Sociological Paradigms

and Organisational
AIlalysis
Elements of the SocioloRY of Corporate L({e

Gibson BUlT'H'eBm
lecturer in the Department of Behaviour in Organisations,
University of lancaster, England
Gareth Morgalm
Associate Professor of Organisational Behaviour and
Industrial Relations, York University. Toronto

ASHGATE
© Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan 1979
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored
in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the Contents
prior permission of the publisher

First published in 1979 by Heinemann Educational Books

Reprinted 1980, 1982 Ust of figures page
v
Reprinted 1985, 1987, 1988 by Gower Publishing Company Limited List of Tables v
Reprinted 1992 by Ashgate Publishing Limited Acknowledgements VI
Introduction viii
Reprinted 1993, 1994 by Arena PART I: IN SEARCH Of A FRAMEWORK

Reprinted 1998, 2000, 200 I, 2003, 2005 by n AssumptiOHlls lllbout the NllltlUlre oa'Social Sciellllce n
Ashgate Publishing Limited The Strands of Debate 4
Gower House Analy'sing Assumptions about the Nature of Social 7
Cron Road Sci.ence
Aldershot 2 Assumptiolllls aboot the Nature off Soddy no
Bants GU 11 311R The Order-Conflict Debate 10
England J 'Regulation' and 'Radical Change' 16
Two Dimelllsioll1lS: ]four !Paradigms 2ll
Ashgale Publishing Company The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms 23
Suile420 The Functionalist Paradigm 25
101 Cherry Streel The Interpretive Paradigm 28
Burlington, VT 0540 1-4405 The Radical Humanist Paradigm 32
USA The Radical Structuralist Paradigm 33
Exploring Social Theory 35
IAshgatc website:http://www.ashgate.com PART II: THE PARADIGMS EXPLORED <1 n

British Library Cataloguing in Publication D:nta ~ Functiollllalist Sociology

Burrell, Gibson Origins and Intellectual Tradition 4\
Sociological paradigms and organisational The Structure of the Paradigm 48
analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate Social System Theory 49
lite. Interactionism and Social Action Theory 68
I. Organization Integrative Theory 87
I. Title II. Morgan, Gareth Objectivism 102
302.3'5 HMl31 The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm 106
:5 FIJlll1lctiomnRist Orglllrusllltiolll nlleory nn8
ISBN 0 566 05148 6 Hbk Theories of Organisation within the Functionalist
185742 1140 Pbk Paradigm 121
Social System Theory and Objectivism 123
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Athenaeum Press Ltd, Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions 184
Gateshead, Tyne & Wear

Introduction
This boole, which has devoured the last two years of our lives, is the
product of a friendship and intellectual partnership. It began as an
innocuous idea which grew with such strength that it developed into a
'way of seeing'. It has changed the ways in which we think about social
theory, and we hope that it will do the same for others.
The book is intended to clarify and help overcome what seem to be
some of the major sources of confusion within the social sciences at the
present time. Initially it had a fairly specific objec-tive: to attempt to
relate theories of organisation to their wider sociological conteJlt. In
the course of development, however, this endeavour widened in scope
and evolved into an enterprise embracing many aspects of philosophy
and social theory in gen-eral. As such it now stands as a discourse in
social theory of relevance to many social science disciplines, of which
those in the general area of organisationstudies - industrial sociology,
organ-isation theory, organisational psychology and industrial relations
- are but special cases by which we illustrate our general themes.
Our proposition is that social theory can usefully be conceived in
terms of four key paradigms based upon different sets of
metatheoretical assumptions about the nature of social science and the
nature of society. The four paradigms are founded upon mutlll-ally
exclusive views of the social world. lEach stands in its own right and
generates its own distinctive analyses of social life. With regard to the
study of organisations, for example, each paradigm generates theories
and perspectives which are in fundamental opposition to those
generated in other paradigms.
Such an analysis of social theory brings us face to face with the
nature of the assumptions which underwrite different approaches to
social science. It cuts through the surface detail which dresses many
social theories to what is fundamental in determining the way in which
we see the world which we are purporting to analyse. It stresses the
crucial role played by the scientist's frame ofreJfer-ence in the
generation of social theory and research.
The situation with regard to the field of organisation studies at the
present time, as in other social science disciplines, is that a vast
Introduction ix
proportion of theory and research is located within the bounds of just
one of the four paradigms to be considered here. Indeed, the bulk of it
is located within the context of a relatively narrow range of theoretical
possibilities which define that one paradigm. it is no exaggeration,
therefore, to suggest that the social-scientific enter-prise in general is
built upon an extremely narrow set of metatheoretical assumptions.
This concentration of effort in a relatively narrow area defines what is
usually regarded as the domimmt orthodoxy within a subject. Because
this orthodoxy is so dominant and strong, its adherents often take it for
granted as right and self-evident. Rival perspectives within the same
paradigm or outside its bounds appear as satellites defining alternative
points of view. Their impact upon the orthodoxy, however, is rarely
very significant. They are seldom strong enough to establish
themselves as anything more than a somewhat deviant set of
approaches. As a result the possibilities which they offer are rarely
explored, let alone understood.
Yn order to understand alternative points of view it is important that
a theorist be fully aware of the assumptions upon which his own
perspective is based. Such an appreciation involves an intel-lectual
journey which takes him outside the realm of his own familiar domain.
It requires that he become aware of the bound-aries which define his
perspective. h requires that hejourney into the une"plored. h requires
that he become familiar with paradigms which are not his own. Only
then can he look back and appreciate in full measure the precise nature
of his starting point.
The work presented here is an attempt to take the student of
organisations into realms which he has probably not explored before. It
is a journey upon which we, the authors, unwittingly embarked as a
result of certain nagging doubts and uncertainties about the utility and
validity of much contemporary theory and research in our subject. We
were concerned about the way in which studies of organisational
activities had generated mountains of theory and research which
seemed to have no obvious links outside narrow discipline areas. We
were concerned about the essentially ephemeral nature of our subject.
We were concerned about the academic sectarianism reflected at
various times in open hostility, ostrich-like indifference and generally
poor-quality dialogue and debate between essentially related schools of
thought. Yn short, we felt that our subject area called for a close
e1tamination of the assumptions upon which it is based with a view to
seeing it in a new, and hopefully refreshing, light. Our book in essence
presents an account of our journey and a record of the
J( Introduction
conclusions and insights which have emerged.
We began our enterprise by considering how we could dis-tinguish
between different approaches to the study of organisations. The view
that 'all theories of organisation are based upon a philosophy of science
and a theory of society' seemed to recur time and again in our
conversations and we soon found it defining two major dimensions of
analysis. Although organisation theorists are not always very explicit
about the basic assumptions which inform their point of view, it is
clear that they all take a stand on each of these issues. Whetller they
are aware of it or not, they bring to their subject of study a frame of
reference which reflects a whole series of assumptions about the nature
of the social world and the way in which it might be investigated.
Our attempt to explore these assumptions led us into the realm of
social phi losoph y. We were confranted wi th problems of ontol-ogy
and epistemology and other issues which rarely receive con-sideration
within the field of organisation studies. As we investigated these issues
we found that they underpinned the great philosophical debates
between social theorists from rival intellectual traditions. We realised
that the orthodoxy in our sub-ject was based in essence uponjust one of
these traditions, and that the satellite perspectives which we had
observed as surrounding the orthodoxy were, in fact, derived from
quite a separate intellectual source. We realised that they were
attempting to articulate points of view which derived from
diametrically opposed assumptions about the basic nature of the social
world; accordingly they subscribed to quite different assumptions about
the very nature of the social-scientific enterprise itself.
In investigating assumptions with regard to the nature of society we
were, at first, able to operate on firmer ground. The sociology of the
1960s had focused upon the 'order-conflict debate' - whether sociology
emphasises the 'problem of order' or the 'problem of conflict and
change'. By the late 1960s the debate had been pronounced dead, and
these two views of society were seen merely as two aspects of the same
problematic. In reviewing the literature relevant to this debate we
became increasingly con-vinced that it had met a premature death.
Whilst it was clear that academic sociologists had convinced
themselves that the 'problem of conflict' could be subsumed under the
'problem of order', theorists outside this tradition, particularly those
interested in Marxist theory, were actively engaged in the development
of social theories which placed the problems of conflict and change at
the forefront of their analysis. Although academic sociologists and
Introduction xi
Marxist social theorists appeared content to work in isolation, ignoring
the contradictory persp.ectives w~lich they. presented, it seemed that
any adequate analySIS of theones of society must take
these rival perspectives into account. .
Our journey into Marxist literature took us mto yet another new
realm as far as our initial interests were concerned. We were surprised
to find striking parallels betwe.en i~tellectual developments within
Mandsttheory and academiC soc~olog~. We
found that the assumptions about the nature of SOCial sCience which
had divided academic sociologists into different schools of thought
also divided Mantist theorists. In that realm, too, t~e dominant
theoretical framework was surrounded by satellite
schools of thought offering rival explanations. Pursuing thes~ tra-
ditions to their source, we found that they emerged from prec~sely
the same bounds of social philosophy which had underWritten
divergent elements within sociology itself. It became clear that the
rival traditions emphasising 'order' as opposed to 'conflict' shared the
same pedigree as far as their roots in social philosophy were
concerned. Deriving from similar assumptions about the ontological
and epistemological status of social science, they h.ad been wedded to
fundamentally different frames of reference With
regard to the nature of society. . , .. Given these cross linkages between
nvalmtellectual traditions,
it became clear to us that our two sets of assumptions could be counter-
posed to produce an analytical sch~mefor studying soci~1 theories in
general: the two sets of assu.mpllons de~ned fo~r baSIC
paradigms reflecting quite separate vlew.s of .soclal. reahty. On attempting
e
to relate this scheme to the SOCial sCience hteratu~e :v
found that we possessed an eKtremely powerful tool.for negottatmg
our way through different subject areas, and one which made sense of a
great deal of the confusion which characterises much con-temporary
debate within the social scienc.es. Th~ schem~ offered itself as a form
of intellectual map upon which SOCial theones could be located
according to their source and tradition. Theories rarely
if ever appear out of thin air; they usually have a well established
history behind them. We found that our i~tellectual map all.owed
us to trace their evolution. Theories fell mto place accordmg to their
origins. Where rival intellectual traditions had been fused, distinctive
hybrid versions seemed to appear. What had first offered itself as a
simple classificatory device for organising the literature now presented
itself as an analytical tool. It pointed us towards new areas of
investigation. It allowed us 10 appraise and evaluate theories against the
backcloth of the intellectual tradition
 xii lfllroductioll
which they sought to emulate. It allowed us to identify embryonic
theories and anticipate potential lines of development. it allowed us to
write this boole.
in the following chapters we seek to present our analytical
scheme and to use it to negotiate a way through the literature on soci~1
theory and org~nisationalanalysis. We have aimed to pre-
sentlt as clearly and directly as we can whilst avoiding the pitfalls of
oversimplification. But the concepts of one paradigm cannot easily be
interpreted in terms of those of another. To understand a new paradigm
one has to explore it from the inside in terms of its own distinctive
problematic. Thus, whilst we have'made every efforlto present our
account as plainly as possible as far as the use of the English language
is concerned, we have necessarily had to draw upon concepts which
may at times be unfamiliar.
. The r,emaining chaJ;>ters in Part i define the nature of our two key
dimenSIOns of analysIs and the paradigms which arise within their
bounds. In this analysis we polarise a number of issues and mance
much use of rough dichotomisations as a means of presenting OUf case.
We do so not merely for the purposes of classification but to forge a
working tool. We advocate our scheme as a heuristic device rather than
as a set of rigid definitions.
in Part II we put our analytical framework into operation. For each
of our four paradigms we conduct an analysis of relevant so.cial .theory
and then proceed to relate theories of organisation to
tillS wider background. lEach of the paradigms is treated in terms
~onsistent wit.h. it,S own distinctive frame of reference. No attempt
IS made to cnticise and evaluate from a perspective outside the
paradigm. S.uch criticism is all too easy but self-defeating, since it IS
usually directed at the foundations of the paradigm itself. Ail four
paradigms can successfUlly be demolished in these terms. What we
seek to do is to develop the perspective characteristic off the paradigm
and draw out some of its 'implications for social analysis. in so doing
we have found that we are frequently able to strengthen the
conceptualisations which each paradigm generates as far as the study of
organisations is concerned. Our guiding rule has been to seek to offer
something to each paradigm within the
terms of its own problematic. The chapters in Part II therefore are
~ssentially eJ\pository i~ nature. They seek to' provide ~
detailed framework upon which future debate might fruitfully be based.
Part. m. pre~ents a slJ(~rt conclusion which focuses upon some of
the prinCipal Issues which emerge from our analysis.
PART I: IN SEARCH OF A FRAMEWORK
10 Assumptions about the
Nature of Social Science
Central to our thesis is the idea that 'all theories of organisation are
based upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' .in this
chapter we wish to address ourselves to the first aspect of this thesis
and to examine some of the philosophical assumptions which
underwrite different approaches to social science. We shall argue that it
is convenient to conceptualise social science in terms of four sets of
assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and
methodology.
All social scientists approach their subject via eJ\plicit or implicit
assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which
it may be investigated. First, there are assumptions of an ontological
nature - assumptions which concern the very essence of the phenomena
under investigation. Social scientists, for eJ\ample, are faced with a
basic ontological question: whether the 'reality' to be investigated is
eJ\ternal to the individual - imposing itself on individual consciousness
from without - or the product of individual consciousness; whether
'reality' is of an 'objective' nature, or the product of individual
cognition; whether 'reality' is a given 'out there' in the world, or the
product of one's mind.
Associated with this ontological issue, is a second set of assumptions
of an epistemological nature. These are assumptions about the grounds
of knowledge - about how one might begin to understand the world and
communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings. These
assumptions entail ideas, for eJ\ample, about what forms of knowledge
can be obtained, and how one can sort out what is to be regarded as
'true' from what is to be regarded as 'false'. Indeed, this dichotomy of
'true' and 'false' itself pre-supposes a certain epistemological stance. It
is predicated upon a view of the nature of knowledge itself: whether,
for example, it is possible to identify and communicate the nature of
knowledge as being hard, real and capable of being transmitted in
tangible form, or whether 'knowledge' is of a softer, more subjective,
spiritual or even transcendental kind, based on eJ\perience and insight
of a
 2 SocioloRical Paradi/?ms and OrRanisational Analysis
unique ~nd .essenti~lIy personal nature. The epistemological
~ssumptlOnsIn these Instances determine extreme positions on the
Issue of whether knowledge is something which can be acquired on
~he one hand. or is something which has to be personally exper-Ienced on
the other.
Associated with the ontological and epistemological issues. but
concept~ally separate from them. is a third set of assumptions
concermng human. nature an? in .particular. the relationship between
human beings and their environment. All social science. clearly •.mu.st be
predicated upon this type of assumption. since human ~Ife IS. essentially
the subject and object of enquiry. Thus, we can Identify perspectives in
social science which entail a view of human beings responding in a
mechanistic or even deterministic fashion to the situations encountered in
their external world. This view tends to be one in which human beings and
their experiences are regarded as products of the environment; one in
which humans
are conditioned by their external circumstances. This extreme
perspecti~ecan be contrasted with one which attributes to human
b~i~gs a m~ch more creative role: with a perspective where 'free will
OCCUPI~S the ~entreof the stage; where man is regarded as the
creator of hiS environment. the controller as opposed to the con-
trolled, the master rather than the marionette. In these two ext~emeviews
of the relationship between human beings and their
environment we are identifying a great philosophical debate between the
advocates of determinism on the one hand and
voluntarism on the other. Whilst there are social theories which adhere to
eac~ of t~ese.extremes,as we shall see, the assumptions
of many SOCial SCientists are pitched somewhere in the range between.
The three sets of assumptions outlined above have direct
implications of a metJlOdoloRical nature. Each one has important
cons.eq~encesfor t~e way in Which. one attemp~sto investigate and
ob~aln kn0':'Vledge about the social world. Different ontologies.
epl~temo.logl~sand models of human nature are likely to incline
SOCial sClent!sts. t?wards different methodologies. The possible
range of ch?l.ce IS Indeed so large that what is regarded as science by ~he
tradl~lOnal '.natural scientist' covers but a small range of
optIOns. nt. IS p~sslbl~, for, example, to identify methodologies
~mployedIn social sCience research which treat the social world
~Ik~ ~he natural world. as being hard. real and external to the
individual, and others which view it as being of a much softer
personal and more subjective quality. '
If one subscribes to a view of the former kind. which treats the
Assumptions about the Nature oj Social Science 3
social world as ifit were a hard, external, objective reality. then the
scientific endeavour is likely to focus upon an analysis of relation-ships
and regularities between the various elements which it com-prises. The
concern. therefore. is with the identification and defini-tion of these
elements and with the discovery of ways in which these relationships can
be expressed. The methodological issues of importance are thus the
concepts themselves. their measurement and the identification of
underlying themes. This perspective e){presses itself most forcefully in a
search for universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is
being observed.
If one subscribes to the alternative view of social reality. which stresses
the importance of the subjective experience of individuals
in the creation of the social world. then the search for understand-ing
focuses upon different issues and approaches t?em in differe~t ways. The
principal concern is with an understanding of the way In which the
individual creates. modifies and interprets the world in which he or she
finds himself. The emphasis in extreme cases tends to be placed upon the
explanation and understanding of what ~s unique and particular to the
individual rather than of what IS general and universal. This approach
questions whet~er there exists an external reality worthy of study. In
methodological terms it is an approach which emphasises the relativistic
nature of the social world to such an extent that it may be perceived as
'anti-scientific' by reference to the ground rules commonly applied in the
natural sciences.
Th0 subjective-objective dimension
The subjectivist The objectivist
approach to !IIpproach to
social sci0nce social science
!Figure 1.1 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science
4 Sociological Paradigms and OrKaflisational Analysis
Hn this brief sketch of various ontological, epistemological, human
and methodological standpoints which characterise approaches to
social sciences, we have sought to illustrate two broad and somewhat
polarised perspectives. !Figure 1.1 seeks to depict these in a more
rigorous fashion in terms of what we shall describe as the subjective-
objective dimension. Hi identifies the four sets of assumptions relevant
to our understanding of social science, characterising each by the
descriptive labels under which they have been debated in the literature
on social philosophy. Hn the following section of this chapter we will
review each of tile four debates in necessarily brief but more
systematic terms.
The Strands of Debate
Nominalism-realism: the ontological delbateR
These terms have been the subject of much discussion in the literature
and there are great areas of controversy surrounding them. The
nominalist position revolves around the assumption that the social
world external to individual cognition is made up off nothing more
than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality. The
nominalist does not admit to there being any 'real' structure to the
world which these concepts are used to describe. The 'names' used are
regarded as artificial creations whose utility is based upon their
convenience as tools for describ-ing, making sense of and negotiating
the external world. Nominal-ism is often equated with
conventionalism, and we will make no distinction between them. 2
Realism. on the other hand. postulates that the social world external
to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, tangible and
relatively immutable structures. Whether or not we label and perceive
these structures, the realists maintain, they stili exist as empirical
entities. We may not even be aware of the existence of certain crucial
structures and therefore have no 'names' or concepts to articulate them.
1F0r the realist, the social world e)(ists independently of an
individual's appreciation of it. The individual is seen as being born into
and living within a social world which has a reality of its own. It is not
something which the indivi~ualcreates-it ex~sts 'out there'; ontologically it
is prior to the eXistence and conscIOusness of any single human being.
1F0r the realist, the social world has an existence which is as hard and
concrete as the natural world.]
Assumptions about the Nature of Sodal Science 5
Anti-positivism-positivism: the
epistemological delbate 4
Hi has been maintained that 'tille word "positivist" like the word
"bourgeois" has become more of a derogatory epithet than a useful
descriptive concept'. S We intend to use it here in the latter sense, as a
descriptive concept which can be used to characterise a particular type of
epistemology. Most of the descriptions of H)ositivism in current usage
refer to one or more off the ontological, epistemological and
methodological dimensions of our scheme for analysing assumptions with
regard to social science. It is also sometimes mistakenly equated with
empiricism. Such confiatiollls cloud basic issues and contribute to the use
of the term in at derogatory sense.
We use 'positivist' here to characterise epistemologies which sede to
explain and predict what happens in the social world by searching for
regularities and causal relationships between its con-stituent dements.
Positivist epistemology is in essence based uporll the traditional
approaches which dominate the natural sciences. Positivists may differ
in terms of detailed approach. Some would claim, for eRailllple, that
hYlPothesised regularities can be verified by an adequate experimental
research programme. Others would maintain that hypotheses can only
be falsified and neVer demon-strated to be 'true'.6 However. both
'verilficationists' and 'fal-silficatioll1lists' would accept that the growth
of Imowledge is essen-tially a cumulative pmcess in which new
insights are added to the e,dsting stock of Imowledge and false
hypotheses eliminated.
The epistemology of anti-positivism may talee various forms but is
formly set against the utility of a search for laws or umderlyill1lg
regularities in the world of social affairs.lFor the anti-positivist. the
social world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood ffmm
the point of view of the individuals who IlIre directly ill1lvolved in the
activities which are to be studied. Anti-positivists reject th(\'; st~ndPoiDlt
off the 'observer'. whidu charactenises positivist en>nstemology, as a valid
vantage poillllt for understlllndinll1l RmmaB1l activiti~s. They maintain that
one can only 'understand' by occupymg the frame olfreferelfllce olfthe
Pllllrticipall1t ilfll action. One lInllls ao Ulll1lderstamll from the inside
rather than the olUtside. lFrom this point olf view social scielOlce is seenn
as beillbg essertlltiatny all subjective rather tnUaln llUIll objectiV<e
elOlaerprise. Anti-positivists ae111l\\J\ to reject the 1Ol0aioll1l ahat
science cllIn generate objecaive Rmowledge ofr' all1lY Reiaud."
6 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational A.nalysis
Voluntarism-determinism: the 'human nature'
debate
This debate revolves around the issue of what model of man is
reflected in any given social-scientific theory. At one extreme we
can identify a determinist view which regards man and his activities
as being completely determined by the situation or 'environment' in
which he is located. At another e"treme we can identify the
voluntarist view that man is completely autonomous and free-willed.
Insofar as social science theories are concerned to understand human
activities, they must incline implicitly or explicitly to one or other of
these points of view, or adopt an intermediate standpoint which
allows for the influence of both situational and voluntary factors in
accounting for the activities of human beings. Such assumptions are
essential elements in social-scientific theories, since they define in
broad terms the nature of the relationships between man and the
society in which he lives.o
Ideographic-nomothetic theory: the method-
ological debate
The ideographic approach to social science is based on the view that
one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand
knowledge of the subject under investigation. It thus places
considerable stress upon getting close to one's subject and e"ploring
its detailed background and life history. The ideographic approach
emphasises the analysis of the subjective accounts which one
generates by 'getting inside' situations and involving oneself in the
everyday flow of life - the detailed analysis of the insights generated
by such encounters with one's subject and the insights revealed in
impressionistic accounts found in diaries, biographies and
journalistic records. The ideographic method stresses the importance
of letting one's subject unfold its nature and characteristics during
the process of investigation. 9
The nomothetic approach to social science lays emphasis on the
importance of basing research upon systematic protocol and
technique. It is epitomised in the approach and methods employed
in the natural sciences, which focus upon the process of testing
hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigour. It is
preoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the use of
A.ssumptions aboul the Nature of Social Science "I
quant.itativ~ tedmiques .for the analysis of data. Surveys,
questIOnnaires, personality tests and standardised research instruments
of all kinds are prominent among the tools which comprise nomothetic
methodology. 10
Analysnng AssumptnoJnls about the Nature of
Social ScieJnlce
l~ese four s~ts ofassumptions with regard to the nature olf social sCI~nce
prOVide an e"tremely powerful tool for the analysis of SOCial theorr. in
mU~h of t~e literature there is a tendency to conti.ate the Issues which
are mvolved. We wish to argue here that con.slder~ble.~dvantagesaccrue
from treating these four strands of soclal~sclentdlcdebate as ~naly~ically
distinct. While in practice ther~ IS often a strong relatIOnship bet.ween
the positions adopted on each. of the ~our strands, assumptions about
each can in fact vary. qUite considerably. It is worth ex.amining this
point in more detail.
The ex tr~me.posi tions on each of the four strands are reflected in
two major mtellectual traditions which have dominated social
th~
sCience over .tlhe last two. hundred years. The first of these is usually
descnbed as 'SOCIOlogical positivism'. in essence this reflects th~
attempt to apply models and methods derived from the natural s~l~nces
to the study of human affairs. h treats the social world as If It wer.e t~e
natural world, adopting a 'realist' approach
to o~tology. TIus IS backed up by a 'positivist' epistemology
~elatlvely :d~terministic' yiews of human nature and the use of
nomothetiC methodologies. The second intellectual traditioR1l that of '<?e.rman
idealism' ,stands in complete opposition to this.l~
that the ultimate reality of the
umvers~ lies I~ spmt .or Idea rather than in the data of sense per~eptlOn. It
IS essentially 'nominalist' in its approach to social reality: In co~tr~st to
the natural sciences, it stresses the ~ssentlally subjective nature of human
affairs, denying the utility and .rele~ance. of the models and methods of
natural science to ~tudles I~ ,thiS. realm. It is 'anti-positivist' in
epistemology, volu~tanst With regard to human nature and it favours ideo-
gra~~I~ methods as a foundation for social analysis. Sociological
pos~t.iVl.sm and German idealism thus define the objective and subjective
extremes of our model.
Ma~y ~ociologists~~d organisati~n theorists have been brought
up wlthm the tradition of SOCiological positivism, without

8 Sodolo~kal Paradigms and Organisational Analysis exposure to the
basic tenets of German idealisr~.Social scienc~for
them is seen as consonant with the configuration of assumptions which
characterise the objective e"treme of our model. ~owev~r,
over the last seventy years or so there has been an mcreasl,ng
interaction between these two traditions, particularly at a SOCIO-
philosophical level. As a result intermediate points of viey-r have
emerged, each with its own distinctive configurafion of
assumptions about the nature of social science. T~ey have 31.11
spawned theories, ideas and approaches cha~actenstlc of their
intermediate position. As we shall argue m later chapters,
developments il1l phenomenology, ethnomethod.ology and the action
frame of reference are to be understood In these terms. These
perspectives, whilst offering their ?wn special brand of
insight, have also often been used as launchlOg pa~s for attacks on
sociological positivism and have generated a c~nslderable a~ou~t
of debate between rival schools of thought. fhe nature of thiS debate
can only be fully understood by grasping and aprrecia~ing
the different assumptions which underwrite the competing pomts of
view.
It is our contention that the analytical scheme offered here enables one
to do precisely this. It is offered not as a ,m~re classificatory device, but
as an important tool for negotiating social theory. It draws attention to key
assumrtions. I~ alloy-rs ~ne
to focus on precise issues which differentiate soclo-sclentlfic
approaches. It draws attention to the degre~ of ,congrue~cy
between the four sets of assumptions about SOCial sCience which
characterise any given theorist's point of view. We offer it here as the
first principal dimension of ~ur ,theoretical .sche~e for analysing
theory in general and orgamsatlOnaltheory m pa~tlcular.
For the sake of convenience we shall normally refer to It as the
'subjectivc>--objective' dimension, two descriptive labels which
perhaps capture the points of commonality between the four analytical
strands.
Notes and! References
For a further discussion of the nominalism-realism debate, see
Kolakowski (1972), pp. 15-16.
2. Kolakowski (1972), PI'. 158-9. In its most extreme form
nominalism does not recognise the e"istence of any world outside
the realm of individual consciousness. This is the solipsist position,
which we discuss in more detail in Chapter
6.
Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 9
3. For a comprehensive review of 'realism', see Keat and Urry
(1975), pp. 27-45. They make much of the distinction between
'positivism' and 'realism' but, as they admit, these terms are used
in a somewhat unconventional way.
4. For a further discussiol1l of the positivism-anti-positivism debate,
see, for e"ample, Giddens (1974) and Walsh (1972).
5. Giddens (1974), p. l.
6. See, for e){ample, Popper (1963).
7. For a good illustration of 31111 anti-positivist view of science, see
Douglas (l970b), PI'. 3-44.
8. The human nature debate in its widest sense involves many other
issues which we have l1Iot referred to here. The precise model of
man to be employed in any analytical scheme, however, is
underwritten by assumptions which relflect the voluntarism-
determinism issue in one way or another. We have isolated this
element of the debate here as a way of treating at its most basic
level a necessary assumption of all social-scientific theories which
purport to account for human activities. Detailed propositions
with regard to the precise e){planation of human activities
elaborate in one way or another this basic theme.
9. For an excellent discussion of the nature of the ideographic
approach to social science, see Blumer (1969), ch. I.
10. It is important to emphasise here that both nomothetic and
ideographic methodologies can be employed in a deductive and
inductive sense. Whilst the inductivc>--deductive debate in science is
a subject of considerable interest and importance, we do not see it as
being central to the fOUir dimensions suggested here as a means of
distinguishing between the nature of social science theories. That
notwith-standing, it remains an important methodological issue, of
relevance to both sociology and organisational analysis, within the
conte". of the assumptions e){plored here.

20 Assumptions about the Nature
of Society
All approaches to the study of society are located in a frame of
reference of one Idnd or another. Different theories tend to reflect
different perspectives, issues and problems worthy of study, and are
generally based upon a whole set of assumptions which reflect a
particular view of the nature of the subject under investigation. The
last twenty years or so have witnessed a number of attempts on the
part olf sociologists to delineate the differences which separate
various schools of thought and the meta-sociological assumptions
which they reflect.
The Order-Conflict Debate
Dahrendorf (1959) and Lockwood (1956), for example, have
sought to distinguish between those approaches to sociology which
concentrated upon e)(plaining the nature of social order and
equilibrium on the one hand, and those which were more con-
cerned with problems of change, conflict and coercion in social
structures on the other. This distinction has received a great deal of
attention and has come to be known as the 'order-conflict debate'.
The 'order theorists' have greatly outnumbered the 'con-flict
theorists', and as Dawe has observed, 'the thesis that socio-logy is
centrally concerned with the problem of social order has become
one of the discipline's few orthodo)(ies. It is common as a basic
premise to many accounts of sociological theory which otherwise
differ considerably in purpose and perspective' (Dawe,
1970, p. 207).1
Many sociologists now regard this debate as dead or as having
been a somewhat spurious non-debate in the first place (Cohen,
1%8; Silverman, 1970; van den Berghe, 1969). Influenced by the
work of writers such as Coser (1956), who pointed to the functional
aspects of social conflict, sociologists have been able to incorpor-
ate conflict as a variable within the bounds of theories which are
Assumptions about the Nature of Society II
primarily geared towards an explanation of social order. The
approach advocated by Cohen, for example, clearly illustrates this. ]
He takes his point of departure from the work of DahrendOif and
elaborates some olf the central ideas in the order-cordlict debate to
present two models olf society, which are characterised in terms of
competing sets olf assumptions which attribute to social systems the
characteristics of commitment, cohesion, solidarity, cons.ensus,
reciprocity, co-operation, integration, stability and persIstence on
the one hand, and the characteristics olf coercion division. hostility.
dissensus, conflict, malintegration and chang; on the other (Cohen,
1968, Pl'. 166-7).
Cohen's central criticism is that Dahrendorf is mistaken in treat-
ing the order and conflict models as being entirely separate. He in
effect suggests that it is possible for theories to involve elements of
both models and that one need not necessarily incline to one or the
other. From this point of view, the order and conflict views of
societ~ are but two sides of the same coin; they are not mutually
exclUSive and thus do not need to be reconciled. The force of this
sort of argument has been very powerful in diverting attention away
from the order-conflict debate. In the wake ohhe so-called counter-
culture movement of the late I%Os and the failure of the 1968
revolution in France, orthodox sociologists have become much
more interested in and concerned with the problems of the
'individual' as opposed to those of the 'structure' of society in
general. The influence of 'subjectivist' movements such as
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and action theory, which we
referred to in passing in the previous chapter, have tended to
become much more attractive and more worthy of attention. As a
result, interest in continuing the conflict-order debate has sub-sided
under the iQfluence olf issues relating to the philosophy and
methods of social science.
Our contention here is that ilf one reviews the intellectual source
and foundations of the order-conflict debate, one is forced to
conclude that it has met a premature death. Dahrendorf and
lo.c~(wood sought to revitalise the work of Marx through their wntmgs
and to restore it to a central place in sociological theory. For. the. most
p~rt Marx had been largely ignored by leading SOCIOlogIsts, the
mfluence of theorists such as Durltheim, Weber and Pareto having been
paramount. Interestingly enough, these laHer three sociologists are all
very much cOlClcemed with tDu~ problem of social order; it is Marx
who is preoccupied with the role off conflict as the driving force
behind social change. Stated in this way, therefore, the order-conflict
debate is underwritten by a
H2 SociologicallParadigms and Organisational Analysis
differell1lce between tRne persl>ectives alIId concerns ofleading social
URneorists of the nineteell1lth and early twentieth centuries. Modem
socioBogy has done Biule more than articulate and develop the basic
themes initiated Iby these pioneers of social analysis. To state that the
order-con1f1ict debate is 'dead' or a 'non-debate' is thus to IImderpBay,
if not ignore, substantial differences between the work of Marx and, for
example, Durkheim, Weber and Pareto. Anyone familiar with the work
of these theorists and aware of the deep division which exists between
Mandsm and sociology is forced to admit that there are fundamental
differences, which are far from being reconciled. 2 nn this chapter
therefore, we wish to re-evaluate the order-conflict issue with a view to
identifying a key dimen-sion for analysing the assumptions about the
nature of society reflected in different social theories. In order to do so,
let us return to the work of Dahrendorf, who seeks to set out the
opposing issaJIes in the following terms:
The integration theory of society, as displayed by the work of Parsons
and other structural-functionalists, is founded on a number of assump-
tions of tine following type:
(I) IEvery society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of ele-
ments.
(2) IEvery society is a well integrated structure of elements.
(3) IEvery element in a society has a function, i.e., renders a con-
tribution to its maintenance as a system.
(4) IEvery lfulJlctiornng social structure is based on a consensus of
values among its members ....
, .. What Hhave called the coercion theory of society can also be
D"4;ducedl to a small number of basic tenets, although here again these
assumptions oversimplify and overstate the case:
(I) IEvery society is at every point subject to !processes of change;
social change is ubiquitous.
(2) IEvery society displays at every point dissenslls and conflict;
social conflict is ubiquitous,
(3) IEvery element in a society renders a contribution to its disin-
tegratiolJl and change.
(4) IEvery society is based on the coercion of some orits members by
others. (Dahrendorf, 1959, IPn>. 160-2)
The opposing adjectives which Dahrendorfs schema suggests for
disuinguisinilllg approaches to the study olf society can be conve-
unielIl\u8y brought together ill'll the fform olf a table, as follows:
Assumptions about the Nature of Society B3
'ftlllb>HIe2.11
rhe 'order' or 'inte/?rationis,' rhe 'conflict' or 'coercion'
I'iew of society emphasises: I-iew of society empJwJises:
Siabilily Change
Inlegralion Conflict
lFunclional co-ordinalion Disintegration
Consensus Coercion
As Dahrendorf admits, this conceptuaiisatimll is something off an
oversimplification. and whilst providing a very useful tool fOB' coming
to grips with the differences between the two standpoints, it is open to
the possibility of misintelfJPretatioffll, in that the different adjectives
mean different things to differet]t peo[ple. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the way in which tine notion of cml/licd has been tn':ated in the
sociological literature. Since Coser's demonstration of the functions of
social conflict, for e"ample, the role of conflict as an integrating
mechanism has received a great deal of attention, nn effeCt, the whole
notion off 'conflica' llDas oftefi1l been incorporated within the notion of
integration. Dahrendorfs integration/ confllict dimension has been
conveniently telescoped so that it is brought within the bm.ll1lllds off
sociology's traditiona8 concel'll1l for the eRplanation of order. TIne
fallacy off this [position becomes dear if one considers certain e,(treme
forms of conflict, such as class conflict, revolution aUlld war, which can
only be incorporated in the integrationist model by the wildest stretch
oft· one's imagination. ]Examples such as these suggest tIDat it is mis~
leading to equate this type of macrostmcturnl collll.flict with the
functional conflict identified lby Coser. There is an importalIl\t
questioll1l olfdegree involved here, which emphasises the dalIl\gers olf
the dichotomisation of integrntion and con1f1ict; realistically the
distinction between the two is much more off a conailfmum tIDarrn ahe
majority olf writers have recognised.
Another strand of the Dalhllrendorlf scheme which caun lbe regarded
as somewhat problematic lies ilIl\ the distinctioUll lbetweelll1
conumU$ all1ld coercion. At first sight the distincti0ll1l appears
obvio,us and clear-cut, focusing UpOIIl\ shared va811.11es 01Il\ the orrne
Inall1ld and tine impositiolIl\ off some sort of Iforce on the other. OU1I
closer iUllspectioUll there is at certain ambiguity. Where do the shared
values come lfrom? Are they acquired all.lltoR1Iomousiy or imposed on
some members ofl'socnety by ot8u~rs?ThisI[]luestiolfn identifies the

D4 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
possibility that consensus may be the product of t~e use ~f some form
of coercive force. for example, as C. Wnght Mills has pointed out,
'What Parsons and other grand theorists call "value orientations" and
"normative structure" has mainly to do with master symbols of
legitimation' (1959, p. 46).
A normative structure here - what Dahrendorf would view as
COIllSei1lSUS - is treated as a system legitimising the power structure.
from Mills's point of view, it reflects the fact of domination. Hn other
words, shared values may be regarded not so much as an index ohhe
degree of integration which characterises a society as one which
reflects the success of the forces of domination illl a society prone to
disintegration. from one point of view, extant shared ideas, values and
norms are something to be preserved; Ifrom another, they represent a
mode olf dominat~on Ifrom which man needs to be released. The
consensus/ coercion dimension cam thus be seen as focusing upon the
issue of social control. Consensus - however it may arise - is identified
in Dahrendorf's scheme as something independent of coercion. This we
believe to be· a mistaken view since, as suggested above, it ignores the
possibility olf a form of coercion which arises through tllhe control olf
value systems.
Hn distinguishing between stability and change as respective
features olf the order and conflict models Dahrendorf is again open to
misinterpretation, even though he explicitly states that he.d<?es fl1lot
intend to imply that the theory olf order assumes that sOCletles are
statk. His concem is to show how functional theories are essefl1ltially
concerned with those processes which serve to maintain the pattems olf
the system as a whole. Hn other words, fU1ll1ctiorrnaD theories are
regarded as static in the sense that they are concerned with explaining
the status quo. Hn this respect conflict theories lllfe clearly of a
different nature; they are committed to, and seek to explain, the process
and nature olf deep-seated structural change in society as opposed to
change olf III more superfBcial and ephemeral Reind. The.fact that~!
1functi<?n.al theo~es recognise change, and that change IS an
obVIOUS empmcal reality in everyday life, has led Dahrendorfs
categorisation in relation to stability and change to lose its potential
radicallforce and influ-ence. It can be argued that different labels are
required to identify Dlllhrendonf's two paramount concerns: first, that
the order view olf society is [)rimarily status quo orientated; second,
that it deals witllb chaulge olf a fundamentally different nature from
that with wlbicOn conflict theorists are concerned.)
Dalnrtmdou-fs notioll1ls olf fmncdiouBal co-ordbnation lllmi disiuu-
Assumptions about dine Nature of Sociedy DS
ugration can be seen as constituting one of the most P?werful strands of
thought which distinguish tt~e order and ~~nfllct per-spectives. Here again,
however, there IS room Ifor mlsn~terpreta tion. The concept of integration in
Dahrendorfs work denves from the functionalists' concern with the
contribution which cOllistituelf1lt elements of a system make to the whole.
In many respects this is an oversimplification. Merton (1948) introduced
the idea of manifest and latent functions, some of which may be
dysfunctional for the integration olf society.4 Again, Gouldner (1959),
writing shortly after the publication of the German edition of Dahrendonf's
work, suggests that various parts olf a syste!" may have a ~igh deg~ee of
autonomy and may contribute very Intle by way olf mtegratlon to the
system as a whole. The term 'functional co-ordination' is thus something of
an oversimplification and, given the existence of the points of view
el\pressed above within t~e. ~mnction.ali~t camp itself, it is not surprising
that the concept of dlsmtegratlon s~ould be seen as relevant and capable of
being used from a functIOnal standpoint. 'Disintegration' can be very easily
viewed as an inte-grationist concept and, as with other aspects of
Dahrendorfs scheme this dimension has often been telescoped and brought
within the bounds olf the theories of order. for this reason it may well have
been clearer if the position of conflict theory on this dimension had been
presented in more radical and distinctive terms. There is much in Mandan
theory, for example, which refers to the notion olf 'contradiction' and the
basic incompatibility be-tween different elements of social structure.
Contradiction implies heterogeneity, imbalance and essentially antagonistic
and divergent social forces. H thus stands at the opposite pole to the
concept of 'functional co--ordinatioll1', which mu~t presuppose a basic
compatibility between the elem~ntsof any gIVen syste~. ~o argue that the
concept of contradictIOn can be ~mbraced wlthm functional analysis
requires either an act olf faith or at least a
considerable leap of imagination. . Dahrendorf's work has clearly
served a very useful purpose m
identifying a number of important strands ofthought distingui~hing
theorists of order from theorists of conflict. However, as Will be
apparent from the above discussion, in many respects th~ dis-
tinctions which have been drawn between the two meta-theones do not
go far enough. In particular, the insights of some twenty ye~rs of debate
suggest that the characterisation of the COnflict perspective has not
been suffici~ntly r~dical to avoid co~usioll1l with the 'integrationist'
perspectIve. Tlus has allowed theonsts of order to meet the challenge
which Dahrendonf's scheme presents
i6 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
to thdr frame of reference within the conte){t of their order-
ornientated mode of thought. In order to illustrate this point, let us
return to the work of Cohen (1968) referred to earlier.
Hn advocating his viewpoint Cohen appears to be misinterpreting
the distinction between the two models. His interpretation of
concepts telescopes the different variables into a form in which they
can be seen as consistent with each other. In effect his whole
anlalysis reflects an attempt to incorporate the conflict model within
the bounds of the contemporary theory of order. He thus loses the
radical essence of the conflict perspective and is able to conclude
that the two models are not mutually exclusive and do not need to be
reconciled. He argues that the two models are not gellluine
alternatives and in effeca suggests that each is no more than the
reciprocal of the other. He is therefore able to leave Dahrendorfs
analysis with the central concern of his book - the fi1'roblem of
order - largely intact. 'fhe incorporation of conflict illlto the bounds
of the model of order de-emphasise£ its importance. S
Un line with the analysis which we presented earlier, we argue tUnat
the attempt to reduce the two models to a common base ignores the
fundamental differences which e"ist between them. A. conflict tlDeory
based on deep-seated structural conflict and concerned with radical
transformations of society is not consistent with a fUlOlctionalist
perspective. 'fhe differences between them, therefore, are important
all1ld worthy of distinction in any auempt to analyse social theory. With
the benefit ofhindsigh,t, it is possible to see that many of the
misinterpretations which have arisen have d]ouDe so becallDse the
models Dun Dahrendorf's analysis were not sufficiently differentiated.
We wish to propose, therefore, that certain modifacations be made illl
order to articulate the differences iUl a more eJ{piicit and radical form.
Since much of the confusion has arisen because of the ambiguity of the
descriptions associated with the two models we wish to suggest the use
of a somewhat different terminology.
Our analysis has shown that the ou'der-conflict distinction is in mall1lY
senses the most problematic. We suggest, therefore, that it $hoold be
replaced as a central theme by the notions of 'regulation' aIumd 'rndical
cRnannge'.
Assumptions about the Nature of Society 17
We introduce the term 'sodology of regulation' to refer to the writings
of theorists who are primarily cOll1cemedl to provide e){plaraations of
society in terms which emphasise its underlyil1lg unity and
cohesiveness. H is a sociology which is essentially Con-cerned with
the need for regulation in human affairs; the basic questions which it
asks tend to focus upon the need to understand why society is
maintained as an entity. H attempts to explain why society tends to
hold together rather than fall apart. It is interested ifl1ufI1derstal1lding
the social forces which prevelf1lt the lHlobbesiautn vision of 'war of
all against all' becoming a reality. 'fhe worl, of Durldleim with its
emphasis upon the nature of social cohesion and solidarity, for
e,mmple, provides a clear and comprehensive illustration of a concern
for the sociology of regulation.
'fhe 'sociology ofradical change' stands in stark contrast to the
'sociology of regulation', in that its basic concern is to find e)
{planations for the radical change, deep-seated structural con-flict,
modes of domination and structural contradiction which its
theorists see as characterising modern society. na is a sociology
which is essentially concemed with man's emancipation from the
structures which limit and stunt his potential for development. 'fhe
basic questions which it asks focus upon the deprivation of maUl,
both material and psychic. Hi is often visionary and Utopian, in tilat
it looks towards potentiality as much as actuality; it is concerned
with what is possible rather than with what is; with altematives
rather than with acceptance olfthestatus {luo. In these respects it is
as widely separate and distant from the sociology of regulation as
the sociology of Man{ is separated and distant from the sociology
of Durkheim.
'fhe distinction between these two sociologies can perhaps be
best illustrated in schematic form; extreme points of view are
counter-posed in order to highlight the essential differences
between them. 'fable 2.2 summarises the situation.
We offer this regulation-radical change distinction as the second
principal dimension of our scheme for analysing sociaft theories.
A.long with the subjective-objective dimension developed in the
previous chapter, we present it as a powerfuft means for identifying
and analysing the assumptions which I.mder-lie social theories in
general.
'fhe notions of 'regulation' and 'radical change' have thus far been
presented in a very rough and e){treme form. 'fhe two models
illustrated in Table 2.2 should be regarded as ideal-typical
formulations. nne seven elements which we have identifBed lell1lrll
themselves to a much more rnigorous and systematic treatment in
us Sociological Paradigms tmd Organisational Analysis A.uumptimRS about tJue Nature of Society U9

which their overall form and nature is speh out in detail. We delay between the sub-elements of each modd need not be congruent, that
this task until later chapters. Here, we wish to address ourselves to is, an analysis may pay attention to elements of both.
the broad relationships which e"ist between the sociologies of The answer to both criticisms follows our defence of Dahrendorf's
regulation and radical change. We maintain that they present work. To conflate the two models and treat them as variations on a
fundamentally different views and interpretations of the nature of single theme is to ignore or at least to umierplay the fundamental
society. They reflect fundamentally different frames of reference. differences which exist between them. Whilst it may be possible to
They present themselves, therefore, as alternative models for the use each model in a diluted form and thus obtain two analyses of the
analysis of social processes. middle ground which apprmdmate each other, they must remain
To present the models in this way is to invite criticism along the essentially separate, since they are based upon oppos-ing
lines of that levelled at Dahrendorfs worl•. For eUffiple, it could be assumptions. Thus, as we have illustrated, to discuss the 'functions'
suggested that the two models are the reciprocals of each other - no of social conflict is to commit oneself to the sociology of regulation
more than two sides of the same coin - and that relationships as opposed to that of radical change. lHIowever close one's position
might be to the middle ground, it would seem that one must always
Tlllll»Be 2.2
be committed to one side more than another. The fundamental
TUne ll"egunDmQnmll-ll'ad!ficaDcDnaJl1lge IlIbimemD@un
distinctions between the sociologies ofregulation and radical change
will become clear from our analysis of their intellectual
TIlt' socio/OIlY of REGULATION 111e soci%!?y of RADICAL CHANGE development and constituent schools of thought in later chapters. We
is cOflc('Y/Ied ",ith: is concerned lIIith: conceptualise these two broad sociological perspectives in the form
(a) The status quo (a) Radical change
of a polarised dimension, recognising that while variations within
(b) Social order (b) Structural connict the context of each are possible, the perspectives are necessarily
(c) Consensus* (c) Modes of domination separate and distinct from each other.
(d) Social integration and (d) Contradiction
cohesion (e) Emancipation
(e) Solidarity
(0 Need satisfactiont (0 Deprivation
(g) Actuality (g) Potentiality
Notes and References
I\!@Qeg I. Among the numerous theorists primarily concerned with the
litBy 'consensus' we mean voluntary and 'spontaneous' agree-ment problem of order, Dawe cites Parsons (1949), Nisbet (1967),
of opinion. Bramson (1%1), Cohen (1968), and Aron (1968).
t The term 'need satisfaction' is used to refer to the focus upon 2. For a discussion of the Mar"ism versus social science debate,
satisfaction of individual or system 'needs'. The sociology of see Shaw (1975). The division between Mantist theorists and
regulation tends to presume that various social characteristics can be orthodm( sociologists is now so deep that they either ignore
explained in relation to these needs. It presumes that it is possible to each othelf completely, or indulge in an exchange of abuse and
identify and satisfy human needs within the conte"t of e,dsting accusation regarding the politicall conservatism or
social systems, and that society reflects these needs. The concept of subversiveness commonly associated wiili their respective
'deprivation', on the other hand, is rooted in the notion that the social points of view. Debate about the intellectual strengths and
'system' prevents human fulfilment; indeed that 'deprivation' is weaknesses of their opposing standpoints is conspicuous by its
created as the result of the status quo. The social 'system' is not seen absence.
as satisfying needs but as eroding the possibilities for human 3. lLater in this chapter we sllIlggest that the descriptions of
fulfilment. It is rooted in the notion that society has resulted in 'concern with the status quo' and 'concern for radical change'
deprivation rather than in gain. provide more accurate views of the issues involved here.
:W Sociological Paradigms and Organisatimwl Analysis
4. Dahrendonf acknowledges Merton's distinction between latent
and manifest functions but does not pursue the con~ sequence
of 'dysfunctions' for the concept of integration (Dahrendorf,
1959, pp. 173-9).
30 Tvvo Dimensions:
5. Other 'order' theorists who have addressed themselves to
Dahrendorf's model tend to follow a similar path in the
Four Paradigms
attempt to embrace conflict theory within their perspective.
See, for e1\ample, vall1l den lBerghe (1%9).

Un the previous two chapters we have focused upon some of the

n,ey assumptions which characterise different approaches to social
theory. We have argued that it is possible to analyse these
approaches in terms of two I(ey dimensions of analysis, each of
which subsumes a series of related themes. h has been suggested
that assumptions about the nature of science can be thought of illl
terms of what we call the subjective-objective dimension, and
assumptions about the nature of society in terms of a regulation-
rndical change dimension. Un this chapter we wish to discuss the
relationships between the two dimensions and to develop a coher-
ent scheme for the analysis of social theory.
We have already noted how sociological debate since the late
1960s has tended to ignore the distinctions between the two dimen-
sions - in particular,how there has been a tendency to focus upon
issues concerned with the subjective-objective dimension and to
ignore those concerned with the regulation-radical change
dimension. Interestingly enough, this focus of attention has
characterised sociological thought associated with both regulation
and radical change. The subjective-objective debate has beelfi
conducted independently within both sociological camps.
Within the sociology of regulation it has assumed the form of a
debate between interpretive sociology and functionalism. Un the
wake of Berger and Luckmann' s treatise on the sociology of Imow-
ledge (1%6), Garfinkel's work on ethnomethodology (1967) and a
general resurgence of interest in phenomenology, the questionable
status of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the
functionalist perspective have become increasingly exposed. The
debate has often led to a polarisation between the two schools of
thought.
Similarly. within the context of the sociology of radical chalfige
there has been a division between theorists subscribing to 'subjec-
tive' and 'objective' views of society. The debate in many respects
taB'es its lead from the publication in france in 1966 and Britain in

22 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
1969 of Louis Althusser's work For Marx. This presented the
notion of an 'epistemological break' in Marx's work and emphas-
ised the polarisation of Marxist theorists into two camps: those
emphasising the 'subjective' aspects of Marxism (Lukacs and the
frankfurt School, for example) and those advocating more 'objec-
tive' approaches, such as that associated with Althusserian struc-
turalism.
Within the context of the sociologies both of regulation and
radical change, therefore, the middle to late 1960s witnessed a
distinct switch in the focus of attention. The debate between these
two sociologies which had characterised the early 1960s disap-
peared and was replaced by an introverted dialogue within the
context of each of the separate schools of thought. Instead of
'speaking' to each other they turned inwards and addressed their
remarks to themselves. The concern to sort out their position with
regard to what we call the subjective-objective dimension, a
complicated process in view of all the interrelated strands, led to a
neglect of the regulation-radical change dimension.
As a consequence of these developments, recent debate has often
been confused. Sociological thought has tended to be charac-terised
by a narrow sectarianism, from which an overall perspec-tive and
grasp of basic issues are conspicuously absent. The time is ripe for
consideration ofthe way ahead, and we submit that the two key
dimensions of analysis which we have identified define critical
parameters within which this can take place, We present them as
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
r---------- ----------1
'Rllldical 'Radical
humlllnist' atructurlllli13t'
I approaching social theory within the bounds of the same
SUBJECTIVE ;-------- +------~I OBJECTIVE
'Functionllllilllt'
L.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION
!Figure 3.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory
Two Dimensions: Four Paradif!.ms 23
twO independent dimensions which resurrect the sociological issues
of the early I960s and place them alongside those of t~e .Iate I%Os
and early 1970s. Taken together, they define four d~stmct
sociological paradigms which can be utilised fo~ the analySIS of a
wide range of social theories. The relationship between these
paradigms, which we label 'r.adic~1 ~u~~nist', 'radi.cal ~tructural ist',
'interpretive' and 'functIOnalIst, IS Illustrated In figure ~.I.
It will be clear from the diagram that each of the paradigms shares a
common set of features with its neighbours on the hori-zontal and
vertical axes in terms of one of the two dimensions but is differentiated
on the other dimension. for this reason they should be viewed as
contiguous but separate - contiguous because of the shared
characteristics, but separate because the differentiation is, as we shall
demonstrate later, of sufficient importance to warrant treatment of the
paradigms as four distinct entities. The four para-digms define
fundamentally different perspectives for the analysis of social
phenomena. They approach this endeavour from con-trasting
standpoints and generate quite different concepts and analytical tools.
The Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms
Before going on to discuss the substantive nature of each of the
paradigms, it will be as well to pay some attention to the way in
which we intend the notion of 'paradigm' to be used.· We regard our
four paradig~sas being d.efined by very basic meta-theoretical
I assumptions which underwnte the frame of reference, mode of
I theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who ~perate
I within them. It is a term which is intended to emphaSise the
I
I commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of
I theorists together in such a way that they can be usefully regarded as
problematic. .
I This definition does not imply complete umty of thought. h
I
I allows for the fact that within the context of any given paradigm
I
there will be much debate between theorists who adopt different
I standpoints. The paradigm does, however, have an underlying unity
I in terms of its basic and often 'taken for granted' assump-tions,
JI which separate a group of theorists in a very fundamental way from
theorists located in other paradigms. ~he '~nity' of the paradigm thus
derives from reference to alternative views of real-
24 Sociololfical Paradixms and Or/?anisational Analysis
ity which lie outside its boundaries and which may not necessarily
even be recognised as existing.
In identifying four paradigms in social theory we are in essence
suggesting that it is meaningful to examine work in the subject area in
terms of four sets of basic assumptions. Each set identifies a quite
separate social-scientific reality. To be located in a particular paradigm
is to view the world in a particular way. The four para-digms thus
define four views of the social world based upon differ-ent meta-
theoretical assumptions with regard to the nature of science and of
society.
It is our contention that all social theorists can be located within the
context of these four paradigms according to the meta-theoretical
assumptions reflected in their work. The four para-digms taken
together provide a map for negotiating the subject area, which offers a
convenient means of identifying the basic similarities and differences
between the work of various theorists and, in particular, the underlying
frame of reference which they adopt. It also provides a convenient way
of locating one's own personal frame of reference with regard to social
theory, and thus a means of understanding why certain theories and
perspectives may have more personal appeal than others. Like any
other·map, it provides a tool for establishing where you are, where you
have been and where it is possible to go in the future. It provides a tool
for mapping intellectual journeys in social theory - one's own and
those of the theorists who have contributed to the subject area.
nn this work we intend to make much use of the map-like qual-ities
of the four paradigms. Each defines a range of intellectual territory.
Given the overall meta-theoretical assumptions which distinguish one
paradigm from another, there is room for much variation within them.
Within the context of the 'functionalist' paradigm, for example, certain
theorists adopt more extreme posi-tions in terms of one or both of the
two dimensions than others. Such differences often account for the
internal debate which goes on between theorists engaged in the
activities of 'normal science' within the context of the same paradigm. 2
The remaining chapters of this work examine each of the four
paradigms in some detail and attempt to locate their principal theorists
in these terms.
Our research suggests that whilst the activity within the context of
each paradigm is often considerable, inter-paradigmatic 'journeys' are
much rarer. This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970) notion of
'revolutionary science'. For a theorist to switch para-digms calls for a
change in meta-theoretical assumptions, some-thing which, although
manifestly possible, is not often achieved in
Two Dimensions: Four Paradif?ms 25
practice. As Keat and Urry put it, 'For individual scientists, the change
of allegiance from one paradigm to another is often a "conversion
experience", akin to Gestalt-switches or changes of religious faith'
(1975, p. 55). When a theorist does shift his position in this way, it
stands out very clearly as a major break with his intellectual tradition
and is heralded as being so in the literature, in that the theorist is
usually welcomed by those whom he has joined and often disowned by
his former 'paradigm colleagues'. Thus we witness what is known as
the 'epistemological break' between the work of the young Marx and
the mature Man, - what we would identify as a shift from the radical
humanist paradigm to the radical structuralist paradigm. At the level of
organisational analysis, a distinct paradigm shift can be detected in the
work of Silverman - a shift from the functionalist paradigm to the
interpretive para-digm. We will analyse such intellectual journeys in
more detail in
later chapters.
Before we progress to a review of the four paradigms, one point is
worthy offurther emphasis. This relates to the fact that the four
paradigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views of
social reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to under-stand
four different views of society. They offer different ways of seeing. A
synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms they are
contradictory, being based on at least one set of opposing meta-
theoretical assumptions. They are alternatives, in the sense that one
can operate in different paradigms sequentially over time, but mutually
exclusive. in the sense that one cannot operate in more than one
paradigm at any given point in time. since in accept-ing the
assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all the
others.
We offer the four paradigms for consideration in these terms, in the
hope that knowledge of the competing points of view will at least
make us aware of the boundaries within which we approach our
subject.
The FunctionaHist Paradigm
This paradigm has provided the dominant framework for the con-duct
of academic sociology and the study of organisations. lIt represents a
perspective which is firmly rooted in the sociology of regulation and
approaches its subject matter from an objectivist point of view.
Functionalist theorists have been at the forefront of
26 Sociological Paradif?ms and Orf?anisational Analysis
the order-conflict debate, and the concepts which we have used to
categorise the sociology of regulation apply in varying degrees to all
schools of thought within the paradigm. It is characterised by a
concern for providing explanations of the status quo, social order.
consensus. social intef?ration, solidarity, need satisfaction and
actuality. It approaches these general sociological concerns from a
standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, determinist and
nomothetic.
The functionalist paradigm generates regulative sociology in its
most fully developed form. In its overall approach it seeks to provide
essentially rational explanations of social affairs. It is a perspective
which is highly pragmatic in orientation, concerned to understand
society in a way which generates knowledge which can be put to use. It
is often problem-orientated in approach, con-cerned to provide
practical solutions to practical problems. It is usu~lIy firmly committed
to a philosophy of social engineering as a baSIS .of social cha~ge and
emphasises the importance of under- sta~dlng order, eqUilibrium and
stability in society and the way in which these can be maintained. It is
concerned with the effective 'regulation' and control of social affairs.
As will be apparent from our discussion in Chapter I the appro~ch to
soci.al science characteristic of the functionalist para-digm IS rooted In
the tradition of sociological positivism. This reflects the attempt, par
excellence, to apply the models and methods of the natural sciences to
the study of human affairs. Originating in france in the early decades
of the nineteenth century, its majo~ influen~e upon the paradigm has been
through the work of social theonsts such as Auguste Comte, Herbert
Spencer, Emile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto. The functionalist
approach to social science tends to assume that the social world is
composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relation-ships
which c~n be identified, studied and measured through approaches
denved from the natural sciences. The use of mechan-ical a~d
biological. analogies as a means of modelling and under-stand!ng !he
socl.al world is particularly favoured in many functIOnalist theones.
By way of illustration consider, for exam-pie, ~he work of Durkheim.
Central to his position was the idea that 'social facts' exist outside of
men's consciousness and restrain men in their everyday activities. The
aim was to understand the relationships between these 'objective'
social facts and to articu-~ate the,soci.ology whi~h e~plained the types of
'solidarity' provid-Ing the SOCial cement which holds society together.
The stability and ordered nature of the natural world was viewed as
characteris-
Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 27
ing the world of human affairs. for Durkheim, the task of sociology
was to understand the nature of this regulated ordcu:.
Since the early decades of the twentieth century, however, the
functionalist paradigm has been increasingly influenced by ele-ments
from the German idealist tradition of socialthoughl. As will be recalled
from our discussion in Chapter I, this approach reflects assumptions
about the nature of social science which stand in opposition to those of
sociological positivism. As a result of the work of such theorists as
Max Weber, George Simmel and George Herbert Mead, elements of
this idealist approach have been util-is~d within the conte"t of social
theories which have attempted to bndge the gulf between the two
traditions. In so doing they have forged theoretical perspectives
characteristic of the least objectiv-ist region of the paradigm, at its
junction with the interpretive paradigm. Such theories have rejected the
use of mechanical and biological analogies for studying the social
world and have introduced ideas which place emphasis upon the
importance of understanding society from the point of view of the
actors who are actually engaged in the performance of social activities.
Since the I940s there has been also an infusion of certain Manist
influences characteristic of the sociology of radical change. These
have been incorporated within the paradigm in an attempt to
'radicalise' functionalist theory and rebuff the general charge that
THIE SOCIOlOGV OF RADICAL CHANGE
f---------- -----------1
I i
I IVllJlntis~ I
I ,
: th~or\l :
I I
I I
SUIlllJIECTIVIE
I OBJECTIVE
I I
I I
G0rmlllll
id00lism
tl1lIEGULATION SOCi?~o~icllll
PO!lI~IVI$m
!Figure 3.2 Intellectual influences upon the functionaiisl paradigm
28 Sociolo/:ical Paradi/:ms alld Or/:allisatiollal Allalysis
ill
functionalism is essentially conservative and unable to provide >
explanations for social change. These attempts underwrite the debate f-
U
examined in the previous chapter as to whether a theory of 'contlict' can ill
-,
ro
be incorporated within the bounds of a theory of 'order' to provide a
adequate explanations of social affairs.
Put very crudely, therefore, the formation of the functionalist
paradigm can be understood in terms of the interaction of three sets of
intellectual forces, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Of these, sociological
positivism has been the most influential. The compet-ing traditions
have been sucked in and used within the context of the functionalist
problematic, which emphasises the essentially objectivist nature of the
social world and a concern for explana-tions which emphasise
'regulation' in social affairs. These cross-currents of thought have given
rise to a number of distinctive schools of thought within the paradigm,
which is characterised by a wide range of theory and internal debate.
By way of overview, again somewhat crudely, Figures 3.3 and 3.4
illustrate the four paradigms in terms of the constituent schools of
sociological and organisational theory which we shall be exploring
later on. As will be apparent, most organisation theorists, industrial
sociologists, psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach
their sub-ject from within the bounds of the functionalist paradigm.

The li nterpretive Paradigm

Theorists located within the context of the interpretive paradigm adopt
an approach consonant with the tenets of what we have described as
the sociology of re/:ulation, though its subjectivist approach to the
analysis of the social world makes its links with this sociology often
implicit rather than explicit. The interpretive paradigm is informed by a
concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental
nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks (f) 0a. VJ _ &II E
explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and
subjectivity, within the frame of reference of the participant as opposed ~~~..,""",--JI-_----'-""='';''';''''i
to the observer of action. >
f-
In its approach to social science it tends to be Iluminalist, anti- U
ill

-,
pO.l'itil'iJf, volulltarist and idl'ographic. It sees the social world as an OJ
:::>
emergent social process which is created by the individuals concerned. lfl

Social reality, insofar as it is recognised to have any existence outside

the consciousness of any single individual, is regarded as being lillie
more than a network of assumptions and
 Two Dimensions: Four Paradigms 31

intersubjectively shared meanings. The ontological status of the

social world is viewed as extremely questionable and problematic
as far as theorists located within the interpretive paradigm are
concerned. Everyday life is accorded the status of a miraculous
achievement. interpretive philosophers and sociologists seek to
understand the very basis and source of social reality. They often
delve into the depths of human consciousness and subjectivity in
their quest for the fundamental meanings which underlie social
life.
Given this view of social reality, it is hardly surprising that the
commitment of the interpretive sociologists to the sociology of
regulation is implicit rather than explicit. Their ontological
assumptions rule out a direct interest in the issues involved in the
order-conflict debate as such. However, their standpoint is
underwritten by the assumption that the world of human affairs is
cohesive, ordered and integrated. The problems of conflict,
domination, contradiction, potentiality and change play no part in
their theoretical framework. They are much more orientated
towards obtaining an understanding of the subjectively created
social world 'as it is' in terms of an ongoing process.
interpretive sociology is concerned with understanding the
essence of the everyday world. in terms of our analytical schema it
is underwritten by an involvement with issues relating to the
nature 9f the status quo, social order, consensus, social integra-
tion and cohesion, solidarity and actuality. 3
The interpretive paradigm is the direct product of the German
idealist tradition of social thought. its foundations were laid in the
work of Kant and reflect a social philosophy which emphasises the
essentially spiritual nature of the social world. The idealist tradi-
tion was paramount in Germanic thought from the mid-eighteenth
century onwards and was closely linked with the romantic move-
ment in literature and the arts. Outside this realm, however, it was
oflimited interest, until revived in the late 1390s and early years of
this century under the influence of the so-called neo-idealist
movement. Theorists such as Dilthey, Weber, Husserl and Schutz
have made a major contribution towards establishing it as a
framework for social analysis, though with varying degrees of
commitment to its underlying problematic.
figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the manner in which the paradigm
has been explored as far as our present interest in social theory and
the study of organisations is concerned. Whilst there have been a
small number of attempts to' study organisational concepts anli
situations from this point of view, the paradigm has not generated
 32 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
much organisation theory as such. As will become clear from our
analysis, there are good reasons for this. The premises of the
interpretive paradigm question whether organisations exist in any~
thing but a conceptual sense. Its significance for the study of
organisations, therefore, is of the most fundamental kind. It challenges
the validity of the ontological assumptions which underwrite
functionalist approaches to sociology in general and the study of
organisations in particular.
The Radical Humanist Paradigm
The radical humanist paradigm is defined by its concern to develop a
sociQlogy of radical change from a subjectivist standpoint. Its
approach to social science has much in common with that of the
interpretive paradigm, in that it views the social world from a
perspective which tends to be nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntar-ist
and ideographic. However, its frame of reference is committed to a
view of society which emphasises the importance of over-
throwing or transcending the limitations of existing social
arrangements.
One of the most basic notions underlying the whole of this paradigm
is that the consciousness of man is dominated by the ideological
superstructures with which he interacts, and that these drive a cognitive
wedge between himself and his true conscious-ness. This wedge is the
wedge of 'alienation' or 'false conscious-ness', which inhibits or
prevents true human fulfilment. The major concern for theorists
approaching the human predicament in these terms is with release
from the constraints which existing social
arrangements place upon human development. It is a brand of
socialthe<?rising ~esigned to. provide a critique of the status quo. It
tends to view society as anti-human and it is concerned to articu-late
ways in which human beings can transcend the spiritual bonds
and fetters which tie them into existing social patterns and thus realise
their full potential.
I~ terms of ~he elements. with which we have sought to concep-
tuahse the sO~lology ofr~dlcal change, the radical humanist places
most emphaSIS upon radical chanr:e, modes o./dominlltion, eman-
cipation, deprivation and potemiality. The concepts of structural
conjlict ~nd (:ontradiction do not figure prominently within this
perspecll~e, since they are characteristic of more objectivist views of
the SOCial world, such as those presented within the conte,u of the
radical structuralist paradigm.
Two Dimensions: Four Paradi/?ms 33
In keeping with its subjectivist approach to social science, the radical
humanist perspective places central emphasis upon human
consciousness. Its intellectual foundations can be traced to the same
source as that of the interpretive paradigm. It derives from the German
idealist tradition, particularly as expressed in the work of Kant and
Hegel (though as reinterpreted in the writings of the young Marx). It is
through Marx that the idealist tradition was ~rst utilised as a basis for a
radical social philosophy , and many radical humanists have derived
their inspiration from this source. In essence Marx inverted the frame
of reference reflected in Hegeliai1l idealism and thus forged the basis
for radical humanism. The paradigm has also been much influenced by
an infusion of the phenomenological perspective de:ivin~ from. Husser~.
.
As we shall illustrate in our detailed diSCUSSIOn of thiS paradigm,
apart from the early work of Mant, interest remained dormant until the
1920s, when Lukacs and Gramsci revived interest in subjectiv-ist
interpretations of Marxist theory. This interest was taken on by
members of the so-called JFrankfurt School, which has generated a
great deal of debate, particularly through the writings of Habermas and
Marcuse. The existentialist philosophy of Same also belongs to this
paradigm, as do the writings of a group of social theorists as widely
diverse as lIIich, Castaneda and Laing. All in their various ways share
a common concern for the release of consciousness and experience
from domination by various aspects of the ideolog-ical superstructure
of the social world within which men live out their lives. They seek to
change the social world through a change in modes of cognition and
consciousness.
JFigures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a somewhat rough and ready
summary of the manner in which this paradigm has been explored in
terms of social theory and the study of organisations. As we shall argue
in Chapter 9, the writers who have something to say on organisations
from this perspective have laid the basis of a nascent anti-organisation
theory. The radical humanist paradigm in essence is based upon an
inversion of the assumptions which define the functionalist paradigm. It
should be no surprise, there-fore, that anti-organisation theory inverts
the problematic which defines functionalist organisation theory on
almost every :.::ount.
The Radnca~ Structuralist Paradigm
Theorists located within this paradigm advocate a sociology of radical
change from an objectivist standpoint. Whilst sharing an

34 Sociological /Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
approach to science which has many similarities with that offunc-
tionalist theory, it is directed at fundamentally different ends.
Radical structuralism is committed to radical change, emancipa-
tion, and potentiality, in an analysis which emphasises structural
conflict, modes of domination, contradiction and deprivation. It
approaches these general concerns from a standpoint which tends to
be realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic.
Whereas the radical humanists forge their perspective by focus-
ing upon 'consciousness' as the basis for a radical critique of
society, the radical structuralists concentrate upon structural rela-
tionships within a realist social world. They emphasise the fact that
radical change is built into the very nature and structure of con-
temporary society, and they seek to provide explanations of the
basic interrelationships within the context of total social forma-
tions. There is a wide range of debate within the paradigm, and
different theorists stress the role of different social forces as a
means of explaining social change. Whilst some focus directly upon
the deep-seated internal contradictions, others focus upon the
structure and analysis of power relationships. Common to all
theorists is the view that contemporary society is characterised by
fundamental conflicts which generate radical change through
political and economic crises. It is through such conflict and change
that the emancipation of men from the social structures in which
they live is seen as coming about.
This paradigm owes its major intellectual debt to the work of the
mature Marx, after the so-called 'epistemological break' in his work.
It is the paradigm to which Marx turned after a decade of active
political involvement and as a result of his increasing inter-est in
Darwinian theories of evolution and in political economy. Man's
basic ideas have been subject to a wide range of interpreta-tions in
the hands of theorists who have sought to follow his lead. Among
these Engels, J?lekhanov, Lenin and Bukharin have been
particularly influential. Among the leading exponents of the radi- cal
structuralist position outside the realm of Russian social theory, the
names of Althusser, Poulantzas, Colletti and various Marxist
sociologists of the New Left come to mind. Whilst the influence of
Marx upon the radical structuralist paradigm is undoubtedly dominant,
it is also possible to identify a strong Weberian influence. As we shall
argue in later chapters, in recent years a group of social theorists have
sought to explore the inter-face between the thought of Marx and
Weber and have generated a distinctive perspective which we describe
as 'conflict theory'. It is to this radical structuralist perspective that the
work of Dahren-
Two Dimensions: Four /Paradigms 35
dorf belongs, along with that of other theorists such as Rex and
Miliband. .
figures 3.3 and 3.4 again provide a ge~erai o~ervlew of the
schools of thoughllocated within the paradigm, which w~~hall be
examining in some detail in Chapters 10 ~nd 1.1. In Bntlsh .and
American sociology the radical structuralist vle~ has recelve.d
relatively little attention outside the r~alm.of conflict the.ory. ThiS
paradigm, located as i.t is ~ith!n a realist view of the socl~1 w?rld,
has many significant ImplicatIOns for the study of organisatIOns,
but they have only been developed in the barest forms. In Chapt~r
II we review the work which has been done and the embrYOniC
radical organisation theory which it reflects.
Exploring Sodal Theory
So much, then, for our overview of the four paradig.ms. Su~
sequent chapters seek to place flesh upon t~e bones of thiS analyti-
cal scheme and attempt to demonstrate ~ts po~er a.s a t~ol ~or
exploring social theory:1 Hopefully, our dlSc~sslonWill do Justice to
the essentially complex nature of the pa~adlgms~nd the net~ork
of assumptions which they reflect, and will ~stabllsh.the.relatlO.n
ships and links between the various perspectJ.ves dommatmg SOCial
analysis at the present time. Whi.'st the focus m C~la~ters 5,7, ?and
11 is upon organisational analysIs, the general pll1nclples and Ideas
discussed in the work as a whole clearly ~ave ~e1evan~e.fo~ the
exploration of a wide variety of ot~er SOCial sCience diSCiplines.
The scope for applying the analytical scheme to other fields of
study is enormous but unfortunately lies beyond ~he scop~ of our
resent enquiry. However, readers interest~d m appl¥mg the
~cheme in this way should find little difficulty m proceedmg from
the sociological analyses presented in Chapters 4,~,8.. an~ 10 toan
anal ysis of the Iiterature in their own sphere of speCialised mterest.
Notes and! References
for a full discussion of the role of paradi~ms in s~iell1tjfic
development, see Kullm (I 970). ~nhis a~aly.sis,lPar~(bgmsare
defined as 'universally recogmsed SCientific adn~vements
that for a time provide model problems and soh.!tlons to a
36 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis Two Dimensions: /Four Paradigms 37
community of practitioners' (p. viii). Paradigms are regarded number of works which have aimed ~o chara a jpaah througlln
as governing the progress of what is called 'normal science', in ahe social science literature by reducing the variables of
which 'the scientist's worlc is devoted to the articulation and sociological analysis to a number off Icey dimensions. TIwse
wider application of the accepted paradigm, which is not itself of Dahrendorf (959), Wallace 09(9), Gouldner (1970),
questioned or criticised. Scientific problems are regarded as Friedrichs (1970), D'<lIwe (1970), Robertson (1974), Keat and
puzzles, as problems which are known to have a solution Urry (1975), Strasser (1976) and Benton (1977) all readily
within the framework of assumptions implicitly or explicitly come to mind. nn a sense our work adds to this literature. Had
embodied in the paradigm.llfa puzzle is not solved, the fault sjpace permitted, we would have liked to demonstrate the
lies in the scientist, and not in the paradigm' (Keat and Urry precise way in which the schemes jproposed by these various
1975, p. 55). 'Normal science' contrasts with rela-tively brief authors all fali, in a partial way, within the bounds of the
periods of 'revolutionary science' , in which 'the scientist is scheme developed here.
confronted by increasingly perplexing anomalies, which call
into question the paradigm itself. Scientific revolu-tion occurs
when a new paradigm emerges, and becomes accepted by the
scientific community' (ibid., p. 55).
We are using the term 'paradigm' in a broader sense than
that intended by Kuhn. Within the context of the present worl,
we are arguing that social theory can be conveniently
understood in terms of the co-existence of four distinct and
rival paradigms defined by very basic meta-theoretical!
assumptions in relation to the nature of science and society.
'Paradigms', 'problematics', 'alternative realities', 'frames of
reference', 'forms of life' and 'universe of discourse' are all
related conceptualisations although of course they are not
synonymous.
2. Some inter-paradigm debate is also possible. Giddens main-
tains 'that all paradigms ... are mediated by others' and that
within 'normal science' scientists are aware of other para-
digms. He posits that: 'The process of learning a para-digm ...
is also the process of learning what that paradigm is not'
(1976, pp. 142-4).
nnterestingly, he confines his discussion to the mediation of
one paradigm by another one. We believe that a model of four
confllicting paradigms within sociology is more accurate and
that academics' knowledge of 'scientists' within the other three
paradigms is m,ely to be very sketchy in some cases.
Relations between paradigms are perhaps better described in
terms of 'disinterested hostility' rather than 'debate' .
3. The notion of need satisfaction derives from the use of a
biological analogy of an organism and plays no part in
interrpretive sociology.
4. The sociological concerns of recent years have resulted in a
~;·:l~i]\H·(,C

111111
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 Subject Index

!l\ccolJlntin~ prmctnccs, 247-11, 250, 260, classical mail2lgemcilt ilneorlf, I:n.

1.69 126-30. 142. 165, 166
mction fmme olf relference. 8, iH. 122, communicllltive distortioll. Ui!>l. Z!li5,
131,195-202, 20ll-lO. 2m, 353 2%.321,323
Administrative Scieroce Quarterly, 162, l;:onl!1ict, 13, n. 95. 2m, 201i. 205. 2iJ!lJ,
163 1.30.326
mlilCnmtioift. 32, 270. 2!l2. 2116, 296, 307, conflict theory, 34. 334, 349-57. :r7!li,
311.312,323.324,329,346-7,348, 3119
349 conflict functionalism. 93-9. 202, 2B
illl Simmd. n congruency between stmnds 011 objec-
as bad fmith, 304-5 tive-subjective dimension. B. 103 •
as fetishism of commodities. 329 246
ms one-dimensionality, 292. 293-4, between organismtiollal sllIbsystems,
317,332 116-9
irnllsccllded by idelltical sUlbject-ob- consciousness, 279-81, 2Il5. 2116, 291.
ject. 2lJ6, 1.37 292,294,296,307,310. 3IB, 337,
llhernative realities, 312-9 353
Illflmrchism, 301. 339 class. 21M, 1.36. 23111
lllJIMnrclnistic communism, 301, 333, Ifalse. J2
334.338-41 pathology olf, 306
Innl!\rchistic DrHJlividnnmlisl1Jn, 233, contingency theory, 126. 1M-II I, 1112
299-302 contrndictions, 34, 9ll, 307,3211-9,344.
lIlnomie, 45. 91. 92, B9 346,347,355,356,357. 353,36lJ,
lJliIti-Oi"glllllisatioll theory. 33, 310-25 377,3113,31l6
lJliIii-rositivism, .'I, 2lJ, 32, 200, 228. 253, convivimlity, 314. JIlJ
291,313,320 cl'iticml tlleoty, 232, 233-99, 3 Hili. 312,
Astoil studies, 162-3. 166 316,320
lb<clliaviOlirisl1Jn. 49, 73-4. 76, IlO, 84. IFmnkfurt School, 234, 290-99, 302,
341.346
102-4, 151 olf orglllnisations, 321-2
behavioural symb()!ic illtemcliornsm, culture, 50. 100, 101. 193,315,3 m, 320
n, 79.81, 11l9-93, 251 cybernetics, 100, 101
bio~~icllli mllmlo!llf (o!1ltlllllismic lIlU1l!nl-
o~y),42,43,44,49-50, 52-3, 56, iJleterminism.6. 25. 34,103,289,3311.345
61,63,64, M, 61l. 73,111, 100. 140, ilimlectic. 21l0. 237, 336, 343, 346, ],49,
153, 154, 159, 1M, 167, 184, 137, 357. 31B
220,355,399.400 lllimlecticllli mateuimiism, 94, 285, :no,
oorC2IIJICrnClf, 9il-3, 862. 175,315,332 3113-4
~lI'ill!llism,236. 1JJ7. 327, :'l30. 332. 337, dyslfunctions, 9$-9, 134, 136,355
340,341, 349-50, 372,373,377, cmll'iricism, 76, 90. 210. 345. 353. 3M,
378,380, 3113. JII6 . 374
Cr1scso(f,326,337,344.359,363,J69, mbstrlllctelil,49.57.02.92, HM-I6>, mo,
378, 3113 !I)JO
cllli1llstrophic llliftmlo~". 66. 3316-7, 337 , empirical stlJlOlnes 0([ oTlf,miftis!l\tioaul,aR
3~~'

&musmlliliftlillysis, 4&l, 231, 3J7-ilJ chal1llcteristics, 126, !60-64\

<envirollment, 156-iMl, IM-6, !~iI, HR,
OniclIIgo $ocio~~y, 77-11, 82. 100, 190 131, 336, 3$~
19.hS • eillisiemol()~lf, Rii, 8, 5. 57, 78. 75, itl,