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PART X
Article X: Local Government
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, GR 152774 (May 27, 2004)

FACTS:
1. In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the
capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.
2. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003
which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to
identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG
for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.
3. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount
of P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for
the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the
principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted
to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer
has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed
but has no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just
share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of
further action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the
current fiscal year is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither
can it exercise control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these
amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
Read:
1. 1991 Local Government Code on Recall, Requisites, Grounds and Procedures and other Important Aspects
CHAPTER 5. - RECALL
SEC. 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to
which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
SEC. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. - (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local
government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities;
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(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;
(3) Legislative District level. - In cases where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal
officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective
barangay officials in the district; and
(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding
against any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated
through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for
the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a
representative of the petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the
province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the
local government unit concerned. The Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the
petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days,
for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters.
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of
candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled.
SEC. 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Commission
or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing
of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial
officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
SEC. 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the
person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
SEC. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in
progress.
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election.
SEC. 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. - All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the Comelec. For this purpose, there shall
be included in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the Comelec for the conduct of recall elections.

REQUISITES
SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A barangay maybe created out of a contiguous territory which has apopulation of at least two thousand (2,000)
inhabitants ascertified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan
political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000)
inhabitants: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be created in such communities
by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural
boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his
territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for
appropriate action. In the case of municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political
subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of
at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices;
a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory
of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce
the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) h The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special
funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
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(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units
at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall
not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring
income.
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P=20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units
at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income.

GROUNDS
CHAPTER 4. - DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
SEC. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.

PROCEDURES
SEC. 50. Internal Rules of Procedure. - (a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety (90) days thereafter,
the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure.
(b) The rules of procedure shall provide for the following:
(1) The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well as the creation of standing committees which shall include,
but shall not be limited to, the committees on appropriations, women and family, human rights, youth and sports development,
environmental protection, and cooperatives; the general jurisdiction of each committee; and the election of the chairman and
members of each committee;
(2) The order and calendar of business for each session;
(3) The legislative process;
(4) The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during sessions;
(5) The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for which
they may be censured, reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more than sixty (60) days, or expelled:
Provided, That the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the
sanggunian members: Provided, further, That a member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at least one (1) year for
any crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled from the sanggunian; and
(6) Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt.

SEC. 83. Grievance Procedure. - In every local government unit, the local chief executive sahll establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve
or settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees.
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SEC. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. - (a) Not less than one thousand (1,000) registered voters in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the adoption,
enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents,
through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
sanggunian concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from Roman numeral I. The Comelec or its designated representative shall extend
assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two (2) or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in
case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the election registrar, or his designated representatives, in the presence of a representative of the
proponent, and a representative of the sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local government unit, as the case may be.
Stations for collecting signatures may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Comelec, through its office in the local government unit concerned, shall certify as to
whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number defeats the
proposition.
(h) If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall
be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the
date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in
case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the
results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec.
(e) Procedure of sale - At the time and place fixed in the notice, the officer conducting the sale shall sell the goods or effects so distrained
at public auction to the highest bidder for cash. Within five (5) days after the sale, the local treasurer shall make a report of the
proceedings in writing to the local chief executive concerned. Should the property distrained be not disposed of within one
hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of distraint, the same shall be considered as sold to the local government unit
concerned for the amount of the assessment made thereon by the Committee on Appraisal and to the extent of the same amount,
the tax delinquencies shall be cancelled. Said Committee on Appraisal shall be composed of the city or municipal treasurer as
chairman, with a representative of the Commission on Audit and the city or municipal assessor as members.
SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall
be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice
who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
SEC. 334. Barangay Financial Procedures. - (a) The barangay treasurer shall collect all taxes, fees, and other charges due and contributions accruing
to the barangay for which he shall issue official receipts, and shall deposit all collections with the city or municipal treasury or in the
depository account maintained in the name of the barangay within five (5) days after receipt thereof. He may collect real property taxes
and such other taxes as may be imposed by a province, city or municipality that are due in his barangay only after being deputized by the
local treasurer concerned for the purpose.
(b) The barangay treasurer may be authorized by the sangguniang barangay to make direct purchases amounting to not more than One
thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) at any time for the ordinary and essential needs of the barangay. The petty cash that the barangay
treasurer may be authorized to hold for the purpose shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the funds available and to the
credit of the barangay treasury.
(c) The financial records of the barangay shall be kept in the office of the city or municipal accountant in simplified manner as prescribed
by the Commission on Audit. Representatives of the Commission on Audit shall audit such accounts annually or as often as may
be necessary and make a report of the audit to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be. The
Commission on Audit shall prescribe and put into effect simplified procedures for barangay finances within six (6) months
following the effectivity of this Code.
SEC. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. - (a) Who may initiate proceeding - Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who has
a cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the
lupon chairman of the barangay.
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman - Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within the next working day summon the
respondent(s), with notice to the complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a mediation of their
conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he
shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses - While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods
for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
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(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for disqualification - The pangkat shall convene not later than three (3) days from its
constitution, on the day and hour set by the lupon chairman, to hear both parties and their witnesses, simplify issues, and explore
all possibilities for amicable settlement. For this purpose, the pangkat may issue summons for the personal appearance of parties
and witnesses before it. In the event that a party moves to disqualify any member of the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias,
interest, or any other similar Procedure discovered after the constitution of the pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the
affirmative vote of the majority of the pangkat whose decision shall be final. Should disqualification be decided upon, the resulting
vacancy shall be filled as herein provided for.
(e) Period to arrive at a settlement - The pangkat shall arrive at a settlement or resolution of the dispute within fifteen (15) days from the
day it convenes in accordance with this section. This period shall, at the discretion of the pangkat, be extendible for another period which
shall not exceed fifteen (15) days, except in clearly meritorious cases.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 249

MALACAÑANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 249
PROVIDING FOR A NEW INCOME CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, THE LAST RECLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES TOOK EFFECT ON JULY 1, 1982, AND AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
EXISTING LAW, THE NEXT GENERAL RECLASSIFICATION SHALL BE EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1986;
WHEREAS, A REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CLASSIFICATION SCHEME REVEALED THAT AROUND EIGHTY PER CENT (80%) OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES WILL FALL UNDER THE SAME CLASS, THEREBY NULLIFYING THE VERY OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF CATEGORIZING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS;
WHEREAS, THE INCOME CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES SERVES, AMONG OTHER PURPOSES, AS BASIS FOR FIXING THE
MAXIMUM TAX CEILINGS IMPOSABLE BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, FOR DETERMINING ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY AIDS,
FINANCIAL GRANTS AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SALARY LAWS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES ON ALLOWANCES AND EMOLUMENTS THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL MAY BE
ENTITLED TO;
WHEREAS, THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO PRESCRIBE A MORE REALISTIC CLASSIFICATION SCHEME THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY SERVE THE AIMS AND
PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING INCOME CATEGORIES FOR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, DO HEREBY ORDER:
SECTION 1. CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES AND CITIES. – PROVINCES AND CITIES, EXCEPT MANILA AND QUEZON CITY WHICH SHALL REMAIN AS
SPECIAL CLASS CITIES, ARE HEREBY DIVIDED INTO SIX (6) MAIN CLASSES ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME THAT THEY
ACTUALLY REALIZED DURING THE LAST FOUR CALENDAR YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE GENERAL CLASSIFICATION, AS FOLLOWS:
(A) FIRST CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF THIRTY MILLION PESOS OR MORE;
(B) SECOND CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF TWENTY MILLION PESOS OR
MORE BUT LESS THAN THIRTY MILLION PESOS.
(C) THIRD CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS OR MORE
BUT LESS THAN TWENTY MILLION PESOS;
(D) FOURTH CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF TEN MILLION PESOS OR MORE
BUT LESS THAN FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS;
(E) FIFTH CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF FIVE MILLION PESOS OR MORE
BUT LESS THAN TEN MILLION PESOS; AND
(F) SIXTH CLASS – THE PROVINCES AND CITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF LESS THAN FIVE MILLION PESOS.
SECTION 2. CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPALITIES. – MUNICIPALITIES ARE DIVIDED INTO SIX (6) MAIN CLASSES ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE ANNUAL
INCOME THAT THEY ACTUALLY REALIZED DURING THE LAST FOUR CALENDAR YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE GENERAL
CLASSIFICATION, AS FOLLOWS:
(A) FIRST CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS OR MORE;
(B) SECOND CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF TEN MILLION PESOS OR MORE BUT LESS
THAN FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS;
(C) THIRD CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF FIVE MILLION PESOS OR MORE BUT LESS
THAN TEN MILLION PESOS;
(D) FOURTH CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF THREE MILLION PESOS OR MORE BUT LESS
THAN FIVE MILLION PESOS;
(E) FIFTH CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF ONE MILLION PESOS OR MORE BUT LESS
THAN THREE MILLION PESOS;
(F) SIXTH CLASS – MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE OBTAINED AN AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF LESS THAN ONE MILLION PESOS.
SECTION 3. PERIODS OF GENERAL RECLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES. – UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS EXECUTIVE
ORDER AND FOR EACH PERIOD OF FOUR CONSECUTIVE CALENDAR YEARS THEREAFTER, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE SHALL RECLASSIFY
ALL PROVINCES, CITIES, EXCEPT MANILA AND QUEZON CITY WHICH SHALL REMAIN AS SPECIAL CLASS CITIES, AND MUNICIPALITIES, ON THE
BASIS OF THE FOREGOING SCHEDULES OF THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME OF EACH PROVINCE, CITY OR MUNICIPALITY DERIVED DURING
THE LAST FOUR CONSECUTIVE CALENDAR YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SUCH RECLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO THE PROVISIONS
HEREOF; PROVIDED, THAT THE FIRST CLASSIFICATION UNDER THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER SHALL TAKE EFFECT ON JULY FIRST, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVEN: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT A PROVINCE OR CITY OR MUNICIPALITY WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR A
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PERIOD OF LESS THAN FOUR FULL CALENDAR YEARS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE CLASSIFICATION HEREIN PROVIDED SHALL BE
CLASSIFIED ON THE BASIS OF ITS AVERAGE INCOME DURING SUCH LESSER NUMBER OF FULL CALENDAR YEARS OR YEAR IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING ITS ORGANIZATION AS SUCH PROVINCE OR CITY OR MUNICIPALITY; AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT NO READJUSTMENT OF
CLASSIFICATION SHALL BE MADE OFTENER THAN ONCE IN FOUR CONSECUTIVE CALENDAR YEARS AFTER THE FIRST GENERAL
RECLASSIFICATION PROVIDED FOR HEREIN, EXCEPT IN CASES OF DIMINISHING REVENUES WHEN THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE MAY ORDER
AT ANY TIME THE READJUSTMENT OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY PROVINCE OF CITY OR MUNICIPALITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INCOME RANGES HEREIN PRESCRIBED.
SECTION 4. DEFINITION OF TERMS. – AS USED IN THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER:
A. THE TERM “ANNUAL INCOME” SHALL REFER TO REVENUES AND RECEIPTS REALIZED BY PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES FROM
REGULAR SOURCES OF THE LOCAL GENERAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS INCLUDING THE INTERNAL REVENUE AND SPECIFIC
TAX ALLOTMENTS PROVIDED FOR IN PDS 144 AND 436, BOTH AS AMENDED, BUT EXCLUSIVE OF NON-RECURRING RECEIPTS,
SUCH AS OTHER NATIONAL AIDS, GRANTS, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, LOAN PROCEEDS, SALES OF FIXED ASSETS, AND SIMILAR
OTHERS.
B. THE TERM “AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME” SHALL REFER TO THE SUM OF THE “ANNUAL INCOME” AS HEREIN DEFINED ACTUALLY OBTAINED
BY A PROVINCE, CITY OR MUNICIPALITY DURING THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF CONSECUTIVE CALENDAR YEARS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE GENERAL RECLASSIFICATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, DIVIDED BY SUCH NUMBER OF CALENDAR YEARS, AS
MAY BE CERTIFIED TO BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT FOR PURPOSES OF SUCH RECLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND
MUNICIPALITIES.
SECTION 5. USES OF INCOME CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES. – THE INCOME CLASSIFICATION OF PROVINCES, CITIES
AND MUNICIPALITIES SHALL, AMONG OTHER PURPOSES, SERVE AS BASIS FOR:
A. THE FIXING OF THE MAXIMUM TAX CEILINGS IMPOSABLE BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;
B. THE DETERMINATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND STATUTORY AIDS, FINANCIAL GRANTS, AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS;
C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SALARY SCALES AND RATES OF ALLOWANCES, PER DIEMS, AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS THAT LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL MAY BE ENTITLED TO;
D. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONNEL POLICIES ON PROMOTIONS, TRANSFERS, DETAILS OR SECONDMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS AT
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS;
E. THE FORMULATION AND EXECUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET POLICIES; AND
F. THE DETERMINATION OF THE FINANCIAL CAPABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO UNDERTAKE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS AND
PRIORITY PROJECTS.
SECTION 6. MAXIMUM AMOUNT EXPENDABLE FOR SALARIES AND WAGES. – THE TOTAL ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR SALARIES AND WAGES OF
PROVINCIAL, CITY AND MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES FOR ONE CALENDAR YEAR SHALL NOT EXCEED FORTY-FIVE PER CENT (45%),
IN THE CASE OF ALL FIRST AND SECOND CLASS PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND FIFTY-FIVE PER CENT (55%), IN THE CASE OF
THOSE LOWER THAN SECOND CLASS, OF THE TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME ACTUALLY REALIZED FROM REGULAR SOURCES DURING THE NEXT
PRECEDING CALENDAR YEAR OR THE CURRENT CALENDAR YEAR ESTIMATES FROM THE SAME SOURCES CERTIFIED AS COLLECTIBLE BY THE
PROVINCIAL OR CITY TREASURER CONCERNED, WHICHEVER IS LOWER, THE APPROPRIATIONS FOR SALARIES AND WAGES OF OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL SERVICES, PUBLIC UTILITIES, MARKETS AND
SLAUGHTERHOUSES AND OTHER ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES OWNED, OPERATED AND MAINTAINED BY THE PROVINCE, CITY OR
MUNICIPALITY, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATION AND EMERGENCY COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCES, SHALL NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE
COMPUTATION OF THE MAXIMUM EXPANDABLE FOR SALARIES AND WAGES.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, HOWEVER, MAY RECOMMEND TO PROPER AUTHORITY THE SETTING ASIDE OF APPROPRIATIONS
IN EXCESS OF THE PERCENTAGES HEREINABOVE FIXED SUBJECT TO SUCH CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BUT IN CASE SHALL THE EXCEED
IN APPROPRIATIONS FOR SALARIES AND WAGES BE MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE PER CENT (25%) OF THE MAXIMUM EXPENDABLE AMOUNTS
NOR SHALL SUCH EXEMPTION BE GRANTED IN CASE OF OVERDRAFT OR IMMINENCE THEREOF.
SECTION 7. SPECIAL PROVISIONS. – PROVINCES, CITIES OR MUNICIPALITIES WHOSE INCOME CLASSIFICATION SHALL HAVE BEEN RAISED OR REDUCED
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER SHALL ACCORDINGLY REVISE AND ADJUST THEIR EXISTING POSITION
CLASSIFICATION AND PAY PLANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF PREVAILING CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE JOINT
COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION CREATED UNDER PD 1136; PROVIDED, THAT NO OFFICIAL OR
EMPLOYEE IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHALL SUFFER ANY DIMINUTION OF THE BASIC SALARY RATE THAT HE IS ACTUALLY RECEIVING
AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE PREPARATION AND AUTHORIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET FOR CY 1988, THE REGULAR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR SALARIES AND WAGES IN THE GENERAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS SHALL BE
COMMENSURATE ONLY TO THE SALARY SCALES AND RATES OF ALLOWANCES, PER DIEMS AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL CORRESPONDING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NEW CLASSIFICATIONS. HOWEVER, ADDITIONAL
APPROPRIATIONS SHALL BE SET ASIDE TO COVER IN FULL ANY DEFICIENCY THAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE PAYMENT OF BASIC
SALARIES AT THE RATES ACTUALLY BEING RECEIVED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER.
NEWLY-APPOINTED OR PROMOTED PERSONNEL SHALL RECEIVE SALARIES AT RATES AUTHORIZED FOR NEW CLASSIFICATION OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT.
FOR PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE SPECIAL PROVISIONS THE JOINT COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
ADMINISTRATION SHALL, WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER, ISSUE APPROPRIATE GUIDELINES
AND PROCEDURES FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
 7

SECTION 8. MAXIMUM RATES OF LOCAL TAXES. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY CHANGE IN INCOME CLASSIFICATION BY VIRTUE OF THIS EXECUTIVE
ORDER, ANY PROVINCE, CITY OR MUNICIPALITY MAY MAINTAIN OR ADJUST ACCORDINGLY THE EXISTING RATES OF LOCAL TAXES:
PROVIDED, THAT ANY LOCAL TAX ORDINANCE ENACTED FOR THE PURPOSE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE WHO, WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE ORDINANCE, SHALL DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS
THEREOF AND ITS EFFECT ON THE FINANCES OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
SECTION 9. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE. – THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW
THE INCOME RANGES HEREIN PROVIDED AT LEAST ONCE EVERY FOUR YEARS AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER
AND RECOMMEND SUCH APPROPRIATE CHANGES OR REVISIONS TO THE PROPER AUTHORITY IN ORDER THAT THE INCOME CLASSIFICATION
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS MAY CONTINUE TO CONFORM WITH PREVAILING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE OVERALL FINANCIAL
STATUS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
SECTION 10. IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. – FOR PURPOSES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE SHALL ISSUE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENT ORDERS FIXING
THE NEW CLASSIFICATIONS OF PROVINCES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES.
b – PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 465, DATED MAY 20, 1974 IS HEREBY REPEALED, ALL LAWS, ORDERS, ISSUANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS OR PARTS
THEREOF INCONSISTENT WITH THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER ARE HEREBY REPEALED OR MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY.
SECTION 12. EFFECTIVITY. – THIS EXECUTIVE ORDER SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.
DONE IN THE CITY OF MANILA, THIS 25th DAY OF JULY, IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVEN.

Citizenship and Residence Requirement for Local Government Positions

8
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Rommel Arnado vs Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 210164 (August 18, 2015)
Election Law – Republic Act No. 9225 – Qualifications of Local Elective Candidates – Citizenship Requirements – Dual Allegiance
FACTS:
1. Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American citizen.
2. On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.
3. On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship.
4. On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
 10

5. A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the ground that Arnado used his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such act of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and that is a
ground for disqualification under the Local Government Code. In short, it was argued that Arnado remained a US citizen.
6. In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he complied with the requirements of Republic Act No.
9225 which provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for elective public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the elective office
they desire, and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships – which must be done before the filing of
the COC.
7. Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not know yet that he had been issued
already a Philippine passport; that when he received said Philippine passport, he used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on November
30, 2009, again executed an Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a notary public.
8. Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and in March 2010.
9. Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared another rival candidate as the
rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).
10. Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No. 195649. While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 elections as he
even acquired 84% of the votes cast for mayor in Kauswagan.
11. Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections and his declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was
voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.

HELD: No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements set by law. The fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes
cast in Kauswagan cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory cannot be
used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225.
Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines and renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed
recanted or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.
In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010. As such, he remained a
US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again (for the third time) his US
citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the 2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when he again made a second renunciation of his US
citizenship on November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of Renunciation he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of the original.
Under the Best Evidence Rule (Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the original must be presented unless the same is lost. In this case, the
original was never alleged to have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being used belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never formally offered.
Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”

Labo Jr. vs COMELEC and Lardizabal

G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the losing candidate, filed a petition for quo
warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian citizen.
Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia. These were not denied; petitioner however claimed
that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his naturalization
in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?

HELD: NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All of which
are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does
not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not
point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has
complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
 11

… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning
renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance]
FACTS: Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a
Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual
citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position.

RULING: No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Topacio vs. Paredes

FACTS: The petitioner alleges that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in the course of that election contest in that he declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on June 4, 1912, and the petitioner
prays that the judgment thus rendered and all subsequent proceedings based thereon be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction. A copy of all
the proceedings which are necessary for a clear understanding of the questions presented is attached to the petition and forms a part thereof.
The admitted facts are these: on June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes,
and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office
of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.
There is now no question and never has been about the correctness of the method of casting and counting the votes. The only question in this case
which it necessary for us to determine is whether or not the respondent judge had jurisdiction, under the provisions of section 27 of the Election
Law, as amended by Act No. 2170, to declare that no one was legally elected president of Imus on June 4, 1912.

ISSUE: have the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction, under the above provisions of law, to determine the eligibility of candidates for office?

HELD: Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different
from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office.1awphil.net In the former case the court, after an examination of the
ballots may find that some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurarity by the board of canvassers actually received the
greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find
that the manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurarity
of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is
before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense
of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In
the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.
Applying the familiar principle of ejusdem generis, we hold that jurisdiction under this section is limited to those matters which may be
decided by an inspection of the registry list and of the ballots and their res gestae. (Sutherland, Sta. Const., par. 268 at seq; Sedgwick, id., 360; 36
Cyc., 1119.)
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those
proceedings that no one was elect municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27
October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo‘s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization, he said, was ―merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator‘s
agents abroad.‖ He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
 12

filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code.

ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

HELD: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo‘s citizenship has already
been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitor‘s stance is
assumed to have been taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC
itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a ―natural-born‖
citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen
of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been
coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. The
anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact
that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s
entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor
of Sorsogon.

Quizon vs COMELEC, 545 SCRA 635

ISSUE: Petitioner Quizon and private respondent Puno were congressional candidates during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections.
On April 17, 2007, Quizon filed a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against Puno, he alleged that Puno
is not qualified to run as candidate in Antipolo City for failure to meet the residency requirement prior to the day of election; and that Punos claim
in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) that he is a resident of 1906 Don Celso Tuazon, Valley Golf Brgy. De la Paz, Antipolo City for four years and six
months before May 14, 2007 constitutes a material misrepresentation since he was in fact a resident of Quezon City.
On April 24, 2007, Quizon filed a Supplement to the petition claiming that Puno cannot validly be a candidate for a congressional seat in
the First District of Antipolo City since he indicated in his COC that he was running in the First District of the Province of Rizal which is a different
legislative district.
Subsequently, concerned residents of the First District of Antipolo City wrote a letter dated April 27, 2007 seeking clarification from the
COMELEC on the legal and political implications of the COC of Puno, who was seeking public office in the First District of the Province of Rizal but
waging his political campaign in the City of Antipolo, which is a separate and distinct legislative district. They prayed that Punos COC be declared as
invalid and that the same be cancelled.

HELD: July 31, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution that puno is qualified to run for he is a resident of the 1 st district of
Antipolo.
As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate of candidacy, it is important to note that this Court has repeatedly held
that provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required
to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory to give effect to the will of
the people. In the instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the
voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.
Moreover, following Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, a subsequent disqualification of Puno will not entitle
petitioner, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. It has long been settled in our jurisprudence,
as early as 1912, that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found to be
ineligible for the office for which he was elected. The second placer is just that, a second placer he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either
the majority or plurality of voters.
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Velasco vs Comelec
575 SCRA 59

Jalosjos vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running
for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC
issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the
2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to
his 10 Id. at 373-393. 11 Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 178. 12 Id. at 215. 13 Id. at 218. Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536 qualifications, as
Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted.
Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

HELD: The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving
eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from
the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any
time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED

Rev. Nardo Cayat v. COMELEC, GR NO. 163776, April 24, 2007

FACTS: For our resolution are two petitions for certiorari filed by Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat is a petition for certiorari of the Resolution dated 12 April
2004 and of the Order dated 9 May 2004 of the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC First Division) a resolution cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of Cayat as mayoralty candidate of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections.The 9 May 2004 Order denied
Cayats motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee.
The motion for execution of judgment filed by Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. (Palileng) and annulled Cayats proclamation was granted. The 25
October 2004 Order also directed (1) the COMELEC Law Department to implement the dispositive portion of the 12 April 2004 Resolution; (2) the
Regional Election Director of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) to create a new Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC);(3) the new MBOC to
convene and prepare a new Certificate of Canvass for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet by deleting Cayats name and to proclaim Palileng as the duly
elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet.Feliseo K. Bayacsan (Bayacsan), duly elected Vice-Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, filed a petition-in-intervention in
G.R. No. 165736.

FACTS: Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Cayat filed his
certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004.On 26 January 2004, Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat before the COMELEC
Regional Election Office in BaguioCity.Docketed as SPA (PES) No. C04-001, Palilengs petition alleged that:
On January 05, 2004, [Cayat] filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor for the Municipality of Buguias, Benguet, Philippines alleging that
he is qualified to run and that he certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
The truth of the matter being that [Cayat] is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final judgment for a criminal offense by
the Municipal Trial Court of BaguioCity, Philippines, Branch 2, for the Crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness. In fact, [Cayat] is still under probation
at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on January 05, 2004
Despite assumption of obligation imposed by this oath that the facts stated in his Certificate of Candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge,
[Cayat] made misrepresentations and committed acts of perjury when he declared that he is eligible for the said office while in truth and in fact,
Respondent was convicted in the above-mentioned Criminal Complaint;

HELD: Despite Cayats non-participation, Atty. Torres proceeded to resolve the issues based on available records.Atty. Torres also submitted the entire
record of the case together with his findings and recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the COMELEC on 24 February 2004.Pertinent portions
of Atty. Torres report read:
It is important to note that based on the petition, [Palileng] seeks to disqualify [Cayat] for material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy. This can be deduced from the fact that the petitioner cited in his petition that the respondent declared that he is eligible for the office he
is seeking to be elected where in fact, [Cayat] is not eligible due to his conviction of a criminal offense. This being [the case,] the petition should have
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been a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy which should have been filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing
certificates of candidacy. Obviously, a petition to deny due course could no longer be filed at the time the petition was received.
However, it is important that the petition alleged the disqualification of the respondent by reason of his conviction of a criminal offense,
which is the main reason why the petitioner filed this case. On this note, the applicable provision of law is now Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code. Said provision of law reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running fro [sic] any elective local position:
(a)Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment
within [two] (2) years after serving sentence;
With this, the issue of disqualification rests on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code and not on the material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy.
The issue now to be resolved is whether or not the crime of Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, to which [Cayat] was convicted by final judgment, is
a crime involving moral turpitude so as to bring the issue within the coverage of Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Law Department is directed to CANCEL the Certificate of Candidacy of REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT as mayoralty candidate
in Buguias, Benguet in connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections on the grounds that he was convicted of moral turpitude which is a ground for
disqualification according to the LGC.
As for the motion for reconsideration filed by Cayat,
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6.Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted.If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.(Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the
elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6.The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation.Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.The Resolution
disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections.Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor
are stray.Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate,
second to none.

Say-ang vs Comelec
Petitioners herein, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and
New Aklan respectively for the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) and Barangay Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate
of candidacy in Barangay Congan on June 6, 2002. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan
on June 8, 2002. On July 19, 2002, a letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec which stated
that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law Department of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) submitted its study to the Comelec en banc on July 9, 2002 recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of candidacy of
petitioners. On the day of the elections or on July 15, 2002, the Comelec, issued En Banc Resolution No. 5393, which essentially denied due course
to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners herein.
Despite the abovementioned Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners on July 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of
votes in their respective barangays. On July 31, 2002, petitioners took their oath of office before Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr., the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Sarangani Province.
On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Alim, invoking and acting pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 5393 and Resolution No. 5584, issued
a directive commanding petitioners to cease and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they were elected. He
also directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers for Barangays Congan and New Aklan to reconvene immediately and proclaim the duly-elected
candidates and to correct the certificates of canvass and proclamation.
Petitioners received the aforementioned directive on August 19, 2002. On August 21, 2002, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
5666 amending its Resolution No. 5584 on the basis of the approved recommendations of Commissioner Sadain.
Issue:THAT THE PROMULGATION OF THE EN BANC RESOLUTION NO. 5393, DATED 15 JULY 2002, BY RESPONDENT HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BEING WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW AND THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING EVEN AS IT DOES TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[3]
At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.[4] Such
jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the
candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or taken his oath of office.[5] Furthermore, a decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after
a period of five days:
Sec. 3. Decisions After Five Days.--- Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to
declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after
the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. [6]
In the present case, the assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners certificates of candidacy was promulgated on June 15, 2002, or
on the very day of the elections. On that day, therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet become final and executory since petitioners still
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had until June 20, 2002 to file their motion for reconsideration. The Barangay Board of Canvassers rightly retained petitioners names in the list of
qualified candidates and could not be faulted from counting the votes cast in favor of the petitioners. Petitioners were, therefore, validly proclaimed
as winners of the elections on June 16, 2002, having garnered the most number of votes. On the day of the elections or on June 15, 2002, petitioners,
for all intents and purposes, were still in the running. The Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted from the list of
qualified candidates only became final and executory on June 20, 2002, or five days from the promulgation thereof.
Petitioners also maintain that they were never served a copy of the assailed Resolution and were never given the chance to present their
evidence. They claim that they only knew about Resolution 5393 on August 19, 2002, when they were served a copy of the directive issued by Acting
Election Officer Alim ordering them to cease and desist from taking their oath of office and from assuming the position to which they are elected. This
allegation was not disproved by respondent Comelec. Instead, it cites Resolution No. 4801, which was published in the Manila Standard and Manila
Bulletin on May 25, 2002, wherein it was stated that the administrative inquiry of the Comelec on the eligibility of candidates starts from the time
they filed their certificates of candidacy. The Comelec maintains, therefore, that by virtue of the said resolution, all candidates are deemed to have
constructive notice of any administrative inquiry against them. Also, it asserts that by virtue of its administrative powers, it may motu proprio deny
or cancel, without any kind of hearing whatsoever, the certificates of candidacy of those who are found not to be registered voters in the place where
they seek to run for public office.
It is clear, however, that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be
heard summarily after due notice
Finally, the Court notes again that petitioners have already been proclaimed as the winners in the elections. They have already taken their
oaths of office and are, at present, serving their constituents in their respective barangays. In Lambonao v. Tero,[11] the Court held that defects in
the certificates of candidacy should have been questioned on or before the election and not after the will of the people has been expressed
through the ballots. It was further held in the said case that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as
directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. The rationale for this principle was explained in Lino Luna v.
Rodriguez,[12] where the Court said that these various and numerous provisions were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs
of the government and not to defeat that object. When voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the
officers tasked under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

Tess Dumpit Michelena vs Boado

Facts: Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the 10 May 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera
("Boado, et al.") sought Dumpit-Michelena’s disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation under Sections 746 and 787 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 ("Omnibus Election Code").
Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La
Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only
transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on 24 October 2003. Her presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was
noticed only after she filed her certificate of candidacy. Boado, et al. presented, among other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay officials of San
Julian West to prove that Dumpit is not a resident of the barangay.
Dumpit countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman
Dumpit, a residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house
Issue: Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Ruling: Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency requirement.
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the qualifications for elective provincial, city, municipal and barangay officials shall
be those provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification is already a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used
synonymously with domicile. In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court declared:
The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile.
Prior to her transfer, Dumpit was a resident and registered voter of Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has
already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter
of San Julian West on 24 October 2003.
Dumpit presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually
built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office. Further, domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements:
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(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. To effect change, there must
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Recall: Requisites under the Local Government Code of 1991

Who may exercise the power of recall? The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit (LGU) to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
What are the legal provisions governing the process of recall? Section 3, Article X of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall enact a
local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum xxx.” This is fleshed out in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended by R.A. 9244.
Why is there a need to wait for 1 year after an election? One of the limitations under the law is that “no recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.”
Can the same elective official be the subject of successive recall elections? Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
Can the local official subject of recall resign? The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall
process is in progress.
How is the recall process initiated? The recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be commenced by a petition of
a registered voter in the LGU concerned and supported by the registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election in which the local
official sought to be recalled was elected. The preparatory recall assembly was already removed as a means of initiating the recall process.
What are the required percentage of registered voters who must sign the petition?
1. At least 25% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of not more than 20,000.
2. At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000, provided that in no case shall the
required petitioners be less than 5,000.
3. At least 15% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than300,000, provided that in no case shall the
required number of petitioners be less than 15,000.
4. At least 10% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of over 300,000, provided that in no case shall the required petitioners be less than
45,000.
What are the required contents of the petition for recall? The recall petition must contain the following:
a. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and their signatures.
b. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to which the petitioners belong.
c. The name of the official sought to be recalled.
d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore.
What is the procedure in the recall process? The procedure in the process of recall:
1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the petitioners before the election registrar or his representative, shall be
filed with the COMELEC through its office in the LGU concerned.
2. The COMELEC shall, within 15 days from the filing of the petition, certify to the sufficiency of the required number of signatures. Failure to
obtain the required number of signatures automatically nullifies the petition.
3. If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall, within 3 days form the issuance of
the certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition, cause its publication a national newspaper of general
circulation and a newspaper of general circulation in the locality, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks at the expense of the petitioners and at
the same time post copies thereof in public and conspicuous places for a period of not less than 10 days nor more than 20 days, for the purpose
of allowing interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the petition and the authenticity of the signatures contained therein.
4. The COMELEC or its duly authorized representatives shall, upon issuance of certification, proceed independently with the verification and
authentication of the signatures of the petitioners and registered voters contained therein. Representatives of the petitioners and the official
sought to be recalled shall be duly notified and shall have the right to participate therein as mere observers. The filing of any challenge or
protest shall be allowed within the period provided in the immediately preceding paragraph and shall be ruled upon with finality within 15 days
from the date of filing of such protest or challenge;
5. Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to
the positive and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled. The officials sought
to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates,
shall be entitled to be voted upon.
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When is the recall effective? The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in
the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.

Garcia vs COMELEC
FACTS: Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of
petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC
because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government
Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send
notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection
of the law.

HELD:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to
initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be
effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why
this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the
direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made
members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given
to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the
province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the
PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be
premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating
against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be
corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its
proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place.
Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due
course by the COMELEC.

Sanchez vs COMELEC
FACTS: The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre- Proclamation Case No. 41, entitled Virgilio Sanchez v. Mayor
Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Fernando, Pampanga, is challenged in these consolidated Petitions for
Certiorari.
In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal
Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while Armando Biliwang was the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan’s (KBL) official candidate for the same position. The
latter was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of said town.
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On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare null and void the local elections in San
Fernando due to alleged large scale terrorism. On the same day, the COMELEC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez moved for
reconsideration. On February 8, 1980, the COMELEC recalled its Resolution and required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
answer. Hearings were conducted thereafter.
On May 15, 1980, the COMELEC issued the challenged Resolution, wherein they annulled the election held on January 30, 1980 of the
local government officials in San Fernando, Pampanga, consequently, the annulment and setting aside of the proclamation of respondent Armando
P. Biliwang and other municipal officials thereat; and they also declared a failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga.

ISSUES:
1. Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism?
2. Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election, considering that there is no failure of elections because the grounds
for calling special elections does not include post-election terrorism?

HELD:
1. Justice Aquino concurs in the result in the Biliwang case. He agrees that the COMELEC is invested with the power to annul an election for
municipal officials on the ground of post-election terrorism. It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to
annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC’s extensive powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with
the function to "enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections." 3 The 1978 Election Code (PD No. 1296) accords it exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest
electio
2. In fine, we uphold the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to annul an election where the will of the voters has been defeated, as well as to
call for a special election where widespread terrorism, whether before or after election, has been proven resulting in a failure to elect, without
need of recourse to the President and the Batasang Pambansa for the enactment of remedial legislation.
It would be to circumscribe the power of the COMELEC to ensure free, orderly and honest elections if we were to hold that the COMELEC
authority to call for the holding of the election is applicable only when the causes therefor occurred before the elections; in other words, that the
grounds for calling special elections do not include post-election terrorism. That interpretation would not only hamper the effectiveness of the
COMELEC in the discharge of its functions but it would also in case of failure to elect due to post-election terrorism, delay the opportunity to the
voters to cast their votes at the earliest possible time. The electorate should not be disenfranchised for long and the COMELEC should not be
prevented from taking the necessary steps to complete the elections. After all, the casting of ballots is not the only act constitutive of elections. An
election is not complete until proclamation has been made.

Residency requirement for local government officials:

1. Registered voter in the constituency in the locality
2. Resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election

Mitra vs COMELEC, July 2, 2010

FACTS: We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents),
dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We annulled in this
Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents petition to cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged
but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of
judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence,
leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the
Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents
evidence failed to sufficiently controvert.Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City
resident.
In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the
following:(1) hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his
preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling
 19

at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the
premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is
no reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.We also
emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to
conclude that Mitras statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the
present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period
required by law.
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our
July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the
findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of finality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court
erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature.It claims that it is elementary that
the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to correcting questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented and substituted its own factual findings over that of
the public respondent.

HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are
the same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and
private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral arguments
proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without
more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering
doubts on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.
REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari
First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that
Mitras petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.They also stress that the
Court should respect and consider the COMELEC's findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.
COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the
factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.This submission appears
to have confused the standards of the Courts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly
misread the import of Mitras petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
Court.Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under
the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the
Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule65 in the filing of a petition forcertiorari, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing)and not to an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action
ofcertiorariunder Rule 65, except as therein provided.In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
POLITICAL LAW: judicial power
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power, pointedly states that
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 20

This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and
differentiates this authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases
under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari
jurisdiction.Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we stress
that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because a
specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not
review in acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence.One such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.In this situation, we are duty bound under
the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of
jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to
appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material representation
to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider
that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning in
the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the
evidence.
ELECTION LAW: residence
The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the
cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying
question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he
transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated
elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer,
while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this point,
we only need to address some of the private respondents misleading points in order to clear the air:
1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is
his residence, is misplaced.This argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only up
to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice.What is important
is that it is renewable at the option of the parties.In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and is
deemed renewed.
2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for
Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009
allegedly showing Mitras signature.To recall, we found thatbased on the records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the
signature of Mitra.Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined therecently submittedcolored copy
of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the alleged signature appears to us to be a merehazy superimposition that
does not bear any resemblance at all to Mitras signature.We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little
evidentiary value.It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters
participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that
its office does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.This late submission was made to
show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.The Certification pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in
Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of
Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons.First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was not an
evidence before us when the case was submitted for resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove
anything; it is, on its face, contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in
Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of
gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan. Under what law or regulation the
certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
 21

At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.Not only was Mitra
able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr.
Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.
ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC
The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in
his COC.We likewise see no merit in this claim.One important point in the present case is that the private respondents failed to prove that there
was deliberate material misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed
in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the private respondents case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he
had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras
favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitras evidence
of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the
situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about
his residence.
The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it
focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence.For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary
error of judgment.By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed
the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this case, it doubly
erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required
by Section 74 of the OEC.
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue
thatgiven his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small
room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs use of subjective non-legal standards.
Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically,
hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a
house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house.These incremental moves do not
offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs highly subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have not presented a
convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on
this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC
regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not shown, through their respective motions, sufficient reasons to
compel us to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.
ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports our conclusion that the private respondents evidence
failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved
by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this
proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the Certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa
City is misplaced. The ponencia cannot give full evidentiary weight to the aforementioned Certification.
To be sure, a bare certification in a disputed situation cannot suffice to conclusively establish the existence of what the certification
alleged. The purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been
adopted and used by Mitra as his own. In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3,
2009, if at all, carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive declaration that she was the one who procured it,
while Mitras Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained the circumstances under which she secured
the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not controvert Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which
adequately proved that Mitras transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early
2008 and concluded in March 2009.
ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead
it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC
Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could
not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative
 22

testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited
above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that
started in early 2008.It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the
evidence clearly pointed to fact that Mitra effectively transferred his residence to Aborlan.
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law,
we cited Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized the term residence as referring to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi).
ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan
Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is significant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of
the issue to the present case.As we emphasized in our Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter
into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under
construction) and whether he indeed resided there.The notarys compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect
not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuineness and due execution.
The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration (dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that
he had already transferred to the newly constructed house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible from month
to month - is misleading.The significance of Mitras statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had already transferred to his newly
constructed house in Aborlan must not be read in isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan
his permanent residence through an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the
primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however, that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had
been squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.
Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral
arguments now before us.Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

Jalosjos vs COMELEC, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008,
at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced
his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was
opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was
then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample
proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING: The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least
one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person
must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
 23

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile
or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years.
Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate
of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly
proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and
his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house.
But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house
in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or
in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover,
Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from
exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented
is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the
people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

League of Provinces vs Angelo Reyes, April 13, 2013

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional
Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over
provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and
cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control
and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not
merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by
respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the
provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-
Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with
other concerned local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X,
Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
 24

provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that
ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.
(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due
course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the
validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function,
which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-
judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations
over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of
AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

Mondano vs Silvosa
FACTS: The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified mayor of
Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa issued an
Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING: Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by
him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the President exercises only general
supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the
1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec
79 (c) of the RAC, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.
Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local governments.

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
 25

Basco vs PAGCOR
FACTS: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law. It waived the Manila Cit government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the law has
intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle
of local autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

HELD:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”
The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the National
Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and
to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869.
Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.”
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations”
which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does
not make local governments sovereign within the state.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Philippine Petroleum Corp vs Municipality of Pililla, 198 SCRA 82

FACTS: Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil base stocks which is a petroleum
product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pilillia Rizal, conducting its business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of municipality of
Pilillia, Rizal and is in continuous operation up to the present. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49 storage tanks for its petroleum
products in Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. Under section 142 of NIRC of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. Respondent
municipality of Pilillia, Rizal through municipal council resolution no. 25-s-1974 enacted municipal tax ordinance no. 1-s-1974 otherwise known as
“The Pililla Tax Code Of 1974” on June 14, 1974 which took effect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on
business, except for those which fixed taxes are provided in the local tax code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distiller, rectifiers, repackers and compounders of liquors distilled spirits and/or wines in
accordance with the schedule found in the local tax code, as well as mayor’s permit sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for flammable,
combustible or explosive substances, while section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes, fees or
charges. Enforcing the provisions of the above mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint on April 4, 1986 docketed as civil case no.
057-T against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor’s permit fee and sanitary
permit inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last named fees starting 1985.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality may validly impose taxes on petitioner’s business.

HELD: No. While section 2 of PD 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend sections 19 and 19
(a) of PD 231 as amended by PD 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers
of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on
business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it should have been expressly stated in PD No. 436.
 26

The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the
prohibition set forth in PC no. 26-73 would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under section 5,
article X of the 1987 constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by congress can define and limit such power of local
governments.
The storage permit fee being imposed by Pilillia’s tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable,
combustible or explosive substances. In as much as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the Municipality of Pilillia but by petitioner PPC,
same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in section 37 of the same code.

William Lines vs City of Ozamis, 56 SCRA 590

FACTS: In this petition for declaratory relief to annul an ordinance of respondent City of Ozamis, 1 the assertion was made that the imposition of a
gross sales tax of one and one-half percent (1-½%) on the gross freight and fares of the cargo and passengers shipped or transported from Ozamis
City collectible on owners, operators or agents of shipping companies with shipping offices or shipping agencies therein is tainted by legal and
constitutional infirmity. The lower court decided adversely against petitioners, upholding its validity. Hence this appeal by certiorari with such a
plea being reiterated with an even greater insistence. It is unavailing. There is, in the present Constitution, support for such an ordinance and
renders futile any attempt at its nullification. We sustain the order of dismissal by the lower court.
On March 18, 1971, the Municipal Board of the City of Ozamis approved Ordinance No. 604, Series of 1971, its questioned provision,
Section 2 provides for the following:
"There is also hereby imposed upon owners, operators or agents of shipping companies with shipping offices or shipping agencies established in
the City of Ozamis and transacting business in the city, a gross sales tax of 1-½ per centum of the gross freight and fares of the cargo and
passengers shipped or transported out from Ozamis City by any of their vessels, ships or boats plying between Ozamis City and other ports, payable
quarterly to the City Treasurer of Ozamis; [Provided], that 50% of the proceeds of the tax collections hereof shall be specifically allocated as City's
aid for the barrio high schools in the City of Ozamis."

ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned provision imposing gross sales tax is unconstitutional, null and void.

HELD: To so argue that imposition of gross taxes by JGU’s are unconstitutional is to lose sign of what is ordained in the present Constitution. There
is this declaration of principle: "The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Even more explicit is this provision on the article on local government: "Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." In the Local Tax Code, in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy on local governments even as to the
power to tax, the absence of any restriction to its conceded competence to impose a revenue measure of this character is quite manifest. It would
appear therefore that the Constitution, far from lending support to petitioners, precisely favors the stand of the respondent City of Ozamis.

Estanislao vs Hon. Costales, May 8, 1991

FACTS: The Sanggunian Panglungsod passed ordinance No 44 of Zamboanga City. The same was sent to the Minister of Finance where it was found
out to contravenes Section 19 of the local Tax Code. The authority of the city is limited to the imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or
receipts of said production. The tax being imposed in the ordinance is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as
authorized under the local tax code. The city Mayor of Zamboanga questioned such decision of the Finance Minister and the lower court ruled in
favor of the former by reason of prescription. The ordinance imposed P0.01 per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured and or bottled within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Zamboanga.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 44 contravenes the Local Tax Code of 1974.

HELD: The court ruled that the tax ordinances issued by the local autonomy is governed by the Local Tax Code of 1974 as it was stated in Section 64
(a) thereof all existing tax ordinances of provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios shall be deemed ipso facto nullified on June 30, 1974. The court
also clarified that the 120 days that lapsed before the Minister of Finance acted on the ordinance did not render the action inoperative due to
prescription. Even if the Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the ordinance within 120 days, it does not follow as a legal consequence
thereof that an otherwise invalid ordinance is thereby validated. It does not also mean that the Secretary can no longer act by suspending and/or
revoking an invalid ordinance even after the lapse of 120 day period.

Velasco vs. Blas Ople, G.R. No. 53967, 115 SCRA 540 (November 26, 1990)

FACTS:
1. On March 28, 1973 Quirino Acebuche, Primitiva Caranyangan, Cora Donor and Catalina Ogaya private respondents, thru their common
authorized representative Rolando Bartolome, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) complaints against Alfredo
 27

Velasco, owners and proprietors of the Belen’s Restaurant of Intramuros, Manila, for overtime pay and salary differentials under the
Minimum Wage Law.
2. After due proceedings in the NLRC, the Commission headed by chairman Amado G. Inciong, rendered a decision on August 15, 1973
Ordering the petitioners to pay the claimants the total amount of P14,087.00 (Exh. K).
3. Upon appeal to the respondent Secretary of Labor, the latter rendered a decision on December 5, 1973 reducing the awards due to the
private respondents due to a mistake in computation (Exh. L).
4. A motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied by Blas Ople as Secretary of Labor in his order dated February 14, 1974.
5. The petitioners filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations on March 12, 1974 a notice of appeal stating that they were appealing the decision
and order to the Office of the President (Exh. N).
6. On June 10, 1974, Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora addressed a letter to the Chief of the Constabulary to cause compliance
by the petitioners of the decision of the Secretary of Labor within five days from the receipt of said letter, pursuant to Section 10 of P.D.
No. 21 which provides for the arrest and detention of any person failing to comply with a decision or order of the NLRC (Exh. P).
7. On July 15, 1974, the petitioners filed with the lower court the present petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction — subsequently amended on July 29, 1974, seeking to restrain the Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Executive
Secretary from implementing the decision of the Secretary of Labor, alleging that since petitioner’s appeal to the Office of the President
has not yet been resolved, the decision of the Secretary of Labor has not yet become final and executory, so that the directive of the
Assistant Executive Secretary to implement said decision is therefore null and void.
8. The lower court issued an order on October 31, 1974 directing the respondent to answer the petition and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the public respondents from implementing the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated December 5, 1973 and the
order of February 14, 1974, as well as the directives of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary dated June 10, 1974 and July 12, 1974;
that after the public respondents had filed their Answer to the amended petition, the lower court, after declaring the private respondents
in default for failure to file their answer, conducted a hearing therein, after which it rendered its decision on September 30, 1975, . . ."

ISSUE 1: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ISSUING INJUNCTION PROHIBITING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
DATED DECEMBER 5, 1973.
HELD: Regular courts, being ill-prepared to apply labor laws, should not interfere in labor cases (Goodrich Employees Association v. CFI of Rizal, L-
30211, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 297). Hence, the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction in the case at bar to issue the writ of injunction to restrain
the enforcement of the decision rendered by the Secretary of Labor. Where the issue is lack of authority or arbitrary or improvident exercise thereof,
the decision of the Secretary of Labor may only be questioned and reviewed through a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which is the
proper forum for it (Asiaworld Publishing House Inc. v. Ople, G.R. No. 56398, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219). Thus, We find the decision of the trial
court null and void for lack of jurisdiction in enjoining the Secretary of Labor from implementing his decision.

ISSUE 2: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE STILL A RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR WHICH WAS ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED BY RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHICH SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY INJUNCTION.
HELD: MACHINERY OR BODY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT GOVERNING SUCH APPEALS NO LONGER EXISTING UNDER THE PRESENT LAW. —
With regard to the remedy of appeal to which the petitioners are entitled under the applicable law then, this Court deems it impractical to allow the
parties to still pursue their appeal to the Office of the President at this time considering that under the present law, the Labor Code, as amended,
the President may only assume jurisdiction only in cases which the latter considers to be of national interest.
With respect to those labor cases which do not involve national interest, such as the case at bar, the machinery or body in the Office of the
President governing such appeals apparently is no longer existing under the present law. Hence, for just and equitable considerations, this Court
instead shall grant the petitioners the opportunity to file a proper petition for certiorari within a reasonable time questioning the decision on the
merits of the Secretary of Labor.
The applicable law then governing appeals to the Office of the President is Presidential Decree No. 21, promulgated on October 14, 1972.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 21 provides: "SEC. 5. The decision of the Commission shall be immediately executory unless appealed to the Secretary of Labor
who shall act on all cases within five (5) days from filing. The latter’s decision is appealable to the President."
The aforequoted section expressly provides for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Secretary of
Labor without qualification. It is only when Presidential Decree No. 1367 was promulgated on May 1, 1978 that the decision of the Secretary of Labor
in labor cases shall be immediately executory provided that the President of the Philippines may assume jurisdiction over cases which he considers
national interest cases.
Subsequently, Presidential Decree 1391 promulgated on May 29, 1978 further eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor.
Hence, petitioners Alfredo and Adelina Velasco could still avail of the remedy of appeal to the President when the decision of the Secretary of Labor
was rendered on December 5, 1973.

Vicente De La Cruz v. Edgardo Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise
FACTS:
1. Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan.
2. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers.
3. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is
pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
 28

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”.
4. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test
of validity.
SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the
business of cabarets.

Municipality of Echague vs. Abellera, G.R. No. L-48671 (December 12, 1986)
FACTS:
1. On November 16, 1977, Avelino Ballad furnished the Municipality of Echague, through its then incumbent mayor, a xerox copy of a Decision
issued on October 13, 1977 by the Board of Transportation granting respondent Ballad a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a
two-motor boat service for the regular and public transportation of passengers and freight between Barrio Soyung-Dammang West and
vice-versa across the Cagayan River all in the municipality of Echague, Isabela.
2. In furnishing petitioner with a copy of the Decision in his favor, Ballad gave notice that he would start his ferry boat service operation in
January, 1978 and petitioner Municipality has to stop its own ferry boat service within the aforementioned routes.
3. Since 1936, the petitioner municipality, through its then municipal council, and later, its Sangguniang Bayan, had been operating a municipal
ferry service 'traversing the Cagayan River to and from the Barangays Soyung-Malitao and Barangays Embarcadero- manner above stated
resulted in an efficient and adequate transport service at reasonable rates to the people of the town and provided some modest revenue
to the petitioner and its barangays.Dammang East and West, all within the municipality of Echague, Isabela. In this regard, petitioner either
operated the ferry service itself, or annually leased the operation of the same to the highest bidder. The regular operation by the petitioner
of the ferry service in the
4. The Municipality expressed its surprise over said Decision because it is averred that it was never notified of the application of respondent
Ballad with the Board of Transportation to operate the ferry service. On January 17, 1977, the respondent Board of Transportation, upon
motion of petitioner Municipality, issued an Order suspending the operation of the motor boat service of private respondent after a
rehearing of the case by the Board en banc.
5. On February 14, 1978, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision, dated October 13, 1977, on the grounds of lack of
notice and deprivation of the opportunity to be heard by respondent Board; and secondly, the award of said Certificate of Public
Convenience to respondent Ballad was approved without favorable indorsement by resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Echague,
Isabela of Ballad's application.

ISSUE: Whether under Presidential Decree No. 1, or the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which vests on the Board of Transportation the jurisdiction
and authority to issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of public land, water and air transportation utilities, there would still be
need for an applicant for a ferry boat service operating between two points within a municipality to obtain a favorable resolution of the Sangguniang
Bayan of said municipality before the Board of Transportation can validly award the corresponding franchise to the applicant, considering the
provisions of Sections 2318-2320 of the Revised Administrative Code.

HELD: The Court does not subscribe to the theory of the private respondent that with the Integrated Reorganization Plan mandated by Presidential
Decree No. 1 and promulgated on September 24, 1972, wherein the Public Service Commission was abolished (Par. 8, Art. III, Chapter I, Part X,
Integrated Reorganization Plan) and in lieu thereof, the Board of Transportation was created with broader jurisdiction, power and authority (Par. (a),
No. 4, Article III, Chapter I, Part X the power of the Board of Transportation to issue certificate of public convenience for the operation of water
transportation utilities is absolute and without any qualification.
Respondents Ballad argue that the judicial decisions relied upon and invoked by the petitioner were rendered prior to the effectivity of the
Integrated Reorganization Plan, and, therefore, the pronouncements therein made are no longer governing.
Respondents claim that the earlier court rulings would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the prescribed Integrated Reorganization Plan
creating the Board of Transportation in substitution of the former Public Service Commission. Accordingly, private respondents contend that the
Board of Transportation has the jurisdiction and authority to grant a certification of public convenience for the operation of a motor boat ferry service
within the territorial jurisdiction of a municipality, without need for an indorsing resolution from the municipality concerned (Rollo, pp. 30-33).
As the ferry service in this case would be operating exclusively within municipal limits of Echague, Isabela, and as the petitioner herein
evidently desires to operate the ferries thru its Barangays, the issuance to private respondent Ballad of the Certificate of Public Convenience by the
Board of Transportation, renders the action taken by the Board unwarranted and more specially so considering the lack of acquiescence or even
previous due notice thereof to the petitioner municipality.
Indeed, the records reflect that in the case at bar there was no compliance made with the essential requirements of administrative due
process. It appears that the notice of hearing was duly published once in two Manila daily newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines
(Comment of Respondent Board of Transportation, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 57-58).
 29

We decline to accept the proposition that the operation of the ferry being then exercised by petitioner municipality, pursuant to clear
provisions of the law, was removed by a general reorganization plan which-was intended only to indicate the agency which would supervise or
regulate the operation of public services. The provisions of the Revised Administrative Code which grant to the municipal council of Sangguniang
Bayan the power to acquire or establish municipal ferries, are different and should be distinguished from the authority of the Board of Transportation
to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience.
While the establishment of a municipal ferry is first given to a municipality, ferry service will nevertheless be subject to the supervision and
control of the Board of Transportation. The winner in a public bidding conducted by the municipal council obtains the privilege to operate the ferry
service, but he has to apply for a Certificate of Public Convenience from the Board of Transportation which then has the duty to regulate the operation,
route, rates to be charged, as well as specify the kind of equipment to be used for the comfort, convenience and safety of the public using the ferry.
In the case of Municipality of Gattaran vs. Elizaga, 91 Phil. 443, this situation was clearly explained and We quote:
The two seemingly conflicting jurisdictions one by the Public Service Commission and the other by the municipalities may readily be
reconciled. Whether the operation of a municipal ferry be undertaken by the municipality itself or let and given to a private party after
public bidding, it should be supervised and regulated by the Public Service Commission. When a private party, winner in a public bidding
conducted by the Municipal Council like Fruto Elizaga, gets the permit to operate a municipal ferry from the municipality, before he can
operate, he must first obtain a certificate or permit from the Public Service Commission which upon granting it, will fix the rates to be
charged by him as well as specify the kind of equipment to be used by him for the comfort, convenience and safety of the public using said
ferry. ...Both Sangguniang Bayan and the Board of Transportation, in effect, act in concert with each other. They do not usurp nor
appropriate functions particularly given to the other.
Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72969-70 (December 17, 1986)
FACTS:
1. The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to relocate the same pursuant to P.D. No. 449,
the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1
2. Although the period of grace for such relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply with the requirement,
as a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased out. 2 To add to his troubles, the Court of FirsCebu, in a
petition to compel the municipal mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waivt Instance of ed his right
to a renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate. 3
3. On July 24, 1980, Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor Celestino E. Martinez by
authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law.
4. As only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than one hundred thousand, 5 Acusar sued
to revoke this license. He failed, however, first before the PC Recom 7 6 and later before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 7 His petition
for certiorari challenging the decision of the lower court was dismissed by this Court. 8
5. Nothing daunted, Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit license and the cancellation of
Sevilla's in what was docketed as PGC Case No. 10. He succeeded initially with the issuance by the PGC on August 16, 1984, of an
interlocutory order allowing him to temporarily operate his cockpit. 9
6. This was challenged in two separate actions 10 filed by Sevilla and the municipal government of Bogo in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
which, on petition of Acusar, were temporarily restrained by the Intermediate Appellate Court. 11 This same court also temporarily
restrained the enforcement of the PGC order of August 16, 1984 pending consideration of the petition to nullify it filed by Sevilla and the
Bogo municipal officials. 12
7. On December 6, 1984, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar's petition and ordered Mayor
Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the necessary mayor's permit in favor of Hee Acusar" and "to cancel and/or revoke the
mayor's permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla." The Commission also "RESOLVED to issue the Registration Certificate of Hee Acusar
for the current year 1984 and revoke the Registration Certificate of E ngr. Santiago A. Sevilla."

ISSUE: Whether Philippine Gamefowl Commission or the municipal government of Bogo, Cebu, has the jurisdiction and power to issue licenses for
the operation of cockpits in the said town.

HELD: The Municipal Government of Bogo has the Jurisdiction. According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to
"grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which
they have been granted," 15 and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks,
subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission."
P.D. 1802, as amended by P.D. 1802-A, provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians" shall have the authority to license and regulate
regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision.
Above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to
issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines
laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary
cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.
At that, even the power of review vested in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission by P.D. 1802-A may have been modified by the Local
Government Code, which became effective on February 14, 1983. Under the Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is supposed to examine the
ordinances, resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to annul the same, but only on one ground, to wit, that it is
beyond the powers of the municipality or ultra vires. 20 Significantly, no similar authority is conferred in such categorical terms on the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission regarding the licensing and regulation of cockpits by the municipal government.
 30

The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local
autonomy embodied in Article II, Section 10, and Article XI of the 1973 Constitution. It is also a recognition, as the Court of Appeals correctly points
out, of the superior competence of the municipal officials in dealing with this local matter with which they can be expected to be more knowledgeable
than the national officials. Surely, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission cannot claim to know more than the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bogo, Cebu, about the issues being disputed by the applicants to the cockpit license.
In the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, the choice of the municipal authorities should be respected by the PGC
and in any event cannot be replaced by it simply because it believes another person should have been selected. Stated otherwise, the PGC cannot
directly exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp the authority directly conferred by law on the municipal authorities.
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide
the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self-reliant communities." The decision we reach
today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.
 31

SECTION 8. “The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

Javier v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 215847 (January 12, 2016)

FACTS:
1. The Comelec and the Department of Interior and Local Government removed Gov. Exequiel Javier from office on Feb. 3, 2015, after finding
him guilty of an election offense. He was also the governor from 1998 to 2001 and 2010 to 2013.
2. The poll body had ruled that Javier violated the Omnibus Election Code when he ordered the suspension of Mayor Mary Joyce Roquero of
Valderrama town in Antique during the 2013 election period.
3. The election law prohibits the suspension of any elective official during the election period without the approval of the Comelec or unless
the suspension is related to graft and corruption.
4. Gov. Rhodora Cadiao, then vice governor, assumed Javier’s post but Cornelio Aldon, who lost to Javier in the 2013 elections, filed a petition
in the Supreme Court that he should be declared and installed as governor.
5. On Jan. 20, Cadiao asked the high court to order a vice gubernatorial candidate to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for
leaking a purported decision of the Supreme Court.
6. In a nine-page petition filed by the provincial legal office in the Supreme Court on Jan. 20, Cadiao accused lawyer Eduardo Fortaleza of
violating the sub judice rule when he sent messages claiming that the Supreme Court reversed the disqualification and subsequent removal
from office of Javier.
7. The sub judice rule prohibits disclosures and comments on pending judicial proceedings to avoid influencing courts.
8. In his messages, Fortaleza, an independent candidate for vice governor, said Javier “could return to the capitol anytime” because the high
court issued a status quo ante (the way things before) order related to Javier’s disqualification by the Comelec.

ANTECEDENTS:
1. On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code).2 Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code
prescribe the following elements of coercion as an election offense
2. Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years. 3 Notably, Section 68
of the Election Code provides that the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).
3. On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code.4 It
increased the penalty for coercion committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890
expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Election Code.
4. On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 93855 fixing the calendar of activities for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the
election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013.
 32

ISSUE 1: Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January
13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for the purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.

RULLING 1: The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.

ISSUE 2: Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of
the Election Code.
RULLING 2: An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction;32 they only involve errors in the court or tribunal’s
appreciation of the facts and the law.33 An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.34
In the present case, it is clear that R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC Second Division’s October 3, 2014 resolution, however, treated this repeal as merely an implied one.
A repeal may be express or implied.36 An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular
and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed. 37 An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a substantial conflict exists
between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.38
Moreover, the general repealing clause in Section 3 of RA 7890 cannot impliedly repeal Section 68 because the latter is not absolutely and
irreconcilably incompatible with Article 286, as amended by RA 7890.

ISSUE 3: Whether the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Order dated January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov.
Javier and annulling his proclamation as the governor of Antique.
RULLING 3: In an en banc decision dated Jan. 12, the high court annulled the Comelec order, according to a post on the official Twitter account of
the Supreme Court’s public information office.
To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier based on a provision of law that had already
been expressly repealed. Its stubborn insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261 (d) despite the clear wordings of the law,
amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.
The Supreme Court has upheld the proclamation of former Antique Gov. Exequiel Javier, reversing his removal from office by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec).
 33

Jalosjos v. COMELE, G.R. No. 191970 (April 24, 2012)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008,
at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
2. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
3. He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed
by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
4. A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was
then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
5. On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny
or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
6. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD: The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one
year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must
not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile
or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile
at a time.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from
Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition,
he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house.
But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house
 34

in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in
the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.
What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga,
Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover,
Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to
establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the
people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
 35

Adormeo vs COMELEC, 76 SCRA 90; GR 147927 (February 4, 2002)

(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall – Exception to the 3 term limit)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their COC for mayor of Lucena City in the May
2001 elections.
2. Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in May 1995, where he again
served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to
the latter in the 1998 election.
3. Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground that the latter was elected and had served
as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as 1 term.
4. Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998
and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
5. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
6. Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”

ISSUE: WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City.

HELD: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his term as
mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. Voluntary renunciation of a
term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).
Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Note: Recall – a petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.

Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In
September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a
criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

HELD: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term
limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.
Dizon vs COMELEC
FACTS: Roberto L. Dizon is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, is the incumbent Mayor of the
Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Dizon alleges Morales was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995,
 36

1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same
position and same municipality.
He argues that Morales is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Under the said provision, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the
same position. On the other hand, Morales asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. Respondent alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he
was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the
three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to him.

HELD: Respondent’s certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections was cancelled pursuant to the above-
mentioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on May 9, 2007. As a result, respondent was not only disqualified but was also not
considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections.
Another factor which is worth mentioning is the fact that respondent has relinquished the disputed position on May 16, 2007. The vice-mayor elect
then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of Mabalacat on May 17, 2007 until the term ended on June 30, 2007. For failure to serve for
the full term, such involuntary interruption in his term of office should be considered a gap which renders the three-term limit inapplicable.
The three-term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary break. The Constitution does not require that the interruption or hiatus to be
a full term of three years. What the law requires is for an interruption, break or a rest period from a candidate’s term of office "for any length of
time."
In sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in the instant case for lack of the two conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly-elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2)
respondent has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007
which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term.

ARSENIO A. LATASA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA

FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. During
petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. On February 28, 2001, petitioner
filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed
that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, and is now running for the first time for the position
of city mayor. Private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa.
Respondent Sunga alleged that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since he
had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
Petitioner argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001 elections since this will be the first time
that he will be running for the post of city mayor. The COMELEC’s First Division issued a Resolution canceling petitioner’s certificate of candidacy
for being in violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. Petitioner filed his
Motion for Reconsideration which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections. Petitioner was proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001,
having garnered the most number of votes. Subsequently, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON Latasa is qualified.

HELD: NO.; THE FACT THAT THE NEW CITY ACQUIRED A NEW CORPORATE EXISTENCE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THAT OF A MUNICIPALITY
DOES NOT MEAN THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING ARTICLE. X, SECTION 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR
WOULD NOW BE CONSTRUED AS A DIFFERENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT POST AS THAT OF THE CITY MAYOR. — The Court notes that the delineation
of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This
Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held
for the new city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as
a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same
as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over
whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

ALTHOUGH THERE WERE CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF DIGOS, NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OCCURRED AS TO
PETITIONER’S AUTHORITY AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OVER THE INHABITANTS THEREOF. —PETITIONER NEVER CEASED FROM ACTING AS CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT AND FROM DISCHARGING HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. — Latasa was, without a doubt, duly
elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of
Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been
deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.
 37

THE LAW CONTEMPLATES A REST PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIAL STEPS DOWN FROM OFFICE AND CEASES TO EXERCISE
POWER OR AUTHORITY OVER THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A PARTICULAR LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT. — It is evident
that in the above mentioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein
was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from office and ceases to exercise. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive
years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution.

Ong v Alegre January 23, 2013

DOCTRINE: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions orrequisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive termsin the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive
terms.
FACTS: Joseph Alegre and Francis Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of SanVicente, Camarines Norte in the 2004
elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor. Alegre filed with COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Francis predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having ran in May 1995, May 1998,and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor for 3 consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. For the May 1998 elections,
Alegre filed an election protest which RTC granted and declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001,
when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente.
COMELEC dismissed Alegre’s petition, not finding the three term rule applicable. Upon Reconsideration, COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision,
disqualifying Francis Ong to run for mayor in the 2004 elections. When Francis received the news, he sought assistance from his political party,
Nationalist People’s Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong, as substitute candidate. On the same day, at 5:05PM
(past the deadline), Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis. Again,
Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001
2. Should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule

HELD: YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article 10 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: “The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more thanthree consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
The SC held that the assumption of office by Francis Ong between 1998-2001 constitutes “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving more than 3 consecutive term for the same position.

RIVERA III versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591)

FACTS: A petition for cancellation of the COC of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was
filed on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in the office that he seeks to run for.
However, Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995 – 1998 in his first term and 2004 – 2007 for his third term, he
was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in the year 1998 – 2001 for his said to be second term that is because his election was declared void by
the RTC due to an election protest. COMELEC ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and
executory on May 14, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether or not Morales had already served his three consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

HELD: For the three term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions must concur to wit: 1.) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.As the issue
whether a “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on
indefinitely”.
With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot
assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
 38

SOCRATES versus COMELEC

FACTS: Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following
regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August
23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that
he cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

HELD: YES. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward
Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

BORJA versus COMELEC

FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections
in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpo’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would
have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that “In both the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession
to an office to which he was not elected.” Carpo won the election case against Borja. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term for the purpose of the
three-term limit under the Constitution.

HELD: NO. The court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbent’s death and served for remainder of the term, he
cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was
elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two
positions are wholly different from each other.

LONZANIDA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 135150)

FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
8 1995 elections where he ran for the mayoralty position of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed the winner. He then assumed office
and discharged said duties therof. His proclamation in the year 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who later on filed an
election protest.
In the year 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballot, COMELEC
declared Alvarez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner to vacate the post.

On the 11th of May in the year 1998 elections again, Lonzanida ran for mayor wherein his contender Eufemio Muli filed a petition to disqualify the
former from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same
post. Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term,
should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not tit may be considered that the petitioner had served three consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in
1995.

HELD: NO. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995 to 1998 mayoral term and became a private
citizen. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government
official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office.

4. Federico v COMELEC
DOCTRINES:1. The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful theconduct of the first national
automated election. Deadlines as regards filing of substitute COCs dependon what prompted the substitution, whether death, disqualification,
or withdrawal. Generally, acandidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yetstarted. If a
candidate withdraws after printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer beaccommodated.2. The statutory power of supervision
and control by the Comelec over the boards of canvassers includesthe power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what
the boards should havedone.3. The rule on succession will only apply in case there is a vacancy.
 39

FACTS: Edna Sanchez (Nationalista Party) and Osmundo Maligaya (Liberal Party) were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, in the May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the
province of Batangas, died. Edna withdrew her COC for the position of mayor and filed a new one and thecorresponding Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband. Renato Federico filed his COC and CONA as
official candidate of the Nationalista Party, as substitute candidate for mayor, replacing Edna. The two substitutions were referred to Comelec En
Banc for its consideration. On the same day, Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel COC of Federico because the period to
file the COC forsubstitute candidates had already lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution.Comelec En Banc gave due course to both substitutions,
however, come election day, the name “Sanchez, Edna P.” was retained in the list of candidates and garnered the highest number of votes. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates (COCVP), showing
“Sanchez, Edna P.” as the winning mayoralty candidate. A second print-out of the COCVP was issued by MBOC bearing the same time and date with
the same number of votes being credited to Federico.Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico as
mayor,predicating on the alleged illegal act of the MBOC in issuing a falsified and patently antedated secondCOCVP in the name of Federico
without reconvening, without due notice, and without annulling the first COCVP issued in favor of Edna. COMELEC en banc granted
Maligaya’s motion and annulled the proclamation of Federico and directed the MBOC to reconvene and proclaim Maligaya as the duly elected
mayor.

ISSUES:1.) Whether Federico could validly substitute Edna

2.) Whether Maligaya’s Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federi
co was filed on time3.) Granting that Federico was disqualified, whether he should be succeeded by Intervenor (Vice Mayor-elect) Silva under the
LGC or replaced by Maligaya

HELD:
1.) NO. Federico argues that Comelec Resolution, which imposed a December 14, 2009 deadline for thefiling of substitute COC and CONA, cannot
prevail over the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, which gives the substitute “not later than midday of the day of the election” to file his
COC, and sincehe filed his COC and CONA 5 days before the elections, his COC was timely filed. Court held that Federico’s argument is not well
taken as the Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national
automated election, as provided by RA 9369, authorizing the automated election system. As automated elections had been mandated by law, there
was a need for the early printing of the ballots and thus, the early filing of the COC was necessary. Pursuant to the 2010 automated elections,
Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 set out different deadlines that would govern the substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or
withdrawal. In case ofdeath or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the COC. In case ofwithdrawal, which is
the case at bench, the substitute should have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.The reason for the distinction is that unlike death or
disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally,a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing
has notyet started. If a candidate withdraws after printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longerbe accommodated. When Armando
Sanchez died, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late husband. The party actually had the option to substitute another
candidate for Governor aside from Edna. The sudden death of Edna’s husband and her substitution in the gubernatorial race could not justify a
belated substitution in the mayoralty race.The Resolution giving due course to the COCs of Edna and Federico was void as it was contrary to the
guidelines set forth by COMELEC. With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as a valid source of any right. The votes garnered by Edna could
not be credited to Federico as he was never a legitimate candidate. As there was an invalid substitution, there could not be a valid proclamation.
2.) YES. Maligaya filed his petition as to the second COCVP in favor of Federico within the 10-day period from the discovery of the issuance.
Accordingly, the Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it annulled the actions of the MBOC and the proclamation of Federico. The statutory
power of supervision and control by the Comelec over the boards of canvassers includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as
well as to do what the boards should have done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be
required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board; conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the
election records of the polling places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on complete returns or on incorrect or tampered returns;
invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an authorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because the
board did not meet at all; requiring the board to convene.
3.) Maligaya should be declared the winner of the race. There being no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should
be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. There was only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race and being such candidate, he received the
highest number of votes and should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. Silva cannot be considered as the legal successor of Federico
because there was no vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be invoked. Petition denied.

Nicasio Bolos Jr. Vs The commission On Election and Rey Angeles Cinconiegue G.R. No. 184082
March 17, 2009
FACTS: For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay
Elections held in 1994, 1997 and 2002.
In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of
Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of
the Sangguniang Bayanposition, which was until June 30, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for
the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground that he had already served the three-term limit. Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed
to run for the same position in accordance with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) ofR.A. No. 7160.
 40

Cinconiegue contended that petitioners relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it
could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that
petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner admitted that he was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the last three consecutive
elections of 1994, 1997 and 2002. However, he countered that in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he ran and won as Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. By reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his remaining term of office as Punong Barangay,
which would have ended in 2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member was by
operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.

ISSUE: WON petitioners election, assumption and discharge of the functions of the Office of Sangguniang Bayan member can be considered as
voluntary renunciation of his office as Punong Barangay of Barangay which will render unbroken the continuity of his service for the full term of
office, that is, from 2004 to 2007. If it is considered a voluntary renunciation, petitioner will be deemed to have served three consecutive terms and
shall be disqualified to run for the same position in the October 29, 2007elections. But if it is considered as an involuntary
renunciation, petitioners service is deemed to have been interrupted; hence, he is not barred from running for another term.

HELD: The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

David v. Commission on Elections[5] elucidates that the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office
for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The
discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more
precisely, [a]s provided for in the Local Government Code.[6] Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are covered
by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The cited provisions
read, thus:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after
the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan members
who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections[8] held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government

Code, has two parts:

x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent
is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited
election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence
of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He insteadrelinquished his office as Punong
Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary
renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.

Rodolfo Navarro vs Ermita, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010

FACTS: The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands’ population is 120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average
annual income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law
R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of
the creation of the province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from
both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial
 41

officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their
new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before
the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of
Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte
of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Province of Dinagat complied with the requirements of the law.

HELD: No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000
inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement
of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the
said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. “There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and
regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law,” held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In
its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

Rodolfo Navarro vs Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 11, 2011

Reversing the earlier Decision and granting the Motion for Reconsideration
Same facts with the February 10, 2010 case, but different decisions

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Province of Dinagat complied with the requirements of the law.
Yes. In Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID
and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating,
“The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared VALID.
According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to
the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and land area, are provided for.”
“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the
land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality
or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of
the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact,
considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of
the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy
decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct
the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold
the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”
Xxx “Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and
minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. The
strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and
impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands.
The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450
and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers,
even if it consists of several islands. This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with
contiguous land area over one composed of islands — and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural
progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-
square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass.”
 42

xxx “What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that
Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and
the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.”

League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC

(Cases are based on same facts, but there were different rulings)
FACTS: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.
However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all
the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February
2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from
March to July 2007 without the President's signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of
the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue
set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code

ISSUE:
1. WON the Cityhood laws violates the Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Sec 10, Art X: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

2. WON the Cityhood laws violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

November 18, 2008 Ruling of the Supreme Court:

The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that
such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in Sec. 450 of the LGC, must be
strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government units (LGUs) in national
taxes.

December 21, 2009 Ruling of the Supreme Court:

The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs)
converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood
bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not
have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a
political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the
cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
 43

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the
much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate
that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status
using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.

August 24, 2010 Ruling of the Supreme Court:

No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its
November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities.
“Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc
Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the
main decision where there is no prior decision,” the Court said. In the latest resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the
Cityhood Laws violate sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no city…shall be created…except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code.” It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in
the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities
under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the
express language of the Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for
being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held.
The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must
apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.”

February 15, 2011 Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case
in 2008.

April 12, 2011 Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the
Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice
and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th
Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the
11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied
in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for
approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and
fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved.
The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009,
and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.”
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the
Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist
that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the
original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.”

Paredes vs Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6

FACTS: BP Blg 86, provides for the creation of a new Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao. It also directs that a plebiscite be conducted in
certain barangays, all within the municipality of Mayoyao, Province of Ifugao, "to determine whether the said Barangays shall become a new
municipality." Commission on Elections was charged with the duty of supervising the conduct of such plebiscite and empowered to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the proclamation.
 44

Petitioners Zosimo J. Paredes and Mario W. Chilagan, the former being the incumbent Governor of the Province of Ifugao and the latter,
Mayor of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao, contend that all the inhabitants of such municipality should participate in such plebiscite as they are
included in the "unit or units affected."

ISSUE: WON BP Blg 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution.

HELD: SC ruled that BP Blg 86 is constitutional. The Constitution provides that "The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local
government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." It is clear that in granting autonomy,
priority is to be accorded the smallest unit, the barangay. That enables its residents the fullest development as a self-reliant community, with a
distinct personality of its own. Adherence to such a philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of
several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will
in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New
burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice - their choice. They should be
left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate
it. That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental
principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units.

Lopez vs Metro Manila Commission, 136 SCRA 633

FACTS: Presidential Decree No. 824 was a response to a felt need for a "central government to establish and administer program and provide
services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. A public
corporation was thus created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporation including the power to
make contracts, sue and be sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such other powers as are necessary to
carry out its purposes."
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or
barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The Local
Government Code was not enacted until 1983. (This is the old LGC, which was in effect at the time of Marcos).

ISSUE: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional, and consequently, WON the Metropolitan Manila it created is also unconstitutional.

HELD: PD 824 and the creation of Metropolitan Manila is valid and constitutional. The challenge is far from formidable due to the following:
1. Metro Manila was created through "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area
authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of
the manager or commission form of government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the President.
2. There is no question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There
was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted with such responsibility.
3. Metro Manila is valid since in Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution there is express recognition of the juridical entity known as
Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls, means that there is no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824.

Tan vs COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727

FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, took
effect on December 3, 1985. On December 23, 1985, the petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled for
January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R.
Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known as
the Province of Negros del Norte.

SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City
of San Carlos on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a
territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
On the other hand, Section 197 of LGC provides for the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and the requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a
population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less
than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province
 45

or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of
trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income

The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and
the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions
of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the
constitutional issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution." At the same time, they asked that the
effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental
and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.

ISSUES:
1. WON BP Blg 885 is unconstitutional because Sec 197 provides that the requisite plebiscite “shall be conducted in the proposed new
province which are the areas affected", and this provision is not in accordance with the Constitution.
2. WON the plebiscite conducted in pursuance to the provisions of BP Blg 85 is null and void
3. In case the plebiscite already conducted is null void, WON another plebiscite could be held to clear the infirmities in the creation of
Negros del Norte
4. WON the creation of Negros del Norte is valid and consequently,

HELD:
1. The SC declared that BP Blg 885 is unconstitutional. The requisite for plebiscite in the said law was contrary to Sec. 3, Article XI of the
Constitution, which states that:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected.
The plebiscite should not be confined only to the new province created, which is Negros del Norte but also include the inhabitants of Negros
Occidental, because its boundaries would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province. Another effect of the new province is that the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long-
established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners'
assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen
sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province.
2. Considering that BP Blg 885 is unconstitutional, the plebiscite conducted in pursuance of its provisions is null and void.
3. A new plebiscite cannot be validly held for the creation of the province. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the
holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
4. Negros del Norte as a new province is not tenable, due to the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area
requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed. The area would only be about 2,856.56 sq.
km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed.

Padilla vs COMELEC, 214 SCRA

FACTS: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the
COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In its resolution for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the voters of
the Municipality of Labo—the parent unit of the new municipality.

The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the creation of the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon. Roy
Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution does not include the parent political unit—the Municipality of Labo.

ISSUE: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?

HELD: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is contemplated by the
phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in
such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the the parent Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte.
 46

SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.

SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.

SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly
beneficial to them in accordance with law.

SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for
purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region.

Ceniza v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763, G.R. No. L-52304 (January 28, 1980)
“Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering
**”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to
the party in power.” **
FACTS:
1. Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities
(unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters
prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections.
2. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added
Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or
Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution.
3. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that
political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City.
4. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered
voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the
province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter.
5. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not
allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based
on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage,
and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that
the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by
the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June
1969.
 47

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon
substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence
from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus
justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component
cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for
provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the
Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

2. Differentiate a Highly Urbanized City from a Component City (See BP 337, Sections 162- 168)
Batas Pambansa Bilang 337
TITLE THREE
THE CITY
CHAPTER 1
ROLE AND CREATION OF CITIES
Section 162. Role of Cities. - As a political unit covering more urbanized and developed communities, the city is akin to the municipality and serves
as a general-purpose government for the coordination and delivery of all basic, regular and direct services within its jurisdiction.

Section 163. Manner of Creation. - A city may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries altered, only by an Act of the Batasang
Pambansa in accordance with the criteria established in this Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the unit or units affected. Except as may otherwise be provided in such Act, the plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
elections within one hundred twenty days from the date of effectivity of said Act.

Section 164. Requisites for Creation. -

(1) A municipality may be converted into a component city if it has a population of not less than one hundred thousand as certified
by the National Census and Statistics Office, and an average regular annual income, as certified by the Minister of Finance, of at
least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.
(2) The regular annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and infrastructure funds exclusive of trust
funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income.
(3) Municipalities created as component cities under this section shall continue to share their income with their respective
provinces in the same manner as municipalities.

Section 165. Cities, Classified. - A city may either be component or highly urbanized. Highly urbanized cities, as hereinafter provided, shall be
independent of the province.

Section 166. Highly Urbanized Cities. -

(1) Cities with a minimum population of one hundred and fifty thousand as certified by the National Census and Statistics Office,
and with the latest annual income of at least thirty million pesos as certified by the Minister of Finance, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
(2) Cities which do not meet the above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which they are
geographically located. If a component city is located within the boundaries of two or more provinces, said city shall be considered
a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
Section 167. Criteria for Evaluation of a Component City to a Highly Urbanized City. - A component city may become a highly urbanized city if it
meets the criteria specified in the preceding section.
Section 168. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. - It shall be the duty of the Minister of Local Government to declare a city highly urbanized
within thirty days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in Section 166 hereof.

1987 Constitution, Article X, Sections 15-21.

Autonomous Region
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities,
and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
 48

SECTION 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the
National Government.
SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act
shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which
shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.
SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the
organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized,
maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility
of the National Government.

Autonomous Regions:
Read: Executive Order no. 220
MALACAÑANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 220
CREATING A CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, pursuant, to Section 1, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, there shall be created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras;
WHEREAS, Section 15, Article X of the Constitution provides that the autonomous region in the Cordilleras shall consist of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of the Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the President has the power to continue to exercise legislative powers until the
first Congress is convened;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 14, Article X of the Constitution, the President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region;
WHEREAS, the incumbent President is sympathetic to the common desire of the peoples of the Cordilleras to be immediately granted meaningful
participation in the conduct of their affairs, in order to enable them to prepare for regional autonomy;
WHEREAS, the constitutional mandate for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras has been preceded by the movement for local
autonomy and administrative decentralization before and since the period of authoritarian rule (September 1972 – February 1986), as
manifested by the work of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the 1976 resolution of governors and other leaders from the Cordilleras,
and finally the regional autonomy representations at the 1986 Constitutional Commission;
WHEREAS, on September 13, 1986, the President of the Philippines met with the representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration and the
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army, presided over the alasiw (exchange of peace tokens) to signify the sipat (cessation of hostilities), and
acknowledged their aspirations for Cordillera autonomy;
WHEREAS, the immediate creation of a Cordillera Administrative Region is a sound and reasonable measure by which the peoples of the Cordilleras
can immediately participate in the pursuit of peace and development and enjoy the benefits thereof;
WHEREAS, the Constitution envisions the building of a just and humane society, and the National Government is pursuing the goals of national
reconciliation, peace, unity and development in the country;
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the -first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent
need, in the interest of national security and public order, -for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure
in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Government’s legitimate concerns in the areas, without
attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent
basis;
 49

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order
and decree:
SECTION 1. Cordillera Administrative Region
— There is hereby created a Cordillera Administrative Region, hereinafter referred to as the CAR.
SECTION 2. Territorial Coverage. — For purposes of the CAR, the region shall consist of the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mt. Province and the chartered city of Baguio. Until otherwise provided by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB), the seat of the CAR shall
be Baguio City. The National Government shall provide appropriate offices therefor.
SECTION 3. Purposes — The CAR shall have the following purposes:
(a) Administer the affairs of government in the region as defined in Sections 4 and 5 below;
(b) Accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units of the region; and
(c) Prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
SECTION 4. Scope of Authority and Responsibility— The CAR shall have authority and responsibility in the region over the following:
(a) Regional administrative system;
(b) Economic, social and cultural development;
(c) Agricultural, commercial and industrial development and promotion of tourism;
(d) Infrastructure development;
(e) Urban and rural development, protection of ancestral domain and land reform;
(f) Regional educational system, including the establishment and maintenance of educational institutions and the formulation of
educational policies to cultivate the indigenous Cordillera cultures and inculcate traditional values;
(g) Health, sports, welfare and social services;
(h) Development of indigenous laws and political institutions, particularly those of direct democracy and collective leadership, as well as
the promotion of indigenous institutions and processes for conflict resolution and dispute settlement;
(i) Preservation and enhancement of indigenous customs, traditions, languages and cultures;
(j) Strengthening of the bodong system of tribal unity and cooperation;
(k) Protection and preservation of the cultural identity, values, mores and norms of the various ethno-linguistic groups in the Cordilleras;
(l) Promotion of social justice and protection of human rights, particularly the rights of women, children, the elderly and disadvantaged
groups, as well as the rights of people’s organizations; and
(m) Such other matters as may be authorized by law or delegated by the President for the promotion of the general welfare.
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions — The CAR shall coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the areas enumerated
in Section 4. Accordingly, it shall be vested with, among others, the following powers and functions:
(a) Coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision
of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region;
(b) Appoint, supervise, control and discipline personnel of the CAR and of such other offices as may be funded by it;
(c) Manage and control funds, facilities and equipment appropriated for the CAR;
(d) Advise the National Government on matters affecting the Cordilleras;
(e) Undertake studies towards codifying the customary laws of the tribes, including the pagtas of the bodong system; and
(f) Promulgate and implement resolutions, rules and regulations necessary to achieve effectively the purposes of this Executive Order and
to carry out the powers and functions of the CAR.
SECTION 6. Peace and Regional Security. – Within the framework of the Constitution and applicable laws, the restoration and maintenance of peace
within the region shall be a major concern of the CAR.
A regional security force shall be organized to assist in the defense and security of the region subject to guidelines issued for this
purpose by the President after consultations with the CAR, other organizations, and appropriate agencies of the Government.
The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
SECTION 7. Structure of the CAR. — The CAR shall have a Cordillera’ Regional Assembly and a Cordillera Executive Board.
SECTION 8. The Cordillera Regional Assembly. — Within the framework of the Constitution, laws and policies of the National Government, the
Cordillera Regional Assembly shall be the policy-formulating body which shall articulate and harmonize the interests and aspirations of the
peoples of the Cordilleras. It shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) representatives to be appointed according to the
following guidelines:
(a) Each municipality shall have one (1) representative;
(b) Baguio City shall have ten (10) representatives;
(c) The non-governmental organizations shall be entitled to a total of eighteen (18) representatives twelve (12) of whom shall come from
the major non-governmental organizations in the region to be determined according to the size of their membership and six (6) from
province-based non-governmental organizations;
(d) Each tribe shall send to the Assembly one (1) representative.
Tribal representatives shall be chosen by the tribes in a manner consonant with the Constitution and in harmony with the
indigenous decision-making processes in the Cordilleras.
The Assembly shall be headed by a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President from among its members. The Chairman
shall be the titular head of the CAR.
The President shall also appoint members from non-governmental organizations as well as representatives of the municipalities
and of Baguio City upon nomination of their respective municipal and city councils.
SECTION 9. Sessions.— The Assembly shall convene once every year for a five-day regular session starting on the 24th day of April provided, however,
that a regular session shall be held in 1987.
 50

The Chairman may call a special session as may be necessary. A special session may also be convened upon the initiative of the
majority of all the members of the Assembly.
During the regular session, the Assembly shall:
a) Discuss the annual report of the Executive Board and the proposed budget for the CAR;
b) Initiate plans and programs for the Cordilleras;
c) Discuss and resolve, inter-tribal issues and conflicts;
d) Formulate policies affecting the Cordilleras consistent with national and local laws; and
e) Identify priority projects and development programs for the region.
The decisions of the Assembly shall be implemented by the Cordillera Executive Board.
SECTION 10. The Cordillera Executive Board. — The Cordillera Executive Board shall be the development body and implementing arm of the CAR.
The President shall appoint the twenty-nine (29) regular members of the Board as follows: (a) Mayor of Baguio City and the five (5)
Governors of the provinces enumerated in Section 2; (b) six (6) representatives from the Cordillera Bodong Administration, one of whom
shall be its chief executive; (c) twelve (12) representatives from the different ethno-linguistic groups in the Cordilleras; and (d) five (5)
representatives from non-governmental organizations.
All regional directors of the line departments of the National Government shall be non-voting ex-officio members of the Executive
Board.
SECTION 11. Executive Director. — The Cordillera Executive Board shall be headed by a full—time Executive Director who shall be appointed by the
President from among its regular members.
The Executive Director shall have the following functions:
(a) Act on behalf of the President as Chief Executive Officer of the CAR;
(b) Preside over the meetings of the Executive Board;
(c) Initiate the proposed budget and annual report for the CAR for the approval of the Executive Board;
(d) Supervise, control and discipline personnel of the Executive Board and of such other offices as may be funded by it;
(e) Coordinate and supervise the Executive Committees and the Cordillera Bodong Administration; and
(f) Perform all other functions assigned by law, the President, the Cordillera Regional Assembly or the Executive Board.
SECTION 12. The Executive Committees.— The Cordillera Executive Board may create executive committees to assist in the implementation of its
powers and functions. Each committee shall be headed by a member of the Executive Board.
SECTION 13. The Cordillera Bodong Administration.— The Cordillera Bodong Administration shall be incorporated into the CAR as a commission and
shall hereinafter be referred to as the CBA. In the territorial units where it is effective, the CBA shall have the following powers and
responsibilities:
(a) Promote respect for the customs and usages of the tribes concerned;
(b) Foster unity among the various communities in the Cordilleras and promote regional confederation;
(c) Observe the traditional practice of direct democracy and collective leadership in the Cordilleras within the context of and in harmony
with administrative mechanisms of the National Government;
(d) Preserve and develop the communal social order and economic system;
(e) Perform all functions of the executive committees referred to in Section 12; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be determined by the Executive Board.
The definition and identification of the territorial units of the CBA shall be submitted to and confirmed by the Executive Board
and adopted by the Assembly.
The CBA shall be supervised by and be responsible to the Cordillera Executive Board.
SECTION 14. CBA Budget. — The CAR, through the Executive Board, shall allocate part of its budget for the operation of the CBA.
SECTION 15. Compensations.— The Chairman and members of the Assembly as well as the Executive Director and members of the Executive Board
shall receive allowances and per diems as determined by the President in accordance with existing laws and regulations. The city mayor
and governors who are members of the Board shall receive additional emoluments as may be allowed by law.
The Chairman of the Assembly shall receive such additional allowances as may be necessary to perform the functions of his office.
The Executive Director and the heads of the Executive Committees shall receive an annual compensation to be determined by
the Executive Board.
SECTION 16. Civil Service Rules and Regulations. — For purposes of the CAR, exemptions from Civil Service rules and regulations may be provided
by the Civil Service Commission.
SECTION 17. Period of Existence. — The CAR and its Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government
shall have been established and organized under an organic act passed by Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
SECTION 18. Term of Office. — The term of office of the members and officers of the Assembly and Executive Board shall be coterminous with the
period of existence of the CAR.
The city mayor, the governors, and the regional directors shall hold office as members of the Executive Board only during the
term for which they were elected and/or appointed.
SECTION 19. Rules of Procedure. — The Assembly and the Executive Board shall each adopt by a majority vote of their members their own rules of
procedure as well as rules and regulations on discipline and privileges. They shall also prescribe rules and regulations regarding internal
organization, sessions, meetings and quorum.
SECTION 20. Projects. — The CAR, through its Executive Board, shall monitor the implementation of all on-going national and local government
projects in the region within the purview of Section 5(a) hereof.
 51

SECTION 21. Appropriations and Funds.— There is hereby appropriated from available funds of the National Treasury the amount of five (5) million
pesos for the operation of the CAR for the fiscal year 1987. Thereafter, an annual appropriation for its budget shall be included in the
General Appropriations Act.
The President and appropriate national departments and agencies shall make available sources of funds for priority physical,
social and economic development programs and projects as recommended by the CAR.
The collection, custody, use and disbursement of public funds in the CAR shall be governed by its resolutions, rules and regulations
of the Executive Board consonant with national laws, rules and regulations.

SECTION 22. Taxes and Resources. — The CAR shall receive an equitable share of the taxes and other government revenues generated in the CAR
territorial coverage. For this purpose, as part of the BIR allotment in the region, the CAR and the local government units within the Cordillera
Administrative Region’s territorial coverage shall have at least fifty percent (50%) share of such taxes and other government revenues to
be distributed as follows: ten percent (10%) to barangays, ten percent (107.) to municipalities, fifteen percent (15%) to provinces or cities,
fifteen percent (15%) to the CAR.
To ensure proper implementation of the principle of equitable sharing, the President shall direct the Department of Finance and
appropriate national departments and agencies to coordinate with the CAR.
SECTION 23. Grants, Donations, Gifts. – Within the framework of pertinent laws and regulations, the CAR shall be authorized to receive grants,
donations or gifts, provided that such grants, donations or gifts shall be administered, obligated and disbursed in accordance with the terms
thereof, or in the absence of such terms, in such manner as a majority of the Executive Board may determine.
SECTION 24. Relationship with the National Government. — The President shall have the power of general supervision over the CAR and the local
government units therein and shall issue the appropriate guidelines therefor. The President may also call upon the appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the CAR as may be necessary.
The Executive Director shall submit a semi-annual report to the President.
SECTION 25. Transitory Provisions. —
1) The Executive Board shall conduct a study on the territorial coverage of the Cordillera autonomous region to be established under an
organic act to be passed by Congress under Sections 15 and IS, Article X, of the Constitution. This territorial coverage may include
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographic areas contiguous to the territory defined herein under Section 2.
2) The President may call upon the Assembly to assist her in constituting the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission.
Consonant with Section 3 (c) hereof, the CAR shall contribute in a meaningful and appropriate manner to the work of
the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and in the preparation of the organic act by Congress for the Cordillera
autonomous region.
3) Pursuant to Section 2, the main offices of the CAR shall be located at the Cordillera House in Baguio City until otherwise determined by
the Cordillera Executive Board.
SECTION 26. Separability Clause. – The provisions of this Executive Order are hereby declared to be separable, and in the event any one or more of
such provisions are held unconstitutional, such shall not affect the validity of other provisions.
SECTION 27. Repealing Clause. – For purposes of the CAR and for the duration of its existence, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended
or modified accordingly.
SECTION 28. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon signing and publication as required by law.
DONE in the City of Manila this 15th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

Ordillo v. Comelec, 192 SCRA 100

FACTS:
1. On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio
cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”
2. The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority
of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-
mentioned.
3. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
4. The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that
there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

ISSUE: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.

HELD: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13)
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regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.