investigation.
[10] The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI
On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y
ALABI,[1] YAMBA LISASI BHOLA,[2] and ZARIATU
AMIDU pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section 4,
[3]
Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425[4] embodied in an
Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto
in Manila and other parts of Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
authority of law, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport 8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act as
brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions with or without
consideration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI,
escaped from the Pasay City Jail before the arraignment. He remains
at large.[5]
The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early
afternoon of May 31, 1993, accused Leangsiri was arrested at the
arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He
was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of
heroin[6] hidden under the false bottom of a black suitcase. [7] He
informed the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to
three (3) people[8] at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.[9]
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA for further
SABLAYAN, formed a team, headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO
SAMALA,[11] to conduct follow-up operations in the case.[12] The
team and agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las
Palmas Hotel,[13] where they allowed Leangsiri to check into
Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the
heroin.[14]
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking
in, Leangsiri received a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri
was told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten
oclock that night.[15] He relayed the information to his escorts,
NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO[16] and SPO4
ELPIDIO BALNEG.[17] Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents
positioned themselves inside the washroom, with its door opened a
fraction to give them visual access to the rest of the hotel room.[18]
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las
Palmas hotel, Samala and other NARCOM and Bureau of Customs
agents were watching for unusual and suspicious events.[19]From
where he sat at the hotels coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant
Amidu paced around the lobby for nearly an hour.[20] At about ten
p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the
hotel.[21] As Amidu flashed a thumbs up sign to them, they all
headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel. [22]
They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up
from the bed in which he sat,[23] opened the door, and let the three
appellants in.[24] Leangsiri took the black suitcase[25] and brought it to
the dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view of
NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the
suitcase and displayed its contents to his visitors.[26]
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2)
transparent plastic bags which contained the heroin.[27] After the
examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to
appellants.[28] Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the
contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the
washroom, identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the
arrest.[29]
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao,
Balneg, and the four foreigners in Room 504.[30] Appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by presenting their
respective passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely
said she was staying in Room 413 of the same hotel. [31] Further
questioning of appellants revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola
were billeted at the Royal Palm Hotel, also located in Manila.[32]
Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, Samala
searched appellant Amidus room. Tucked within the pages of her
telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name
SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it.[33] The paper and Amidus
other possessions were confiscated.[34]
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal
Palm Hotel where appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted.
The agents coordinated with the security officers of the hotel, who
stood as witnesses when the former entered and searched said
appellants room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with
false bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from
Leangsiri.[35] Masking tape and an empty transparent bag were also
found in the room.[36]
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin
by Leangsiri. They told a different tale.[37]
Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal
Palm Hotel. On that fateful night of March 31, 1993, they went to the
Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu and an American
named David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as
they made their way to Room 413 (Amidus room), they were
accosted by some people who forcibly brought them to Room
504. They explained that they were at the hotel to meet Amidu. Some
of those who intercepted them left the room and returned with
Amidu. Appellants money and jewelry were taken from them. Those
who dispossesed them turned out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of
the policemen entered its premises as appellants and the others
remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were brought to
NARCOM headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were
presented to the media as members of an international drug
syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding
them guilty of conspiring to transport heroin in violation of Section
4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding all the accused (herein appellants) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN
y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and ZARIATU AMIDU, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime described in the Information,
and hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment
plus a fine of P30,000 for each of (them).
The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered
archived.
The Heroin of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the
manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial
grounded on the following
I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED DURING THE TRIAL PREJUDICIAL TO THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN
APPELLANTS);
II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN
DISCOVERED WHICH THE ACCUSED (APPELLANTS) COULD
NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE HAVE DISCOVERED
AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND WHICH IF
INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE
THE JUDGMENT.
The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony
of a certain Julita Thach Camerino, a Thai citizen, who narrated in
her affidavit:
1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail,
Old Bilibid Prison Compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
2. That on or about 11:00 oclock in the morning of 31 August 1993,
(she) noticed the arrival of inmates (appellants) into (the prison)
compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;
3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head
against the concrete wall, but after a few attempts she was prevailed
upon to stop by another woman;
4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why
Zariatu Amidu was behaving that way, and found out that she and
the two other male detainees were just sentenced by the Court of
very severe penalty of life imprisonment;
5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her)
conscience rebelled and started tormenting (her) since (she) knows
that they are innocent of the crime charged against them of
transporting heroin into the country;
6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and
voluntarily offered (her) help, if it is still possible under the situation,
whatever assistance (she) could extend to let justice prevail and
reveal the truth out of that incident on the evening of 31 March 1993,
at Las Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA,
acting as an interpreter between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police
when the former was being interrogated at the NARCOM
Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in
the afternoon of 31 March 1993, and into the evening of said date at
Las Palmas Hotel;
7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter
revealed to (them) that he was going to deliver his stuff of heroin to
someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not identify the person whom
he was going to meet at the hotel nor mention the name/s of the
same;
8. That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of 31 March 1993,
(she), Suchinda Leangsiri, and the police team arrived at Las Palmas
Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri were instructed to proceed to the
desk counter and check-in, and got Room 504 to occupy;
9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she)
knew as Emil went to Room 504 to await for someone who would
allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the claim or testimony that
SPO3 Gapiangao and SPO4 Balneg were also inside Room 504
together with Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;
10.That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room
504 two black males whom (she) later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola
and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;
11 . That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi
Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting and complaining to
the police why they were brought inside Room 504;
12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about
to visit a lady friend billeted at Room 413 of the same hotel;
13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Besides, her testimony, summarized in the undated Affidavit
Insp. Dela Cruz to go with him, and (they) immediately went inside submitted by the accused (appellants) on September 24, 1993, does
Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu Amidu to Room 504 to join not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted
with the two male black nationals already inside; by this Court for violation of the dangerous drugs law, as amended.

14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of xxx xxx xxx[39]
Royal Palm Hotel, where (they) search the room of the two black
Appellants now impugn the trial courts decision and its denial
males and found no prohibited drugs;
of their motion for new trial, and raise the following assignments of
error:
15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM
Headquarters at NAIA, where (she) divested the three black I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn them over to CONSIDERING THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping; BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;
II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE
16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and
DIRECT AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
related matters in court during my testimony in the trial of the case
TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
against (appellants);
REASONABLE DOUBT;

xxx xxx xxx[38] III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES
The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus: AND OTHER SUBSTANTIAL
xxx xxx xxx EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE ACCUSED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING
stenographic notes, and the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and conclusions AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE
regarding the guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well as the ACCUSED;
sufficiency of the evidence against them, are amply supported by the
evidence, and the present motion did not ventilate any new matter V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
as to warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set aside. DENYING ACCUSEDS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.[40]
We affirm appellants conviction for reasons we shall discuss in
With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court seriatim.
disagrees with the stance taken by the accused (appellants) on this
point. The testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could not be One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that
considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to the appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport eight-and-a-half
premises of the Court for identification during the trial of this case. kilos of heroin.
 Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the
finding of conspiracy. The first prong urges that there is neither
direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the transport of
heroin by Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiris
testimony can prove their alleged conspiracy. The running fault in
appellants line of reasoning is obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[41] It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence.[42] Proof of
previous agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to
establish conspiracy. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused, whose conduct before, during, and after the commission of
the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld
the finding of conspiracy where it is shown that the accused acted in
concert to attain the same objective.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Gapiangao, Balneg, and Samala established the concerted
acts of appellants aimed at carrying out the unlawful design of
transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. When Leangsiri
was interrogated after his arrest, he revealed to the authorities that
he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las
Palmas Hotel. Later, while in Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri
received a telephone call in the presence of Gapiangao and Balneg,
by which he was informed that the heroin would be picked up
from him at ten oclock in the evening. Shortly before the
designated pick-up time, Samala saw appellant Amidu (who had
been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour) flash a
thumbs up sign to appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola when they
arrived at the hotel. The three (3) appellants then took the elevator
and went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room
504, and Leangsiri let them into the room. In full view of
Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants examined Leangsiris heroin,
and took it and the suitcase with the false bottom in which it was
hidden. Appellants were on their way out of the room with the
suitcase and heroin when they were arrested by Gapiangao and
Balneg. These facts show beyond doubt that appellants conspired
with Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under
Section 4 of R.A. 6425, from Leangsiri to appellants even though
Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the control of the
NARCOM on the evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the
fringes of reason is appellants argument that since the NARCOM
agents had already taken Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody
and control, it is the NARCOM agents who should be liable for
transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar.
In bringing Leangsiri and the heroin to Las Palmas Hotel, the
NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in furtherance of
their follow-up operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend
appellants to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to be made.
Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were
caught in possession of the heroin, they cannot be held liable under
Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were neither delivering nor
transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not
penalize the recipient of the delivered contraband.[43]
The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in
People vs. Lo Ho Wing.[44] In Lo Hong Wing, the authorities gathered
from their intelligence and surveillance activities that the accused
were going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the country. The
accused were arrested while on-board a taxi cab which they hailed
and boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that
there was no delivery, transporting or dispatching of shabu made by
the accused therein, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or
dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a
regulated drug. The conjunction or was used, thereby implying that
the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the
alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of delivery
because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being
absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that
dispatching cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or
disposed of drugs. As for transporting, appellant contends that he
cannot also be held liable therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is non-
existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the
operative acts of which appellant and his co-accused were charged
in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law
enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of
transporting a prohibited drug. The term transport is defined as to
carry or convey from one place to another. The operative words in
the definition are to carry or convey. The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting
was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached. Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives
rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co-accused did not
intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no
place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a
prohibited drug was interrupted by the search and arrest of the
accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been
commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of
the Las Palmas Hotel carrying the suitcase with a false bottom
containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were arrested by the
NARCOM agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying
the heroin to an unknown destination. Their act was part of the
process of transporting the heroin. They were all involved in a
conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the heroin is
appellants act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from
Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. C and its sub-
exhibits) and the suitcase with false bottom (Exh. F) are admissible
against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary
exhibits were formally offered only against Leangsiri. They were also
offered against them. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General in
his Brief:
xxx xxx xxx
The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo and State Prosecutor Reynaldo
Lugtu formally offered Exhibits A to Q and their submarkings against
Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original Records, pp. 67-
71). xxx[45]
Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece
of paper found in Amidus hotel room, with the name SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI written on it,[46] should not have been admitted by the
trial court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.[47] We interpreted this provision
in Nolasco vs. Pao,[48] thus:
 xxx xxx xxx
The better and established rule is a strict application of the
exception provided xxx that is to absolutely limit a warrantless
search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the
time of and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a
place other than the place of arrest.
We then held that the warrantless search made by the
authorities on the accuseds apartment which was located a few
blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal for being an
untenable violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional
right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In
subsequent cases, we validated warrantless searches made not only
on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible area within
his reach.[49] We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless search
goes beyond the person of the one arrested and includes
the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.[50] The immediate control test was enunciated in
the American case of Chimel vs. State of California.[51] In that case,
defendant was arrested in his home for burglary of a coin
shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers conducted a search of his
entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, a small
workshop, and drawers. Various items -primarily coins - were found
through the search, and were admitted in evidence against him by
the trial court, which convicted him of burglary. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction as it struck down the
warrantless search on the ground that the search of the accuseds
home went far beyond his person and the area from within which
he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and the
premises under his immediate control admits of an exception. The
exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as
explained in People vs. Musa,[52] in this wise:
xxx Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search
warrant but having information that the defendant husband was
selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building
manager a passkey to defendants apartment, and entered it. There
they found the defendant husband in the living room. The
defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the
kitchen, as small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-
shaped package containing green leafy substance which he
recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic
Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S.
Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not
unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent
kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that the
discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since
the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. x x x
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the
marijuana was legal on the basis of the plain view doctrine and
upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecutions evidence.
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. x x x
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following
limitations on the application of the doctrine.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the
Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name was
obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same
hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus
telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal
and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted
as evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence
will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not
destroy the prosecutions case against appellants. The remaining
evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses
made by the court a quo. The trial court judge had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand, and his findings
are entitled to great weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangaos, Balnegs, and Samalas
testimonies alluded to by appellants hardly relate to the material
parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved the elements of
the crime at bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that
corroborative testimonies, in order to be credible, need not coincide
on all aspects. Given the natural limitations of the human senses, the
immaterial and slight discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses,
far from weakening their probative value, serve to strengthen their
credibility. Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect
testimonies.[53]
Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled
by the fact that the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses during
the trial were not exactly and totally reflected in their Joint Affidavit,
dated April 1, 1993.[54] We have held before that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on
the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex
parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations because they
are oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity
of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. xxx[55]
In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are
incongruous with reality. The story proffered by appellant
Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and
incredible to be believed. His story begins in February, 1992, with his
wife and two children being killed in a civil war in his
native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to migrate to
the United States of America.[56] He first flew to Thailand, where he
stayed for six months without managing to learn a single Thai
word.[57] Despite his language inadequacy, he was able to land a job
in a cargo company in that country. He did not befriend any Thai
national. Neither did he apply for an American visa in Thailand.[58]
He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi
that it was easy to obtain an American visa from the United
States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan flew
fromThailand to our country. He stepped on Philippine soil
on March 16, 1993, only to learn that Jabar and Samsi had long left
the country.[59] Instead of going to the United States embassy atRoxas
Boulevard or any of the many travel agencies doing business in the
country, he spent his first two weeks here making the rounds of bars
and clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow Africans and
American citizens who could help him obtain an American visa. In
this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-appellant Bhola[60] and an
American named David whom he was supposed to meet on the
fateful night of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved in with
Bhola at the Royal Palm Hotel, and David promised to help him
obtain his American passport.[61]
Omogbolahans story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide
him with a convenient defense and to elicit sympathy from the
courts. The testimonies of his co-appellants are equally
incredulous. They are also tattered with inconsistencies. As observed
by the Solicitor General, they could not even get their occupations
straight, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at
the time she testified, a widow and as shown in her passport, a
seamstress by occupation. However, in her testimony, she stated that
she is a plain housewife. (tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)
On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native
of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central Africa, 37 years old at the time he
testified, married and a high school graduate xxx. In his testimony,
he stated that he is a trader xxx. Later on, he stated that he was
working for the New Star Investment in Thailand as marketing
officer.[62] (tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)
Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he
testified and an elementary graduate and plumber according to his
passport. In his testimony, however, he claimed to be a
technician.[63](tsn July 13, 1993 p. 4).
Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying appellants motion for new trial.
We find appellants first argument in moving for a new trial as
baseless. As discussed above, the purported errors and irregularities
committed in the course of the trial against the substantive rights of
appellants do not exist.
Appellants second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is
likewise unmeritorious. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of
Court grants an aggrieved party the right to move for new trial on
the ground, among others, of (n)ewly discovered evidence, which he
could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced
at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result
(thereof).[64] Newly discovered evidence, in order to warrant a new
trial, must meet three requirements, viz: (1) it must have been
discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if
presented, it would probably alter the results of the action.[65]
In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even
with the use of reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained
Camerinos testimony during the trial. On the contrary, as correctly
noted by the trial court, Camerino was identified in open court by
appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerinos prospective
testimony would acquit appellants. Firstly, her affidavit embodies a
narration of events almost identical to that presented by
appellants. As has been discussed earlier, the defense version of
what occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and
difficult to believe. Secondly, Camerinos claim that she was a
member of the team that arrested appellants is belied by the
testimony of prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable
Court and accused through counsel claim she was a
member of the team which arrested the three Africans now
the accused in this case. What can you say to that?
A: I dont know that person, sir.
 Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date
of March 31, 1993 when you met this Julita Camerino?
A: I dont know, sir.
Q: You dont recall any?
A: I dont recall any, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Cross?
ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino
served as your interpreter during the custodial
investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the
person of Suchinda Leangsiri?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31
to April 1, 1993 at the police headquarters or at the Las
Palmas Hotel?
A: I dont know that person, sir.[66]
Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she
herself has been previously convicted of violating the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and
the Order, dated October 11, 1993, of the RTC of Manila, Branch 47,
in Criminal Case No. 93-118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.)
Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008
Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one
be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with
five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by
the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits
ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police
Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and
Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch
Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other
policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom. 6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on
Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of
his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a
Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5) pieces
of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning.
Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp
Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm
was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain
Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol),
and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him
out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of
the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for
his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum
Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon
City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of
the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the
government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision
but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to
four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision.
Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied with
finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring
this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection and
deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it
instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. 22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now
recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the
evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by
the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from
the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to
possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his
superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-
Appeal, together with the OSG’s position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a
general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion
of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules
or excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s
motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion,
which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s
evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately
bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime
which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v.
People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our
earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally
acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the
ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc
Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to
suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was
heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the
case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside
our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the
re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier
made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense.
The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to
board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting
officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of
the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened
a cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of
the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that
we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a
general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or
effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental
right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are
the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are
allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the
enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations. 33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident
to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are
governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not
without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin,
Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only
on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latter’s reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure
of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. 40 The phrase
"within the area of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of
arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso
was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They
pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet outside the
room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of
Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm
and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area
within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him,
for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But
under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or
the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should
not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 47 In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the
search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
"plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of
Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used
against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not
just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against
him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which
the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still
it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If
people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless.
This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of
the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental
law way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All
told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome
the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of
the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the
other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the
government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008
Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED
LUZ vs. PEOPLE
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 [2] and Resolution dated 8 July
2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which
sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then
assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified
that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from
the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle;
that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station;
that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were
issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket; that
he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or
metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in
size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of
scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the
said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that
upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
entered a plea of Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003,
after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a
forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand,
petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of
evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted
petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on
10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show
that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person
of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also
found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving (i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE
ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS
and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held: INVALID.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby (ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE
crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging (iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY
from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for
BEYOND THE REASONABLE
turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
DOUBT (sic).[7]
Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in
accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.[6] Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that
there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the
had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In
a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully
to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed
arrested, the RTC held thus:
its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his down and apprehended in this case by Police
Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City
Petition:
Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the
use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders
 thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing
penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the
time when he was flagged down by the said police
officers, albeit he had a helmet in his
possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the
part of the apprehending officers to flag down and
arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other
words, the accused, being caught in flagrante
delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could
therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the
particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the
entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can
correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those
that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense.[10] It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an
intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that
there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license
of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License.
Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act
or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the
driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize
the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date
of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the
receipt shall not be extended, and shall become
invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the suspension
and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations
Manual[12] provides the following procedure for flagging down
vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or
Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a
general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue
a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the
vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest.
There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him,
deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the
issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the
police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact,
as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only
for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was
no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme
Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be
considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such
questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning,
the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of
time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a
traffic stop significantly curtails the freedom of
action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the
detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a
crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop
ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic
power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine
announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced
strictly, but only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the decision are
implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic
stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege
against self-incrimination to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop
mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First,
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. The vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few
minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a
policemans light flashing behind him, are that he
will be obliged to spend a short period of time
answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then
be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely
will be allowed to continue on his way. In this
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic
stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that questioning
will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the
typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist
feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be
sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer
has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a
citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects
of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is
public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic
stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry
stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a
formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates
of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of
ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that
persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops
are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs
projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda
become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal
arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is
subjected to treatment that renders him in custody
for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein
was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the
traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such
that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither
can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be
considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being
made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of
Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended
such an offense. due to a traffic violation:

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic The purposes of the safeguards prescribed
by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into relieve the inherently compelling pressures
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In generated by the custodial setting itself, which work
to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic much as possible to free courts from the task of
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
violation. after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much
by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons
suspected of felonies.
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation
and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
drugsas he was already in their custody.
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights
to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
make could be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
possession of dangerous drugs.
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and
frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. [15] None
of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a
lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence.[17] It must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket. [18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the
defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and
was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged
was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a
warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While
the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious
or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal
act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not
authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court
therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist
to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
 In Robinson, supra, we noted the two
historical rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in
order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to
preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But
neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the
search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first
rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and weighty,
x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic
citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case
of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a
custodial arrest involves danger to an officer
because of the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting
him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer
flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic
stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no
formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile
to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for
officer safety is absent in the case of a routine
traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at
110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the
concern for officer safety in this context may
justify the minimal additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype
search. Even without the search authority Iowa
urges, officers have other, independent bases to
search for weapons and protect themselves from
danger. For example, they may order out of a
vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and
any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a
patdown of a driver and any passengers upon
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct
a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant
is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049
(1983); and even conduct a full search of the
passenger compartment, including any containers
therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the
authority to search incident to arrestthe need to
discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was
stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the
evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of
the offender or in the passenger compartment of the
car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he
may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. [24]

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are

inadmissible.[25] The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. [26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February

2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516
affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198694 February 13, 2013
RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @
MON,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20,
2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No.
(unreadable part) which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
08(unreadable part) convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y
Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.’’
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto
Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and
PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who were all assigned to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9
(Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit
Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting
"Putanginamo! Limang daan na ba ito?" For purportedly violating
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila
City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later
identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover
from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the
sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the former
marked the item with the latter’s initials, "RMG." There, Police
Superintendent Ferdinand Ricafrente Quirante (PSuptQuirante)
prepared a request for laboratory examination which, together with
the specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal
(PSInspCalabocal )examined the specimen which contained 0.173
gram of white crystalline substance and found the same positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous
drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165 through an
Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of
white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the
incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in
the afternoon, while walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a
welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing
approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually
introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a
tricycle (sidecar) where the said officer asked him if he was carrying
illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to
be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque propositioned Ramon and asked
for P20,000.00 in exchange for his release. When Ramon’s wife,
Amalia Goco, was unable to produce the ₱20,000.00 which PO2
Soque had asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City
Hall for inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its elements
to have been established through the testimonies of the prosecution’s
disinterested witnesses. In this relation, it also upheld the legality of
Ramon’s warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was disturbing
the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the time
of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon elevated his
conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramon’s appeal and
thereby affirmed his conviction. It up held the factual findings of the
RTC which found that the elements of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in
possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on
Ramon as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest for breach of the
peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers,
notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)subsequent
dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CA observed that every link in the chain of custody of
the prohibited drug was sufficiently established from the time
PO2Soque took the same up to its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramon’s claim of extortion as his
asseverations failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers’ official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred
in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a person’s right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains
revered, effects secured by government authorities in contravention
of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
[referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited
proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one. 7 As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches,8 searches of moving vehicles,9seizure of evidence in plain
view,10 consented searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 and
searches incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception
is of particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further
disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one
that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court14 which requires that the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person
caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged.15 Specifically with respect to
arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.16In this light,
the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause
necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly
violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance which provides
as follows:
Sec. 844. – Breaches of the Peace. – No person shall make, and,
countenance, or assist in making any riot, affray, disorder,
disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal
violence upon another without just cause in any public place; or
utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression
or exhibit or display any emblem, transparency, representation,
motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any
public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly.1âwphi1
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or
fine not more than Two Hundred pesos (PHP 200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinance penalizes the
following acts: (1) making, countenancing, or assisting in making
any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2)
assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another without
just cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous,
threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or
displaying any emblem, transparency, representation, motto,
language, device, instrument, or thing; and (4) doing any act, in any
public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose, or disturbance or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a
warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the
apprehension was effected after a reasonable assessment by the
police officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
In this regard, PO2 Soque’s testimony detailed the surrounding
circumstances leading to Ramon’s warrantless warrant, viz:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol?
PO2 Soque:
A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on
top of his voice telling "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?"
pointing to his right front pocket, sir.
Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other
the shouting came from? cooperatives?

A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?
A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a
man, sir.
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity
of the place, sir.
Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.
Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?
A: Me, sir.

Q: Who was that man? Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with
Goco?
A: Goco, sir.
A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case? near the place, sir, they scampered in different directions.

A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir. Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you
approached the accused?
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: They followed me, sir.
A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused
Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded therein Goco?
immediately, when you saw a man?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.
A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
x x x x17
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?
CROSS EXAMINATION:
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. AMURAO:
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2
Soque:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are many people outside their houses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?
A: They were talking casually.
x x x x18
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of
probable cause when the police officers conducted their warrantless
arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-
populated place, with many people conversing with each other on
the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section
844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not
making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or
breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal
violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted –
"Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" –are not slanderous, threatening
or abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or
excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit
Street was still teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramon’s shouting disturbed the public. On the
contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain
Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing
in front of the store of a certain Mang Romy when a man in civilian
clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately handcuffed and took him away.19
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances
could not have engendered a well-founded belief that any breach of
the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his
warrantless arrest was effected. All told, no probable cause existed to
justify Ramon’s warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the
reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law
at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the
act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a
person’s liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. As law enforcers, it
is largely expected of them to conduct a more circumspect
assessment of the situation at hand. The determination of probable
cause is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct
unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between
legitimate human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal
activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performed wisely
and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably
discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed
rights lie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be
(unreadable portion)
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested
the warantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the
subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in
evidence for being the (unreadable portion)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision
and September 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. (unreadable part) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such
violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No.
6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-
64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug,
without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess
or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp.
Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science
Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning,
Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established
the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a
warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite,
to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko
on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his
witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer,
he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-
appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and
Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search
warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house,
Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. [8] They found
12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared
to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant
with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with
the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence.[13] The white crystalline substance with a total
weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total
weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks
of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own
behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law,
Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26,
1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a
commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly,
about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed
over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof. [15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search
warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of
him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. [16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one
place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly
opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45
caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995,
and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with
them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-
appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano,
corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen
ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods
and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254
grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned
for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this
Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National
Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
 Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that - Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of
the process when an officer undertakes to justify its
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant
SEARCH WARRANT VALID unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED- reads:
APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 160
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
For: Violation of RA
6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
SEARCH WARRANT

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE
SEARCH WARRANT.
GREETINGS:
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining
grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered
under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness
from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the
SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control
evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in
pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of
Annex A, the properties to wit:
unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG
Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not issue except PARAPHERNALIA
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime
be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. of the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring
the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
 Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three
grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug
paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than
one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of
shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing
probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search
warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing
the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have
been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua,
the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in
the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything
about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section,
NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned
into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for
monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate
inside the area and established contract with ROBERT
SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT
SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and
drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in
the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
(P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being
kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the
stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was
done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by
him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from
ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I
proceeded back to our office and reported the progress of
 my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12
grams of shabu I bought from the subject.Then afterwards,
our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime
Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which
yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown
in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95
dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your
statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu,
he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of
One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per
gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support
the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not
warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact
would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by
the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is
valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its
existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly
described two obscene books but improperly described other
articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it
does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion
would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper
if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the
warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid
portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating
to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge
of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise
valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other
articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid
portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be
obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor
items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale
seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property
specified.Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could
not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was
issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be
seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the
judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by
the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second
part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense because possession or use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A.
No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar
case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is
in connection with Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof
that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie
and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and
exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense
stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs
Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in
the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for
Violation of R.A. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law
were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sets of paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity
of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued
for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling
by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are
covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1)
specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have
been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of
shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third
for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories
of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned:
For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.).
The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was
issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.
1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that while
illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866
and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of
firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant was
necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the
said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to
indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City, the trial court took note of the fact that the
records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to
wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the
premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at
Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness
which described the premises as a house without a number located
at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the
location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers
who raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as
Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan
where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of
appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by
Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it was really
appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first
ascertained through their informant that appellant was inside his
residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For
example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment
Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the
basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and
that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the
description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass. [34] In
this case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated by
the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant
described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from
accused-appellants residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on
the ground that the drug was seized within the plain view of the
searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied
with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant
and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume
that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view
doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course
of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the
police is the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellants
lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a
lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the
premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from
obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory
evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the
marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous
with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellants person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no
apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar
to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs
were contained in a plastic bag which gave no indication of its
contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging
in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They
had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant
refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they
not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM
agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was
within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their
plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in
aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of
rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana
allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the
form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent
container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been
readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time
or manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of
the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a
warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine,
we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against
accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be
upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary
force was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to
execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up
the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and
windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent
proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like
the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-
appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
 In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use
some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants
of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door
despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several
times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the
people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching
partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated
unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering
the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana,
as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and
its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court
of Appeals dated September 15, 1998 which affirmed the judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding
herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution2 dated November 9,
1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged
with the crime of theft committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the
Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the Province
of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors,
valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and
prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence,
trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja
and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods,
the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep
was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on
the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the
cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned
by National Power Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires
weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked
appellant where the wires came from and appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo
Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded
with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified
that he is a driver and resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna; a
NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon
of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney,
he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him
to transport in his jeepney conductor wires which were in
Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished
his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way
to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM
 headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that
something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos
advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and
that the former would act as back-up and intercept the
vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty.
Although Resty had his own vehicle, its tires were old so the
cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with
kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5)
masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon
crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case,
he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When
they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the
cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty
Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to
proceed to police headquarters where he was interrogated.
The police officers did not believe him and instead locked
him up in jail for a week."4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of property
worthP55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS,
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to
indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in
the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
but deleted the award for damages on the ground that the stolen
materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that appellant RUDY CABALLES is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1,
Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty
of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years,
Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."6
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was
violated when the police officers searched his vehicle and
seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and
when samples of the wires and references to them were
admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting
petitioner's defense that he was engaged in an entrapment
operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt and
thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner
to presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the
validity of the warrantless search and seizure made by the police
officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue
thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial
court ruled that:
 "As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the
constitutionality of the search and validity of his arrest on
the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The
Court cannot again sustain such view. In the case of People
v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has
been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be
obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is not of
recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No.
83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for
Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that
'automobiles because of their mobility may be searched
without a warrant upon facts not justifying warrantless
search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal
can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence
and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating
their escape in many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187
SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme
Court held that a search may be made even without a
warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the
circumstances, the police officers are not only authorized but
are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without
a warrant."7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police
officers who were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it
might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that,
contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the appellate
court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search
of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his
right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to
be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof,
which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;8 (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;9 (3) search of
moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search;11 (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); 12 and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied
with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of
the articles procured.14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the
police officers in the case at bar was not authorized by a search
warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the appellant. Without said
evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1.nêt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.15 Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the
years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that
can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.16 Searches without
warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such
searches are made at borders or 'constructive borders' like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the
police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate
searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory
and in the absence of probable cause.18 Still and all, the important
thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.19 The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is
not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the
facts of each case.20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search"
without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been
declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted by the
exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists.23 A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or
it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's
right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a
vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors;26 (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check
is conducted in a fixed area.29
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar.
The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple
routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the
physical intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into the vehicle
goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side
window. The agent thus effected a physical intrusion into
the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an
officer did not conduct a search when he physically intruded
part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . .
physical intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he
could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing
so, his inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either
inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the
area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if
he had stuck his head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either
the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a
judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations
where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of
marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report
from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3)
Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited
drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused
Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed
to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential
information that a woman having the same physical appearance as
that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;32 (5) the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said
accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged -
that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down
because the police officers who were on routine patrol became
suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered
with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q Now on said date and time do you remember of any
unusual incident while you were performing your duty?
A Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt.
Noceja were conducting patrol in the said place when we
spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and
searched the load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these
conductor wires.
 Q You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the
jeepney you became suspicious, why did you become
suspicious?
A Because the cargo was covered with leaves and
branches, sir.
Q When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves
on top of the load what did you do next, if any?
A We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents
thereof, sir."34
The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:
"ATTY SANTOS
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle,
what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by
Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I became
suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by
those and I flagged him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the
watercraft used by the accused was different in appearance from the
usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he
attempted to flee from the police authorities do not sufficiently
establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the
following details are suggestive of probable cause -
persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and
other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the
Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the
apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate
his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high
seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute
"probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or
package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver
the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious
bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in
question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a
police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing
boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the
process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was
carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases
where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists
in this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's
vehicle were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the
object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In
other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article,
then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not
exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks 39 and covered
with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately
apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was
hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a matter of fact, they
had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case,
it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that
he checked the vehicle "with the consent of the accused" is too vague
to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that there
is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it
was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied acquiescence,
a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.42 The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.43 Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on;44 (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; 45 (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in
which the search was conducted in this wise:
"WITNESS
Q On June 28, 1989, where were you?
A We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some
barangays, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After conducting the patrol operation, do you
remember of any unusual incident on said date and time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is that incident?
A While I was conducting my patrol at barangay
Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a vehicle and the
vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle,
what did you do?
A Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes
was covered by kakawati leaves, I became suspicious since
such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged
him, sir.
Q Did the vehicle stop?
A Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed
the cover of said vehicle and by so doing, I saw the
aluminum wires.
Q Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to
the accused?
A Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.
Q What was the answer of Caballes?
A He did not answer and I observed him to be pale,
"nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires
loaded on the jeep, what did you do?
A I asked him where those wires came from and he
answered those came from the Cavinti area, sir."48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the
police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally
articulated to the accused and in such language that left no room for
doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some
instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences
of such request.49
In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers
sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the
latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to
said search. In People vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding
in a taxi were stopped by two policemen who asked permission to
search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding
the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant
himself who was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly
said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing
to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,52 the
accused admitted that they signed a written permission stating that
they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI
agents to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs.
Montilla,53 it was held that the accused spontaneously performed
affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being
forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be
construed as a clear waiver of his right. In People vs.
Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see
the contents of his bag to which the accused said "you can see the
contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen asked if
they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it."
The Court said there was a valid consented search.1âwphi1.nêt
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2)
that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to
be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja
approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of
his vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to
believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were asking
or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the
vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they
wereinforming, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will
search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the
police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of
herein petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not
asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will
look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission
was actually requested and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was
asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the
vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked
a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will
inspect the vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought.
Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his direct
examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his
consistent answer was that they searched the vehicle. He never
testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an
implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People vs.
Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a
bus where two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the
carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the box,
appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the
search. The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal
and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the
unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing
the ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely
a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain petitioner's conviction. His guilt can
only be established without violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes is herebyACQUITTED of the
crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
TERRY vs. OHIO
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the
“Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an officer after the
officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for
weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and
dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another
individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking up and down
the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third
man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store
for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for
questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided
to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick
frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the
Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for
arrest is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”)
held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick
seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer
reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be
unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals
that the officer suspects to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning
that the majority’s holding would grant powers to officers to
authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not
possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he
emphasized an additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop
to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he
emphasized that the particular facts of the case, that there was
suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the
Supreme Court’s willingness to allow the search. The suspicious
activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer’s
suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to
approach the men for questioning without searching them. The
officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to
constitute an arrest without probable cause.
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA vs. REMEDIOS MAGO
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with
preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis,
Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin Alagao, a
patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago
and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the
order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which
authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were
seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of
the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent
Remedios Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further
proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496.
Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Judge from
executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in
Civil Case No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit
of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent
of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina
Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine
bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the
Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of
the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention
of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to
transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon
Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members
of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the
request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened
and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs
Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to
examine the goods because the goods were no longer under the
control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the
goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and,
undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the
Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them
from another person without knowledge that they were imported
illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of
Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs
regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained
their constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly
suffer irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte,
enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their
agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ
of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a
judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
 On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil Case No.
67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from
opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the
hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16,
1966. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of
the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila
Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of
herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an
amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as party
defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila
and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. Herein
petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their
"Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and
detention of the goods and the trucks and of their other actuations,
and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court
of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the
case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case,
the petition stated no cause of action in view of the failure of
Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for
in the Tariff and Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not
lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and charges
thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police
Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was
not unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c)
of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and
arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the
said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the writ
could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not
entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of the
goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff
and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the
authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners
prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining order, for the
denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for
the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the
conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be
made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of
the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti-
Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December
13, 1966, the above-named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing
the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966,
filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the
patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to
the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the
release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no
jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in
the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was filed by herein petitioners
on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure
proceedings against the goods had been instituted by the Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all
questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the
Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a
manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and other charges due
on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein
respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
 On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967,
said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own
behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila
Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of
the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the
seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners
filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners
alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge acted without
jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of
the disputed goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First
Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no
cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies
before invoking judicial intervention; (3) the Government was not
estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not
collecting the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent
Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition
for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their answer,
respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the
jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of
March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long
before seizure, and identification proceedings against the nine bales
of goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2)
that petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after
the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods
had left the customs premises and were no longer within the control
of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those goods
can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4) that
the seizure of the goods was affected by members of the Manila
Police Department at a place outside control of jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs and affected without any search warrant or a
warrant of seizure and detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and
detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal
and unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the
seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in question
because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that
petitioners are estopped to institute the present action because they
had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not
interpose any objection to the release of the goods under bond to
answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be
liable; and (8) that the bond for the release of the goods was
sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the
respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of
March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction,
among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from
imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent
and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3)
to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question were
imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the importation
has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed
terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other
charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry
and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated
in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General 5 wherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and
other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to
P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau
of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been
paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties
had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing
the articles found in the bales upon examination and
inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared,
presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. For example,
Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that
there were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the
inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale No. 1
alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of
assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were
assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5
pieces of men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's
metal watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of
men's metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of
men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that
there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale
No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8, and
another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine
bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section
2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs
Code. And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of
which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, 7 and that
goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question
had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs
had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods
were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by
members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions
and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally
deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs
had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of
the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs
the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which
duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be
paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in
question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of
the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance
of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods
even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the
purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been
issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio
Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April 27,
1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it
appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose
Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags,
valued at P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru
the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to Manila
on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods where about to
leave the customs premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the
customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon
examination the goods were found to be different from the
declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy
Commercial subsequently demanded from the customs authorities
the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith
of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the Bureau of
Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that the goods
came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy
Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to compel said customs
authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that
the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods because
the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not
liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was not an
original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the
importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the goods
imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On
November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a
warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of
cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. The Court of First Instance held resolution on the
motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On
December 14, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a
preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by Francindy
Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs sought the lifting of the
preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their
motion to dismiss. The Court of First Instance of Manila, however,
on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary
and mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial
of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs authorities
thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In
resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the
Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute
forfeiture proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of
First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release
the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition
in the Court of first Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964)
ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and
forfeiture (on November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau
should yield the jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in
question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e., before
Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the
seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not
Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation.
Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales
thereof, for the same were found to have been released
regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to
goods imported illegally or released irregularly from
Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under Section
2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power,
among others to collect revenues from imported articles,
fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other
frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws
(Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at
the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been
released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City,
they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for
which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the
goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526,
Nov. 20, 1966.) From the decision of the Commissioner of
 Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as
provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of
Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First
Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in
effect render ineffective the power of the Customs
authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and deprive
the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate
jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,supra,
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of
Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being
special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general
legislation, not to mention that the former are later
enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the
jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the
goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of
seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of
Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In
the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in
question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of
Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the
enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the
regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and
detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as
respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an
attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge
did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the
petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need
of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over
the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing
said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer
of the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in
question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be
sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G.
Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs
and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or
liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He
could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect
the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in
question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was
what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with
his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with
the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was
given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the
cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by
a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code
to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. .
. ."17 It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United
States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a legal
provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th
Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the
following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made
as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel, where readily they could be
put out of reach of a search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3
Stat. at L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for customs
officers not only to board and search vessels within their
own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person
in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they
should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so
unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the
same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.
This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap.
100), for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865,
revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13
Stat. at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in
the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at
L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes
as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has
ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section
was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von
Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2
Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and
his companion policemen did not have to make any search before
they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition,
and amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and
Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18All
that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they
were intercepted without any search warrant near the
Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department,
where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the
effect that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held
that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
 structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily
be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct.,
280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W.,
389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27
A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel was whether
an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without
search warrant or other process and the goods therein seized used
afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws
of the State. Same counsel contended the negative, urging the
constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution
directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant, as is
sometimes asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure
is forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is
unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial
and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a
seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances
under which it is made must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of
recent development, which has multiplied by quantity
production and taken possession of our highways in
battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with
their easily noted individuality, are rare. Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities,
and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising
means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the
history of the world before their advent. The question of
their police control and reasonable search on highways or
other public places is a serious question far deeper and
broader than their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum
running," which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on
highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private
premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards
from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent
to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary,
and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that
problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and
seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public
place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final
analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all
the circumstances under which it is made.
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila
Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with
law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and decisive
issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the
purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by
the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
petitioners;
 (b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without
jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio,
dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by

this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining respondent Judge from
executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
and from proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila; and1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay

the costs.

It is so ordered.
DANILO VILLANUEVA Y ALCARAZ,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DECISION
We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from
the Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution3 dated 18 October
2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.chanrobleslaw
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
Information4 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the same
to [be a] dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5chanrobleslaw
PROSECUTION'S VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior
Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan
Coralde, (3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police
Officer 1 (SPOl) Antonio Asiones.6 Their testimonies reveal that a
Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Daniio Villanueva for
allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde,
SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPOl Anthony
Asiones, together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva.
They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him.
They invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a
body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was
recovered from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the
sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante
Mananghaya brought it to the National Police District Scene of the
Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination.7chanrobleslaw
DEFENSE'S VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home
watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited
him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been
identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then
frisked and detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its
Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8)
months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one
issue, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS
ILLEGAL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S WARRANTLESS
ARREST AND SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case
No. 70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13
which the CA denied in a Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following
lone issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART
OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE
CONFISCATED DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of
valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged
shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any
warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is, consequently,
inadmissible.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment16 stating that
the shabu confiscated from petitioner was admissible in evidence
against him; that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he
cannot raise the issue regarding the apprehending officers' non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time
on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic
rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and
the arresting officer show none of the above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-
appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively
participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one
who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest.17chanrobleslaw
The warrantless search conducted is
not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal
search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the search
were made without a warrant. While the accused has already
waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed
to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a
warrantless search can be conducted. These searches include: (1)
search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs
search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation;
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstance.19chanrobleslaw
The search made was not among the enumerated instances.
Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a
seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside
the left pocket of accused-appellant's pants. Neither was it a stop-
and-frisk situation. While this type may seemingly fall under the
consented search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is
not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence.20chanrobleslaw
Consent must also be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.21 In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out
the contents of his pocket. The testimony of the police officer on the
matter is clear:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: And what did you do when you frisked a small plastic sachet?
A: When I felt something inside his pocket, I ordered him to bring
out the thing which I felt.
Q: And what did Danilo Villanueva do when you instructed him to
bring out the contents of his pocket?
A: He took out the contents of his pocket and I saw the plastic
containing shabu.22
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is
thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously,
this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant
with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the
seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot be
sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the
alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[wjhile this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the
means."24chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4

May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
32582 areSET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES,
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated May 14, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, finding accused-
appellant Leila Johnson y Reyes guilty of violation of 16 of R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on June 26, 1998 inside the Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, each bag weighing:
#1 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN POINT FIVE (187.5) grams;
#2 ONE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT POINT ZERO (198.0) grams;
and
#3 ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR POINT SEVEN (194.7) grams,
respectively,
or a total of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY POINT TWO (580.2) grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That the above-named accused does not have the corresponding
license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, NBI
Forensic Chemist George de Lara, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, duty
frisker Olivia Ramirez, and SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. The defense
presented accused-appellant who testified in her own behalf.
The facts are as follows:
Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the
incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side,
California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was
naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and had since been
working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and
those with Alzheimers disease, in convalescent homes in the United
States.[4]
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons
family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United
States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village
Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next
day, June 26, 1998.[5]
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as
a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was
to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for
weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband goods, and
explosives.[6]
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing
passenger bound for the United States via Continental Airlines CS-
912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an
ectopic pregnancy.[7]
 Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter
to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying Sir, hindi po ako
naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a
panty.) She was directed to take accused-appellant to the nearest
womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the
rest room, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed
outside.[8]
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by
Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and accused-
appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez
then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-
appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then
turned over to Embile, outside the womens room.[9]
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3,
contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was found by
NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.[10]
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st
Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the arrival area
of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were
taken and her luggage opened. Pictures were taken and her personal
belongings were itemized.[11]
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing
in line at the last boarding gate when she was approached by Embile
and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken
to the womens room. There, she was asked to undress and was then
subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on
her person. She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage,
and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and some
change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to
her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred to the office of a
certain Col. Castillo.[12]
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security
guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They
told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied
knowledge and ownership of the packages. She was detained at the
1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken
before a fiscal for inquest.[13] She claimed that throughout the period
of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was
never allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S.
Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines.[14]
On May 14, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:[15]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as
amended and hereby imposes on her the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and condemns said accused to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of suit.
The Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) having a total net
weight of 580.2 grams (Exhibits G, C-2 and C-3) are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered to cause the transportation thereof to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of her detention at
the City Jail of Pasay City during the pendency of this case provided
that she agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted
her: (1) despite failure of the prosecution in proving the negative
allegation in the information; (2) despite failure of the prosecution in
proving the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride; (3)
despite violation of her constitutional rights; and (4) when guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
First. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and
detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights. She argues
that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her
because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags
while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance
of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional
rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, should have been excluded from the evidence.[17]
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken
from accused-appellant during her detention and used in evidence
against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants
invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is
involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid
search made on her person.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was
never placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested
without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175
SCRA 230 as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom in any significant way. This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator
is trying to elicit information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls
in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the
allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far
from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during
the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19] Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel.[20] Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus
been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant
herein.Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs
(Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained while she was
in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of
counsel, the Solicitor General correctly points out that nowhere in
the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to
affix her signature to the packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile
and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were
presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of
accused-appellants passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other
personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also
inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her signature
thereon. Rule 126, 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
and
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant
should be returned to her.
Second. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to
fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to
justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
states:
Section 20 - Application Of Penalties, Confiscation And Forfeiture Of The
Proceeds or Instrument Of The Crime The penalties for offenses under
Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act, shall be applied if the dangerous drugs
involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu, or methylamphetamine
hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp of marijuana;
6. 50 grams of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or
8. In case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements as determined and promulgated
by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultation/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
Under this provision, accused-appellant therefore stands to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for her possession of
580.2 grams of shabu.
Accused-appellant attempts to distinguish between a
quantitative and a qualitative examination of the substance
contained in Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3. She argues that the
examination conducted by the NBI forensic chemist was a qualitative
one which merely yielded positive findings for shabu, but failed to
establish its purity; hence, its exact quantity remains indeterminate
and unproved.
This contention is likewise without merit.
The expert witness, George De Lara, stated that the tests
conducted would have indicated the presence of impurities if there
were any. He testified:
PROS. VELASCO By mixing it twice, Mr. Witness, if there are any
adulterants or impurities, it will be discovered by just
mixing it?
WITNESS If some drugs or additives were present, it will appear
in a thin layer chromatographic examination.
PROS. VELASCO Did other drugs or other additives appear Mr.
Witness?
WITNESS In my thin layer chromatographic plate, it only
appears one spot which resembles or the same as the
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride sample
....
PROS. VELASCO So, Mr. Witness, if there are any adulterants
present in the chemicals you have examined, in chemical
examination, what color it will register, if any?
WITNESS In sample, it contained a potassium aluminum sulfate,
it will not react with the reagent, therefore it will not
dissolve. In my examination, all the specimens reacted on
the re-agents, sir.
PROS. VELASCO And what is potassium aluminum sulfate in
laymans term?
WITNESS It is only a tawas.
....
COURT In this particular case, did you find any aluminum
sulfate or tawas in the specimen?
WITNESS None, your Honor.
....
ATTY. AGOOT I will cite an example, supposing ten grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is mixed with 200 grams
of tawas, you will submit that to qualitative examination,
what will be your findings, negative or positive, Mr.
Witness?
WITNESS It will give a positive result for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
ATTY. AGOOT That is qualitative examination.
WITNESS And also positive for aluminum sulfate.[21]
A qualitative determination relates to the identity of the
material, whereas a quantitative analysis requires the determination
of the percentage combination of the components of a mixture.
Hence, a qualitative identification of a powder may reveal the
presence of heroin and quinine, for instance, whereas a quantitative
analysis may conclude the presence of 10 percent heroin and 90
percent quinine.[22]
De Lara testified that he used a chromatography test to
determine the contents of Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-
3. Chromatography is a means of separating and tentatively
identifying the components of a mixture. It is particularly useful for
analyzing the multicomponent specimens that are frequently
received in a crime lab. For example, illicit drugs sold on the street
may be diluted with practically any material that is at the disposal of
the drug dealer to increase the quantity of the product that is made
available to prospective customers. Hence, the task of identifying an
illicit drug preparation would be an arduous one without the aid of
chromatographic methods to first separate the mixture into its
components.[23]
The testimony of De Lara established not only that the tests
were thorough, but also that the scientifically correct method of
obtaining an accurate representative sample had been
obtained.[24] At any rate, as the Solicitor-General has pointed out, if
accused-appellant was not satisfied with the results, it would have
been a simple matter for her to ask for an independent examination
of the substance by another chemist. This she did not do.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to
prove the negative allegation in the information that she did not
have a license to possess or use methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Art. III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding
license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Accused-appellant claims that possession or use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,a regulated drug, is not
unlawful unless the possessor or user does not have the required
license or prescription. She points out that since the prosecution
failed to present any certification that she is not authorized to
possess or use regulated drugs, it therefore falls short of the
quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction.
The contention has no merit.
The question raised in this case is similar to that raised in United
States v. Chan Toco.[25] The accused in that case was charged with
smoking opium without being duly registered. He demurred to the
information on the ground that it failed to allege that the use of
opium had not been prescribed as a medicine by a duly licensed and
practicing physician.
This Court denied the motion and said:
The evident interest and purpose of the statute is to prohibit and to
penalize generally the smoking of opium in these Islands. But the
legislator desired to withdraw from the operation of the statute a
limited class of smokers who smoked under the advice and by
prescription of a licensed and practicing physician . . . . Hence where
one is charged with a violation of the general provisions of the
Opium Law, it is more logical as well as more practical and
convenient, if he did in fact smoke opium under the advice of a
physician, that he should set up this fact by way of defense, than that
the prosecution should be called upon to prove that every smoker,
charged with a violation of the law, does so without such advice or
prescription. Indeed, when it is considered that under the law any
person may, in case of need and at any time, procure the advice of a
physician to use opium or some of its derivatives, and that in the
nature of things no public record of prescriptions of this kind is or
can be required to be kept, it is manifest that it would be wholly
impracticable and absurd to impose on the prosecution the burden
of alleging and proving the fact that one using opium does so
without the advice of a physician. To prove beyond a reasonable
doubt, in a particular case, that one using opium does so without the
advice or prescription of a physician would be in most cases a
practical impossibility without the aid of the defendant himself,
while a defendant charged with the illegal use of opium should find
little difficulty in establishing the fact that he used it under the has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just
advice and on the prescription of a physician, if in fact he did so. [26] as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy
in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[29]
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
The Court is convinced that the requirements of the law in
the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect
order that a person may be validly charged with and convicted of
the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation
illegal possession of a dangerous drug in violation of R.A. No. 6425,
which he owes to himself, when to meet it is an easy thing for him to
as amended, have been complied with by the prosecution in this
do, he has no one but himself to blame.
case. The decision of the trial court must accordingly be upheld.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
As regards the fine imposed by the trial court, it has been held
there is nothing in R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
that courts may fix any amount within the limits established by
amended, which requires the prosecution to present a certification
law.[30] Considering that five hundred eighty point two (580.2) grams
that accused-appellant has no license or permit to possess
of shabu were confiscated from accused-appellant, the fine imposed
shabu. Mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per se
by the trial court may properly be reduced to P50,000.00.
and the burden of proof is upon accused-appellant to show that she
has a license or permit under the law to possess the prohibited drug. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 110, finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of 16
Fourth. Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the evidence
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty
presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to support a finding
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that she is guilty of the crime charged.
that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced
This contention must likewise be rejected. to P50,000.00. Costs against appellant.

Credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of the The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal
prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers effects not yet returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered
have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are returned to her.
inclined to uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has
SO ORDERED.
been presented to suggest any improper motive on the part of the
police enforcers in arresting accused-appellant. This Court accords
great respect to the findings of the trial court on the matter of
credibility of the witnesses in the absence of any palpable error or
arbitrariness in its findings.[27]
It is noteworthy that, aside from the denial of accused-
appellant, no other witness was presented in her behalf. Her denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.[28] As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of
defense, particularly when it is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi,
DON DJOWEL SALES y ABALAHIN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision 1 dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution2dated January
27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942. The
CA upheld the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 231 finding petitioner Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of marijuana.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) under an Information which states:
That on or about the 24th day of May 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused DON DJOWEL A. SALES, without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.23 gram of
dried Marijuana fruiting tops, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. x x x4
Upon arraignment, petitioner duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Evidence adduced by the prosecution at the trial established that on
May 24, 2003, petitioner was scheduled to board a Cebu Pacific plane
bound for Kalibo, Aklan at its 9:45 a.m. flight. He arrived at the old
Manila Domestic Airport (now Terminal 1), Domestic Road, Pasay
City at around 8:30 in the morning. As part of the routine security
check at the predeparture area, petitioner passed through the Walk-
Thru Metal Detector Machine and immediately thereafter was
subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty, Daniel M.
Soriano, a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Aviation Security Group (ASG).5
While frisking petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging
inside the right pocket of his short pants. When Soriano asked
petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to
open his hands. Soriano struggled with petitioner as the latter was
nervous and reluctant to show what he brought out from his pocket.
Soriano then called the attention of his supervisor, PO1 Cherry
Trota-Bartolome who was nearby.6
PO1 Trota-Bartolome approached petitioner and asked him to open
his hands. Petitioner finally opened his right hand revealing two
rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After
informing petitioner of his constitutional rights, PO1 Trota-
Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd
Police Center for Aviation Security (2nd PCAS), PNP-ASG
Intelligence and Investigation Branch and immediately turned over
petitioner to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Airport Team at the Ramp Area, Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex, Pasay City.7 The investigating officer, POII Samuel
B. Hojilla,8 placed the markings on the two marijuana sticks: "SBH-
A" and "SBH-B."9
The specimens marked "SBH-A" and "SBH-B" when subjected to
chemical analysis at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug.10
Denying the charge against him, petitioner testified that on May 24,
2003, he, together with his girl friend and her family were headed to
Boracay Island for a vacation. While he was queuing to enter the
airport, he was frisked by two persons, a male and a female. The two
asked him to empty his pockets since it was bulging. Inside his
pocket were a pack of cigarettes and cash in the amount of P8,000.00
in 500 peso-bills. His girl friend told him to get a boarding pass but
he asked her to wait for him as he will still use the comfort room. On
the way to the comfort room, he was blocked by a male person who
frisked him for a second time, asking for his boarding pass. This
male person wearing a white shirt without an ID card, asked
petitioner to empty his pockets which he did. The male person then
said it was "okay" but as petitioner proceeded to go inside the
comfort room, the male person called him again saying that "this fell
from you" and showing him two "small white wrappings which
seemed to be marijuana." Petitioner told the male person that those
items were not his but the latter said they will talk about it in the
comfort room.11
At that point, petitioner claimed that his girl friend was already
shouting ("Ano ‘yan, ano ‘yan?") as she saw PO1 Trota-Bartolome
approaching them. PO1 Trota-Bartolome then told petitioner to
explain at the ground floor while the male person (Soriano) was
showing to her the marijuana sticks saying "Ma’am, I saw this from
him." Petitioner went back to the comfort room and there he saw his
girl friend’s father (the Mayor of their hometown, Camiling, Tarlac)
talking with a police officer. However, his girl friend and her family
left him and he was investigated by the police officers. 12
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following: PO1
Trota-Bartolome, P/Insp. Sandra Decena-Go (Forensic Officer,
Chemistry Division, PNP-Crime Laboratory) and NUP Soriano.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the
accused, Don Djowel Sales y Abalahin, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
also known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The 0.23 gram of dried marijuana fruiting tops confiscated from the
accused is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government. The
officer-in-charge of this Court is hereby ordered to immediately
turnover the same to the appropriate government agency for proper
disposition in accordance with law.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the CA ruled that the body search conducted on
petitioner is a valid warrantless search made pursuant to a routine
airport security procedure allowed by law. It found no merit in
petitioner’s theory of frame-up and extortion. On the issue of the
integrity and probative value of the evidence used to convict
petitioner, the CA held that there is no hiatus or confusion that the
marijuana that was marked at the airport, then subjected to
qualitative examination on the same day and eventually introduced
as evidence against petitioner, is the same prohibited drug that was
found in his custody and possession when he was apprehended at
the pre-departure area of the airport in the morning of May 24, 2003.
The CA also explained that while the "marijuana leaves" referred to
by Soriano in his testimony was otherwise called by the public
prosecutor and the Forensic Chemical Officer as "dried marijuana
fruiting tops" in both the criminal information and the Laboratory
Report, these do not refer to different items. Both marijuana leaves
with fruiting tops were rolled in two papers which were actually
found and seized from petitioner’s possession in the course of a
routine security search and frisking.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner is now
before us alleging that the CA failed to address the following
assigned errors:
IT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH COMPETENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS SUPPOSEDLY TAKEN FROM THE
APPELLANT WERE THE VERY SAME ITEMS THAT REACHED
THE CHEMIST FOR ANALYSIS;
THIS, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE PROSECUTION’S
IMPROBABLE SCENARIO AT THE AIRPORT WHERE, FOR NO
SPECIAL REASON GIVEN, THE APPELLANT HAD TO BE
METICULOUSLY BODILY SEARCHED EVEN AFTER HE HAD
TWICE SUCCESSFULLY PASSED THROUGH THE DETECTOR. 14
The petition has no merit.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.15
In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established that airport
security officers found in the person of petitioner the marijuana
fruiting tops contained in rolled paper sticks during the final
security check at the airport’s pre-departure area. Petitioner at first
refused to show the contents of his short pants pocket to Soriano
who became suspicious when his hand felt the "slightly bulging"
item while frisking petitioner.
In People v. Johnson,16 which also involved seizure of a dangerous
drug from a passenger during a routine frisk at the airport, this
Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.17
Petitioner concedes that frisking passengers at the airport is a
standard procedure but assails the conduct of Soriano and PO1
Trota-Bartolome in singling him out by making him stretch out his
arms and empty his pockets. Petitioner believes such meticulous
search was unnecessary because, as Soriano himself testified, there
was no beep sound when petitioner walked past through the metal
detector and hence nothing suspicious was indicated by that initial
security check. He likewise mentioned the fact that he was carrying a
bundle of money at that time, which he said was not accounted for.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who
was asked to empty the contents of his pockets upon the frisker’s
reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking
petitioner’s short pants was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Such search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. Said
provision reads:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition
printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are
subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,"
which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger
and the air carrier. (Italics in the original)
The ruling in People v. Johnson was applied in People v.
Canton18 where the accused, a female passenger was frisked at the
NAIA after passing through the metal detector booth that emitted a
beeping sound. Since the frisker noticed something bulging at
accused’s abdomen, thighs and genital area, which felt like packages
containing rice granules, accused was subjected to a thorough
physical examination inside the ladies’ room. Three sealed packages
were taken from accused’s body which when submitted for
laboratory examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused was forthwith
arrested and prosecuted for illegal possession of a regulated drug.
Affirming accused Canton’s conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of shabu, we ruled that accused-appellant was lawfully
arrested without a warrant after being caught in flagrante delicto. We
further held that the scope of a search pursuant to airport security
procedure is not confined only to search for weapons under the
"Terry search"19 doctrine. The more extensive search conducted on
accused Canton was necessitated by the discovery of packages on
her body, her apprehensiveness and false statements which aroused
the suspicion of the frisker that she was hiding something illegal.
Thus:
x x x. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for
prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport
security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby
depriving them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including to further search without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in
law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search
in the ladies’ room was justified under the
circumstances.20 (Emphasis supplied)
The search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a
valid search pursuant to routine airport security procedure, the
illegal substance (marijuana) seized from him was therefore
admissible in evidence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents
of his short pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the rolled papers
containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the
suspicion of the arresting officers that he was indeed carrying an
item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities.
The trial and appellate courts correctly gave credence to the
straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota-Bartolome and
NUP Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre-departure area,
during which the two rolled papers containing dried marijuana
fruiting tops were found in his possession, and on petitioner’s
immediate arrest and investigation by police officers from the 2nd
PCAS and PDEA teams stationed at the airport. As a matter of
settled jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug cases, credence is
usually accorded the narration of the incident by the apprehending
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner.21
Petitioner reiterates his defense of being a victim of an alleged
frameup and extortion.1âwphi1 However, the CA found his claim
unworthy of belief considering that there is no evidence that the
apprehending police authorities had known petitioner before he was
caught and arrested for possession of marijuana. The CA aptly
observed:
It bears stressing that while the defense of Sales is anchored heavily
on his theory of purported frame-up and extortion, nonetheless
Sales’ testimony is without any allegation that the police and
security personnel who participated in his arrest, investigation and
detention have demanded money in exchange for his freedom, the
withdrawal of the drugs charge against him, or otherwise their
desistance from testifying against him in court. True enough, Sales
himself admitted in the course of the trial that the security and police
personnel demanded him to turn over and surrender all his
possessions, to wit: cellular phone, pla[n]e ticket and boarding
pass, except his money (TSN, April 16, 2008, p. 18). This, to the mind
of this Court, strongly belied Sales’ imputation of frame-up by the
police to secure monetary gain.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
Petitioner questions the integrity of the drug specimen supposedly
confiscated from him at the airport by PO1 Trota-Bartolome. He
maintains that there was no evidence adduced to assure that those
items that reached the Chemist were the same items which were
taken from him. This is crucial since the Chemist had said that the
items were brought to her, not by the PNP officer, but another
person (SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca of PDEA) who was not presented
as witness.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited
drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as
well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence
are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements
and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its
presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would
include testimony about every link in the chain or movements of the
illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in
evidence. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony
about a perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain.23
The identity of the seized substance in dangerous drug cases is thus
established by showing its chain of custody. Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 defined the
concept of "chain of custody" as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or
plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition[.]
The rule on chain of custody under R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) expressly demands the
identification of the persons who handle the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from
the accused until the time they are presented in court.24 We have
held, however, that the failure of the prosecution to show
compliance with the procedural requirements provided in Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is not fatal and does not
automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.25 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.26 As long as
the chain of custody remains unbroken, the guilt of the accused will
not be affected.27
After a thorough review of the records, we hold that the prosecution
in this case has established by facts proved at the trial that the chain
of custody requirement was not broken.
During her direct-examination, PO1 Trota-Bartolome narrated
clearly and consistently how she obtained initial custody of the
seized dangerous drug while on duty at the airport’s pre-departure
area. Said witness identified Exhibits "G" and "H" with markings
"SBH-A" and "SBH-B" presented in court to be the same dried
marijuana fruiting tops in two rolled papers that they found in the
possession of petitioner while the latter was being frisked by
Soriano. She also testified that petitioner and the confiscated
marijuana were promptly brought to the PDEA team stationed at the
airport where it was marked in her presence by the assigned officer,
Samuel B. Hojilla, using his own initials.28 The two rolled papers
containing marijuana fruiting tops with markings "SBH-A" and
"SBH-B" was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory on the same
day by SPO2 Rosendo Olandesca.29 Police Inspector Engr. Sandra
Decena-Go, Forensic Chemical Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory
likewise testified that on the same day, she personally received from
SPO2 Olandesca the letter-request together with the seized dried
marijuana fruiting tops in two rolled papers (sheet cigarette
wrapper) like improvised cigarette sticks, marked as "SBH-A" and
"SBH-B" and wrapped in white bond paper.30 After describing the
condition of the specimen at the time she received it, P/Insp.
Decena-Go confirmed the findings of the chemical analysis of the
said substance already presented in court, and identified her Initial
Laboratory Report and Certification, both dated May 24, 2003,
stating that the qualitative examination gave positive results for the
presence of Marijuana.31
We find no merit in petitioner’s argument that the non-presentation
of SPO2 Olandesca and PO2 Hojilla as witnesses is fatal to the
prosecution’s case. As this Court held in People v. Amansec32:
x x x there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing
rules, which requires each and everyone who came into contact with
the seized drugs to testify in court. "As long as the chain of custody
of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken
and the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs
seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person who came
into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand." This
Court, in People v. Hernandez,33 citing People v. Zeng Hua Dian,34 ruled:
After a thorough review of the records of this case we find that the
chain of custody of the seized substance was not broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized in this
case. The nonpresentation as witnesses of other persons such as
SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer on
duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of
presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for the court to
decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its
case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as
witnesses.35
In the light of the testimonial, documentary and object evidence on
record, the CA correctly concluded that the identity, integrity and
probative value of the seized marijuana were adequately preserved.
The prosecution has proved with moral certainty that the two pieces
of rolled papers containing dried marijuana fruiting tops presented
in court were the same items seized from petitioner during the
routine frisk at the airport in the morning of May 24, 2003. Its
presentation in evidence as part of the corpus delicti was therefore
sufficient to convict petitioner.
As to the penalty imposed by the R TC, we find the same in order
and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision dated September 30, 2009 and Resolution dated January 27,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31942 are
hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
NEW JERSEY V. TLO Held. The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The
Brief Fact Summary. The vice-principal of a school searched a majority observed, “we are faced initially with the question whether
students bag and found evidence that she was dealing marijuana. that Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.”
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “[S]chool officials need not obtain a
The majority observed “[i]t is now beyond dispute that “the Federal
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.”
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.’ ” Equally
Facts. The principle of a high school discovered two girls smoking in
indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
a laboratory. One of the girls admitted she was smoking, which
protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school
violated a school rule. The second girl claimed she was not smoking
officials.”
and as such did not break the rule. The assistant vice-principal took
“Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise authority
the student into his private office and demanded to search her purse.
voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act
While looking for cigarettes, the vice-principal found a package of
in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary
cigarette rolling papers. He continued searching the purse and found
policies. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions
a small amount of marijuana and a pipe, a number of empty plastic
pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the
bags and a substantial amount of one dollar bills and an index card
State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim
with the names of various people who owed the student money.
the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth
The state brought delinquency proceedings against the student and
Amendment.”
the student argued that her Fourth Amendment Rights were violated
The majority then asked, “[h]ow, then, should we strike the balance
. The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress and the student
between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the
was found to be delinquent. The Appellant Division affirmed the
school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in
trial court’s finding there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The
which learning can take place? It is evident that the school setting
Supreme Court of New Jersey overruled the Appellate Division.
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in
Issue. What is the appropriate “standard for assessing the legality of
particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher
searches conducted by public school officials and the application of
to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an
that standard to the facts of this case[?]”
infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases
dispensed with the warrant requirement when ‘the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search, we hold today that school officials need not
obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
authority
.’ ” will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of
“We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in
concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not
require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on
probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated
or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether
the . . . action was justified at its inception,’ second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.’ Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a
student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at
its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
theinfraction.”
“This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of
school authorities to maintain order in their schools nor authorize
unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren. By
focusing attention on the question of reasonableness, the standard
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit
them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason
and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard
should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in
theschools.”
“Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of
marihuana dealing by [the second student] was reasonable, the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude that evidence from [the
student"s] juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment
grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey is erroneous.”
Dissent. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concurred in part and
dissented in part. The justices observed we “fully agree with Part II
of the Court’s opinion. Teachers, like all other government officials,
must conform their conduct to the Fourth Amendment’s protections
of personal privacy and personal security. As Justice Stevens points
out, this principle is of particular importance when applied to
schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as by
exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers
with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of
our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same time
immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect
constitutional protections” “[The dissenting judges] do not, however,
otherwise join the Court’s opinion. Today’s decision sanctions school
officials to conduct fullscale searches on a ‘reasonableness’ standard
whose only definite content is that it is not the same test as the ‘p
robable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.
In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure
from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court
carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has
developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems.
Its decision is supported neither by precedent nor even by a fair
application of the ‘balancing test’ it proclaims in this very opinion. ”

Discussion. This case illustrates another instance where the warrant

requirement does not apply due to the uniqueness of the situation
involved.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
- versus -
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA),
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH
to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The
drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of
drug used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations
as contained in the schools student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and
private offices.Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the companys work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk
in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions
of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the
prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this
Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of
Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the
national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo
mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they will
be assured that only those who can serve with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to
the authority vested in it under the Constitution,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code),
[RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following
rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public
office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government
forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug
certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists
of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates.Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those
 candidates who failed to comply with said drug test.
xxx

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum
and file drug test certificate.No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and
until he has undergone mandatory drug test and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2
hereof the drug test certificate herein COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
required. (Emphasis supplied.) senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds

candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of

(1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. candidates for senator.

6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice
Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug
the Constitution, which states:
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f),
and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion
years of age, able to read and write, a registered
to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
election.
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached
by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also
seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that
Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at
bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna
to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed
to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional
rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]
the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an
actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a
party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[4] To have
standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can
be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no
doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for
the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he
has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among
other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this
Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right
to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and
the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation
of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
(4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be,
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries
of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments
acting under delegated authority, the powers of each
of the departments x x x are limited and confined
within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such
powers as are necessarily implied from the given
powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative
 enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
leap.[10]
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
undergone mandatory drug test.Viewed, therefore, in its proper
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged
candidates for senators.
provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec.
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process
argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement
of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception,
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]
made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to
As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to
senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-
and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office
condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or,
of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory
nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning
and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to
review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA
9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly
the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This
statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can
be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous
drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a
result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals.
They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal
drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA
9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug
Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any person who
violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close
relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment
and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon
such application, the Board shall bring forth the
matter to the Court which shall order that the
applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be
ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x
x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability
Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission
 program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal
liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the
following conditions:
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of
Education),[18]both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases
involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

xxxx
In Vernonia, school administrators
in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically
random urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton,
impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency.
a high school student, was denied participation in the football
Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]
program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug
testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the schools drug testing
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
Constitution.
unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the
Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues
own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-
raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco
decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory
parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights;
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
(3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4)
by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation;
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school
(5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since
children, we turn to the teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v.
a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District
is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal
drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th
Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy
constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school
in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra-curricular activities.Lindsay Earls, a
member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team
declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing
policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th
Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in
locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non-athletes on the
basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so
ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an
athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the
parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of
the students. And in holding that the school could implement its
random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a
kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to
engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases
and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2)
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians,
and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to
safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational
institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the
people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually
end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students
in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may
even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
 The US Supreme Court and US Circuit
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing school and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the importation of tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy
drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]
the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the
users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In
stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones
individual students.
private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in
for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow
this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting
from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
public and defers to the states exercise of police power.[29]
privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
the validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a
Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic,
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals
Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing
of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that
the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing what was referred to inVernonia as swift and informal
disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required
or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation
in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one,
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR),
as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards
preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees
or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer
and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test,
nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is
to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken
under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the
law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods,
i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure
as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In
addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug
results shall be on the need to know basis; [34] that the drug test result
and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned
to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165,
is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out
illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the
citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the
medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group,
and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready
market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and
immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has
hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious
drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance
with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of
preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than
other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable
and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable
and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on
public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness
for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test
for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to
be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the
provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing
for students of secondary and tertiary schools and
officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It
enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case
of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On
the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be
observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall
be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases,
safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality
of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to
issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of
Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to
enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and
offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR
of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under
what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet
area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting
to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165,
the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of
their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in
drug test policy and requirement.
G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 6486 asUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons
to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633
charged before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but

operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned
and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
SO ORDERED.
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their
will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime
D. dela Cruz, from the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth
Division of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section
15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an
Information3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer,
having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as
Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in
the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after
having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive
for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly
known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test
conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal whether De la
Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31
January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-
CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin
(Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants
claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the
live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by
several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for
allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they were
instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them P100,000, later lowered
to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the
complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and
narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at
the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls supposedly from
"James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants.1âwphi1 A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which
took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime
dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James"
and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done
by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to
submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test
result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-
TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the
charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he
was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at
the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the
NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be
allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to
no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its
Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for
a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas,
Lahug, Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of
the result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been
admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he
alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation
of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis
to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that
the CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug
testing conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a
person’s right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied
the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He
assigns as errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his
conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his
arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment,6 saying that "petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his
arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less
so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately
established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the
laboratory examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and
existing law.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting
head-on the issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon
the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not
grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with the
Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate originals
or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of
the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A person apprehended or
arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession
such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11
of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following
elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested;
(2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory
test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the admissibility of the
evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot
invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine
because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make
a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one’s
body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of
a custodial investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the
subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be
read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended
or arrested for, among others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ;
being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal chemical
diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals"16 ;
"manufacture or delivery"17 or "possession"18 of equipment,
instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of
dangerous drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ;
"unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or
culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note tha
taccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive
of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or
arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging
and convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The
essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v.
Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on
Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that
are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law
enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence
of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the
form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent
of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate
first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive
confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum
penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the
penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a
minimum of six months rehabilitation in a government center. To file
charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate
the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the
form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were
found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest
was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of
custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under
Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was
no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty
under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any
person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the
maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine
of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence
that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed
to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug
users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in
dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form
of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is
positive for use of dangerous drugs .In such cases, to afford the
accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or
involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when
another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in
Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested"
in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended
or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this
provision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicion
less. The ideas of randomness and being suspicion less are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
(Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before
this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and
the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-
testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause
of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not
required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the
right against self incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the
giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People
vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455
[1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been
held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to
submit to physical examination to determine her pregnancy;
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by
his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine
from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have
the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with bloody
footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil.
308 [1921]) and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
[1950])28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be
material to the charge of extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible.
In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions
were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search
warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and
confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and
his companions in that case were also asked to give urine samples,
which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was
found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited
drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter’s urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the
Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his
body in evidence, when it may be material." The situation in
Gutangwas categorized as falling among the exemptions under the
freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be
examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which
was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give
samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same
when they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the
record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the
culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different
from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case.
Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other
pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes
charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for
extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his
urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis
for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine
extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to
his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his
efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his
urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone
drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as
they vigorously track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb
the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our
society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable
limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear
intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be
knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its
citizens including even members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22
June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution
dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
 petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft
LUCAS vs. LUCAS
Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial
support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA
the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to
testing order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this
accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise petitioner
question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively
on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made several
new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of
attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were
Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution
in vain.
dated December 17, 2009.

Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate

The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Parties to DNA Testing)[2] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about
1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated
petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain Ate Belen (Belen)
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would
respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel
oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got
therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace,
copy of the petition.
and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear
petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not
the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition
stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on
to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order [3] setting the
told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the
petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover,
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for
petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the reconsideration, issued an Order[6] dismissing the case. The court
case. remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,[7] there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3,
the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial
first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present
in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as
evidence of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating
respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required,
acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.
he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary
The court observed that the petition did not show that these
appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the
procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima
hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject
facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare
matter.[4]
that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners
statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and
hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent;
Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there
Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is
was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by
adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
the latter or his family. The court opined that, having failed to
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present
motion for reconsideration.[5] Respondent averred that the petition
any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order
was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have
therefore reads:
personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued
 WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to
petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8
establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action in his of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the
petition, his motion for the submission of parties to statements in the petition were not of petitioners personal
DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is
hereby DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed
prejudice. respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA
SO ORDERED.[8]
test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA

Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order Evidence[11] allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts

dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in

October 20, 2008, it issued the Order[9]setting aside the courts the matter in litigation.

previous order, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered
and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for
hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order
dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition, [12] reiterating
that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no
defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were
hearsay; and (b) there was no prima facie case, which made the
petition susceptible to dismissal.

SO ORDERED.[10] The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19,
2009, and rescheduled the hearing.[13]
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon
by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the
CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it
2009.
included a certification against forum shopping, and it contained a
plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
 On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition
for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. The assailed Orders dated October 20,
2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City
in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as
SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.[14]
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him.
Respondents special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although
respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver
of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing
order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to
show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met. The CA further held that a DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence]
appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been
intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties.
It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote
disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for
evidence. Such will be the situation in this particular case if a
court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the
DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately
available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring
first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and
absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote
harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to
stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA
testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the
plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x
If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the
court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory
recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do
members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists
and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual
sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as
a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of
the paternity of their children may just be taking the
chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long
past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and
unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory
recognition case opens wide the opportunities for
extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for
scandal.[15]
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009,
II.
the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.[16] WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION
following issues: (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
I. COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS TESTING.
ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF II.A
HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
CERTIORARI. ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA
TESTING CAN ONLY BE
I.A ORDERED AFTER THE
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT PETITIONER ESTABLISHES
OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF
RULED THAT JURISDICTION FILIATION.
WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE
PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT. III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
I.B ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA
OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT VS. ALBA,
FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR
SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A
THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.[17]
COURT A QUO.

I.C
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT petition for certiorari the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person.
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE
Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues
TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER
THAN ITS BODY, IS not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate,
CONTROLLING. respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative
relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and
for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even
expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to
Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and
academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although
the caption of the petition does not state respondents name, the body
of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known address. He
maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the
caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not
be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal
ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as
to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion.[18] Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of filiation
before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously
relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case,
as enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.[19] Petitioner avers that these
procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings
because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during
the trial.[20]
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues
raised in the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous
arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent
counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue
before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due
form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to
the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and
voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court
that summons is indeed required. He avers that the assertion of
affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial
court were orders denying respondents motion to dismiss the
petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in
a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can
a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and
until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the
court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial
of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[21] In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to
dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were
(a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence
of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition
to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to
state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of
jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent
waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the
primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first
place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of
summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the
nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a
person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.[22]
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over
the res. Jurisdiction over the resis acquired either (a) by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective. [23]
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an
action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right
sought to be established.[24] Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.[25] This is but proper in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses.[26] Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the
lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the
adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as
in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to
respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in
the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his
opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition should
have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein
petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a
defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the
non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding
is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.[27] In this petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by
the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor
General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It
satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the
complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action inadequate.[28] A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. [29]
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by
petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent,
however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay
as they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is
clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point
but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action,
the question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for
said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint.[30]
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no
other.[31] The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court
could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.[32]
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and
substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is
incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismissand require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The
veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial
of the case on the merits.[33]
The statement in Herrera v. Alba[34] that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied
in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a
paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a
partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since
no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the
circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no
such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to
allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and
deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation, we find
that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid
the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly
in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue
a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench
and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the
judicial system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper
procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of
DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA
evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various
methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall
continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public.[35]
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant
to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation
for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically
valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution
of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any,
which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will
be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant
must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or
a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. [36] In these states, a court order for blood testing is The same condition precedent should be applied in our
considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding possibility of paternity
of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the
issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
showing of sufficient justification under the preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed disallow a DNA testing.
regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
be made before a court can constitutionally order
is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25,
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008
testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained and January 19, 2009 of
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there SO ORDERED.
is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing.[37]
 MARYLAND vs. KING
Facts of the case
The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local
law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals
who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of
violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was
arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under
arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged
in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to
a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the
only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's
motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-
degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an
unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege
against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court
held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's
interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.
Question
Does the Fourth Amendment allow states to collect and analyze
DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes?
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4
majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part
of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so
invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative
procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require
the same justification and the search of a location. The Court held
that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a
crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as
valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's
criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of
determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and
what conditions should be set on his/her release from custody.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the
Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for
evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion
allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence
linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall
within the boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth
Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the
procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective
and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the
dissent.