Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15088 January 31, 1961
TORIBIA FONTANILLA PACIO, SANTIAGO PACIO, ESPERANZA PACIO, and ROSARIO PACIO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUELA PACIO BILLON, BRIGIDA PACIO, and DOMINGA PACIO, defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
In 1901, Flaviano Pacio married Severa Jucutan. Herein defendants were their children. Severa died in 1930; and thereafter Flavio married the
plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla, who bore him the other four plaintiffs.
The dispute between the parties in the La Union court of first instance, concerned two parcels of land which defendants allegedly retained without
any right thereto. The litigants later agreed to a partition of the first parcel, and the court so decreed.
As to the second parcel, a hearing was held, and it was awarded to the defendants, on the ground that it had been donated propter nuptias to
Severa, in 1901, by Flaviano Pacio, who was then admittedly the owner.
According to the stipulation of facts:
. . . a donation propter nuptias was made in a private instrument by Flaviano Pacio in favor of his first wife Severa Jucutan, before their marriage on
June 4, 1901 . .;
3. That the land continued to be declared in the name of Flaviano Pacio notwithstanding this donation propter nuptias until 1956 when the same
was changed in the name of the defendants Brigida, Manuela and Dominga, all surnamed Pacio;
4. That land taxes were paid in the name of Flaviano Pacio as shown by tax receipts for the years 1931, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944,
1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1955, and 1956;
5. That Flaviano Pacio died on November 2, 1951;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That defendants lived with their father and the second wife, Toribia Fontanilla, from the date of their marriage in 1933, except Manuela who left
on the date of her marriage in 1941, and returned in 1946, and Dominga who left in 1943 and Brigida is presently living with the other defendants;
9. That while the plaintiffs and the defendants lived together during the said period, they equally shared all the harvests reaped from the land in
the litigation;
10. That the land taxes were paid on both parcels (a) and (b) in the names of the defendants starting with the year 1957 when the tax declarations
were changed into their names on December 20, 1956; . . .,"
The plaintiffs-appellants contend that the donation was void, because it was not made in a public instrument. They are right. Art. 633 of the
Spanish Civil Code states that "In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by public instrument in which the property
donated must be specifically described and the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the donee expressed . . .." .
And this Court has held that a donation propter nuptias of real property written on a private instrument is not valid even between the parties.1
The trial judge said "a donation propter nuptias in order to be valid between the donor and the donee, need not be embodied in a public
instrument as such formality is only necessary for registration purposes in the Office of the Register of Deeds" so as to bind third persons. He was
obviously applying the new principles in the Philippine Civil Code effective in the year 1950.2 But in 1901 when the gift was made, the law was
contained in the Spanish Civil Code, according to which, even between the parties, the donation must be in a public instrument.
Realizing the force of plaintiffs' point, defendants emphasize that the deed of donation constituted a title on which to base acquisitive prescription,
inasmuch as Severa possessed the land from 1901 to March 1930 when she died. The stipulation of facts says nothing about such possession. True,
there was a witness, Monica Pacio, who testified; but she stated that both husband and wife held possession of the land, and the stipulation says
that from 1933 the parties shared the harvests equally. At any rate, it is obvious that normally, prescription by adverse possession can not exist
between husband and wife. See Article 1109 Civil Code of the Philippines.
Espique v. Espique3 on which the appellees rely is not controlling because the prescription there mentioned did not refer to possession by the wife
as against her husband.
It follows that Flaviano Pacio continued to be the owner of the land as the donation had no effect and there was no prescription. Upon his death,
the land became the joint property of his children by the first and second marriage. Subject of course to the rights of his surviving spouse, the
plaintiff Toribia Fontanilla.
Reversing the decision in so far as this parcel is concerned, we hereby order the return of the expediente to the court below for further
proceedings on partition in accordance with these views.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-
appellants.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of
Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no
other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del
Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed
a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel
of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death
(Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the
plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present
appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in
the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late
Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of
land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this
Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931,
cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123,
sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the
old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given
the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287,
new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive
effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior
legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early
part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband
and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands
in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted
to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion
that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order
that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old
Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON.
LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena,
et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action
in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the
plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July
17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has
no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside
the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975,
counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute
their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second
motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion
for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in
pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the
complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending
case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested
before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The
respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal
personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4
The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest
for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The
question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which
survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the
respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent
Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not
have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to
appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court
did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has
not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them
because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground
that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that
under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the
instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as
guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the
Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra
and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow
the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad
litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE
DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of
Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-
7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special
Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case
No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said
hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco
de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits;
including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone
has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into
on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims,
counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well
as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under
the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano;
al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal,
respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation
Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall
depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less,
which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2
of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the
payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns,
hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of
action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now
have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case
No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability,
arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the
estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and
specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the
papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the
corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and
upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said
sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special
Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R.
case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by
Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja;
(2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it
were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision
in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that
the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise
pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all
of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the
Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the
agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12
October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the
probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement
between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the
estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle
or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be
deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of
the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court
enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by
the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under
article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent
of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous
probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted
and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with
a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was intended to
have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an
agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all
surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which
contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total
and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all
surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price
thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further
effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same
appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it
was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise
contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to
Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the
consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under
date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs.
Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal
compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty
days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties
for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A)
because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de
Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since
what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that
eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided
hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article
1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and
marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex
"A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in
itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status
as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special
Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had
been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had
declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated
that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the compromise
agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses
is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various
reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of
the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's
will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow
of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja
should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter
step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter
of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable
that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory
compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de
Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described,
decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of
the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment
of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into
with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-
24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the
values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during
his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether
it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding)
declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil
Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the
conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual
share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the
parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja
and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of
Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the
Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to
Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an
area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife),
seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose
de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established
by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De
Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of
the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953
(Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff
Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3")
listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana
Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa
Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and
the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor
of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive
property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6
August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo
(Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for
P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent
demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo)
wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said
that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his
business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-
appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of
Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can
not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and
Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money
paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de
Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already
dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this
portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno
personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there
were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70
sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to?
In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of
cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character
of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and
his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F").
Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but
actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the
conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special
proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved
in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987
JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO ONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs.
Allied Banking Corp. et al." affirming, with modification, the January 5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
35230.
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, Block 407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, with
an area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong
"(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate in Civil Case No.
107089. The letters of administration was registered on TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim Che
Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On June
8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705 on the same date with the following notation: "...
mortgagee's consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page
No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public of Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation
tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had
allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the
court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which
will also take charge of the interest of the loan.
Concluding, the trial court ruled:
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the capital of the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said property should be
presumed as acquired during the marriage and, therefore, conjugal property,
After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her conjugal share, together with the
hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage constituted on said property, upon express
authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her conjugal share thereon, together with her hereditary
rights.
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the appealed decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive
portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall be held in abeyance
to await the final result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE MATTER
OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with which the restraining order of
the lower court in this case restraining the sale of the properties levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and effect coterminous with
the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid., pp. 24-29), but in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986,
respondent court denied the motion for lack of merit (Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p. 30), without giving due course to the petition, resolved to
require private respondent to comment thereon and it did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a Resolution dated April 6, 1987,
the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 43).
Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private respondent filed its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp.
62-68).
The sole issue in this case is —
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR
WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
The instant petition is devoid of merit.
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect, carries even more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals as in the case at bar.
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner — the wife of the deceased, is a community property
and not the separate property of the latter; (2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her capacity as
administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects the wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in the estate of her husband.
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several
cases wherein this Court ruled that the regulations provided in the said section are mandatory.
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her husband is concerned the same is not true as regards her
conjugal share and her hereditary rights in the estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily mortgaged the property in
question because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the time she executed
the real estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the mortgage, so she took it upon herself, to secure an order.
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89
of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the
estate of her husband.
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further
argues that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under
administration. While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily
entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of
Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court
of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on
the property under administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect to her conjugal
share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and
hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was the ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is
there any claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir or anybody else have been prejudiced for
impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618 —
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of his
estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2, 1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5,
1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that
during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchase. On December 12, 1920, the partition
of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in
payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon the portion thus conveyed
and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas
Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land
in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant, after trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-
half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half by express acknowledgment of the other
defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana Melgar could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was then
in custodia legis, that is, under judicial administration. This is error. That the land could not ordinary be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not
mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The
ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to
dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other
heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in
connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the
conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove,
provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government.
Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel may arise from the making of a promise even though
without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would
be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24434 January 17, 1968
HEIRS OF PEDRO REGANON, JOVENCIA REGANON, MENCIA REGANON, JOSEFA REGANON, VIOLETA REGANON, and FLORA REGANON, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
RUFINO IMPERIAL, defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is an appeal from the orders dated June 9, 1964, July 14, 1964 and August 11, 1964, respectively, of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte (Dipolog, Branch II).
The facts of the case are admitted by both parties.
On February 22, 1963, the heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of about one-hectare portion of a
parcel of land (Lot No. 1 or Lot No. 4952, situated at Miasi, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, covered by O.T.C. No. 1447, with an area of 7.9954
hectares), with damages, against Rufino Imperial.
Defendant not having filed an answer within the reglementary period, the plaintiffs on April 8, 1963 filed a motion to declare the former in default.
The trial court granted the motion in its order dated April 10, 1963.
On April 23, 1963, the plaintiffs presented their evidence ex parte before the Clerk of Court acting as Commissioner. The court a quo on May 6,
1963, rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs lawful owners of the land in question and entitled to its peaceful possession and enjoyment;
ordering defendant immediately to vacate the portion occupied by him and to restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; and sentencing
defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P1,929.20 and the costs.
On November 29, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. This was granted by the trial court in its order of December
9, 1963.
The Deputy Provincial Sheriff submitted on February 8, 1964 a sheriff's return of proceedings reporting the garnishment and sale of a carabao and
goat belonging to defendant for P153.00, and the attachment and sale of defendant's parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 4694, situated
in Sicet, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, for P500.00 — both sales having been made to the only bidder, plaintiffs' counsel Atty. Vic T. Lacaya.
On March 13, 1964, the Philippine National Bank deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch the residuary estate of its former ward,
Eulogio Imperial, in the sum of P10,303.80, pursuant to an order of Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Sp. Proc. No.
R-145.
On May 25, 1964, the heirs of said Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate,
wherein was apportioned P1,471.97 as defendant Rufino Imperial's share.
Informed of this development, the plaintiffs filed on June 5, 1964 an ex parte motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an order
directing the manager, or the representative, of the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch, to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same
to the provincial sheriff of the province to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of the money judgment. This was granted by the trial court
(Branch II) in its order dated June 9, 1964.
On June 17, 1964, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff issued a sheriffs notification for levy addressed to defendant, giving notice of the garnishment of
the rights, interests, shares and participation that defendant may have over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial, consisting of the
money deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.
Defendant, through counsel, appearing for the first time before the trial court, on June 24, 1964 filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated June 9, 1964, and to quash the alias writ of execution issued pursuant to it, to which plaintiffs filed their opposition on July 6, 1964. On July
14, 1964, the trial court denied defendant's aforesaid motion.
Defendant's second motion for reconsideration likewise having denied by the trial court in its order of August 11, 1964, defendant appealed to Us,
raising the following issues:
(1) Upon the death of a ward, is the money accumulated in his guardianship proceedings and deposited in a bank, still considered in custodia legis
and therefore cannot be attached?
(2) Is the residuary estate of a U.S. veteran, which consists in the aggregate accumulated sum from the monthly allowances given him by the United
States Veterans Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, exempt from execution?
Defendant-appellant argues that the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis and therefore can not be attached.
It is true that in a former case 1 it was held that property under custodia legis can not be attached. But this was under the old Rules of Court. The
new Rules of Court 2 now specifically provides for the procedure to be followed in case what is attached is in custodia legis. 3 The clear import of
this new provision is that property under custodia legis is now attachable, subject to the mode set forth in said rule.
Besides, the ward having died, the guardianship proceedings no longer subsist:
The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all powers and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which
remains, to make a proper accounting and settlement in the probate court. 4
As a matter of fact, the guardianship proceedings was ordered conditionally closed by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte in which it was pending, in its order of February 8, 1964, where it stated —
In the meantime, the guardian Philippine National Bank is hereby directed to deposit the residuary estate of said ward with its bank agency in
Dipolog, this province, in the name of the estate of the deceased ward Eulogio Imperial, preparatory to the eventual distribution of the same to the
heirs when the latter shall be known, and upon proof of deposit of said residuary estate, the guardian Philippine National Bank shall forthwith be
relieved from any responsibility as such, and this proceeding shall be considered closed and terminated. 5
And the condition has long been fulfilled, because on March 13, 1964 the Philippine National Bank-Manila deposited the residuary estate of the
ward with the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch, evidenced by a receipt attached to the records in Sp. Proc. No. R-145. 6
When Eulogio Imperial died on September 13, 1962, the rights to his succession — from the moment of his death — were transmitted to his heirs,
one of whom is his son and heir, defendant-appellant herein. 7 This automatic transmission can not but proceed with greater ease and certainty
than in this case where the parties agree that the residuary estate is not burdened with any debt. For,
The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death, and where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the
estate is not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the
properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in the shoes of the latter. 8
That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of
settlement before the courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. 9
It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including herein defendant-appellant, have on May 25, 1964 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. This instrument suffices to settle the entire estate of the decedent — provided all the requisites for its validity are fulfilled 10 — even
without the approval of the court. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have been settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the
residuary estate from the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch and divide it among themselves. The only reason they have not done so is
because of the alleged illegal withdrawal from said estate of the amount of P1,080.00 by one Gloria Gomez by authority of Branch I of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, which incident is now on appeal before the Court of Appeals. This appeal, however, does not detract any
from the fact that the guardianship proceedings is closed and terminated and the residuary estate no longer under custodia legis.
Finally, it is defendant-appellant's position that the residuary estate of Eulogio Imperial, a former U.S. veteran, having been set aside from the
monthly allowances given him by the United States Veterans Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, is exempt from execution.
Any pension, annuity, or gratuity granted by a Government to its officers or employees in recognition of past services rendered, is primordially
aimed at tiding them over during their old age and/or disability. This is therefore a right personalissima, purely personal because founded on
necessity. It requires no argument to show that where the recipient dies, the necessity motivating or underlying its grant necessarily ceases to be.
Even more so in this case where the law 11 providing for the exemption is calculated to benefit U.S. veterans residing here, and is therefore merely
a manifestation of comity.
Besides, as earlier stated, the heirs of Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is appellant, have already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition — the end
result of which is that the property is no longer the property of the estate but of the individual heirs. And it is settled that:
When the heirs by mutual agreement have divided the estate among themselves, one of the heirs can not therefore secure the appointment of an
administrator to take charge of and administer the estate or a part thereof. The property is no longer the property of the estate, but of the
individual heirs, whether it remains undivided or not. 12
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25952 June 30, 1967
MARGARITA SALVADOR, in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-fact of CANDIDA SALVADOR, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, DOMINADOR CARDENAS, REMEDIOS CABRERA, ALBERTO M. K. JAMIR and SIMEON ENRIQUEZ,
respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land, situated in Bigaa, Bulacan, were owned by Celestino Salvador. In 1941, he executed a
deed of sale over them in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed
on May 12,1955, against said vendees, a suit for reconveyance of said parcels of land (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I, Civil Case No. 1082).
On April 27, 1956, Celestino Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, twenty-one persons1 were on May 18, 1956 substituted as plaintiffs in the
action for reconveyance. And meanwhile, special proceedings for the probate of his will and for letters testamentary was instituted (CFI of Bulacan,
Br. II, Sp. Proceedings No. 940). In said proceedings, Dominador Cardenas was appointed on June 11, 1956 special administrator of Celestino
Salvador's testate estate.1äwphï1.ñët
On September 4, 1956 the administrator filed in Sp. Proceedings No. 940 an inventory of properties of the estate, covering the same parcels of land
subject matter of the reconveyance action. On September 7, 1956, Celestino Salvador's will was admitted to probate and Dominador Cardenas was
appointed executor of said will. Actual issuance of letters testamentary to him was made on October 27, 1956.
Twenty-three (23) persons were instituted heirs in the will. Of these, nine (9) were not among the twenty-one (21) alleged relatives substituted in
the reconveyance case; and of the twenty-one (21) substituted alleged heirs seven (7) were not instituted in the will. 2
In the suit for reconveyance, on November 26, 1956, the Court (CFI of Bulacan, Br. I) rendered judgment, ordering the defendants therein (the
spouses Alfonso and Anatolia), to reconvey the parcels of land to the estate of Celestino Salvador. Appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals was
interposed by said defendants.1äwphï1.ñët
On August 12, 1961, the Court of Appeals affirmed the reconveyance judgment, with the correction that reconveyance be in favor of the twenty-
one (21) heirs substituted as plaintiffs therein.
About three years later, pursuant to an order of the CFI of Bulacan, Br. II, in the testacy proceedings, dated April 21, 1964, one of the parcels of
land involved, Lot 6, was sold so that with its proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid. The Philippine National Bank bought it at P41,184.00.
Said amount was then deposited in the same bank by the administrator, subject to Court order.
On December 18, 1964, defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance over the subject parcels of land, in favor of
Celestino Salvador's estate. Revoking the same as lot in accordance with the final judgment therein, the CFI of Bulacan, Br. I, on September 24,
1965, ordered a new deed of reconveyance to be executed, in favor of the twenty-one persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. Accordingly,
on September 30, 1965, a new deed of reconveyance was made, in favor of said twenty-one (21) persons as heirs of Celestino.
Following this, on November 22, 1965, said Br. I, ordered the corresponding title certificate (TCT No. 54639) in the administrator's name, cancelled;
new title certificate to be issued in the names of the same twenty-one (21) persons. Said order was carried out, and TCT No. 63734 was issued in
the names of the twenty-one persons. 3
On December 7, 1965, Br. I (reconveyance court) ordered the Philippine National Bank to release the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6, to
the twenty-one (21) plaintiffs in the reconveyance case. Apparently, although the passbook was given by the administrator to said twenty-one
persons, no release was made, as the Philippine National Bank awaited Br. II's order.
Br. II, on March 1, 1966, approved the following claims against the estate:
Taxes
— Nat'l. gov't
P5,328.23
Atty's fees
— Atty. Enriquez
8,000.00
Atty's fees
— Atty. Jamir
12,000.00
Loan
— R. Cabrera
13,544.35
TOTAL........

38,872.58
=========
On March 30, 1966, said Br. II (probate court), ordered return of the passbook to the administrator; and release to the administrator by the PNB of
the P41,184.00, or so much thereof is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of the estate.
After failing to get reconsideration of said order, the twenty-one (21) substituted heirs, on April 25, 1966, filed with Us the present special civil
action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to assail the order to pay the debts of the estate with the P41,184.00 proceeds of the sale of Lot 6;
and to question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the reconveyance suit in Br. I.
Raised are these issues: (1) Are the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of them, properties of the estate or not? (2) Does final
judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the twenty-one so-called heirs who substituted Celestino Salvador, bar the disposition of the
reconveyed properties by the settlement court?
It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the
debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a
residue after payment of the debts (Castellvi de Raquiza v. Castellvi, L-17630, October 31, 1963; Jimoga-on v. Belmonte, 84 Phil. 545; Sec. 1, Rule
90, Rules of Court).
Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts abovementioned. They only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by
final judgment reconveyed to them, not to the estate the same are not properties of the estate but their own, and thus, not liable for debts of the
estate.
Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the
reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they claim
are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. The right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part
of the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in the reconveyance action, was perforce in trust for the
estate, subject to its obligations. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts of the estate
being first satisfied.
At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone (P41,184.00) appears more than sufficient to pay the debt (P38,872.58); and there will remain the other
parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement court, after
payment of the debts (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436; Maningat v. Castillo, 75 Phil. 532; Jimoga-on v. Belmonte, supra).
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied, without costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-
Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six
legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina
Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son
of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon,
Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land
appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly
allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her
bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the
properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of
each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have
received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia
received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their
respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the
cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of
the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½)
amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor
proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other
properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the
properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should
be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees
totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants,
to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process
has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if
upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of
the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the
will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired
is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate,
and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under
Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by
the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance
therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the
lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the
plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be
faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may
substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in
the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and
the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it
is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she
specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080
of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar
as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the
differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as
Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the
efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate,
which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions
support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by
oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same,
which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the
estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy
and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the
Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations
in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made
by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other
compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her
ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed
partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the
testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this
erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of
law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory
heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder
of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the
same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were
therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately
following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my
heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties
I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do
not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely
provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard
to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he
devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the
share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as
well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080
of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that
"'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire
estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix
principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the
approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to
her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will,
by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition
of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the
legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly
declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The
transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the
value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the
oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any
way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should
receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law
on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her
co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have
received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to
their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DECEASED, AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION:
FIDELA DE GUZMAN and EMETERIO DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO BENITEZ, DIONISIA VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES VALENZUELA
respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioners have appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings
Nos. SC-347 and 352, disallowing the will of Francisco Benitez, and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of his intestate estate.
On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch IV, (docketed as SC-347) a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of letters
of administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been administering the said estate as judicial guardian of his person and
property duly appointed on January 22, 1957 in Spl. Proc. No. SC-29 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual Benitez, and Camila Valenzuela whose brother was the father
of private respondents, Dionisia Valenzuela and Melquiades Valenzuela. He died single at the age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without
descendants, nor ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14) parcels of coconut land in Laguna, with a total
area of 34 hectares, a residential lot on S. Crisostomo Street in the poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the
Philippine National Bank.
The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to
him (De Guzman) and that a petition for its probate was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 352 in Branch II of the same court the two cases were later
consolidated and jointly heard in Branch IV of the court.
Emiterio de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs, Fidel, Cresencia and Rosalie, all surnamed De Guzman, in both
proceedings.
In support of the petition for probate (SC-352), the petitioner Fidel de Guzman and two attesting witnesses of the will, Pelagio Lucena and Judge
Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave evidence.
The oppositors (petitioners for administration in SC-347) presented six (6) witnesses, namely, Marcial Mendoza, Pedro Cabela, Porfirio Reyes,
Dionisia Valenzuela, Honoria Recalde Leonardo and Prudencio Leonardo, who identified the transcript of the testimony given on January 22, 1957
by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez (since deceased) in the proceedings (SC-29) for the guardianship of Francisco Benitez for incompetence on account of
insanity. Various documentary exhibits were presented by both sides.
On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased. The pertinent findings of the trial court are quoted hereunder:
The pivotal issue hinges on the mental capacity of the supposed testator, Francisco Benitez on August 18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last
will and testament. Did Francisco Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind on August 18, 1945?
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence (Exhibit I and Exhibit H) shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National
Mental Hospital for varying periods of time as follows:
DATE OF ADMISSION DATE OF DISCHARGE
(a) January 18, 1929 March 12,1929
(b) March 7, 1931 June 6, 1931
(c) November 12,1936 November 29, 1937
(d) February 16, 1938 August 16, 1939
(e) July 9, 1940 March 12, 1941
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion that [at] the time Francisco Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he
was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed probate.' (pp. 123, 124 and 126, Rollo.)
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed by that Court on March 3, 1982 (p. 135, Rollo).
The petitioners De Guzman assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that:
The finding that the deceased Francisco Benitez 'was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind' when he executed his will on August 18, 1945,
is grounded merely on speculation, surmises and conjectures, as well as on hearsay and contradictory, biased, and obviously incredible testimony.
(p. 10, Rollo.)
Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that
Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no
compelling reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.
The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appellate
court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible
evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582)
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners Fidel, Crisencia and Rosalia de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in
English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear
before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the following
tangled strands of human relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec.
Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his parents as
shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito
was 5 years old when Mauro married Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. That explains why on her death she had
accumulated some cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled
and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried
to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63,
Record of testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of
CA case). Agapito has been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old,
was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her
up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza.
She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was
thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo).
In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo
Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate
case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix
was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the
probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of
the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two
orders directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the savings
accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the
testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of
the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the
decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn
was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they questioned the probate court's
jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April
23 an order probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for
administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will
was not duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks
of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as
executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109,
Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April
24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that
opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and
nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp.
124-125, Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the
daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's son but merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p.
143, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-
appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will
is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That
case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of
February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax
had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her
thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was written. (In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did
not make any finding that the will was written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole
compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that
the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits
Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the record of the probate case by alleging that it
was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that
if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly advised Nenita to desist from claiming the
properties of the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal
Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did
not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of
the testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter dated
September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from having access to the record of the testamentary
proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she
(Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable decision. Evangeline also denied that
she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court Administrator's memorandum of September 25,
1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report
dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that
the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting
witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer
would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the
special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the administrative case for having allegedly become moot
and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which might have
resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the
decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or
interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law).
Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules" (In re lmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the
performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco,
Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision
of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which
was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly
referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he
could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on
respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980
she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI
November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).
SO ORDERED.