ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No.

151258 counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the
Petitioner, conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala
- versus - prohibita.[4]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
Respondent. country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
x-------------------------x emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954 Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Petitioner, Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center;
- versus - Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City. [6]
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this
JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. [7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE commission. As interpreters of the law, judges arecalled upon to set aside
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No.
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents. Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and
x-------------------------x 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, FACTS
- versus - G.R. No. 155101 The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. the trial court,[9] are as follows:
x-------------------------x In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
- versus - Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS G.R. Nos. 178057 Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ & 178080 Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Promulgated: On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some
Respondents. February 1, 2012 members of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law
School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they
went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes
on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there
DECISION would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation
SERENO, J.: rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of
on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. [1] Due their initiation.
in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received
were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread threats and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of
effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the
fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
initiation. 16. Antonio General (General)
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended. 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino In Criminal Case No. C-38340
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed 38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining
these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
following 35 Aquilans: judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
 1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban,
Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General,
Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.)
were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel
Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr.
(Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were
also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio
Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having
found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa
in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005,
the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions
were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,
questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30
August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first,
that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture
of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due
process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited
Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to
present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no
longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right
should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking
for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the
hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing
date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have
likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of
the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. [23] He claims
that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the
fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo
the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling. [24] Further, petitioner
echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted
by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death. [25] The Solicitor
General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the
injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but
if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim. [26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by
ill will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of
Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work
in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the
alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a
stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites
the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it
was not true and that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was
negated by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to
the testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked
the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the
latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped
Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to
petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of
compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there
could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation
had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should
have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner
posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.
According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding
of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission
of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying
for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated
17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves
the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial
for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera,
S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29
November 1993. For various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the
nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the
9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as
the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In
contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender
dies prior to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of
personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las
pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the
criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil
liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death
of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action. [34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his
criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil
liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition
is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the
reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of
September; and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated
that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not
yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the
line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present
evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present
evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested
in open court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate
evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other
accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant
to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the
line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25
August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were
supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993. [38] Counsel for
accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To
address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging
that he had to appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready
to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial
court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as
a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the
Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to
present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due
process of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence.
According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have
been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not
supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present
evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned
to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said
hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on
the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in
accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the
finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less
than the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present
evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend
oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing
of the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21
June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular
membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement
of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very
same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared
that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance
at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order, we
held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June
1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995
hearing should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to
present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived,
such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive
in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death,
as in the present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the
accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver
of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure
to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the
accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences
of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan
simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence
without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June
1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a
criminal case involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken
lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable
so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the
waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially
since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon
was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-
assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his
pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid
waiver of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to
vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand
of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts
have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as
a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be
upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence
on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record
to resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or
irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide
the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application
of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct
participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions
of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension
of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity. [49] He
even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only
after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over
from one judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the
Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has
been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the
key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall
proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused
failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona,
Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted
for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the
evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of
Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there
be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. [53] The right is
deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. [54] In determining the
right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be
weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the
assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the
case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal
would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. [59] As we have
previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a
petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness
thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and
lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the
case against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
the violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would
reveal that the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the
proceedings in the case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with
the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing
factors that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are
justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been
utterly violated in this case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact
that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals,
and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995,
the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of
the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with
the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court
a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such
order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August
5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial
court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in
granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until
August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no
action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings
filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which
was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set
case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the
case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information
was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval
or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment
of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a
clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of
the delay in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,
where the Court found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases;
similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held
that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's
duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was
filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby
depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation
by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated.
Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this
Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the
effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or
an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice
and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in
the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of
the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights
of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this
particular constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed
either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through
an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same
Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there
is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a]
verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument
of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. [76] We further
stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the
lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the
latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3)
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of
a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
justice.[83] In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of
double jeopardy.[84]
 The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks
the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of
Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of
a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for
Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x. [85] Allegedly,
the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility;
set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4
of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that
the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot
be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and
the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application
for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we
are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted
fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical
injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against
the accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used
to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse
of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the
exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and
Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the
physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature.
However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no
precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the
medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the
offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness
or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved
beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950].
And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed
should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los
Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As
such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the
appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and
not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding
that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case
would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required
medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its
own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal
officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple
traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA
found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall
be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that
intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious
act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of
the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries
punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a
person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We
emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable
for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
 Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their
acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the
CAs own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that
criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have
directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No.
154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as
a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide,
as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they
had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa,
had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of
their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were
acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries;
and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain
advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the
case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to
join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically
strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order
to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-
Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and
psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of
thought.[105] The classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a
moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil. [106] It
asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts
so long as free will appears unimpaired. [107] The basic postulate of the classical
penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their
actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. [108] They refrain
from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of
possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is
thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens
rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the
predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an
act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things. [115] The
second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit
act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a
certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. [119] It does
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the
result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one to action
for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce
the result.[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. [122] With these
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer
to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the
existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously,
with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the
other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for
conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is
to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice.
The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent
to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In
culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without
malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed;
however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the
deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act,
which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means ofculpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a
vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [132] Furthermore,
the victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal
intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It is
said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been
associated with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous
tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle
Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked
as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is
rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were
tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to
prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse
some connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to
a scholar, this concept lends historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby
prospective members are asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the
organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing. [141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a
student wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a
neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two
semesters long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and
to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to
understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point
average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and
respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni
members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to
involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization
may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering
or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more
than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret
society named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng
Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters
of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity
believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities
or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151]The Katipunans ideology was
brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said
that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and
were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or
[pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the
Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth
classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in
permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various
ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got
involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his
second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-
victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the
initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading
to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb. [161] Members of
Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle
candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned
paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests. [163] The
victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked
medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims. [164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State
University chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a
pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to
repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the
chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to
the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were
on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body
slamming, an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up
in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put
the pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
 In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went
through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn
University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a
ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner
leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed
and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise,
butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its
members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as
driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during
which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running the
gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran
down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs. [169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim
Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion
and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-
victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. [173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought
initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the
2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated
in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other
candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks. [176] During the
last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified. [177] The pledges sustained
roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several
other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth
by fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing
proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the
path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future
of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership
opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem;
professional networking opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with
close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to
hazing in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services
was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful
or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the
efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting
and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal
or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat
hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the
most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider
hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except
hazing that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In
a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than
one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a
person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a
deadly weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness
resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily
injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term
of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless
the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member,
in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an
imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail
felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by
confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less
than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the
hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of
a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed
five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise
be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to
penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G
felony if hazing results in the death of another. [203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited
remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted
to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in
South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
 The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites
does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus.
If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with
a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise
they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement
that with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the
other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial
court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill
Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of
homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill
will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space
had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the
accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to
have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as
follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It
was very clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence
on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of
homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido
Marquez to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full
appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances were made, the
Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were
briefed as to what to expect during the next three
days and we were told the members of the fraternity
and their batch and we were also told about the
fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were
made to ride a van and we were brought to another
place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the
place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to
link our arms and then the driver of the van and
other members of the Aquilans who were inside left
us inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa
akin ka, Asuncion Patay ka and the people
outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong
a voice these remarks uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of
excitement in their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through
and through, what were the voices or utterances
that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin,
etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they
continue during the rocking of the van which lasted
for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing
voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were
being inflicted, was there any utterances by
anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and
some were encouraging others who were
pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta
atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed
looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us
whether matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words
that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances
simultaneously, I could not really pin point who
uttered those words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the
conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on
my thigh, he would say that and I quote ito, yung
pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so
that would in turn sort of justifying him in inflicting
 more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking,
he would jump on my thighs and then after on was
Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this
guy, his father stole the parking space of my
father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on
Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you
of having your family have his brother killed, what
was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was
just making it up sir. So he said that I knew
nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact
after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn justify him
and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning
that Lenny Villas father stole the parking space
allotted for his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that utterance
was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were
different people who heard from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next
accusation against Lenny Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came
near to us and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard
him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny
Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and
sometime he stand up and he kicked his thighs and
sometimes jumped at it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You
mentioned also that accusations made
by Dizon you or your family had his brother
killed, can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations that were
charged against you while inflicting blows upon
you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular
if I knew that his family who had his brother killed,
and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I
knew that it was just a story that he made up
and I said that I knew nothing about it and he
continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And
another incident was when a talk was being given,
Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I
was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking
beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez,
ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung
pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid,
yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor
or a physician came around as promised to you
earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez,
have you stated that there was a briefing that was
conducted immediately before your initiation as
regards to what to expect during the initiation, did I
hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told
you to expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular
place, we would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed,
humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be
physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go
back to school. All the bruises would be limited to
our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular
school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be
 covered actually so we have no thinking that our
face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would
have bruises on your body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you
expect that would create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a
paddling or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of
the initiation procedures is psychological in
nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of
physical initiation, meaning body contact, is that
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological
initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things
calculated to terrify you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief
situation intended to, I repeat, terrify you,
frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting
the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you,
he said or he was supposed to have said according
to you that your family were responsible for the
killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you
remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to
you by Dizon that you did not believe him
because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you
perhaps, the purpose as I have mentioned
before, terrifying you, scaring you or
frightening you into quitting the initiation, this
is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why
he was saying those things was because he
wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception,
correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to
Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the
same forms of initiation by all the initiating masters?
You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or
kicked you said something similar as was told to
you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance,
the masters would run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the
initiating masters not only on you but also on the
other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of
initiation was administered by one master, was
also administered by one master on a neophyte,
was also administered by another master on the
other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by
the CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the
accused were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on
the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by
Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal
are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during
their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake
of substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon
for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it
was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny
Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To
repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it
was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had
no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It
was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness
Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon
who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis
for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer
to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully
appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the
neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure
in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and
intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari
ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka,Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang
ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating
the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported
NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space
of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including
those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed
by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting
psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the
initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing.
Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-
up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of
hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the
period of interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological
pain and suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the
recruit but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain
acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the Russian
roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the
neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and putting a
noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several
times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside
portion of the building these are the mental or psychological tests that
are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities.
The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such
acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to
psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to
prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not
be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny
Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-
neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it
was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up. [218] Even the trial court did
not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he
cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x. [219] The
Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [220] Instead, we
adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled
that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven
beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the
Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262
to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must
be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-
being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission
of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. [223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction
of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused
teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and
thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the
corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for
slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she
had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was moderate and
that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent.
Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner
did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v.
Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the
Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment
plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a
bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen
knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling through those
means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused
the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the
trial courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
and instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we
ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external
acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon
used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be
determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine
the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected
to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and
the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they
were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were
officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the
neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human
barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical
and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul
or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order
that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and
to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days
before the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila
Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily
consented to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned
from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to
become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they
were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that
before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage.
Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking,
psychological tests and physical punishment would take place.
They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of
hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can already play basketball.
Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the
initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle would
be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the
first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the
specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts
of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were
done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional rounds on the second night were held upon the
insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the
consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members
still participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed
pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict
injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the
arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were
assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the
neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious
intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process
of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted
or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that
hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the
circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical
injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in
the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The
following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are
already punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it
results in death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be
frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual
abuse does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a
new offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons
either composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making
this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal
across the land that no group or association can require the act of
physical initiation before a person can become a member without being
held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale
for that imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he
is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment
of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment
of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which
are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to
discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense
for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling
difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as
a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to
commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President.
Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is
death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of
hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent
or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this
activity called hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed
or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent
act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po
ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala
talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at
buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So,
kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin
sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay
kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President,
of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his
statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the
intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical
injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged
mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving
or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel
situation where we create the special crime without having to go
into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were
merely to initiate, then there is no offense. And even the
distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se,
not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to
the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent,
but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the
basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely,
is being criminalized because in the context of what is happening
in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one
will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a
criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that
the masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is
 important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or
those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility
and say, We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our
initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill
or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have
been charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide,
mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a
group that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My
question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution
have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during
hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would
the prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the
prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr.
President, if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder.
It should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the
issue of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing
Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no
objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting
from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy
can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the
commission of sodomy forced into another individual by another
individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase
without consent for purposes of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify
sodomy with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of
hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts
here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with
or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without
the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of
hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the
malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with
or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless
of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing
or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into
joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there
is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be
protected from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in
time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can run
after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not
there was consent on the part of the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken
by the distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is
correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and
practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private
proclivities of some individuals when they do their acts in private as we
do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their
thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered
acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that the
State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President.
Such that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only
sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the
neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing
not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of
pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the
initiator said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it.
So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the
consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at
all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it will
always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or
suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would
want to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply
because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing,
like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher
penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only
aggravate the offense if it is committed without consent of the
victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will
collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
 SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee
amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is
approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,
Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought
out the idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita.
There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to
go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make
this a special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under
the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose
that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law
and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code,
Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a
special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This
dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique
as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered
the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to
presume that Lennys parents would not have consented[239] to his participation
in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by
them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate
Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing
or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering
has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there
was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual
background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on
the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or
negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. [243] Here,
the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing
an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act.
Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the
degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the
danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses
to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to
prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not
much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of
precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure
secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims
heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its
requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the
blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries,
veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple
hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have
resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows,
paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so
markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the
brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the
abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack
of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded
that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered
from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and
thighs, resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood
from his vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be
taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila
Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were
punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on
their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their
thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough
basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya
sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim
was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter. [266] The
relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various
cross examinations of defense counsels that the
injuries that you have enumerated on the body of
the deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as
Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves
would not cause the death of the victim. The
question I am going to propound to you is what is
the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the
victim. So, it is not fair for us to isolate such injuries
here because we are talking of the whole body. At
the same manner that as a car would not run minus
one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole
and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity
members were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable
felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of
care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule
that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since
the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have
been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity
accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening
the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future
legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated
during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the
misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined
the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered,
such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up,
because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he
did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining
the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the
circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they
were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug,
and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the
prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to
the applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the
amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral
damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also
awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of
death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we
sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
 The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,
including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long
as the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to
award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred
or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief
suffered on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article
2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in
the amount of ₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE
IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article
365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus legal interest
on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al.,
is hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and
the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
from the decision* of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the
accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal
Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the
respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense
charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the
Solicitor General as official counsel for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April
1983, but a did not have complete equipment that could make his venture
workable. He also had another problem, and that while he was going into this
entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing
Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as
Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that
he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon
Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB
Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was
willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a
warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the
pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since
petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on
a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent
amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was
Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the
same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each
item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor
such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security
for the faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the
satisfactory completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to
the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing
agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and
petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the option to buy the same.
After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez
who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When
the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit
the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6)
postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and
cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts of
the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by
Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with
sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated
August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September
15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28,
1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it
pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner
became aware that Corazon Teng was the one who advanced the warranty
deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay
the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were
deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the
accused-petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4)
cases, as follows:
 . . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and
sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each
Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to
pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject
checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the
court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of
the cases which were intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand
and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is
one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the
Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the
petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the
instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00
corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject
of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not
used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have
been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or
about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to
pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed
part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but
remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were
pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying
possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and
just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is
to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and
operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner
did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez
to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction.
This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral
per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of
the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that
it was she who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source
out the needed funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of
transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is
in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those
who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi
has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise
need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty
deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the
guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off
business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat
of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing
court system to apply the full harshness of the special law in question, using
the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with
materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to
above in the lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of
the cases, were mere accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey
Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of said amount
from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To
argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit
should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out
the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of
the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of
the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not
intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich
themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing
honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the
prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that
the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against
actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in
the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the
actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the
unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is
founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e.,
which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is
inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a
certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call
punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the
method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11,
citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's
view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed
upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be
directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case,
there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for
mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a
menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the
accused, however, by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven
when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty,
the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the
obligation of the accused to complainant had been
extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement — by
the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by
complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee — and
that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of
said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he
assumed that the amount was already returned to the
complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change
the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the
evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on
account or for value. And as We have already observed, in
order that there may be a conviction under the from paragraph
of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of
said offense that the check should have been made and
issued on account or for value — it is sufficient, all the other
elements of the offense being present, that the check must
have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment,
after the issuance of the checks, of the obligation in
consideration of which the checks were issued, would have
resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory
proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present
case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced
any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the
complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already have
been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the
cardinal rule that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same court even expected the
petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the
crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty
deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of
Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally
interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back
the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the
petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real
nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the
accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law,
violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the
rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether
or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not
being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts
being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses
of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated
checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on
account or for value", as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When
viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and
"deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more,
the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A
promise that certain facts are truly as they are represented to
 be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance
Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423) Management.

A cross-reference to the following term shows: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-
petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Fitness for Particular Purpose: —
SO ORDERED.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and
that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or
modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or

security for the performance of some contract, to be forfeited if
the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be
part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser
the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge

for safe- keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of
another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker,

for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the
depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the
money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives
for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and
generally understood among bankers and by the public,
includes not only deposits payable on demand and for which
certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued,
payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future
time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the
very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with
which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly
intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding

G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by
virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters
of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under
the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from
the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination
that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is
a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry
in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the
proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy
the following privileges and immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed
by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives
the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception
that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to
determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the
prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and
it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence,
should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires
and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic
agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional
or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of
a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right
in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a
statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8
Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render
it defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like
Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the
imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away
in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a
tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near
murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for
Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in
the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid
in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned
by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All
of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived
at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who
also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able
to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of
First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by
counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense
charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any
court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer
was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered
finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine
sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of
924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney
de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be
quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without
lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of
universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court
and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for
decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal
Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with
a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
 If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another
nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of
presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred
to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal
to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or
firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide,
or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four
hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against
chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without
means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all
others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as
including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code,
every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has
the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States
relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United
States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution,
the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the
government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting
at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct
action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock
Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the
Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to
General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in
the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme,
and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,
the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private
rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime,
are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible
with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded
by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered
by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary
Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of
August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing
with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the
Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy,
would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards
but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing
as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific
provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions
elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the
Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,
and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The
Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the
United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty
formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and
the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States.
A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with
the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the
United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar
reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil.,
533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited
meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would
read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States
and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation
not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present,
which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty
to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the
accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the
court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with
provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial
court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as
to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy
and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as
shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District.
The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the
equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both
instances. So ordered.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another

nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy,
notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances
named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death.
The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and
(2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves.
It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court,
finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced
the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances,
that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES
C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of
the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27,
2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of
kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil,
with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near
Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly
boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led
by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The
pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained
the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-
appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint,
the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well
as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted
with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to
PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of
the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the
Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue
operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the
vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another
vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return
to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on
March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about
10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called
"Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T
Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-
appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving
the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed
the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the
vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were
released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to
government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline
by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and
gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their
respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant
Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in
Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the
crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the
incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at
Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind,
who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at
the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against
accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN
DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April
10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor
launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon,
board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC
TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the
complement and crew members, employing violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the
vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10,
1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the
effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red
speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba
on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if
they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that
each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if
they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-
going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee,
and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore,
claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the
morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for
nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to
their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed
by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he
was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger
brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced
evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as
Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel,
working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum
to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was
"Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio
Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to
the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the
aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations
Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride"
but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991.
Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the
contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain
the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T
Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before
departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port
clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul
Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass
through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the
vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The
brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and
then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the
Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of
Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the
"Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey
report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong
then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at
Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and
quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil
purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same
procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that
that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for
the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on
March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four
vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to
act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went
to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the
details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong
was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that
weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong
checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN
OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in
at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that
the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of
the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the
accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime
is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong
is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD
532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and
Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can
no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to
remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the
amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon,
at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount
is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby
ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T
Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to
said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly
and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in
the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until
said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has
served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at
the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during
the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide
by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of
Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all
the accused.
 SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-
appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O.
Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that
the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the
time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer,
thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the
proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas
had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly
contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were
not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew
who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these
accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated
the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden
is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no
knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft
or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an
accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court
erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters
and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to
convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions
without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to
the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do
not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of
qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in
the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified
piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the
information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues
that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For
the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within
its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the
legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented
accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and
implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3)
did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified
piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by
accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be
convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters
and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record)
was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr.
on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced
when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause
shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During
the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a
categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the
nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the
truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992,
pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed
on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights
may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized
by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of
Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is
amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and
properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination
of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence,
we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul
Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA
553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which
gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to
any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be
in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called
confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very
basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar.
Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from
the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter
in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]).
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit")
derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in
this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants,
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in
evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We
agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco
(Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of
then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses,
officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who
identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who
attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about
 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and
crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about
sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo
to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was
discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of
about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one
(1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court
that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify
the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused
were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and
Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed
to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the
three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the
said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board
when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the
port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of
denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater
weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the
commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently
desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly
Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their
companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily,
said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an
indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without
even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the
personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible
and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial
court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture
in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen
(p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on
May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was
in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is
fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove.
Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about
midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in
Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise
unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity
to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether
a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the
trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and
different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact,
constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and
seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the
shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus,
Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for
their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-
coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the
time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task
in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco
(aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-
Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their
residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other.
Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has
known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the
Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both
been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of
steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin
Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at
large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be
convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections
2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic
Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the
Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532.
He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered
"superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed
in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the
word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532
must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to
offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel,
whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding
him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who,
on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member
of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo
of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement
or passengers.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of
the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics
supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between
the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one
of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its
cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was
later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that
the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine
waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed
part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code.
As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on
the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by
direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his
group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that
his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and
its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and
his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting
piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly
and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in
any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly
or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or
brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is
lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice
and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as
to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always
resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40
SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of
the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to
overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived
benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in
disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T
Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked
cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He
even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General
Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through,
undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food,
beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and
Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant
Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to
avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant
Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have
easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have
resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of
the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been
effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail
accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods
summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy
Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the
vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of
Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its
voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely
stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the
evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the
voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and
transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T
Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at
the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH,
Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross
cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed
his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2
CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt
for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the
requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29,
1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it
was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo
on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T
Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the
same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer
from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of
his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the
cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the
source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T
Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he
should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very
suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a
single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of
sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize
the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even
verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor
did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66
nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of
his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted
with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and
thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00
to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less
than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of
this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore,
spend much time and money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated
price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying
records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the
cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following
the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in
obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful
purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is
lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation
not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on
board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate
said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was
convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications
of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the
"Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the
evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court
in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November
10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
under an indictment alleging that on or about October 22, 1988, at Barangay
Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of
P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
positive for marijuana.1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his
rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga
where he was temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily
waived his right to a pre-trial conference,3 after which trial on the merits
ensued and was duly concluded.
I Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as
a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo,
Guagua, Pampanga. Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the
3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team
composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked
money from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to
Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay
officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed
out appellant to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him
if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to
buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter,
handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked
money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen
meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was
the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought
by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep
and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that
transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the
one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from
appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the
buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members,
that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not
actually see the sale that transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw
his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the
one who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter
was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to counsel.
Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation
of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise
informed the court below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that
only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However,
Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of
"one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they were the
ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the
marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were
practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also
did not find any trace of physical injury on the person of appellant. The next
day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered
that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience
abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant
came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain,
his physical condition remained normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts,
claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching
television with the members of his family in their house when three persons,
whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance
that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment,
appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they were going to Camp
Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on
board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp, he was
ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his
signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied
knowledge of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the
twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he
vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed that he did
so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being
subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido
Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m.
There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his
sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga
where he was confined for three days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was
hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and
vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from
peptic ulcer even before the latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a
resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination
revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did
not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on
his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court
rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the
costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the
lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1)
not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt
of Property Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting
him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and
evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated
subsequently from his possession,14 the latter not being in any way connected
with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags
of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution
in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed
by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal
possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not charged
herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly
and unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether for money or
any other material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond
doubt that appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two
twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both
parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to
prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell
two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself
creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his testimony was amply
corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony
of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the
utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion
and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt
do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not
effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team
before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to
them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed
their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving
and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,22 erected as it
is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited
chance for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly
done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the
then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp
Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23
confirmed in her Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four
tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of
3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully
proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost,
according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags
from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with
the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the
marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with
which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana
was confiscated from the possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo
that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and,
as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there was clearly a
mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not
take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of
their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly
confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary
to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been
satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting
such operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so
as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the
object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we
are lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be
purchased only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS,
as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a
request for that powder because they, themselves, are using that in their
own work, sir.29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money
bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be
fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act
punishes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."30 The
dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary
technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any
barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of
pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay official or police
authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires
that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay
official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On
the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto,
they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report
prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking
Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for
selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation
of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these
remarks was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner, the receipt for
the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein
he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible
in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations
against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained
in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he
was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever incriminatory
admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in
writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving
and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot
thereby be extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in
the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of
the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of
the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any
peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to
a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal
rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to
that class of crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is
not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total
stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer
and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of
the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale could
be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person,
time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly
acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are
not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental
torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas
the night he was placed under custody.43 This he asserts to support his
explanation as to how his signatures on the documents earlier discussed were
supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence
to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation
of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.44 The evidence
on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment.
Two doctors, one for the prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46
testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury,
abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the
cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been
suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that fact,
saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had
no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to
see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.49
Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the authorities nor file
appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to
do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his
arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were
determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest
was only the culmination, the final act needed for his isolation from society and
it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit
trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a
note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective
December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original
disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall
now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of
the case at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses
under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
 xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea
bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to
be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would
be whether the patently favorable provisions of Republic Act
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty
provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally
amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the
Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of
said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall
be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The
execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses
since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could
neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary
question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be
imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case
of People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring
the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons
accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice
were not under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not
the accused has applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to
the prescription of the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties
provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or
the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and
pragmatic considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being
brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties
appears to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby
calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now
further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall
unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more
of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the
maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also
as the minimum of the penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or
more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited
and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting
provisions in order to give effect to the whole law,57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the
quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the
fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams,
hence covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second
paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty
shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drug
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a
complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides
that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum,
the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of
Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty
shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and
to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the
aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty,
as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of
our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for
a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be
divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to
be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the
three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at
bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again,
another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as
a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and
illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is
whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be
taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability
should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing
the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should
not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however,
reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved
provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and
which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised
Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of
the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were
not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article
71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is
a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against,
such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks
of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64
of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in
the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the
United States but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal
Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of
penalties with definitive durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for
one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory
cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and referred to at the time
laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during the American
regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct
that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code
and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages
with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required
by section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud
committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by means of
false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and
 fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code
and shall be punished in the same manner as therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were
specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in
the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700
(Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the
penalties run from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the
penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion
perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less
than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when
committed without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not
less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed
with violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and
life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are
different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised
Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of
penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or
applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special
law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic
Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised
Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other
penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the
law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the
Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and
special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative
effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory
enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have
suppletory effect to the penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and
1866. While these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses
thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the
statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the
Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of any
express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would
be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of
penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have
been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential
Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it
was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code should not apply to said special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law
entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From
the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification
and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code,
which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the
intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of
the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions
thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of
the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in
the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article
63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that
where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying
the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application
of the provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623,
contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the
penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by
the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application
of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of
experience in the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and
prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code, 67 with much more
reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all
attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the
different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act
No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in
the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay
down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and
applied only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within
rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61
of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall
be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by
one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and
68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the
aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty
in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs
thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the
penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed
in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as
many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule
were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree
lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each
likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is
for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not
to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot
be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of
and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not
involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as
ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more
important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence
for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted portion of the
section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty
imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that
the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate
sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature
of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there
could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In
the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this
rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this
holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea
expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No.
7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in
their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact,
for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1
which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
(Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an
admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.
Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act.
No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to
the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held
that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced
therein although what the law states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that
under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have
been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the
interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in
an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with
laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion,
and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.72 The "minimum"
sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and
not of right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his
sentence outside of his confinement.73 It does not constitute the totality of the
penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence
under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the convict's
eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be
ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum
range we have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum
sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of
prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction
rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga
is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is,
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the
maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the
penalty to be imposed would be prision correccional pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A.
No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the
range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two
or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or
of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or
two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.
No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by
Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
 if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into
account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses
punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws
(or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and
penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the
Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is
punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in
Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or
special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by
such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its
definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in
the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal
Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law
punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty
therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the
mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by
no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by
the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the
penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses
related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare
that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of
participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of
penalties to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.),
complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among
others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the
penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the
Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should
be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each
should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as
the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under
the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity
of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section
20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be
considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty
shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250
grams) the proper principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is
one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority
opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties
in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any
event be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the
drugs involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present
(paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or
under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree
because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional.
Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction
at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary
because within the same second paragraph involving the same range of
penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68,
and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance,
viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by
providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and
limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair
because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be
imposed would be reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged
mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of
only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is
prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he
has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the
accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
— When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always
lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to
apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the
penalty to be imposed would be prision correccional pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A.
No. 7659, the sentence to be meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose minimum is within the
range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two
or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating circumstances or
of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the penalty by one or
two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I the Revised Penal Code.
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.
No. 6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be considered as
punished under the Revised Penal Code for purposes of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by
Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into
account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses
punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws
(or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and
penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the
Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is
punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of Penalties in
Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or
special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by
such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its
definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in
the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal
Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law
punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty
therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties. In short, the
mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by
no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the
penalties prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses
related to drugs should now be considered as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also bound, ineluctably, to declare
that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature of
participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of
penalties to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.),
complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among
others. We cannot do otherwise without being drawn to an inconsistent posture
which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the
penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the
Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, where the proper penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused should
be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the
special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in
Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three
distinct penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion
temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code, each
should form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as
the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet, considering that under
the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity
of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section
20, as amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be
considered as a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying circumstances pursuant to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty
shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250
grams) the proper principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is
one mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be
imposed should be prision correccional in its minimum period. Yet, the majority
opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in
the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any
event be prision correccional in order to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the
drugs involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present
(paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or
under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree
because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional.
Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction
at all would be allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary
because within the same second paragraph involving the same range of
penalty, we both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68,
and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance,
viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by
providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and
limiting fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair
because an accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be
imposed would be reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum because of privileged
mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused who is found guilty of possession of
only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be imposed is
prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction thereof even if he
has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the
accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age.
— When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one
coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not
exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted
with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always
lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed.
 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty
next lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to
apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 125297. June 6, 2003]
ELVIRA YU OH, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 16390, promulgated on January 30,
1996, affirming the conviction of petitioner Elvira Yu Oh by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City and the resolution dated May 30, 1996
which denied her motion for reconsideration.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International
Traders, Inc., a company engaged in jewelry trading. Due to her failure to pay
the purchase price, Solid Gold filed civil cases [2] against her for specific
performance before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On September 17, 1990,
petitioner and Solid Gold, through its general manager Joaquin Novales III,
entered into a compromise agreement to settle said civil cases. [3] The
compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided that petitioner
shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of P50,000.00
each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and the
balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 which
is also the due date of the 99th and last postdated check. Petitioner issued ten
checks at P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00, drawn against her
account at the Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City
Branch. Novales then deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due
dates with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said
checks were dishonored by EBC for the reason Account Closed. Dishonor slips
were issued for each check that was returned to Novales. [4]
On October 5, 1992, Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 92-26243 to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City
charging petitioner with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law.[5] Except for the dates and the check numbers, the
Informations uniformly allege:
That on or about the in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to JOAQUIN
P. LOVALES III to apply on account or for value Equitable Banking Corp.
Grace Park Caloocan Branch Check No. dated payable to SOLID GOLD
INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC. in the amount of P50,000.00, Philippine
Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said SOLID GOLD INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC.
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The cases were consolidated and subsequently raffled to Branch 99 of the
said RTC. Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty.[7] Trial then
ensued. On December 22, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of ten counts of violation
of BP 22 and hereby sentences her to a penalty of one year imprisonment for
each count, or a total of ten years, to be served in accordance with the
limitation prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and to
indemnify complainant the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the
amount of P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the ten informations; it overlooked the
fact that no notice of dishonor had been given to the appellant as drawer of the
dishonored checks; it failed to consider that the reason of closed account for the
dishonor of the ten checks in these cases is not the statutory cause to warrant
prosecution, much more a conviction, under B.P. Blg. 22; it failed to consider
that there is only one act which caused the offense, if any, and not ten separate
cases; and it disregarded the definition of what a check is under Sec. 185 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.[9]
Finding the appeal to be without merit, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with costs against appellant.
Hence, herein petition raising the following errors:
I
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING
THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-
 APPELLANT BY UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING HER OF THE LEGAL
BENEFITS OF GIVING RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION
OF THE INFERIOR COURTS TO COVER THE OFFENSES
INVOLVED IN THESE CASES PURSUANT TO ART. 22 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, THUS IN EFFECT RENDERING THE
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION PROMULGATED BY THE TRIAL
COURT BELOW AND AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING IN
FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE
OF DISHONOR HAD BEEN GIVEN HER AS DRAWER OF THE
DISHONORED CHECKS PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT
EXPRESSLY PROVIDED UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22.
III
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE
PROVISIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 CONTRARY TO
THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION THAT PENAL STATUTES, SUBSTANTIVE AND
REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL, ARE, BY THE CONSECRATED
RULE, CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE, OR
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED AND THAT IT IS
ALWAYS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO RESOLVE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENCE UPON A THEORY OF
INNOCENCE RATHER THAN UPON A THEORY OF GUILT
WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO, AND IN SO DOING THE
DECISION APPEALED FROM INDULGED ITSELF IN JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION TO FAVOR THE PROSECUTION AND TO WORK
GRAVE INJUSTICE TO THE ACCUSED.
Simply worded, the issues of this case may be stated as follows: (1) whether
or not the appellate court erred in not granting retroactive effect to Republic Act
No. 7691[10] in view of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); (2) whether or
not notice of dishonor is dispensable in this case; and (3) whether or not the
appellate court erred in construing B.P. Blg. 22.
We will resolve the first and third issues before considering the second
issue.
First issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving
retroactive effect to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC.
Petitioner argues that: the failure of the appellate court to give retroactive
application to R.A. 7691 is a violation of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of the felony; R.A. 7691 is a penal law in the sense that it affects
the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of criminal cases; taken
separately, the offense covered by each of the ten Informations in this case falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court under Sec. 2
of R.A. 7691; and the Court of Appeals is guilty of judicial legislation in stating
that after the arraignment of petitioner, said cases could no longer be transferred
to the MTC without violating the rules on double jeopardy, because that is not so
provided in R.A. 7691.[11]
The Solicitor General, in its Comment, counters that the arguments of
petitioner are baseless contending that: penal laws are those which define
crimes and provides for their punishment; laws defining the jurisdiction of courts
are substantive in nature and not procedural for they do not refer to the manner
of trying cases but to the authority of the courts to hear and decide certain and
definite cases in the various instances of which they are susceptible; R.A. No.
7691 is a substantive law and not a penal law as nowhere in its provisions does
it define a crime neither does it provide a penalty of any kind; the purpose of
enacting R.A. No. 7691 is laid down in the opening sentence thereof as An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court whereby it reapportions the jurisdiction
of said courts to cover certain civil and criminal case, erstwhile tried exclusively
by the Regional Trial Courts; consequently, Art. 22 of the RPC finds no
application to the case at bar; jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the
time of the filing of the complaint, and once acquired, jurisdiction is not affected
by subsequent legislative enactments placing jurisdiction in another tribunal; in
this case, the RTC was vested with jurisdiction to try petitioners cases when the
same were filed in October 1992; at that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not yet
effective;[12] in so far as the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7691 is concerned, that
same is limited only to pending civil cases that have not reached pre-trial stage
as provided for in Section 7 thereof and as clarified by this Court in People vs.
Yolanda Velasco[13], where it was held: [a] perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will
show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication
can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending
or decided by the RTC prior to its effectivity. [14]
On this point, the Court fully agrees with the Solicitor General and holds
that Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application to the case at bar.
Said provision reads:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving sentence.
A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that
prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines
crime, treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.[15] R.A. No. 7691 does
not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat
of the nature of crimes and its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not
a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22 of the RPC does not apply in the present case.
B. P. Blg. 22, which took effect on April 24, 1979, provides the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine
of not less than but not more then double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court.
R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129,
and vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6)
years.[16] Since R.A. No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said
law is substantive.[17]
In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals,[18] this Court held that jurisdiction
being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court.[19] R.A. No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of
the cases in the trial court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals.[20] There is therefore no merit in the claim of
petitioner that R.A. No. 7691 should be retroactively applied to this case and the
same be remanded to the MTC. The Court has held that a law vesting additional
jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect. [21]
Third issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals erroneously construed B.P. Blg.
22.
Petitioner insists that: penal statutes must be strictly construed and where
there is any reasonable doubt, it must always be resolved in favor of the
accused;[22] the Court of Appeals, in construing that B.P. Blg. 22 embraces cases
of no funds or closed accounts when the express language of B.P. Blg. 22
penalizes only the issuance of checks that are subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, has enlarged by implication the
meaning of the statute which amounts to judicial legislation;[23] a postdated
check, not being drawn payable on demand, is technically not a special kind of
a bill of exchange, called check, but an ordinary bill of exchange payable at a
fixed date, which is the date indicated on the face of the postdated check, hence,
the instrument is still valid and the obligation covered thereby, but only civilly and
not criminally;[24] the trial court also erroneously cited a portion in the case
of Lozano vs. Martinez[25] that the language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad enough to
cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued
in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous
exchange for something of value, since the same is mere obiter dictum;[26] in the
interpretation of the meaning of a check, where the law is clear and
unambiguous, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.[27]
The Solicitor General counters that a postdated check is still a check and
its being a postdated instrument does not necessarily make it a bill of exchange
payable at a fixed or determinable future time since it is still paid on demand on
the date indicated therein or thereafter just like an ordinary check. [28] It also
points out that the doctrine laid down in Lozano vs. Martinez was reiterated
in People vs. Nitafan,[29] hence, it can no longer be argued that the statement in
the case of Lozano regarding the scope of checks is mere obiter dictum.
Again, we agree with the Solicitor General and find petitioners claim to be
without merit.
The rationale behind B.P. Blg. 22 was initially explained by the Court in the
landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez[30] where we held that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation
for payment The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions,
the making or worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The
law punished the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.[31]
...
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system
and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. [32]
The same is reiterated in Cueme vs. People[33] where we pronounced that:
. . . B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of worthless
checks in the mainstream of daily business and to avert not only the
undermining of the banking system of the country but also the infliction of
damage and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate
issuances of such checks. By its very nature, the offenses defined under B.P.
Blg. 22 are against public interest.[34]
In Recuerdo vs. People, this Court also held that the terms and conditions
surrounding the issuance of the checks are irrelevant since its primordial
intention is to ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being
virtual substitutes for currency.[35]
Petitioners claim that cases of closed accounts are not included in the
coverage of B.P. Blg. 22 has no merit considering the clear intent of the law,
which is to discourage the issuance of worthless checks due to its harmful effect
to the public. This Court, in Lozano vs. Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the
language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether
present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of
value.[36]
In People vs. Nitafan,[37] the Supreme Court reiterated this point and held
that:
B.P. Blg. 22 does not distinguish but merely provides that [a]ny person who
makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check is
subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
But even if We retrace the enactment of the Bouncing Check Law to determine
the parameters of the concept of check, we can easily glean that the members
of the then Batasang Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include
all checks drawn against banks.[38]
In this light, it is easy to see that the claim of petitioner that B.P. Blg. 22
does not include postdated checks and cases of closed accounts has no leg to
stand on. The term closed accounts is within the meaning of the phrase does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.
Anent the second issue: whether or not notice of dishonor is dispensable in
the case at bar. Petitioner failed to show any cogent reason for us to disturb the
findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law seeks to prevent the act of making
and issuing checks with the knowledge that at the time of issue, the drawer does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment and the checks
were subsequently dishonored upon presentment.[39] To be convicted
thereunder, the following elements must be proved:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[40]
For liability to attach under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution
establishes that checks were issued and that the same were subsequently
dishonored. The prosecution must also prove that the issuer, at the time of the
checks issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or credit in
the bank of payment thereof upon its presentment.[41]
Since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the
holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in
full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the
issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt
thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its
payment.[42] The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section
cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to
the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received
by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-
day period.[43]
In this case, it is not disputed that checks were issued by petitioner and said
checks were subsequently dishonored. The question however is, was petitioner
furnished a notice of dishonor? If not, is it sufficient justification to exonerate
petitioner from her criminal and civil liabilities for issuing the bouncing checks?
The trial court ruled that the second element is present because:
the accused knew at the time of issuance of the checks that she did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with her drawee bank for the payment of the checks
in full upon their presentment [as] admitted by her in the Counter-Affidavit she
executed during the preliminary investigation of these criminal cases (itals.
ours), to wit:
4. That the time of the issuance of the said checks, due notice and information
had been so given to Solid Gold anent the actual status of the checks that the
same might not be able to cover the amount of the said checks so stated
therein (Exhibit N, 1, underscoring supplied).
This fact became evident again during the cross-examination by the accuseds
counsel of the prosecutions witness, Joaquin Novales III:
 ATTY. TAGANAS:
Q: And the reason you agreed to the terms and conditions for the
issuance of post-dated checks because you are also aware the
particular time the accused Mrs. Elvira Yu Oh did not also have
enough funds or money in the bank within which to cover the
amount of the checks?
A: I am not aware, sir.
...
Q: To your knowledge when the accused had already admitted to you
that she had not enough money to pay you?
A: That is the terms and promise and agreed upon, sir.
Q: But inspite of the fact that she already told you about that, that you
never suspected that she did not have enough money to cover
the checks agreed upon and issued to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And inspite of the fact she told you you never suspected that she
did not have enough money to cover you . . .
Q: You still believe that although she does not have enough money
she still issued checks to you?
A: Yes, sir. (TSN, April 6, 1993, pp. 24-26)
At any rate, there is already prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds on the part of the accused from her failure to pay the amount due on
the checks or to make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank
within five banking days after she received notice of their dishonor, each of the
checks having been presented within ninety days from their respective dated
(B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 2). The defense did not controvert this evidence. (itals.
ours)[44]
Although the trial court in its decision, mentioned that herein petitioner
received notices of dishonor, nowhere in the records is there proof that the
prosecution ever presented evidence that petitioner received or was furnished a
notice of dishonor. The notices of dishonor that were presented in court and
marked as Exhibits D-2, E-2, F-2, G-2, H-2, I-2, J-2, K-2, L-2, C-2[45] were all sent
to the private complainant, Solid Gold, and not to petitioner. In convicting
petitioner, the trial court, gave probative weight on the admission of petitioner in
her Counter-Affidavit which she submitted during the preliminary investigation
that at the time of issuance of the subject checks, she was aware and even told
private complainant that the checks might not be able to cover the amount stated
therein.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC, to wit:
. . . Neither can We agree that accused-appellant was still entitled to notice of
dishonor of the bouncing checks as she had no more checking account with
the drawee bank at the time of the dishonor of the ten checks in
question. Accused-appellant must have realized that by closing her checking
account after issuing the ten postdated checks, all of said checks would
bounce. Knowing that she had already closed her checking account with the
drawee bank, certainly accused-appellant would not have expected, even in
her wildest imagination, that her postdated checks would be honored by the
drawee bank. Thus, accused-appellant need not be notified anymore of the
obvious dishonor of her rubber checks. (itals. ours)[46]
Based on the law and existing jurisprudence, we find that the appellate court
erred in convicting petitioner.
In cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that the prosecution
prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. Since service of notice
is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact
of service. Basic also is the doctrine that in criminal cases, the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for cases of B.P. Blg. 22
there should be clear proof of notice.[47]
Indeed, this requirement cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides
for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing
on the check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of
said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal
prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of
dishonor be actually served on petitioner. In the case at bar, appellant has a right
to demand and the basic postulate of fairness requires that the notice of dishonor
be actually sent to and received by her to afford her to opportunity to aver
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.[48]
The Solicitor General contends that notice of dishonor is dispensable in this
case considering that the cause of the dishonor of the checks was Account
Closed and therefore, petitioner already knew that the checks will bounce
anyway. This argument has no merit. The Court has decided numerous cases
where checks were dishonored for the reason, Account Closed [49] and we have
explicitly held in said cases that it is essential for the maker or drawer to be
notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make
arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law[50] and
omission or neglect on the part of the prosecution to prove that the accused
received such notice of dishonor is fatal to its cause.[51]
A perusal of the testimony of the prosecution witness Joaquin Novales III,
General Manager of complainant Solid Gold, discloses that no personal
demands were made on appellant before the filing of the complaints against
her.[52] Thus, absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor
of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment
as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict her of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner
was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.[53]
Moreover, as understood by the trial court itself in the herein aforequoted
portion of its decision, General Manager Novales knew of the non-availability of
sufficient funds when appellant issued the subject checks to him. This Court has
held that there is no violation of B.P. 22 if complainant was told by the drawer
that he has no sufficient funds in the bank.[54]
 For these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial courts conviction of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is without
prejudice, however, to her civil liability towards private complainant Solid Gold in
the amount of P500,000.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
from date of finality of herein judgment.[55]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh is
ACQUITTED of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on ten counts for
insufficiency of evidence. However, she is ordered to pay complainant Solid
Gold International Traders, Inc. the total amount of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) with 12% interest per annum from date of finality of herein
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, G.R. No. 149995
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 28, 2007
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21879 dated September 17, 2001,[1] affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-
5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and
issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the
check described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de
Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face amount of such check when
presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee
the face amount of said check or make arrangement for full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.[2]
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-
apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. [3] On June 27,
1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside [4] after petitioner posted
the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.[5]
Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September
1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount
of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a
postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. [6] However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for
insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to
make good the said dishonored check.[7]
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an
investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the
subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a
loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987.[8] He
claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor
allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with
the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued
sometime in February 1988,[9] complainant knew that the same was not
funded.[10]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23,
1997 a Decision[11] finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M.
Palana guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of
Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum
of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until
full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial courts decision in toto.[12]
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was
issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners investment
theory. In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial
court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General
Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does
not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS
ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE
THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED
TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP
WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS
REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED
WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.[14]
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691
is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action[15] and
not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the
governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129[16] which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal
or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than
30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment[17] at the discretion of the
court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. [18] The
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action
because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more
than P4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the
Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has
already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction
to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless
the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691
contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to
criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its
effectivity.[20] The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the
commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not be
ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior
courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature. [21]
After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized
under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution.
Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant
but he did not comply with it.[22]
In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim
that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected
petitioners investment theory. The issue as to whether the amount of the subject
check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to
petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question
involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the
appellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the
advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial,
which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the
present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a loan
and not an investment.[23]
Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it
is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who
makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility,
to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Since
it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in
various amounts,[24] petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued
for value.[25]
The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential
suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely
intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation
is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only
inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent
becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and
absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not
intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the
same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which
the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine
the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which
checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes
in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking
communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as
to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions,
hence, no such distinction can be made by means of
interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that
petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those
checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]
The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check
is likewise immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, is the first delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or
about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the Checking
Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and
proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights. [29] In a
prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check
is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at the
time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it
cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised
by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he
does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet,
he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to
prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant
knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan
hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when presented for
payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as
clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine
may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed
to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of
imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.[31]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO
M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount
of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent
interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the
amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%)
interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment,
petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.