SECTION 13 – RIGHT TO BAIL
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BASCO vs RAPATALO
FACTS: Inocencio Basco filed a complaint against Judge Leo H. Rapatalo of RTC,
Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union for gross ignorance or willful disregard of established
rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving
evidence and conducting a hearing.
Basco is the father of the victim of a murder by three men. Roger Morente, one of
the three accused, filed for a petition for bail. For several times and several
reasons, a hearing for the petition was set but did not push through.
Later, Basco allegedly saw Morente in Rosario, La Union. He later learned that
Judge granted the latter’s petition for bail despite the fact that the petition was not
heard at all.
The Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor’s option not
to oppose the petition as well as the latter’s recommendation setting the bail bond in
the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to
oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not.
He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume
that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the
case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, the private prosecutor
was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Eventually, the bail bond posted by Morente was cancelled and a warrant for his
arrest was issued on account of Basco’s motion for consideration. Morente is then
confined in the La Union Provincial Jail.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Judge can grant a petition for bail without a hearing
for that purpose.
HELD: No, a judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.
The Supreme Court then reiterated the following rules outlining the duties of a
judge in case an application for bail is set:
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation.
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion.
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution.
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or
leave the application of bail to the discretion of the court.
While it may be true that the respondent Judge set the application for bail for
hearing three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to
the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the
fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his
duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong
for purposes of bail.
The Judge is reprimanded with the warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN
1991] Thursday, February 12, 2009 - Habeas Corpus – Right to Bail –
Rebellion
Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion.
was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his
co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held
thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was later agreed upon by both parties
that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in
custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial.
The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the
habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for
bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not
bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas
is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he
withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be
held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his
petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that
Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a
waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by
his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
PEOPLE VS. FORTES [223 SCRA 619; G.R. NO. 90643; 25 JUN 1993]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case
Digests, Political Law
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,Province
of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police
station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by
the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A
bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional release. The MCTC
found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond
was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same
amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail violated.
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right
when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall
be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter
of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty,
bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on
the part of the court.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG
1991]
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP
were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the
alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now
claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article
of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not
released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court
martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal
charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to
present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of
February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21,
1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits.
On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were
again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena
that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a
waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to
pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority
to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas
corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in
the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from
their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process
and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able
to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R.
No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under article 18 of the
articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and
the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are
hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Baylon v Judge Sison 243 SCRA 284 (1995)
“application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua/life
imprisonment requires a hearing to giveprosecution the chance to present
evidence on the guilt of the accused”
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the
accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at
least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15,
section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-
working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the
prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present
evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge
justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution
did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was
cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in
the grant of bail to the accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the
judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was
filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday
thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating
the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well
established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing
where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have
carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an outright
grant of this motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence
because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of
such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion
but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
MANOTOC v. CA
Facts: Criminal complaints were filed by some clients of the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., to which petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is a principal
stockholder, after the torrens title submitted to and accepted by the same were
suspected to be fake. The cases were assigned to different trial courts. In all
cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail, with FGU Instance Corporation as
Surety.
Petitioner then filed motion for permission to leave the country in each trial
courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative
to his business transactions and opportunities.". His motion was denied thus
he elevated his petition to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that
having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which granted him
bail could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. The
same was denied hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released
on bail, has an unrestricted right to travel?
Held: Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute
right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states that “The liberty of
abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court,
or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health.” The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the said constitutional provision.
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA VS PURGANAN
Facts: The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order
set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the
arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government
requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was
issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions: The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s: No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the
word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition
of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But
because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due
processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has
thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)
Facts: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court.
Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the
Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region
filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a
petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
“flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was
granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing
its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited
in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue: WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Ratio Decidendi: Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s
liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States
of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675
April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court
took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is
given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court
departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be
allowed to post bail.
Enrile v Sandiganbayan and People
Facts: Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the
PNP General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:
He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal
considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary
surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously
considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
He is charged with a capital offense;
That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the
prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to
fix bail?
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s
fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by
the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the
accused during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time
recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of his
innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail
for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged
should be allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to bail
it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true
purpose of bail.
SECTION 14 – CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
TATAD VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [159 SCRA 70; G.R. NOS. L-72335-39; 21 MAR
1988]
Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a
report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on
October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to
"sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known
that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The
Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months
after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the
complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former
Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June
12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA.
3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to
file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and
1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution
deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of
the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.
Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were
violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad
had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D.
No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other
hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A
delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the
light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Galman v Sandiganbayan 144 SCRA 392 (1986)
Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case
involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority
reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the
assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to
the military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the
Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the
intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement the
acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan
and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert
genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence
and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from
the charges against them.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process
and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the
due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was
not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and
the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the
authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and
closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary.
The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed
void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with
lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set
aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order
for a re-trial was granted.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the
Philippines - Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due
Process
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and
had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna.
The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of
venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape
and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on
the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that
Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of
the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown
impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case
is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO [42 SCRA 60; G.R. L-21325; 29 OCT 1971]
Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he
could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was
for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from
Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only Dramayo and
Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal
Issue: Whether or not the accused’s criminal liability proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of
innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right
safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even
called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit
only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt be shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required then is moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is meant that which
of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind
rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not
demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
regular to constitute the offense."
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on
the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest
credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was more
than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the
prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It
must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time,
there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the
defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being
allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense
guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their
capability.
Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal
Protection” – Eligibility to Office after Being 65 - Judicial Review;
Requisites thereof
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He
has already retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement
benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that
retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office.
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of
the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr.
These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of
BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of
action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this
case should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from
Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea
that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for
crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints
against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the
laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require
that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated,
a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired,
as provided for in the challenged provision.
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ v. COMELEC, GR No. 112889, 1995-04-18
Facts: a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the
Province of Quezon... filed this petition for certiorari praying for the
reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
which dismissed... his petition for quo warranto against the winning
candidate... h... erein private respondent... for being allegedly a fugitive
from justice.
It is averred tha... at the time private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy... a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance
fraud... was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
State of California, U.S.A.
Before the... elections, a petition for cancellation... of respondent's
certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification
under... of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the
COMELEC
COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings... inst private
respondent before the COMELEC... the COMELEC
Hence, this petition for certiorari
Issues: whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge
before a foreign... court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within
the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local
Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for,
and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
Ruling: Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he
asseverates, needs no further interpretation and construction. Section
40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it
disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political... cases here
or abroad" from seeking any elective local office
The Solicitor General, taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like
opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but... likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
he Court believes and thus holds,... albeit with some personal reservations
of the ponente... that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term
"fugitive... from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has
been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether
or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term
must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The
omission is understandable since the COMELEC... dismissed outrightly
the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court
itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to
the COMELEC for a... determination of this unresolved factual matter.
uestioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission
which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch
conformably with the foregoing opinion
Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)
Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision finding him
guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting
supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurer’s office. He denied having
misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a
shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was
the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4
checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced
by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book
despite not actually receiving the amount.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of
innocence of the accused of the charge against him
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield
to the positive findings that he malversed the government funds
considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the
charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the
paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were
inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave
on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.
Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262,
31 May 1991]
Facts: The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned
and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left
Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil
and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy
Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel
anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the
Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the
knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in
the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of
Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The
Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the
required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the
port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view
thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder
International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International (Phils.)
Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure
and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated 12
December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties,
through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17
March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T
"ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100
M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating
Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder International
appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated
13 May 1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of Customs of
Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International filed a petition for
review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the
Commissioner from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the
Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the
Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed
a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the
Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in
view of the Court's decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the
Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its
questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having been denied on 4
July 1990, it interposed the present petition.
Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the
corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent.
Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in
nature, contrary to the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the
case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court
made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in
relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in
nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the
imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can
be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are purely
civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to
enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful
importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure
cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be
imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of
penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for
the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since
they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition
upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is
merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be
presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an
accused in a criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the
Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at
least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel
M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo
pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder
International is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to
unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of
Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the
elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of
the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to
great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Case Digest: Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines
FACTS: On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela
and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four
years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed
that she had witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had
been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.
Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had
become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution to its success.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and
spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-
examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.
In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of
shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was
informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became
piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on
Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against
him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken
place, he was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the
US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As
documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four
stamps recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the US,
Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his
stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by
the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a
thorough recount of his activities in the US
ISSUE: Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should
be given more credence by the Court than the positive identification by
Alfaro.
RULING: For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at
least two criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness; and
The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the
above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around the agency
for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. And although her testimony included details, Alfaro
had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.
She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her
testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front
door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime
scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and
satisfactory evidence that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded
documentary alibi presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches
Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the
other accused. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold
altogether. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.