Republic of the Philippines
The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA
SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982,
private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner
as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of
Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor,
Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao,
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that
Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud
petitioner of its property.
GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda
Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions
conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a
witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed
private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later
or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal
dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages,
after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was
considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered
petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have
received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay
private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid
decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the
backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of
private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2)
years' backwages.
1
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's
acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated
immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with
Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of
the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private
respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive
suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company
pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she
was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for
the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's
right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay
with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of
October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the
Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed
her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to
evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we
hold that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make
whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled
Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived
without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to
her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular
employments, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor
Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis
supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas
of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such
topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights.9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
2
 The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions
of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law.10(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under
the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of
labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the
fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social
Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State
Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in
national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in
our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an
employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the
Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized
dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand,
the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should
find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the
legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took
effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the
constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent,
she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full
backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement
and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from
which one had been removed"15 and in the latter, to give her back the income
lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee
finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time
(22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it
would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no
3
longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when
supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust
or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of
"antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first
place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and
to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by,
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the
wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of
the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when
the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it
is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the
employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such,
enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-
Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to
organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations
to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in
an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
4
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar
systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years
did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of only.
supplies and company assets.
This decision is immediately executory.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or SO ORDERED.
breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis
which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed
______________________________________________________________________
on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since
Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed _____________________________
reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its
averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, Republic of the Philippines
do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of SUPREME COURT
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of Manila
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
EN BANC
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be
most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of
vs.
Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN
respondent is wanting from the records.
DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not
have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt MENDOZA, J.:
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been are acquitted and ordered released.
unlawfully dismissed.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the
Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his

5
son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26,
1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the
Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for
failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into
their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled
that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of
the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec.
3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was
unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of
a judgment of acquittal."1 The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while
petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood
between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that
the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he
was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said
the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of
R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the
instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed
such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal
shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but
upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor
Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions
of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to
recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be
innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court. Through
counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call
for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime
which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he
contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared innocent would be
to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was
justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in
criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution
fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent
stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared
innocent of the crime before he can recover compensation for his
imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory
that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a)
is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the
language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves
out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation
before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
6
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be
acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to
sustain a civil action for damages.2 In one case the accused, an alien, was
acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of
the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as
evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that
he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt," 4so
is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that
the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution
the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is
quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has
been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape
with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption
of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts
of unlawful conduct do not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with
the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may
on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the
victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That
is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that
under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of
the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What
this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt
that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it
must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has
acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance
of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service.
Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a
manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal
concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say,
such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or
error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically
and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner,
in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of
which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence
of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note
this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be
erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
7
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in
filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an
accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a
conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's
conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or
gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to
believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner
is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his
coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon?
These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of
petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because
of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances
respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a
grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for compensation
under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was Feliciano, J., is on leave.
no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
______________________________________________________________________
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito
Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to show _____________________________
Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to
show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in
furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged
against the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis
on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual
killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit
murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26,
1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the
two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was
Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of
the dark shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be
shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with
his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact

8
Republic of the Philippines Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision,
SUPREME COURT public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-
Manila 08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the application of private respondent
Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
SECOND DIVISION Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.

G.R. No. 177333 April 24, 2009
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE GAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI),
ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, et
al., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on
February 23, 1995, created the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
(ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other
things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power
under Sec. 7 (f), viz:
Section 7.
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or
license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;
xxxx
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself
as such licensor/regulator to the international business and gaming
community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority
of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the
operation of games of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does
not give power or authority to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate,
license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia
with R.A. No. 7903 as it likewise created economic zones and provided for the
powers and functions of their respective governing and administrative
authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of authority to operate
games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of
R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent
provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority
Act" enacted on March 13, 1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. –
xxxx
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. – The Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have
the following powers and functions:

9
xxxx
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject
to priorities and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and
amusements, except horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which
shall continue to be licensed by the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the Conversion Authority; to
maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;
xxxx
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted
on February 24, 1995:
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority –
The Cagayan Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxxx
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or
license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements,
recreational and sports facilities such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling,
casinos, golf courses, and others, under priorities and standards set by the
CEZA;
xxxx
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,"
enacted on February 24, 1995 authorizing other economic zones established
under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and its successor
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other
games of chance under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto
clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or
exemptions granted to special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227
shall ipso facto be accorded to special economic zones already created or to
be created under this Act. The free port status shall not be vested upon the
new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the
ecozone-related statutes, Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically
empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or authorize
entities to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and
"amusement" employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence,
PAGCOR concludes, ZAMBOECOZONE Authority’s grant of license to private
respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR’s) authority under Presidential
Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to centralize and
regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,1 contends that PAGCOR has no
personality to file the present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which
proves its claim of having been granted exclusive right and authority to license
and regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary to
PAGCOR’s assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of
R.A. No. 7903 include "games of chance" as was the intention of the
lawmakers when they enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,2 PAGCOR cites the November 27,
2006 Opinion3 rendered by the Office of the President through Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the pertinent portions of
which read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows
the operation of tourism-related activitiesincluding games and
amusements without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of
authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative
franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
10
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws
specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o
operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to
others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 4
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute
there should be no departure.5
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous
meanings in law which are clearly different from "game of chance" or
"gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;
while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or
enjoyment.6 On the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which
chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is defined
as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of
gaining something of value." 7
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar
provisions in the three cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while
the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which authorized the Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos
within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was being vested in
their respective administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.8 Not any of these instances is present in the case
at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to
exclude "games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity,
contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators.
The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of chance" and
"gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate
the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No.
7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903. But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the
President which, after differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan
Special Economic Zone and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while
the former is authorized to, among other things, operate gambling casinos and
internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not.
The relevant portions of said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and
ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To the former, the grant of powers is not only
explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of power is merely what the
law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the differences in language telling, it will be
noted that both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law
only one (1) day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of
ZAMBOECOZONE and February 24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x
Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what Congress intended
them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted
the two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the
operation of tourism-related activities including games and amusements
without stating any form of gambling activity in its grant of authority to
ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA included such
activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
11
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative
franchise (RA 7903), the ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any
gaming activity by itself unless expressly authorized by law or other laws
specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of
the President, the latter’s interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and
deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical
construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors
which may be regarded as bases thereof – factors leading the courts to give
the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules
in themselves. These factors include the respect due the governmental
agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which
the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with
unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies,
or improvements in the statute.8
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power
to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga
Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from
exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate
the operation of any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine
Gaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from
operating any games of chance pursuant to the license granted to it by public
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo
T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing
the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated
on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
12
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics
Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely
filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal
was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment
filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the
September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the
September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared
the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he
be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital
obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the
family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of
a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo
was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It
relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the
effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December
10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution, 4 denied the
motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period
to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142
SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE
ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS
PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE
WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
13
 C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED
"RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS
APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO
COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION
OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING
THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN
THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES
IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be
resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is
applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the
CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited
Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said
case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied
because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case
from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null
were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in
2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided
after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his
appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void
due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of
the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render
marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of
the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
14
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the
phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
"petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It
is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
"from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial
justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of
this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the
Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for
taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By
their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As
pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986
in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently
and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running
of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under
the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision
was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision
which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for
review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent
case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While
the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an
essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1
thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.16
15
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is
not the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________________________________________
_____________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the
petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code
as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to
the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book
II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post
a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a
license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding
company acceptable to the Administration and duly accredited
by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all
valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions
for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise
guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and
placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant
16
 issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the
Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include
the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the
surety and that any judgment against the principal in
connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall
be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000
with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book
II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond
requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only
to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall
be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section
1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond
as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by
a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied
upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed
for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on
the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period
for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to
the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further
insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against
these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license,
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other
liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a
standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be
reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of
about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this
17
award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds
and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the
other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to
exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow
money required of the recruiter.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than
annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It
is so ordered.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction.
Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
______________________________________________________________________
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and
the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local _________________
agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to
be sent. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of Manila
rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a THIRD DIVISION
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because
of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-
effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such
insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4
vs.
and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as
inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI,
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
harmonious whole.
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA
overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary
to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
POEA.

18
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-
Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition
for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary
insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private
respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No.
1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking
cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the
delivery of any property owing and belonging to said
respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other
persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-
debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the said
respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners' putting up a
bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1,
Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City
of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26, 1981, also
communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order,
apprising the latter that "the personal and real property which have been levied
upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final determination of the
petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance
of insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things,
that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order;
on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of
Angeles City from disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent
debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983,
they (sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the
effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory,
sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be
investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that some of the
aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.;
and that in view of such development, it is their submission that without an
insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as
early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be
injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the
prayer that the insolvency order (which has not been rendered yet by the
court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its
name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of
respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same
second urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final
certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in
its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership
of certain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of
foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which
properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption, respondent
court issued an order disposing, thus:
19
 WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio
C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered claimants in this case, and,
in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed to post a
bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so
as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his functions, as
such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the
attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as
by that time the proposals, which the respective representatives of the
parties-claimants desire to clear with their principals, shall have
already been reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which
are now in the actual or constructive custody and management of the
receiver previously appointed by the Court on petitioners' and
claimants' proposals be placed under this actual or constructive
custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court
hereby dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having
become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila,
in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order directing respondent Sheriff of
Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days
from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered
by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner.
(Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering
the proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary
attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff,
which put up a bond of P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on
attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in
the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No.
7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner,
ordering private respondents and their co-defendant Peoples Appliance
Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91
plus interest thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid;
P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5",
Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946
became final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof
issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of Angeles
City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905
and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was
accordingly issued in its favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of
petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused
to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating
among other things, that subject motion is improper and premature because it
treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the
reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles
City were brought to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the
determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the
approved credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that
the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion referring to
matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another
jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out
with its assailed extended order with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order
issued in pursuance of a similar motion of the movant, the Court
denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated
May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate in the supposed
meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected
assignee. (Annex "J").
20
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc.
(RTPI, for short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March
31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE
THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT
NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of
the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent
spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended),
provides:
Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and
qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under his hand
and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real
and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his
deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall
relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency,
and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate,
and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on
mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall
operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor
not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment
levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment
entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior
to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside
any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are
undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of the
Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then
Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was
commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends
that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and
was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law,
which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon
which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the
estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the
amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the
proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of
Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable
for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted
Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject
properties in its name.
21
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit.1âwphi1 The provision of the available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the
above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that insolvency proceedings.
attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding
the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the
set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal
default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30) constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion
In short, there is a cut off period — one (1) month in attachment cases and amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate
respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not
Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and
dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT
the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
SO ORDERED.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a
statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of
a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the
whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of ______________________________________________________________________
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and __________
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and
effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042
Republic of the Philippines
[1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the
petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the insolvent
THIRD DIVISION
debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the
case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this
Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and transactions G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their operation. vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never
placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made DECISION

22
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with
her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at
ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion
to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of
the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government
scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December
21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January
1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000,
petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the
funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. 5 The succeeding
student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student
councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information
reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special
Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and
JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent
of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and
renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for
which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October
24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently encashed by
accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite
repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
23
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or
over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property),
Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was
duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount
came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her
person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did
not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or
duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her
official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation
of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It
should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a
public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of
administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not
compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not
an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are
within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the
prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this
provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his
office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation
of the student body, she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27,
is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
24
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan
has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the
officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary
grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of these
officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the
Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-
movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the university, such as: 1) To
receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as
may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To
prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the
government of the university such general ordinances and regulations,
not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of
the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees
of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in
its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation
and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act
only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of
non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is
the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University
of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board
of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant
undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this
Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the
fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27
or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the
same of P15 Million was received from former President Estrada and
not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that
should be properly ventilated during the trial on the merits of this
case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 The
motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004. 18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT
COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
25
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural
grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal
case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to
go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such
as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident
reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. 22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly
explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no
appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair
to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general
rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court
of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to
quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from
further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance
of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further
action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to
quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court. 24
26
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to
Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25She repeats the reference
in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical
error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite
corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978.
It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of
public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was
promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983,
further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands,
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher;
27
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
"27'" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as
the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant
to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
28
 where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17,
1960. The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for
violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful
for any person having family or close personal relation with any public
official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract
with the government, in which such public official has to intervene.
Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity
or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation"
shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy
which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause
any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines
graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not
among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in
hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan
mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap
at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by
reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole
text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In other
words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a
statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na
interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
29
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason
to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director
of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality.
The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as
an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of
the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive
Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia
were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No.
3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest
Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1,
1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No.
830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the
Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC
as a regular government agency under the Office of the President and
allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater
firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the
Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not
have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the
inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases
and those of the government employees separately charged for the
same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged,
as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private
persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that
even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive
any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely
the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr.
v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are
public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in
different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by
him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all
only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating
and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a
vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
30
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public
office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in
fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is
not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher,
its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions
may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees
of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed,
a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element
of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An
investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a
public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of
the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing
advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and
giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it
was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the
approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the
BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts
were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her
act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
information.51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss,
or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that
petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother,
JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
31
Source of funds is a defense that should We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his
be raised during trial on the merits. citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court should be characterized by
candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts. 58
funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has
no leg to stand on. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office SO ORDERED.
of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Nachura,
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of JJ., concur.
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No.
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the
trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented

his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge
petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall
not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where
Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with
a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by
using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant
suspension or disbarment.56

32
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO
SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside
of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition
for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure
question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public
Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No.
192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso.
The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for
the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28,
1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold
the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property
now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The
mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the
petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine
National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National
Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held
on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as
the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a
"Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was
executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The
public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the
motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of
Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to
vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to
repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984,
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was
filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August
31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal
offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition
and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ
of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the
respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
33
order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order
dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave
due course to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial
court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise
giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the
court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to
the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H.
Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9,
1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970
of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to
repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already
started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been
dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to
child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by
the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court
went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of
reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the
date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when
the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the
period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7,
1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this
petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts
below, their right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the
petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs.
Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's
decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the
petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to
heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the
petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section
119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the
affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase
their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject
to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within
a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of
persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his
widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private
respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do
not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the
property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The
petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees
34
of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a
child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this
score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the
appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering
that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her
husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of
the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue
here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase
their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the
respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The
facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case.
In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a
foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the
five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date
of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date
the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser
because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de
retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the
property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to
repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory
condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the
other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar.
Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either
through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank
as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court
ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public
auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the
expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is
executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the
mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on
February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the
two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and
the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private
respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest
at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together
with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private
respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named
amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17,
1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the
Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of
the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent
to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of
reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the
latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes
he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to
November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
35
36
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT
LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR
DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES,
CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT.
VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO
PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS
PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA,
CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO
LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL
MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT
SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO
CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L.
CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez,
Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel
Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
37
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena. In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise
93177. raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
I

CRUZ, J.:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the
same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup
d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI
Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14,
1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually
addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned
Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan
Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-
trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of
AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny),
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date
AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
controverting evidence.
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the
they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel
charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical
constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the
certificates of victims of the rebellion.
General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No.
various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which
14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory
to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary
challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and
Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no
gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-
jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
denying bail to the private respondents.

38
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce
their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be
signed by a person subject to military law, and under the oath either
that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters
set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after
a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made.
This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set
forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case
should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such
investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-
examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded
after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of
the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis
supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a
roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their
affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to
submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested
that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the
president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the
petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for
his release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP
Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De
Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the
appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of
Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson
and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the
right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly,
the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does
not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the
ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared
null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby
directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the
petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons
facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General
Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the
provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors
Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
39
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with
this Court a petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge
Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given
several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at
the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990,
to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing.
This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the
PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General
Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process
because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure
to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the
subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-
affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right
to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As
their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring
the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their
defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be
heard.1âwphi1 If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI
Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so
held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive
a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986
(1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by
Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71,
Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army
General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial
procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its
language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial
in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could
consider the same contention, reversing a court- martial
conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded
that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall
short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress
has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
40
 Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge
Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had
been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were
void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated
in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of
Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress
in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left
unchanged the language here under consideration.
compensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army general
court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether
irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal
procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that
issue was resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where
we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided
in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-
respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were
signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he
had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent
records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers,
and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The
charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in
accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the
Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets
were not certified in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that
the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood
its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a
"pretrial investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado,
wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911,
petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-
affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading
seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners
were not able to confront the witnesses against them was their own
doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions
in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in
accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-
6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de
Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military
area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding
officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be
appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa,
there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was
issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form
showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM
41
No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said
order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly
invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other
respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was
originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War),
as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial
may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for
cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and
validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one
member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall
ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are
offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but
the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Alejandro,3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the
passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the
National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers
and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who
were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer
corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for the
demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and
that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus
Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as
worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act,
made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either
the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After
December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law, encompassing the
length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until
the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.
After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated
in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article
of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of
court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals
"to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may
be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the
National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees,
general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to the
existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges
under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The
42
proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the
cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other
general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of
law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory
challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result,
the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically
revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to
peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered
no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in
the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial
law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that
discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge
may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused
officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of
Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed
to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects.
This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the
petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by
the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is
argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of
Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of
Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to
ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers
before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting
power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in
their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their
undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave
abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction.
This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
43
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
for habeas corpusand quo warranto.5 In the absence of a law providing that
the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much
was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General
as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to
exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are
allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the
discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry
out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a
damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer
number alone is already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting
thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which
could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal
treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where
the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because
they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had
not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February
18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum
and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the
charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of
more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against
the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General
thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it
pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of
officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed
coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or
investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-
charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that
those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout the
44
 Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout
Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP
Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the
following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the
point that if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for
which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili
cannot be established and no charges can be filed against him or the
existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General
Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents
must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinement is
not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps
must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and
release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be
punished as a court martial may direct.6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge
Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad
cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied,
after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41,
Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial
was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private
respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this
Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the
following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to
prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as
the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it
in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even
an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of
a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted
with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify
the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the
petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we
find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have
been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent
courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
45
 THIRD DIVISION WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION G.R. No. 154598 for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has no
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the
HABEAS CORPUS Present: petition is not sufficient in substance.

RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,

and in behalf of the minor SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER CORONA and Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on
DELLE FRANCISCO THORNTON CARPIO MORALES, JJ.
Petitioner, August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations

Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl

- versus -
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 16, 2004 plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x relations officer in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her

friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent

DECISION
was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of

CORONA, J.: the househelp.

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she

July 5, 2002 resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left

in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her

the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of substance. The

dispositive portion[2] read:

46
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to
Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family
Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of
the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office
of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification [3] that respondent
was no longer residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular
phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva
Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another
petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that
since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-
stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the
jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural
expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was
enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The
Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship,
custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and
RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of
habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The
simple answer is, yes, it did, because there is no other
meaning of the word exclusive than to constitute the Family
Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court
other than the Family Court also possesses the same
47
 competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive
but concurrent and such an interpretation is contrary to the rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides that a petition
simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, [4] Court of
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction
over a petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas
corpus on him or her by just moving out of the region over be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.[5]
which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial
jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred
by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in
The petition is granted.
this Court, it cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by
expediency or necessity.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the
authority of this Court or any court for that matter to determine. there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive
domain of the legislature. When there is a perceived defect in of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but
only from the legislature. The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902

and BP 129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over

habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has
which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody
exclusive apparently cannot be construed any other way.
of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts

We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an

exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has

48
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to
be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the
State is to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children. The creation of the Family Court is geared towards
addressing three major issues regarding childrens welfare
cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations
for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to
avoid further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater
sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the case
and the parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the
children party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of
the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the
Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving a minor child whose
whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one
of the situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature
of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of
the childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the evil
sought to be avoided by the legislature: the childs welfare and
well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word exclusive
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by
the Solicitor General, inFloresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,[6] the
heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file
suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmens Compensation
Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had exclusive
jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the
case at bar. it supports petitioners submission that the word
exclusive in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote
automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner
that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the
case at bar is concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of
habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial
49
 jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the territorial
jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be
determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the
same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided
in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the
Court of Appeals or any member thereof in
the instances authorized by law, and if so
granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in
the Philippines, and may be made returnable
before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of
First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioners exclusive jurisdiction did not
foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this Court, in the
same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect
to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the
well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent,
not the letter, of the law:
Idolatrous reverence for the law sacrifices the human
being. The spirit of the law insures mans survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, the letter of the
law killeth; its spirit giveth life.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social
justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the
power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing
legislation aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of
being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature
actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to
absurdity, injustice or contradiction.[7] In the case at bar, a literal
interpretation of the word exclusive will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote the welfare of
children[8]under the Constitution and the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the
provisions of RA 8369.
50
 Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a
clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature
should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all
doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect
to all laws on the subject.[9]
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing
writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that
family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody
of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing
and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in
habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.
51
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all

over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which

the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As

explained by the Solicitor General:[10]

That the serving officer will have to search for the

child all over the country does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is
no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace
officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is
likewise enforceable anywhere within the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition

for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is

hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals,

Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

52
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic
Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for
early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well
as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail
of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive
officials and employees of the National Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from
the coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she
was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay
for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable
Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the
beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a
government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I
more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled
are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget
needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and
Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to
be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel
of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular
benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like.
There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted.
The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter
No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years
of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but
further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status as of December 2,
1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not
contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the
date of your separation from the service, is co-terminous with
the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission
shall sustain its original decision.
53
 xxx xxx xxx3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the
Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant
to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23
(sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A.
No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies
for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with a definite expected
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-
Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines including those of the
Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who
retire or elect to be separated from the service
for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A.
No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A.
No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or
P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired
voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law
and have received the corresponding benefits
of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending
cases punishable by mandatory separation
from the service under existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations; provided that if
such officials and employees apply in writing
within the prescriptive period for the availment
of the benefits herein authorized, shall be
allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all
charges and their application accepted and
approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not
belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of
NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil
Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the
Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency
employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more
reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent
status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15
years of faithful, continuous service in the government should
be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the
law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment
papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service
record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project
(WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World
Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's
position became functus officio.
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2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not
included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6,
P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the
other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most
that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment
is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS
law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of
tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or
retirement benefits but reorganization 5to streamline government functions.
The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which
it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the
government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the
WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature
of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early
retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters and local government
units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the
parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in
the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as
amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found
in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil
Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement
Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees
(regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is
classified as follows:
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment
should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility:
Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior
qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly
technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic
staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and
technical positions in scientific or research institutions which
shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.
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 (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive
Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the
Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or
unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests
of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal
confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with
fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to
undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall
exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but
occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro
v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber
Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December
1974 designated as a laborer holding emergency status with
the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R
Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was
a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On
1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the
NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31
May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga
River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980,
she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management &
Erosion Control Project) retaining the status
of temporary employee. While with this project, her
designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5
November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31
December 1988. The appointment paper 12attached to the
OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the
Project.
56
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is
considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the
duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June
22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the
function of determining creditable services for retiring officers
and employees of the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No.
966 provides that all previous services by an officer/employee
pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the
Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section
6 (a) thereof states that services rendered on contractual,
emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions
inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual
employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly
approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services
rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status,
irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall
be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to
the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved
appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies
concerned shall submit the necessary proof of
said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and
rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity
date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period
prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill
the service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989
CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-
terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the
status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose
entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by
the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure
or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified
into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project — When the
appointment is co-existent with the duration of
a particular project for which purpose
employment was made or subject to the
availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing
authority — when appointment is co-existent
with the tenure of the appointing authority.
57
 c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when
appointment is co-existent with the appointee,
in that after the resignation, separation or
termination of the services of the incumbent
the position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g.
"co-terminous for a period of 3 years" — the
appointment is for a specific period and upon
expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c)
and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not
the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure
of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d)
the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter
are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration
in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence
to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers
belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to
another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects
during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a
work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that
the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate
the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that
the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim
of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in
this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that
may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the
time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One
of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is
the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that
what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
58
 necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of
power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater
includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit,
simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement
Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage
of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year,
renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early
retirement and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the
actual status or nature of the appointment one received, but if
he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a
proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording
supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early
retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a
total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of
the date of separation. The term "contractual employees" as
used in this Act does not include experts and consultants hired
by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage
of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim
the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case,
upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from
the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods,
and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to
qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or
project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient,
whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here,
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring
because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the
benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law
of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits
to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in
such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of
functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for
such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7)
years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or
non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar
regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical
59
and mental well-being of public servants"22 After all, co-terminous personnel,
are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and
she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after
expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally
filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the
interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for
recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent is void
because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law.
Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or
legal.
Held:
Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by ordinance,
may impose a realty tax of “not less than one-half perfect but not more than two
percent of the assessed value of real property.” The additional one-half percent then
is legal. Furthermore, the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of
Manila that the additional one-half percent is sanctioned by the Special Education
Fund Law when the same states that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centum.” The doctrine of necessary implications means that
“that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of

petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683,
in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.

SO ORDERED.

City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al.

GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Facts:
The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the
other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed an “annual additional tax of 1%
on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly
levied thereon” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed 3%”
Since the
maximum limit imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed an additional .
5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the
following: 1.5% as per charter of Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .
5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid the

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