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To hold the conjugal partnership liable, some advantages must accrue to the spouses
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is
to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. [CHING vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004]
Any alienation of the conjugal property made by one spouse without the consent of the other
renders the contract voidable
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions (Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code), the husband
could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied,
of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that
such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider
the transaction as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil
Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the
questioned transaction, seek its annulment.
Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may
bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. [HEIRS OF REYES vs. SPOUSES
MIJARES, G.R. No. 143826, August 28, 2003]
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
2
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CIVIL LAW
Justification in annulling the contract in its entirety and not merely as to the share of the wife
The necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not merely as to the share of
the wife, is not without its basis in the common-sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon
the provisions of Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even
subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the
payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, "should
have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient." These are considerations that go beyond
the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband to
be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more
fundamental is the fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but
lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under Article 166. [HEIRS OF REYES vs.
SPOUSES MIJARES, G.R. No. 143826, August 28, 2003]
Rules on co-ownership applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to marry
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar.
This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their
cohabitation.
Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar.
It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each
other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with
respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found
PROPERTY
Principal issue in ejectment cases
In a forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere physical or material
possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of
the property involved. [DELA ROSA vs. CARLOS, G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2003]
If the owner himself is the builder, the issue of good faith is irrelevant
Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case
where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the
land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, "where the true owner himself is the builder of
works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant." [PNB vs. DE
JESUS, G.R. No. 149295, September 23, 2003]
CO-OWNERSHIP
PRESCRIPTION
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property
Generally, an action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four
years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is a constructive notice to
all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. On the other hand, Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides: “If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.“ An action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The general rule that the discovery of fraud is
deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is considered a
constructive notice to all persons does not apply in this case. It is true that registration under the
Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
[GSIS vs. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 155206, October 28, 2003]
Action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe, nor is
it barred by laches
In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing.
The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are
basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law.
Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code
conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-
empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set
up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate
their inheritance despite the lapse of time. [AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. HEIRS OF
CALIPAN, G.R. No. 140417, May 28, 2004]
Actions based on written contract prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues
Private respondents' action is based on a written contract. Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code
provides that the prescriptive period for an action on a written contract is 10 years from the time
the right of action accrues. [CHINA AIRLINES, LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 129988,
July 14, 2003]
Donation as a mode of acquiring ownership; requisites for its validity; effect on third persons
As being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of
title over the property from the donor to the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law
requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code
provides, however, that "titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are
not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds)
shall not prejudice third persons." It is enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable
property, that the donation be made in a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the
donation must be registered in the Registry of Property [SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs ROQUE, GR No. 148775, JANUARY 13, 2004]
Concept of Fraud; obligation of other party to fully explain terms of contract where a party is
unable to read or when the contract is in a language not understood by a party and mistake or
fraud is alleged
As defined, fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination,
manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into error. The deceit
employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into
error, taking into account the circumstances of each case.
Where a party is unable to read or when the contract is in a language not understood by a
party and mistake or fraud is alleged, the obligation to show that the terms of the contract had
been fully explained to said party who is unable to read or understand the language of the contract
devolves on the party seeking to enforce it. The burden rests upon the party who seeks to enforce
the contract to show that the other party fully understood the contents of the document. If he fails
to discharge this burden, the presumption of mistake, if not, fraud, stands unrebutted and
controlling. [MAYOR vs. BELEN, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004]
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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Purely Potestative, Suspensive and Conditional Obligations dependent on the whims of the
debtor are prohibited
The Code prohibits purely potestative, suspensive, conditional obligations that depend on
the whims of the debtor, because such obligations are usually not meant to be fulfilled. Indeed, to
allow the fulfillment of conditions to depend exclusively on the debtor's will would be to sanction
illusory obligations. [Vda. DE MISTICA vs SPOUSES NAGUIAT, GR No. 137909, DECEMBER 11,
2003]
CONTRACTS
Mere exchange of offers and counter-offers does not result in a perfected contract
A contract is perfected by mere consent. From the moment of a meeting of the offer and
the acceptance upon the object and the cause that would constitute the contract, consent arises.
However, the offer must be certain and the acceptance seasonable and absolute; if qualified, the
acceptance would merely constitute a counteroffer. While there was an initial offer made, there
was no acceptance; because when there allegedly came an acceptance that could have had a
binding effect, the offer was already lacking.
The Civil Code provides that no contract shall arise unless its acceptance is communicated
to the offeror. That is, the mere determination to accept the proposal of a bidder does not
constitute a contract; that decision must be communicated to the bidder.
Where the parties merely exchange offers and counteroffers, no agreement or contract is
perfected. A party may withdraw its offer or counteroffer prior to its receipt of the other party's
acceptance thereof. To produce an agreement, the offer must be certain and the acceptance
timely and absolute. [THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. vs. ASSET BUILDERS
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 147410, February 5, 2004]
Article 1416 of the Civil Code does not apply to contracts void ab initio
Under Article 1416 of the Civil Code: When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely
prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if
public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to
benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sale of three parcels of
land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio
because they were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to
recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy. [FRENZEL vs. CATITO, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003]
Reformation is the proper remedy if parties failed to include in the written document a
sufficient description of the subject property
Although both parties agreed to transfer one-hectare real property, they failed to include
in the written document a sufficient description of the property to convey. This error is not one for
nullification of the instrument but only for reformation.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of
the parties, the proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.
Reformation is a remedy in equity whereby a written instrument is made or construed so as
to express or conform to the real intention of the parties where some error or mistake has been
committed. In granting reformation, the remedy in equity is not making a new contract for the
parties, but establishing and perpetuating the real contract between the parties which, under the
technical rules of law, could not be enforced but for such reformation.
In order that an action for reformation of instrument as provided in Article 1359 of the Civil
Code may prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must have been a meeting of the
minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the
parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to
mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. [QUIROS vs ARJONA, GR No. 158901, MARCH 9,
2004]
Compromise Agreement
A compromise agreement is an agreement between two or more persons who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their respective positions by mutual consent in the
way they feel they can live with. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the
parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated—such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence—or when there is forgery or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably
unconscionable.
Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary action for specific
performance, the compromise agreement is part and parcel of the judgment, and may therefore be
enforced as such by a writ of execution. [GENOVA vs. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 132076, July 22,
2003]
The stipulations of the contract constitute the law between the parties; thus, courts have
no alternative but to enforce them as agreed upon and written. [Vda. DE MISTICA vs SPOUSES
NAGUIAT, GR No. 137909, DECEMBER 11, 2003]
Incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent renders the contract merely voidable under
the Old Civil Code
The relevant laws governing the minors' redemption in 1973 are the general Civil Code
provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1327 of the Civil Code
provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a contract. Article 1390 provides that a
contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent is voidable or annullable. Thus, the
redemption made by the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab
initio, as petitioners argue. [SAMAHAN NG MAGSASAKA SA SAN JOSEP vs. VALISNO, G.R. No.
158314, June 3, 2004]
Estoppel in Pais
The essential elements of estoppel in pais, in relation to the party sought to be estopped,
are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or, at
least, calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with,
those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation,
that this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the knowledge,
actual or constructive, by him of the real facts. With respect to the party claiming the estoppel,
the conditions he must satisfy are: 1) lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth
as to the facts in question; 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party
to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his position
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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CIVIL LAW
or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice. [SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs ROQUE, GR No. 148775, JANUARY 13, 2004]
He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was
the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith. [HEIRS OF REYES
vs. SPOUSES MIJARES, G.R. No. 143826., August 28, 2003]
Vendors covered by Art. 1602 usually find themselves in an unequal position when
bargaining with the vendees, and will readily sign onerous contracts to get the money they need.
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC- Secretariat),
Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao (Political Law), Francis
Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law), Jinky Ann Uy
(Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
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CIVIL LAW
This is precisely the evil that Art. 1602 seeks to guard against. The evident intent of the provision is
to give the supposed vendor maximum safeguards for the protection of his legal rights under the
true agreement of the parties. Article 1602, par. (1), accords significance to the gross inadequacy
of the price of a purported sale to such an extent as to create the presumption that the transaction
is an equitable mortgage.
The rule is well-settled that a contract appearing on its face to be a definite sale, like the
contract in question, may be interpreted as an equitable mortgage if any of the circumstances in
Art. 1602 of the New Civil Code, such as the gross inadequacy of the price, is present. [CRUZ vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 143388, October 6, 2003]
Remedies of unpaid seller: rescission allowed only in cases where breach is substantial
Under settled doctrine, nonpayment is a resolutory condition that extinguishes the
transaction existing for a time and discharges the obligations created thereunder. The remedy of
the unpaid seller is to sue for collection or, in case of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract.
These alternative remedies of specific performance and rescission are provided under Article 1191.
(SOLIVA vs INTESTATE ESTATE VILLABA, GR No. 154017, DECEMBER 8, 2003)
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that in case an immovable property is sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall belong: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and, (3) in the absence thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In all cases, good faith is essential. It is the basic premise of the preferential rights granted
to the one claiming ownership over an immovable. What is material is whether the second buyer
first registers the second sale in good faith, i.e., without knowledge of any defect in the title of the
property sold. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who
takes the certificate of title in bad faith, with notice of a flaw. [SPS. OCCEÑA vs. ESPONILLA, G.R.
No. 156973, June 4, 2004]
Right of Redemption
Whenever a piece of rural land not exceeding one hectare is alienated, the law grants to
the adjoining owners a right of redemption except when the grantee or buyer does not own any
other rural land. In order that the right may arise, the land sought to be redeemed and the
adjacent property belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption must both be rural
lands. If one or both are urban lands, the right cannot be invoked. [PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP.
vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 150060, August 19, 2003]
Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides that the right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. In stressing the mandatory character of the requirement, the
law states that the deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless the same is
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners. [PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. vs. SPS. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 150060, August 19,
2003]
LEASE
Duty of the lessor to maintain lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease
As lessor, Agricom had the duty to maintain Chua Tee Dee in the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the leased premises. Such duty was made as part of the contract of lease entered
into by the parties. Even if it had not been so, the lessor is still duty-bound under Art.1654 of the
Civil Code. The duty "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease
for the duration of the contract" mentioned in No. 3 of the article is merely a warranty that the
lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal, and not physical, possession. [CHUA TEE DEE vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 135721, May 27, 2004]
Partnership has separate juridical personality; obligation of the partnership; extent of its
liability
“The partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners.” Since the capital was contributed to the partnership, not to petitioners, it is the
partnership that must refund the equity of the retiring partners.
Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the shares of
the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other
words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before
the partners can be paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated.
After all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes available
for the payment of the partners’ shares. [VILLAREAL vs. RAMIREZ, G.R. No. 144214, July 14,
2003]
AGENCY
TRUSTS
Constructive Trusts
The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that is akin to the implied
trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code, "If an absolute conveyance of property is made in
order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by
virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it
becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him."
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustee's sole
duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course,
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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the "wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must
himself do equity."
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this
case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the
Civil Code, "When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give,
the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have
received . . . In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which,
with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who
is bound to return." [MORENO vs. MACTAN — CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, G.R.
No. 156273, October 15, 2003]
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
LOAN
Contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions on simple loan
despite the fiduciary nature of bank-deposit relationship
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the
contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether
express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not
a breach of trust. The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and
performance in complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those
required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement
because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves. The
law allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the highest
possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to the
bank and not to the depositors who are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors are cestui que
trust of banks, then the interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that
Congress certainly did not intend in enacting Section 2 of RA 8791. [THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and
TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 138569, September 11, 2003]
"1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
"3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit." [SPS. BIESTERBOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
No. 152529, September 22, 2003]
GUARANTY
Effect of extending the period for enforcing the indebtedness on the liability of sureties
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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CIVIL LAW
Stated otherwise, an extension of the period for enforcing the indebtedness does not by
itself bring about the discharge of the sureties unless the extra time is not permitted within the
terms of the waiver, i.e., where there is no payment or there is deficient settlement of the
marginal deposit and the twenty-five percent (25%) consideration, in which case the illicit
extension releases the sureties. Under Art. 2055 of the Civil Code, the liability of a surety is
measured by the terms of his contract, and while he is liable to the full extent thereof, his
accountability is strictly limited to that assumed by its terms.
The foregoing extensions of the letters of credit made by respondent Bank without
observing the rigid restrictions for exercising the privilege are not covered by the waiver stipulated
in the Continuing Guaranty. Evidently, they constitute illicit extensions prohibited under Art. 2079
of the Civil Code, "[a]n extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the
guarantor extinguishes the guaranty." This act of the Bank is not mere failure or delay on its part to
demand payment after the debt has become due, as was the case in unpaid five (5) letters of credit
which the Bank did not extend, defer or put off, but comprises conscious, separate and binding
agreements to extend the due date, as was admitted by the Bank itself.
The consequence of these omissions is to discharge the surety, petitioners herein, under
Art. 2080 of the Civil Code, or at the very least, mitigate the liability of the surety up to the value
of the property or lien released [SPOUSES LUIS TOH vs SOLID BANK CORPORATION, GR No.
154183, AUGUST 7, 2003]
Surety need not have consideration apart from that of the principal in the contract;
consideration of principal binds the surety and makes the contract effective
A surety is one who is solidarily liable with the principal. Petitioners cannot claim that they
did not personally receive any consideration for the contract for well-entrenched is the rule that
the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not pass directly to the surety, a
consideration moving to the principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same
consideration that makes the contract effective between the principal parties thereto. Having
executed the suretyship agreement, there can be no dispute on the personal liability of petitioners.
[SPOUSES EVANGELISTA vs. MERCATOR FINANCE CORP., G.R. No. 148864, August 21, 2003]
MORTGAGE
Nature of Mortgage
Article 2126 of the Civil Code describes the real nature of a mortgage: it is a real right
following the property, such that in subsequent transfers by the mortgagor, the transferee must
respect the mortgage. A registered mortgage lien is considered inseparable from the property
inasmuch as it is a right in rem. The mortgage creates a real right or a lien which, after being
recorded, follows the chattel wherever it goes. Under Article 2129 of the same Code, the mortgage
on the property may still be foreclosed despite the transfer.
Indeed, even if the mortgaged property is in the possession of the debtor, the creditor is
still protected. To protect the latter from the former's possible disposal of the property, the
chattel mortgage is made effective against third persons by the process of registration.
"The consideration of the accessory contract of real estate mortgage is the same as that of
the principal contract. For the debtor, the consideration of his obligation to pay is the existence of
a debt. Thus, in the accessory contract of real estate mortgage, the consideration of the debtor in
furnishing the mortgage is the existence of a valid, voidable, or unenforceable debt. [PNB vs. RBL
ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. No. 149569. May 28, 2004]
Pactum Commissorium
It is a well-established doctrine that the mortgagor's default does not operate to vest the
mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property, and the act of the mortgagee in registering
the mortgaged property in his own name upon the mortgagor's failure to redeem the property
amounts to pactum commissorium, a forfeiture clause declared by this Court as contrary to good
morals and public policy and, therefore, void. Before perfect title over a mortgaged property may
thus be secured by the mortgagee, he must, in case of non-payment of the debt, foreclose the
mortgage first and thereafter purchase the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale. [RAMIREZ
vs COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 133841, AUGUST 15, 2003]
2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SUBJECT CHAIRPERSONS
Maricel Abarentos (Over-all Chairperson), Ronald Jalmanzar (Over-all Vice Chair), Yolanda Tolentino (VC-Acads), Jennifer Ang (VC- Secretariat),
Joy Inductivo (VC-Finance), Elaine Masukat (VC-EDP), Anna Margarita Eres (VC-Logistics) Jonathan Mangundayao (Political Law), Francis
Benedict Reotutar (Labor Law),
Romuald Padilla (Civil Law), Charmaine Torres (Taxation Law), Mark David Martinez (Criminal Law), Garny Luisa Alegre (Commercial Law), Jinky Ann Uy
(Remedial Law), Jackie Lou Bautista (Legal Ethics)
19
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CIVIL LAW
Definition of a Right
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of
one person against the other.
When a right is exercised in a manner, which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. [MWSS vs ACT
THEATER, INC., GR No., JUNE 17, 2004]
Presumption of Negligence
Article 2185 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Under Article 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an
employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the
supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and the supervision of its employee.
In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable
only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including
documentary evidence. [PLEYTO vs. LOMBOY, G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004]
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent. [THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST
CORPORATION vs COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 138569, SEPTEMBER 11, 2003]
Recovery of damages for loss of earning capacity; computation of loss of earning capacity
Article 2205 of the New Civil Code allows the recovery of damages for "loss or impairment
of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury." Such damages covers the
loss sustained by the dependents or heirs of the deceased, consisting of the support they would
have received from him had he not died because of the negligent act of another. The loss is not
equivalent to the entire earnings of the deceased, but only that portion that he would have used to
support his dependents or heirs. Hence, we deduct from his gross earnings the necessary expenses
supposed to be used by the deceased for his own needs. The Court explained in Villa Rey Transit,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that: “the award of damages for loss of earning capacity is concerned with
the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents
and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his
earnings, but of the support they received or would have received from him had he not died in
consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must
reckon with the 'necessary expenses of his own living', which should be deducted from his earnings.
Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate
for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire
money, 'less the necessary expense for his own living.' Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is
not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the
beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning are to be
considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings
or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
Aside from the loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased, another factor considered in
determining the award of loss of earning capacity is the life expectancy of the deceased which
takes into account his work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the accident. [MAGBANUA
vs. TABUSARES, G.R. No. 152134, June 4, 2004]
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the factors that should be taken into account in
determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the
victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the
formula (2/3 x [80 – age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the
Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by
multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. 24
Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity
= [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living
expenses)].
It was established that Ricardo Lomboy was 44 years old at the time of his death and is
earning a monthly income of P8,000 or a gross annual income (GAI) of P96,000. Using the cited
formula, the Court of Appeals correctly computed the Loss of Net Earning Capacity as P1,152,000,
net of and after considering a reasonable and necessary living expenses of 50% of the gross annual
income or P48,000. A detailed computation is as follows:
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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We affirm the award of moral damages, there being proof that the victim's mother and her
family suffered wounded feeling, mental anguish and similar injury. However, we reduce the award
to P50,000.00. Verily, moral damages are not intended to enrich the victim's heirs; rather they are
awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and
psychological suffering. [PEOPLE vs. SIMON, G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004.]
We also award the victim's heirs P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. This is pursuant to our
ruling in People vs. Catubig that if a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified. [PEOPLE vs.
SIMON, G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004]
Foreshore Land
Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide. It is that part of the land adjacent to the
sea, which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the
alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not
Effect of Registration
Of no moment in the instant case is the issuance of a Torrens certificate pertaining to the
disputed property. It "does not create or vest title," but is merely an "evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein."
Land registration under the Torrens system was never intended to be a means of acquiring
ownership. [LARENA vs MAPILI, GR No. 146341, AUGUST 7, 2003]
Certificate of Title
“The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under
the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.
Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land. Besides, their certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the
equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeable”. [PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 114172, August 25, 2003]
Persons dealing with a registered property is not required to go beyond the certificate;
Exception
As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE AND DIGEST POOL
CHAIRPERSON: Romuald Padilla ASST. CHAIRPERSON: Vida Bocar, Joyce Vidad EDP’S: Alnaiza Hassiman, Dots Gayon SUBJECT HEADS: Butch Marasigan
(Persons and Family Relations), Donnie Casabar (Property), Aira Ferrer (Wills and Succession), Ian Pua (Obligations and Contracts), Lai Dumama (Sales and
Lease),
Stephen Quiambao (PAT), Chris Cabigao (Credit Transactions), Ligaya Alipao (Torts and Damages), Anthony Purganan (LTD), Rica Tugadi (Conflicts of Law)
DIGEST POOL: Michael Acejo, Johnsen Alejandro, Madelyn Almazora, Rowena Antonio, Anissa Apolinario, Katrina Atienza, Jen Balboa, Ishmalyn Balbontin,
Ian Bartolome, Regina Batac, Janet Calderon, Hashreen Caudang, Bambi Delos Reyes, Jeenice de Sagun, Wren Dones, Edsel Duque, Rojane Elopre,
Ulysses Gonzales, Randy Guina, Mae Ann Gutierrez, Ghia Hurtado, Anelyn Javillonar, Jessette Labriaga, Maureen Lontoc, Diana Marie Miano, Sophie
Nepomuceno, Genevieve Nueve, Louell Pamela Neri, Iggy Sapalo, Ayn Sarsaba, Rachelle Saya, Pam Solis, Tom Timbol, Paulette Tongcua, Jocelyn Tsang,
Joanne Villareal, Rhyne Ypulong.
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beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this principle admits
of an unchallenged exception: “a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not
merit the protection of the law.” [CAYANA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 125607, March 18,
2004]
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go
beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances
which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold
to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course, expected from the
purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the
occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in concept of
owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises
involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the
land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller . . ., it would then be
incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure
of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and
would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a 'purchaser in good faith'.
(HEIRS OF CELESTIAL vs HEIRS CELESTIAL, GR No. 142691, August 5, 2003)
The general rule is that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system
need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. However, this principle does not apply when
the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in
his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated
an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith. [SPS. OCCEÑA vs. ESPONILLA, G.R.
No. 156973, June 4, 2004]
Effect of registration where vendor was no longer the owner at the time of the registration
“Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is ‘without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court
to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land
if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody
else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. [SPS. ABRIGO vs. DE VERA, G.R. No. 154409, June
21, 2004]
The requirement that the survey plan must be appended to the application and duly approved
by the bureau of lands is mandatory
The application for land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance (now
RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the