FIRST DIVISION
The rebuff, according to complainant,
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY TAN,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6634
Promulgated:
August 23, 2007
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Tan Tiong
Bio, a.k.a. Henry Tan, against Atty. Renato L. Gonzales for allegedly
notarizing a conveying deed outside the territory covered by his notarial
commission and without requiring the personal presence before him of the
signatories to the deed before notarizing the same, in violation of the Notarial
Law and the lawyers oath.
As records reveal, complainant purchased several parcels of land at the
Manila Southwoods Residential Estates (Southwoods, for short), a mix
residential-commercial complex situated in Carmona, Cavite owned/operated
by Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI) and Fil-Estate Properties,
Inc. (FEPI). FEPI has its office at Renaissance Towers, Meralco Avenue,
Pasig City. In one of the transactions adverted to, complainant, as vendee,
was made to sign and execute Deed of Sale No. 1108[2] (Deed 1108,
hereinafter) covering a lot described in and covered by the vendors Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-427206. Following payment of the contract
price in full, including miscellaneous expenses, TCT No. 968702 in
complainants name was delivered to him with the corresponding completed
deed of sale. Respondent Renato L. Gonzales, employed as corporate
counsel for FEPI and appointed/reappointed from 1996 to 2001 as notary
public for Quezon City[3], was the notarizing officer of Deed 1108 on which
the name and signature of Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (Bondoc) appear as the
vendors authorized representative.
As complainant would allege in his Complaint Affidavit dated November 17,
2003, and its annexes, sometime in 1995, he made another Southwoods
purchase covering Lot 10, Block 27, Phase 3 (or Lot 10). Several years
following his payment of the amount of P2,068,523, representing the full
purchase price for Lot 10 and after he had signed a deed with the space for
the title number and technical description left in blank, complainant
repeatedly asked for but was not able to secure a certificate of title for the
same or a refund of his payment.
impelled him to file a case for estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City.
In connection with the estafa charge, so complainant claims, Ms. Bondoc,
signatory (for FEGDI as vendor) to Deed 1108, executed a counter-affidavit
therein stating that she had not personally met nor transacted with the
complainant either with respect to the negotiations for the sale of the land
covered by TCT No. T-427206 nor during the execution of Deed 1108.
Complainant would add, however, that Ms. Bondoc admitted that she and the
complainant did sign the said deed of sale, but at different times and in
different places, and not in each others presence,[4] like other signed
hundreds of deeds (of sale) over other documents for our behalf of the
President [of Fil-Estate] with buyers [she] had never (even) met.[5]
It is on the basis of Ms. Bondocs foregoing statements that complainant
initiated the present disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), it being his posture that respondent Gonzales notarized
Deed 1108 without requiring him, or Ms. Bondoc, to appear and
acknowledge before him the due and voluntary execution thereof, a practice
not only violative of the Notarial Law, but detrimental to his interests and
those similarly situated as well.
Respondent, in his Verified Answer,[6] was less than categorical on the
matter of whether or not complainant and Ms. Bondoc, vis--vis Deed 1108,
indeed appeared before him and attested to the contents and the truth of
what are stated in the deed. Instead, he alleged as follows:
10. Because of the hundreds of documents I have notarized, I do not recall
with absolute certainty the details of the notarization ceremony of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in question. Nevertheless, what I do know is that I have
personally met both complainant and Atty. Bondoc and notarized documents
which they had acknowledged. Based on the admissions of both the
complainant and Atty. Bondoc that they have not personally met, it appears
that in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale in question, both complainant
and Atty. Bondoc appeared before me and signed, but at different times.
11. As a matter of practice, I require the personal appearance of all parties
who seek to have deeds of sale notarized. However, the parties need not
necessarily sign and acknowledge their acts in one anothers presence. xxx
13. Thus, complainant cannot dispute that both signatories to the Deed of
Absolute Sale personally appeared before me ., albeit at different times. That
is all that is required by law. The fact that the signatories to the Deed signed
and acknowledged the same on different occasions is of no moment, and
certainly does not constitute misconduct on my part.
xxxxxxxxx
15. The only basis for the charge of professional misconduct against me is
that I allowed the signatories to acknowledge their signatures on the Deed of
Absolute Sale at different times. However, complainant fails to cite any law or
rule which obliges a notary public to require the parties to the instrument to
simultaneously appear before him, as in fact, there is none. Thus, even if I
did not require complainant and Atty. Bondoc to personally appear before me
at the same time, I cannot be faulted for such, as I am not required to do
so.[7]
The respondent parlays in his answer the idea of laches, arguing that the
transaction in question took place in 2001, while complainant initiated the
disbarment charge only in November 2003.
At the preliminary conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission), complainant and respondent entered into the following
stipulation of facts, to wit:
[T]he Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 was duly executed by Mr. Henry Tan
and Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc as authorized signatory of the seller; that
the subject document was notarized by respondent as document no. 367,
page no. 74, book no. 8, series of 2001 of his notarial register; that
respondent admits that his notarial appointment covers Quezon City and that
the subject document was notarized in Pasig City, specifically, at the
Renaissance Tower; and that the parties admit that Atty. Alice Odchigue-
Bondoc and Henry Tan Tan were not present at the same time when the
subject document was notarized xxx (Underscoring added.)
After due hearings, Investigating Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila submitted
his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated August 27, 2004, which, as
approved by the IBP Director for Bar Discipline, was forwarded to the Court.
In the report, the Commission recommended that respondent be adjudged
liable and penalized for violating the rule proscribing one from acting as a
notary outside the area covered by his commission, but recommended the
dismissal of the complaint insofar as it charges the respondent for notarizing
a document without the personal appearance before him of the party-
signatories thereto.
We agree.
As aptly found by the Investigating Commissioner, delving on the second part
of the recommendation, complainant failed to substantiate with competent
proof his allegations that respondent performed the notarial procedure on
Deed 1108 without his (complainant) being present to acknowledge the due
execution thereof. Being a notarized document, Deed 1108 and the
solemnities attending its execution are disputably presumed to be regular.[8]
Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the certification in Deed 1108
that the vendor and the vendee personally appeared before the respondent
to acknowledge the same must be upheld. As we said in Vda. De Rosales v.
Ramos,[9] when a notary certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal, the document thus notarized is converted
into a public document. To us and to the Investigating Commissioner,[10] the
declaration of Ms. Bondoc in her counter-affidavit before the prosecutors
office is not the clear and convincing evidence required to overturn the
presumption of regularity. Ms. Bondocs declaration that she had not met or
dealt directly with Southwoods buyers does not necessarily prove that such
buyers and FEPIs representatives in the purchase did not in fact appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the fact of contract execution before
him. If at all, Ms. Bondocs declaration simply means that she has not
personally met the buyers, or, with like effect, that she, as representative of
the seller, has not appeared together with the buyers before the notarizing
officer. As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to whether or not the parties
to a conveying instrument must be present before the notary public at the
same time when they acknowledge its due execution.
There can be quibbling, however, that the respondent breached the
injunction against notarizing a document in a place outside ones commission.
As reported by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent acknowledged
that from February 1, 1996 to September 30, 2001, within which period Deed
1108 was notarized, his notarial commission then issued was for Quezon
City.[11] Deed 1108 was, however, notarized in Pasig City. To compound
matters, he admitted having notarized hundreds of documents in Pasig City,
where he used to hold office, [12] during the period that his notarial
commission was only for and within Quezon City.
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of
notarizing documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by
his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.
While perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the
violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray [13] is very much
apropos:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine
Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition
of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public.[14] Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a
commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than
casual.[15]
For all legal intents and purposes, respondent, by performing through the
years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized, has indulged
in deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent
likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.
To be sure, respondent cannot plausibly seek refuge in the complainants
alleged delay in filing the instant complaint for disbarment. He cannot, as a
means to defeat the present charge, invoke the complainants ill-motive in
filing said complaint. We have, time and again, held that the Courts
disciplinary authority cannot be defeated or frustrated by a mere delay in
filing the complaint, or by the complainants motivation to do so. The practice
of law is so delicately affected by public interest that it is both a right and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
public welfare.[16] Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint
against a member of the bar does not prescribe.[17]
Needless to stress, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his
capacity as member of the bar and as a notary public. His proven
transgression does not, however, merit disbarment, as urged by the
complainant. This most severe form of disciplinary sanction ought to be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of a respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of
the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired.[18]
The IBP Report recommended the revocation of respondents commission as
a notary public (in any jurisdiction), if still existing, and that he henceforth be
disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. A
one-month suspension from the practice of law for violation of Canon 1[19]
and Rule 1.01[20] of the Code of Professional Responsibility is also
recommended for the respondent.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,[21] the Court meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from law practice on Atty. Simpliciano as well as his permanent
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for notarizing
several documents after his commission as notary public had already
expired.
Considering the circumstances and the extent of respondents willful
malfeasance, and guided by Zoreta, a penalty higher than that recommended
by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline ought to be imposed.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Renato L. Gonzales is PERMANENTLY
BARRED from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective
upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land, through the
Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and let the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified of this Decision
which is hereby ordered duly recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7781 September 12, 2008
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, ET AL. vs. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7781 September 12, 2008
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L.
FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI, and JUANITO V. LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano,
Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V.
Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent
notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by them and their sister, Zenaida
V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged that: (1) their signatures in this
document were forged; (2) they did not appear and acknowledge the
document on July 16, 2004 before respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3)
their purported community tax certificates indicated in the document were not
theirs.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements in
the acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made it
appear, among other things, that complainants "personally came and
appeared before him" and that they affixed their signatures on the document
in his presence. In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively
enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of their deceased
parents’ property in Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell the same to the Department of
Public Works and Highways.
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of the
document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He explained
that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the representation
and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the community
tax certificates appearing in the document were true and correct." Navarro
would not, according to respondent, lie to him having known, and being
neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally, respondent disclaimed liability
for any damage or injury considering that the falsified document had been
revoked and canceled.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned document bore
the signatures and community tax certificates of, and purports to have been
executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2) respondent indeed notarized the
questioned document on July 16, 2004; (3) complainants did not appear and
acknowledge the document before respondent on July 16, 2004; (4)
respondent notarized the questioned document only on Navarro’s
representation that the signatures appearing and community tax certificates
were true and correct; and (5) respondent did not ascertain if the purported
signatures of each of the complainants appearing in the document belonged
to them.
The Commission concluded that with respondent’s admission of having
notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as thus
established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial Law had
been committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila, personally came and
appeared the above-named persons with their respective Community Tax
Certificates as follows:
xxxx
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument and they acknowledge to me that the same is their own free act
and deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably with
the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,1 that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial commission, if still
existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary
public for two (2) years. On September 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-147, adopting and approving the report
and recommendation of the Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises
holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain from
affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons
who signed it are the same individuals who executed and personally
appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated
therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the Notarial Law, an
instrument or document shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment
is made in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by
law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.2
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document
in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is
the party’s free act or deed.3 Furthermore, notaries public are required by the
Notarial Law to certify that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and
presented before the notaries public the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place, and
date of issue as part of certification.4 Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice5 now requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase "competent evidence of
identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not
limited to, passport, driver’s license, Professional Regulations Commission
ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID,
voter’s ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior
citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of
registration, government office ID, certificate from the National Council for the
Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and
Development certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated
February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and
who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of
whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public documentary
identification.
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be remembered that
notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a
private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.6 A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face
and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic
requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public on notorized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two
(2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision, with WARNING that a
repetition of the same negligent act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the
IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it
entered into respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6,
2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for
his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in the
violation of their rights over their property.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco
(Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements,
consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B,
C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary
public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly
executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The
notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P.
Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before
respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainant’s husband
died on July 29, 2003.3
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and
issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that
respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only
violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law.
Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a
deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son,
Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco,
through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see
him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street,
Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick
and wanted to discuss something with him.
Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and
sickly, but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed
him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation.
Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed
of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be
notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him.
Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed
deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally
notarize and acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his
law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29,
2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation.
Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment
to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which
was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was
established that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent
on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the
one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the
notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty.
Linco died.81avvphi1
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating
the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the
donor appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003,
it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July
30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on
July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a
public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion
of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco
"personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is
also violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission
be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a
period of two (2) years.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19,
2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying
complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed
resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated
anything new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the
reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent
violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as
notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for
reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court,
recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.
RULING
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently
established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the
deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he
knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation.
We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more
than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the
deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty.
Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with
the notarization of the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in
order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that
respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act
of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the
very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and
appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not
have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July
29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14
Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the
importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document;
thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument.16
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.17
Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A

graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging
complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held
liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his

duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were
imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional

Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D.
LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision
in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7591 March 20, 2012
CORAZON T. NEVADA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Corazon T. Nevada (Nevada) seeks the disbarment of Atty. Rodolfo D.
Casuga (Casuga) for alleged violation of his lawyer’s oath and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Rules).
The Facts
Nevada is the principal stockholder of C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc., a family
corporation which operates the Mt. Crest Hotel located at Legarda Road,
Baguio City (the Hotel).
In her affidavit-complaint1 dated June 28, 2007, with annexes, Nevada
alleges that she and Casuga are members of the One in Jesus Christ
Church, a religious group which counts the latter as one of its "elders."
According to Nevada, she has allowed the use of one of the Hotel’s functions
rooms for church services. And in time, Casuga was able to gain her trust
and confidence.
Nevada further alleges that unbeknownst to her, Casuga, sometime in 2006,
started to represent himself as the administrator of the Hotel. In fact, on
March 1, 2006, he entered into a contract of lease2 with a certain Jung Jong
Chul (Chul) covering an office space in the Hotel. Notably, Casuga signed
the lease contract over the printed name of one Edwin T. Nevada and
notarized the document himself.
Annex "B"3 of the affidavit-complaint is a notarized letter dated May 15,
2007, wherein Chul attested that he gave Casuga, upon contract signing, the
amount of ninety thousand pesos (PhP 90,000) as rental deposit for the
office space. The amount thus deposited, so Nevada claims, was never
turned over to her or to C.T. Nevada & Sons, Inc.
Nevada adds that, in the course of their acquaintanceship, Casuga was able
to acquire from her several pieces of jewelry: a ¾ K diamond solitaire ring,
earrings with three (3) diamonds each and a ring with three (3) diamonds,
with an aggregate value of three hundred thousand pesos (PhP 300,000),
and a solid gold Rolex watch with diamond dials valued at twelve thousand
US dollars (USD 12,000). Casuga took possession of the valuables
purportedly with the obligation of selling them and to remit any proceeds to
Nevada. However, despite repeated demands by Nevada for Casuga to
return the valuables or otherwise remit the proceeds of the sale, no jewelry or
money was ever returned.
In compliance with a directive from the Court, Casuga submitted an Affidavit4
dated December 5, 2007, as comment on the administrative complaint. In it,
Casuga claims that Nevada informally instituted him as the administrator of
the Hotel in a limited capacity but denied receiving the PhP 90,000 from
Chul. With regard to the pieces of jewelry and the Rolex watch, Casuga
stated that Nevada actually pawned them in a pawnshop and that she later
asked his wife to redeem them using their own money. Thereafter, Nevada
asked Casuga’s wife to sell the valuables and reimburse herself from the
proceeds of the sale.
By Resolution of July 2, 2008, the Court, thru the Office of the Bar Confidant,
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation/decision. The case was docketed
as CBD Case No. 7591 entitled Corazon T. Nevada v. Atty. Rodolfo D.
Casuga.
On September 22, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), thru
Commisioner Norberto B. Ruiz, issued and sent out a Notice of Mandatory
Conference directing the parties to appear before it on October 23, 2008. On
that date, only Nevada showed up, prompting the designated commissioner
to reset the conference to November 25, 2008, with a warning that he,
Casuga, will be declared in default and the case submitted for resolution
should he again fail to appear. November 25, 2008 came, but only Nevada
was present at the conference. Thus, CBD Case No. 7591 was submitted for
resolution on the basis of Nevada’s Position Paper dated December 3, 2008
and the evidence she submitted consisting of, among others, twenty-one (21)
official rental receipts Casuga issued to at least two (2) lessors of the Hotel.
Results of the Investigation

In its Report and Recommendation5 dated January 14, 2009, the IBP CBD
found Casuga guilty of the charges against him, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is hereby recommended that Casuga
be suspended for one (1) year for gross misconduct, violation of the notarial
law and infidelity in the custody of monies, jewelries and a Rolex watch which
pertain to the complainant and the family corporation.
The IBP Board of Governors later adopted and approved the CBD’s Report
and Recommendation, with modification, as indicated in Resolution No. XIX-
2010-461 dated August 28, 2010, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled
case x x x; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Casuga’s
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
misappropriation of his client[’s] funds and jewelries, for violation of the
Notarial Law when he signed as a party to a lease contract and notarized the
same and also taking into consideration the gravity of the offense committed,
Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
four (4) years. In addition, Atty. Casuga is Suspended or Disqualified from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years and Ordered to Return the
amount of P90,000.00, jewelries amounting to P300,000.00 and the Rolex
watch valued at $12,000.00 or its equivalent to Mr. Jung Jong Chul,
otherwise his Suspension shall continue.
The CBD Report and Recommendation and a copy of Resolution No. XIX-
2010-461 were subsequently forwarded to the Court along with the records
of the case.
In the meantime, Nevada, upon receipt of a copy of Resolution No. XIX-
2010-461, wrote and asked the IBP Board of Governors to rectify said
resolution. Instead of the return of the amount of PhP 90,000, the jewelry and
the Rolex watch or their monetary value to Chul, as directed in the resolution,
Nevada requested the return to be made in her favor. The letter-request of
Nevada had remained not acted upon owing obviously to the fact that the
records of the case have been transmitted to the Court in the interim.
The Issues
The principal but simple issues in this case pivot on the guilt of Casuga for
the charges detailed or implied in the basic complaint; and the propriety of
the return to Nevada of the items, or their money value, and the amount
subject of the case.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the CBD’s inculpatory findings, as endorsed by the IBP Board
of Governors, and the recommended upgrading of penalties, as shown in
Resolution No. XIX-2010-461, but subject to the modification as shall be
discussed.
Casuga is guilty of gross misconduct for misrepresenting himself
In re Horrilleno6 defined "gross misconduct" in the following wise:
The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance under Philippine law are
two: (1) Serious misconduct and (2) inefficiency. The latter ground is not
involved in these proceedings. As to the first, the law provides that "sufficient
cause" must exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court involving "serious
misconduct." The adjective is "serious;" that is, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The noun is "misconduct;" that is, a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The
word "misconduct" implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error or
judgment. For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules. (Lawlor vs. People [1874], 74 Ill., 228; Citizens' Insurance Co. vs.
Marsh [1861], 41 Pa., 386; Miller vs. Roby [1880], 9 Neb., 471; Smith vs.
Cutler [1833], 10 Wend. [N.Y.], 590; U.S. vs. Warner [1848], 28 Fed. Cas.
No. 16643; In re Tighe [1904], 89 N.Y. Supra., 719.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The above definition was to be reiterated in Ajeno v. Judge Inserto,7 where
the Court wrote:
In the case of In re [Horrilleno], 43 Phil. 212, this Court previously ruled that
"For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing
that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules."
Of similar tenor is the definition provided in Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong:8
x x x The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct – defined
as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or
persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules x x x.
Respondent Casuga represented himself as a duly-authorized representative
of Nevada when in fact he was not. Casuga admitted signing the subject
contract of lease, but claimed that he was duly authorized to do so by
Nevada. However, Casuga failed to adduce an iota of evidence to prove that
he was indeed so authorized. One who alleges the existence of an agency
relationship must prove such fact. The Court ruled in Yun Kwan Byung v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,9 "The law makes no
presumption of agency and proving its existence, nature and extent is
incumbent upon the person alleging it."
Plainly enough, Casuga is guilty of misrepresentation, when he made it
appear that he was authorized to enter into a contract of lease in behalf of
Nevada when, in fact, he was not. Furthermore, the records reveal that
Casuga received the rentals by virtue of the contract of lease, benefitting
from his misrepresentation. Chul’s notarized letter of May 15, 2007
sufficiently shows that Casuga indeed received PhP 90,000 as rental deposit
from Chul. In his affidavit-comment dated December 5, 2007, Casuga denied
having received such amount, alleging that a certain Pastor Oh, who
purportedly introduced him to Chul, received the money. However, Casuga
again failed to adduce a single piece of evidence to support his contention. A
bare denial must fail in light of the positive assertion of Chul, who appears to
have no ulterior motive to incriminate Casuga.
In Tan v. Gumba,10 the respondent lawyer similarly misrepresented herself
to have been authorized to sell a parcel of land by virtue of a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA). By virtue of the SPA, the lawyer was able to obtain a loan
from the complainant, secured by the said parcel of land through an "open"
deed of sale. When the respondent lawyer defaulted in the payment of the
loan, it turned out that the SPA only authorized the lawyer to mortgage the
property to a bank. Thus, the complainant could not register the deed of sale
with the register of deeds and could not recover the amount that he loaned to
the lawyer. In that case, the Court ruled:
Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into
lending money to her through the use of documents and false
representations and taking advantage of her education and complainant’s
ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by complainant, he would have
never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondent’s
misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and if
respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the "open" deed
of sale if she fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded
not only complainant’s perception of the legal profession but the public’s
perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she
may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, by maintaining an office within the Hotel, taking
advantage of his apparent close relationship to Nevada, and through the use
of false representations, Casuga led Chul to believe that he was the
administrator of the Hotel, when in fact he was not. By doing so, he made it
appear that he was duly authorized to enter into contracts for the Hotel and
to receive rentals from its occupants. His fraudulent scheme enabled Casuga
to collect rentals from the occupants of the Hotel, Chul in particular, which he
did not transmit to Nevada. Worse still, Casuga obtained money belonging to
the Hotel. Following the principle laid down in Tan, Casuga’s
misrepresentation properly constitutes gross misconduct for which he must
be disciplined.
Notably, in Tan, the respondent lawyer was held guilty of misconduct and
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Casuga also violated Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
With regard to the jewelry and watch entrusted to him, Casuga alleged that
Nevada pawned them and thereafter instructed Casuga’s wife to redeem
them with the latter’s money. He added that Nevada then instructed his wife
to sell the valuables and use the proceeds to reimburse herself for the
redemption price. Again, however, Casuga’s allegations are unsupported by
a single shred of evidence. Pawnshop receipts would have provided the best
evidence under the circumstances. But they were not presented, too.
Moreover, Casuga’s admission that the valuables are indeed in his
possession, without any adequate reason, supports Nevada’s version of the
story. Casuga’s failure to return such property or remit the proceeds of the
sale is a blatant violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (the Code). The Code’s Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 state:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his profession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Having been tasked to sell such valuables, Casuga was duty-bound to return
them upon Nevada’s demand. His failure to do so renders him subject to
disciplinary action. To be sure, he cannot use, as a defense, the lack of a
lawyer-client relationship as an exonerating factor. In Barcenas v. Alvero,11
the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after
he failed to account for or return PhP 300,000 that was entrusted to him for
deposit with the courts. The Court ruled:
From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client
relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing
that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to his client. x x x
Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds
and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall
deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon
demand. x x x
[Respondent] Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed
no attorney-client relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were
true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it
that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
Atty. Alvero’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when
due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his
lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of
disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the
money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior
for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to return, upon demand, the items entrusted to him by Nevada
or remit the proceeds of the sale, Casuga violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.03
of the Code.
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit,12 the Court suspended a lawyer from the
practice of law for two (2) years for failing to account for the money and
properties of his client. Similarly, in Small v. Banares,13 a lawyer was also
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, as he failed to return
the money of his client that he was holding in trust and for failing to file an
answer to the complaint and his refusal to appear at the mandatory
conference before the IBP. Thus, the same penalty should be imposed upon
Casuga.
Casuga violated the Notarial Rules
The Notarial Rules, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, provides in its Rule IV, Section
1(c) and Sec. 3(a) when a notary public may sign a document in behalf of
another person, thus:
SEC. 1. Powers. – x x x
xxxx
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is
physically unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark
to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: "Signature affixed by notary
in presence of (names and addresses of person and two (2) witnesses)";
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.
On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. 3(a) disqualifies a notary public from
performing a notarial act if he or she "is a party to the instrument or
document that is to be notarized."
None of the requirements contained in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a
notary signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case.
Moreover, Casuga’s act of affixing his signature above the printed name
"Edwin T. Nevada," without any qualification, veritably made him a party to
the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which
he is a party is a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the
Notarial Rules, for which he can be disciplinarily sanctioned provided under
Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the Notarial Rules, which provides:
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. – x x x.
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or
impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who:
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or
mandated by these Rules;
Aside from being a violation of the Notarial Rules, Casuga’s aforementioned
act partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct punishable under the
ensuing Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, x x x or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
So it was that in Lanuzo v. Bongon14 the Court suspended a notary public
from the practice of law for one (1) year for violation of the Notarial Rules.
This was on top of the penalty of disqualification from being commissioned
as a notary public for two (2) years.
In Dela Cruz v. Zabala,15 the Court adjudged the respondent notary public
guilty of gross negligence for failing to require the parties to be physically
present before him. In revoking the erring notary’s commission, the Court, in
Dela Cruz, stressed the significance of notarization and proceeded to define
the heavy burden that goes when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary
public. The Court wrote:
x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that x x x notarization
x x x converts a private document into a public document making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof.
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of x x x duties; otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
xxxx
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because what are
stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally
sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said
documents as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements.1âwphi1 By affixing his notarial seal on the
instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. x x x As a lawyer commissioned to be a
notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with
faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in
an acknowledgment or jurat. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent
upon him, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.16 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The recommended penalty must be modified
Considering the various infractions Casuga committed, as discussed above,
the aggregate penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors of
suspension from the practice of law for four (4) years was correct. It hews
with prevailing jurisprudence as cited above. However, Casuga’s
disqualification from reappointment as notary public for two (2) years should
match his suspension from the practice of law. The disqualification should
accordingly be increased to four (4) years, since only a lawyer in good
standing can be granted the commission of a notary public.
The desired disbarment of Casuga, however, is too severe a sanction to
impose under the premises; it cannot be granted. The penalty of disbarment
shall be meted out only when the lawyer’s misconduct borders on the
criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.17

The money, jewelry and Rolex watch should be returned to Nevada

Nevada’s plea that the rental deposit of PhP 90,000, the pieces of jewelry
worth PhP 300,000, and the Rolex watch valued at USD 12,000 or its
equivalent in Philippine Peso should be ordered returned to her instead of to
Jung Jong Chul is well-taken. We need not belabor the fact that Chul has no
right whatsoever over the amount or property mentioned above.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga GUILTY of gross

misconduct for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Rules. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of four (4) years from the practice of law. The notarial commission of
Atty. Casuga, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as Notary Public also for four (4) years.
Additionally, he is ordered to return the amount of PhP 90,000, the pieces of
jewelry subject of this case or their equivalent of PhP 300,000, and the Rolex
watch valued at USD 12,000 or its equivalent in Philippine Peso to Corazon
T. Nevada within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision; otherwise, he
shall be cited for contempt. Lastly, Atty. Casuga is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Rodolfo D. Casuga as a member of
the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all trial courts for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9514 April 10, 2013
BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N.
Jandoquile against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.
The Facts of the case are not disputed.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit2 signed by Heneraline L.
Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas
is a sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile
complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act3 per
Section 3( c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as
follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a
notarial act if he:
xxxx
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by
affinity or consanguinity of the principal4 within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three
affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny
but admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The issue, according to Atty.
Revilla, Jr., is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of
relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not
requiring them to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also
says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be
considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he notarized their
complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid
identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline Brosas and
Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the live-
in houseboy of the Brosas family.
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve
the case instead of referring it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation.
Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. We agree with him, however,
that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.
Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is beyond
dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-
affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly
disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the
notarial act, since two of the affiants or principals are his relatives within the
fourth civil degree of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification
rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse
notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we
consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not as notary
public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate6 at
the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary public,
with a notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012.
He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held
liable. If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require
them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the
definition of a "jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument
or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or
affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. In
this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn
Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in SO ORDERED.
houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants
personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid
identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to
indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was
included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.7 Let it be
impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the
complaint-affidavit of his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt
him from liability for violating the disqualification rule.

As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under

Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a sufficient
ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other
serious ground for disbarment under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez
and disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six
months. We were convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than
disbarment, would already suffice as sanction for Cortez’s violation. In
Cortez, we noted the prohibition in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice that a person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary’s
presence personally at the time of the notarization and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez had notarized a special
power of attorney without having the alleged signatories appear before him.
In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that removal from
the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe such
as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end
desired.1âwphi1

Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation committed

by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe than
disbarment would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED

and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public, or from
performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary
public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED
to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his
disqualification has lapsed.
Republic of the Philippines makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng
SUPREME COURT mga sumusunod:
Manila
1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay
SECOND DIVISION ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng
humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;
A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang;
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants, Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay
vs. namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent. Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso,
Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;
DECISION
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay
CARPIO, J.: pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang
pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan
The Case siya ay naninirahan;

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa
(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña
(Omaña).
The Antecedent Facts
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa
tuwing may pagkakataon;
5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at
ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath 6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga
as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office. kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na
ako interesado dito;
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they 7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na
July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng pinagsamahan o conjugal.
Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:
BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL
KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY Nagkasundo (Sgd)
RODOLFO ESPINOSA
KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may Nagkasundo
sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng
may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon
COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA
Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 482;
Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.
Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during
their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a
law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was
not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a
complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know
Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the
next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-
time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her
signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that
the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of
apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized
the document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña
arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the
person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in
her office when the contract was notarized.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD
stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The
IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that
Omaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her
function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first
claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD
found:
Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its
authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make
deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from
the practice of law and for two years as a notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution
of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has
also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what
Omaña did in this case.1avvphi1
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where
the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which
permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with
another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document
entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from
each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations,
authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might
have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married
couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing
the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a
document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff
who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for
the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his
staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully well that the
"Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public
policy. Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of

law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still
existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
THIRD DIVISION
JESSICA C. UY,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. EMMANUEL P. SAO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6505
Promulgated:
September 11, 2008
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed[1] by complainant Jessica C. Uy against
respondent Atty. Emmanuel P. Sao for allegedly notarizing several
documents despite the expiration of his commission.
Respondent was the counsel for a certain Pablo Burgos, an intervenor in a
civil case docketed as EJF-01-03-10 for Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage.[2] In the course of the proceedings, respondent introduced before
the trial court, certain documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale[3] which
he notarized on December 7, 2001 under Doc. No. 376, Page No. 73, Book
No. V, Series of 2001.
It appeared, however, in a letter[4] dated February 9, 2004 of Atty. Blanche
Astilla-Salino, Clerk of Court VI, that no notarial commission was issued to
respondent for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. Hence, the instant
administrative case.
Respondent, for his part, admitted that he was not issued a notarial
commission during the aforesaid period; yet, he performed notarial works.
He, however, explained that he applied, through a representative, for a
notarial commission in the year 1998 and was commissioned as such from
1998 to 1999.[5] In 2000, he applied for the renewal of his commission, again
through an office aide, who later informed him that his application was
approved.[6] By virtue of said representation, respondent resumed his
notarial work; only to find out later that he was not given a new
commission.[7] He exerted earnest efforts in locating the whereabouts of the
office aide but to no avail. Having acted on the mistaken belief that he still
had his notarial commission, respondent pleaded that he be excused and
given clemency for this fiasco and be allowed to correct and make
amends.[8]
In a Resolution[9] dated December 8, 2004, we referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On September 1, 2005, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted
her report and recommendation,[10] the pertinent portion of which reads:
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION:
From the facts and evidence presented, we find sufficient proof to warrant
disciplinary action against the respondent. Notarizing documents after the
lawyers commission as notary public had expired is malpractice and gross
misconduct (Flores vs. Lozada, 21 SCRA 1267). Respondents explanation
that he was made to believe by his agent that his commission has been filed
and approved cannot be accepted for to rule otherwise will be to enable
irresponsible lawyers to avoid disciplinary action by simply attributing the
problem to his aide/secretary or employee (Gutierrez vs. Zulueta, 187 SCRA
607).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby recommend that
respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL SAO be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX
MONTHS from receipt hereof from the practice [of] his profession as a lawyer
and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[11]
Per Resolution No. XVII-2006-115 dated March 20, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors modified the report and recommendation of Commissioner
Villanueva-Maala by increasing the recommended period of suspension from
six (6) months to one (1) year. In addition, the Board resolved to revoke
respondents notarial commission and disqualified him from reappointment as
notary public for a period of two (2) years.
We agree with the IBPs conclusion, finding respondent guilty of malpractice,
warranting disciplinary action. We, however, find the penalty recommended
by the Board of Governors to be too harsh; instead, we sustain the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.[12]
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing
any act which might lessen, in any degree, the confidence and trust reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[13]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified and
authorized may act as notaries public. It must be underscored that the act of
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making it admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[14]
Respondent admitted that he applied for a notarial commission in 1998. Such
application, according to him, was facilitated by a representative. In renewing
his commission for 2000 until 2002, he again relied on the assistance offered
by an office aide. It appears from respondents Comment that he, in fact, did
not personally know the said office aide; yet, he completely relied on his
representation that this office aide would facilitate respondents renewal of his
notarial commission. At the very least, respondent should have demanded
from the office aide documentary proofs of the approval of his commission.
Besides, respondent could have easily verified the aides representation at
the office of the Executive Judge. His actuation clearly shows disregard of
the requirements for the issuance of notarial commission. His effort in shifting
the responsibility to the office aide does not strike the Court as the kind of
diligence properly required of a member of the bar in performing his duties as
notary public.[15]
To be sure, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite
commission therefor as reprehensible, constituting as it does, not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents. For such
reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission
and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.[16]
Time and again, we have held that where the notarization of a document is
done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. One who is performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes.
These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as
a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise
violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.[17]
As to the appropriate penalty, considering the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, and based on jurisprudence on this matter, suspension for six
(6) months is adequate.
Complainant in the instant case presented only one document showing
respondents unauthorized notarization. However, by respondents own
admission, he had been placed in a mistaken belief that his commission was
renewed from 2000 to 2002. During this two-year period, it seems entirely
possible that he had similarly notarized, without legal authority, other still
unidentified documents.[18]
In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[19] Atty. Joelito Barrera was administratively
sanctioned for committing acts of unauthorized notarization. As in the instant
case, Atty. Barrera claimed that he was unaware of said lack of authority,
and he shifted the blame to his secretary to whom he had entrusted the task
of making sure that his notarial commission would be renewed. Though only
five documents were presented to prove his culpability, considering that more
than twelve (12) years had lapsed, and it was possible that similar
documents had been unlawfully notarized, the Court suspended him from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
In the instant case, since only two years had lapsed prior to the discovery of
the unauthorized act, six-month suspension suffices.
An attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood
that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove
from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of
attorney, and thus, to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney.[20]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Emmanuel P. Sao is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is HEREBY REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period
of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, and the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and recorded in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San
Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
211762 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a resident of
the United States of America (USA), he entrusted the administration of the
subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious
Special Power of Attorney (SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and
subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho ("Ho"), as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated November 15, 2001. As a
result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1508145
issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer,
causing him damage and prejudice.
In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal lawyer-client
relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have merely
extended his services for free. He also denied receiving money from the
complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the property.
Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy
Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz ("Diaz"), who offered the subject
property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to
having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the back
of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he
was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate
mortgage and received his proportionate share of ₱130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho
and insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's
forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the subject property.
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties
stipulated on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176
(45228) of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the
property of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a
new one, TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty.
Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not signed by complainant Lorenzo
D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by
the mortgagee on the aforementioned property of complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized
mortgage and sale of his property;

8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he
claims to have falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of
TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken out from his office.8
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that
respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his client
without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified
SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the
IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated various provisions of the Canons
of Professional Responsibility and accordingly recommended that he be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report of Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-24810 as
follows:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and
for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
The Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's
oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was
entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the
findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board
of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of a
falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his
client's property for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his
knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own
benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then
financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is
flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature
reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa,
the fraudulent transactions involving the subject property were effected using
the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and
custody during complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors
correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the pertinent
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
which may come into his possession.
Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the respondent
lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the
grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The respondent
lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated transaction not only by
notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse – sharing in
the profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the property
subject of the Deed of Sale.
In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
deliberately made false representations that the vendor appeared personally Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was found guilty of information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
grave misconduct. respondent's personal record as attorney.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain SO ORDERED.
inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession.
He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to
stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the
high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client

relationship between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his
liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed
in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.14
1âwphi1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of
disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa
and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx" (emphasis
supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial

evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.15 Having carefully
scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the
standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly

violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and
his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6882 December 24, 2008
MARISA BACATAN WILLIAMS and ORLANDO VERAR RIAN, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO ICAO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Maria Bacatan Williams and Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (petitioners)
administratively charge Atty. Rodrigo Icao (respondent) for violation of the
Notarial Law and for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct
unbecoming of an attorney.1
In their Joint-Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment,2 petitioners allege that on
May 23, 2002, respondent notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition3
(the document) making it appear that three of its signatories – Lucia Briones,
Ramon Verar, and Martin Umbac – signed it in his presence when in truth
they did not. In support of their allegation, they gave the following details,
quoted verbatim:
Proof that Attorney Icao was not present when the DECLARATION was
actually signed came to light on June 3, 2003 during the trial in Criminal
Case No. 3051 held at MCTC Bacong, Negros Oriental when, in his sworn
testimony, Francisco B. Ventolero, one of the six signers, said that he was
the one to carry the document from one signer to the next to get their
signatures. x x x
Additional support that the document was not signed in attendance with
Attorney Icao is found where the participants declared they signed the
document on 14 January 2002 in Bacong as opposed to the
acknowledgment where Attorney Icao declares that they signed the
document on 23 May 2002 in Dumaguete City.
It is also apparent that Lucia Briones did not sign with Attorney Icao in
attendance since her Community Tax Certificate was not recorded, nor was
any notation made as to how she was identified. In addition, her printed
signature (L. Briones) on page #2 is quite different from her written signature
(Felicidad Briones) on page #1 and #3 suggesting further that the signing
was not attended by Attorney Icao. In addition, it is commonly known
amongst the participants that Lucia Briones lived in Cotabato for 20+ years
before she died in 2004. It was equally known that she was deathly sick in
2002 which explains why Francisco B. Ventolero had to take the document to
Cotabato for her signature.
The style of the signatures of Francisco and Desiderio Ventolero also appear
not to be under the guidance of a legal expert since the family name of
"Ventolero" is used on page #2 while the family name of "Briones" is used on
page #1 and #3. An attorney would never knowing[ly] allow such an
inconsistency in a legal document. Bouncing back and forth from one family
name to another and from a written signature on page #2 to thumbmarks on
page #1 and #3 also seem to be highly irregular for a document supposedly
signed in front of a lawyer.4 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners additionally charge respondent to have conspired with Atty. Rudy
T. Enriquez (Atty. Enriquez), one of the signatories to, in the falsification, of
the document.5
In his Comment,6 respondent, admitting that the document was not executed
in his presence, claims that before he notarized it, the parties thereto
appeared before him and he ascertained their identities as well as of those of
their witnesses; that he explained to them the contents of the document
which they acknowledged to be true and correct; that all the parties
acknowledged before him that the signatures appearing thereon were theirs
and that they executed the same freely and voluntarily; that he did not find in
the document anything contrary to law, morals and public policy since at the
time of the notarization, the signatories were accompanied by their counsel,
Atty. Enriquez; that he did not require the presentation of other documents to
support the document as he was not privy to its preparation; and that
petitioners’ complaint had already prescribed under Section 1, Rule VIII of
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
IBP under which a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional
misconduct.
Respondent attached to his Comment a Joint Affidavit7 of Ramon Ventolero
Verar, Martin Umbac, and Desiderio Briones Ventolero, who are among the
signatories to the document, in which they attested to having appeared
before respondent to acknowledge as theirs the signatures they had
previously affixed thereon.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.8 While a mandatory
conference/hearing was set on April 24, 2007,9 petitioners requested that the
case be resolved on the basis of the parties’ position papers.10
In his Report and Recommendation,11 IBP Commissioner Edmund T. Espina
(Espina), brushing aside respondent’s defense of prescription, citing Calo v.
Degamo12 which held that disbarment proceedings do not prescribe, found
respondent guilty of violation of the Notarial Law.
Espina thereupon recommended that respondent be reprimanded, with
warning that similar acts in the future would merit severe penalty.
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of December 14, 2007, resolved
to dismiss the case, viz:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.13 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 averring that:
The Commission on Bar Discipline [sic] must have made an error by
dismissing this case for "lack of merit" considering that Commissioner Espina
stated on page #7 of his report and recommendation that, "The manner on
which all the parties signed the document is highly irregular and
questionable." Furthermore, on page #8 the Commissioner added, "Sad to
say, respondent miserably failed to refute the allegations against him15
(Italics and underscoring in the original),
which motion the IBP forwarded to the Court.
The Court finds for petitioners.
On the technical issue of prescription, Frias v. Bautista-Lozada,16 holds that
that prescription does not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers.
x x x As early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does
not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case of
Heck v. Santos,17 we declared that an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not prescribe.
xxxx
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative
proceedings against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to
regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence,
in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints
against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and
principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP
which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Corut. It
should therefore be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra
vires.18
On the merits. The document does not bear the residence certificate number
of Lucia Briones, one of the signatories. In notarizing it without recording
Lucia’s residence certificate, respondent violated the Notarial Law then
effective19 which required the notary public to certify that a party to the
instrument which was acknowledged before him had presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to
enter its number, place and date of issue as part of the certification.20 This
formality is mandatory and cannot be neglected, failure to comply with which
results in the revocation of a notary’s commission.21
By respondent’s admission, the signatories to the document did not
personally sign it in his presence. He, however, claims that they appeared
before him and confirmed their identities and acknowledged that the
signatures appearing thereon were theirs. If indeed the heirs-signatories and
their witnesses had personally appeared before respondent, it is beyond
comprehension why he did not ask them to affix their signatures in his
presence. By such omission, he failed to heed his duty as a notary public to
demand that the document for notarization be signed in his presence.22
More. The document contained false statements. Thus, it listed the
signatories’ counsel, Atty. Enriquez, as one of the six heirs of Aurea Briones,
albeit he is merely the legal counsel of the heirs.23 The Joint Affidavit
respondent attached to his Comment stating that there were five, not six,
heirs should have readily alerted him of such falsity.
Still more. The document states that Aurea Briones Ventolero died ab
intestato during the Second World War. The death certificate of the deceased
on file at the Civil Registry states, however, that she died on July 12, 1998.24
And the document states that the six signatories are heirs of Aurea Briones,
whereas in the Joint Affidavit attached to respondent’s Comment, the three
signatories-affiants claim that they are, as well as of the deceased Aurea
Briones’ husband Ciriaco Ventolero, heirs of Aurea Briones.

Records show that Atty. Enriquez had in fact been previously suspended
from the practice of law for two years for his complicity in executing the same
document.25

In notarizing a document containing false statements, respondent failed to

discharge his duty to inform himself of the facts to which he intended to
certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise.26

It bears recalling that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary

act.27 It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notary public.28 As a notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties, lest the confidence of the public in the integrity of
the document will be undermined.29

No concrete evidence being appreciated from the records in support of the

charge of complicity in the falsification of the document, the same must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Rodrigo Icao is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law and from his commission as a notary public for a
period of one year, effective immediately, with warning that a commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno for acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the
Records Department of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno.
Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot
7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of
Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She
personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno, as respondent was
her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her husband in
1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property
settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D.
Kraus, as she was respondent's trusted employee who did secretarial work
for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited
respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested
that she (complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses
on her property for sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered
as collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would work out the
speedy processing and release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but since
she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of
₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was
released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it to respondent who would
handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-up the same,
and complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to
time, complainant inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent
always assured her that she was still preparing the documents required by
the bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not bother to check
on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would handle
speedily the preparation of her application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she
discovered that her apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four
residential houses were constructed on her property, which she later learned
was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her property from
Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent about
what she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her.
After verification, complainant learned that her property was sold on
November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and respondent was
the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold
the same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of
sale in its favor nor appeared before respondent to acknowledge the sale.
She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the
instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign
any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in
any capacity in her law office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus
(Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent denied that she suggested
that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to construct
townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who
requested her (respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise
the money she needed to complete the amortization of her property, which
was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent
stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses
Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their conversation,
complainant offered the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses
Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were interested, and got the telephone number of
complainant. Thereafter, complainant told respondent that she accompanied
the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of the Register
of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent
to tell her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and they
requested respondent to prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company,
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the Spouses
Kraus went to respondent's office where complainant signed the Deed of
Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the
Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of the Deed
of Sale, as the understanding was that the complainant would, in the
meantime, work for the release of the mortgage, and, thereafter, she would
deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses
Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price.
Complainant allegedly told respondent that she would inform respondent
when the transaction was completed so that the Deed of Sale could be
recorded in the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had
no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the Spouses
Kraus. Respondent stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it
was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's
inaction for eight years to verify what happened to her property only meant
that she had actually sold the same, and that she concocted her story when
she saw the prospect of her property had she held on to it. Respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply,6 belying respondent's
allegations and affirming the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996,
complainant moved that hearings be scheduled by the Commission on Bar
Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial hearing, and
hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence.
Thereafter, hearings for the reception of respondent's evidence were set, but
supervening events caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was
opposed by complainant. The Investigating Commissioner denied
respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the complaint, and directed
respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the
cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of complainant and the issuance
of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of
Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29,
2003, respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from Records Officer
Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which
certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C. Peña
in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land in
Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry and that
the same may be considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On
February 17, 2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating
Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her
memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss before the IBP on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed
against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case was
anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed
in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The
RTC held that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty.
Christina C. Paterno, respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to
secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the absence of the
Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that Anita Peña's
signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land was made through
fraudulent documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not
there was clear and preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated
the Canons of Professional Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita
C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to
enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c)
knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner
of the IBP, submitted his Report and Recommendation finding that
respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by complainant by executing
a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's certificate
of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale.
Commissioner Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that
respondent actively conspired with any party or actively participated in the
forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless, Commissioner Sordan
stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her signature
on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced
notwithstanding diligent search in the National Archives and the Notarial
Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan
stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness,
Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title was delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did
not give credence to respondent's denial that complainant handed to her the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as
Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor
at the GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to
respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that
she gave respondent her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable
respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a townhouse, and
that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven years.13 Despite
repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it.14 Yet,
respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner.15 Later,
complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in
January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent
argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never
took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her
property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained
that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission
of her title in order to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to
sell complainant's land to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was
evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of
the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for
₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of
Sale in her presence inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither
directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct
examination,20 but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not
denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella
Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove
the alleged signing by complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale,
and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed. However,
Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed
that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere
recording, but he later affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like
respondent's testimony that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale
before her is proof of respondent's deception. Respondent's notarization of
the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to
prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to
exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the
alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in
truth and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof.
Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the
necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made
respondent liable for violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law and her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent,
if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified
from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution
No. XIX-20-464, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if still existing is Revoked
with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as
respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Notarial Law, and agrees with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative
case, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections 128 and 2,29
Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal
cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not
preclude the continuance of a separate and independent action for
administrative liability, as the weight of evidence necessary to establish the
culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can
proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on
both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a
judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution failed to
prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime was
committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the
misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and
the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to
complainant's testimony that she gave respondent her owner's copy of the
certificate of title to her property as respondent would apply for a bank loan in
complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former
records processor in complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of
respondent, who stated that she saw complainant give her title to
respondent.35 Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the
Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale
was notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in
complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be
presented in evidence, through no fault of the complainant, nonetheless, the
consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her allegation that her
signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by
facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without
complainant's approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did
not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila, National Capital
Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed
of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12,
Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,
states that every notary public shall keep a notarial register,38 and he shall
enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall
keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter
in said records a brief description of the substance thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the
notary to send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First
Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month next following or the
failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper
clerk of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification,41
dated February 22, 1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a
Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year 1986, and that respondent
has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for
the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and
notarized by her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said
Deed of Sale could not also be found in the National Archives per the
certification42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for Director
Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public
to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of
the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause
for revocation of her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with
fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
removed or suspended for any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. – A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of
complainant's copy of the certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the
property in Marikina, and it was respondent who admittedly prepared the
Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the
important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the
Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However,
a copy of the Deed of Sale could not be produced by the Register of Deeds
of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files of the registry,
and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be
considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court
of the RTC of Manila her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,46
including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11, 1986.
Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that efforts
were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent
complainant from getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting
verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature on the Deed of
Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to the proper RTC Clerk
of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a
copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has
far-reaching implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed
evidence on the veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful
conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its authenticity. During her
testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and reflected
in the transcript of records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor
deny that she notarized the said Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the
practice of law. As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
the following Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from
the practice of law, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the
notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is
perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina
C. Paterno from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4179 November 11, 2004
ALICE GOKIOCO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAFAEL P. MATEO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint filed by Alice Gokioco against Atty. Rafael P.
Mateo for falsification of a public document.
On January 24, 1992, Alice Gokioco filed an Affidavit-Complaint with this
Court alleging that: during the pre-trial conference of civil case "Sps.
Eustaquio Gokioco and See Chua-Gokioco vs. Jennifer Gokioco, Sps.
Mariano Gokioco and Alice Gokioco," they discovered that the complaint in
said case was subscribed and sworn to by See Chua-Gokioco before herein
respondent on November 10, 1992; See Chua-Gokioco however, died on
October 7, 1992 as evidenced by the death certificate issued by the local civil
registrar; respondent, a long time counsel for the family, notarized and filed
the said complaint, fully aware of the death of See Chua-Gokioco; this
constitutes a violation of the Revised Penal Code, the Notarial Law, the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
warrants respondent's disbarment and/or suspension from the practice of
law.1
In his comment, Atty. Rafael Mateo denies that he is a long time counsel of
the Gokioco family and explains, as follows: He only transacted with them in
1976 and again in 1992; his law office prepared the complaint for the
Gokioco spouses on September 22, 1992; thereafter, he called See Chua-
Gokioco and her son Francisco to come to his office in Tanay for the reading
and verification of the complaint; respondent forgot, however, the exact date
when this was done which could be anywhere between September 22, 1992
and October 7, 1992, the date of her death; from the time Mrs. Gokioco left
his office in Tanay up to the time he filed the complaint in court, he was not
aware that Mrs. Gokioco had already died; his office has no telephone and is
about 70 kilometers from the residence of the Gokioco family in Caloocan; he
notarized and filed the complaint on November 10, 1992 without any
personal knowledge of the fact of death of Mrs. Gokioco;2 and, the death of
Mrs. Gokioco was brought to the attention of the court only during the pre-
trial conference on May 18,1993 which ordered Eustaquio to amend the
complaint.
On June 27, 1994, the Court issued a resolution referring the instant case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report and
recommendation.3
After several hearings, Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano III of the IBP
submitted his report dated November 10, 2003, portions of which read as
follows:
In this case, the respondent failed to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law. The
respondent should have entered the fact of See Chua-Gokioco's verification
on the date when the latter actually verified her complaint in the respondent's
presence, as opposed to the date when he filed the complaint.
In addition to failing to obey the pertinent portions of the notarial law quoted
above, the respondent also violated his lawyer's oath to, inter alia, do no
falsehood or consent to the doing of the same.
The respondent admits that although See Chua-Gokioco signed and
subscribed the civil complaint at an earlier date, the said respondent only
entered the fact of the signing and subscribing of the said complaint much
later, that is, on the date of the filing of the said civil complaint.
The respondent reasons that he delayed the filing of the civil complaint
against the herein complainant and her family because he wanted to make
sure that the parties had the opportunity to amicably settle the issues raised
in the civil complaint.
It would have been a simple matter for the respondent to exercise a little
circumspection by ascertaining from Eustaquio and See Chua-Gokioco if any
settlement was agreed on between Eustaquio and See Chua-Gokioco on
one hand, and the herein complainant and her family upon the other, prior to
the institution of the civil complaint in question. In doing so, the respondent
would have found out that See Chua-Gokioco had died.
The respondent's arguments to the effect that his office was 70 kilometers
away from his clients' residence and that his office did not have a telephone
are of no moment. The respondent had the duty to determine whether or not
to file the civil complaint in question and he should have exhausted all
possible means to communicate with his clients.
Furthermore, the respondent's act of making it appear that See Chua-
Gokioco verified the civil complaint on the date of its filing, when in fact she
did not, means that the respondent effectively notarized a document when
the affiant was absent. In other words, the affiant did not sign or subscribe to
the said civil complaint in the presence of the notary public on the date stated
in the civil complaint, because on the date stated the affiant was dead or
otherwise absent.
… resolution as follows:
There is no question therefore that the respondent is liable for his misconduct
as follows:
(1) the respondent neglected or otherwise failed to enter in his notarial
register the true date when See Chua-Gokioco signed the verification portion
of the civil complaint against Alice Gokioco, her husband Mariano Gokioco,
and their daughter Jennifer Gokioco;
(2) the respondent neglected or otherwise failed to contact his clients prior to
the filing of the said civil complaint in order to ascertain if his clients wanted
to proceed with the filing of the same; and,
(3) the respondent violated his lawyer's oath to obey the laws and do no
falsehood when he made it appear that See Chua-Gokioco personally signed
and executed the civil complaint in question on the date stated in the said
civil complaint in his presence, when in fact she was already dead on the
said date or was otherwise not physically present.
The undersigned commissioner, however, is of the opinion that the
respondent's misconduct while serious, is not so gross as to merit
disbarment or suspension. From the record, it appears that the Presiding
Judge of RTC Rizal, Branch 79, rather than citing the respondent's
misconduct ordered the civil complaint amended.
The damage that was caused to the legal system, to the respondent's clients;
to Alice Gokioco, her husband Mariano Gokioco, and their daughter Jennifer
Gokioco because of the respondent's misconduct was minimal or was
otherwise contained by the amendment of the civil complaint in question.
Furthermore, the damage that may have been caused by the respondent's
misconduct is mitigated by the fact that the respondent had no dishonest or
selfish motive in notarizing the civil complaint despite the fact that the affiant
was absent on the date of its alleged notarization.4
He then recommended that:
…respondent be reprimanded and warned that any future misconduct on his
part will warrant the imposition of a greater penalty.5
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-50
Adm. Case No. 4179
Alice Gokioco vs.
Atty. Rafael P. Mateo
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case… and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering that respondent had no dishonest or selfish motive in
notarizing the civil complaint despite the fact that the affiant was absent on
the date of its alleged notarization, Atty. Rafael P. Mateo is hereby
REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any future misconduct on his part will
warrant the imposition of a greater penalty.6
While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we find that the penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate to the misconduct committed by respondent.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the CPR when he made it
appear that the complaint of the Gokioco was verified by See Chua on
November 10, 1992.
The verification of the civil case submitted to the trial court states,
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO THIS November 10, 1992, in Tanay,
Rizal."7 The death certificate submitted by complainant states however that
See Chua Gokioco died on October 7, 1992.
Rule 10.01 of the CPR holds that:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
The Notarial Law, as provided for in Title IV, Chapter II, Revised
Administrative Code, also states that:
Sec. 245. Notarial Register – Every notary public shall keep a register to be
known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official
acts as notary…
Sec. 246. Matters to be entered therein. The notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the
signature, the date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument,
the fees collected by him for his services as notary in connection therewith,
and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof
as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief
description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a
consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The
notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also
state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same
is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries. (Emphasis supplied)
It cannot be stressed enough that notaries public should be truthful in
carrying out their functions. They must observe with the highest degree of
care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties in order to
preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.
Courts, agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by notaries public appended to instruments.8
Their functions should not be trivialized and they must discharge their powers
and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity.9 With the eroding faith of the public in the integrity of public
documents, this Court will exhort all the more the notaries public to be more
circumspect in the discharge of their duties.10
Indeed, faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.11 The act of notarization
is invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may perform the duties of notaries public.12
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A
graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.13 He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Failing in his
duties, he must bear the commensurate consequences.14
Sec. 249 of the Notarial Law provides for grounds for the revocation of the
notarial commission, thus:
Sec. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. --- The following
derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the
proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:
(a) The failure of the notary to keep a notarial register.
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
(c) The failure of the notary to send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk
of Court of First Instance within the first ten days of the month next following.
(d) The failure of the notary to affix to acknowledgments the date of
expiration of his commission, as required by law.
(e) The failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to the
proper clerk of court.
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.
(g) The failure of a notary to make report, within a reasonable time, to the
proper judge of first instance concerning the performance of his duties, as
may be required by such judge.
(h) Any other dereliction or act which shall appear to the judge to constitute
good cause for removal. (Emphasis supplied)
While we agree with the observation of the IBP that there was no proof that
respondent had any dishonest or selfish motive in notarizing the civil
complaint despite the fact that the affiant was absent on the date of its
alleged notarization, we do not agree however that Atty. Mateo's conduct
deserves a mere reprimand. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rafael P. Mateo is SUSPENDED from practice of law
for six (6) months; his incumbent notarial commission, if any, is REVOKED;
To exculpate himself, respondent claims that he entered the fact of signing and he is prohibited anew from being commissioned as a notary public for
and subscribing of See Chua-Gokioco of the complaint on a later date, that is two (2) years, effective immediately, with a stern warning that repetition of
the date of its actual filing, because he was hoping that the parties, which the same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
come from the same family, would amicably settle the issues raised in the
complaint. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Atty.
Rafael P. Mateo in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
We are not persuaded. The jurat must truthfully reflect all the information furnished the courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
stated therein since the courts and the public rely on such representations.
There is also no rule stating that the verification be subscribed and sworn to SO ORDERED.
at exactly the same day as the filing of the complaint. Worth noting also is the
fact that respondent did not raise such explanation in his comment before
this Court dated February 25, 1994,15 the earliest opportunity he had to put
up such defense, but merely stated the same during the IBP hearing on
August 10, 1999.16

In Coronado vs. Felongco,17 respondent lawyer was found guilty of

misconduct and suspended from his commission as notary public for a period
of two months for notarizing a deed, not knowing that the affiant who went to
his office personally and signed the document days before, had already died
at the time he notarized said document. The lack of ill intent on his part and
the fact that it was his first offense merely mitigated his liability.18

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for

which he must be suspended.

We note that this is not the first administrative case filed against respondent
lawyer concerning his commission as a notary public. In Follosco vs.
Mateo,19 promulgated by this Court on February 3, 2004, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three months and his notarial
commission revoked for one year for notarizing documents without the
personal appearance of the affiants. The penalty was only reduced to
prohibition against his commission as a notary public to six months and his
period of suspension from the practice of law deemed already served, thru
this Court's Resolution on June 9, 2004, based on humanitarian reasons and
equity which respondent raised in his motion for reconsideration.

Considering that this is not the first offense committed by respondent in the
exercise of his duties as a notary public, we hold that respondent, in the
present case, should be suspended from the practice of law for six months
and prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years.