision had not been
declared unconstitutional, it still does not grant a
right of appeal to parties aggrieved by orders and
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases as in
fact said Section mentions only appeals from "all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman."
4. Cruz v DENR, GR 135385 (2000)
 Overview: Equal votes by SC En Banc ;Regalian Doctrine;
Ancestral Domain
 Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided
and the necessary majority is not obtained, the case is
redeliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the voting
remains the same, the petition is dismissed pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal
rights, or those rights which the King has byvirtue of his
prerogatives.
o The Regalian theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial.
 The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.
48 | P a g e
 Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to Indigenous
Cultural communities/ Indigenous Peoples(ICCs/IPs) held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted
by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings with government and/or
private individuals or corporations.
 Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. For areas certified as
ancestral domain, jurisdiction of the government agency
or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof
ceases. HOWEVER, the jurisdiction of government
agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not terminate by such certification
because said agencies are mandated under existing laws
to administer the natural resources for the State, which is
the owner thereof.
 Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of
rights under the IPRA. In the absence of any applicable
provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven,
can define rights and liabilities, and it uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs.
o However, the use of customary laws under the IPRA is
not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of
use. In fact, customary laws, when specifically
enacted to become part of statutory law, must first
undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such.
o The application of customary law is limited to
disputes concerning property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are
members of the same indigenous group. It therefore
follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a
non-member of an indigenous group, or when the
indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the application of customary law is not
required
 An “independent agency” is an administrative body
independent of the executive branch or one not subject
to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a
“subordinate agency” or an administrative body whose
action is subject to administrative review or revision.
o The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree,
was placed by Congress “under the office ofthe
President” and, as such, is still subject to the
President’s power to control and supervision with
respect to its performance of administrative
functions.
5. Martinez v CA, GR 123547 (2001)
 Overview: Exception that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 ; Double
Sale; Failure to pay docket fees; Denial of motion for
reconsideration
  As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
review may nevertheless be granted under certain
exception:
o (a) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures
o (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;
o (c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
o (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
o (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
o (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issue of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
o (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court;
o (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
o (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents;
o (j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
o (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion
 This case, however, involves double sale and, on this
matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that where
immovable property is the subject of a double sale,
ownership shall be transferred:
o (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it to the Registry of Property;
o (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith
was first in possession; and
o (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title
 The requirement of the law, where title to the property is
recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold:
o Acquisition in good faith and
o Recording in good faith.
 To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser
must not only prove prior recording of his title but
that he acted in good faith
 Failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, the
dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate
court.
o Under Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by SC
implementing Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
(B.P. 129), there are only two requirements for the
perfection of an appeal, to wit:
 (a) the filing of a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period.
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 (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal by any
party.
 Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that "No
petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or
denied without stating the basis therefor." This
requirement was fully complied with when the Court of
Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated
in its resolution that it found no reason to change its
ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new.
6. Aguirre v Rana, Bar matter No. 1036 (2003)
 Overview: Unauthorized practice of law of a newly bar
passer
 "Practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
o A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice
law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld
even from one who has passed the bar examinations,
if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license.
 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in
the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer.
o The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations
is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely:
 His lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court
and
 His signature in the Roll of Attorneys
7. In RE: IBP Elections Bar Matter No. 491 (1989)
 Overview: IBP as a strictly nonpolitical body
 Reports and stories, some were even admitted by the
candidates as national officers of IBP show that there was
indeed overspending and vote-buying in the campaign.
The manner in which the principal candidates prepared
for the elections violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws
and made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly nonpolitical”
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
Among these acts are the setting upof campaign
headquarters by the three principal candidates in five-
star hotels, the island-hopping to solicit votes of the
chapter presidents, are acts that made a political circus of
the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
 The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also
the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
 lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to
abstain from "activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.”
 Thus, as countermeasure, the court resolved to declare
the June 3, 1989 election null and void. It also restored
the former system. The position of Executive Vice-
President shall be rotated among the nine IBP regions.
One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding
election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine regions shall have been completed; whereupon,
the rotation shall begin anew.
8. De La Llana v Alba 122 SCRA 291
 Overview: Constitutionality of BP 129
 With the accelerated economic development, the growth
of population, the increasing urbanization, and other
similar factors, the judiciary is called upon much oftener
to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what
appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy,
the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act,
before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the
essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as
it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before
enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
 There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional
reforms," characterized in the Report as "both pressing
and urgent." It is worth noting, likewise, as therein
pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if
it were to take place, would be the most thorough after
four generations.
 Nothing is better settled in our law than that the
abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity:
o It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices
is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. .
. . And, of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. (Cruz v. Primicias, Jr.)
o Legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new
appointments and commissions.
 Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position.
o He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore,
it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
50 | P a g e
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration.
 No fear need be entertained that there is a failure
to accord respect to the basic principle that this
Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to
the action taken by either of the two departments.
Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue.
 Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs
E. Constitutional Commissions
1. Cayetano v Monsod, GR 100113 (1991)
 Overview: Practice of Law requirement to the position of
Chairman of COMELEC
 Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
 To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.”
o Atty. Monsod’s past work as a lawyer-economist,
lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
2. Gaminde v COA, GR No. 140335 (2000)
 Overview: Term vs. Tenure
 Term vs Tenure
o The term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
o The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of
office is not affected by the hold-over.
 The transitory provisions mean that the incumbent
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall
continue in office for one year after the ratification of this
Constitution under their existing appointments at the
discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short
their tenure by:
o (1) Their removal from office for cause;
o (2) Their becoming incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office, or
o (3) Their appointment to a new term there under, all
of which events may occur before the end of the one
year period after the effectivity of the Constitution.
  The rotational system for the appointment of CSC
members was first introduced under the 1973
Constitution. The operation of the rotational plan
requires two conditions, both indispensable to its
workability:
o (a) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners
should start on a common date, and,
o (b) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the term should
only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
 Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, the
appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under
the 1987 Constitution must be on February 2, 1987, the
date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of
a belated appointment or qualification, the interval
between the start of the term and the actual qualification
of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
3. Brillantes v Yorac, GR No. 93867 (1990)
 Overview: Designation of the president to Yorac as acting
chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional
 Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as"
independent."Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.
o Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its
decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
o The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of
the regular chairman comes under that discretion.
That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with
its consent, by the President of the Philippines.
 The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is
no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill
the void by extending the temporary designation in favor
of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and
not of men. The problem allegedly sought to be
corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential
action. The situation could have been handled by the
members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President, however well-
meaning.
4. CSC v DBM, GR 158791
 Overview: Fiscal autonomy of CSC in relation to alleged
shortfall of revenue ; “no report, no release” policy
 "No report, no release" policy may not be validly
enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy like
CSC.
o Such policy violates Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which provides:
51 | P a g e
 “Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.”
 By parity of construction, "automatic release" of
approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with
fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean
that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed.
 The alleged shortfall in revenues is totally
unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that
there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify
non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted
Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
o The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal
autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be
subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the
event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent,
place petitioner and the other entities vested with
fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others
which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby
reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.
o The agencies which the Constitution has vested with
fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the
release of their approved appropriations over all
other agencies not similarly vested when there is a
revenue shortfall.
 The plain implication of the omission of the provision
proscribing such reduction of appropriations below that
for the previous year between Judiciary and
Constitutional Commission is that Congress is not
prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
5. Sarmiento v COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
 Overview: Jurisdiction of COMELEC En Banc
 Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution expressly provides:
 "SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or
in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
o Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies
and as such, must be heard and decided by a Division
of the Commission.
o The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same cases at the
first instance.
 The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of
petitioners in the Special Cases (pre-proclamation cases)
 without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said
resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set
aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending
before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
6. Ambil v Comelec GR No. 143398
 Overview: Jurisdiction of COMELEC en banc
 The power of SC to review decisions of COMELEC as
prescribed in the constitution (Sec.7) mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has
no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission
on Elections.
 Decision, order or resolution of a division of the
COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via
a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.
 Exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion
for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to
elevate the case to the COMELEC en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
F. The CSC
1. Camporedondo v NLRC, GR No. 129049
 Overview: PNRC is a GOCC
 Paid staffs of the PNRC are government employees who
are members of the Government Service Insurance
System and covered by the Civil Service Law. Unlike
government service in other agencies, Red Cross service
demands of its paid staff uberrima fides, the utmost good
faith and dedication to work.
 The test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of
a public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law?
o Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, and are compulsory members of
the Government Service Insurance System.
o The PNRC was not "impliedly converted to a private
corporation" simply because its charter was amended
to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be
exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and
other charges of all kinds on all importations and
purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its
disaster relief work and other services and in its
benefits and fund raising drives, and be alloted one
lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster
52 | P a g e
relief operation in addition to its existing lottery
draws for blood program.
2. General v Roco, GR No. 143366 (2001)
 Overview: Security of tenure in the career executive
service
 In the career executive service, the acquisition of security
of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment
is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by
the CES Board, thus the two requisites to attain security
of tenure:
o Career Executive Service Eligibility - Passing the CES
examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of
a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the
roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is
done by the Board through a formal Board Resolution
after an evaluation is done of the examinee's
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility
examinations.
o Appointment to CES Rank by the president - Upon
conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with
the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an
incumbent of a CES position may qualify for
appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES
rank is made by the President upon the
recommendation of the Board. This process
completes the official's membership in the CES and
most importantly, confers on him security of tenure
in the CES
 The President may, however, in exceptional cases,
appoint any person who is not a Career Executive Service
eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently
take the required Career Executive Service examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until
he qualifies in such examination.
o It is settled that a permanent appointment can be
issued only "to a person who meets all the
requirement for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.
o A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, as an exception to the rule, may
be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent
even if it may be so designated.
 In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent
Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess
the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for
the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V).
Falling short of one of the qualifications that would
complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot
successfully interpose violation of security of tenure.
Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other
positions in the career executive service.
o Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
members of the Career Executive Service may be
 reassigned or transferred from one position to
another and from one department, bureau or office
to another; provided that such reassignment or
transfer is made in the interest of public service and
involves no reduction in rank or salary; provided,
further, that no member shall be reassigned or
transferred oftener than every two years; and
provided, furthermore, that if the officer concerned
believes that his reassignment or transfer is not
justified, he may appeal his case to the President.
o The law allows appointment of those who are not CES
eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligibility, in
the same manner that the appointment of
respondent who does not possess the required CES
rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional
Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary
capacity.
3. CSC v Salas, GR 123708
 Overview: ‘Confidential Appointees’
 Respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR
Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and
assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
However, his employment was terminated by the Board
of Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly
for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation
conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR.
 Taking into consideration the nature of his functions, his
organizational ranking and his compensation level, it is
obviously beyond debate that private respondent cannot
be considered a confidential employee. As set out in the
job description of his position, one is struck by the
ordinary, routinary and quotidian character of his duties
and functions. Moreover, the modest rank and fungible
nature of the position occupied by private respondent is
underscored by the fact that the salary attached to it is a
meager P2,200.00 a month. There thus appears nothing
to suggest that private respondent's position was "highly"
or much less, "primarily" confidential in nature. The fact
that, sometimes, private respondent may handle
ordinarily "confidential matters" or papers which are
somewhat confidential in nature does not suffice to
characterize his position as primarily confidential.
 Primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution
in providing for the declaration of a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is
to exempt these categories from competitive
examination as a means for determining merit and
fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions
are covered by security of tenure, although they are
considered non-competitive only in the sense that
appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive
examinations for purposes of determining merit and
fitness.
 Although appointed by the Chairman, ISS members do
not directly report to the Office of the Chairman in the
performance of their official duties. An ISS members is
subject to the control and supervision of an Area
53 | P a g e
Supervisor who, in turn, only implements the directives
of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The latter is himself
answerable to the Chairman and the Board of Directors.
Obviously, as the lowest in the chain of command,
private respondent does not enjoy that "primarily close
intimacy" which characterizes a confidential employee.
4. Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC, GR No. 159940
 Overview: Career Service
 Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of
1987 provides:
o SECTION 7. Career Service. – The Career Service shall
be characterized by
 (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications;
 (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and
 (3) security of tenure
o The Career Service shall include:
 (1) Open Career positions for appointment to
which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
 (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or
highly technical in nature; these include the faculty
and academic staff of state colleges and
universities, and scientific and technical positions
in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
 (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service (CES);
namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed
by the President;
o From the above-quoted provision of the
Administrative Code, persons occupying positions in
the Career Executive Service (CES) are presidential
appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft
Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by
the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in
Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution.
 Authority of CSC to approve appointments in the civil
service is limited to determining whether or not the
appointees possess the legal qualifications and the
appropriate eligibility.
o Under P.D. No 807, Sec. 9 (h) which authorizes the
CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil
service, except those specified therein, its authority is
limited “only to [determine] whether or not the
appointees possess the legal qualifications and the
appropriate eligibility, nothing else.
o It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or
CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic
qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as
 provided in the Qualification Standards. Such being
the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the
request of the Ombudsman that appointment be
made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To
refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment
on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as
appointing authority.
5. Vistan v Nicolas 201 SCRA 524
 Overview: Violation of Election Laws by respondent judge
 The charge for violation of election laws was brought up
in AC No. 3040. Complainant narrated that as early as 10
February 1987, prior to 24 March 1987, or the date set by
the Commission on Election (COMELEC) to be the start of
the campaign period, and while still an MTJ Judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, Respondent started circulating
handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in
the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to
run for a congressional seat.
 SC find that Respondent had acted improperly when he
sent out letters/handbills, manifesting his intention to
run as a congressional candidate, addressed to electoral
constituents of the second district of Bulacan as early as
10 February 1987, while still the incumbent MTC Judge of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, and prior to the commencement of
the campaign period on 24 March 1987, this violates
o Section 45 of Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law)
stating that No officer or employee in the Civil Service
including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity
or take part in any election except to vote nor shall be
use his official authority or influence to coerce the
political activity of any other person or body.
o Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides that “A judge is entitled to entertain
personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not
make political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or
participate in other partisan political activities”
 For having held himself out as a congressional candidate
while still a member of the Bench, Respondent took
advantage of his position to boost his candidacy,
demeaned the stature of his office, and must be
pronounced guilty of gross misconduct.
 Atty. Arias: This rule, however, does not apply to senators
who are running for another post like presidency (e.g.
Grace Poe), who still exercise his/her function as senator
while campaigning. Rationale is that position of senator is
political in nature compare to a judge like in the case at
bar.
6. Domingo v Zamora, GR 142283 (2003)
 Overview: Power of the President to re-organize his
office
 Section 31 of EO 292 provides: Continuing Authority of
the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
54 | P a g e
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose,
he may take any of the following actions:
o (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
o (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency as well
as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments and Agencies; and
o (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President
from other Departments or Agencies
 President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments
or Agencies, and vice versa.
o This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of
tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in
good faith necessarily results in the employee's
cessation in office, but in such event there is no
dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases
to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions
or agencies does not result in the employee's
cessation in office because his office continues to exist
although in another department, agency or office. In
the instant case, the BPESS employees who were not
transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later
permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS,
ensuring their continued employment. At any rate, RA
9155 now mandates that these employees "shall be
retained by the Department."
7. OP v Buenaobra, GR 170021 (2006)
 Overview: Security of tenure of non-career service
personnel
 Under Section 4, Article IV, of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, positions in the civil
service is classified into career service and non-career
service. Section 6 of same article describes a non-career
service employee or officer as follows:
o Sec. 5. The Career Service shall be characterized by
 (1) Entrance based on merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations, or based on highly technical
qualifications;
 (2) Opportunity for advancement to higher
positions; and
 (3) Security of tenure
o Sec. 6. The Non-Career Service shall be characterized
by
  (1) Entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and
 (2) Tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.
1. The Non-Career Service shall include:
Chairman and members of commissions
and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff.
2. Non-career service personnel enjoy security
of tenure. They may not be removed
without just cause and non-observance of
due process. The constitutional and
statutory guarantee of security of tenure is
extended to both those in the career and
non-career service positions, and the cause
under which an employee may be removed
or suspended must naturally have some
relation to the character or fitness of the
officer or employee, for the discharge of the
functions of his office, or expiration of the
project for which the employment was
extended
8. Central Bank v CSC, 171 SCRA 744
 Overview: CSC authority to disapprove an appointment
 It is well-settled principle that the appointing authority is
given ample discretion in the selection and appointment
of qualified persons to vacant positions. Within the
parameters of this principle, the right to select and
appoint employees is the prerogative of the employer
which may be exercised without being held liable
therefor provided that the exercise thereof is in good
faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and
not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements and provided further that such prerogatives
are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.
o There is no question that the Central Bank of the
Philippines is vested with the power of appointment
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 265, as
amended, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act.
 The authority of the CSC is limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the law governing the Civil Service.
o The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of
its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
55 | P a g e
condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
G. The COMELEC
1. Brillantes v Comelec, GR 163193 (2004)
 Overview: COMELEC does not have authority to conduct
an “unofficial count” ; Automated Election System
 Under Section 27 of RA 7166, as amended by RA 8173,
and reiterated in Section 18 of RA 8436, the accredited
citizen's arm - NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use
a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an
"unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the
national or the local elections. No other entity, including
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the
election returns for purposes of conducting an
"unofficial" count.
 The second or third copy of the election returns, while
required to be delivered to the COMELEC, are not
intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The
copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by
COMELEC to verify election results in connection with
resolving election disputes that may be imminent.
However, in contravention of the law, the assailed
Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers
(RO) to open the second or third copy as basis for the
encoding and transmission of advanced "unofficial"
precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count,
but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing
the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by
creating a gap in its chain of custody from the Board of
Election Inspectors to the COMELEC.
 There is no constitutional and statutory basis for
COMELEC to undertake a separate and an "unofficial"
tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.
Indeed, by conducting such "unofficial" tabulation of the
results of the election, the COMELEC descends to the
level of a private organization, spending public funds for
the purpose. Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to
conduct two kinds of electoral counts - a slow but
"official" count, and an alleged quicker but "unofficial"
count, the results of each may substantially differ.
 The AES provided in RA 8436 constitutes the entire
"process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and
local elections" corresponding to the Phase I, Phase II and
Phase III of the AES of the COMELEC. The three phases
cannot be effected independently of each other. The
implementation of Phase II of the AES is a condition sine
qua non to the implementation of Phase III. The
nullification by this Court of the contract for Phase II of
the System effectively put on hold, at least for the May
10, 2004 elections, the implementation of Phase III of the
AES.
2. Sandoval v Comelec, GR 133842
 Overview: Pre-proclamation cases
  Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining
to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by, any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns.
 "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of
the House of Representatives. -- For purposes of the
elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating
to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or the certificates of
canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it."
 As a general rule, candidates and registered political
parties involved in an election are allowed to file pre-
proclamation cases before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation
controversies.
o As an exception, however, to the general rule,
Section 15 of RA 716626 prohibits candidates in the
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and
congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation
cases. The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the
proclamation of the winner in the election, which
delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive
posts.
 The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the
exception. The second sentence of Section 15
allows the filing of petitions for correction of
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns even in elections for president,
vice- president and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason that the
correction of manifest error will not prolong the
process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation
of the winner in the election. This rule is consistent
with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an, election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections."
 The authority to rule on petitions for correction of
manifest error is vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section
7 of Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that if the error is discovered before
proclamation, the board of canvassers may motu proprio,
or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party,
56 | P a g e
organization or coalition of political parties, after due
notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.
o The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the
board to the Commission and said appeal shall be
heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
Section 5, however of the same rule states that a
petition for correction of manifest error may be filed
directly with the Commission en banc provided that
such errors could not have been discovered during
the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence
and proclamation of , the winning candidate had
already been made.
 The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation
of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and
hearing and it rendered the questioned order based
solely on private respondent's allegations.
o Procedural due process demands prior notice and
hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary
that the tribunal show substantial evidence to
support its ruling. In other words, due process
requires that a party be given an opportunity to
adduce his evidence to support his side of the case
and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.
o "Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without
due process of law. Although public office is not
property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to
public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due
process in proceedings before the COMELEC,
exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due
notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the
COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power
to annul or suspend the proclamation of any
candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
Elections, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and
Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally
annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing."
 "Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-
proclamation controversies. -- The Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation
controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written
petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the
partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any
proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence
shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding
sections."
o The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the
annulment of proclamation but to the manner of
initiating the proceedings to annul a proclamation
made by the board of canvassers. The law provides
two ways by which annulment proceedings may be
initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the
COMELEC (motuproprio) or by written petition. In
 either case, notice and hearing is required. This is
clear from thelanguage of the law.
 The law requires that the hearing be held before
the COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the
public respondent first issued an order annulling
the proclamation of petitioner and then set the
date of the hearing.
 Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for
annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was
not merely performing an administrative function. The
resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent
and petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest
error in the questioned certificate of canvass requires the
COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the
veracity of their allegations and to decide whether the
alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of
this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its
quasi- judicial power.
o It has been said that where a power rests in judgment
or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of
functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer
other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-
judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-
judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed
by private respondent.
3. Al Haj v Comelec, GR No. 151046
 Overview: Instances wherein a failure of election may be
validly declared
 The court held that the only three instances wherein a
failure of election may be validly declared are when:
o a.) the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed in account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
o b.) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
or
o c.) after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases.
o The enumeration is exclusive and restrictive
 The irregularities pointed out by petitioners such as vote-
buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election
contest and may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a
failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater
number of the electorate through the misdeeds precisely,
of only a relative few.
4. Guevarra v Comelec, 104 Phil 269
 Overview: COMELEC could not exercise the power to
punish for contempt
57 | P a g e
 As defined in the Constitution, COMELEC "shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon
it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location
of polling places, and the appointment of election
inspectors and of other election officials."
 In the Section 5 of the Revised Election Code, it would
appear that COMELEC not only has the duty to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections but the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. As to what question may come within
this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised
Election Code specifies. But it is clear that, to come under
its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in
nature and must refer to the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
election.
 Considering that the administrative duty of the
Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious
preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of
election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots,
etc., it may also be said that the requisitioning the ballot
boxes to be used in the elections is an imperative
ministerial duty which the Commission. Such is the
incident which gave rise to the contempt case before us.
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission
has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that
however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the
Commission has performed in its administrative capacity
inrelation to the conduct of elections ordained by our
Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only
discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any
judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated
in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
5. Jaramilla v Comelec, GR No, 155717 (2003)
 Overview: COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction
 As stated in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, and in
line with the Court's recent pronouncement in Milla v.
Balmores-Laxa, election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies should first be heard and decided by a
division of the COMELEC, and then by the commission en
banc if a motion for reconsideration of the division is
filed.
o It must be noted however that this provision applies
only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it
merely exercises purely administrative functions.
 Accordingly, when the case demands only the
exercise by the COMELEC of its administrative
functions, such as the correction of a manifest
mistake in the addition of votes or an erroneous
tabulation in the statement of votes, the COMELEC
 en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its
constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
 The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in
the case at bar alleges an erroneous copying of
figures from the election return to the Statement
of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the
tabulation of the results, which merely requires a
clerical correction without the necessity of opening
ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only
the exercise of the administrative power of the
COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc
properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.
 SEC 18. Nonpayment of Prescribed Fees - If the fees
above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may
refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding.
o The use of the word "may" in the aforecited provision
readily shows that the COMELEC is conferred the
discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in
case of non-payment of legal fees. And even if it
werenot afforded such discretion, as discussed above,
it is authorized to suspend its rules or any portion
thereof in the interest of justice.
o Rationale: Laws governing election contests must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. Adherence to
technicality that would put a stamp on a palpably
void proclamation, with the inevitable result of
frustrating the people's will, can never be
countenanced.
6. Baytan v Comelec, GR No. 153945 (2003)
 Overview: COMELEC En Banc
 Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed
resolutions were issued in the preliminary investigation
stage and all that is required in the preliminary
investigation is the determination of probable cause to
justify the holding of petitioners for trial, in this case the
COMELEC found certain circumstances prevailing in the
case sufficient to warrant the finding of probable cause.
o There is no question that petitioners registered twice
on different days and in different precincts
withoutcanceling their previous registration. Aside
from this, the COMELEC found certain circumstances
prevailing in the case sufficient to warrant the finding
of probable cause.
o This principle emanates from the COMELEC's
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may
otherwise be provided by law.
 The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution to "prosecute cases of violations
of election laws." The prosecution of election law
violators involves the exercise of the COMELEC's
58 | P a g e
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can
directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file the criminal information for double
registration against petitioners in the instant case. There
is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the
criminal information be first decided by any of the
divisions of the COMELEC.
o The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers,
whether en banc or in division. The Constitution
merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in
the "Commission on Elections," while providing that
the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions."
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers.
Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC
both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
o The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is
subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the
COMELEC in division, and the motion for
reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It follows, as held by the Court in Canicosa, that
the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in
division, and then upon motion for reconsideration
en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-
judicial powers.
 The second sentence of Section 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution is not applicable in
administrative cases, like the instant case where
the COMELEC is determining whether probable
cause exists to charge petitioners for violation of
the provision of the Election Code prohibiting
double registration.
H. The COA
1. DBP v COA, 231 SCRA 202
 Overview: Pre-audit and Post-audit power of COA
 While it is true that the applicable procedure in force at
the time of the questioned transaction was COA Circular
86-257 requiring a pre-audit, there is nothing to preclude
respondent COA from conducting a post-audit of the
already pre-audited transaction.
o Article IX (D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution
expressly grants respondent Commission the power
to conduct a post-audit, to wit:
 "Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, and on a post-audit basis:
 1. (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution;
2. (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities;
3. (c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and
4. (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the
Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity . . .
 DBP is no doubt a government corporation and the
question of whether COA Circular 86-299 was
retroactively applied to the subject transaction is
thus of no moment. To begin with, there was never
any retroactive application of post-audit.
Regardless of the result of the pre-audit, it cannot
be denied that respondent COA is so empowered
to conduct a post-audit.
o A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions
before their consumption or payment and is basically
a special development of the control aspect of
accountancy as well as an integral part of the
accounting and payment process. Thus, pre-audit
seeks to determine that:
 1. The proposed expenditure complies with an
appropriation law or other specific statutory
authority;
 2. Sufficient funds are available for the purpose;
 3. The proposed expenditure is not unreasonable
or extravagant and the unexpended balance of
appropriations where it will be charged to is
sufficient to cover the entire amount thereof; and
 4. The transaction is approved by proper authority
and the claim is duly supported by authentic
underlying evidences (COA Journal, August 1976, p.
8)
2. Bustamante v COA, 216 SCRA 164
 Overview: Power of COA over GOCC
 "Sec. 2. The Commission on Audit shall have the following
powers and functions: "(1) Examine, audit, and settle, in
accordance with law and regulations, all accounts
pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or
held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations;
keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the
vouchers pertaining thereto; and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations including those for the
prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or
extravagant expenditures or uses of funds and property. .
. ." (Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.)
59 | P a g e
o In the exercise of such power it promulgated COA.
Circular No. 75-6 dated November 7, 1975, regulating
the use of government motor vehicles, aircrafts and
watercrafts, which, among others, provides: "VI.
Prohibition Against Use of Government Vehicles by
Officials provided with transportation allowance –
“"No official who has been furnished motor
transportation allowance by any government
corporations or other office shall be allowed to use
motor vehicle transportation operated and
maintained from funds appropriated in the above
cited Decree. (Sec. 14, P.D. 733)”
 It is very patent that the circular is addressed,
among others, to managing heads of Government-
owned or Controlled Corporations, the NPC being
held under such category of corporations.
 SC likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention
that the Commission, in the exercise of its power
granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory
functions of the NPC, Board of Directors for it leads
to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board of
Directors of a government-owned and controlled
corporation, by issuing a resolution, can put to
naught a constitutional provision which has been
ratified by the majority of the Filipino people.
o The factual finding of the Commission that petitioner
was indeed assigned a government vehicle is
conclusive upon this Court. The petitioner faults
respondent Regional Auditor for relying on her
serious doubts as to the nature of the use of the
vehicle assigned to petitioner as basis for the
disallowance. We hold, however, that such issue is
immaterial in the case at bar for the COA circular, in
prohibiting the use of motor vehicles by officials
receiving transportation allowance, is categorical. The
use of government motor vehicle and the claim for
transportation allowance are mutually exclusive. It is
on this basis that the P1,250.00 transportation
allowance was disallowed.
3. DBP v COA, GR No. 88435 (2002)
 Overview: Non-exclusivity of COA’s audit power ; Central
Bank vis-à-vis COA
 Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and
the clear intent of its framers, point to only one
indubitable conclusion - the COA does not have the
exclusive power to examine and audit government
agencies. The framers of the Constitution were fully
aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA
audit, as when there is a private investment in a
government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or
as in the case at bar when the government borrows
money from abroad.
 The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of
the entire Section 2 is that the COA's power to examine
and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COA's
 authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate
auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive.
o The findings and conclusions of the private auditor
may guide private investors or creditors who require
such private audit. Government agencies and officials,
however, remain bound by the findings and
conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls
under the first or second paragraph of Section 2,
unless of course such findings and conclusions are
modified or reversed by the courts.
 The power of the COA to examine and audit government
agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be taken away
from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting
any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any
guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."
o The mere fact that private auditors may audit
government agencies does not divest the COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored
since even with a private audit the COA will still
conduct its usual examination and audit, and its
findings nor conclusions will still bind government
agencies and their officials. A concurrent private audit
poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
 There is another constitutional barrier to the COA's
insistence of exclusive power to examine and audit all
government agencies. The COA's claim clashes directly
with the Central Bank's constitutional power of
"supervision" over banks under Section 20, Article XII of
the Constitution. This provision states as follows:
o Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting
periodic and special examination and audit of banks
to determine the soundness of their operations and
the safety of the deposits of the public. Undeniably,
the Central Bank's power of "supervision" includes
the power to examine and audit banks, as the
banking laws have always recognized this power of
the Central Bank. Hence, the COA's power to examine
and audit government banks must be reconciled with
the Central Bank's power to supervise the same
banks. The inevitable conclusion is that the COA and
the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under
the Constitution, to examine and audit government
banks.
o However, despite the Central Bank's concurrent
jurisdiction over government banks, the COA's audit
still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the
COA is the constitutionally mandated auditor of
government banks. And in matters falling under the
second paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of the
Constitution, the COA's jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus,
the Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or
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disallow expenditures of government banks since this
function belongs exclusively to the COA.
o There is no existing statute prohibits government
banks from hiring private auditors in addition to the
COA.
I. Sandiganbayan
1. PD 1606
 Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications;
tenure; removal; and compensation. –– A special court,
of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing
all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known
as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a
Presiding Justice and fourteen Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President. (As amended by R.A.
No. 8249)
 No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at lease 40 years
of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a
court of record or been engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to
the bar as a pre-requisite for a like period.
 Section 3. Division of the Court; Quorum –– The
Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) divisions of three
Justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.
 Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in
divisions: Provided, that when the required quorum for
the particular division cannot be had due to the legal
qualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a
vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may
designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be
determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse
order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said
division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular
member of said division the trial and determination of a
case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of
the court will be prejudice thereby, in which case the
President shall, upon the recommendation of the
Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the
Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
 Section 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
o (A) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
 (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade “27” and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
 1. (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
2. (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurer,
assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (c) Officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
3. (d) Philippine army and air force colonels,
naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
4. (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police
while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of
senior superintendent or higher;
5. (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
6. (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations;
 (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
 (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
 (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
 (5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
o (B) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection of this section in relation to their office.
o (C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
 In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade “27” or higher,
as prescribe in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
 The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
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original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
 In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
 Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. –
The unanimous vote of the three justices in a division
shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
In the event that the three justices do not reach a
unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two
other justices from among the members of the Court to
sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
2. Nunez v Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433
 Overview: Ex-Post Facto Law ; Constitutionality of PD
1486 or the creation of Sandiganbayan
 "An ex post facto law is one which:
o (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
o (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed;
o (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
o (4) alters the legal rules of the evidences, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense;
o (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a
right for something which when done was lawful; and
o (6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
 "The case clearly does not come within the definition of
Ex Post Facto Law, nor can it be seen in what way the act
in question alters the situation of petitioner to his
disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government,
the benefit of the appeal, and is intended as furnishing
the means for the correction of errors. The possibility
that the judge of the Court of First Instance may commit
error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears
to be the only foundation for the claim. A person can
have no vested right in such a possibility."
 Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is
no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming
from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto
clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in
the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an
accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
 adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of
life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him." The
crucial words are "vital for the protection of life and
liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case.
 Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to
the protection of his liberty?
o The answer must be in the negative. In the first place,
his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-
judge court of a division of respondent Court.
Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which
"the Presiding Justice shall designate two other
justices from among the members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five
justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment."
Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a
review to see whether any error of law was
committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
J. Ombudsman
1. Roxas v Vasquez, GR No 114944
 Ombudsman's determination whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe a crime has been
committed; Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
 Ordinarily, The SC do not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probable guilty
thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. However, the
court found that the case at bar falls under one of the
recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the
constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the
charges are manifestly false.
o In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not
probable cause exists, the Court may interfere with
the findings and conclusions. Be that as it may, Court
recognizes that the power to investigate offenses of
this nature belongs to the Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor.
o While the Ombudsman may have erred in
disregarding the recommendations of the Special
Prosecution Officers which appear to be
substantiated by the record, he should be allowed an
opportunity to review his decision and, where
necessary, correct it. Furthermore, it appears that
petitioners were deprived of due process when the
Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against
them without their knowledge. Due process of law
requires that every litigant must be given an
opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be
present and defend himself in person at every stage
of the proceedings.
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2. People v Velez, GR No. 138093
 Overview: Party desiring to appeal; Office of Ombudsman
and Sandiganbayan
 SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
o The Court has previously held that the "party"
referred to in the rule is the original party in the main
case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main
case. Hence, only the aggrieved original party in the
main case is the only proper party as petitioner.
 The grant of affirmative relief based on the first
assigned error would really redound to the benefit
of an entity which was not made a party in the
main case and which did not seek to intervene
therein. Therefore, it has no personality to seek a
review of the public respondent's Amended
Decision under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only
the original parties to the main case may do so.
 The Court notes that Salmingo was not a party in
the main case. While it is true that he initiated the
criminal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against respondents for various
offenses, however, under the Information filed
with the SB, the parties are the People of the
Philippines as plaintiff and the respondents as the
accused. The private complainant is the City of Silay
while Salmingo is merely a witness for the plaintiff.
 The private complainant in a criminal case before
the SB is also a proper party to file a petition under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, but only on the civil aspect of the case. It
must be noted that Salmingo was not the private
complainant in the main case. As gleaned from the
Information, Silay City was the party which suffered
damage as a consequence of the wrongful acts of
the malefactors and hence is the private
complainant in the main case.
 SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
o A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive
or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be
filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
 (1) New evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the order, directive or decision;
 (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided,
 that only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
o The Office of the Ombudsman is vested under the
1987 Constitution with investigatory and
prosecutorial powers. Said office, through the Special
Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of
the case. When it filed the Motion to Withdraw
Information on its finding that there was no probable
cause against respondents, except the City Engineer,
the Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its
investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
 While the Office of the Ombudsman has the
discretion to determine whether an Information
should be withdrawn and a criminal case should be
dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal of such
Information or dismissal of a criminal case, the final
disposition of the said motion and of the case is
addressed to the sound discretion of the SB subject
only to the caveat that the action of the SB must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused and
of the right of the People to due process of law.
3. Ledesma v CA GR No. 161629
 Overview: Office head’s accountability; Ombudsman’s
power to “recommend” or order” removal, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecute of a gov’t official or employee
 The ombudsman has the power to “recommend” or
“order” removal, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecute
of a gov’t official or employee.
o Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural
and functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman
and his deputies not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the administrative,
civil and criminal liability of government officers and
employees in every case where the evidence
warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people. The authority of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations
as in the present case is settled.
o Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties: (3) direct
the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
 The Ombudsman has the authority to determine
the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head
of the office or agency concerned to implement the
penalty imposed. In other words, it merely
concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction.
o The provisions of RA 6770 support public
respondents' theory. Section 15 is substantially the
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same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution. The
"order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute" an officer or employee - akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature
but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an
erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the
implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer, which in this case would be the head
of the BID.
o It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it
can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government
officers and employees. The Office was granted the
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
(with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can
preventively suspend any officer under its authority
pending an investigation when the case so warrants.
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the
wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
4. Ombudsman v Madriaga, GR No. 164316
 Overview: Power of the ombudsman to enforce its duly-
issued judgments
 The Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of a public official or employee at
fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In
other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of
the Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction.
 SC note that the proviso in Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770
qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee - akin to
the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with
such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring
officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a
strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should
not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of
the authority of the head of office or any officer
concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act
 or omission of any public official is not an exclusive
authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect
of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the
Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken
against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in
the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the
implementation of the order be coursed through the
proper officer.
o The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be
read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
o In fine, petitioner's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
5. Ombudsman vs CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27
 Overview: Resort to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari without need of prior motion for
reconsideration before Court of Appeals; Power of CA to
issue injunctive writ; Abandonment of condonation
doctrine
 As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first
be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition.
o One of the recognized exceptions is “where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.”
 The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition
against any court except the Supreme Court from issuing
a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
o Generally speaking, "injunction is a judicial writ,
process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to
do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action." Considering the
textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a
provisional injunctive relief.
o The exception to the no injunction policy is when
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter
of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction.
o Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain
administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction
of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but
has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
o First paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is declared
ineffective insoafar as it encroaches upon the court's
inherent power to issue injunctions.
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 The second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA
had no jurisdiction over the main CA petition, as it is
supposedly the Supreme Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or
findings, is vague for two (2) reasons:
o (a) it is unclear what the phrase "application for
remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and
o (b) It does not specify what procedural remedy is
solely allowable to the Supreme Court, save that the
same be taken only against a pure question of law.
o The appropriate construction of the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is that all remedies
against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are
prohibited, except the Rule 45 remedy to the
Supreme Court on pure questions of law.
o In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 also increased the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that (the
SC) gave its consent to the same. Applying the ruling
in Fabian vs Desierto, second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 is unconstitutional and perforce, invalid
 Court may decide on constitutional questions
affecting jurisdiction even though not raised in the
pleadings.
 With the unconstitutionality of the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes
that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main CA petition (Binay petition seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order).
 Ombudsman's independence protects it from political
pressure , but not from judicial power
o Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the "protector of the people"
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints
and action bureau. Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to
enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution. (see Gonzales III v. Office of the
President)
o The concept of Ombudsman's independence covers
three (3) things:
 First: creation by the Constitution, which means
that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges,
be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made;
 Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the
office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to
use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane
to [its] functions, hence, its budget cannot be
strategically decreased by officials of the political
 branches of government so as to impair said
functions; and
 Third: insulation from executive supervision and
control, which means that those within the ranks of
the office can only be disciplined by an internal
authority. (see Gonzales III v. Office of the
President)
 Consequently, it remains that the CA had the authority to
issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these
issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9
(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had
already acquired over the main case
o By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a
penalty but only a preventive measure. Its purpose is
to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office
to influence potential witnesses or tamper with
records which may be vital in the prosecution of the
case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or
removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
o Not being a penalty, the period within which one is
under preventive suspension is not considered part of
the actual penalty of suspension.
o Section 24, RA 6770 sets forth two (2) conditions that
must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension pending an investigation,
namely:
 (1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
 (2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist
with the first requirement:
1. The charge involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty;
2. The charge would warrant removal from
the service; or
3. The respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
 The condonation doctrine, which is the basis of the CA's
injunctive writs, is abandoned.
o Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the
electorate, when re-electing a local official, are
assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in
any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary
to human experience that the electorate would have
full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds.
Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily
covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual
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level, condonation presupposes that the condoner
has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned.
Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.
 Abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application.
o For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds
to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local
official from office are stated in Section 60 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC). Section 66 (b) of
the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall
not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Note, however, that the provision only
pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect
on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that
the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by
the fact of re-election. At best, Section 66 (b) of the
LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows
said official to still run for re-election.
K. Office of the Special Prosecutor
1. Zaldivar v SB, 160 SCRA 843
 Overview: Tanodbayan under the Special Prosecutor
 Freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice. For the protection
and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context,
in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.
o Only slightly less important is the public interest in
the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and
control professional misconduct on the part of
lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every
man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears
to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may
have to be more limited than that of a layman.
o Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for
contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and
suggests that the members of this Court have
recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy
of libel suits by individual members of this Court may
well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is
 by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover,
whereas in the instant case, it is not only the
individual members of the Court but the Court itself
as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel
suits cannot be an adequate remedy.
 The point in this case is that the Tanodbayan, now under
the Special Prosecutor, no longer holds the power to
conduct preliminary investigations as this right has
already been vested to the Ombudsman with its creation
during the effectively of the 1987 Constitution. Refer to
Article 11, Section 7 of the Constitution.
2. Orap v Sandiganbayan, 139 SCRA 252
 Overview: Tanodbayan’s power to conduct preliminary
investigation
 Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as
prosecutor as well.
o As ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited
to complaints initiated against officers and personnel
of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a)
of the law. Insofar as administrative complaints are
concerned, the courts, judges and their appurtenant
judicial staff are outside the Tanodbayan's
investigatory power. The reason for such exclusion is
quite evident: under Section 6, Article 10 of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that exercises
administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel and, therefore, is the proper forum to
which administrative complaints involving judges and
the court's personnel should be lodged.
o As prosecutor, however, the authority of the
Tanodbayan is plenary and without exceptions. His
powers are defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D.
1607. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term,
confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief
Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors, the
exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to
direct and control the prosecution of said cases
therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other
court personnel he outside the investigatory power of
the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee
could ever be brought to justice for crimes and
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of
proper officer or entity authorized to conduct the
preliminary investigation on complaints of such
nature against them. This absurd situation the law
could never have intended, considering that the
Office of the Tanodbayan was purposely created to
"give effect to the constitutional right of the people
to petition the government for redress of grievances
and to promote higher standards of integrity and
efficiency in the government service.
 "SEC. 10. Powers. - The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers
1. (a) He may investigate, on complaint by any
person or on his own motion or initiative,
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any administrative act whether amounting
to any criminal offense or not of any
administrative agency including any
government-owned or controlled
corporation;
 Sec. 17. The Chief Special Prosecutor, the Assistant
Chief Special Prosecutor, and the Special
Prosecutors shall have the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file
informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases therein; Provided,
however, that the Tanodbayan may, upon
recommendation of the Chief Special Prosecutor,
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in
the government service to act as Special
Prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan who shall not receive any
additional compensation except such allowances,
per diems and travelling expenses as the
Tanodbayan may determine in accordance with
existing laws, rules and regulations.
 "SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other
Person.- If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe
that any public official, employee, or other person
has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause
him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief
Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
before the proper administrative agency. In case of
failure of justice, the Tanodbayan shall make the
appropriate recommendations to the
administrative agency concerned."
L. National Commissions
1. Carino v CHR, GR 96681
 Overview: Limit of CHR’s power
 The investigation by the Commission on Human Rights
would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should
result in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to
reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can
only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly
by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer
the matter to the appropriate Government agency or
tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
 The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
 cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
o The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
 The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as
an independent office. Upon its constitution, it
succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee
on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of
the Constitution. Its powers and functions are the
following: "(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights; X X X X X
o As should at once be observed, only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment.
o But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
 Legal meaning of "investigate" is: "to follow up step
by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace
or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a
legal inquiry;"; "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "an administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a
hearing. . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters.
 "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment
o Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,
having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to
do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
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the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights
had been transgressed.
 These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
o Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above
narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and
resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil
Service Commission; and even this Court itself has
had occasion to pass upon said issues.
o The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place
in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding
into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no
business going over the same ground traversed by the
latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved. This would accord success to what may well
have been the complaining teachers' strategy to
abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the
Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be
adverse to them
2. Canonizado v Aguirre, GR No. 133132
 Overview: Security of Tenure of CSC Employees and
officials; Abolition of office in good faith
 Security of tenure in the civil service
o Petitioners are members of the civil service, which
embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. As such, they
cannot be removed or suspended from office, except
for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for
cause provided by law" refers to "... reasons which
the law and sound public policy recognize as
sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause,
and not merely causes which the appointing power in
the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."
 Abolition of a public office must be done in good faith
o The creation and abolition of public offices is
primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged
that Congress may abolish any office it creates
without impairing the officer's right to continue in the
position held and that such power may be exercised
for various reasons, such as the lack of funds or in the
interest of economy. However, in order for the
abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith,
not for political or personal reasons, or in order to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of
civil service employees.
o Where one office is abolished and replaced with
another office vested with similar functions, the
abolition is not in good faith and is invalid.
 o An abolition of office connotes an intention to do occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And
away with such office wholly and permanently, as the in that case, security of tenure would not be a
word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
abolished and replaced with another office vested which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
This is because where the abolished office and the security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
offices created in its place have similar functions, the valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
abolition lacks good faith. is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition"
 Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
declaration that that office is vacant. While it is positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish the existence of ample funds.
certain offices, it cannot be conceded the power to  Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It
simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby is of no moment that there are now new appointees to
effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof from the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that
the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, when a regular government employee is illegally
an infringement of the constitutional guarantee of dismissed, his position never became vacant under the
security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on law and he is considered as not having left his office. The
that account. It cannot be justified by the professed new appointments made in order to replace petitioners
"need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom are not valid.
invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to
upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments. (see Mayor v. Macaraig)
 In order to determine whether there has been an implied
abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes
introduced by the new law in the nature, composition
and functions of the NAPOLCOM.
o Powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically
unchanged by the amendments. Under the RA 8551,
NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the
same administrative, supervisory, rule-making,
advisory and adjudicatory functions.
 Public respondents argue that the fact that the
NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative control
and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under
RA 6975 it only exercised administrative control should
be construed as evidence of legislative intent to abolish
such office. This contention is bereft of merit. Control
means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter." On the other hand,
to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, and to
superintend the execution of or the performance of a
thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect
with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Thus,
the power of control necessarily encompasses the power
of supervision and adding the phrase "operational
supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would
not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as
to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office
has been created.
 Reorganization, to be valid, must be done in good faith
o As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
"good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually
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