Case No.

G056153

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT - DIVISION THREE

MARK DANIELS,
Petitioner and Respondent
vs.
NEAL KELLEY, Orange County Registrar of Voters,
Respondent.
LENORE ALBERT, aka LENORE LUANN ALBERT, aka LENORE
ALBERT-SHERIDAN,

Real Party in Interest, and Appellant

From the Superior Court for Orange County

Craig Griffin, Presiding Judge
(Case No. 30-2018-00980421-CU-WM-CJC)

APPELLANT LENORE ALBERT’S OPENING BRIEF

AND CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

Lenore L. Albert
14272 Hoover Street #69
Westminster, CA 92683
Ph 424-365-0741
Lenorealbert@msn.com
Real Party in Interest, Appellant, Lenore Albert, pro per

1
 TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL APP-008
COURT OF APPEAL CASE NUMBER:
COURT OF APPEAL Fourth APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION Three G056153

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY: STATE BAR NUMBER:

SUPERIOR COURT CASE NUMBER:
NAME: Lenore Albert 30-2018-00980421-CU-WM-CJC
FIRM NAME:
STREET ADDRESS: 14272 Hoover Street #69
CITY: Westminster STATE: CA ZIP CODE: 92683
TELEPHONE NO.: 424-365-0741 FAX NO.:
E-MAIL ADDRESS: lenorealbert@msn.com
ATTORNEY FOR (name):

APPELLANT/ Lenore Albert

PETITIONER:
RESPONDENT/ Mark Richard Daniels, et al
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS

(Check one): INITIAL CERTIFICATE SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE

Notice: Please read rules 8.208 and 8.488 before completing this form. You may use this form for the initial
certificate in an appeal when you file your brief or a prebriefing motion, application, or opposition to such a
motion or application in the Court of Appeal, and when you file a petition for an extraordinary writ. You may
also use this form as a supplemental certificate when you learn of changed or additional information that must
be disclosed.

1. This form is being submitted on behalf of the following party (name ): Lenore Albert

2. a. There are no interested entities or persons that must be listed in this certificate under rule 8.208.
b. Interested entities or persons required to be listed under rule 8.208 are as follows:

Full name of interested Nature of interest

entity or person (Explain):

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Continued on attachment 2.

The undersigned certifies that the above-listed persons or entities (corporations, partnerships, firms, or any other
association, but not including government entities or their agencies) have either (1) an ownership interest of 10 percent or
more in the party if it is an entity; or (2) a financial or other interest in the outcome of the proceeding that the justices
should consider in determining whether to disqualify themselves, as defined in rule 8.208(e)(2).

Date: 08/29/2018

s/ Lenore Albert
Lenore Albert
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF APPELLANT OR ATTORNEY)

Page 1 of 1
Form Approved for Optional Use
Judicial Council of California
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.208, 8.488
www.courts.ca.gov
APP-008 [Rev. January 1, 2017]

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................... 9

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................ 10
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY........................................... 11
IV. STATEMENT OF KEY ISSUES ON APPEAL ........... 15
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................... 16
VI. ARGUMENT ................................................................ 17
A. MARK DANIELS DID NOT PROVE ANY BALLOT
DESIGNATION BY MS. ALBERT WOULD MISLEAD THE
PUBLIC, SO THE TRIAL COURT ERRED; AND THAT ERROR
WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ELECTION ............................. 17
1. THE BALLOT DESIGNATION CHALLENGE .................. 17
a. ORANGE COUNTY IS NOT ISSUING ORDERS IN
CONFORMITY WITH ELECTIONS CODE §13107(F) 18
b. OTHER COUNTIES INTERPRET BALLOT
DESIGNATION CHALLENGES UNDER ELECT. CODE
§13107 IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE
CANDIDATE OF ANY BALLOT DESIGNATION AT ALL22
c. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF CANDIDATES WHEN
APPLYING §13107 VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE CANDIDATE’S FIRST
AMEND RIGHTS BECAUSE IT STIFLES THEIR CORE
POLITICAL SPEECH ............................................. 26
d. THE RESULT LED TO MISINFORMING THE
ELECTORATE AS TO THEIR CHOICES DURING THE
2018 PRIMARY RACE FOR ORANGE COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHICH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPERMISSIBLE ................................................... 29
e. THE RESULT DRAMATICALLY DECREASED THE
LIKELIHOOD OF MS. ALBERT’S SUCCESS ON
ELECTION DAY BECAUSE THE ELECTORATE RELY

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 ON THE BALLOT DESIGNATION FOR DOWN BALLOT
RACES................................................................. 31
B. THE SUSPENSION ISSUE WAS NOT A VALID
JUSTIFICATION TO TAKE AWAY ALBERT’S RIGHT TO
A BALLOT DESIGNATION ....................................... 36
1. A STATE AGENCY, INCLUDING THE STATE BAR
HAS THE POWER TO (BUT NO RIGHT TO)
INTERFERE IN ELECTIONS BY BACK DATING A
SUSPENSION ................................................ 36
2. EVEN IF SUSPENDED A PROFESSIONAL STILL
GETS A BALLOT DESIGNATION...................... 37
3. “SUSPENDED” IS NOT A NOUN ...................... 38
C. AMENDING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
AT THE HEARING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR .......... 42
D. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MS. ALBERT’S
SUSPENSION STARTED ON FEBRUARY 14, 2018 AND
CONTINUED THROUGH APRIL 5, 2018; THAT ERROR
WAS PREJUDICIAL WARRANTING REVERSAL........... 46

1. THE STATE BAR’S OWN POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES SHOWED CRC DOES NOT
CONTROL THE EFFECTIVE SUSPENSION DATE
FOR ATTORNEYS ........................................... 46

2. THE BANKRUPTCY PREVENTED THE STATE

BAR FROM WITHHOLDING MS. ALBERT’S
LICENSE....................................................... 50
3. THE UNDERLYING DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
WERE VOID ORDERS .................................... 51
E. OTHER ISSUES ...................................................... 54
1. INADEQUATE RECORD TO GRANT THE
PETITION ..................................................... 55
2. PUBLIC WAS DEPRIVED OF DIAMOND’S $15.00
FEE .............................................................. 55

4
 F. MULTIPLYING EFFECT THIS ORDER CONTINUES TO
HAVE ON OTHER PROCEEDINGS AND THE GREATER
PUBLIC INTEREST DEMONSTRATE THIS APPEAL IS
NOT MOOT ............................................................ 55
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................. 58
VIII. CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ............................ 61
IX. STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ......................... 61
X. PROOF OF SERVICE .................................................. 62

5
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1 ................................. 52
Andal v Miller 28 Cal.App.4th 358, 364 (1994) ................................ 29, 32
Barns v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524 ........ 54
Bauman v Bowen, Sacramento County Superior Court Case No.
34-2014-80001796 (March 27, 2014) .............................................. 23, 45
Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509 .................................................... 53
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525
U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999) ................................. 41
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119
L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) .......................................................................... 40, 41
Campisi v. Super. Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1833, 1839 (1993) ............... 43
Chambers v. Terry (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 153 ......................................... 50
City of Petaluma v. County of Sonoma (1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th
1239 ....................................................................................................... 26
Cook v Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2010) ....................................................... 40
Corralejo v. Quiroga (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 871 .................................... 52
Darley v Ward (1980) 28 Cal3d 257, ....................................................... 53
De Young v City of San Diego (1993) 147 Cal App 3d 11 ................. 26, 28
Dean v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 638 ................................ 27
Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 785 ................................... 27
Early v. Becerra et al. CV087605 8/02/18 (pet for rev S250475
denied 08/10/18.) ................................................................................... 50
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489
U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) ............................... 41
Eye Dog Found v State Board of Guide Dogs (1967) 67 Cal 2d 536 ....... 56
Ferrara v Belanger (1976) 18 Cal 3d 253 ................................................ 55
Franchise Tax Board v Municipal Court (1975) 45 Cal pp 3d 377 ........ 44
Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal. 3d
152, 155 ................................................................................................. 27
In re David B (2017) 12 Cal App 5th 633 ................................................. 55
In re Garcia (1998) 67 Cal App 4th 841 ................................................... 55
In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637 .................................... 52
In re Marriage of Fuller (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1070 ............................ 52
In re Stasson, 472 B.R. 748, 754 (BK ED Mich 2012) ............................ 51
In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal App 4th 1228 .............................................. 55

6
In re Taggart, 249 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.2001)............................................. 50
In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal 3d 16 ....................................................... 55
In the contested Election Matter of Todd Spitzer, Orange County
Superior Court Case No. 30-2018-01002774-CU-PT-CJC, .................. 56
Inglewood (2015) PERB Decision No. 2424-M (Issued on 6/1/15) .......... 43
Jenson v Superior Court (2008) 160 CalApp4th 366 .............................. 16
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986) ..................................................... 50
Knoll v Davidson, (1974) 12 Cal3d 335................................................... 55
LeFrancois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094, 1108 (2005) ................................. 43
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Los Angeles Export
Terminal, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287 ............................................ 16
Love v. Scott (In re Love), 442 B.R. 868, 871
(Bankr.M.D.Tenn.2011) ........................................................................ 50
Lufkin v Bd of Profl Responsibility 336 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn Sup Ct
2011) ...................................................................................................... 51
Mackovski v City of Garden Grove 11-cv-1538-CJC ......................... 11, 44
McKee v Orange County Unified School District 110 Cal. App. 4th
1310 ....................................................................................................... 16
Monarch Healthcare v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. 4 App. 4th 1282
(2000)..................................................................................................... 43
Moore v Kaufman 189 CalApp4th 604 (2010) ........................................ 53
Richard C. Cassar v. Michael Vu (Mark B. Wyland), San Diego
County Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00027737-CU-WM-
CTL (August 12, 2016) .................................................................... 23, 32
Richters v Spitzer, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-
2018-000976891 .................................................................................... 56
Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
1228 ....................................................................................................... 53
Roe v Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113.............................................................. 55
Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir.1992) ......................................... 41
Salinger v. Jordan (1964) 61 Cal.2d 824, 826 ........................................ 29
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 4th 726, 739 (2005) ............ 43
Sole Energy Co. v. Hodges (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 199 ......................... 52
Tennessee Bd. Prof'l Responsibility v. Brooks (In re Brooks), Case
No. 04-15901, Adv. No. 04-1290, 2008 WL 1924040
(Bankr.E.D.Tenn. Apr.28, 2008)........................................................... 50
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117
S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) ................................................ 40, 41

7
Vasquez v Happy Valley Union School Dist (2008) 159 CalApp4th
969, ........................................................................................................ 16
Western States Petroleum Assn v Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal4th
559, 575 ................................................................................................. 54
Willard v Kelley ....................................................................................... 45
Wong v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 541, 548 ....................... 53
Zeilenga v Nelson (1971) 4 Cal3d 176 ..................................................... 55
Zuniga v WCAB (2018) 19 Cal App 4th 981, 988 n6................................ 55
Statutes
11 USC §523(a)(7) ................................................................................... 56
11 USC §525(a) .................................................................................. 50, 57
CCP §632 ................................................................................................. 54
CCP §128(a)(8)......................................................................................... 43
CCP §1095. .............................................................................................. 54
CCP §2023.040. ................................................................................. 51, 52
Elections Code §333................................................................................. 35
Elections Code §13107............. 13, 15, 17-22, 24, 28, 31, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42
Elections Code §13107(a)(3) ........................................................ 17, 18, 20
Elections Code §13107(f) ............................9, 13, 15, 19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 33
Elections Code §13314....................................................................... 17, 34
Govt Code §7626(a)(1) ............................................................................. 54
Other Authorities
State Bar’s Probation Office Policies and Procedures ............................ 48

Rules
CRC Rule 3.1590 ..................................................................................... 54
CRC Rule 8.532 ................................................................................. 47, 48
CRC Rule 9.18 ................................................................................... 47, 48
Regulations
CCR §20714 ......................................................... 18, 29, 30, 34, 35, 37, 42
Constitutional Provisions
I Amend U.S. Const ................................................................................. 36
XIV Amend U.S. Const Art 1 .................................................................. 36
XIV Amend U.S. Const Art 3 .................................................................. 36

8
 I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

“What we’ve got here is failure to communicate.”

Cool Hand Luke, 1967
or
“What we have here is a failure to communicate.”
The Great Bank Robbery (1969).

Ms. Albert appeals the trial court striking her entire ballot
designation during a local election for Orange County District Attorney.
This is a case of bait and switch. Mark Richard Daniels petitioned
for a writ of mandate requesting the court to strike the phrase “civil
rights” from her ballot designation of “civil rights attorney.” Then at the
hearing, the petition was orally amended sua sponte to requesting the
court to strike “civil rights attorney” leaving Ms. Albert without any
ballot designation at all. Since the amendment occurred at the
evidentiary hearing, Ms. Albert was not prepared to fully defend the
status of “attorney.” The court struck her designation and did not order
the Orange County Registrar of Voter’s office to comply with Elect Code
§13107(f) which would have allowed Ms. Albert to submit an alternate
designation within 3 days.
The court also wrongfully determined that Ms. Albert was
suspended from the practice of law and the dates of the purported
suspension, without notice or on a full record, leading to a multitude of

9
subsequent rulings relying on this Minute Order that the court should
review the decision.
Ms. Albert contends that the ruling was prejudicial because it
took away a choice from the voters on the ballot and her core political
speech, both of which violated a fundamental constitutional right,
making this appeal one of public importance. Second, the ruling is
being spread amongst the bench and used to find that in fact Ms.
Albert was suspended contrary to the State Bar’s own position. There
was no substantial evidence to support these findings by “clear and
convincing” evidence.
Appellant contends that the Fourth District Court of Appeal
should reverse the order.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 9, 2018 Ms. Albert submitted her nomination papers
to run for Orange County District Attorney. [AA 108-11]
On March 9, 2018 when she submitted here papers to run for
local office, the California State Bar website member page for Ms.
Albert listed her status as “active.” [RJN] Since the Petitioner was not
challenging her designation as an “attorney” she had no reason to
include it in her response. The petitioner was only challenging her
status as “civil rights.” Consequently, she attached historical data
showing one year earlier on March 9, 2017 her State Bar profile
showed that one of the areas of law she practiced in was ‘civil rights’.
[AA 105,114] She also attached a federal case where she had been
representing a client in a civil rights matter captioned Mackovski v

10
City of Garden Grove 11-cv-1538-CJC, from 2014 onward. [AA 120-
121]
At the April 5, 2018 hearing on the petition for writ of mandate,
the court then flipped the switch, sua sponte moving the train from
track A off to track B and amended the petition to be the complete
ballot designation of “civil rights attorney” giving Ms. Albert no notice
or time to think through what that meant versus what ire may come
from the bench who was the trier of fact if consent was not given.
The court then found Ms. Albert was suspended, so she could
not have the designation of “attorney” on her ballot designation and
since the word “attorney” was now being challenged, her entire ballot
designation had to be stricken.
Ms. Albert went in ex parte requesting an alternate ballot
designation of “civil rights advocate” and the court denied the request.
In obedience to the trial court’s order, the Orang County
Registrar of Voter’s office removed the ballot designation of Ms. Albert
from the voter’s ballots throughout Orange County.
Ms. Albert appealed.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Attorney Gregory Diamond solicited Mark Richard Daniels and
filed (but not served) a pithy 3-page petition for writ of mandate on
March 19, 2018 “to remove Ms. Albert from the ballot”… “in the
alternative, issue a writ of mandate ordering Respondent Neal Kelley
to remove the words “Civil Rights” from Ms. Albert’s ballot
designation on the grounds that there is no evidence that she has

11
worked in Civil Rights law while there is much evidence that she has
worked in the area of Consumer Rights law.” [AA 5]
Mr. Diamond never served the petition. [AA 8] and he provided
no proof of service to show otherwise. [AA 4-6; 286] Nevertheless, the
court set hearing for April 5, 2016 on the matter and Mr. Diamond
filed a brief and request for judicial notice in support of his petition on
March 29, 2018. [AA 14-86; 87-103]. Ms. Albert opposed the petition
and filed a declaration in support of her opposition on April 3, 2018.
[AA 104-185; 186-212].
Mr. Diamond did not appear at the hearing on April 5, 2018. As
reflected in the Minutes of April 5, 2018, an attorney named Lee Fink
appeared for petitioner while Mr. Diamond purported to file a Notice
of Association of Lee Fink, Esq. from “150 Mountain View Drive,
Tustin, CA 92780, (657) 210-1975, Lee@LeeFink.com” the same day
(again, with no proof of service). [AA 216; 244] Mr. Diamond filed an
“application” requesting no stay pending an appeal. Ms. Albert filed a
request for judicial notice in opposition to the petition and the parties
appeared and argued the papers (no one was sworn in and no other
declarations were submitted). [AA 217-243]
After the hearing Ms. Albert filed an Objection to Lee Fink’s
association after she discovered he really worked for the County of
Orange as deputy attorney for the Orange County Employee
Retirement System [AA 245-49]. Mr. Diamond responded that “Mr.
Fink appeared in this matter as an individual attorney, on his own
time while taking leave from his position at the Orange County
Employees Retirement System (OCERS), and OCERS has no

12
involvement in this matter.” [AA 250-51] No signature with the name
“Lee K. Fink” below the signature line [AA 251], but not on the
caption page [AA 250].
On April 6, 2018 at 4:14PM, the court issued a 9-page Minute
Order striking Ms. Albert’s ballot designation. [AA 252-261] Judge
Griffin wrote:
“Respondent is ORDERED to strike the ballot designation of
“Civil Rights Attorney” of Real Party in Interest Lenore Albert.” [AA
260]
No direction was ordered of Respondent Neal Kelley to follow
Elections Code §13107(f). Shocked, Ms. Albert reached out to Neal
Kelley for proposed alternatives and was informed that without a
court order, she would not be allowed to file a ballot designation. [AA
267] She filed an ex parte application to correct the judgment. [AA
264-268]. She proposed a compromise where the “alternate ballot
designation of civil rights advocate” would take the Civil Rights
Attorney designation’s place. [AA 263]
Mr. Diamond opposed. [AA 269-275]. He stated, “There was no
“clerical error.” This court and its staff merely followed the relevant
law.” [AA270] He further argued “Ms. Albert mischaracterizes this as
Petitioner ‘arguing that Ms. Albert could use an alternate ballot
designation.’ This fundamentally misunderstands the process at hand
during a ballot challenge.” [AA 270] On the following page in bold, Mr.
Diamond told the court “Albert’s Asserted “Clerical Error” was
actually the Court’s Following Proper Procedure and It Should Not Be
Rewarded with Yet Another “Bite at the Apple.”” [AA 271]

13
 Mr. Diamond asserted the burden was on Albert to make an ex
parte application. “Her actions fly in the face of procedural fairness
and judicial economy, and gratuitously insult the dignity of the court.”
[AA 271] “She is not entitled to propose such a designation now, after
both the submission and the merits hearing, without the consent of
the court and of the other party (by stipulation) – the latter which she
does not have.” [AA 272] Mr. Diamond then says Ms. Albert “simply
didn’t understand the law.” [AA 273] He then inserted an implied
request for sanctions against Albert because “she didn’t know the
rules and did not [] follow them…mak[ing] a mockery of the judicial
system” [AA 274]
Mr. Diamond filed a declaration stating under penalty of perjury
that at the ex parte hearing “agreed to by stipulation by the parties[],
there would be no designation” and that he has “followed Ms. Albert’s
political career for two years and have looked for stories about her
positions. I have extensive experience with civil rights. I have heard
and read many comments from Ms. Albert about consumer rights, but
cannot recall hearing, reading, or hearing of anything from her
regarding civil rights, as in I know the term is sued in ordinary
discourse.” [AA275]
No stipulation exists.
Mr. Diamond never provided the court with a proposed judgment
or a proposed Writ of Mandate commanding a lawful order to Neal
Kelley and the court never filed any. [AA 286-289]

14
 Judge Griffin denied Ms. Albert’s ex parte application on June
11, 2018 ordering Mr. Diamond to give notice. [AA 276] Mr. Diamond
did not give notice. [AA 286-289]
Although no judgment was filed, and no Writ of Mandate issued
commanding Mr. Kelley to notify Ms. Albert pursuant to Elections
Code §13107(f), that her proposed ballot designation of “civil rights
attorney” for the upcoming June 6, 2018 primary election was
unacceptable, Mr. Kelley took the extraordinary act of striking Ms.
Albert’s previously accepted ballot designation from the ballot.
Ms. Albert timely appealed on April 13, 2018. [AA 277]. On
April 27, 2018 Mr. Fink filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel. 1[AA
278-279]. Mr. Diamond failed to perfect his appeal and it was
dismissed. Appellant’s notice designating the record was filed on June
20, 2018. [AA 281-284]. As such, she has appealed without the
reporter’s transcript.2
IV. STATEMENT OF KEY ISSUES ON APPEAL
The key issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
striking the ballot designation of Ms. Albert focusing on (1) how to
properly and uniformly apply §13107(f) to writ proceedings; (2) how to
interpret CCR §20714 licensing issues on the date “nomination papers

1 This was the first and only document with a proof of service attached
of some sort attached. [AA 280]
2 A reporter was at the hearing on the petition for writ of mandate and

Ms. Albert received a fee waiver, however, there is actually no provision

that waives the cost to prepare the reporters transcript on appeal.

15
are signed”; and (3) amending ballot designation challenges at the
writ hearing.3
Whether the trial court erred in finding Ms. Albert was effective
February 14, 2018 and that suspension continued through April 6, 2018
when he ruled.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 The factual findings are reviewed using the substantial evidence
standards while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo for CCP 1085
proceedings. Vasquez v Happy Valley Union School Dist. (2008) 159
CalApp4th 969, 981. However, de novo review is used in CCP §1102
actions. Jenson v Superior Court (2008) 160 CalApp4th 366, 271.
This appellate court has held that the proper standard of review
on appeal is de novo. McKee v Orange County Unified School District
110 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1315
"As an appellate court, ' ... we "conduct .in dependent review
of the trial court's determination of questions of law."
[Citation .] (3) Interpretation of a statute is a question of
law. [Citations.] Further, application of the interpreted
statute to undisputed facts is also subject to our
independent determination. [Citation .]' " ( International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Los Angeles
Export Terminal, Inc. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 287, 293 [81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 456).)

Id at 1315

3 Elections Code §13107 is not being uniformly applied throughout

the state of California leading to constitutional rights violations and/or
making the regulation unconstitutional on its face is of public interest.

16
 VI. ARGUMENT

A. MARK DANIELS DID NOT PROVE ANY BALLOT DESIGNATION

BY MS. ALBERT WOULD MISLEAD THE PUBLIC, SO THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED; AND THAT ERROR WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE
ELECTION
Mr. Daniels filed a petition for Writ of Mandate requesting Ms.
Albert be removed from the ballot or in the alternative have her
designation of “civil rights” stricken. [AA 4-6] The court did not remove
Ms. Albert from the ballot and she does not challenge that ruling on
appeal. Her challenge is limited to his striking her ballot designation
and his finding of suspension.
1. THE BALLOT DESIGNATION CHALLENGE
As to the ballot challenge, Mark Daniels asserted Ms. Albert’s
ballot designation did not comply with Elections Code §13107(a)(3). [AA
102:16]
Elections Code §13314 allows a person to file a petition for writ
challenging a ballot designation:

(a)(1) An elector may seek a writ of mandate alleging that an

error or omission has occurred, or is about to occur, in the
placing of a name on, or in the printing of, a ballot, sample
ballot, voter pamphlet, or other official matter, or that any
neglect of duty has occurred, or is about to occur.
(2) A peremptory writ of mandate shall issue only upon proof
of both of the following:
(A) That the error, omission, or neglect is in violation of this
code or the Constitution.
(B) That issuance of the writ will not substantially interfere
with the conduct of the election.

17
 (3) The action or appeal shall have priority over all other
civil matters.
Id.

Judge Griffin found:

Ms. Albert’s ballot designation declares she is a “Civil Rights

Attorney”. Petitioner challenges this designation. In light of
the Court’s finding that Ms. Albert has been disqualified from
the practice of law from February 14, 2018 to the present, her
use of the word “Attorney” in her ballot designation is
improper. To the extent that Ms. Albert may be contending
that the status of “attorney” can be used under the prong of
“principal professions…of the candidate during the calendar
year immediately preceding the filing the nomination
documents (§13107(a)(3)), requiring §20714(b)(2) [sic] creates
a restriction not on the “current” profession but on the
candidate’s ability to invoke her status as attorney as a
“principal profession in general (See §20714(b)(1).(b)(2).)

[AA 259-260]

The court struck Ms. Albert’s ballot designation without

affording her the opportunity to submit an alternate designation.
[AA 260]
A. ORANGE COUNTY IS NOT ISSUING ORDERS IN
CONFORMITY WITH ELECTIONS CODE §13107(F).
Elections Code §13107 is not being interpreted or applied in the
same manner during ballot challenges of local elections. The variance
materially affects the outcome of the candidate’s First Amendment
rights. In one case, the judge may issue a writ striking the ballot
designation and ordering a substitute ballot designation in its place. In
another case, the judge may strike the ballot designation without any

18
provision for the candidate to have any ballot designation at all. In yet
another case, the judge may strike the ballot and invoke the
Respondent to follow the procedure laid out in subsection (f) of Elections
Code §13107, effectively giving notice to the candidate that the
candidate has 3 days to come up with an approved ballot designation.
The appeal is warranted because Orange County trial courts and
the Orange County Registrar of Voter’s office is not applying either
Elections Code §13107 or the procedure for petitions for Writ of
Mandate CCP §1085 as intended.
Elections Code §13107(f) states:

(f) If, upon checking the nomination documents and the ballot
designation worksheet described in Section 13107.3, the
elections official finds the designation to be in violation of any
of the restrictions set forth in this section, the elections
official shall notify the candidate by registered or certified
mail return receipt requested, addressed to the mailing
address provided on the candidate’s ballot designation
worksheet.
(1) The candidate shall, within three days, excluding
Saturday, Sunday, and state holidays, from the date he or
she receives notice by registered or certified mail, or from the
date the candidate receives actual notice of the violation,
whichever occurs first, appear before the elections official or,
in the case of the Secretary of State, notify the Secretary of
State by telephone, and provide a designation that complies
with subdivision (a) or (b).
(2) If a candidate fails to provide a designation that complies
with subdivision (a) or (b) within the three-day period

19
 specified in paragraph (1), a designation shall not appear
after the candidate’s name.4

Elections Code §13107(a)(3) allows each candidate to have a 3-

word designation below their name on the ballot.
(a) “immediately under the name of each candidate….may
appear…one of the following designations…
(3)“No more than three words designating either the current
principal professions, vocations, or occupations of the candidate, or
the principal professions, vocations, or occupations of the
candidate during the calendar year immediately preceding the
filing of nominations documents.”

Id. [bold added]

4 Former Elections Code §13107 (c) states:

(c) If, upon checking the nomination documents and the

ballot designation worksheet described in Section 13107.3,
the elections official finds the designation to be in violation
of any of the restrictions set forth in this section, the
elections official shall notify the candidate by registered or
certified mail return receipt requested, addressed to the
mailing address provided on the candidate's ballot
designation worksheet.
(1) The candidate shall, within three days, excluding
Saturday, Sunday, and state holidays, from the date he or
she receives notice by registered or certified mail, or from
the date the candidate receives actual notice of the violation,
whichever occurs first, appear before the elections official or,
in the case of the Secretary of State, notify the Secretary of
State by telephone, and provide a designation that
complies with subdivision (a).
(2) In the event the candidate fails to provide a designation
that complies with subdivision (a) within the three-day
period specified in paragraph (1), no designation shall
appear after the candidate's name. Id. [Bold added]

20
 Appellant, Ms. Albert ran for District Attorney in Orange County
where the county uses the middle option of depriving the candidate
completely from any ballot designation at all.
Appellant contends that this outcome is contrary to statutory
interpretation on the grounds such an interpretation of Elect Code
§13107 would make subdivision (f) superfluous and it is in violation of a
candidate’s First Amendment rights. There is no precedent laying out
this issue and as such this court should decide it because it will be
useful for future elections.
Mark Daniels attorney, Mr. Diamond, declared under penalty of
perjury that “Having participated in previous ballot designation
challenges, [he] knew at the time of the informal discussion at the
previous ex parte – and knew that [his] co-counsel [sic] Lee Fink also
knew – that, in the event of a ballot challenge where no alternative to a
ballot designation had ben offered by the Real Party in Interest (and in
[his] experience, agreed to by stipulation by the parties), the result
would be no designation. [He] therefore had no obligation to “move to
deprive [Ms. Albert] of any ballot designation’’; that result obtained
through proper operation of law.” [AA 275]
Appellant contends this interpretation and application of
Elections Code §13107 violates a candidate’s First Amendment rights
and is contrary to how this Code section is interpreted and applied in
other counties in California.
In Ms. Albert’s case, she was not allowed to designate another
ballot designation. The petitioner was allowed to obtain relief based on

21
a pithy 3-page petition. Petitioner was not required to serve the
petition. Petitioner was not required to prepare a proposed judgment or
Writ of Mandate. The Registrar of Voters was allowed to strike Ms.
Albert’s previously accepted ballot designation without a separate Writ
of Mandate commanding it to do so. The court was not required to
instruct the County Registrar’s office to notify Ms. Albert (the
candidate) that her ballot designation was not acceptable and invoke
Elections Code §13107(f). And the Respondent, Neal Kelley was not
required to Return the Writ of Mandate to demonstrate he complied
with the judge’s order. [AA 286-289] One might characterize Orange
County as being the Wild, Wild West of Writs.5
These variances are in stark contrast to how other counties
interpret ballot challenges and apply its process.
B. OTHER COUNTIES INTERPRET BALLOT DESIGNATION
CHALLENGES UNDER ELECT CODE §13107 IN A WAY THAT
DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE CANDIDATE OF ANY BALLOT
DESIGNATION AT ALL
Other counties interpret ballot designation challenges under Elect
Code §13107 in a way that does not deprive the challenged candidate of
any ballot designation at all.
When local candidates in other counties lose on a ballot
designation challenge, the court either designates a new ballot
designation as part of the writ of mandate or orders the Respondent to
give the candidate notice that the candidate has three days to submit a

5"Even if you're on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit
there." - Will Rogers

22
new ballot designation pursuant to Elect Code §13107(f).
For example, in Richard C. Cassar v. Michael Vu (Mark B.
Wyland), San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-
00027737-CU-WM-CTL (August 12, 2016) a school board candidate’s
ballot designation of “Education Foundation President” was successfully
challenged in court. However, the candidate was given an opportunity
to submit and justify an alternative designation, “Educator” after losing
on the merits (to the chagrin of the petitioner because the new
designation was much better than the one that was originally
challenged). [RJN 27]
In Bauman v Bowen, Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 34-2014-
80001796 (March 27, 2014) the secretary of state was directed to strike “Political
Reform Advocate” from the ballot and “add the designation ‘Political Involvement
Educator’ to candidate Dan Schnur’s ballot designation.” [RJN 40-41]
Here, on the other hand, the Orange County Superior Court did
not give Albert an opportunity to submit and justify an alternative
designation after her ballot designation of “Civil Rights Attorney” was
successfully challenged. Mr. Diamond represented in his opposition to
her ex parte application that she was so denied because Orange County
doesn’t operate that way and considered Ms. Albert’s request
sanctionable for failing to “follow the rules” and a “mockery of justice.”
[AA 273-274]
The consequence of being able to make an alternative designation
or not, based on which county you are running for office in after a
successful ballot challenge is a significant substantive variance

23
affecting the rights of the candidate.6
The resulting difference can be seen by the approach taken after
the judges ruled. All three judges in the above example, Judge Chang
(Sacramento County), Judge Griffin (Orange County), and Judge Taylor
(San Diego County) ruled that the ballot designation of the candidate
was not proper and could not be included on the upcoming election
ballot. [AA 259-260; RJN 28-36, 42-43] Judge Chang allowed an
alternative ballot designation in her judgment. [RJN 42-43] So did
Judge Taylor. [RJN 25-27] Judge Griffin did not. [AA 259-260]
Judge Taylor, in San Diego County, made the prevailing party
prepare a properly proposed order in conformity with Elections Code
former Elect Code §13107(c) [now subd (f)]. In that case, the Judgement
read:
1. The Petition is GRANTED.

2. Respondent Vu is directed to notify Real Party in Interest,

Wyland, pursuant to Elections Code §13107(c), that his
proposed ballot designation of “Education Foundation
President” for the upcoming November 8, 2016 election is
unacceptable.

3. Petitioner is entitled to his costs of suit.

[RJN]

Sacramento County judge Chang provided the alternate

designation in her directions to the Secretary of State:
The Secretary of State is directed to add the designation of

“Conflict follows wrongdoing as surely as flies follow the herd.” -

6

Doc Holiday.

24
 “Political Investment Educator” to candidate Dan Schnur’s
ballot designation.”

[RJN 43]
Judge Griffin, on the other hand, did not allow Ms. Albert any
ballot designation at all. He didn’t require Diamond to draft a proposed
writ or judgment. He took away Ms. Albert’s core political speech:
The Petition is GRANTED IN PART, AND DENIED IN
PART
Respondent is ORDERED to strike the ballot designation of
“Civil Rights Attorney” of Real Party in Interest Lenore
Albert.
Real Party’s name shall remain on the ballot for this office of
District Attorney.
Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
1110(b) any notice of appeal filed in this matter shall not
operate as a stay of execution of this Order.
This Minute Order shall constitute as the formal order and
Writ of Mandate.
[AA 260]
Appellant, Ms. Albert was treated differently than the candidates
she opposed on the District Attorney ballot and disparately amongst
other challenged candidates running in San Diego County and for
statewide office (Sacramento County), because she was foreclosed from
any ballot designation at all.
Mr. Diamond declared under penalty of perjury that he has
“participated in previous ballot designation challenges.” [AA 275] He
steadfastly asserted that in Orange County a successful ballot challenge
was an “all or nothing” proposition. [AA 274] There is nothing in the
record to demonstrate that Judge Griffin disagreed with Mr. Diamond’s

25
analysis.
Consequently, the ruling by judge Griffin was based on a pattern
and practice of depriving candidates in Orange County of their civil
rights to core political speech and thus tipping the electoral outcome in
races here, making this issue of utmost importance.
C. UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF CANDIDATES WHEN APPLYING
§13107 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND
THE CANDIDATE’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT BECAUSE IT
STIFLES THEIR CORE POLITICAL SPEECH
A statute is supposed to be interpreted in such a manner that
gives meaning to each word and phrase and read as a whole. Orange
County’s interpretation of §13107 fails to put any meaning in subsection
(f) (formerly found in subsection (c)). There is nothing in the legislative
history to suggest that a challenge to a ballot designation was intended
to completely deprive a candidate from having any ballot designation at
all. De Young v City of San Diego (1993) 147 Cal App 3d 11, 17-18.
This appellate division has already laid out the framework when
interpreting the statute and interpreting the applicability of a statute
in question:

"[T]he interpretation and applicability of a statute is a

question of law." (City of Petaluma v. County of Sonoma
(1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th 1239, 1244 [15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 617].) In
reviewing petitioner's claim, we are guided by well-settled
rules of statutory interpretation. The most fundamental of
these rules is that where the statute is clear, the "plain
meaning" rule applies. The Legislature is presumed to have
meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language
governs. (Great Lakes Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo

26
 (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 152, 155 [137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d
244].) " 'If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no
need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia
of the intent of the Legislature . . . .' " (Delaney v. Superior
Court (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 785, 798 [268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 789
P.2d 934].)

Dean v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 638

Orange County’s interpretation of ballot designation petition
challenges, as so stated by Mr. Diamond, would make the procedure
laid out in §13107(f)(1) meaningless. That provision provides:
The candidate shall, within three days, excluding Saturday,
Sunday, and state holidays, from the date he or she receives
notice by registered or certified mail, or from the date the
candidate receives actual notice of the violation, whichever
occurs first, appear before the elections official or, in the case
of the Secretary of State, notify the Secretary of State by
telephone, and provide a designation that complies with
subdivision (a) or (b)

Elect Code §13107(f)(1)

There should be no difference in outcome when the Registrar of

Voters Office or Secretary of State’s Office challenges the ballot
designation while the candidate is standing on the other side of the
counter in the first instance or when the public challenges a ballot
designation by way of a petition for a writ of mandate.
Nothing in the statute bans a candidate from offering a new
alternate ballot designation after a successful challenge to a petition for
writ of mandate. Additionally, nothing in the statute restricts the
candidate to their original two alternate designations provided under
subsection (f). No legislative history even suggests as much. All parts of

27
the statute must be harmonized together. De Young v City of San Diego
(1993) 147 Cal App 3d 11, 17-18.
In this case, Ms. Albert thought there was merely a mistake and
diligently contacted Kelley’s office to determine if they were going to
allow her to provide an alternate designation. When she found out they
were not, she filed for ex parte relief to correct the judgment. However,
the court denied her ex parte request. [AA 264-68, 274]
Unlike Wyland, residing and running for office in San Diego
County, who had his ballot designation stricken and was allowed to
provide a new, alternate designation pursuant to Elections Code
§13107(f), and unlike Schnur, running for statewide office, who had his
ballot challenged and stricken in Sacramento County, but was provided
a new alternate designation, Albert was prevented from any alternate
designation at all, thus treating candidates unequally under the First
Amendment when applying Elections Code §13107 in California in
violation of equal protection of their fundamental rights.
San Diego County correctly gave subsection (f) meaning and
placed it in its Writ of Mandate. Mr. Diamond’s participation in these
ballot challenges has resulted in nothing less than mischief and
absurdity. De Young v City of San Diego (1993) 147 Cal App 3d 11, 17-
18.
This mischief and absurdity resulted in prejudicial error in
Albert’s case and is at risk of recurring in other elections where a ballot
is challenged and, if successful, the judge does not provide either an
alternate designation to be substituted in its place or direct the
Respondent to invoke subsection (f) of Elect Code §13107.

28
 D. THE RESULT LED TO MISINFORMING THE ELECTORATE AS
TO THEIR CHOICES DURING THE 2018 PRIMARY RACE FOR

ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY WHICH IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE
In Andal v Miller 28 Cal.App.4th 358, 364 (1994), the California
Supreme Court noted that "[a] major purport of the Elections Code is to
insure the accurate designation of the candidate upon the ballot in
order that an informed electorate may intelligently elect one of the
candidates." (Salinger v. Jordan (1964) 61 Cal.2d 824, 826.) To further
this purpose, the Secretary of State has issued guidelines for selecting
ballot designations.
CCR §20714 provides:

If a candidate is licensed by the State of California to engage

in a profession, vocation or occupation, the candidate is
entitled to consider it one of his or her “principal”
professions, vocations or occupations if (i) the candidate has
maintained his or her license current as of the date he or she
filed his or nomination documents by complying with all
applicable requirements of the respective licensure,
including the payment of all applicable license fees and (ii)
the status of the candidate's license is active at the time he
or she filed his or her nomination documents. CCR
§20714(b)(1)

A candidate who holds a professional, vocational or

occupational license issued by the State of California may
not claim such profession, vocation or occupation as one of
his or her “principal” professions, vocations or occupations if
(i) the candidate's licensure status is “inactive” 2 CCR §
20714(b)(2)

29
 Judge Taylor in San Diego county was struggling with a
similar situation where the candidate currently had no profession:

Real party candidly acknowledges in footnote 3 on page 5 of

his brief that he has neither a vocation nor an occupation.
He also concedes at page 6, line 1 that he receives no salary
or other compensation from the Wyland Institute for
Education.

In light of these concessions, the court is able to focus the

inquiry: real party has the burden of demonstrating that his
principal profession in the year prior to August, 2016 was
that of "Education Foundation President."

[RJN 35]

Judge Taylor construed the statute to mean he had to look to the

prior profession. Judge Griffin, on the other hand, stopped at looking at
how he viewed the present situation. CCR §20714 clearly states that
the second step is to look at the prior year’s profession. As such, judge
Griffin erred.
Both Wyland and Albert found themselves similarly situated. Yet,
two disparate results.
Mr. Diamond asserted in his papers that Albert needed to request
an alternate designation in her papers. [AA 269-275] But the
amendment to the ballot designation challenge did not occur until the
hearing on the challenge. Until a time machine becomes a reality, Ms.
Albert had no way of placing a defense to an issue that had not yet
arose. UP to the hearing only the portion of her ballot designation “civil
rights” was being challenged. [AA 4-6] Moreover, San Diego took short

30
shrift of counsel’s attempts to do so in Wyland ballot designation
challenge. Wyland was not deprived of any ballot designation at all like
Albert.
In contrast to the concluding paragraph in Appellant’s Albert’s
case, judge Taylor ordered:
The court declines the invitation to impose (or even suggest)
an alternate designation. Let a writ of mandate issue from
this court directing Michael Vu, Registrar of Voters for the
County of San Diego, to make the notification to the real
party mandated by Election Code section 13107, subsections
(b) and (c): that his proposed ballot designation is
unacceptable.

The court finds that issuance of the writ will not

substantially interfere with the conduct of the election.
Counsel for petitioner is directed to present forthwith for
signature by this court a form of Judgment consistent with
the foregoing. The proposed order submitted with the reply
briefing is not sufficient for this purpose, inasmuch as it
presupposes the court ruling on an alternate designation.

[RJN 36]
Judge Taylor then parted ways with judge Griffin by inserting
subsection (f) of §13107 into the Writ of Mandate and judgment. The
result in Ms. Albert’s case led to misinforming the electorate because
there was no designation at all beneath her name.
E. THE RESULT DRAMATICALLY DECREASED THE
LIKELIHOOD OF MS. ALBERT’S SUCCESS ON ELECTION
DAY BECAUSE THE ELECTORATE RELY ON THE BALLOT
DESIGNATION FOR DOWN BALLOT RACES
San Diego County invoked former Election Code §13107(c) (now

31
subsection (f)) which triggers the Registrar of Voters to give notice to
the candidate that their designation is improper and gives the
candidate 3 days to propose an alternate one. The same or similar
procedure is used in other counties.
However, Orange County does not follow suit, thus depriving
candidates in Orange County equal treatment and depriving them of
their fundamental First Amendment rights.
This disparate treatment was highly prejudicial to Albert and
unfair to the voters in Orange County, California.
The designation appears directly under the candidate’s name in
the sample ballot and on the ballot itself, describing the candidate’s
“current principal professions, vocations, or occupations.” California
Elections Code § 13107(a)(3).
It plays a significant role in how the public perceives the
candidate, and can dramatically increase or decrease the likelihood of a
candidate’s success on Election Day. This is especially the case for
district attorney candidates and for those in other low visibility or
“down ballot” races, where the candidates are not widely known.
Other than the candidate’s name, the ballot designation is one of
the main factors voters use to distinguish among candidates.
In the case of Richard C. Cassar v. Michael Vu (Mark B. Wyland),
San Diego County Superior Court Case No. 37-2016-00027737-CU-WM-
CTL (August 12, 2016) the court signed a Judgment [RJN 25-26] and a
Writ of Mandate.7[RJN 27] The Writ of Mandate said:

7 The Court of Appeal found nothing inappropriate in the way of the

32
 To: Respondent, Michael Vu, Registrar of Voters for the
County of San Diego:

Pursuant to the judgment of this court, you are

commanded to notify Real Party in Interest Wyland,
pursuant to Elections Code section 13107(c), that his
proposed ballot designation of “Education Foundation
President” for the upcoming November 8, 2016 election is
unacceptable.”

[RJN 27]

Judge Griffin interpreted his power under the Election Code to

strike Ms. Albert’s ballot designation without invoking Elect Code
§13107(f) or commanding Neal Kelly, Registrar of Voters for the County
of Orange to give notice and allow Ms. Albert to provide a new
designation under Elections Code section 13107(f).
Ballot designation challenges were never intended to cut off a
candidate’s First Amendment rights. However, by failing to follow the
rules, Ms. Albert’s First Amendment rights were cut off.
Ballot designations are heavily regulated via the Elections Code
and the Secretary of State’s Ballot Designation Regulations with the
goal of preventing candidates from making false or misleading claims
about their official or professional endeavors. (2 California Code of
Regulations, § 20710 et seq.) Any voter may file a petition for writ of
mandate alleging that an error, omission, or neglect of duty has
occurred or is about to occur in connection with the ballot designation.

Registrar’s office allowing the Real Party in Interest to receive the

ballot designation of “Educator.” Cassar v Vu (unpublished) D071396
(1/18 1/18/18). [RJN 37]

33
California Elections Code §13314.
Elections Code §13107(b) provides that elections officials shall not
accept designations that would mislead voters; use the name of a
political party; or refer to a racial, religious or ethnic group or to any
activity prohibited by law.
The Ballot Designation Regulations are extremely detailed,
providing definitions of “principal,” “profession,” “vocation” and
“occupation,” as well as types of activities that are not allowed,
including one’s “avocation,” “pro forma” position, or “status.” (2
California Code of Regulations, §§ 20714 & 20716)
CCR §20714 reads in pertinent part: “Recognized professions
generally include, but are not limited to, law…Profession includes
“attorney.” CCR §20714(a)(1).

(1) If a candidate is licensed by the State of California to

engage in a profession, vocation or occupation, the candidate
is entitled to consider it one of his or her “principal”
professions, vocations or occupations if (i) the candidate has
maintained his or her license current as of the date he or she
filed his or nomination documents by complying with all
applicable requirements of the respective licensure,
including the payment of all applicable license fees and (ii)
the status of the candidate's license is active at the time he
or she filed his or her nomination documents.
CCR §20714(b)(1)

(2) A candidate who holds a professional, vocational or

occupational license issued by the State of California may
not claim such profession, vocation or occupation as one of
his or her “principal” professions, vocations or occupations if
(i) the candidate's licensure status is “inactive” at the time
the candidate files his or her nomination document, or (ii)

34
 the candidate's license has been suspended or revoked by the
agency issuing the license at the time the candidate files his
or her nomination documents.

CCR §20714(b)(2)

(d) If the candidate is engaged in a profession, vocation or

occupation at the time he or she files his or her nomination
documents, the candidate's proposed ballot designation is
entitled to consist of the candidate's current principal
professions, vocations and occupations. In the event the
candidate does not have a current principal
profession, vocation or occupation at the time he or she
files his or her nomination documents, the candidate may
use a ballot designation consisting of his or her
principal professions, vocations or occupations, which the
candidate was principally engaged in during the calendar
year immediately preceding the filing of the candidate's
nomination papers.

CCR §20714(d)

Ms. Albert’s license had to be active on the date she signed her
nomination papers to be designated an “attorney” on her ballot
according to CCR §20714. It is undisputed that Albert filed her fee and
signed her declaration for candidacy on March 9, 2018. [AA 108] It is
also undisputed that as far as the State Bar knew; as far as Ms. Albert
knew; and as far as the general public knew - on March 9, 2018 Albert’s
law license was active when she filed her nomination papers. [AA 108;
RJN 12 and Request for OCROV to submit File] Elections Code §333
states “Nomination documents” means declaration of candidacy and
nomination papers.
Although petitioner later contended Albert was suspended on that

35
date because on or about March 16, 2018 the State Bar website said she
was, even though the State Bar webpage clearly indicated on March 9,
2018 that Albert held an active license on March 9, 2018, also. [RJN 70]
B. THE SUSPENSION ISSUE WAS NOT A VALID
JUSTIFICATION TO TAKE AWAY ALBERT’S RIGHT TO A
BALLOT DESIGNATION
1. A STATE AGENCY, INCLUDING THE STATE BAR HAS THE POWER
TO (BUT NO RIGHT TO) INTERFERE IN ELECTIONS BY BACK
DATING A SUSPENSION
On or about March 16, 2018 Ms. Albert’s web page changed to
state she was suspended. On March 20, 2018 Maricruz Farfan notified
Ms. Albert for the first time, she was suspended and that her 30 day
suspension was back dated to February 14, 2018. Can a state agency
interfere in an election by retroactively back dating a suspension of a
professional license, thus making what was once a valid ballot
designation invalid during the candidate’s campaign? The answer
should be no. Such a result would open up elections to way too much
tom foolery where people in positions of power within those licensing
agencies are generally appointed and have a political flavor.
There is no case precedent appellant was able to find on this issue.
It would appear that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution preserving the right to fair notice and the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution would on its face apply. XIV
Amend U.S. Const Art 1; XIV Amend U.S. Const Art 3; and I Amend
U.S. Const The agency is interfering in determining the electoral
outcome and violating a fundamental right to core political speech in

36
violation of the candidate’s First Amendment rights. The agency is also
violating the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving notice before the
suspension as to the start date of the suspension. This leaves
professionals with state licenses at the mercy of the licensing agency
and open to unequal treatment under the Equal Protection clause.
Candidates cannot go back in time, and to the extent that a state
agency attempts to, nothing in CCR §20714 provides for such
retroactive action.
Much evidence on this was not provided in the papers on the
grounds, there was never an issue of removing Ms. Albert’s designation
as being an “attorney” in the petition for writ of mandate. [AA 4-6]. Ms.
Albert was ambushed at the hearing by the ‘bait and switch’ tactic
where the petition was amended to include the word “attorney.”
In any case, the record is clear that Mr. Diamond did not bring
evidence showing on March 9, 2018 Ms. Albert’s license was suspended.
He conceded that the change by the State Bar which he had been
hoping for, did not happen until March 16, 2018 in his own Orange
Juice Blog. [AA 158] Since the only evidence presented of Ms. Albert’s
status on March 9, 2018 was that her license was active, she was
entitled to remain on the ballot as “attorney” at the election and the
court erred – the error was prejudicial warranting reversal, because
such circumstance could happen again.
2. EVEN IF SUSPENDED A PROFESSIONAL STILL GETS A BALLOT
DESIGNATION
Even if Albert could not hold herself out as a lawyer, and under
the circumstances, she was entitled to have her designation of

37
“attorney” remain - she still had the right to a ballot designation. As
stated in subdivision (d) of CCR §20714, Albert could use her principal
profession of the prior year.
Although much of the jurisprudence surrounding ballot
designations stems from statutory and regulatory requirements, there
are also appellate cases that elaborate upon these issues. The appellate
cases, however, are relatively few and far between, given the lack of
time that exists between the public availability of proposed ballot
designations and the deadline for printing the ballot materials. Often,
by the time a voter prepares and files the litigation, seeks an order
shortening time for the briefing and hearing of the matter, and has the
matter heard, it is the proverbial eleventh hour and there is no time for
appellate relief.
3. “SUSPENDED” IS NOT A NOUN

A “ballot designation” may take one of three forms under

California Elections Code §13107:
(1) Words designating the elective city, county, district,
state, or federal office which the candidate holds at the time
of filing the nomination documents to which he or she was
elected by vote of the people, or to which he or she was
appointed, in the case of a superior or municipal court judge.

(2) The word “incumbent” if the candidate is a candidate for

the same office which he or she holds at the time of filing the
nomination papers, and was elected to that office by a vote of
the people, or, in the case of a superior or municipal court
judge, was appointed to that office.

(3) No more than three words designating either the current

principal professions, vocations, or occupations of the

38
 candidate, or the principal professions, vocations, or
occupations of the candidate during the calendar year
immediately preceding the filing of nomination documents.
Cal. Elect. Code § 13107(a)(1)-(3).

The statute further mandates that “[n]either the Secretary of

State nor any other election official shall accept a designation [that] ․
would mislead the voter.” Cal. Elect.Code § 13107(b)(1).

The trial court erroneously found that word “attorney” violated

§13107. The petitioner urged that Ms. Albert was no longer an
“attorney” because she was “suspended.” Since Ms. Albert had the word
“Attorney” in her ballot designation, she was not entitled to a ballot
designation. First, this reviewing court should correct the record
because it is vital. A licensed professional that is suspended, at least an
attorney that is suspended, is still an “attorney;” they are just put to
“inactive” status. “Suspended” is not a noun. “Suspend” is not a noun either.
“Attorney” is a noun and the word “suspend” does not substitute it. The flawed
logic led to mass misinformation and public confusion on the part of the electorate.
Put another way, if Ms. Albert’s suspension made her no longer an attorney, then
she was a suspended what? The ruling impinged on Appellant’s First
Amendment rights. To read and apply the statutes this way was
impermissible, and the regulation should be stricken if they cannot be
uniformly applied.

“No bright line separates permissible election-related

regulation from unconstitutional infringements on First
Amendment freedoms,” and that courts are required to make
“hard judgments” given the interests involved. Timmons v.

39
 Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct.
1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997)

Courts will uphold as “not severe” restrictions that are generally

applicable, even-handed, politically neutral, and which protect the
reliability and integrity of the election process. See Hussey v. City of
Portland, 64 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir.1995). A restriction is particularly
unlikely to be considered severe when a candidate is given other means
of disseminating the desired information. In Timmons, for example,
the United States Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting candidates
from listing more than one party affiliation on the ballot, in part
because the party retained great latitude in its ability to communicate
its support for that candidate notwithstanding the minor ballot
prohibition. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 1364.
In election regulation cases, the Supreme Court developed a
balancing test to resolve the tension between a candidate's
First Amendment rights and the state's interest in
preserving the fairness and integrity of the voting process.
When deciding whether a state election law violates First
and Fourteenth Amendment speech rights, courts are to
“weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the
State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the
State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent
to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary.”
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358,
117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) quoting Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245
(1992).

Courts will strike down state election laws as severe speech

restrictions only when they significantly impair access to the ballot,
stifle core political speech, or dictate electoral outcomes. For example,

40
Cook v Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2010), overturned a law requiring ballots
to contain notations describing whether or not the candidate supports
term limits, holding that it punishes candidates on the basis of core
political speech and dictates electoral outcomes. Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142
L.Ed.2d 599 (1999), similarly overturned a requirement that petition
circulators wear badges and publish identifying information, because
the regulation hinders core political speech. In Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 109 S.Ct. 1013,
103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989), the United States Supreme Court struck a
regulation prohibiting official governing bodies of political parties from
giving endorsements to candidates, holding that the law burdened core
political speech. Likewise, in Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th
Cir.1992), the Sixth Circuit invalidated a regulation prohibiting the
political party designation of “Independent” while permitting
“Republican” or “Democrat” designations, holding that party labels
designate the views of party candidates and the regulations therefore
hinder “core political speech.”
Like Rosen v Brown, here Appellant was prohibited from any
ballot designation at all while the other candidates she was opposing
had one. This hindered Albert’s core political speech because the
candidate designation contains the view of the candidates and on down
ballot races are the only thing many voters know about them and
differentiates one candidate from the other.
“Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights
must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state

41
 interest.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997), quoting
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119
L.Ed.2d 245 (1992)
Section §13107 as applied in Orange County imposed a severe
burden on Appellant’s rights by striking her ballot designation. First,
the regulation is not viewpoint neutral. Any use of the term “attorney”
is not banned from the ballot whether used alone or with any additional
description. Active attorneys and inactive attorneys as later
determined by a judge during a ballot challenge are not treated the
same.
Second, the regulation, as applied, prevented Albert from
communicating her status as a candidate with recent experience
working as a Civil Rights Attorney on the ballot, so it infringed on “core
political speech,” and favored one type of political speech over another.
Here, no other candidate had that experience, so it also took away a
choice from the voters in Orange County.
Third, neither the ruling nor the regulation provided Albert with
an ample channel for communicating her activities to the public because
she was prevented from having any ballot designation at all. She was
given nothing at all making it appear she was disqualified from the
ballot.
C. AMENDING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AT
THE HEARING WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Can a judge sua sponte or the petitioner orally change a petition
for writ of mandate at the hearing on the writ of mandate putting at

42
issue the suspension dates of a professional’s license during the hearing
as happened here? The issue should be answered, and the answer
should be no because nothing in Election Code §13107 or CCR §20714
allows for such a practice. There is nothing that states such could be
stipulated to and waived.
During Administrative hearings, (1) adequate notice and opportunity
to defend must be given to the respondent, (2) it must be related to
the subject matter under consideration, (3) it must be fully litigated,
and (4) there must be opportunity to examine and cross examine
under the “unalleged violations doctrine.” Inglewood (2015) PERB
Decision No. 2424-M (Issued on 6/1/15)

Here, there was no adequate notice and as such not opportunity

to defend this amendment at the hearing.
Of course, the Court has jurisdiction to correct its order sua
sponte to conform to law and justice. CCP §128(a)(8) provides that
"Every court shall have the power to do all of the following: ... To amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law
and justice." See Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 4th 726, 739
(2005) (By enacting reconsideration statutes, the "Legislature did not,
however, attempt to limit the court's sua sponte authority.); see also
LeFrancois v. Goel, 35 Cal. 4th 1094, 1108 (2005) (the trial court 19
may on its own motion reconsider one of its rulings).

43
 But there was no law or justice being corrected in this instance. It
was a bait and switch that ambushed the appellant. Monarch
Healthcare v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. 4 App. 4th 1282 (2000),8

Judge Griffin relied on Franchise Tax Board v Municipal Court

(1975) 45 Cal pp 3d 377, 384. That petition was not substantively
changed in its allegations. That petition was only amended to add a
verification page, so the case was inapposite.

Judge Griffin opined:

“the petition on its face seeks to challenge only the phrase

“civil rights” in Ms. Albert’s ballot designation however,
petitioner argues in his supporting papers that the entire
designation of “civil rights attorney” should be stricken. In
her opposition papers, Ms. Albert expressly recognized that
petition is seeking to strike the entirety of her designation.
Ms. Albert agreed during oral argument to petitioner’s
amendment of the writ petition to include all of her ballot
designation.” [AA 253]

Ms. Albert’s written understanding was “petitioner wants her

ballot designation changed from Civil Rights Attorney to Consumer
Protection Attorney. However, there is nothing false or misleading
about Ms. Albert-Sheridan’s designation and the petitioner has not been

8 ("[F]undamental principles of due process also call for those

with an interest in the matter to have notice and the opportunity to be
heard, so that the ensuing order does not issue like a 'bolt from the blue
out of the trial judge's chambers."' (quoting Campisi v. Super. Court, 17
Cal. App. 4th 1833, 1839 (1993))).

44
able to point to any evidence to the contrary in a clear and convincing
manner.” [AA 193:2-5]

Ms. Albert went on to argue “Mackovski v City of Garden Grove

(SACV 11-01538-CJC) is not the only civil rights case she handled. She
also handled Urenia v US Public Storage that was filed in 2013…” [AA
193] Albert’s entire response to the Ballot Designation challenge, which
was separately headnoted as Section B, never once referred to the issue
of suspension or having the word “attorney stricken” from the ballot.
[AA 191-195]

Additionally, Defendant’s memorandum in support of their

petition only contained one pithy paragraph on the issue of the ballot
challenge. After citing a code section in very tiny print, petitioner
concluded, because Albert was “suspended from the practice of law,
“civil rights attorney” is not her current profession.” [AA 102] That was
it.

That is not putting Albert on notice that “attorney” was being

added to ballot challenge portion of the petition and the petitioner was
looking to completely deprive Albert of a ballot designation. (For
contrast see Bauman v Bowman petition for writ of mandate, [RJN 44-
54]; Willard v Kelley court docket showing length of petition for writ of
mandate, [RJN 59-63])

Placing the task of producing evidence for every conclusory

argument made in a memorandum is too onerous a burden to bear and
not required by the rules. Appellant had the constitutional right to fair

45
due process and notice of what she was supposed to defend herself
against and neither of those concepts played out at this hearing.

D. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MS. ALBERT’S

SUSPENSION STARTED ON FEBRUARY 14, 2018 AND
CONTINUED THROUGH APRIL 5, 2018; THAT ERROR
WAS PREJUDICIAL WARRANTING REVERSAL

1. THE STATE BAR’S OWN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SHOWED

CRC DOES NOT CONTROL THE EFFECTIVE SUSPENSION DATE
FOR ATTORNEYS

On April 6, 2018 the court found that Ms. Albert “has been
disqualified from the practice of law from February 14, 2018 to the
present.” [AA 259] The court erred. This error was and is prejudicing
Ms. Albert, warranting reversal.
The court reasoned that California Rules of Court 8 series applied
and as such, the date the California Supreme Court denied her petition
for rehearing was the start date of her suspension as a matter of law.
[AA 259]
However, California Rules of Court 9 series applies to attorney
disciplinary matters, not Rule 8 series unless and to the extent they are
explicitly referred to in the Rule 9 series. Moreover, just like §13107,
the starting place is looking at the Order itself.
The California Supreme Court rubber stamped the Review
Department recommendation on December 13, 2017. The only

46
triggering date in the Supreme Court’s opinion is found on the first
page of the opinion which states:
I. Lenore LuAnn Albert is suspended from the practice of law
for the first 30 days of probation, and she will remain
suspended until the following conditions are
satisfied: ·
a. She pays the following sanctions ( or reimburses the
Client Security Fund, to the extent of any payment
from the Fund to the payees, in accordance with section
6140.5), and furnishes proof to the State Bar Office of
Probation in Los Angeles:

the $2,675.50, $i,242.50, and $1,820 sanctions awards

issued on August 3 I, 2012, by the Superior Court of
Orange County in case no. 30-2012-00568954-CL-UD-
CJC, plus 10 percent interest per year from August 31,
2012.

[RJN 173; AA 24-25] [emphasis added]

Most California Supreme Court orders give a date certain.

However, the Court, left it up to the discretion of the probation
department to determine and merely stated that it would start “the first
thirty days of probation.” [RJN 173, AA 24]
Nothing in California Rules of Court, Rule 8 contains a trigger
date as to when probation starts and neither does California Rules of
Court, Rule 9. Rule 9.18 only gives a 30-day period after ruling when
the Order will be in effect, meaning the order so quoted above. The
order does not state suspension starts the first day the order is effective.
It states the suspension starts the first day of suspension. Since, the
court relied on California Rules of Court Rule, CRC Rule 8.532 and CRC

47
Rule 9.18, and neither denote when suspension starts, the court erred,
and this finding should be reversed. [AA 255-256]
After apparent coaxing from Mr. Diamond and others, on or about
March 20, 2018, the probation department determined that the start
date would be February 14, 2018 as evidenced by the meta data
captured from Maricruz Farfan’s letter dated March 20, 2018. [AA 122-
125, 158-159]
It is the responsibility of the Office of Probation to formulate the
suspension date and the first step is to draft a letter to the attorney to
remind them of the upcoming suspension date (a ‘get ready’ letter) after
the Supreme Court order issues according to their own Office of
Probation Policies and Procedures. [RJN 84-85] Probation Office
Policies and Procedures page 7.
There is a system for them to check to determine when the case
was assigned to them, but the State Bar redacted that procedure out.
What was provided that is germane to show the suspension start date
could not be February 14, 2018 is as follows:

Effective: enter the date the order becomes effective. Always

verify the date on AS/400

[RJN 93] [bold added]

“Actual Begins: enter the date Respondent's actual

suspension begins (if applicable). If actual suspension is
imposed, the amount of time and effective date will be
specified in the Supreme Court Order;”

[RJN 93] [bold added]

48
 The word “begins” is important. It shows a future tense –
something to happen after the department receives the order. As such,
the suspension could not happen on the same day the order issued.
Second, also contrary to judge Griffin’s ruling, the effective date is not
found in CRC Rule 8.532 or CRC Rule 9.18. The effective date is found
in the “Supreme Court Order” as stated in the State Bar’s policies and
procedures: “effective date will be specified in the Supreme Court
Order.” [AA 255, RJN 93]
Consequently, reviewing the California Supreme Court order as to
Albert it was impossible for the effective date to start on February 14,
2018 because the Order on Rehearing did not issue until February 14,
2018. The effective date was “the first thirty days of probation.” The
first thirty days of probation are not determined by CRC Rule 8 as
judge Griffin noted in his Minute Order. In this case, it was determined
by the probation department. However, the probation department had
no authority to backdate the date of Ms. Albert’s suspension.
The State Bar redacted out the table [RJN 83] showing the dates
the Probation Department uses because they know they are in deep
water here – not because of their self-professed ‘privileged’ information
spouted in the letter. [RJN 72-73] The point is, Mr. Diamond hoped for
a suspension on March 9, 2018 and the judge used what he had – two
Rules to see his way. But those were not the right rules to use and the
State Bar held onto the policies and procedures for a very, very long
time. But since the burden was on the Petitioner, the court should have
found that Petitioner did not meet his burden because he did not bring
forth the evidence to prove the date of suspension. Not under these

49
circumstances where there was no publication of suspension of Ms.
Albert in the California Lawyer, Daily Journal et al for February 2018.
There was no printout or certified copy from the California Supreme
Court (costs $1.00) showing Ms. Albert was suspended. Zilch, nil, nada.
The Third District Court of Appeals received a ballot challenge
against Xavier Becerra. The challenge was based on the grounds his
attorney license has been “inactive” thus not qualifying the time period
proscribed for California Attorney General. The Third District Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition citing, Chambers v. Terry (1940) 40
Cal.App.2d 153 which stands for the proposition that the qualifications
must be uniform throughout the state and also that the legislature
cannot overreach into judicial matters. Early v. Becerra et al. CV087605
8/02/18 (pet for rev S250475 denied 08/10/18.).
2. THE BANKRUPTCY PREVENTED THE STATE BAR FROM
WITHHOLDING MS. ALBERT’S LICENSE
Second, Ms. Albert showed the court she was in bankruptcy and
that such protection prohibited the State Bar from withholding her
license. 11 USC §525(a). The court did not consider this argument.
However, Ms. Albert was right, and the State Bar admitted it. [RJN
146-221]
Ms. Albert is still right because 11 USC §523(a)(7) discharges the
debt, too. In re Taggart, 249 F.3d 987 (9th Cir.2001); Love v. Scott (In
re Love), 442 B.R. 868, 871 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.2011). The rationale for
these decisions is drawn from the decision in Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986) In re Scheer (Scheer v. State Bar of Calif.), 819 F.3d

50
1206, 1209-1212 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because a fundamental policy of the
Bankruptcy Code is to afford [honest] debtors a fresh start, `objections
to discharge should be strictly construed against an objecting creditor
and in favor of the debtor.”); Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475 (6th
Cir.2006) (civil attorney malpractice judgment entered by default as a
sanction for discovery abuse was dischargeable.); See also, Tennessee
Bd. Prof'l Responsibility v. Brooks (In re Brooks), Case No. 04-15901,
Adv. No. 04-1290, 2008 WL 1924040 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. Apr.28, 2008)
(“Restitution ordered paid by disciplined attorney was not payable to
State and was dischargeable under rationale of Hughes.); Lufkin v Bd
of Profl Responsibility 336 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn Sup Ct 2011) (Attorney
disciplinary proceeding costs were discharged.); In re Stasson, 472 B.R.
748, 754 (BK ED Mich 2012) (“The costs assessed in disciplinary
proceedings certainly are compensatory in their effect, and the purpose
of such costs clearly appears to be to compensate the State Bar of
Michigan for the expenses of the disciplinary proceeding”).
Consequently, the trial court was incorrect on this ground, too.
3. THE UNDERLYING DISCOVERY SANCTIONS WERE VOID ORDERS
The court did not consider whether the California Supreme
Court’s order was even valid or not. No valid order can be based on a
void one.
CCP § 2023.040 states:
A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion,
identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the
sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.
The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of
points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration

51
 setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary
sanction sought.

Id. (RJN)

10675 S. Orange Blvd, LLC did not “identify every person, party,
and attorney against whom the sanction is sought” in the notion of
motion because the name “Lenore Albert” did not appear as the counsel
in the caption of the motion or in the first paragraph of the notice of
motion, giving her proper notice that 10675 S. Orange Park Blvd, LLC
was seeking monetary sanctions against her in violation of CCP
§2023.040. (See, Ex 5, 6 & 7)
Since all three requests for discovery sanctions didn’t identify
Albert in violation of CCP§ 2023.040, the orders were void. "Adequate
notice prior to imposition of sanctions is mandated not only by statute,
but also by due process clauses of both the state and federal
Constitutions." (Sole Energy Co. v. Hodges (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 199,
208) "`[D]ue process requires fair warning and an opportunity to
respond before penalties can be imposed.'" (Ibid.)
In such circumstances, the attorney is not properly "placed on
notice of possible sanctions against him [or her] and the need to prove
blamelessness." (In re Marriage of Fuller (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1070,
1076-1078; see also, Corralejo v. Quiroga (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 871,
873-874; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 652.
The trial court violated statutory and constitutional due process
notice requirements and, in so doing, abused its discretion. (See,

52
e.g., Sole Energy, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 207-208; Alliance Bank
v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
Albert did not have to appeal the orders because they were void
and she is allowed to collaterally attack them each time they rear their
ugly head.
Since the trial court had no jurisdiction over Albert to issue the
sanctions making the orders void, the State Bar’s order is also a legal
nullity.
The analysis cannot be laid out any better than the Second
District Court of appeal laid out in the case of Moore v Kaufman 189
CalApp4th 604 (2010)
““A judgment in favor of a person who is not a party to the
action is obviously beyond the authority of the court” and
hence is void. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008)
Jurisdiction, § 315, p. 927 [collecting cases].) That rule
applies if the nonparty is the attorney or former attorney of
a party. (See, e.g., Wong v. Superior Court (1966) 246
Cal.App.2d 541, 548 [attorney]. Moore, Id.

Because the judgment is void as to Albert, subsequent orders

purporting to enforce the judgment against her or sanction her, like
suspending her license, are likewise void. Moore, Id.

“A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment.

By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.” [Citation.]‟”
(Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1240, quoting Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-
514; see also Levine v. Smith (2006) M

53
 Moore v Kaufman 189 CalApp4th 604, 615-616 (2010)
So, to say there was a legitimate suspension is farfetched.
E. OTHER ISSUES
1. INADEQUATE RECORD TO GRANT THE PETITION
Here it is abundantly clear that the petitioner, who was required
to bring forth an adequate record, failed to do so. Consequently, the
court erred when it did not deny the petition on the lack of adequate
record. Darley v Ward (1980) 28 Cal3d 257, 260. The universal facts
under consideration by the court were both the records of the California
State Bar and the filed in the Orange County Registrar of Voter’s Office.
Diamond did not bring forth the record from either agency for the court
to determine in his favor. He opted to place other things in the record
other than the record. [AA 14-87] Western States Petroleum Assn v
Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal4th 559, 575.

The reviewing court can make these decisions because courts of

appeal only defer to the trial court’s determination of facts if supported
by substantial evidence. The rest is de novo, because "[i]t is for the court
[of appeal] to decide whether the facts found by the [lower court]
constitute a violation of [law]." Barns v. Workers' Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 530-531.
Albert did not provide the court with an adequate record because
that word “attorney” was not part of the petition’s ballot designation
challenge. The court did not give notice to Ms. Albert that it was going
to consider the “attorney” portion of her ballot designation until the
hearing. [AA 4-6; 252-261]

54
 The issue is not moot because other courts are using judge
Griffin’s determination of Ms. Albert’s dates of suspension and that
there was a suspension through April 5, 2018 a res judicata/collateral
estoppel effect.
2. PUBLIC WAS DEPRIVED OF DIAMOND’S $15.00 FEE

Diamond was supposed to prepare the judgment and a proposed

writ. CCP §632, CRC 3.1590, CRC 3.1312 and CCP §1095. Petitioner
was supposed to pay $15.00 fee pursuant to Govt Code §7626(a)(1) and
submit the proposed peremptory writ. Diamond did none of these
things and deprived the public even his filing fee. He did not pay for or
serve the petition and he cheated the public of his $15.00 fee for the
Writ of Mandate. Lee Fink should have disclosed he was with OCERS.
F. MULTIPLYING EFFECT THIS ORDER CONTINUES TO
HAVE ON OTHER PROCEEDINGS AND THE GREATER
PUBLIC INTEREST DEMONSTRATE THIS APPEAL IS
NOT MOOT

As shown herein, this appeal contains important constitutional

issues raised and are of general public interest on matters requiring
uniform application of the election laws throughout the state and are
therefore not moot.” Knoll v Davidson, (1974) 12 Cal3d 335, 344, citing
Zeilenga v Nelson (1971) 4 Cal3d 176, 719-720.
The case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to
recur. In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal App 4th 1228, 1232. In re William M.
(1970) 3 Cal 3d 16, 23-25; In re Garcia (1998) 67 Cal App 4th 841. Such
issues would escape judicial review. Roe v Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113,

55
125; Ferrara v Belanger (1976) 18 Cal 3d 253, 259 (completed election
did not moot the matter given the important need to interpret the
Election statutes).
There is also a possible recurrence of the controversy between the
parties. Zuniga v WCAB (2018) 19 Cal App 4th 981, 988 n6.
Material questions for the court’s determination nonetheless
persist. The court should continue to rule “to do complete justice.” In re
David B (2017) 12 Cal App 5th 633, 652-54. The court of appeal should
not leave unresolved questions that would preclude a party from
litigating its rights or liability on an issue still in controversy. Eye Dog
Found v State Board of Guide Dogs (1967) 67 Cal 2d 536, 541.
As it stands the world is using the order against Ms. Albert to find
she practiced unauthorized practice of law which comes with the price
tag of disbarment. Courts are using it against her and her former
clients, thus precluding her right to litigate the issue when it was never
fully presented before judge Griffin in the first instance.
Here, the issue of Albert’s status of her license is still in
controversy as well as the trial court’s authority to make such rulings
as well as the original void discovery orders that Albert has a right to
collaterally attack every time they rear their venomous head. The
court’s ruling below on Albert’s license status has resulted in a
multitude of other trial court rulings and additional State Bar
disciplinary actions. The court used it in the contested Election Matter of
Todd Spitzer, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2018-01002774-CU-PT-
CJC, Court Order by judge Robert Moss filed on August 10, 2018, to find Ms.

Albert was suspended during the campaign [RJN 66-69] and in the

56
matter of Richters v Spitzer, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2018-
000976891 Court Order by judge Theodore Howard filed on May 7, 2018
wherein Ms. Albert was not even notified or giving an opportunity to
respond. [RJN 64-65] It has taken on a life of its own, irrespective of the
election.
Judge Griffin never reviewed whether the underlying orders were
dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 USC §523(a)(7) or if federal
law enjoined the state from withholding Ms. Albert’s license under 11
USC §525(a).
Judge Griffin never reviewed the three motions to compel filed on
August 24, 2012; August 24, 2012 and August 27, 2012 to determine if
10675 S Orange Park Blvd, LLC complied with CCP §2023.040 and the
notions of due process, by identifying Ms. Albert in the caption and
notice of the motion to put her on notice that she would have to defend
against sanctions because she was not a party to the action. [RJN 222-
514] The court never even determined if the three Orders issued,
entered and noticed only a few days later in the amount of $2675.50,
$1242.50, and $1820.00 were void for failure to comply with CCP
§2023.040; lack of due process; due to the court recusing itself
thereafter making all prior orders void; discharged by way of the UD
judgment granting 10675 S Orange Park Blvd $25,000.00 in damages;
or by way of bankruptcy. [ RJN 222-236, 515-533] The records were
never before the court to even make that determination.
If those orders are void so are every order that comes thereafter
that depends on it and Ms. Albert has a right to collaterally attack
those orders whenever they raise their ugly head. Courts are under a

57
duty to refrain from relying on or wielding void court orders because
they are not supposed to multiply the initial harm that void orders
cause. The court surely did not go through the US Bankruptcy law to
determine if they debt was dischargeable or whether a stay was in effect
whereby federal law preempted state law and actions contrary
including withholding Ms. Albert’s law license. If it had it would have
found on April 5, 2016 that Ms. Albert could not be suspended because
such suspension was preempted by federal law. This was later admitted
to by the California State Bar. [RJN 146-221, 534]
Commissioners are not supposed sanction counsel that just came
onboard because their clients did not produce discovery responses in pro
per and the court finds the new attorney’s responses after a few short
weeks of being in the case to be inadequate. When commissioners wield
that kind of power, other judges are not supposed to hop on the band
wagon. Since they are, this court should find that the underlying
discovery orders are void, making any order based on it, including the
California Supreme Court order to suspend Ms. Albert void and judge
Griffin’s Minute Order granting the petition for writ in mandate to
strike Ms. Albert’s ballot designation void.
Ms. Albert should be awarded costs on appeal.
VII. CONCLUSION

"If you find yourself in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging."
- Will Rogers

Ms. Albert is in a hole. She stopped digging but the courts have

58
not. In reviewing this appeal, this court can and should stop others from
throwing dirt over her before she is completely buried and there is no
sign of life left with regard to the date of purported suspension.
Although personally to Ms. Albert that is of the utmost
importance, the appeal also has a very legitimate broader public
interest here where Election Code §13107 is not being applied uniformly
throughout California. This is a case of first impression and an
important one. Ms. Albert requests that this reviewing court interpret
§13107 in a way which requires the writ to command the Responding
Secretary of State or Registrar of Voter’s office to issue a Subsection (f)
letter to the candidate and allow the candidate to choose an alternate
ballot designation. The Responding Party must return the writ of
Mandate to the court to ensure that the candidate timely received the
notice. This is the fairest way to approach it, without offending the
constitutional rights of the candidates while allowing the state to
regulate its elections in a way that is fair and gives the electorate an
informed choice between the candidates on the ballots.
Additionally, the court of appeal should find that no court can use
a back dated suspension as a basis to take away that licensed
professional’s ballot designation. The pandora’s door has been opened
and it is an important issue concerning licensed professionals who seek
to run for office and what legal limits the licensing agency has on
affecting the outcome of that race.
Finally, the court should conclude that if the petitioner does not
bring the entire ROV file or other administrative file for consideration
on a ballot challenge, then the record is insufficient as a matter of law

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on a ballot designation challenge.
For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court should grant Ms.
Albert the above-mentioned relief, reversed the order with directions to
the Orange County Superior Court to incorporate subsection (f) in all
future writ of mandate proceedings where the ballot designation is
stricken; that the petitioner must prepare an adequate proposed
judgment and writ of mandate; and that the Orange County Registrar
of Voter’s Office must follow procedure and return the Writ of Mandate
to determine its compliance. There are rules and those rules should be
followed in order to protect the constitutional rights of the candidates
and give the voters of this County the information they are entitled to
ensure that their choice at the ballot box is not cut off and they can
make an informed decision.
Ms. Albert should also be awarded costs on appeal.

Dated: August 29, 2018 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Lenore Albert___________________
LENORE L. ALBERT, pro per

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 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
The text of this brief consists of 13,029 words as counted by the
Microsoft Word 2016 word processing program used to generate this
brief, including this Certificate and the attached Proof of Service.
Dated: August 29, 2018 Respectfully Submitted,

_s/Lenore Albert___________
Lenore L. Albert
Appellant pro se

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Appellants is aware that the following cases pending in this Court

would have been deemed related.

In the Contested Matter of Todd Spitzer, Orange County Superior

Court Case No. 30-2018-01002774-CU-PT-CJC, Court Order by judge
Robert Moss filed on August 10, 2018 (appeal just filed)

Richters v Spitzer Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-

2018-000976891 Court Order by judge Theodore Howard filed on May 7,
2018 (never served on Plaintiff) (appeal to be filed)

Pending before the BAP Ninth Circuit is:

Albert v Farfan, et al 18-1222

Dated: August 29, 2018 Respectfully Submitted,

_s/Lenore Albert___________
Lenore L. Albert
Appellant pro se

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 PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE:
I declare that I am over the age of 18 years; that I am employed in Orange
County, California; my business address is 14272 Hoover Street #69, Westminster,
CA 92683. On August 29, 2018, I served a copy of the following document(s)
described as:
APPELLANT LENORE ALBERT’S OPENING BRIEF AND
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES

On the interested parties in this action as follows:

Mark Daniels: Plaintiff and Respondent Gregory Avergon Diamond
Law Office of Gregory A. Diamond
920 Steele Drive
Brea, CA 92821

Neal Kelley: Other Rebecca S. Leeds

Office of Orange County Counsel
333 W Santa Ana Blvd Ste 407
P. O. Box 1379
Santa Ana, CA 92701

[x ] BY EMAIL – I caused such document(s) to be transmitted to the office(s) of

the addressee(s) listed above by electronic mail at the e-mail address(es) set forth
per agreement of counsel via Tru Filing.

Hon. Craig Griffin, Dept N17

Orange County Superior Court
1275 North Berkeley Avenue, Fullerton, CA 92832-1258

[x] BY MAIL – I caused such document(s) to be placed in pre-addressed

envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid and sealed, to be deposited as
Express/Priority Mail for next day delivery at Westminster, California, to the
aforementioned addressee(s).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: August 29, 2018

/s/ Ed Garza________________________
Ed Garza

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